This report explores the partnership between the EU and the UN in peacebuilding. It shows that although both organizations employ a mix of crisis management instruments and aid intended to address structural risk factors, there is little agreement on what works and how these instruments should be combined. It confirms that the European Commission funding relationship with the UN is increasingly significant in fragile states, while policies are not always aligned. This report argues that the key to strengthening operational partnerships is to move the needs assessment, planning, priority setting and resource allocation to the country level, and to ensure that assistance is controlled by a partnership of national and international actors.
EU–UN Cooperation in Peacebuilding

Partners in Practice?

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NOTE

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FOREWORD

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has long supported research on how to improve the policy and practice of disarmament and arms control in post-conflict contexts or in fragile states in which small arms are an important risk factor. UNIDIR has also actively monitored the development of the United Nations (UN) institutional approach to peacebuilding. For instance, in 2007 an issue of the UNIDIR journal Disarmament Forum was dedicated to the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).

This project builds on UNIDIR’s past research experience and institutional knowledge of the UN and European Union (EU). Using a mix of quantitative and qualitative analysis, it identifies trends in the European Commission (EC) funding relationship with the UN, examines the coherence of EC and UN peacebuilding policies, and presents recommendations for how the EU might strengthen the EC–UN operational partnership and support efforts to improve external coherence. More specifically, it is intended to inform the EU response to reform proposals presented in the Secretary-General’s July 2009 report Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of War and its preparation for the review of the role of PBC in 2010.

One of the principal messages of this report is that the key to strengthening operational partnerships and coherence is to move the assessment, planning, priority setting and resource allocation to the country level, and to ensure that assistance is controlled by a partnership of national and international actors. In other words, rather than seeking to build up the EU–UN Peacebuilding Partnership at the headquarters level, the focus must be on building capacity and empowering local EU and UN leadership to negotiate priorities and governance mechanisms that promote mutual accountability. This finding is consistent with proposed UN peacebuilding reforms that emphasize the strengthening of in-country UN leadership capacities, and with policies of the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in relation to promoting aid effectiveness in fragile states. Importantly, as with much of UNIDIR research, it is informed by an appreciation of the profoundly political nature of external
assistance and seeks to ensure that external policies are tailored to local political realities.

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SUMMARY

Given their shared values and strongly convergent objectives in promoting peace and development and the European Union’s (EU) stated interest in promoting “effective multilateralism”, the EU and United Nations (UN) are often considered to be natural partners in peacebuilding. This report explores this assumption by examining EU and UN policies and funding relationships with a view to identifying ways to strengthen the operational partnership and promote the coherence and effectiveness of the collective peacebuilding effort.

PART 1: POLICY TRENDS AND THE EU–UN PEACEBUILDING PARTNERSHIP

Section 1.1 examines the peacebuilding record to date with a view to establishing the evidence base for current approaches to peacebuilding. It finds that while there is broad agreement on the aspirational goals of promoting security, good governance and development, there is little understanding of what actually works and why. Given the mixed record of peacebuilding, some argue that international engagement has not been robust enough to build the capacity of the state and promote reform through pressure on national elites in line with a crisis management approach to peacebuilding. Others question the sustainability of this approach and stress the inherently limited role that external actors can play in transforming state–society relations. In this view, peacebuilding is a transformative process in which external actors can only play a modest role in addressing structural risk factors, and supporting processes of change. Although some scholars argue for an approach that combines a top-down crisis management approach, which aims to maximize external leverage for reform with a long-term, bottom-up approach that aims to support transformative processes and address root causes, there is no consensus on how short-term and long-term strategies should be combined. In short, there is little evidence-based guidance for what coherent peacebuilding should look like in practice.

Part 1 also addresses the question “Are EU and UN peacebuilding policies coherent?” by tracing the evolution of EU and UN policies and explaining
why different organizational actors within the EU and UN have different conceptions of what peacebuilding involves. Section 1.2 describes the conceptual and policy development of peacebuilding within the UN. It shows that while the term “peacebuilding” entered the public usage through the UN, the UN departments and agencies with the greatest operational engagement in this area—notably the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Department of Political Affairs (DPA)—have chosen to develop distinct concepts to describe their operational engagements in line with their core security, development and political mandates. They do not agree on what peacebuilding involves at the operational level, nor on how to ensure coherence of the UN peacebuilding effort. Although the UN institutional Peacebuilding Architecture created after 2005 was intended to address the internal coherence challenge, it was not configured to do so.

Section 1.3 traces the evolution of EU approaches to peacebuilding. It notes that, as in the UN, there is no common interpretation of what peacebuilding involves. For instance, the EU European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) engagements are not typically defined in terms of peacebuilding although crisis management interventions, including civilian missions designed to strengthen state police and justice capacities, are considered prerequisites for consolidating peace. Within the European Commission (EC), peacebuilding has been conceptually associated with conflict prevention and the objective of promoting “structural stability” by addressing the root causes of conflict. It involves long- and short-term assistance to address key risk factors related to governance, state capacity, natural resource management, and includes support for dialogue and mediation processes. Although EC conflict prevention policy frameworks have been reframed in terms of short-term crisis response and aid effectiveness in fragile states, the challenges facing their implementation remain unchanged: EC capacity to deliver politically attuned programming designed to build capacity and promote reform remains limited.

Section 1.4 concludes that for both the EU and UN institutional fragmentation and competition has led to conceptual diversity and confusion. In the absence of clear evidence-based policy guidance, organizational approaches to peacebuilding have been based on unexamined assumptions and organizational mandates rather than “best practices” supported by empirical analysis. Moreover, while the UN has focused on the challenge of improving systemic efforts to consolidate peace,
within the EU the peacebuilding challenge is primarily viewed at the activity level. EU and UN conceptual and policy frameworks are not, therefore, obviously coherent. However, this report argues that the EU and UN do have similar approaches to peacebuilding. They both seek to marry a top-down crisis management approach with a bottom-up approach that uses aid to transform state–society relationships and promote structural stability. Yet, there is no internal agreement on how these distinct approaches should be combined. While crisis management actors favour strategic coherence through integration of the external effort, development actors hold that the key to promoting a sufficient level of external coherence is the agreement of common matrices or “compacts”. These serve as a strategic framework and enable mutual accountability of the collective (national and international) peacebuilding effort.

**PART 2: FUNDING TRENDS AND THE EC–UN PEACEBUILDING PARTNERSHIP**

Part 2 uses a mix of quantitative and qualitative analysis to identify trends in the EC funding relationship with the UN in fragile states and to highlight key operational challenges.

Section 2.1 provides an overview of global trends in funding for fragile states. It notes that there has been a gradual rise in Official Development Assistance (ODA) funding for fragile states, excluding debt relief, but that this is not distributed on the basis of the greatest need or likely poverty-reduction impact. A relatively small number of states receive a disproportionately large amount of the funding, while others remain “aid orphans”. This, it contends, can be explained by the influence of political bias as well as the inherent organizational difficulties associated with efficient aid disbursement in situations of fragility.

Section 2.2 reviews data on EC funding for fragile states. It notes that EC commitments to fragile states largely reflect global trends (although EC data on ODA in fragile states are not up to date). In line with global trends, a small number of fragile countries receive a large proportion of EC funding. For example, since 2003, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Iraq, the Sudan and the West Bank and Gaza\(^1\) have regularly featured in the top five recipients of EC aid. Exploring EC funding trends, the section briefly charts the trajectory of EC policy development, noting the increased emphasis on good governance and state-building in EC development policy. It then reviews the operational challenges associated with implementing these policies in fragile states, noting that funding for governance is higher in “normal” development contexts and concentrated in relatively few fragile states. It argues that reforms to improve aid disbursement efficiency and the process of EC devolution have reduced institutional incentives and capacity to engage in politically sensitive governance programming and have increased the fragmentation of substantive expertise in Brussels between the Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX), Directorate-General for Development (DG DEV) and EuropeAid. Disbursement pressures, risk aversion and substantive capacity shortfalls have, by the same token, increased EC incentives to use budget support and multi-donor funding instruments in fragile situations.

Section 2.3 provides quantitative evidence that the volume of EC assistance channelled through the UN increased from 2001 to 2006 and then declined slightly in 2007 and 2008 (with the decline after 2006 largely attributed to a reduction in assistance in the four countries that had previously received the most). The countries in which the largest volume of EC funding has been channelled through the UN are Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia and the West Bank and Gaza. EC funding for the UN has, therefore, increased especially in fragile or post-conflict situations. From 2001 to 2006, over 55% of funds contracted by the EC to UN bodies were in fragile states, with Afghanistan, Iraq and the West Bank and Gaza collectively receiving a third of the total.

The analysis of these findings suggests that the EC and UN are natural operational partners in fragile states where the UN is often the only actor with the capacity, legitimacy and mandate to deliver international assistance. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the agreement in 2003 of the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) effectively lowered the administrative costs of cooperation for the EC and is an important factor in explaining the general rise in EC funding through the UN. Nevertheless,

\(^{1}\) In EC funding data categorization, the West Bank and Gaza are grouped as a country. For the sake of data consistency, this report uses the same categorization.
interviews reveal persistent operational frictions between EC and UN partners that stem from different perceptions of the nature of the partnership and different organizational cultures and administrative practices. These have formed stereotypes of the EC as an overly demanding and interfering donor and of the UN as an unreliable implementing partner that is not interested in involving the EC in strategic decision-making in line with FAFA co-management provisions.

Section 2.4.1 provides a global overview of EC funding for peacebuilding, using data provided by EuropeAid and a 2009 evaluation of EC assistance for peacebuilding. It finds that EC spending for peacebuilding increased from less than €100 million in 2001 to over €1 billion in 2007, declining to €745 million in 2008. As with global ODA trends for assistance in fragile states, the bulk of peacebuilding assistance went to a few countries: West Bank and Gaza (26%), Afghanistan (12%), Iraq (11%), the Sudan (8%) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (5%). Of the total EC funding on peacebuilding, 37% (€2.2 billion) was contracted to the UN, confirming that the UN is a key operational partner for the EC in peacebuilding.

Section 2.4.2 examines the EC–UN funding partnership in relation to nine countries: the top five recipients of peacebuilding assistance (West Bank and Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), and the four countries on the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) agenda (Burundi, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau). It finds that in Afghanistan and Iraq, most EC assistance was channelled through the UN due to the UN management of Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, too, most EC assistance (for the 2006 election) was administered by UNDP. In the West Bank and Gaza, EC funding for United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) remained constant, while increases in assistance after 2006 were largely channelled directly to the Palestinian Authority or the Temporary International Mechanism. In Sudan, very little EC assistance was channelled through the UN, and the vast majority was used to support the African Union Mission in the Sudan directly. In the four countries on the PBC agenda, the volume of EC aid identified as peacebuilding assistance was far lower and a relatively small proportion of it was channelled through the UN. This was mostly linked to election support implemented by UNDP. In short, in early recovery phases where the use of MDTFs is common or where the UN has been asked by the host country to play a central role, the UN has been a natural implementing
partner for the EC. But in other cases, the EC–UN partnership is context and sector specific. The strength of the operational partnership in these cases depends on relative operational capacity of the UN compared with other implementing partners, and on the political standing of the UN in the country.

Section 2.5 focuses on the EC Instrument for Stability (IfS)—the EC principal funding instrument for short-term crisis prevention and recovery actions—and the extent to which it has been used to support UN peacebuilding. By EC standards, this is a relatively small instrument with a budget of around €120 million per year. But over 40% of it has been channelled through the UN in 2007 and 2008 for a range of post-conflict actions, often intended to complement EU and UN missions with assistance aimed at helping establish rule of law and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in post-conflict situations. The IfS also includes a small crisis preparedness component (€7 million per year), the so-called Peacebuilding Partnership, which is explicitly intended to build peacebuilding capacity in other international, regional and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Given its small size, it is perhaps unsurprising that it has been spread thinly in an ad hoc manner across a range of actors. In the case of the UN, for instance, it has been used to support projects of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and UNDP that aim to improve donor coordination. It argues that there is great potential for expanding the use of this instrument to build capacity within and beyond the EU and to strengthen the evidence base for peacebuilding policies and programmes.

PART 3: EU ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UN PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE

Part 3 documents the evolution of the UN peacebuilding reforms since the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, with a view to informing the EU position on proposed future reforms, particularly those relating to early peacebuilding and the role of PBC.

Section 3.1 (3.1.1–3.1.3) provides an overview of the development of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, comprising PBC, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and PBSO, and its working practice. It charts EU early engagement, documenting its active support for the establishment of this institutional infrastructure and the early challenges encountered regarding
EU representation in PBC. More recently, EU involvement has been characterized by active political engagement in PBC, some financial support for PBSO projects to improve aid mapping, but no direct support to PBF, with the EC privileging bilateral forms of assistance.

Section 3.1.4 assesses the record of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture against its stated aims. It finds that its role in developing integrated strategies for peacebuilding for the countries on its agenda is increasingly contested on the grounds that it does not empower national leadership, adds little value to other strategic exercises and is too labour intensive. As a result, the 2010 review process will likely address “lighter” ways in which PBC can accompany countries on their path to peace, notably through monitoring and providing political support for the implementation of agreed national peacebuilding frameworks.

A review of the PBC mandate to develop best practices argues that while the Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL) and Country Specific Meetings (CSMs) have explored key issues and provided an important educational role, the focus of PBC should be on making better use of existing knowledge through a strengthened advisory role. For instance, PBC could advise the UN Security Council with a view to ensuring that peacekeeping mandates include a peacebuilding perspective. It might also address specific requests for advice from countries, or horizontal themes.

With regard to its mandate to mobilize resources and sustain international attention, this report argues that in order to focus attention on a greater number of “forgotten countries” PBC attention must be scalable and compatible with existing monitoring and tracking mechanisms. It notes that PBC has not delivered on its resource mobilization mandate. While PBC has, to date, focused on PBF, in future its role will be clearly separated from the management of this fund. Recent revisions to the mandate of PBF mean that it will increasingly be used to develop and kick-start early priority action plans in addition to providing funding for longer-term peacebuilding initiatives. Therefore, PBC should aim to provide political support for the broader aid effectiveness reform agenda, including the establishment of country-specific early recovery MDTFs.

PBC is also mandated to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN. Yet, PBC does not have the authority or proximity to UN operational actors to ensure coherence within the UN
system. UN operational actors and donors who base their operational decisions on processes of consultation (with national actors) tend to view these processes as equally if not more legitimate. There is no evidence to suggest that peacebuilding strategies developed by PBC have served to guide the actions of other external actors, including the EC. Rather, PBC has introduced another complicating layer in efforts to promote coherence through integrated strategies, and one that is more easily embroiled in the politics of global governance played out in New York than in the domestic politics of peacebuilding. In this sense, it also fails to meet the (EU) principle of subsidiarity; PBC does not meet at the appropriate level (or place) to make decisions regarding country priorities and how they should best be implemented. In short, the analysis of the coherence challenge in this report argues that it is more efficient and legitimate to address the coherence challenge at the country level, where the development and implementation of peacebuilding strategies should form part of the peace process. This, nevertheless, leaves PBC with the important role of holding actors to account for delivering on their agreed commitments.

The Secretary-General’s 2009 report Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict argues for this reorientation of the UN peacebuilding effort around strategies developed in-country. Given its importance for future UN peacebuilding reform, Section 3.2 summarizes its main findings and recommendations. Taken together, these call for additional support for national and UN in-country actors to identify early priorities and drive sustainable peacebuilding processes. More specifically, the Secretary-General’s report calls for stronger and better-supported UN leadership teams on the ground and the expanded use of common assessments methodologies that can be successively developed over time into “compacts” that can be used by international and national actors to monitor progress against commitments. While highlighting that the international community needs to do better at building on existing capacities rather than substituting for them, the Secretary-General’s report identifies a number of areas where UN and international actors should increase their capacity to provide technical assistance, notably in the areas of civil administration, justice and corrections, including by mobilizing civilian experts from the region. It also draws attention to early recovery funding gaps and argues for the establishment of more flexible, rapid and predictable funding modalities for countries emerging from conflict, including increased use of MDTFs.
The concluding Section 3.3 argues that the experience of the EC–UN operational partnership and EU engagement in PBC is consistent with the principal message of the Secretary-General’s 2009 reform proposals: that efforts to identify peacebuilding priorities and strengthen capacity and partnerships should be focused at the country level. Moreover, given that many of the organizational challenges to effective peacebuilding are common to both the EU and the UN, it follows that many of the Secretary-General’s 2009 recommendations are relevant to EU internal development as well as its analysis of how best to support UN peacebuilding.

The following recommendations for the EC, the European Council and EU member states are, therefore, fully consistent with the current UN peacebuilding reform agenda.

**SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU**

Recommendations for all EU actors, including EU member states:

1. **Prioritize national capacity-building**

   EC programming and ESDP planning should be informed by common needs assessments, such as those that use the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) methodology. While tailored to local needs, demand for EU support is likely to increase in the areas of public administration and finance, for the delivery of basic public services at the community-level and for support to local crisis management and political reform processes. The EU should strengthen its capacity to provide rapid assistance in these areas.

2. **Strengthen EU Special Representatives**

   The European Union Special Representative’s (EUSR) coordination role should be strengthened and its capacity for supporting reform and capacity-building processes should be enhanced, ideally through multifunctional teams drawn from the EC, European Council and contracted staff.

3. **Strengthen ESDP missions for local capacity-building**

   Missions to build state capacity should build on national and international needs assessments and consult local UN leadership as a matter of course.
As far as possible, mission planning should be moved from Brussels to the field and follow a programming approach. Where they substitute for local capacity, ESDP missions should be accompanied by EC “flanking” measures to build that capacity. Efforts to deploy non-EU nationals in ESDP missions, in particular women and experts from the region, should be stepped up. Regular reviews of all missions should be mandatory and feed into Political and Security Committee (PSC) reflections and lessons learning processes.

4. Promote internal coherence and learning

Post-Lisbon reforms should promote internal EU coherence through structural links between the European External Action Service (EEAS) and DG DEV and the Council Directorate responsible for strategic planning for ESDP, including through the establishment of country and thematic teams. Institutional learning should be enhanced through the promotion of a best practices facility. ESDP missions and EC delegations should have staff, who are responsible for learning lessons, report to the EU best practices centre and their organizational hierarchy.

5. Support the adaptation of the UN PBC

The EU should support efforts to move UN assessment, planning, priority setting and resource allocation to the country level, while expanding the PBC role in monitoring the implementation of peacebuilding agreements. The EU should also support a strengthened advisory role for PBC, including vis-à-vis the Security Council and in response to requests from UN Member States.

6. Develop joint EU–UN initiatives to build regional capacity for civilian deployments

The EU should prioritize developing regional peacebuilding capacity through tri-partnerships such as the proposed EU–UN–African Union (AU) capacity-building partnership. It should also support the development of existing regional peacebuilding centres to mobilize civilians for international deployments.
Additional recommendations for the EC:

1. **Improve the transparency of EC assistance in fragile states**

   The EC should ensure that detailed data on its funding in fragile states are made public and are consistent with the Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) online database. It should also ensure that funding decisions are made public in recipient states and, where possible, enter funding data directly into software used to map donor assistance by recipient states.

2. **Improve resource mobilization and aid effectiveness**

   To improve the flexibility and predictability of financing in transition periods, EC and EU member states should implement proposals to improve aid effectiveness in fragile states developed with the support of the Organisation for OECD DAC. They should also explore, together with the UN, World Bank and other donors, how to expand the use of MDTFs and increase the use of direct budget support in line with agreed Transitional Results Frameworks of governance or peacebuilding compacts.

3. **Expand the IfS, including its crisis response and Peacebuilding Partnership components**

   The size of the IfS should be expanded. The crisis response component should also be used to strengthen national early recovery initiatives, potentially through support to the new UN Immediate Response Facility (IRF) of PBF. The Peacebuilding Partnership component should be increased and consideration should be given to multi-year funding for strategic capacity-building programmes. Partnerships with non-state actors should be developed with a view to strengthening the evidence base for peacebuilding policies and programmes.

4. **Empower EC leadership in fragile contexts**

   EC delegations in fragile states should be strengthened and provisions should be made for additional support in the event of a crisis. These should aim to strengthen the capacity of delegations to engage in negotiations and adapt programming priorities, even where this may require exceptions to the financial regulation.
5. Improve EC programming capacity in fragile states

To develop capacity for conflict-sensitive assistance, peace and development advisers should be routinely appointed to EC delegations in fragile states and delegation staff should receive additional training on conflict-sensitive and armed-violence reduction programming. To improve EU–UN operational partnerships, guidance should be developed regarding the interpretation of FAFA.

6. Strengthen EC–UN cooperation to build internal peacebuilding capacity

The EC and UN could develop joint approaches for: (i) mobilizing regional civilian experts for potential deployment in UN or regional missions, including by supporting regional roster managers; (ii) joint training initiatives, including in the area of senior leadership coaching, mediation and dialogue training, and training on EC and UN administrative practices; and (iii) strengthening the evidence base and promoting institutional learning, for instance, by extending the UN “peacebuilding community of practice” e-discussions to relevant EU staff and linking up the separate EC and UN “initiatives for peacebuilding”.
INTRODUCTION

Our commitment to the United Nations is based on shared values and strongly convergent objectives in many areas and translates into an active partnership with the UN in operational, normative, and policy work, backed up by strong financial support.

Benita Ferrero-Waldner
Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy
Louis Michel
Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid
(United Nations Office in Brussels 2007)

Given their shared values and strongly convergent objectives and the European Union’s (EU) stated interest in promoting “effective multilateralism”, the EU and United Nations (UN) are often considered to be natural partners in peacebuilding. This report explores this assumption with a view to identifying ways to strengthen the partnership and support the further development of UN peacebuilding. Part 1 examines the peacebuilding record to date, with a view to establishing the evidence base for current approaches to peacebuilding. It also addresses the question “Are EU and UN peacebuilding policies coherent?” by tracing the evolution of EU and UN policies and explaining why different organizational actors within the EU and UN have different conceptions of what peacebuilding involves. Part 1, therefore, examines the policies of the EU, as agreed in the intergovernmental second pillar framework of the European Council as well as the policies of the European Commission (EC), the supranational body that is responsible for EU external aid.

Part 2 aims to explore the funding relationship between the EC and UN in order to determine trends in EC funding for peacebuilding and assess the strength of the EC–UN operational partnership in peacebuilding. It uses a mix of quantitative and qualitative analysis to identify trends in the EC funding relationship with the UN and operational challenges. This focus on the EC–UN partnership has been chosen because of its relevance to UN
peacebuilding efforts and to forthcoming reviews of EC funding instruments for peacebuilding, including the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in 2010.² The conclusions and recommendations of Part 2 are, therefore, designed to improve EC support for peacebuilding, including through the UN.

Part 3 documents the evolution of the UN Peacebuilding institutional architecture, including the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). It reviews the extent to which they have achieved their mandates and assesses current proposals for their reform, including recommendations made in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*. The analysis informs the recommendations for the EU (European Council and EU member states) on how to support the further development of UN peacebuilding. These are intended to feed into the forthcoming review of PBC in 2010 and to inform debates on how to strengthen EU and UN capacity and the coherence of external peacebuilding efforts.

² This is not to suggest that the EU–UN operational relationship in peacebuilding is predominantly about funding. The EU–UN operational partnership also involves cooperation between EU crisis management missions undertaken in the second pillar framework of ESDP and UN peace operations. These partnerships are being actively developed in the field and through the implementation of the EU–UN joint declaration on crisis management.
PART 1

POLICY TRENDS AND
THE EU–UN PEACEBUILDING PARTNERSHIP

1. INTRODUCTION:
THE CONTESTED CONCEPT OF PEACEBUILDING

The term “peacebuilding” remains subject to many different interpretations. The EU and UN do not subscribe to a common definition of the term. In the UN, peacebuilding tends to be associated with the system-wide effort to consolidate peace, whereas in the EU the term tends to be associated with a wide range of long-term development activities designed to promote structural stability, or with short-term actions with direct conflict prevention objectives. The European Council does not use the term to describe its interventions in the framework of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Instead, EU support for international missions is rationalized on the basis that they are in line with EU crisis management ambitions and address the threat posed by fragile states to international peace. Nor is there a common understanding of the term within EU and UN Member States. While some states frame their post-conflict activities around the term peacebuilding, others use alternative, related terms such as stabilization and reconstruction, state-building or nation-building. Thus, although the use of the term peacebuilding3 has become more common outside the UN since it was first introduced in 1992, the EU has only partially adopted it and there is still considerable confusion about its conceptual boundaries and policy implications.

3 The term “peace-building” was hyphenated in all UN documents until the 2000 Report of the High-level Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the so-called Brahimi Report (United Nations 2000). By this stage its use had become so widespread, approaching that of the more established terms peacekeeping and peacemaking, that the hyphenation was no longer considered necessary. Peacebuilding is not typically hyphenated in EC documents, but it is in European Council documents.
This can be explained by a number of factors. At the most fundamental level, as Section 1.1 shows, conceptual confusion persists because there is no agreement about how to institutionalize peace after war. Peacebuilding has, therefore, become an umbrella term associated with an aspiration rather than a specific procedure, policy, doctrine or operational programme. It is defined by its signal aim of preventing relapse into war. As one UN official put it, “peacebuilding is not a set of activities, but a reason we are choosing to do them”. In the absence of consensus over what works, the evolution of the term has been shaped by how institutions have chosen to conceptualize their engagement in post-conflict contexts as peacebuilding. This, in turn, reflects their normative rationale as well as organizational interests. One review of how 24 governmental and intergovernmental bodies that are active in peacebuilding have used the term concluded that “an organization’s core mandate will heavily influence its reception to, and definition and revision of, the concept of peacebuilding” (Barnett et al. 2007:37). The authors observed that there are even more significant differences in how organizations operationalize peacebuilding. They adopt strategies and programmes that “more often than not, reflect unexamined assumptions and deeply rooted organizational mandates rather than ‘best practices’ born from empirical analysis” (Barnett et al. 2007:53). If, as the review concludes, bureaucratic interests have been a critical factor in framing the concept of peacebuilding and in determining its practice, then one can expect greater conceptual and policy convergence between organizations with similar mandates and practices. Indeed, Barnett et al. (2007:37) also noted “organizations do not exist in isolation but instead are nested in structured relationships and exchange of resources and information; those that are linked have tended to converge on a consensus definition”.

Section 1.2 provides an overview of the mixed peacebuilding record, arguing that there is no consensus on what actually “works” and why. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 survey the conceptual and policy evolution of peacebuilding within the EU and UN in order to identify the main factors that have driven the conceptualization and institutionalization of peacebuilding in the absence of evidence-based guidance. Section 1.5 compares institutional approaches and argues that despite differences in the conceptualization of peacebuilding, both organizations combine a conflict-transformation approach to peacebuilding—working to transform conflict from the bottom up—with a crisis management approach based on strategic deals with national elites. While both approaches can be complementary, they operate
at different levels and require different forms of coordination. The section concludes with remarks on the implications for practical cooperation.

1.1 THE PEACEBUILDING RECORD

Attitudes about what external peacebuilding interventions can and should deliver have changed over time. When the concept of peacebuilding was introduced in 1992 there was a sense that peacebuilding could represent a new era of benevolent international intervention (Rose 2006). This was underpinned by an optimistic assumption about the ability of third parties to deliver peace (Tschirgi 1996, 2004). The post-Cold War empirical record provides some evidence that this was not necessarily misplaced. International interventions have been relatively successful at ending violence (Fortna 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Zürcher 2006). Quantitative analysis also suggests a strong correlation between the risk of a country’s reversion to war and the presence of peace operations that include a range of peacebuilding components (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). These multidimensional missions are more successful than purely diplomatic efforts or traditional peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, a significant number of wars have recurred. Although the rate of recurrence is subject to some dispute because of difficulties in distinguishing between old wars that recur and new wars, most argue that between one-fifth and one-third of all ended conflicts recur within five years (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).4

Comparative quantitative analysis also points to a range of risk factors that increase the likelihood of war recurrence. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) grouped these factors into two composite measures. The first, the “degree of hostility”, incorporates factors such as the type of war, number of parties, hostility of the neighbourhood, number of soldiers, type of settlement and level of casualties. The second, “local capacity”, includes economic indicators as well as institutional capacity. Others have identified additional risk factors such as the presence of lootable natural resources (Downs and Stedman 2002). For both Stedman and Downs (2002) and Doyle and Sambanis (2006), the greater the “degree of difficulty” of the situation, the

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4 However, the rate of recurrence is higher (43%) after negotiated settlement, which typically provides the entry point for international peacebuilding, than after outright victory (Mack 2007:5).
more is required from international actors in terms of troops, money and sustained political attention.

Not only does quantitative analysis suggest that at least a quarter of international interventions have failed to ensure stability and prevent recurrence of violence within five years, but qualitative analysis also point to the international community’s limited success in building sustainable peace that involves more than “stability”. Relatively few cases are counted as peacebuilding success stories. For instance, the UN Secretary-General has identified only El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Namibia and Tajikistan as successes (United Nations 2004a). Drawing on evidence from the mixed peacebuilding record, many scholars and practitioners have argued that the liberal peacebuilding model is unrealistically ambitious and/or counterproductive. For instance, a number of scholars point to the constraints on international peacebuilders and the unfavourable conditions in which they operate. They argue that with few resources, and limited political backing, it is wildly unrealistic to engineer in a few years what it took Western states centuries to achieve, especially under conditions of post-war fragility characterized by profound mistrust and high levels of destruction (Chesterman 2004; Orr 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006).

Another critique of the liberal peacebuilding model defends the goal of liberal democracy, but contends that a rush to market liberalization and elections after conflict is destabilizing (Zakaria 2003; Paris 2004). For instance, Paris (2004) argued that the effort to transform war-shattered states to liberal democracies as quickly as possible subjects fragile societies to tremendous stress. In the absence of institutional frameworks and civic culture that absorbs the competitive pressures of market and political competition, rivals wage their struggle through markets and ballots and resort to violence when the liberal reform agenda threatens their power base. The potentially destabilizing impact of economic liberalization and democratization is now received wisdom in policy circles. For instance, a recent report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) on evaluating peacebuilding began by challenging the notion that progress toward liberalization, economic growth, prosperity, human rights and democracy all contribute to peace, noting that “evidence shows that while some of those efforts do contribute to peace, others have negative or negligible effects on conflict” (OECD 2007a:3).
The Paris (2004) critique of the liberal peacebuilding model favoured greater external support for the construction of institutions and a more gradual introduction of liberal political and economic reforms. It has been influential in generating support for the state-building agenda. State-building has also been characterized as “standing behind” peacebuilding (Barnett and Zürcher 2009:26) in so far as efforts to build peace are increasingly associated with a process of building state capacity and legitimacy. However, as with the concept of peacebuilding, there is no consensus on the scope of state-building. Issues relating to the degree or capacity of the state, the kind of state and what role external actors can and should play in building state capacity remain live. While state-building interventions have tended to focus on creating institutional capacity to provide basic services (the degree of the state) a number of scholars argue that the Western model of the state is inappropriate, especially where it never existed before. Rather, they argue that state-building should explicitly pursue the objective of establishing “mediated” or “hybrid” states, in which a central government with limited power and capacity relies on a diverse range of local authorities to execute core functions of government and mediate relations between local communities and the state (Menkhaus 2006a; Boege et al. 2009). Others have argued that even when interventions have aimed to create liberal states, they have resulted in reinforcing pre-existing forms of state-hood. For example, Barnett and Zürcher (2009: 24) argued that, given the interests and resources of external peacebuilders, “compromised peacebuilding” is the equilibrium outcome of a process of bargaining between domestic and external actors. This is characterized by symbolic reforms, while previously existing state–society relations are reinforced (Barnett and Zürcher 2009). Similarly, Jeong (2005) observed that external interventions tend to rebuild the state–society status quo and argued that only a more contextualized approach to state-building can address the structural causes of conflict. Hence, although practitioners tend to view state-building as a subset of peacebuilding associated with efforts to build national institutional capacity, how these concepts are related in practice remains subject to ongoing academic and policy debate.5

5 The OECD DAC Working Group on Conflict and Fragility is exploring the relationship between state-building and peacebuilding though its support for “international dialogue on peacebuilding and state-building”, which was called for in the Third High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra in 2008. Information about the dialogue is available at <www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/pbsbdialogue>.
Another critique of the peacebuilding through state-building approach argues that it undermines the political resilience of those countries that receive peacebuilding interventions. For instance, Chandler (2006:26–27) argued that external interventions have created “peace without politics”, depleting politics at the national and local levels and reducing political autonomy and capacity for self-governance. He contended that external efforts to build local institutional capacity are misguided in so far that the institutions they create are hollow and unsustainable. Such fundamental critiques of external peacebuilding interventions have informed policy recognition of the importance of “national ownership” for the sustainability of peacebuilding. However, there is little agreement on how to operationalize this slogan in relation to the peace process, the state-building agenda or specific subsets of that agenda, notably Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), rule of law and transitional justice. For instance, in relation to SSR, the dominant view is that national ownership requires “buy-in” from a critical mass of national elites. However, scholars and practitioners who argue that reform efforts are only sustainable if “done by” local actors have challenged this view (Nathan 2008). Some argue that given the complexity of conflict dynamics and the limited knowledge that the international actors have on how to promote local autonomy, the best response strategy is for international actors to play a limited role. For instance, Feldman (2004) concluded that the high failure rate of nation-building exercises strongly supports the basic intuition that we do not know what we are doing. He argued in favour of autonomy on the basis that people tend to know themselves, better than others, how they ought to live their lives. Similarly, others pointed to successful cases of peacebuilding and state-building “from the bottom up” with no or limited outside intervention, notably in Somaliland and Bougainville (Boege et al. 2009). Indeed, within the specialist peacebuilding community of practice, there is widespread recognition of the centrality of domestic politics, and the inherently limited role that external actors can play in shifting state–society relations. Nevertheless, most argue that external actions can support domestic peacebuilding processes.

There is broad support for bringing local voices into the planning, design and implementation of external interventions intended to provide support for promising processes engaging agents or constituencies for change. However, there is also a broad recognition that the strategy and form of international engagement with local actors will and should vary according to the level of engagement. Some call for a combination of “bottom-up”
and “top-down” approaches. For example, Van Brabant (2008), argued for a differentiated approach with some actors (NGOs and other implementing agencies) dedicated to a “soft” approach designed to nurture socio-political processes of change and build relationships from the bottom up, while other external actors (international organizations and states) apply a “hard(er)” approach to implementing standards and commitments in line with negotiated peacebuilding “compacts”. This is consistent with positions adopted by advocates of “multi-track diplomacy” who argue that multiple levels of engagement are complementary (Diamond and McDonald 1996) and is also supported by evidence from some conflict resolution processes. For instance, one “cumulative impact” study of the Northern Ireland peace process argued that peace was an “emergent” phenomenon in which a confluence of local (bottom-up), national, and regional initiatives played a critical part (Fitzduff and Williams 2007).

Within the peace research community there is an emerging consensus that external support for peace processes requires different types of interventions at different levels. Many international peacebuilding NGOs, for instance, support the conflict transformation approach associated with the work of Lederach (1997). He divided society into three levels arguing that they should be approached with different strategies. Top leadership can be accessed by an outcome-oriented approach and mediation at the level of states. Mid-level leadership can be reached through more resolution-oriented approaches, such as workshops or peace commissions with the help of influential insiders, and the grass-roots level can be reached through a wide range of local peacebuilding activities, including community dialogue and development projects. However, although this framework remains popular and provides the rationale for many peacebuilding strategies at the programming level, its assumptions regarding the link between “tracks” have been brought into question (Paffenholz 2003, 2006). In other words, although there is agreement that external strategies must be tailored to a particular level of intervention, there is no consensus among scholars on the appropriate weighting of approaches and on how top-down crisis management approaches should be combined with long-term, bottom-up efforts to build relationships and address the root causes of conflict.

Nevertheless, despite a lack of evidence-based understanding about how intervention strategies should be elaborated or combined, efforts to promote external coherence of action have been at the forefront of the international peacebuilding agenda. Just as it is the prevailing wisdom
that peace operations are most successful when backed by strong unified external political support, there is a widely held view that the impact of external interventions has been undermined by incoherent external peacebuilding strategies and lack of coordination (Stedman et al. 2002; Dahrendorf 2003; Dobbins 2004; Paris 2004; Dobbins et al 2005; Cutillo 2006). Persistent challenges associated with coordinating the international effort have strengthened the resolve of agencies, nations and international organizations to improve their internal coherence around common strategies. At the national level, this has led to various efforts to promote “whole-of-government” and/or “comprehensive” approaches to planning military engagements. At the global multilateral level, the UN PBC was established in 2005 to tackle, inter alia, the coherence of the collective external peacebuilding effort. There are, however, concerns that achieving agreement on strategic frameworks for external interventions will be ever more difficult in an increasingly divided world (de Coning 2008). Within the UN membership, for instance, there is evidence of growing resistance to what are perceived as Western state-building agendas. The shadow of Iraq has fuelled suspicions in some states in the Global South that peacebuilding can lead to “neo-imperialist exploitation of vulnerable post-conflict societies” (Paris and Sisk 2007; de Coning 2008:12). Similarly, the Non-Aligned Movement and the G–77 have consistently challenged the conflict-prevention, peacebuilding and state-building agendas on the basis of their intrusive, prescriptive nature. This suggests that, despite policy convergence around the importance of state-building and the coherence of external interventions, external differences between states regarding the kind of state to be built may reduce the international community’s leverage in the conduct of the crisis management approach to peacebuilding. In other words, divisions between external actors are likely to undermine the crisis management approach to peacebuilding where this is based on maximizing leverage on national political elites.

Similarly, a number of scholars have highlighted the challenges to achieving external coherence. Research has highlighted the inherent contradictions or trade-offs between different security, state-building and development mandates and approaches (Paris and Sisk 2009). This has resulted in discourse on the inherent “dilemmas” of peacebuilding (Johnstone 2006; Paris and Sisk 2007; de Coning 2008; Edelstein 2009; Paris and Sisk 2009). Policymakers, including the OECD DAC Working Group on Conflict and Fragility, have also noted trade-offs between coherence, flexibility in approach and programmatic innovation. While coordination is important
for maximizing political leverage with national elites, flexibility and programmatic innovation is seen as particularly valuable in dynamic conflict situations characterized by a high degree of uncertainty regarding “whom to work with” and “what works”. Similarly, some scholars have argued that a lean, coordinated international effort is not a sufficiently “robust” response to non-linear dynamics of conflict. For instance, de Coning (2008) used insights from complexity theory to argue for greater policy tolerance of fragmentation and duplication, noting that, in highly dynamic environments, the systems that do well have a high degree of “robustness”, i.e. they have multiple ways of responding to changes in the system, and some degree of overlap and duplication is thus actually healthy in these systems. This view is supported by reviews of the cumulative impact of peacebuilding efforts that have stressed the importance of multi-level and sometimes overlapping initiatives in delivering transformational impacts. For instance, one review process found that the biggest surprise for many, contrary to intuition and conventional wisdom, was that a multiplicity of uncoordinated efforts in Northern Ireland “added up” without any coherent overall strategy. Indeed, there appeared to be “a redundancy that was helpful—duplication that facilitated progress rather than waste” (Collaborative for Development Action 2008:6). Thus, among scholars and practitioners, there is mounting support for the suggestion that external coherence can and should only be a matter of degree.

In summary, the mixed record of peacebuilding has served to reduce Western optimism about the ability of external interventions to engineer a liberal peace and increased scepticism in the Global South about the peace/state-building agenda. The practice of peacebuilding, and how best to manage it, is arguably more deeply contested in 2009 than when the concept was first introduced in the early 1990s. Research over the past two decades has highlighted the “conflicted” nature of peacebuilding and state-building. There is little agreement on the scope of peacebuilding (and state-building) objectives, and what role the international community can and should play in pursuit of them. In other words, inherent to the peacebuilding project are dilemmas relating to the degree of intrusiveness of international support, the duration of the international presence and local participation or ownership (Paris and Sisk 2009). Similarly, while external peacebuilding efforts have fallen short of expectations, there is no consensus around why this is so. Some conclude that “we still know remarkably little on a more specific level about which international efforts work and which do not” (Call and Cousens 2008:6). Given this evidence deficit, peacebuilding has
been and is likely to remain an aspirational ambition, characterized by operational diversity and contest. The following sections seek to explore how, in the absence of evidence-based policy guidance, the concept and policies of peacebuilding have evolved and become institutionalized within the EU and the UN.

1.2 EVOLUTION OF UN CONCEPTS AND POLICY

The term “peacebuilding” entered public usage through the UN and it first entered the UN lexicon in 1992, in Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s report *An Agenda for Peace*. This served to expand the qualitative scope of peacekeeping operations, paving the way for multidimensional operations, and provided for a continued commitment to building peace beyond the time frame of the peacekeeping presence. The report drew on work by the peace researcher Johan Galtung (1975) who had earlier distinguished between three approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. It defined peacebuilding as the closing stage in a continuum that passed from pre-conflict prevention, through peacemaking and peacekeeping to peacebuilding. In this model, preventative diplomacy was represented as the opening stage of UN intervention. If it failed, it would be followed by political efforts to negotiate a peace settlement (peacemaking). Should a ceasefire or peace agreement be reached, a mission could be deployed to monitor the ceasefire and the implementation of the agreement (peacekeeping) and lay the foundations for peacebuilding (United Nations 1992:paragraphs 55–57). Therefore, in *An Agenda for Peace*, peacebuilding was introduced as the phase that followed peacemaking and peacekeeping. It was defined as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (United Nations 1992:paragraph 21).

As an increasing range of agencies asserted their relevance to peacebuilding in the complex emergencies of the early 1990s, pressure grew for a conceptual definition that “left no agency behind” (Call and Cousens 2008:3). Boutros-Ghali’s report *Supplement to the Agenda for Peace* in 1995 introduced two conceptual modifications that accommodated these pressures by expanding the concept of peacebuilding (United Nations 1995). First, it clarified that the scope of peacebuilding goes beyond stabilization or “negative peace”. Rather, peacebuilding was to address “root causes” of conflict and establish the conditions for “positive peace” that would eliminate the need for future violence, rather than only ending the war.
Peacebuilding, thereby, became synonymous with the concept of conflict prevention. This conceptual expansion increased the range of activities that were described as peacebuilding. As Barnett et al. (2007:44) have observed, this was inevitable “because there are multiple contributing causes of conflict, almost any international assistance effort that addresses any perceived or real grievance can arguably be called ‘peacebuilding’”. Similarly, there are a number of variables that can conceivably contribute to a just peace. Therefore, a “root causes” definition of peacebuilding enabled conceptual inflation. Indeed, during the 1990s, peacebuilding evolved into an amorphous umbrella concept associated with an array of efforts to address a number of possible root causes rather than a process to identify priority risks or needs in specific contexts. The following 2001 Presidential statement is commonly cited as evidence of the UN expanded root causes agenda:

The Security Council recognizes that peacebuilding is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short- and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of society’s sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence (United Nations 2001:1–2).

Moreover, in the 2006 Inventory of United Nations Capacity in Peacebuilding, the argument was made that “in the absence of a well-articulated (peacebuilding) paradigm, the tendency (including in this inventory) is also to adopt a supply-view of what is needed, thereby overlooking critical areas for effective peacebuilding which to date may be weakly conceptualized or ignored by the international community” (United Nations 2006b:6). The inventory listed a number of areas in which UN capacity was weak (notably state-building) or where capacities were dispersed, and identified

6 The concepts of negative and positive peace were conceived by Johan Galtung (1985).
7 Indeed, some argue that given the “complex” characteristics of social systems there are epistemological barriers to our ability to predict tipping points or phase transitions to violence or peace.
additional “gaps” such as in-depth knowledge of local context, expertise in land reform, management of state assets and organized crime. In short, a “root causes” conception of peacebuilding continues to support an agenda of institutional capacity-building for international organizations.

The second conceptual clarification introduced in the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace was that the term applies not only to post-conflict situations, but also to the entire conflict management spectrum since those technologies that are used to build peace also serve to prevent war. However, the report maintained a distinction between peacebuilding and other UN instruments for peace, notably: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, disarmament, sanctions and peace enforcement. Similarly, subsequent reports by the Secretary-General viewed peacebuilding as a “complement” to peacekeeping (United Nations 1998b:paragraph 70) and argued that it involved the “reorientation” of humanitarian and development activities to reduce the risk of resumption of conflict (United Nations 1998a:paragraph 63). Therefore, despite the fact that peacebuilding was no longer conceptually associated with a particular conflict stage, the notion that peacebuilding represented something that followed peacekeeping persisted.

At the same time, however, there was increased appreciation of the need for immediate post-conflict gains to solidify the peace and increase confidence in the peace process. Although this shift in policy had been driven by development actors who found that early recovery needed to begin closer to the location of the conflict, in practice, early efforts to generate peace dividends and build institutional capacity were associated with greater involvement of UN peacekeepers in a range of civilian tasks rather than efforts to bring forward the development response. The perspectives of the three different UN departments that were responsible for operationalizing peacebuilding concepts and policy reflect this piecemeal evolution.

1.2.1 The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) perspective

The recommendations of the Brahimi Report of 2000 proved highly influential in shaping the evolution of peacebuilding from the perspective of peacekeeping (United Nations 2000:paragraphs 55–57). The Brahimi Report defined peacebuilding as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence
of war”. It, thereby, reinforced the notion that peacebuilding principally related to a long-term process that followed peacekeeping. It, nevertheless, argued that peace operations should lay the foundations for peacebuilding so as to facilitate the “transition” to peacebuilding carried out by other actors. As a result, the Brahimi Report gave further impetus to the trend toward multidimensional peace operations, incorporating dimensions of peacebuilding. This resulted in an acceptance that some aspects of DDR, rule of law and SSR should be funded out of the assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations budget. It also consolidated the standard inclusion of funds for Quick Impact Projects in UN peacekeeping budgets.

Although the Brahimi Report led to an increased peacebuilding role for UN peace operations, it nevertheless maintained that peacebuilding was distinct from peacekeeping and associated with other actors in a later post-conflict phase of operations. Barnett et al. (2007:42) argued that DPKO “abstinence owes less to principled opposition to peacebuilding and more to the view that peacebuilding is outside its mandate and [to its] vested interest in ensuring that these areas are treated as distinctive, if related and sequential, activities”. This also explains why DPKO has frequently used alternative terms such as “civilian post-conflict capacities” to describe its efforts in the areas of DDR, SSR and rule of law (United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit 2004). Indeed, while DPKO-led missions are not described in terms of peacebuilding, DPKO has consistently asserted its leading role in many of the issue areas associated with peacebuilding. For instance, DPKO has argued in the context of the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee deliberations, that it should be the lead actor on core dimensions of state-building, including SSR and rule of law.

While peacekeeping reforms have established that peacekeepers have an important role to play in core dimensions of peacebuilding, the Brahimi Report, nevertheless, proved influential in maintaining that peacebuilding was functionally distinct from peacekeeping. Rather, it served to strengthen the association of peacebuilding with political and development interventions. It noted that “peacebuilding is, in effect, a hybrid of political and developmental activities targeted at the sources of conflict” (United Nations 2000: paragraph 44). Accordingly, it identified the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) within the Secretariat as the focal point for peacebuilding in the UN system and called for the creation of a peacebuilding unit within DPA to act as a focal point within the UN system for coordination, information gathering and best practices. It also identified
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the lead agency in implementing peacebuilding activities. Therefore, although the need for continuous efforts to consolidate peace was recognized in the *Supplement to the Agenda for Peace*, DPKO engagement in the debate resulted in the expansion of the peacekeeping remit justified on peacebuilding grounds, while the term peacebuilding remained principally associated with a long-term process, distinct from peacekeeping and led by political and development actors.

1.2.2 The DPA perspective

In 1997, DPA was identified as the UN focal point for peacebuilding\(^8\) and it has since embraced its explicit peacebuilding mandate. Although DPA had long conducted political missions and maintained “good offices” designed to support specific political processes, shortly after 1997 it experimented with a new model designed to operationalize peacebuilding through the establishment of PBSOs.\(^9\) This led to the establishment of PBSOs in the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Tajikistan that were intended to provide operational support to post-conflict societies to consolidate peace and democracy where the UN Security Council felt that no troop presence was necessary. They were funded from the regular UN budget and authorized by the Security Council. However, a review of these missions by UNDP and DPA staff in 2001 found that, with the exception of the UN Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding, none of these missions had been successful (Call 2005:23). This finding is hardly surprising given events on the ground: Liberia reverted to war and both Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic experienced coups d’état. However, the 2001 review revealed that PBSOs had failed principally because they were structurally weak and had little leverage, including over other elements in the UN system. Rather, they were perceived as competing with UN agencies, funds and programmes for donor funds. In all cases, except Tajikistan, this resulted in tensions between the resident coordinator or resident representative, who headed up the UN Country Team, and the head of PBSO. The review concluded that the single most significant obstacle to effective collaboration within the United Nations system is the absence of a coherent

\(^8\) DPA was designated the focal point in the UN system for post-conflict peacebuilding by virtue of its role as the convenor of ECPS (Call 2005).

\(^9\) These DPA offices should be distinguished from the New York Secretariat-based Peacebuilding Support Office that was created in 2006 to support the PBC and reports to the Secretary General.
strategy for peacebuilding based on a shared understanding of objectives and priorities. It informed the 2004 UNDP/DPA conclusion that PBSOs were not a successful model, and prompted the elaboration of a “Plan of Action on Peacebuilding” to improve coordination within the UN system. However, its recommendations were not developed through DPA. Rather, policy issues relating to cooperation were taken up by development and humanitarian actors in the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) Working Group on Transitions.

Furthermore, the distinction between primarily political “peacebuilding” missions and primarily security “peacekeeping” missions, combined with the persistent notion that peacebuilding was linked with an end phase in a UN intervention, served to privilege discourse over sequencing and raised questions over how to manage transitions between different kinds of operations (including between DPA-led political and DPKO-led security missions). DPA continued to lose ground to DPKO. Whereas in 1997 DPA had served as the lead agency for peace missions that preceded (such as the UN Advance Mission in 1992 in Cambodia) and followed DPKO missions (including the Misión de las Naciones Unidas en El Salvador and the UN Office in Vienna after 1995 and the UN Political Office for Somalia in 1996), turf battles grew as DPKO became more involved in multidimensional operations. The issue was resolved in favour of DPKO in 2002 when the UN Secretary-General specified that DPKO would serve as the lead department for the planning and management of all peace and security operations in the field, even when primarily civilian (United Nations 2002). This has led to the current division of roles whereby DPKO leads all larger missions and DPA leads smaller, purely civilian ones often dedicated to assisting the Secretary-General in his good offices. Thus, while the role of DPKO in peacebuilding was further institutionalized, albeit under the name of multidimensional peacekeeping, the scope of operational peacebuilding operations became associated with far more limited “advisory” interventions.

In addition, DPA efforts to strengthen its strategic peacebuilding “focal point” role within UN Headquarters “never really got off the ground” (Call 2005:5). In a report DPA commissioned in 1997, former Special Representative of the Secretary-General Margaret Anstee recommended that a peacebuilding unit be established within DPA for the adequate fulfilment of this role. This recommendation was later supported in the Brahimi Report and subsequently received UN system-wide support in the Peacebuilding Plan of Action in
2001. However, the idea never received the support of Member States. The proposal was rejected in the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in 2002. While some traditional “donor” states had chosen to build up peacebuilding capacity in UNDP by supporting the establishment of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) in 2001 rather than a peacebuilding unit in DPA, other Member States from the Global South appeared nervous about expanding the UN political role in post-conflict situations. Paradoxically, therefore, the department that was identified as the “focal point” for peacebuilding within the UN system has seen a reduction of its role in peacebuilding relative to other UN departments and agencies. This can be partly explained by its small size and limited institutional capacities, which rendered it relatively weak compared with DPKO and UNDP. To illustrate DPA’s relative institutional weakness, Call (2005:22) noted that, in 2004, DPA had fewer staff monitoring country developments—52 desk officers—than the NGO Human Rights Watch. It had less than half the staff of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, and its country officers were fewer in number than the number of World Bank staff in one country alone—Indonesia. While relatively limited DPA capacity is part of the explanation for why it was relatively unsuccessful in internal inter-institutional turf wars, its increasingly limited role in peacebuilding is also evidence of the operational and political difficulties attendant in associating peacebuilding with principally political interventions. Not only have purely political “advisory” interventions failed in operational terms, for instance, when DPA PBSOs had limited political backing and resources, but also peacebuilding without an explicit link to development resources has proved a hard sell to the wider UN membership. This indicates the political importance of tying external peacebuilding ambitions to development objectives, and helps explain why the UNDP approach has received greater support from donors and affected Member States.

1.2.3 The UNDP perspective

Although UNDP has actively pursued its role as a lead agency for implementing peacebuilding, it frames its actions through two distinct concepts. It adopted the definition of peacebuilding used in the Brahimi Report, but has always stressed that peacebuilding is virtually synonymous with conflict prevention. It used both concepts interchangeably for a few years, but increasingly refers only to prevention to describe actions that are designed specifically to mitigate, reduce or prevent conflict. Nor does UNDP typically use the term peacebuilding to refer to its broader efforts
to promote socio-economic development in post-conflict contexts. Rather, it uses the term “recovery”. The dual conceptual focus is evident in the name of BCPR. It attests to the operational alignment of UNDP work with programmes targeted specifically at reducing conflict as well as its broader efforts, together with UN humanitarian agencies, to address the relief to development gap. Indeed, BCPR was created “to provide a bridge between the humanitarian agencies that handle immediate needs and the long-term development phase” (UNDP 2008: inside front cover). Given that humanitarian agencies have no interest in framing their emergency-response activities in terms of peacebuilding, it is unsurprising that this constellation of actors has adopted the more politically neutral term “recovery” to describe their ambitions in the post-disaster and post-conflict space. More recently, this has been defined as actions designed to “restore the capacity of national institutions and communities to recover from a conflict or a natural disaster, enter transition or ‘build back better’, and avoid relapses” (Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery and UNDG–ECHA Working Group on Transition 2008: 9). In summary, conceptually and operationally, UNDP has made a distinction between its work on conflict that has an explicit preventive objective, and its work that is primarily directed toward the socio-economic aspects of development in fragile and post-conflict contexts. Its preventive work includes support for political dialogue and peace processes as well as efforts targeted at addressing specific threats to peace consolidation such as DDR, rule of law, landmines and small arms. These are treated separately from activities designed to consolidate “recovery” through economic growth and state capacity-building.

Evidence of the success of the UNDP approach includes its relatively rapid institutional capacity development. Even though the UNDP BCPR was created in 2001 with six staff, it numbered over 100 personnel three years later. The Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery that was established with voluntary contributions to fund UNDP operations in this area has also steadily increased in size to over US$ 100 million in 2007. Although a relatively small proportion of this fund is dedicated to operations with an explicit conflict prevention objective, it has also sought to promote prevention activities as well as conflict-sensitive development through UN Country Teams. Working together with the interdepartmental Framework for Coordination on Early Warning and Preventive Action (the Framework Team), UNDP has partnered with DPA in introducing peace and development advisers to assist the UN resident coordinator in developing conflict prevention strategies and programmes. In contrast to the DPA
PBSOs, this initiative serves to strengthen the political component of UN Country Teams without calling into question who is in charge or highlighting the political nature of UN interventions. UNDP, thereby, aims to improve the political content of its programming without necessarily labelling it as such.

In summary, the above account of the conceptual evolution of peacebuilding within the UN indicates that donor preferences combined with institutional interests have played a large part in explaining how peacebuilding has been conceptualized and operationalized. Despite the expansive UN use of the term, relatively few UN actors use it to describe their work. Indeed, the UN departments and agencies with the greatest operational engagement in this area have chosen to develop distinctive concepts to describe their engagements in line with their core security and development mandates. This suggests that the dynamics of bureaucratic power and political infighting have served to promote conceptual diversity as a means of protecting institutional turf. Moreover, while the term peacebuilding was initially most closely associated with DPA and its political interventions, the link between peacebuilding and DPA has been weakened. Rather, as explained in Part 3, peacebuilding has been institutionalized in the UN context in PBC and its associated Support Office and Fund which, together, constitute the UN Peacebuilding Architecture. The UN-dedicated peacebuilding structures are not, therefore, institutionally associated with any of the main operational actors. Rather, they occupy an institutional no-man’s-land, with PBC reporting to the Security Council and General Assembly and its associated Support Office and Fund reporting directly to the Secretary-General.

1.2.4 The challenge of coherence

There is broad international and interorganizational consensus that security, political and development aspects are central to the peacebuilding agenda, while differences in emphasis and categorization remain common.10

10 Reviews of how different nations and international actors approach peace consolidation all concur that the security, political and economic dimensions are critical (Barnett et al. 2007; de Coning 2008; United States Institute for Peace 2008). However, differences in categorization and emphasis are still common. For instance, the AU includes gender as a core dimension of peacebuilding (African Union 2006). In a recent study for the US government, for example, rule of law is considered a separate category, and activities to promote social
Thus, underlying the diversity in the UN approach to peacebuilding there is convergence around the view that peace consolidation is a multidimensional undertaking with interdependent security, development and political (including support for peace processes and state capacity-building) objectives. It is also true that the dimension of strengthening political institutions or “state-building” has received increasing attention since 2000. The UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change argued that peacebuilding should focus on state-building (United Nations 2004). Scholars talk of a “New York Consensus” that privileges the state-building dimensions of peacebuilding and note that the state-building model “has found its ideological home at the United Nations headquarters in New York” (Kahler 2009:288). Despite the elevation of the state-building agenda within the UN, it is not equated with peacebuilding. Rather, state-building is still conceptualized as one of the core dimensions of peacebuilding. Thus, while departments and agencies within the UN define their interventions in distinct terms in line with their core mandates, there is widespread agreement that a range of institutional competencies, from across the UN system, are relevant to these core dimensions of post-conflict peacebuilding (see Table 1).

With increased recognition that peacebuilding is a multidimensional undertaking closely correlated with improvements in security, governance and development, the focus of the UN debate has been on how the UN should get its internal act together in support of these objectives. In other words, the UN has privileged a process of reflection on how it should improve the coherence of its action. This was prompted by feedback in the form of evaluations of UN operations and research studies that identified poor coordination as one of the factors that contributed to the mixed record of UN success (Cutillo 2006; Dahrendorf 2003; Dobbins et al. 2005; Paris 2004; Stedman et al. 2002). Evidence of instances of duplication or where different UN actors have worked at cross-purposes has underpinned the widely held belief that a more coherent approach would have a more effective and sustainable impact on peacebuilding. More importantly, perhaps, were supply-side pressures for institutional streamlining. The 2006 Inventory of UN Capacity in Peacebuilding noted the scattered nature of UN capacities and argued that “not only does this result in gaps and well-being are distinguished from economic development (United States Institute for Peace 2009).
overlaps … [but] certain sectors lack a clear lead entity or central resource location, resulting in limited accountability for delivery” (United Nations 2006b:7). It prompted UN Member States to demand reform that would identify sector-wide leads and division of responsibilities. In short, Member States demanded greater integration and clearer division of roles in order to improve the accountability of UN post-conflict efforts to the donors/Member States and help prevent gaps and overlaps that were viewed as the principal cause of operational inefficiency.

Table 1. Dimensions of peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security and rule of law</th>
<th>Providing a safe and secure environment</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SSR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disarmament and demobilization</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Police, corrections and judicial reform (rule of law)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political and governance</td>
<td>Support the peace process and oversee political transition</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Political participation, national dialogue and reconciliation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Government institutions and civil service capacity-building, including public administration at national and local levels</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Extend state authority throughout the territory</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Support conflict management capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socio-economic recovery</td>
<td>Physical infrastructure: roads, ports, airports, electricity, telecommunications (with particular emphasis on employment generation for youth and former combatants)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social services: health, education, social welfare, population registration (particularly for internally displaced persons and refugees)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stimulating economic growth, through a mix of micro-level efforts to build on existing local capacity and macro-economic policy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening civil society</td>
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Source: Adapted from de Coning (2008).
There are clear structural reasons for the fragmented UN approach. This is reflected in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report, which includes a section on “UN systemic challenges” to efficiency and effectiveness. It noted that:

The United Nations has deep capabilities in the fields of peace and security, human rights, development and humanitarian action, and successful peacebuilding requires the combined efforts of all of these “pillars”. However, the UN entities with capacity in these fields were each designed for a different purpose. Each of them has different mandates, guiding principles, governance structures and financing arrangements—and different cultures and notions of how things should be done. As practice has evolved, each part of the UN system has developed its own set of external partners and stakeholders. This becomes a complicating factor for unity of purpose and action on the ground. Various parts of the United Nations are very rightly linked to distinct international instruments, each with its own pace and accountability. In this context, our efforts to “deliver as one” in the field are vital but not sufficient (United Nations 2009:paragraph 24).

In addition, whether a country is considered to be a case for conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping or peacebuilding has implications for how activities are funded and which institutional actor is in the lead. The role of the Security Council in authorizing peacekeeping missions and the assessed contribution system for funding them has ensured that peacekeeping has been a relatively well-resourced and politically well-supported UN instrument. In contrast, peacemaking, conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts funded out of the UN core budget (DPA actions) or through Member State contributions (UNDP actions) have been relatively less well backed and/or subject to considerable funding lags. This has served to privilege peacekeeping over other UN instruments and has resulted in a fragmented approach to improving coherence.

Efforts to address coherence “from the top down”, where there is a UN peacekeeping presence, have led to the so-called “Integrated Approach” to mission planning and deployment. Where there is no peacekeeping presence, the so-called “Delivering as One” reforms have been designed to improve coherence between UN humanitarian, development and environmental actors through partial integration of UN in-country organization and funding. The Secretary-General has also tried to create a cabinet-style decision-making structure in his own office and to this end his Policy Committee has been tasked with clarifying the division of roles within
the UN by identifying “lead agencies” at Headquarters that should provide system-wide service in their respective area of expertise. Although much organizational energy has been committed to designing and implementing these reforms and they are still actively pursued by UN Member States and the Secretary-General, their implementation in the field has proved difficult in light of the structural fragmentation described above. No ongoing reform efforts have been comprehensive enough to address the coherence of the collective UN peacebuilding effort, especially during transitions where there is no clear UN lead actor, or in areas where a number of agencies share competence.

For example, while the UN has engaged in a serious attempt to promote integrated planning where it deploys peace missions, the early results demonstrate how difficult this is in practice. Integration was one of the main themes of the Brahimi Report (United Nations 2000). As a result, the Secretary-General called for a plan that could help the different parts of the UN system work together to develop country-specific peacebuilding strategies that are coherent, flexible and field driven. It resulted in the UN Integrated Approach, in which the planning and coordination of complex peace operations is integrated in a single country-level UN system. In this system, mission planning is conducted in accordance with the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), which includes a greater degree of consultation with other UN actors (United Nations 2008b). While the UN Secretary-General remains committed to this approach, reviews of its implementation in practice reveal that barriers to integration remain at various levels (policy, strategic, programmatic and administrative). One review of integrated UN missions concluded that:

> cases of success in integration are largely attributable to the initiative of individual UN staff finding ways of working around the numerous organizational barriers and learning from the fluid post-conflict environment. These successes come with high transaction costs: UN staff may spend as much time navigating systemic dysfunction as they do carrying out their assigned tasks (Campbell and Kaspersen 2008:482).

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11 Since 2005, the majority of UN missions are integrated and have been designed using the Integrated Mission Planning Process. By comparison, while there are ambitions in the EU context to develop a similar comprehensive approach to planning, they have yet to be realized.
The persistence of organizational obstacles to integration has led practitioners to question the efficiency of integrated approaches. As reviews of integrated missions indicated, there is an increasing sense that the form of integration should follow function (Eide et al. 2008). That is, missions should only be integrated to the extent that there is a critical mass of multiple tasks with a broad mandate. They also note that integration is still perceived by most UN entities as a means by which they are subordinated to the priorities and procedures of DPKO and its Department of Field Services. This suggests that the “Integrated Approach” has not been fully accepted in the wider UN system. There is, moreover, evidence that there are substantive as well as bureaucratic reasons for resistance. For instance, some argue the integrated mission approach is incompatible with a decentralized approach to peacebuilding, which is designed with national actors from the bottom up (Hazen 2007). In any case, there is broad agreement that the Integrated Approach only addresses integration at the field level in a subset of cases (where there is a peacekeeping mission) and it is, therefore, not well suited to managing UN coherence during transitions, including when peacekeepers leave, or coherence of the collective external effort.

Similarly, significant resources and political attention have been given to parallel structural reforms to improve UN system-wide coherence and “Deliver as One” (United Nations 2006c). For instance, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Development Operations Coordination Office support the delivering-as-one reform effort. And both provide support for sector-wide coordination at headquarters level and in the field, through support of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the resident coordinator and the humanitarian coordinator. These rationalizing reforms have helped establish clearer lines of authority in-country. However, they are designed for situations where there is no UN security presence and are, therefore, not sufficient to ensure coherence of the broader peace consolidation effort.

The principal UN institutional innovation to address the coherence challenge in peacebuilding has been designed to build on these efforts to improve UN coherence at the field level in peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping contexts. In the report on UN reform In Larger Freedom, the Secretary-General recognized that there was “a gaping hole” in the UN machinery in this area and that “no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to peace” (United Nations 2005a:paragraph 114). The new
UN Peacebuilding Architecture, comprised of PBC, PBF and PBSO and located in the Secretariat in New York, was expressly designed to address this institutional gap. PBC was to provide a forum for coordination of the “many post-conflict activities of the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes” as well as the activities of donors, troop contributors and other international organizations and international financial institutions. The UN Peacebuilding Architecture was, therefore, designed to bring together the key UN and external actors with a view to sustaining attention, mobilizing resources and addressing the demands of collective coordination, across and beyond the UN system.

Part 3 of this report explores in more detail the extent to which the UN Peacebuilding Architecture has been able to fulfil this ambitious mandate. At this stage, it is perhaps sufficient to point to the fact that it has generated limited results in terms of coordination and resource mobilization and that there is growing scepticism regarding how appropriate it is for New York-based national ambassadors to develop country-specific peacebuilding strategies. Moreover, given the UN interest in how to sustain international attention after a peacekeeping mission leaves, PBC has, to date, focused on countries in a relatively late peace consolidation phase, typically after a peace operation had left and from three to five years after cessation of hostilities. In doing so, it evidently did not address the early recovery phase, which was also seen as critical in peace consolidation.

Indeed, partly due to the limitations of the Integrated Approach to mission planning to guide humanitarian and development approaches to early recovery, a range of “bottom-up” coordination initiatives have emerged between development and humanitarian actors to improve their engagement in this phase. For instance, standing and ad hoc committee structures such as the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), ECHA and UNDG explored the challenges of coordinated action with a view to refining and improving the integrated mission approach. In addition, the Inter Agency Standing Committee Cluster Framework also served to bring together UN agencies and programmes to work on policy, organizational and programming guidance in specific issue areas including 12 thematic interagency working groups such as those on conflict prevention (the UN Framework Team) and the DDR taskforce have developed policy and programming guidance that also aims to improve the coherence of the UN effort in relation to particular issues.
“early recovery”. These aimed to develop coordination arrangements as well as capacity to ensure that when the humanitarian assistance draws down, development programmes and funds are in place to maintain and expand efforts to develop sustainable solutions. However, these efforts often encountered serious systemic obstacles, with little predictable funding for non-emergency recovery efforts and little capacity in critical areas. Many of these difficulties and gaps were documented in the influential report *Recovery from War* (Chandran et al. 2008) and have served to stimulate engagement among donors13 and in the UN system about how to bring forward the international development response to improve early recovery efforts.

Within the UN, in May 2008, the Security Council encouraged the Secretary-General, PBC and Member States to consider how the UN and the international community could do better at supporting national actors in this early recovery phase. More specifically, it requested the Secretary-General to provide advice on how to “support national efforts to secure a sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively, including in the areas of coordination, civilian deployment capabilities and financing”. This resulted in the Secretary-General’s report *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict* (United Nations 2009). It proposes that UN interventions should be oriented toward the development of national capacity from the earliest stage and should be guided by early peacebuilding strategies developed with and in support of national actors. In marked contrast to the Integrated Approach to mission planning and the elaboration of integrated peacebuilding strategies in PBC, it stresses that the early elaboration of a strategic framework should be negotiated directly by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General with national actors. This, it is suggested, should make use of more inclusive planning methodologies such as the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) methodology already used by the UN, World Bank and EC. The impact of the report’s recommendations is to shift the locus of strategic peacebuilding planning from New York to the field, investing the responsibility for external coherence with the in-country UN leadership team.

13 The United Kingdom (which commissioned the *Recovery from War* report) has championed efforts to address reforms to early recovery funding; this issue has also been taken up by a working group on conflict and fragility of OECD DAC.
It is evidently too early to comment on whether these recommendations have been accepted much less whether they have achieved their intended results. However, it is noteworthy that this latest attempt at addressing the coherence of the external effort is significantly different in approach from previous efforts. It aims to ensure coherence by increasing the authority and capacity of national actors and UN leaders to negotiate common strategies to guide national and external engagements. The report recognizes the fragmented nature of governance across the UN system and the coordination challenges this brings, but does not propose new structural solutions. Rather, it seeks to embed the process of setting priorities in the local context—arguing that strategies should build on existing national and international capacities. As such, it places a premium on the ability of local and country-based UN actors to negotiate common priorities, while somewhat insulating this process from the influence of Member States in New York.

To summarize, in addition to convergence around the core security, institution-building and development dimensions of peacebuilding, there has also been convergence around the importance of external coherence. At the UN level this has led to a range of efforts to promote an integrated approach. These included integrated planning for peace operations, and the establishment of PBC, charged with improving the coherence and coordination of the collective external effort in the late consolidation phase. Most recently, the UN has emphasized the importance of engaging national actors in strategic decision-making at an earlier stage, and shifting the elaboration of strategic guidance from headquarters to the field. However, how this will be implemented and how it will link with the existing models of planning peace operations remains unclear. Similarly, the management of the late peace-consolidation effort is also in question, with the five-year review of the advisory role of PBC scheduled for 2010. If the UN adopts the same logic as in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report, there is little reason for a New York-based body to be involved in the negotiation of integrated peacebuilding strategies in a late peace-consolidation phase. In any event, although the UN underscores the imperative of national ownership in peacebuilding, the UN debate about peacebuilding remains focused on the still unresolved issue of how best to promote coherence across fundamentally fragmented external interventions.
1.3 Evolution of EU Concepts and Policy

The term peacebuilding does not feature prominently in EU policy and there is no EU agreed definition of peacebuilding. There have been no European Council Common Strategies or Joint Actions, nor any EC Communications on “peacebuilding” as such. Rather, the EU has developed a mosaic of policies associated with security, development and governance interventions that are relevant to preventing conflict and building peace. While originally framed in terms of conflict prevention, the subsequent development of EU policies has been framed in terms of the objectives of improving aid effectiveness and coherence of EU security and development policies in relation to fragile states. Although the EU rarely uses the term state-building, EU policies on governance and fragility have prioritized state-building as a principal means of preventing conflict. Similarly, recent security policy developments have highlighted the importance of security risks linked to the state to be addressed through SSR and DDR.

1.3.1 Conceptual origins

Despite the fact that the EU has not tended to frame its activities in terms of a peacebuilding objective, it is nevertheless possible to trace the conceptual origins and evolution of the concept. In contrast to early evolution of peacebuilding within the UN, peacebuilding within the EU has always been associated with the concept of conflict prevention. The EC conflict prevention agenda emerged in the mid-1990s and was the first EC policy area to explicitly make the link between development and security. For instance, the 1996 EC Communication from the Commission to the Council, Conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond, argued that development instruments need to take account of:

their potential for balancing the interests and opportunities of different identity groups within a state, for encouraging democratic governments that enjoy widespread legitimacy among the population, for fostering consensus on key national issues … and for building mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group interests (European Commission 1996a:4).

The 1996 Communication also introduced the concept of “structural stability” as the ultimate EC policy goal. This was defined as “a situation involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures, and healthy social and
environmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change without the resort to violent conflict” (European Commission 1996a:2). Promoting structural stability was equated with addressing the structural causes of conflict and the “wider sense” of conflict prevention. Moreover, the EC Communication argued that “activities of conflict prevention in a wider sense should be summarized under the term peacebuilding” (European Commission 1996a:5).

With regard to programming for structural prevention, it argued that programme design should be sensitive to the social impact of development assistance and be prepared to shift the balance of power and opportunities within societies (European Commission 1996a). Furthermore, in its 1996 Communication Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (European Commission 1996b), the EC also identified the dangers of not doing so. The EC Communication described how politically insensitive development programmes as well as bad governance can exacerbate ethnic or religious differences and contribute to the causes of conflict. The potentially dangerous nature of EC development aid was, therefore, recognized by the EC well before Andersen’s (1999) influential “Do-No-Harm” initiative drew popular attention to shortfalls in the relief-to-development continuum. These EC policy documents indicate that the EC was relatively quick to recognize the interdependencies between security, humanitarian and development policy.14 Optimism in the growing and progressive role of the EU in the area of conflict prevention was also echoed in academic and NGO literature (Costy and Gilbert 1998; Cross 1998; Cross and Rasamoelina 1999). It was apparently justified by the production in 2001 of an EC Communication on conflict prevention (European Commission 2001a) and the EU Programme of Action on the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, commonly referred to as the Göteborg Programme (European Council 2001). These documents established the EU internal strategic logic for improving its engagement in fragile or post-conflict states and formally elevated the status of conflict prevention to “one of the main objectives of EU external relations”

14 The OECD DAC 1998 review of EC development assistance (OECD 1998) acknowledged as much in its praise of the above-mentioned reports, its characterization of the EC proactive role in formulating the DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (OECD 1997), and in its conclusion that “the international community can look to the EU for strong leadership in this area” (OECD 1998:15).
As such, they served to reframe the EC mandate in the area of development and governance as promoting (early) structural prevention as well as (late) operational prevention.

Although the 2001 Communication on conflict prevention did not employ the term “peacebuilding”, it is still considered by many EC practitioners as providing the strategic framework and intervention logic for the EC approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The EC Communication identified three main objectives: (i) adapt long-term EU instruments to address the root causes of conflict; (ii) improve EU capacity to react quickly to address conflict risks or seize opportunities for prevention; and (iii) promote cooperation with international partners. The EC Communication distinguished between long-term and short-term prevention objectives on the basis of an intervention time frame (possibly in line with the EC funding instruments). These ultimate objectives could also be defined in terms of their contributions to “structural” or “operational” prevention, or contributions to achieving “positive” or “negative” peace.

The political objectives of EU development policy were formally outlined in the 1992 Treaty on European Union. This identified the objectives of EU development assistance as “the promotion of stable conditions for human and economic development and the promotion of human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms” (Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives in Article 11 and Development Cooperation objectives in Article 177(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Union). These objectives were reconfirmed in EC regional cooperation agreements in the early to mid-1990s. The 1995 revisions to the Lomé Convention between the EU and the ACP countries added an institutional and political dimension to cooperation policy (Articles 5, 224 (m) and 366) and the EC commitment to supporting human rights and democratization was articulated in agreements relating to the Mediterranean region (MEDA) in 1996 and in Asia and Latin America (ALA) in 1992 (in the MEDA Council Regulation 1488/1996 and the ALA Regulation 443/92).

For a discussion of the distinction between structural and operational prevention see Menkhaus (2006b).

A number of practitioners and analysts have sought to introduce greater conceptual clarity through other conceptual distinctions. For instance, some practitioners make a distinction between programmes designed specifically to prevent violence from re-erupting—“peace writ little” in the short to medium term, with those that are designed to promote broader institutional and societal transformation—“Peace Writ Large” (Church 2008; Collaborative for Development Action 2008). Others argued that organizations distinguish clearly between preventative peacebuilding at the activity or programme level and post-conflict peacebuilding at the systemic level (de Coning 2008). OECD DAC often
In pursuit of the long-term objective of promoting “structural stability”, the EC Communication on conflict prevention advocated the “mainstreaming” of conflict sensitivity into development cooperation, macro-economic stabilization and democratization programming. In addition, it argued that long-term efforts should address specific “cross-cutting” risk factors associated with conflict such as natural resource management and the illicit trade in drugs and small arms. Another dimension of promoting long-term structural stability is the objective of promoting regional cooperation. To this end, the EC Communication emphasized the importance of developing the capacity of regional frameworks in near-abroad Europe (through the Central and Eastern Europe Accession partnerships, Western Balkans Stabilization and Association Process and the Barcelona Process for Mediterranean countries); as well as strengthening other regional organizations with a conflict prevention mandate: the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the South African Development Community and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; and supporting intraregional and interregional trade, including through offering developing countries better access to the EC market.

The second principal objective identified in the 2001 Communication on conflict prevention relates to the goal of “reacting quickly to nascent conflicts” or short-term prevention. Thus, the EC Communication recommended building or adapting institutional practices and capacities to enable more rapid and targeted “preventative” interventions using EC funds as well as instruments such as political dialogue, sanctions and crisis management interventions. In addition to the long- and short-term conflict prevention objectives, the EC Communication also identified cooperation with other actors as a policy objective. Whereas in the UN cooperation with other partners is seen as a necessary consequence of increased interdependence of external actors and, therefore, as a means to the end of promoting external coherence and efficiency, in the EC Communication it is presented as an operational objective in its own right. This testifies to the importance of “multilateralism” in EC conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy, which was subsequently confirmed in the EC 2003 Communication on multilateralism. This stated that conflict prevention and crisis management are areas in which “the goals and activities of the EU and the UN are united by the premise that the case for multilateralism and international makes a distinction between activities with direct and indirect peacebuilding/armed violence reduction objectives (OECD 2007a, 2009).
cooperation is unequivocal” (European Commission 2003c:13). These conceptual distinctions are illustrated in Figure 1, which presents the logical framework of the EC 2001 Communication on conflict prevention.

As with the UN “root causes” definition of peacebuilding, the EC approach to promoting structural stability resulted in an intervention logic that encompassed a broad “multisectoral” range of activities distinguished by their (indirect) contribution to peace consolidation as well as activities justified by their (direct) preventative impact. Although the policy logic was evidently intended to improve the real impact of EU engagement on the dynamics of conflict, the focus of the recommendations related to outputs regarding organizational capacities and approach. The concrete recommendations, thereby, focused on how the EC should “mainstream” conflict prevention in security, development and trade policies. This required greater attention to conflict in Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) guiding EC development programming and in trade agreements, and dedicated resources to address cross-cutting risk factors, including those associated with post-conflict contexts. For short-term actions, EC funding was to become more flexible and rapid, while the EC argued that greater use should be made of European Council instruments to promote political dialogue, mediation and the “preventative” use of sanctions and crisis management operations.

The 2001 EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts drew on the EC Communication and included additional recommendations regarding the European Council approach to conflict prevention with a view to contributing to “a global culture of prevention”. Its objectives included improved political direction and the elaboration of preventive strategies within the intergovernmental decision-making bodies of the European Council and the Political and Security Committee (PSC), supported by improved early-warning capacities. It also identified thematic policy issues that should receive more institutional attention where these included SSR, DDR, democracy promotion and efforts to address the spread of small arms and light weapons and the illicit trade in high-value commodities, including diamonds. A final explicit objective of the Programme was to build cooperation and partnerships with the UN and other regional and international organizations as well as non-state actors at all levels. Thus,
**Figure 1.** Objectives of EC support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding

- **Contribute to developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms** (TEC, Art. 177, 1997, 2002)
- **Preserve peace and strengthen international security** (TEU, Title V, Article 11)
- **Foster sustainable economic and social development of developing countries** (TEC, Art. 177, 1997, 2002)
- **Reacting quickly to nascent conflicts (short-term prevention)**
- **Promoting stability (long-term prevention)**
- **Strengthening cooperation with international partners**
- **Reading quickly to nascent conflicts (short-term prevention)**
- **Diminish the impact of cross-cutting factors of conflicts (natural resources, small arms, drugs and crime)**
- **Enhance early warning**
- **Optimize community instruments**
- **Use political and diplomatic instruments**
- **Use sanctions also preventatively**
- **Adapt EU crisis management tools to a pre-crisis role**

**Source:** Adapted from the scoping study on EC conflict prevention and peacebuilding (European Commission 2009b:15); see also European Commission (2001a).
in addition to highlighting a number of “cross-cutting” policy issues that should receive greater attention, the Programme represented a political commitment to changing the processes by which all EU external actions were developed with increased emphasis on addressing root causes of conflict, including those that relate to weak state capacity, in partnership with other actors.

There have been a number of external and internal challenges to pursuing this agenda. While mustering political will for an agenda that is intangible and, therefore, has no political revenue is intrinsically challenging, the dramatically changed security environment after 11 September 2001 ensured that within the EU political attention focused primarily on developing EU capacity for short-term crisis management response and counter-terrorism. In reflecting on the implementation of the conflict prevention agenda in 2006, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner (2006:2) conceded that “the long-term approach involved in conflict prevention is frequently knocked off course by the imperatives of short-term crisis management”. Certainly, there is little evidence to suggest that the European Council and PSC have developed “coherent and comprehensive preventive strategies”. While these bodies have been increasingly active in responding to crisis, their deliberations are not typically strategic with regard to conflict prevention. This is in spite of internal reform efforts in 2001 that sought to encourage the development of proactive “preventive strategies”, drawing on the full range of EU instruments in European Council regional working groups, and sought to feed these conclusions into Council and PSC deliberations. In practice, while a few strategies have been proposed, none have been adopted or resulted in proactive Common Foreign and Security Policy or ESDP actions. Rather, the discussion of conflict prevention has been reduced to a tour de table of country concerns in the “orientation debate” in the European Council at the beginning of each presidency.

Similarly, the European Council annual reports of the implementation of the Conflict Prevention Programme are evidence of a shift in focus away from structural prevention or peacebuilding. Rather, they consistently document EU short-term response to crises over longer-term engagements to project

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18 One European foreign minister stated that “no politician has ever been re-elected by preventing a conflict in a country that most of the population has never heard of”. This was cited in a presentation by Dan Smith at an Expert Workshop on the German Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building (INEF and SEF 2006:12).
structural stability. For example, while these reports list EU civilian and military crisis management operations, arguing that they constitute “important assets in the EU conflict prevention policy” (European Council 2007:3), they do not address long-term efforts to promote structural stability through development assistance (European Council 2006, 2007). These reports also emphasized the EC efforts to address threats (to the security of Europe) of proliferation, terrorism and organized crime, over efforts to promote structural stability or build peace. While this shift in emphasis is certainly in line with political priorities, there are also practical administrative reasons for it. One relates to the difficulty in measuring the institutional commitment to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. A European Council report (2006) acknowledged as much in pointing out that whereas crisis management has “clearly implementable strategies” conflict prevention lacks a clear policy framework and dedicated budget lines.

In practice, the role of reviewing the EC implementation of its specific commitments to increased conflict sensitivity in its long-term engagements has been taken up by European NGOs from the development and peacebuilding sectors (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 2006; International Alert, Saferworld, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 2007) or in reviews by peers and independent consultancies (Faria and Ferreira 2007; OECD 2007b). These independent evaluations of the EC record acknowledged institutional improvements in the funding architecture for crisis response, including through the Africa Peace Facility, a funding mechanism that the AU can draw on for support of its peace operations, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism and the follow-on IFS. They also noted progress in relevant policy developments related to security, notably in relation to SSR and DDR as well as greater EC engagement in policy development related to the management of natural resources and conflict. However, a common critique relates to the limited success of EC efforts to mainstream conflict prevention or conflict sensitivity in and beyond development assistance. For instance, NGO reviews of CSPs indicated that only in a few cases, such as Somalia, have CSPs explicitly addressed issues related to conflict (International Alert, Saferworld and European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 2007:8). Similarly, NGO reviews of conflict prevention policies in relation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Horn of Africa and Uganda demonstrated that conflict assessments have not been systematically used in the design of country strategies and programmes (Saferworld 2006a, 2006b; Vaillant 2006). While the European Council (2007:7) stated that “conflict prevention and peacebuilding has been given a high priority in
many of the new strategies [for the period 2007–2013], there is as yet little evidence of this. Likewise, at the project level, the EC has no systematic approach to integrating conflict analysis into project design, monitoring and evaluation. It does, however, now require that implementing partners undertake conflict analysis in their project design although it is not followed up in EC project monitoring and evaluation.

There are a number of obstacles to implementing the EC conflict prevention “mainstreaming” agenda. At the organizational level, EC reforms introduced in the late 1990s have privileged the promotion of the EC as an efficient aid disbursement agency. These reforms reduced institutional incentives and capacity to engage in politically sensitive and administratively heavy programming. Moreover, the combination of institutional restructuring in Brussels with devolution to the field, has led to the fragmentation of substantive expertise across three Directorates-General in Brussels—Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX), Directorate-General for Development (DG DEV) and EuropeAid—and between headquarters and the field. Limited and fragmented expertise has complicated efforts in Brussels to integrate conflict analysis in the development of CSPs and country programming documents and has led to a wide degree of variation in the capacity and approach to implementing conflict-sensitive programming in EC delegations. Moreover, at the strategic level, the partnership approach to developing CSPs in conjunction with recipient governments—a legal obligation for all African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP)—militates against the development of politically sensitive activities, particularly in countries where the government may be a party to the conflict. This helps explain why conflict does not feature highly on programming agendas even in countries affected by conflict (e.g. Angola). Thus, despite strong policy commitments made in 2001, efforts to mainstream conflict prevention, including through the work of the Conflict Prevention Unit in DG RELEX and the interagency Quality Support Group, have met with limited success. In the absence of substantive capacity and buy-in from geographical desks and delegations, the implementation of conflict-sensitive programming remains scattered, ad hoc, projectized and relatively rare.

In summary, while the conflict prevention agenda drew attention to a number of thematic policy areas that are situated within the development—

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19 On the contrary, interviews with European Council officials suggest that root causes of conflict are only explicitly addressed in the CSP for Sierra Leone.
security nexus and has promoted funding flexibility through two new, but limited, budget lines dedicated to short-term crisis response, it failed to provide a policy framework to rally political will and leadership among the EU member states, or to mainstream conflict prevention in EC development assistance.

1.3.2 Changing the framework

The normative framework of conflict prevention appeared to lose its political appeal after 2001. Thereafter, “operational” preventative actions, including assistance for SSR, DDR and small arms and light weapons, non-proliferation and addressing the root causes of terrorism were increasingly couched in terms of security objectives, while efforts to tailor development assistance to countries threatened or affected by conflict have been reframed in terms of the broader international agenda to promote aid effectiveness and policy coherence in fragile states. In line with the Paris High-level Forum (2005) on Aid Effectiveness, the 2006 General Affairs and External Relations Council conclusions on Governance in the European Consensus on Development called for an improved EU response to fragile states, to which the EC responded with an EC Communication on fragile states (European Council 2007). This elevated the importance of state-building as a key dimension of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. As with the 2001 Communication on conflict prevention, the EC Communication on fragile states also stressed the critical importance of promoting a coherent and comprehensive approach. One evaluation of the EC approach to fragile states concluded that “the development of an EU approach to fragile states is not about introducing new policies but rather about developing a comprehensive framework under which existing policy commitments relating to aid effectiveness, governance, and conflict prevention can be brought together (Faria and Ferreira 2007:32). Similarly, the 2007 peer review of EC assistance by OECD (2007a:66) identified joint EU policy statements on promoting coherence in EU development20 as “the main EU policy frameworks that govern work in the areas of conflict, security and fragile states”. Thus, while short-term EC conflict prevention ambitions were increasingly framed in terms of crisis response, its efforts to promote structural prevention through development aid have increasingly focused on improving governance and state capacities in line with common donor

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objectives of improving the coherence and effectiveness of assistance in fragile states.

This reframing of the conflict prevention objective in terms of improving aid efficiency in fragile states was also arguably in line with EC institutional interests. While EC reforms had reduced institutional incentives and capacities for engaging in conflict-sensitive programming at the operational level, the politics of EU integration and inter-institutional turf wars have reduced incentives to pursue the conflict prevention agenda at the strategic level. The conceptual terrain of conflict prevention was affected by inter-institutional battles over competence. These battles were fought in the courtroom with two inter-institutional cases regarding the dividing line between development and security introduced to the European Court of Justice in 2004 and 2005. They also affected the inter-institutional negotiations on EC financing instruments for the period 2007–2013. During the negotiations in 2005 and 2006, certain member states challenged EC past support for conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities as overstepping EC competence, in line with the European Council Legal Service defence in one of the court cases before the European Court of Justice. Specifically, the European Council criticized EC support for conflict prevention programmes implemented by subregional organizations (South African Development Community and ECOWAS) as well as EC support for conflict prevention initiatives in Nepal, for mediation efforts in Aceh, Liberia and Sudan, for peacebuilding efforts in Bolivia and for support to the UN good offices in Colombia. The European Council, supported by a number of member states, insisted that the term was removed from the objectives of new development and regional funding instruments and sought instead to narrowly circumscribe EC actions that they deemed legitimate development activities. Consequently, the objective of “conflict

21 Action brought on 21 February 2005 by the EC against the European Council of the European Union, Case C-91/05, Official Journal, C 115/10, 14 May 2005. In this case, the EC argued for the annulment of a European Council decision to provide assistance (in the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy) to ECOWAS for a Small Arms and Light Weapons Convention, on the grounds that the previous EC decision to provide support to ECOWAS for similar objectives took legal precedence. In the second case, no. C-403/05, the European Parliament took the EC to court arguing for the annulment of a decision to provide support for border management project in the Philippines, on the grounds that it had no competence to fund a project with the explicit objective of combating terrorism.
prevention” was limited to the relatively small IfS, which is tailored for short-term actions to address the emergence or re-emergence of conflict and global threats to international security. Indeed, the IfS remains the only EC funding instrument that includes “conflict prevention” and “peacebuilding” in its objectives and programme of work. It is also, incidentally, the only funding instrument that is designed to support the peacebuilding capacity of other regional and international organizations, including the UN.

Although the impact of these decisions on EC programming is uncertain,\(^{22}\) this period of heightened inter-pillar competition arguably contributed to the EC preference for framing its activities within emerging or established multi-donor development agendas rather than through agendas that are common to both development and diplomatic or security actors. Reframing its engagement in fragile states in terms of OECD DAC priorities of promoting aid effectiveness, coherence and good governance had the advantage of re-enforcing strategic alliances with development actors in member states and international organizations, while also providing political shelter from those actors within the EU states and the European Council that sought to limit the scope of the EC development assistance activities or to tie them to national foreign policy interests.

At the policy level, there is ample evidence for EC policy alignment with policy innovations crafted within the framework of the OECD DAC working groups. Although the UN is recognized as leading policy developments in areas such as DDR, EC officials testified to the fact that EC policies tend to follow and be informed by policy discussions developed in the context of OECD DAC (interviews with EC officials in Brussels, March 2008). This is also clear from the coincidence in timing and content of major OECD policy guidelines and EC Communications. It is true, for instance, of EC policies on development coherence, good governance, SSR and, most recently, on funding for early recovery. Similarly, EC policy on conflict prevention has been developed in line with DAC guidelines on peace and development cooperation. This close alignment of EC policies with OECD DAC policy guidance is evidence of the strength of the donor policy networks linked to OECD DAC and helps explain the distinct EC conceptualization of peacebuilding from the perspective of a donor.

\(^{22}\) In any case, this may have been short lived given the subsequent 2008 court ruling in favour of the more expansive EC interpretation of its competences.
In contrast, the European Council preference for framing EU interventions in terms of security objectives clearly relates to EU stated ambitions to develop its role as a global security actor. The EU 2008 review of its 2003 security strategy Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy provides a snapshot of how the EU conceptualizes its external interventions in terms of its security objectives (European Council 2008). The section on the objective of “building stability in Europe and beyond” makes no mention of peacebuilding or conflict prevention as such, but does identify “post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction” (including SSR and DDR), “state fragility” and “competition over natural resources as a source of conflict” as priorities under the subheading of “security-development nexus” (European Council, 2008:8). Thus, the building of “stability” is identified as a core EU objective that is pursued by a combination of security and development actions and instruments attuned to fragile or post-conflict situations. Despite the strategic review’s emphasis on competences relevant to post-conflict interventions designed to address threats to security, there is also evidence of the persistent association of peacebuilding with long-term structural prevention. For instance, the section on enhancing EU capacities noted that “preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach. Peacebuilding and long-term poverty reduction are essential to this” (European Council 2008:9).

The above account of the conceptual evolution of peacebuilding in the EU suggests that, as in the UN, the dynamics of bureaucratic power have served to promote conceptual diversity as a means of protecting institutional turf. Rather than converge on a common objective of preventing conflict, building peace or even projecting stability, institutional actors have chosen to frame their activities in terms of development or security objectives that are clearly in line with their core mandates and operational approaches. Conceptual confusion is, therefore, a product of institutional diversity and competition.

However, although the EU (Council and Commission) rarely uses the terminology of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the EU appears to maintain the intervention rationale presented in its 2001 conflict prevention programme of action. Specifically, it maintains a distinction between long-term efforts intended to promote structural stability, primarily through development assistance designed to establish conditions that are conducive to peace, and actions and policies that are intended to tackle particular threats to peace or risk factors in the short to medium
term. These are pursued through both first pillar political dialogue and assistance, and second pillar political and crisis management instruments. Similarly, in line with its 2001 conception of conflict prevention policies, the EU consistently recognizes the interdependence of its efforts to promote security, development and good governance, and advocates a comprehensive approach, involving the coherent use of a range of policy instruments. There has, however, been relatively little progress in efforts to integrate external instruments within EU headquarters or in the field, although the prospects for post-Lisbon Treaty structural reforms, with a common European External Action Service (EEAS) and a merging of EC and EU delegations in-country, evidently provide opportunities for future efforts to promote internal coherence. If, as many believe, the EEAS will not include the substantial funding instruments managed by DG DEV and EuropeAid or the ESDP crisis management instruments, it may resemble the UN DPA. DPA has a limited role in peacebuilding and no authority to ensure coordination of the UN system-wide effort. Therefore, the potential of the EEAS to improve the coherence of EU action arguably lies in its ability to promote coherence from the bottom up. Whether it does so will depend on the extent to which the EEAS leads to greater country-level capacities for and engagement in policy direction, planning and resource allocation.

Finally, the EU maintains its explicit normative preference for cooperation with multilateral partners, notably the UN, in relation to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. For instance, it makes cooperation with the UN an explicit objective of its conflict prevention policy and champions operational crisis management cooperation with the UN as a means to improving “effective multilateralism” in its security strategy. However, despite a solid foundation of shared values, policy alignment with the UN is assumed rather than explored in EU policy documents and efforts to strengthen the EU role as a security actor are not necessarily compatible with support for UN leadership in-country.

1.4 Conclusion: Implications of Partial EU–UN Conceptual and Policy Alignment

Sections 1.3 and 1.4 show how EU and UN policy discourse has been framed in line with institutional mandates and operational approaches, resulting in a diversity of peacebuilding-relevant concepts and practices. This remains the case. Reflecting on the process of consultation that informed the Secretary-General’s 2009 report Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict,
one PBSO official noted that “we didn’t attempt to resolve definitional issues relating to peacebuilding or state-building because this would have led us into a black hole. We found that humanitarian, development, political and security actors all had distinct visions of what peacebuilding was and all thought that their view was the mainstream one” (interview with PBSO official, New York, May 2009). Despite or perhaps because of the diverse views of what peacebuilding involves in operational terms, peacebuilding discourse within the UN is closely associated with improving systemic efforts to consolidate peace. This is supported by the fact that the principal innovations associated with peacebuilding in the UN system have evolved in response to perceived weaknesses, gaps and incoherence of the collective international response at the systemic level. The UN principal institutional response to these concerns, notably PBC, was designed to bring together the most significant external actors in an effort to secure their sustained support for peace consolidation around a common strategic approach. More recently, the UN has turned its attention to the collective peacebuilding effort in the immediate aftermath of conflict, arguing for strengthened in-country capacity to promote strategic coordination and for efforts to bring forward the development response.

Like the UN, the EU is a fragmented institutional actor, in which the principal line of cleavage is between the development and security “pillars”. Within these pillars, different actors are engaged in a variety of activities that can be said to contribute to peacebuilding, using a range of different instruments. Their conceptions of what peacebuilding involves vary accordingly. For example, interviews reveal that for EC officials (first pillar) involved in implementing the IfS, peacebuilding is often associated with a subset of activities that are designed to address specific risk factors and promote dialogue and mediation. Officials working in DG DEV and EuropeAid (first pillar) associate peacebuilding with efforts to promote conflict sensitivity in development assistance and address root causes by supporting long-term processes of democratization, improving governance and promoting development. Within the European Council (second pillar), officials do not typically define their work in terms of peacebuilding, but rather argue that short-term crisis management interventions, including political negotiations and interventions designed for post-conflict state-building, are essential prerequisites for consolidating peace.

Although it is widely recognized in the EU that “post-conflict stabilization”, recovery and peacebuilding require a comprehensive approach, combining
security, development and governance activities, the EU member states have not demanded institutional coherence in the same way that they have in the UN context. Rather, to date, the politics of EU integration have served to entrench the security and development divide, with security actors emphasizing decision-making autonomy, and development actors privileging conceptual and policy links with the broader donor community and national development ministries over cross-pillar alliances. This helps explain why, in the EU, the peacebuilding challenge is primarily viewed at the activity level—designing, supporting or implementing specific actions that are considered to have an impact on the root causes of conflict and the consolidation of peace.

Within the EU, even if there is a unified view that peacebuilding aims to prevent relapse into violence by improving security, governance and socio-economic development, there is no shared view on the political and operational questions of who decides on priorities, who implements them and how this should be done at the programming level. This has clearly limited the operational utility of the concept of peacebuilding. On the other hand, while the UN has tentatively begun to address the questions “who decides and who implements” by efforts to bring together key external actors in PBC or through efforts to integrate UN interventions at the field-level, there is only partial “buy-in” to these efforts and little consensus on “how peacebuilding should be done” at the activity level. Rather, in the UN, operational policy and guidance is decided within discrete communities of practice within specific organizational settings and there is no common view of what peacebuilding involves in operational terms.

Given that the EU tends to view peacebuilding at the programming level, the main focus for the EC has been on strengthening operational partnerships to address specific threats to peace. In the UN, the principal interest has been on maintaining EU support for the nascent Peacebuilding Architecture in New York and for UN-led coordination efforts and programmes in-country. However, although the EU and UN privilege different levels of the peacebuilding challenge and this contributes to conceptual confusion, in practice, both organizations combine similar approaches to peacebuilding albeit using different conceptual terms. Their organizational approach to peacebuilding is, therefore, arguably more similar than it appears from an analysis of terminology.
For instance, the EC approach to peacebuilding is similar to that of UNDP in many ways. Both organizations support a conflict transformation approach to peacebuilding, working to transform violent conflict from the bottom up through various actions designed to promote social and political reconciliation. While their engagement with national elites is a prerequisite for their operational engagements, their activities are not typically targeted at changing the behaviour of national leaders in the short term. Rather, they are often designed to create enabling conditions for peace in the longer term. The EC and UNDP, thus, share ambitions to tackle the root causes through long-term programming in areas such as justice, rule of law, democratization, state-building at national and local levels and poverty reduction. Their engagement in post-conflict recovery is also increasingly guided by common needs assessments and the EC supports UN efforts to speed up the delivery of peace dividends through better humanitarian-development coordination and funding innovations. In these cases, the approach to conflict transformation is necessarily a soft one based on long-term partnerships with national governments and efforts to build local capacity. Although the EC and UN might compete for influence in-country, they tend to share a long-term preventative approach to peace consolidation.

In contrast, the use of political and security instruments for peacebuilding follows a distinct “crisis management approach” in the EU and UN. Although both organizations stress the imperative of national ownership for their operations designed to build state capacity, priority actions are decided from the top down. Actions implemented by external actors form part of a package of incentives (positive and negative) designed to maintain the support of political elites for the implementation of peace agreements or mutually agreed reforms.

This difference in approach also has implications for how the different actors perceive the imperative of external coherence and coordination. In line with the logic of crisis management, efforts to promote coherence of the external peacebuilding effort are primarily important for strategic political reasons since “unity of effort” increases the leverage or power of the external actors vis-à-vis key domestic political elites. The same is not, however, necessarily true for efforts that aim to improve structural stability or change from the bottom up. In these cases, the external actors require consent from national elites but not in return for short-term concessions. Indeed, the development community has long been cognizant of the
negative consequences for their work of strict conditionality. From the perspective of many development actors, then, coherence is desirable for reasons of efficiency or administrative accountability. Operational partnerships can enable or strengthen interventions and aid harmonization is considered important for achieving “critical mass” without burdening limited state capacity with the administration of external aid. It is not, therefore, principally important for strategic reasons associated with ongoing negotiation processes designed to promote political reform from the top down.

Thus, while both long-term conflict transformation and short-term crisis management approaches to peacebuilding can be complementary they are organized in fundamentally different ways, with different objectives, theories of change, timelines and coordination “requirements”. In theory, local EU and UN leadership helps synchronize different approaches and ensure that they are complementary. However, in both cases they often lack the authority and capacity to do so. Similarly, while the EU and UN have created dedicated peacebuilding funding instruments (the IfS of the EU and the PBF of the UN) to fill strategic gaps, or address imminent risks, these are no substitute for agreeing strategic external priorities in line with peace consolidation objectives. And while both the EU and UN support the ambition of PBC to guide “strategic” international engagement, in practice, it has limited geographical scope and has not guided their operational decisions.

In conclusion, although the EU and UN employ different conceptual frameworks for peacebuilding, they adopt similar organizational approaches, combining bottom-up support for peacebuilding processes with top-down pressure for reform. This creates opportunities for inter-institutional cooperation within sector-specific communities of practice. However, there is no consensus among practitioners or scholars on how to combine these approaches to deliver whole-of-system strategic guidance. This suggests that, in practice, peacebuilding will remain characterized by conceptual and operational competition, both within and between the EU and UN.

Not only is this competition inevitable given the fragmented nature of external engagement, but it is also arguably useful. Just as competition in the humanitarian community has led to improvements in service delivery, and to improvements in coordination and funding, it also has the potential to
improve the practice of peacebuilding. However, in order to do so, member states and donors need to be better equipped with operational feedback and knowledge in order to judge what works for which purpose and to assess the extent to which they can and should package their “strategic” assistance to maximize collective leverage. What is needed, therefore, is not greater conceptual clarity or new institutions, but greater emphasis on building mechanisms for institutional learning and accountability into current practices.
PART 2

FUNDING TRENDS AND
THE EC–UN PEACEBUILDING PARTNERSHIP

2. INTRODUCTION: HAS THE EC INCREASED ITS SUPPORT FOR UN PEACEBUILDING?

This section aims to answer the central question: Has the EC increased its support for UN peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict or fragile states since 2001? It identifies quantitative trends in EC funding for peacebuilding and traces the proportion of EU funding for peacebuilding channelled through the UN, drawing on published data. In addition to tracking global trends, it provides country examples, illustrating the diversity of EC–UN in-country operational partnerships in conflict-affected countries. The narrative analysis offers explanations for the key trends observed and is complemented by a discussion of the main organizational obstacles to effective aid delivery, including through the UN, in fragile situations.

2.1 GLOBAL TRENDS IN FUNDING FOR FRAGILE STATES

OECD defines fragile states as countries that “lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development, and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations” (OECD 2007c:2). Using a range of economic and governance indicators, OECD compiles an index of fragile states, which currently
includes 38 states.\textsuperscript{23} Figures 2 and 3 are drawn from OECD data and, therefore, refer to the states that OECD currently categorizes as fragile.\textsuperscript{24}

**Figure 2.** Net ODA disbursement from all donors to fragile states

![Graph showing net ODA disbursement from all donors to fragile states from 2000 to 2007.](image)

**Source:** OECD (2008).

As Figure 2 demonstrates, since 2001 there has been a gradual rise in total (multilateral and bilateral) Official Development Assistance (ODA)

\textsuperscript{23} In 2009, these were: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Liberia, Mauritania, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

\textsuperscript{24} When compared with other similar indices, including the World Bank index of Low-Income Countries Under Stress, the Failed States Index or the Difficult Partnership Countries, the OECD list of fragile countries tends to be longer.
for fragile states. This is due, in part, to significant debt relief programmes as well as to the 2010 aid targets that states committed to at the 2005 Gleneagles Summit. However, as Figure 3 demonstrates, over half of ODA to fragile states between 2001 and 2007 was channelled to five countries: Nigeria, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sudan and Cameroon.

Figure 3. Shares of net ODA to fragile states (2001–2007)


According to White (2009:6) regarding ODA for fragile states, “the bulk of foreign assistance is channelled to moderately well-off countries, those recently emerging from a conflict or those possessing special geopolitical significance”. The rest are so-called “aid orphans” that receive relatively little support despite high levels of need and probabilities of the (re-) eruption of violence. This confirms that conflict prevention is not the main determinant of global aid priorities. Nor, it appears, are governance or state capacity-building the main focuses of funding in fragile states. Even in those states that receive high levels of ODA, a high proportion of the assistance is in the form of debt relief or humanitarian assistance. It is not, therefore, clear whether programmable aid for long-term institution-building and development has risen since 2001.

A number of reasons have been given for why many fragile states receive a small proportion of aid despite evident need. The first relates to aid effectiveness. Research in 2000 showed that aid had a positive impact
on countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies (Burnside and Dollar 2000:847–868). This proved influential, with donors increasingly determining aid allocations on the basis of good performance. However, a number of researchers argued that performance-based aid has left fragile states behind and the causes of state fragility unaddressed (Goodhand 2006; Fukuda-Parr and Picciotto 2007; White 2009). Research conducted for the World Bank on the “poverty alleviation” efficiency of aid showed that there was an inefficient allocation of aid, with fragile states receiving less aid than was consistent with what aid could achieve in terms of growth and poverty alleviation (Collier and Dollar 1999). Similarly, research for OECD showed that most fragile states were underfunded relative to what they should have received according to their poverty, population and World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment scores. On the other hand, a few “aid darlings” received more aid than their scores justified (Levin and Dollar 2005). Thus, fragile states tend to receive less than their need and their performance merit. This suggests that performance-based aid is not necessarily biased against fragile states. To explain the discrepancy, some point to the influence of political and commercial interests to help explain the disproportionately high amount of funding that middle-income countries receive. Moreover, the margins between what states merit based on aid performance criteria and what they receive are larger in bilateral aid than in aid from multilateral organizations (Levin and Dollar 2005). This is possibly because multilateral aid is relatively less influenced by political and commercial interests than bilateral aid. A further study shows a preference for donor funding for states where capacity is weak, but state legitimacy is strong (Carment et al. 2009), pointing to the importance of political stability as a factor in aid allocation decisions, regardless of donor political or commercial interests.

While political influence may be one factor in explaining aid allocation discrepancies, it is certainly not the only one. Organizational incentive structures are clearly weighted against risky and administratively costly aid in fragile states. Donor agencies are accountable to their principals—legislators and member states who stress accountability and concerns over corruption. They also stress aid disbursement efficiency that puts a premium on aid volume. These pressures have, moreover, intensified with the G8 commitments and the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. They are also translated within organizations into individual appraisal and incentive structures that reward high-volume, risk-averse interventions. By the same token, there are no incentives to encourage staff to take up
posts in fragile countries or to seek out projects linked to state capacity-building. These require high levels of supervision, local expertise and political acumen to maintain relationships with partner governments, while tackling political obstacles. In summary, “risk aversion, budget pressures and a reluctance to make the labour-intensive investments commensurate with the challenge posed by fragile states all discourage engagement with them” (White 2009:9).

Yet, as Collier (2008) has shown, aid as technical assistance can help turn around failing states. There is, for example, statistical evidence that technical assistance in the first years of incipient reform has a big favourable effect on the chances that the momentum of the reforms will be maintained (Collier 2008:114). Similarly, there is evidence that programmes and projects in fragile states require higher levels of supervision (Collier 2008:118). The trick, he argued, is for agencies to create or support funding mechanisms for high-risk interventions, including early recovery funds, and for agencies and donors to accept that they will need to spend relatively more on project administration in fragile contexts.

The following section explores to what extent these broad trends and challenges that discourage engagement in fragile states apply to EC funding for fragile states.

2.2 Trends in EC funding for fragile states

The EC does not routinely publish data on its funding for fragile states. Nevertheless, its EU Donor Atlas platform initiated an online tool for tracking aid in situations of fragility. This was based on the World Bank list of fragile situations and was maintained until 2005. These data are reproduced in Figure 4.

Figure 4. ODA by type from EC

Although not up to date, Figure 4 reveals an increase in EC ODA assistance to fragile states since 2000. However, much of this additional spending is related to emergency humanitarian aid rather than core development assistance. It is, therefore, less clear to what extent EC funding for core dimensions of the state-building agenda had increased up to 2005.

2.2.1 Trends in EC funding for state-building in fragile states

Since 2000, there has been a concerted effort within the EU to promote good governance and state-building in EU development policy. This has been reflected in an increasingly elaborate policy framework and dedicated financial commitments. The policy developments can be traced through a number of EC and joint EU–European Council policy documents. These include the joint statement on EC development policy (European Commission 2000a), which identifies institutional strengthening as one of the six priority areas, and the EC Communication on governance and development (European Commission 2003a), which evolved into the EC Communication on governance (European Commission 2006a). Governance issues also feature prominently in the European consensus on development (European Council 2005a), the EU strategy for Africa (European Council 2005b) and the 2006 EC Communication on governance (European Commission 2006a). This draws upon the results of independent evaluation (PARTICIP 2006) with a view to developing a more harmonized approach to governance within the development context.

In line with its elevated policy profile, financial commitments to the good governance agenda have been increasingly significant, although difficult to quantify. The lack of appropriate classification codes has meant that attempts to identify the volume of aid allocated to good governance have been tentative. A 2003 review of country and regional strategy papers conducted by DG DEV, nevertheless, estimated that €2 billion out of a total programmable envelope of €10 billion for 2002–2007 was allocated to governance-related support (European Commission 2003b). Another estimate of financial volumes (by region) over the period 1995–2004 showed an increase in good governance-related commitments, representing 27% of total EC commitments. But it also revealed a widening gap between commitments and payments, with only one-third of the commitments disbursed over the period (PARTICIP 2006:38). The EC earmarked €2.7 billion to good governance from the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) for 2008–2013 out of a total programmable envelope of €13.5 billion.
for ACP countries. While 80% of EDF is allocated through CSPs, which may also include governance support, the remaining 20% (€2.7 billion) is set aside as an additional “incentive tranche”. These funds are allocated on the basis of partner countries’ commitments to governance plans of action. The EC insists that this system does not constitute a form of conditionality since it offers a more collaborative approach to implementation, with joint responsibility for attaining targets. Nevertheless, as the OECD DAC review observed, democratic governance is increasingly seen as a precondition for budget support and it remains unclear how the incentive tranche system will work in fragile states where state capacity is weak (OECD 2007a:64, 68). Thus, although aid allocations for good governance are significant and increasing, the fact that recipients must meet minimum governance standards to receive budget support or “additional” governance assistance, suggests that there are significant challenges to aid disbursement on “governance” in fragile states.

As with global ODA trends, it appears that funding for governance is higher in “normal” development contexts and in fragile states is concentrated in relatively few “aid darlings”. The EC Communication on governance acknowledged that the majority of good governance assistance is delivered in stable political contexts (European Commission 2003a, 2006). Likewise, the EC report on peacebuilding activities (European Commission 2005a) provides relatively few concrete examples of EC support for state-building in fragile contexts with some notable post-conflict exceptions, including Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq and countries of the Western Balkans. EuropeAid annual reports also showed that top recipients of EC aid are often conflict-affected countries. Since 2003, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, the Sudan and the West Bank and Gaza have featured among the top five recipients.

2.2.2 Operational challenges for EC engagement in fragile states

Although there has been little quantitative analysis of the breakdown of EC assistance in fragile states, there have been a number of qualitative studies of EC assistance in this area. The EC commissioned two of these, the 2006 thematic evaluation of EC support to good governance (European Commission 2006). In EC funding data categorization, the West Bank and Gaza are grouped as a country. For the sake of data consistency, this report uses the same categorization.
Commission 2006d) and the 2008 mapping study on situations of fragility (European Commission 2008a). In addition, in 2007 the Portuguese Presidency of the EU commissioned a study intended to inform EU strategy in response to situations of fragility (Faria and Ferreira 2007). These reviews of EC assistance documented the increasing prominence given to the governance dimension in EC development policy, but also identified a gap between policy and practice. As with global reviews of assistance in fragile states, the studies highlighted disbursement pressures combined with an emphasis on financial accountability as factors that served as disincentives for risky and administratively “heavy” governance programming. Similarly, they noted the difficulty of prioritizing governance issues in CSPs where partner governments are not in agreement, and all stressed that EC in-country capacity was often not sufficient for providing and overseeing governance assistance in many post-conflict contexts.

Building on the analysis provided in these formal reviews of EC assistance, this subsection explores EC capacities for marrying political and substantive analysis with programming, and argues that the structural reforms introduced in the 1990s have served to exacerbate the challenge by reducing and fragmenting substantive expertise. According to OECD DAC reviews of EC reforms as well as the analysis of the then Commissioner for Development Aid Nielson (OECD 1998; Jørgensen 2006:206), member state criticism of EC aid management efficiency,27 through the OECD peer review process, was a key driver of the two major organizational reforms of the late 1990s. This was reinforced by internal criticism (European Commission 2000b) and resulted in a comprehensive reform package. The reforms involved the consolidation of project management tasks in a new Directorate-General—the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO)—established in 2001,28 and the devolution of EC aid management. Grant-making authority was delegated

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27 Evidence for the sluggishness of EC aid management included the amount of undisbursed funds: as of December 1996 the committed but undisbursed funds had reached €11.6 billion, including €1.3 billion on commitments made before 1992 (OECD 1998:55).

28 The proposal to establish a single office responsible for the operational aspects of aid management was initially intended to tackle aid disbursement efficiency by introducing greater flexibility in staff recruitment. This prompted the 1997 suggestion to create an independent aid agency, distinct from the EC. The idea encountered resistance from all the affected Directorates-General, on the basis that out-sourcing core aspects of the aid disbursement function would undermine the institutional competence and authority of the EC, and in 1997
to EC delegations and some staff were transferred from Brussels to the 140 countries in which the EC is represented (European Commission 2004a).

The centralization of the operational management of aid disbursement was intended to separate out the policymaking and programming functions retained by DG RELEX and DG DEV from the operational project management tasks. Consequently, EuropeAid is formally responsible for all phases of the project cycle (identification and appraisal of projects and programmes, preparation of financing decisions, implementation and monitoring, evaluation of projects and programmes) that are necessary to ensure the achievement of the objectives of EC programmes. Four of the seven EuropeAid directorates are organized by region, two provide operational support and one, Directorate E—Operations Quality Support—is dedicated to ensuring that EuropeAid is a “centre of excellence”, where projects are designed with input from substantive experts. In relation to EC assistance to post-conflict peacebuilding and state-building, the relevant units for providing substantive input to project design and implementation are E4 “governance, human rights and gender” and E5 “security and migration”. Institutional expertise related to post-conflict state-building and conflict prevention was, therefore, formally separated from expertise on governance within EuropeAid until mid-2007 when these two units were merged.

Thus, organizational restructuring in order to streamline EC aid disbursement has resulted in the fragmentation of the Brussels-based grant-making infrastructure into three Directorates-General with distinct functional roles and organizational cultures. DG RELEX is designed to promote the EC role as a political and foreign policy actor, DG DEV is aligned with the EC role as an aid agency and EuropeAid is designed to promote the functional imperatives of efficient rule-based aid disbursement. All three Directorates-General have centres of thematic expertise in the area of conflict prevention and post-conflict state-building. This is located in the Conflict Prevention Unit of DG RELEX, the Governance and Security Unit of EuropeAid and the pan-African unit (dealing with security, governance and migration) in DG DEV, in addition to country and regional desk officers. The task of “mainstreaming” conflict prevention or promoting a coherent approach to post-conflict state-building has, therefore, been complicated...
by the fact that this requires interservice cooperation between the three Directorates-General with distinct organizational agendas, all of whom can claim competence on the basis of their formal roles and expertise.

In addition to the increased fragmentation of the policy and programming infrastructure in Brussels, the process of EC devolution has compounded the scattered nature of EC decision-making and increased the challenge of ensuring substantive expertise and policy coherence in the delivery of EC external assistance. The extensive and rapid devolution of management responsibilities from EC headquarters to EC delegations abroad was guided by the principle that “anything that can be better managed and decided on the spot, close to what is happening on the ground, should not be managed or decided in Brussels” (European Commission 2000c). It was implemented between 2000 and 2005 and was prompted by severe criticism of EC efficiency as a donor.29 In line with this analysis, an independent review of the reform process stated that a “profoundly important factor in explaining the current crisis is the ‘existential transition’ in which the EC finds itself, i.e. from acting as a ‘motor’ for the European integration process to becoming a ‘manager’ of large funds” (Bossuyt et al. 2000). Devolution was, therefore, designed to quickly yield results that related to the strengthening and expediting of EC aid disbursement bureaucracy, in addition to delivering qualitative improvements in recipient ownership through the gradual decentralization of management responsibilities to recipients.

Studies of decentralization efforts within EU member states revealed that devolution reforms within donor organizations are generally hampered by reliance on centralized procedures, lack of analytical capacity in missions, understaffing and a lack of clear division of responsibilities between different entities in the donor system (OECD 2003). This also appears true of EC efforts, and the specificities of the EC make some of these challenges more acute. For example, while it was broadly acknowledged that understaffing contributed to the slow pace of EC aid disbursement, efforts to address this through devolution still leave the EC relatively short of personnel compared with other donors and have focused on increasing human resources for project administration over substantive expertise to promote effective project design and quality control. In total, 1,559 staff (375 EC officials

29 By 1999, the EC backlog of outstanding commitments reached more than US$20 billion and the average delay in disbursements had increased from three to four and a half years in the last five-year period.
and 1,184 external staff) were hired to cover the devolution process, of which over half of the new official positions were for finance and contract specialists. By the end of 2004, these new positions gave the EC 4.8 staff to manage every €10 million, up from 2.9 in 2000 but still well below the average for EU member states, which have between three (Austria) and 23 (Germany) staff for every US$10 million (European Commission 2004b:81). Given that devolved systems tend to be more staff intensive than centralized ones, and that few of the new hires have substantive or local expertise, the devolution process did not necessarily increase the human resource capacity in delegations to deliver more locally attuned and politically sensitive funding decisions.30

The finding that devolution has not increased the effectiveness of aid delivery has been reinforced by feedback from ACP governments, which stressed that the expertise in the delegations has not matched the expertise required by the focal areas of CSPs or National Indicative Programmes (ACP Secretariat 2004). Moreover, in a number of recipient countries, the devolution of administrative responsibilities and capacity to the national level has led the EC to roll back joint management with host countries in order to expedite implementation. Therefore, it has been noted that the process of devolution, coupled with the pressure to disburse and a preoccupation with financial accountability, has undermined the strategy of building capacity in the recipient country and has confused “disbursed money” with “impact” (Frederiksen and Baser 2004:9–10). This has prompted calls for increases in operational staff working in the focal area of EC assistance (particularly governance) and for incentives to reward staff for quality improvements and for active contributions toward strategic reform objectives (Frederiksen and Baser 2004:10).

In light of persistent staff shortages and the increased responsibilities that EC delegations have acquired, the character and competence of delegations is increasingly shaped by the leadership and recruitment choices of EC heads of delegation. Faced with limited staff allotments, EC managers have to make difficult decisions over whether to prioritize those with experience in supporting sector wide approaches over those with project management

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30 This is, in turn, exacerbated by current incentives in EC career progression. Despite a recent change in the EC statute requiring officials in the Directorate-General dealing with external relations to go abroad after a maximum of six years in Brussels, there are no financial or career progression incentives for doing so, and hence many officials find ways to avoid field assignment.
skills or broad development experience. NGO reports on EC delegation capacity in countries or regions affected by conflict reveal a wide variation in capacity and expertise, with some delegations (such as for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia/Somaliland and Uganda) having acquired a high degree of expertise, including through the local recruitment of ALATs (agents locaux d’assistance technique) (Saferworld 2006a, 2006b; Samson 2007).

In summary, the above account of the reform of EC development assistance highlights how the interaction between member states and the EC created a reform agenda that focused on developing the institutional competence of the EC as an administratively accountable aid disbursement agency. While neither member states nor DG RELEX commissioners who orchestrated the reforms foresaw that privileging aid disbursement efficiency might adversely affect aid effectiveness, in practice, it has undermined efforts to build substantive capacity and procedures that promote politically sensitive and transformative funding strategies in fragile states. Rather, EC reforms have reduced institutional incentives and capacity to engage in politically sensitive project-based programming and to allocate relatively scarce staff resources to developing in-house specialist competence. Moreover, the combination of institutional restructuring in Brussels with devolution to the field has led to the fragmentation of substantive expertise across three Directorates-General in Brussels (DG RELEX, DG DEV and EuropeAid) and between headquarters and the field. In doing so, it has complicated efforts in Brussels to integrate conflict analysis in the development of CSPs and country programming documents and has led to a wide degree of variation in the capacity and approach to implementing politically sensitive governance programming in EC delegations. This helps explain why, in the absence of substantive capacity and buy-in from geographical desks and delegations, governance programming remains scattered, ad hoc, projectized and relatively rare in some fragile states.

By the same token, disbursement pressures combined with capacity shortfalls have increased operational imperatives to channel funds through administratively efficient instruments, such as budget support. The EC has used budget support for debt relief in fragile states (e.g. Burundi, the Central African Republic, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo) and is working, together with other donors, on the development of guidance to increase the use of budget support for state-building and governance development in fragile states. However, given the limited capacity or “eligibility” of
national government counterparts and risk aversion of member states and the European Parliament, the use of budget support in fragile states is not yet widespread, and would, in any case, likely need to be combined with technical assistance programmes in the area of financial administration.

EC capacity shortfalls and risk aversion also arguably contribute to an operational interest in partnering with other donors and other international organizations in the implementation of assistance in fragile states. They help explain the increase in the use of Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) in fragile states, administered by the UN or World Bank and the use of the UN as an implementing partner for projects and programmes. Distributing aid through the UN is relatively administratively light for the EC, especially since the 2003 Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA), and makes sense in so far as the UN has a comparative capacity advantage and established relationship with the authorities in many fragile states. In short, although the EC and EU may have ambitions to use its political influence and financial clout directly in fragile situations (and this ambition may yet be realized through reforms following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty), this has not in many cases been easy to reconcile with its role as an efficient donor. Where the UN has a comparative political and capacity advantage in fragile states, one might, therefore, expect the UN to be natural implementing partner for the EC. The following section explores whether this is borne out by recent funding trends and evaluations of EC assistance.

2.3 Global Trends in EC Funding for the UN

2.3.1 Trends in EC assistance channelled through UN bodies

There have been a number of efforts to track European funding that is channelled through the UN. Within the EC, EuropeAid has produced an annual report of EuropeAid financial contributions to the UN since 2001, providing statistics on the external aid that EuropeAid is responsible for disbursing. This includes aid from the European Community Budget and EDF, but does not include humanitarian aid disbursed through the European Commission for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). Since 2005, the Brussels Office
of UNDP has also produced annual reports highlighting the results of the EC–UN operational partnership. In addition, the EC launched an evaluation of external EC cooperation with partner countries through the organizations of the UN family. This involved both quantitative and qualitative analysis and was delivered in 2008 (European Commission 2008d). This section draws on the data published in these reports and aims to provide an overview of the main trends in the EC–UN funding relationship.

**Figure 5.** Financial contributions from the European Commission to the United Nations

![Financial contributions from the European Commission to the United Nations](image)

**Source:** EuropeAid financial contributions to the UN, 2001–2008.33

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32 These annual reports are available on the web site of the UNDP Brussels office at <www.undp.org/eu/>.

33 These EuropeAid statistics are prepared using data from the Common RELEX Information System (CRIS), which contains information on projects funded from the general EC budget (about €4 billion per year). It also includes data from projects in the OLAS database, which are funded by EDF that covers ACP (about €3 billion per year). Since 15 February 2009, however, CRIS also includes data previously included in OLAS. The source of the statistics on EC humanitarian funding from ECHO is also from EuropeAid, as represented in the report *Improving Lives* (UNDP 2008:20).
Figures 5 and 6 show that since 2001 there has been a marked increase in funding channelled from the EC through the UN. From 2002 to 2006, the volume of aid channelled through EuropeAid to the UN quadrupled from some €257 million to over €1 billion in 2006. Although from 2006 to 2007 this declined to around €719 million, this can partly be explained by an accounting change. In 2007, all food aid programmes, with a total budget of €220 million, were transferred to the Directorate-General for ECHO and, therefore, most contracts concluded with the World Food Programme (WFP) do not appear in 2007 figures. However, this alone does not explain the decline in 2007 and 2008. As Figure 11 (p. 74) indicates, the decline since 2006 can be explained by a decline in aid to some of the countries that received a high proportion of EC assistance, often channelled through UNDP.

Figure 6. Total EC aid and percentage channelled through the UN system (2002–2007)

Figure 7 reveals that a large proportion of EC funding for the UN is allocated to situations of fragility (European Commission 2008d). It shows that between 1999 and 2006 more than half (55%) of the total funds contracted by the EC (DG RELEX, DG DEV, AIDCO) to the UN bodies over the period 1999–2006 was for interventions in clear situations of political crisis. During this period, three countries received one-third of the total: West Bank and Gaza Strip €548 million (14%); Iraq €478 million (10%); and Afghanistan €356 million (9%). However, as Figure 8 shows, substantial funding for Afghanistan only began in 2001, Iraq in 2002 and the others in 2003–2004.

Figure 8 also demonstrates that high volumes of EC funding for the UN are concentrated in particular crisis-affected states. In addition to the three countries mentioned above, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia were the next three largest recipients of EC funding channelled through the UN, along with regional ACP initiatives. Likewise, the annual reviews of the EC–UN partnership conducted by UNDP consistently reveal that most of the countries for which they receive high levels of funding from the EC (over €15 million per year) have been affected by political crisis. For
instance, in 2007 there were 15 UN country programmes which received over €15 million from the EC. These were, in order of volume, the Sudan, West Bank and Gaza, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iraq, Thailand, Ukraine, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, South Africa, Togo, Indonesia and Chad (United Nations Office in Brussels 2008:20).

**Figure 8.** Evolution of the contracted amounts of EC assistance channelled through UN bodies, 1999–2006: seven largest versus other recipient countries

![Graph showing evolution of EC assistance](image_url)

**Note:** DRC = the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**Source:** Evaluation of EC external cooperation with partner countries through the organizations of the UN family (European Commission 2008d).

EC assistance is channelled through a wide range of UN agencies and programmes. EuropeAid annual reports routinely report on no fewer than 38 UN bodies that receive EC assistance. However, given that a high proportion of assistance is channelled to countries in situations of crisis, the UN agencies or programmes that are present and have a mandate to deliver recovery assistance receive a relatively large proportion of EC assistance. As shown in Figure 9, which excludes EC humanitarian funding, a large proportion of EC funds were granted to a limited number of UN bodies between 1999 and 2006. UNDP was the main recipient with €1.5
billion, representing 40% of total EC contributions, followed by WFP with contracts amounting to €0.8 billion (21%). Five other large recipients were the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (15%), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (5%), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (3%), the World Health Organization (WHO) (3%) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) (2%). Combined, these seven UN bodies received 89% of EC funding for the UN between 1999 and 2006.

Figure 9. Distribution of the amount contracted from EC by UN bodies (% of value, 1999–2006)

Source: Evaluation of EC external cooperation with partner countries through the organizations of the UN family (European Commission 2008d).

Given that EC assistance for the UN is concentrated in a relatively small number of countries and UN agencies, as indicated in Figure 9, it is likely that large fluctuations in country assistance will be reflected in the volume of funding received by the main UN agencies that operate in those countries. This appears to be borne out by the trend in UNDP funding from the EC, shown in Figure 10. In 2004, 2005 and 2006, when UNDP was conducting large elections and reconstruction projects in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq and the Sudan, it received over €400 million per year from the EC, whereas previous and subsequent levels of funding have been less than half that amount.
Figure 10. EuropeAid financial contribution to the United Nations Development Programme (2001–2008)

Source: European Commission (2009c:45).

2.3.2 Analysis

EuropeAid does not offer any evaluation of the funding trends documented in its annual reports, but it has commissioned studies to evaluate the “added value” of channelling EC funding through international organizations. For instance, in 2006, it commissioned a study to provide an overview of implementation by international organizations, which concluded that the principal reasons for EC cooperation with these organizations were: (i) their ability to mobilize expertise and aid toward emerging global concerns; (ii) their potential for aid coordination; and (iii) their emphasis on capacity-building and on a strong policy agenda. It argued that one of the benefits of collaboration with international organizations is that it increases EC policy influence at a broader level and contributes to interorganizational learning (European Commission 2006c). Similarly, the 2006 UN review of its programmatic portfolio with the EC noted the importance of UN specialist thematic expertise and its coordination role as important reasons for channelling EC assistance through the UN. In addition, it noted that the EC partnered with the UN “on sensitive issues that require the legitimacy and impartiality of the UN and in fragile country situations where consistent field presence and combined UN mandates facilitate transition out of crises” (United Nations Office in Brussels 2006:12). This suggested that the strong operational EC partnership with the UN in fragile situations flows from the
UN capacity and legitimacy in these contexts. The 2008 evaluation of EC assistance through the UN reinforced this suggestion, concluding that the added value of channelling EC aid through the UN was simply that it was the only option for intervention in many cases. It concluded that:

a number of interventions would not have been possible if they had not been conducted through UN bodies. In various cases, the Commission benefited from the unique specific characteristics of the UN system and bodies, which were required for being able to intervene and which no other organisation could offer (European Commission 2008d:v).

Of particular note in this context is the use of multilateral response mechanisms for major events, such as MDTFs, which are administered through the UN. The UN, thereby, “made delivery of aid possible in cases where this would otherwise have been difficult, particularly in politically sensitive situations”. The study found that when the UN has a clear mandate to administer multi-donor interventions in the absence of government capacity, notably in crisis or post-conflict situations, “the organisation becomes a natural partner for the Commission” (European Commission 2008d:22). This, for example, includes the Iraq Trust Fund (UNDP), the elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNDP) and the mandate of UNRWA in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In many crisis situations, the evaluation studies found that channelling aid through the UN also “had impact in terms of policy dialogue with partner countries” (European Commission 2008d:vi). This is because the UN had established presence and relationship with national authorities. Channelling aid through the UN offered the EC access to national authorities and a platform for discussion, which was seen to be particularly valuable in fragile states (European Commission 2008d:25). Also, in cases where the UN administered multi-donor interventions, EC participation enhanced EC influence through the governance structures of MDTFs. This was, for instance, the case in the elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the EC actively participated in the technical committee responsible for the elections. There is, therefore, a broad consensus arising out of the evaluations of the EC funding partnership with the UN that in fragile situations the partnership is strong and natural because it is necessary; it enables the EC to disburse aid in these difficult contexts and enhances EC influence with local partner countries.
While none of the evaluations of EC assistance channelled through the UN set out to explain the funding trends, they nevertheless identify a range of factors that help account for the rise in volume and proportion of EC assistance channelled through the UN between 2001 and 2006. According to EC staff interviewed in Brussels and in the EC delegations, this trend was “significantly influenced” by the clear EC policy preference for supporting effective multilateralism by working with the UN and a crucial administrative agreement that made it easier to disburse funds to the UN in practice. More specifically, the 2001 Communication *Building an Effective Partnership with the United Nations in the Fields of Development and Humanitarian Affairs* (European Commission 2001b) and the 2003 Communication *The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism* (European Commission 2003c) provided a supportive policy framework, which was further strengthened by the emphasis of the Paris Declaration on donor cooperation and harmonization of external aid. However, the 2003 FAFA was a critical enabling factor. The 2008 ADE study noted that it “allowed UN bodies to work within their own procedures, it specified mutual obligations, and it made possible substantial pre-financing” (European Commission 2006d:vii). From the EC perspective, it reduced the time needed for partner selection compared with calls for proposals. However, it did not necessarily reduce delivery time given that it effectively transferred the administrative burden to the UN. The UNDP report on EC–UN cooperation in 2006 argued that, in addition to FAFA, which lowered the transaction costs of cooperation for the EC, assistance channelled through the UN has been aided by the devolution process within the EC that has increased the country-level entry points for cooperation and helped the EC assess local UN capacities more accurately (United Nations Office in Brussels 2006). Finally, while the ADE study noted that the increase in volume of funding until 2006 is a general phenomenon and does not only apply to countries with high public awareness and donor mobilization (e.g. Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq), the subsequent decline in funding since 2006 can be largely explained by a reduction in funding for some of the major recipient countries, most of which are in political crisis (see Figure 11). Thus, while there has been a general rise in the volume of assistance channelled through the UN, this is likely to fluctuate along with trends in funding high-profile countries or crisis events that precipitate large volumes of aid.

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34 This operationalized Article 53 of the Financial Regulation agreed in 2002, which provided the legal parameters and procedures for all EC assistance.
Despite the consensus that the EC and UN are natural operational partners in fragile states where the UN has the capacity, legitimacy and mandate to lead international responses, interviews with EC staff and evaluations of the EC–UN partnership reveal persistent frictions that stem from different perceptions of the nature of the partnership and different operational practices. For example, the EC has unusually high financial accountability standards linked to the financial regulations relating to ODA, which are required of the EC by the European Parliament. They have, however, led to the widespread perception within the UN that the EC is an “overly” demanding donor when compared with other donors. Reporting requirements that require annual interim reports and financial reports in euros often require distinct management of EC funds within UN interventions, which, in turn, creates problems for the pooling of resources. From the EC perspective, however, the UN is often seen as an unreliable implementing partner precisely because of insufficient and delayed narrative and financial reporting, which create accountability problems for EC officials. For example, the EC was forced to take abnormal financial risks in contravention of procedures when funding the elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo through UNDP, although both sides agree with hindsight that a proactive attitude to taking risks was required for the sake of the project’s (successful) outcome.

At the operational level, the EC–UN relationship is also strained by different interpretations of what partnership means in practice. From the EC point of view, co-management as defined in FAFA requires that the UN provide the EC with full information and involve the EC in strategic decision-making relating to project implementation. From the UN perspective, however, the EC is viewed as a demanding donor that wants to interfere in UN project management where it has no responsibility for the implementation for the project and does not deserve a “privileged” status vis-à-vis other donors. While both partners argue that the partnership should be based on mutual respect between “equals”, both often feel disrespected. EC evaluations have concluded that these organizational frictions can be overcome through greater clarification of mutual obligations, including through further guidance on the precise interpretation of FAFA as well as staff training. However, further organizational adaptation may be necessary. There is a strong case for adapting EC financial regulations, making them more risk tolerant in fragile states where the UN has a leading role in early post-conflict recovery, and for the increased use of MDTFs that reduce
transaction costs for the EC and the recipient country while ensuring that the donors are involved in their governance.

2.4 EC FUNDING FOR UN PEACEBUILDING

2.4.1 Global trends in EC funding for UN peacebuilding

The EC does not routinely provide statistics relating to its aid for peacebuilding. However, in EuropeAid 2006 and 2007 reports on its contributions to UN funds, programmes and agencies it identified the total amounts that the EC contracted with direct links to peacebuilding. In 2006, the total figure was €806 million, of which 36% was focused on elections and institution-building, 11% for support to refugees, 11% for economic recovery and 7% for management of natural resources. Other identified categories were DDR (3%), demining (3%), justice and human rights (5%) and children/gender in post-conflict assistance (2%) (European Commission 2007b). In 2007, EuropeAid identified that the total amount contracted to the UN with direct links to peacebuilding as €318 million, of which 41% was dedicated to elections and institution-building, 29% for rule of law, justice reform and human rights, 14% for SSR, 6% for management of natural resources, 5% for DDR, 3% for demining and 2% for support to refugees (European Commission 2008c). These categories were identified on the basis of unexplained “peacebuilding” criteria. The 2006 report also stated that 20% of aid had “no links with peacebuilding”, while the 2007 breakdown only included peacebuilding categories. This discrepancy raises the issue of the scope of peacebuilding. From EuropeAid 2007 and 2006 reports, it appears that peacebuilding has been defined as support for governance and security measures, but not for socio-economic activities.

The issue of how EuropeAid defined the scope of peacebuilding was tackled again in 2008, when EuropeAid commissioned a two-phase thematic evaluation of EC support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The preliminary phase resulted in a scoping and mapping study that sought to address issues of scope and build an inventory of EC support for conflict prevention and peacebuilding from 2001 to 2008 (European Commission 2009b). It produced an inventory of 3,080 interventions that were classified in 11 thematic categories derived from priority themes in the 2001

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35 This practice has since been discontinued in EuropeAid reporting.
Communication on conflict prevention (European Commission 2001a). More specifically, the inventory included all EC funding decisions that were “easily” linked to conflict prevention and peacebuilding by their OECD DAC sector codes (e.g. UN post-conflict peacebuilding “15230”) or domain codes (e.g. IfS). This produced a list of some 546 interventions. A second phase identified additional projects from an additional 64 search keys that related to the 30 “key concepts” identified from the 2001 Communication on conflict prevention. After cross-checking, this produced the “inventory” of 3,080 interventions. This section, which addresses the EC–UN funding partnership in peacebuilding, draws on data provided in this inventory since it is the most comprehensive source of publicly available data on EC support for peacebuilding. However, it should be noted that this data set is based on a more limited understanding of peacebuilding than is typical in the UN context, which includes most governance, socio-economic and security support in a fragile situation as well as much humanitarian relief. In contrast, the EC peacebuilding inventory explicitly excludes humanitarian support dispersed through ECHO as well as direct budget support, although many might argue that both play a role in peace consolidation and state-building in fragile contexts.

36 These categories were: economic support and trade cooperation; democracy, rule of law and civil society; security sector; peace consolidation and conflict prevention; reconstruction and infrastructure; anti-drug actions; environment and natural resources; health and communicable diseases; population flows and human trafficking; rapid intervention; and multsector interventions in other thematic categories.
Figure 11. Total EC spending on peacebuilding in top five major recipient countries

![Figure 11](image_url)

Source: CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission 2009b).

Figure 12 reveals that total spending for peacebuilding increased dramatically from €86 million in 2001 to over €1 billion in 2007, totalling some €5.9 billion from 2001 to 2008. Of this, €2.2 billion (37%) went through the UN. As with ODA trends for assistance to fragile states, for most of this time the bulk of EC assistance went to a few countries. In the case of the EC, as shown in Figure 11, the top four recipients of peacebuilding assistance were the West Bank and Gaza (26%), Afghanistan (12%), Iraq (11%) and the Sudan (8%). Together, they received 57% of EC assistance from 2001 to 2008. The Democratic Republic of the Congo received a further 5% and 11 other countries received between 1% and 2%.37 However, in 2008, funding

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37 These countries include: Angola, Bangladesh, the Central African Republic, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Indonesia, Liberia, Somalia, Timor-Leste and Ukraine.
levels for the top four recipients declined. This was largely because no new funds were contracted to the Iraq and Afghanistan Trust Funds or the African Union Mission in Sudan, and the funding for the Temporary International Mechanism to support the Palestinian Authority declined. Given that in Afghanistan and Iraq, in particular, much of the EC funding was channelled through the UN-managed trust funds, this largely explains the drop in the EC funding for the UN in 2007 and 2008 as shown in Figure 12 and in the level of funding for UNDP as shown in Figure 10.

**Figure 12.** Total EC spending on peacebuilding

![Total EC spending on peacebuilding](image)

*Source:* CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission 2009b).
2.4.2 EC–UN funding trends in selected countries

In order to illustrate the variety of the EC–UN operational partnerships in different peacebuilding contexts, this section explores the funding relationship in nine countries. These include the top five recipients of EC peacebuilding assistance (the West Bank and Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) as well as the four countries on the agenda of the UN PBC (Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone).

The West Bank and Gaza

In the West Bank and Gaza, much of the spending was in the form of direct budgetary assistance to the Palestinian Authority (see Figure 13). For example, this included €98 million in 2002, €80 million in 2003 and €70 million in 2005. In 2006, the EC provided around €100 million to the Temporary International Mechanism to support the Palestinian Authority, which increased to €342 million in 2007, but dropped significantly in 2008. By contrast, EC spending channelled through UNRWA remained
fairly level at just under €100 million per year. This corresponded to 14% of EC peacebuilding funding to the UN from 2001 to 2008 (European Commission 2008d:13), which was used to support relief and reconstruction programmes. In general terms, the EC–UN partnership in the West Bank and Gaza is strong, where the EC is the principal donor and the UN is the principal implementing agency, with a specific 1949 mandate to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestinian refugees.

**Afghanistan**

**Figure 14. Total EC spending on peacebuilding in Afghanistan**

![Graph showing total EC spending on peacebuilding in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2008.](image)

**Source:** CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission 2009b).

In Afghanistan, the majority of EC assistance was dispersed to MDTFs (see Figure 14). These included the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, which, inter alia, pays the salaries of Afghan National Police. Since its inception, the EC has been the largest donor to the trust fund, but currently the United States is the largest. The EC has also contributed to the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund. Both of these are managed by UNDP and implemented together with national partners. The EC also contributed to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which is one of the most important delivery means for channelling aid into the government’s core
budget. It does not, however, fund security-related activities. The Fund is administered by the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and UNDP. In addition, the EC also plays a leading role in supporting the Afghan health sector, where service delivery is largely contracted to NGOs. In general terms, the EC partnership with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is constructive, with, for instance, active EC engagement in the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. However, this partnership is rendered less significant, given that there is little strategic coherence between EU institutional actors and member states in Afghanistan, and that UNAMA does not, in practice, exercise a coordinating role in relation to US and International Security Assistance Force state-building efforts (HTSPE 2008:27–37).

**Iraq**

**Figure 15.** Total EC spending on peacebuilding in Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Spending in Millions (Euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission2009b).

This study was commissioned by the European Commission to follow up the European Council Conclusions on Security and Development. It explores the relationship between EU security and development actions in six case studies, one of which is Afghanistan.
In Iraq, a large proportion of EC funding was channelled to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) (see Figure 15). This consists of the UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund and the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund. Between 2003 and 2007, the EC was the largest donor to IRFFI, contributing 42% of the Fund. In addition to funding channelled through IRFFI, the EC has supported UNDP projects in the field of human rights and civil society as well as and rule of law and justice. Given the improved security situation in Iraq in 2008, the decision was taken to wind down IRFFI, and EC assistance is now shifting to more bilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, a significant number of EC programmes will continue to be implemented by UN agencies, including through UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF and WHO. Since 2003, almost half of EC aid has been dedicated to the development of basic services (education, health, infrastructure, water and sanitation), one-quarter to human development (agriculture, poverty reduction, landmine action, refugees) and the rest to electoral support and capacity-building (including rule of law and justice, human rights and civil society). The EC and UN share objectives that are aligned with the International Compact with Iraq and the Iraqi National Development Strategy. Their significant operational cooperation forms the basis of a strong EC–UN partnership in Iraq.

The Sudan

The majority of the funding for peacebuilding in the Sudan was from the African Peace Facility and was used to support the African Union Mission in Sudan (see Figure 16). This, for instance, totalled €74 million in 2004 and €70 million in 2005 and indicates that in material terms the EU–AU partnership is more significant than the EU–UN partnership. Nevertheless, the EC also channelled assistance through UN implementing agencies. Notable examples include its support for the Sudan post-conflict community-based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme. This is administered through UNDP, which serves as National Authorising Officer for the EC, but is implemented by a consortium of local NGOs and non-state actors. The EC has also provided €12 million in support for an interim DDR programme, implemented with the assistance of UNDP, over €6 million for an education management programme implemented by UNICEF and €4 million for a population census project implemented by the United Nations Population Fund.
Figure 16. Total EC spending on peacebuilding in the Sudan

Source: CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission 2009b).

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

In contrast to the Sudan, much of EC funding was channelled through the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo after the EC resumed its engagement in 2002 (see Figure 17). The largest proportion of assistance was dedicated to preparing and supporting the 2006 elections (€165 million between 2004 and 2006), which was implemented by UNDP with additional technical support provided by the EC. Although, at an operational level, the “co-management” of this assistance was strained given the inherent challenges in managing such a difficult project with limited UNDP staff, EuropeAid evaluations attest to the unique technical and logistical advantages that the UN provided, making it the only organization capable of implementing this programme (European Commission 2008a). While the elections received the majority of EC funding, the EC also supported transport and infrastructure projects as well as projects designed to support
security and rule of law. For instance, it provided €20 million to the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program managed by the World Bank, provided more than €40 million for support of the justice sector and €10 million for the police, complementing the EU ESDP police mission to establish an Integrated Policy Unit in Kinshasa. Although the majority of EC assistance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was channelled through UNDP, the EU–UN in-country relationship was broader and more complex. This reflected the range of EU and UN actors on the ground. In the case of the EU, this involved the European Union Special Representative (EUSR), the EC head of delegation and the heads of mission for various ESDP missions of the EU. The relatively large EC and EU member state engagement served both to increase EU ambitions and, at times, undermine EU cohesion. On occasion, this led to competition between the EU and UN, for example, in 2006, over the issue of who should coordinate international SSR efforts (interviews with EU officials in Brussels, September 2008, and with DPKO officials in New York, August 2008).

**Figure 17.** Total EC spending on peacebuilding in the DRC

![Graph showing total EC spending on peacebuilding in the DRC](image)

**Note:** DRC = the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**Source:** CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding inventory (European Commission 2009b).
Burundi

Figure 18 shows that a relatively small proportion of EC peacebuilding programming assistance has been channelled through the UN in Burundi. The EC channelled €5 million through UNDP in support of the electoral process in 2005–2006, €1.5 million for mine action capacity development, and smaller amounts relating to food security, demobilization and human rights to FAO, WFP and UNHCR, respectively. Moreover, the EC 2008–2013 strategic programming documents were agreed with the government before PBC agreed the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi in 2007. EC officials testified that their programming decisions were not, therefore, influenced by the work of PBC (interviews with EC officials in Brussels, September 2008, and with DPKO official in New York, August 2008). In summary, the EC operational partnership with the UN is not strong in Burundi. While the EC has actively supported UN-led efforts to support the peace process and agreed integrated peacebuilding strategies in the framework of PBC, this has not affected EC strategic decision-making processes based on bilateral dialogue with the Government of Burundi.

Figure 18. Total EC spending on peacebuilding in Burundi

Source: CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission 2009b).
However, Figure 18, drawn from the data set from the EC scoping study on peacebuilding (European Commission 2009b), is arguably not an accurate reflection of broader EC peacebuilding engagement. For instance, the data do not include EC macro-economic assistance, budget support, humanitarian assistance or much of the rural programming. Moreover, the swings in funding indicated in the graph are misleading in so far as they represent multi-year contracts. In practice, the EC is the largest single donor in Burundi and EC funding has steadily increased since 2001, with a shift toward funding for governance and direct budget support. Programmed EC assistance under the 9th EDF (2003–2007) totalled €115 million, of which about half the amount was for rural development, 27% for macro-economic support and 15% (€17.25 million) for good governance. The governance interventions provided support for decentralization with support for rule of law programmes at national and local levels. In addition, the EC disbursed over €100 million in unforeseen funding and humanitarian aid. The EC Burundi CSP and National Indicative Programme for 2008–2013 confirms an increase in funding for state-building with €90 million for direct budgetary support (European Commission 2007c). Support for rural development remained constant at over €50 million, while support for health increased to €25 million.39 While the EC has maintained or increased its support for socio-economic recovery, it has also increased the level and proportion of funding for state-building. This has contributed to the overall increase in ODA in Burundi. While conflict had turned Burundi into an “aid orphan” in the 1990s with a total of less than US$ 100 million ODA in 1997, ODA has increased steadily since 2000, to US$ 415 million in 2006 according to OECD.

Sierra Leone

As in Burundi, the vast majority of EC spending on peacebuilding in Sierra Leone has not been channelled through the UN. The little that was channelled through the UN included support for the truth and reconciliation commission implemented by UNHCR in 2002–2003 and electoral assistance though UNDP in 2008–2009. Nor is the majority of EC aid represented in Figure 19 because it does not include macro-economic support, humanitarian support or infrastructure support. Yet,

39 These funding decisions are in line with the EC stated priorities of: (i) reinforcing the legitimacy and capacities of the state; (ii) supporting justice reform; (iii) supporting decentralization; and (iv) preparing for the 2010 elections.
this formed the bulk of EC assistance. For instance, from 2003 to 2009, the EC provided €220 million, and the programmed proportion of this included €70 million for reconstruction, €50 million for direct budget and €5 million for support to civil society. Similarly, the CSP for 2008–2013 provides for €242 million, of which €95 million is for infrastructure, €90 million for direct budget support, €37 million for good governance and institutional support and €20 million for efforts in relation to trade and agriculture. The EC CSP was elaborated jointly with Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom Department for International Development. This process was not linked to PBC discussions regarding a peacebuilding strategy or compact. Although PBC engagement was intended to provide a common framework for donor assistance, it was perceived as being linked with the “vertical” PBF and disconnected from benchmarks and procedures already negotiated by donors and the government (Mollet et al. 2007; interviews with senior government officials from Sierra Leone in Geneva, December 2008). In summary, the operational partnership between the EC and UN was not strong in Sierra Leone. Moreover, the work of PBC was seen to provide little added value, while adding another complicating layer to donor coordination.

**Figure 19.** Total EC spending on peacebuilding in Sierra Leone

![Graph showing total EC spending on peacebuilding in Sierra Leone from 2001 to 2008.]

**Source:** CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission 2009b).
The only EC support for UN programmes represented in Figure 20 was for a UNDP programme for election assistance and for unforeseen food security support implemented by FAO. The EC funding relationship with UN programmes and agencies was, therefore, relatively insignificant. Between 2003 and 2007, the EC programmed aid to the Central African Republic amounted to €55 million, of which the three priority areas were economic integration, transport and infrastructure, and management of natural resources. Support for conflict prevention and political dialogue received some €5 million. The level of EC support has increased in the 2008–2013 programming cycle to €137 million, with a greater emphasis on governance and socio-economic rehabilitation (€72.5 million), plus €34 million in budget support, with infrastructure receiving relatively less (€19.5 million). The EC relationship with the UN is, therefore, not strong in terms of funding. Moreover, since 2008, when the EU launched an ESDP mission, EUFOR Tchad, to protect civilians and UN staff in north-eastern
Central African Republic, it has been overshadowed by European Council-led cooperation with the UN (humanitarian actors and DPKO) in relation to the ESDP mission and its UN Mission in Chad/Central Africa follow-up. Nevertheless, the EC and UN maintain a strong policy-level relationship in-country (interviews with UNDP and EC officials in Brussels, September 2009).

**Guinea-Bissau**

**Figure 21.** Total EC spending on peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau

![Graph showing total EC spending on peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau](image)

**Source:** CRIS and OLAS, drawn from the peacebuilding scoping study (European Commission 2009b).

The line indicating EC spending through the UN in Figure 21 captures EC support in Guinea-Bissau for parliamentary and presidential elections that was channelled through UNDP in 2005 and 2008. The data for EC support to peacebuilding do not, however, cover the majority of EC assistance in the country. From 2003 to 2008 this totalled some €92 million, with a focus on infrastructure (€51 million) and governance, including support for elections and SSR (€17 million). In the 2008–2013 programme, it totalled some €100 million with two priority areas identified as conflict prevention and water and energy. Under conflict prevention, the strategy paper identified SSR, administrative capacity-building and reform, and support for rule of law as
priorities. In line with an increasing emphasis on SSR, the EC had sent a team of experts to work within relevant ministries in 2008, preceding the launch of an EU SSR mission in the framework of ESDP. In 2009, the UN cited the need to improve the coordination of various SSR efforts as one of the reasons why its field presence should be strengthened to an integrated peacebuilding office. Although the EC and UN view their engagement as complementary and both consider SSR as critical to promoting political stability, the UN focus on addressing the risk factors of drug trafficking and youth unemployment differs from the EC emphasis on supporting regional hydro-energy infrastructure projects that are seen as a prerequisite for economic development.

Conclusions on EC–UN country partnerships

The above country cases illustrate that trying to identify the scope of peacebuilding on the basis of project or programme objectives inevitably introduces inconsistencies in how peacebuilding is defined. For instance, in the top recipient countries, where use of MDTFs was common, the inventory included a range of activities related to reconstruction, security, and political and social development. In the case of Sudan, the majority of EC assistance was for an AU peacekeeping presence, an activity not included in ODA. In other cases, including the countries on the PBC agenda, the identification of peacebuilding programmes appears to have been more selective, including short-term emergency response and governance programmes, but not direct budget support or action primarily geared toward socio-economic development. In these cases, peacebuilding appears to have been associated with a subset or “cluster” of activities with peace consolidation as their primary objective rather than the collective recovery effort. In other words, where the EC uses funding mechanisms designed specifically for post-conflict recovery, including MDTFs or the African Peace Facility, the entire effort is categorized in terms of peacebuilding. Where there is more limited donor engagement, peacebuilding tends to be counted as only those activities that have direct peace consolidation objectives. Therefore, if one were to compare like with like, the proportion of assistance for Afghanistan and Iraq would appear relatively lower.

40 SC/9690 Briefing to the Security Council by Joseph Mutaboba, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations PBSO in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), 23 June 2009.
Although such quantitative overviews appear to import inconsistencies in how donors categorize funding, they are nevertheless revealing in so far as they point to the central coordinating role that the UN plays through MDTFs in cases such as Afghanistan and Iraq, or where the UN has been asked to play a key role in relation to critical events, as with the 2006 elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, in a number of less high-profile fragile states, the UN is not necessarily a “natural” implementing partner for the EC, nor does it inevitably have greater capacity than other actors or a privileged relationship with the government of the state. Although the EC and UNDP appear to routinely collaborate in support of elections, EC support for state-building, including DDR and SSR, is not typically implemented through the UN in these cases. Conversely, there are other cases, such as in Aceh, Indonesia (not covered above), where the EU has played a key role in reaching and implementing (the demobilization and disarmament aspects of) a peace agreement, but where an agency of the UN has taken the lead in implementing the follow-up reintegration programme. This suggests that the form and strength of EC–UN in-country partnerships depends on specific in-country capacities and relationships between the UN, EC and the government of the country. Although a desk-based quantitative analysis evidently does not capture the quality of in-country political or policy partnerships, it does suggest that even in fragile or peacebuilding contexts, operational partnerships and approaches to donor coordination are context specific, with leadership functions assumed by the actors with the most capacity and the strongest relationships with the government concerned.

2.5 EC SUPPORT FOR UN PEACEBUILDING THROUGH THE IFS

2.5.1 Overview of the IFS

Objectives

The IFS is the only EC financial instrument with an explicit mandate for crisis prevention and recovery and the largest proportion of the instrument (approximately €1.3 billion over seven years) is dedicated to crisis response. It was introduced in 2007, replacing the Rapid Reaction (funding) Mechanism introduced in 2001. It is intended to deliver an immediate and integrated response to situations of crisis in third countries within a single legal instrument until normal cooperation under one of the other instruments for cooperation and assistance can resume. Previously, a crisis
response could trigger as many as seven separate EC financing instruments, each with its own decision-making procedures and budgetary constraints. The IfS, therefore, improves upon past instruments for short-term EC financing in so far as it has led to important streamlining of decision-making in the crisis response phase. Like the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, the IfS enables the EC to make rapid funding decisions (without comitology). It integrates the Rapid Reaction Mechanism budget line and improves upon it by allowing more time (two years) to secure follow-on funding from the geographic budget lines. It has, therefore, also been designed to improve the links between the initial response and follow-up assistance delivered under the main long-term geographic instrument, and to strengthen the coherence between EC assistance and EU foreign policy response using intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy instruments.

In addition to the crisis response component (Article 3 of the IfS regulation), the instrument also contains a longer-term component that provides for “assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation” (Article 4). This is divided into three parts. Article 4.1 provides for efforts designed to support international efforts to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, threats to critical infrastructure and critical maritime routes. Article 4.2 provides for efforts to address threats posed by trafficking, terrorism and organized crime (including support for efforts to address the illicit trade in small arms). Article 4.3 is referred to both as the “crisis preparedness” component and, more commonly, as the Peacebuilding Partnership. It aims to build capacity for crisis response, including the capacity of non-state actors and international organizations. It is the only part of the IfS that explicitly mentions peacebuilding, in the context of the Peacebuilding Partnership that aims to mobilize and build civilian expertise for peacebuilding.

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41 In Iraq, for instance, the response previously included the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, the Human Rights Regulation, the Mine Action Regulation, and Humanitarian Aid. Other options included the regulations on “Aid to uprooted people” and “rehabilitation”.

42 Comitology refers to the process in which the EC consults advisory committees made up of EU member state representatives when implementing EU law and making significant funding decisions.
Size

In the budgetary planning for the IfS, €2.062 billion is allocated for the period 2007–2013. Of this, the crisis response component (Article 3, budget heading 19.06.01) is to receive no less than 73%, or €1.49 billion.\textsuperscript{43} However, in 2008 this was revised down to between €1.27 and €1.29 billion, representing a loss of at least €20 million per year.\textsuperscript{44} In 2007, the crisis response component was allocated €93 million and, in 2008, this figure rose to €129 million. This corresponds to the reported commitment of €220 million for some 59 “actions” in 2007 and 2008. The geographical distribution of these actions is represented in Figure 22.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure22.png}
\caption{IfS crisis response funding in 2007–2008}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{43} The IfS is by far the smallest of EC external relations instruments. Budgetary allocations for the other principal financial instruments for the period 2007–2013 are as follows: €5.6 billion for humanitarian aid, €15.1 billion for development cooperation, €10.6 billion for European Neighbourhood Policy and €10.2 billion for the Pre-Accession Instrument. All figures are based on the EC services working document \textit{Multiannual Financial Framework, Indicative Breakdown of Expenditure within Individual Headings} of April 2006.

\textsuperscript{44} The budget was revised down after €240m was re-allocated to the Food Facility, which was pledged to assist developing countries to cope with the effects of increased food prices. It was originally intended to be drawn from budget lines for (internal) agriculture, but in line with rules for budgetary re-allocation it had to come from a source within the external relations Budget Heading 4. This explains why the IfS was “raided” for food.
The crisis response component also includes three thematic “facilities” to enable the financing of smaller actions at the sub-delegated level without the need for an individual financial decision. The first is the Policy Advice and Mediation Facility (€10 million), which has enabled the EC to draw on short-term advice and expertise (including in Armenia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Myanmar and Sri Lanka) and to provide funding for post-conflict/disaster needs assessments with the World Bank and UN in Bangladesh, Haiti, Myanmar and Ukraine. Although small in size, it represents an important, new mechanism that can be used to strengthen EC substantive and analytical capacity, and to provide mediation support on an ad hoc basis. The second facility is the Conflict Resources Facility, which is also small (€2 million) and has been used to strengthen processes designed to address the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The third facility, the Transitional Justice Facility (€12 million), can be used to provide timely assistance to international tribunals and transitional justice initiatives.

In addition, the IfS includes a long-term crisis preparedness component (Article 4.3), commonly referred to as the Peacebuilding Partnership. It is not included in the crisis response component, but is of a similar size to the “facilities” of the crisis response component mentioned above (€15 million over 2007–2008). It has been principally used to support non-state actors, although it has also been used to support capacity-building in the UN and regional organizations. For instance, it provided support for the African Union Continental Early Warning System and for OECD DAC-supported international dialogue on peacebuilding and state-building and monitoring of the implementation of principles of good international engagement in fragile states. Its support for UN capacity-building is described in the next section. In addition, the Peacebuilding Partnership has been used to fund the development of EU crisis management capacities, including through support for training for civilians interested in deployment in ESDP missions.

**Scope**

The scope of the activities that the IfS can support was subject to intense negotiation between member states, the European Council and the European Parliament in 2005 and 2006. The final compromise describes the activities that the IfS can be used to support in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis as well as other security-related activities to promote cooperation in tackling organized crime, terrorism, non-proliferation and
the protection of critical infrastructure. In relation to peacebuilding, the instrument provides for “support for the development of democratic, pluralistic state institutions ... an independent judiciary, good governance and law and order, including non-military technical cooperation to strengthen overall civilian control and oversight over the security system and measures to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement and judicial authorities ...”\(^45\) In addition, it identifies a number of priority preventive objectives. These include strengthening the role of civil society and its participation in the political process and strengthening the capacity of non-state actors in the fields of mediation, “track-two” diplomacy and reconciliation, and building effective bridges between non-state actors and formal diplomatic initiatives. It also provides for measures aimed at strengthening the conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery efforts of international regional and subregional organizations, with specific mention of support to African regional organizations as well as the UN PBF. In short, the IfS was intended to support the full range of civilian activities designed for conflict prevention, state-building and post-conflict recovery, with the exception of activities associated with “defence” reform. It explicitly cites both prevention and recovery as potential objectives and has, therefore, been used to address specific threats to peace or to fill gaps in broader recovery efforts. Indeed, the priority areas identified in the regulation have been interpreted as indicative rather than prescriptive and, in practice, the interpretation of the objectives of the instrument has been even wider.

The IfS annual reports do not provide a detailed quantitative breakdown of the allocation of funding by theme or activity type. Nevertheless, they provide eight thematic categories under which actions have been funded. These are summarized in Table 2.

Because ESDP missions have no independent source of project funding, so-called “flanking measures” that have been designed to complement ESDP missions appear to have been particularly significant. These include €15 million for internally displaced people and clearance of unexploded ordnance in parallel with the deployment of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia. In the Central African Republic and Chad—alongside and in support of the EUFOR mission—€15 million was used to support the UN Mission in Chad/Central African Republic for a police programme and the

election census in Chad, while €6.5 million was used to kick-start SSR in the Central African Republic. In Kosovo, €14.2 million was allocated to the International Civilian Office during the difficult transition between the declaration of independence Kosovo and the launch of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. And in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, €10 million was allocated for support for stabilization in eastern Congo.

Table 2. Thematic priorities of the crisis response component of the IFS, 2007–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic area</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advice for post-conflict SSR</td>
<td>Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Palestine, Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Flanking” measures for ESDP missions</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Kosovo, Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening regional peacebuilding capacity</td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia, AU–UN mediation in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law and transitional justice</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Columbia, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to interim administrations</td>
<td>International Civilian Office, Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict resolution and reconciliation</td>
<td>Burma, Colombia, Nepal, Peru, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uganda, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict/disaster programmes and needs assessments</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to displaced populations</td>
<td>Lebanon, Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict resources</td>
<td>Dedicated facility (see below)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In situations where there have been no ESDP missions, large actions have included €13 million for a recovery programme in Bangladesh and €6
million to support the transition process in Nepal. Although EC delegations are encouraged to and on some occasions do provide project proposals, they are in most cases responsible for monitoring project implementation. In total, 40 actions representing €180 million have been sub-delegated to the delegations.

In summary, the IfS is used for actions that complement ESDP actions or seek to fill perceived funding gaps in post-conflict recovery. These actions are by definition not programmed in advance since they are developed in response to situations of crisis. Although they are intended to address “gaps” in recovery, funding decisions do not appear to be based on PCNAs. Rather, priorities are dictated by the needs (or opportunities) as perceived by ESDP missions, staff in DG RELEX A/2 or by EC delegations. Only in the case of the post-disaster recovery of Bangladesh has the crisis response component been mobilized after a joint UNDP–World Bank–EC needs assessment. This suggests that, for the most part, the EC IfS has addressed gaps in post-conflict recovery as identified by EU officials on an ad hoc basis. A relatively small proportion of the instrument has been dedicated to actions that are primarily preventative in nature. This may, in part, be a reflection that these actions are relatively less expensive and/or that the EC does not have the capacity to administer a large number of small projects. Given this, it is understandable that the EC has introduced “facilities” to discharge smaller funding decisions. Such mechanisms may also make sense for the Peacebuilding Partnership, which has the ambitious objective (but limited resources) of improving the preventive and peacebuilding capacity of other actors, including non-state actors. In any case, it appears somewhat arbitrary that the crisis response and crisis preparedness (Peacebuilding Partnership) components are formally separated in the IfS.

Although the crisis response component has an EU bias in so far as it is intended, inter alia, to complement ESDP actions and can be triggered by proposals submitted by EC delegations, it can also be used to strengthen UN peacebuilding. The following section seeks to address to what extent this has been done.

2.5.2 IfS funding for UN peacebuilding

In 2007, 41.5% of the IfS crisis response actions were channelled through the UN, representing some €38 million. Similarly, in 2008, 42% of all actions supported by the IfS were channelled through the UN, with a value
of some €54 million. Thus, over a third of the EC dedicated short-term crisis response funding has been channelled through the UN. Figures 23 and 24 indicate the distribution of this funding within the UN.

**Figure 23.** IfS funds channelled through the UN system (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency or Program</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPKO/DPA</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other UN agencies, funds and programmes</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 24 shows that the EC short-term crisis response actions have been implemented by: (i) actors associated with security response and rule of law (DPKO); (ii) the humanitarian response, including UNHCR, International Organization for Migration (IOM) and others; (iii) good governance and socio-economic recovery and reconstruction through UNDP and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS). This is in line with the findings of the previous sections that a relatively high proportion of EC funding is channelled through the UN in fragile situations. In 2007, DPKO/DPA was the largest UN recipient of IfS funding, while in 2008 UNDP received the most. While a range of UN actors are important operational partners in crisis response, the EC funding relationship with DPKO/DPA is more significant in relation to the IfS, which is administered by DG RELEX, than is the case with long-term funding instruments administered through DG DEV, EC delegations and EuropeAid.
Figure 24. IfS funds channelled through the UN system (2008)

Note: ILO = International Labour Organization


Although the IfS crisis preparedness component was intended to build capacity in other international organizations, regional organizations and NGOs in relation to peacebuilding, it is noteworthy that it has not been used to contribute to the UN PBF. According to some EC officials, this is because the IfS serves a similar purpose to PBF. The IfS has been used to support actions in three of the four PBC focus countries—the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone—and, in Burundi, the EC remains the largest single donor. Some EC officials contend that direct contributions would not necessarily add value, but rather simply transfer administrative burden from the EC to the UN. Moreover, they argue that the IfS is better suited to mobilizing additional EC resources in so far as it is designed to identify and kick-start funding from long-term EC funding instruments. However, there is no evidence that IfS decisions are guided by priorities established within the context of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and, therefore, no reason to believe that the IfS will necessarily complement the work of PBC or be consistent with the priority areas addressed by PBF.

In practice, rather than provide direct support to the UN PBF, the Peacebuilding Partnership has been used to strengthen the objectives of donor coordination and national capacity-building through other UN-led
initiatives. These include two grants for UNDP PCNAs, as described in Box 1, and a grant for a UNDP project to develop guidance on natural resources and conflict, as described in Box 1.

**Box 1. PCNA methodology**

The EC has been a strong advocate for the agreement of common frameworks for recovery planning in situations of conflict and fragility. In particular, the crisis preparedness component of the IfS has been used to support the development and use of a common platform for post-conflict recovery planning, notably the PCNA methodology, which was initially developed by the UN Development Group and the World Bank. It involves the conduct, by cluster teams comprised of national and international experts, of field and desk assessments that seek to map the terrain of key needs in a country. Using this information, the Transitional Results Framework is developed with key milestones relating to the needs mapped by PCNA. Actions included in the Transitional Results Framework reflect strategic dimensions of peacebuilding and conflict mitigation by referring to gender-, ethnic-, age- or region-specific actions. Thus, the framework lays out a selective group of priority actions and outcomes with their financial implications, and allows national and international stakeholders to align efforts to support a successful transition.

_Source:_ Adapted from the Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning, signed by the EC, UNDG and World Bank on 25 September 2008.

In 2009, the Peacebuilding Partnership also provided support for a project initiated by the UN PBSO to provide a software tool designed to help countries track donor assistance (see Box 2). It has also provided financial support to the UN Mediation Support Unit, linked to DPA, in order to improve its capacity to deploy experts in natural resources and mediation.

While the IfS has been used to support some capacity-building in the UN, EC staff recognize that cooperation, to date, has been ad hoc and limited. According to a 2009 evaluation of the Peacebuilding Partnership, this is partly due to the annual budgeting cycle, which made it difficult to develop more strategic engagement in capacity-building processes, and partly due to limited EC staff resources that limit EC ability to engage in more strategic policy dialogue (Bayne and Trolliet 2009:36). Given that the objectives of
the IfS Peacebuilding Partnership are so closely aligned with the mandate of PBSO to “develop best practices”, there may well be greater opportunities for exploiting institutional synergies. For instance, PBSO has focused on developing “best practices” networks for reflection across UN agencies and is collaborating with non-state and academic actors to develop the evidence base, including through the web-based Peacebuilding Initiative (www.peacebuildinginitiative.org). Yet, there is no link with similar EC-supported initiatives, including the EC-supported Initiative for Peacebuilding (www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu), which also seeks to build the evidence base for best practice drawing on the operational experience of specialist peacebuilding NGOs. There is, therefore, clearly scope for linking up separate EU and UN “best practices” initiatives in line with the important, but relatively neglected objective of building the evidence base and promoting institutional learning on peacebuilding.

Box 2. Support for the Peacebuilding Assistance Database

In 2009, the EC provided support to PBSO to develop a web-based software tool to enable beneficiary countries to map international assistance and build public financial management capacity. It is intended to integrate existing sources of information at the national level, including the Aid Management Platform or Development Aid Database if countries are already using them. In addition, the database will incorporate ODA data and UN agencies will provide information directly to the Peacebuilding Assistance Database. The project, thereby, aims to empower beneficiary countries to direct donors to priority sectors or regions and will also assist PBSO to prepare “mapping of resources” documentation for PBC on a biannual basis.


2.5.3 Conclusions and outlook for the IfS

On present evidence, EC–UN funding cooperation drawing on the IfS is significant, but not systematic. In some cases of crisis response, it has been triggered by dialogue within established EU–UN dialogue channels. This is, for instance, the case with the EU–UN Steering Committee where IfS support for DPKO/DPA activities has been raised. In the case of the crisis
preparedness component of the IfS, support for joint conflict analysis or for the PBSO database project has been negotiated outside formal dialogue processes between DG RELEX and UNDP or PBSO.

In 2010, the IfS will be subject to a mid-term review. This will be an opportunity to take stock of whether the IfS is structured to fulfil its strategic objectives. The above quantitative analysis suggests that it has been deployed to support a range of actions and actors, in many cases the UN, and that the majority of assistance has been for actions designed to complement ESDP or UN missions in post-conflict settings. A relatively small proportion of the IfS is dedicated to improving the peacebuilding knowledge and/or capacity of actors, whether non-governmental, regional or international (through the Peacebuilding Partnership). Nor has it provided for individual capacity-building (training) for non-EU national or international actors. It was, moreover, long disputed whether the IfS should be used to build EU capacity by supporting the training of EU nationals for civilian crisis management, although this has now been agreed for 2009. The 2010 review should clarify whether or not the IfS is indeed intended to build EU capacity for peacebuilding. If it is, there is much more that could be done, providing that additional resources could be found. For instance, in addition to providing additional support for the training of (proposed) ESDP mission personnel, the Policy Advice and Mediation Facility of the crisis response component could be expanded in size and competence. It could then serve as an instrument to enable local EU leadership (EUSRs, heads of ESDP mission and EC delegations) draw on local and technical expertise in crisis situations. Similarly, if the Peacebuilding Partnership was to strengthen EU capacities, it could also provide support for additional training/coaching for delegation staff in relation to conflict-sensitive and armed violence reduction programming. In addition, the Peacebuilding Partnership could be developed to include a more systematic approach to identifying and conducting joint training with UN and regional partners. This has already been identified as a common interest in the follow-up to the EU–UN joint declaration on crisis management, but has yet to be implemented. Despite the recognized need and high demand for building institutional peacebuilding capacities within and outside the EU, the Peacebuilding Partnership, with an annual budget of around €7 million, is clearly not sufficiently resourced to have a large capacity-building impact as well as promote learning and provide policy guidance. In short, the Peacebuilding Partnership is spread too thinly. The 2010 reform should, therefore, make strategic decisions about its core objectives. While there may be pressure
from member states to increasingly use this funding instrument to train EU nationals for ESDP missions, such support should not undermine the Peacebuilding Partnership core objective of strengthening EC influence and capacity by supporting the development of strategic partnerships with key operational actors through programmes designed to build capacity and promote inter-institutional learning.

In addition, while the peacebuilding record points to the central importance of establishing national capacities for leadership in crisis situations, especially in the early recovery phase, the crisis response component of the IfS has rarely been used to do so directly. The 2010 review should examine how (given EC financial regulation, the limited size of the instrument46 and limited human resource capacity for administering the IfS) the focus on national capacity-building could be strengthened. Alternatively, the EC could outsource the provision of early support for national capacity development to the UN, through support to the newly established Immediate Response Facility (IRF) of PBF. The crisis response component of the IfS is not equivalent to this UN facility, which provides funding in the immediate aftermath of a conflict in order to enable the country-team to identify capacity-building priorities and kick-start recovery programming that aims to promote confidence in the peace process with a demonstrable “peace dividend”. In either situation, the case for supporting UN efforts to pre-position funds for early recovery is clear. It should, as is argued in Part 3, help address recognized weakness in providing rapid recovery response, while also promoting the coherence of the national, UN and donor efforts to consolidate the peace.

2.6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EC

Part 2 confirms that the EC has increased the volume of its support for peacebuilding in fragile states and the volume and the proportion of support for UN peacebuilding. It also finds that EC peacebuilding funding is concentrated in a few cases and the strength of the EC–UN operational relationship is case specific. The countries that have received the most EC assistance since 2001 and where relatively large proportions have been channelled through the UN are Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq and the West Bank and Gaza. These are either still “in” conflict or in the early recovery phase. The EC–UN funding relationship is also

46 The EC has other, far larger, budgets for providing emergency relief funding that could be better adapted for early recovery funding.
particularly significant where the UN has a role in administering MDTFs or in relation to particular themes. The EC–UNDP relationship is, for example, consistently strong in relation to providing support for democratization and election processes.

The above review of the EC–UN funding relationship does not, however, reveal anything about the impact of EC assistance or the quality of its policy partnership with the UN. It does not trace aid patterns relative to conflict dynamics, distinguish assistance on the basis of how it was delivered, or reveal the extent to which EC funding priorities were consistent with international role division or were in line with a strategy shared by the international community and national government. Over and above these inevitable limitations of a quantitative approach, the analysis of EC support for peacebuilding in Section 2.4 reveals additional difficulties associated with quantifying EC work on peacebuilding. While it is clear that the EC provides support for socio-economic development, governance and security in fragile contexts, the categorization of funding, and whether or not it is considered to fall within the scope of peacebuilding, depends on the country context and funding mechanism. For example, while all funding through conflict-specific funding instruments such as the IfS and MDTFs is included, in other cases (including the countries on the UN PBC agenda) funding for peacebuilding is associated with a smaller subset of activities designed to (re)build states, provide security and tackle specific risk factors. This makes it difficult to establish funding trends for peacebuilding.

This finding further reinforces one of the conclusions of Part 1, that the amorphous concept of peacebuilding is not operationally useful. The analysis of EC funding for peacebuilding (in Section 2.4) shows that even when the scope of peacebuilding is carefully linked to EC peacebuilding policies and concepts, it cannot be applied consistently because of inconsistencies in aid categorization. For this reason, rather than pursue efforts to track funding for peacebuilding as such (which is interpreted differently within the EU and between external actors), the EC should actively support efforts to improve the transparency of its assistance in fragile states, and the consistency of aid categorization, in cooperation with other donors.
Recommendation 1: Improve the transparency of EC assistance in fragile states

It is important for EC accountability, donor coordination and aid effectiveness that the EC provides accurate statistics regarding its assistance to fragile states. More specifically, the EC should:

- ensure that detailed data on its assistance in fragile states are made public and are consistent with the OECD DAC online database; and
- enter data on EC funding decisions and projects directly into the online software packages used by recipient states to map donor assistance.

Parts 1 and 2 offer explanations why, given its limited resources and organizational emphasis on being an efficient and financially accountable aid disbursement agency, the EC faces serious organizational and administrative obstacles to directing assistance to peacebuilding in fragile states. Part 2 also identifies the utility of the MDTF mechanism in fragile contexts since it promotes donor coherence, minimizes donor risk and enables funds to be dispersed rapidly (from the EC) despite weak state capacity. It also establishes that direct budget support is critical for peace and state-building when used in line with Transitional Results Frameworks for governance or peacebuilding compacts.

Recommendation 2: Improve resource mobilization and aid effectiveness

To improve the flexibility and predictability of financing in transition periods, EC (and EU member states) should:

- implement proposals to improve aid effectiveness in fragile states developed with the support of OECD DAC;
- use and support the development of MDTFs in fragile contexts; and
- continue to explore, together with the UN, World Bank and other donors, the conditions under which it can expand the use of budget support, in line with agreed Transitional Results Frameworks of governance or peacebuilding compacts.

Part 2 establishes that the IfS is unique mechanism in the EU context, enabling a timely response to address risks and opportunities in fragile situations. A small proportion (5%) of the instrument is also used with the objective of building peacebuilding capacity within and beyond the
EU in order to strengthen operational and policy partnerships with key peacebuilding actors. This is a rare and useful funding instrument, with no parallel instrument available in the UN context or in most EU member states. Given evidence of the importance and effectiveness of technical assistance early on in recovery and governance reform processes (Collier 2008:114) and the recognition that there are weaknesses in the international community’s ability to deliver such assistance, the demand for such an instrument is likely to increase.

**Recommendation 3: Expand the IfS**

In preparation for the mid-term review of the IfS in 2010, the EC should:

- explore how the size of the instrument could be increased in light of the evidence to support the utility of early recovery assistance, including technical assistance to build state capacities (and the fact that its funding allocations were cut in 2008);
- explore how the crisis response component of the instrument might be increasingly used to provide direct support for national crisis management structures and processes (such as peace committees) as well as rapid support for nationally identified early recovery and capacity-building priorities;
- explore whether the crisis response component could also be used to indirectly support national capacity-building priorities, including through support for the new IRF of the UN PBF;
- channel additional funding to the Peacebuilding Partnership component of the instrument, since this is an important instrument for building international capacities and improving programming guidance, but is not sufficiently resourced to have a significant impact on internal capacities or the capacities and practices of key partners;
- give consideration to multi-year funding for strategic capacity-building programmes of the Partnership for Peace, which is appropriate given the long-term nature of building capacity and inter-institutional relationships for policy dialogue;
- develop partnerships with non-state actors with a view to supporting targeted preventative programming and programming innovation as well as developing the evidence base for peacebuilding policy and programming;
- assure that clear criteria that reflect IfS objectives guide the selection of projects and actions supported by it; and
• adapt monitoring and evaluation processes for the IfS so that they are
designed to feed into institutional learning processes about effective
engagement in fragile states.

Parts 1 and 2 also show that for many practitioners, peacebuilding is
associated with a narrower subset of activities that have the principal
objective of preventing conflict by addressing a particular risk factors linked
to governance. Yet, the proportion of programmable EC aid for activities
that aim to address these risk factors has not increased in fragile countries.
This report suggests that this is due to the limited capacity of EC delegations
and EC organizational culture, which is risk averse and privileges financial
accountability over accountability for results. In order to strengthen its
programming engagement in politically uncertain and inherently “risky”
contexts, the EC must also adapt its management and programming practice
accordingly.

Recommendation 4: Empower EC leadership in fragile contexts

At the management level, improving EC capacity to engage in programming
that aims to address politically sensitive “risk factors” should include efforts
to:

• strengthen EC delegations in the event of political crisis or in fragile
  situations, which should enable heads of delegation to draw on in-
  house expertise (or expertise within the future EEAS) as well as external
  expertise mobilized through the IfS Policy Advice and Mediation
  Facility to engage in political dialogue with partners and adapt EC
  programming; and

• increase the capacity and flexibility of EC delegations to support
  programmes aimed to address risk factors and support protective factors
  in fragile situations: unlike the present emergency funding exceptions
  to the financial regulation, EC delegations should be given authority to
  fund actions even where such programmes do not correspond with the
  priority areas defined in EC CSPs and national indicative programming
documents.

To improve programming practice, learning about “what works” and
accountability for results, the EU needs to increase its capacity to design,
monitor and learn from interventions that aim to have a direct impact on
conflict. OECD DAC guidance on evaluation of conflict prevention and
peacebuilding activities argues that interventions undertaken with the express aim of preventing conflict and building peace must be accountable for (and measured against) their impact on the factors that drive conflict. Their design and evaluation should, therefore, differ from other actions undertaken in a conflict area that should, nevertheless, be “conflict sensitive” in the sense that they should be aware of how they affect the dynamics of conflict (OECD 2007a).

**Recommendation 5: Improve EC programming capacity and accountability**

In order to improve programming practice and accountability, the EC should:

- appoint peace and development advisers to EC delegations in fragile situations (as the UN and some Member States do already) to support conflict-sensitive programming and develop programmes in sensitive areas of capacity-building and reform;
- build awareness and capacity in EC delegations through additional staff training in conflict-sensitive programming in conflict-prone countries or for armed violence reduction programming in countries where rates of urban/youth interpersonal violence are high;
- clarify and provide guidance for EC and UN staff on the interpretation of FAFA, drawing on examples of good practice in relation to co-management; and
- adapt EC monitoring and project evaluation practices in fragile states in line with OECD DAC guidance on monitoring and evaluation for peacebuilding.

**Recommendation 6: Strengthen EC–UN cooperation in building peacebuilding capacity**

The EC should work with UN counterparts to:

- mobilize regional civilian expertise for potential deployment in UN or regional missions, including ESDP missions (e.g. through support to regional roster-managers and training);
- identify and support joint EU–UN training initiatives, including leadership coaching, mediation and dialogue training, and training to improve cooperation through better understanding of EC and UN processes and administrative practices;
• develop the peacebuilding community of practice, for instance, by extending the PBSO Community of Peacebuilding Practice e-discussions to relevant EC and European Council General Secretariat staff; and
• explore ways to link up the separate but complementary EC and PBSO-supported “initiatives for peacebuilding” that aim to establish evidence-based policy and programming guidance. While the EC initiative aims to feed into programming guidance by collating lessons learned based on operational experience of specialist peacebuilding organizations, the PBSO-supported effort has sought to collate and summarize relevant academic research with a view to supporting evidence-based programming.
PART 3

EU ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UN PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE

3. INTRODUCTION: EU AND UN PEACEBUILDING REFORM

It is only relatively recently, in 2006, that the UN established a dedicated institutional “architecture” for peacebuilding, comprising PBC, PBSO and PBF. These structures are often considered the centre-piece of UN peacebuilding, particularly in New York. However, the previous sections of this report demonstrate that they are relatively marginal to the bulk of EU and UN operational engagement in peacebuilding and to their operational cooperation.

Part 1 argues that peacebuilding has become something of an “all and nothing” concept; it is associated with an expansive “root causes” agenda yet not appropriated by many EU or UN actors to describe their operations or policies. It is explicitly not limited to multidimensional peace operations, early recovery or conflict prevention, but instead aims to build on all of these operational experiences. Despite or perhaps because of the diverse views of what peacebuilding involves in operational terms, peacebuilding discourse within the UN is associated with improving systemic efforts to consolidate peace. It did not evolve in response to challenges at the activity or programming level, but rather to address incoherence or weaknesses of the collective international response. Thus, although the peace-consolidation objective leaves no agency behind, peacebuilding is not institutionally linked with any of the main UN operational actors. This helps explain why it occupies an institutional no-man’s-land, with PBC reporting to the Security Council and General Assembly and its associated Support Office and Fund reporting directly to the Secretary-General.

Within the EU, peacebuilding is also an amorphous concept that has not been embraced by any one actor and there are a number of interpretations of what peacebuilding involves in practice. Moreover, policy development is not typically linked to peacebuilding. Within the European Council,
debates on the improvement of ESDP instruments are couched in terms of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction and focus on how to adapt (military) planning for a more comprehensive approach. They are also framed around issues that are subsets of peacebuilding, such as DDR, SSR, police or justice reform. Within the EC, relevant policy debates are linked to debates on aid effectiveness in situations of fragility or to specific dimensions of peacebuilding, including governance/state-building and specific risk factors (such as natural resources, or illicit trafficking). This conceptual fragmentation presents challenges for institutional learning in so far that “best practices” debates do not draw on a common community of practice or organizational approach.

In terms of EC–UN operational cooperation in peacebuilding, Part 2 demonstrates that the EC and UN are important operational partners in many countries emerging from conflict, with over a third of all EC peacebuilding assistance being channelled through the UN. However, only in cases where the UN has a role in administering MDTFs are the levels of funding consistently high and programming priorities “automatically” synchronized. In most cases, while there may be broad harmonization of EC CSPs with national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers that form the basis of UN programming (if they are in place), the strength of the operational and policy partnership will be case specific and largely determined at the field level. Even in the countries on the PBC agenda, the elaboration of EC country programming was not influenced by integrated strategies developed within PBC. Therefore, the EC relationship with the UN in peacebuilding is operationally important, but primarily linked to funding rather than policy development. It also remains relatively unstructured. This is despite bilateral efforts to improve strategic cooperation in crisis management, including through the EU–UN Steering Committee, and to promote joint analysis and recovery planning, including through the PCNA methodology.

In short, the preceding sections demonstrate that the business of developing peacebuilding-relevant policy and operational partnerships is scattered across EU and UN institutions and involves a range of actors, the majority of whom are not represented within PBC.\(^{47}\) It also shows that policy development in peacebuilding is typically driven by the strongest institutional actors in response to operational experience. Given the narrow institutional

\(^{47}\) While the EC and EU Presidency are represented, the UN operational departments, programmes and agencies do not have a seat at the table.
base and limited resources of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, it appears self-evident that it can only partially address the multi-level and multi-actor challenges of resource mobilization, external coherence and institutional learning. It should, therefore, be judged by how it can add value to other initiatives to address these concerns.

This will shortly be addressed by PBC members with the review of PBC scheduled for 2010. This section aims to trace EU engagement with PBC to date and suggest how it might approach the review process in order to better enable the Peacebuilding Architecture to fulfil its mandate and strengthen EU–UN partnerships in peacebuilding.

3.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE UN PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE AND THE EU ROLE IN IT

3.1.1 The establishment of the UN PBC

The EU was a strong supporter of the idea of a PBC in the run-up to and during the September 2005 Summit where the idea was finally agreed by UN Member States. Although, as described in Part 1, the UN had identified the concept of peacebuilding in 1992 and the Brahimi Report identified DPA as the UN institutional focal point, there was a widely held perception that the UN institutional machinery was not well suited to the management of multifaceted interventions across “transitions” from war to peace. The idea for a new UN-based body to address these challenges arose out of the High-level Panel on Security Threats and Reform that convened in 2003. In its report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, the panel argued that there was no body within the UN system designed to arrest a state’s slide into war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace and identified the need for:

- a single intergovernmental organ dedicated to peacebuilding,
- empowered to monitor and pay close attention to countries at risk,
- ensure concerted action by donors, agencies, programmes and financial institutions, and mobilize financial resources for sustainable peace (United Nations 2004b).

More specifically, it proposed the idea of a PBC and argued that it be a subsidiary of the Security Council, supported by a PBSO and a PBF. Secretary-General Kofi Annan was a vigorous proponent of the idea, which
was duly reflected in his 2005 report *In Larger Freedom* and included a range of reform proposals to be addressed at the 2005 Summit (United Nations 2005a). An addendum to the report elaborated that PBC should: ensure that the international community supports national authorities; proposes priorities based on realities in the receiving country; mobilizes necessary resources for early recovery and medium- to long-term investment; and creates a forum in which representatives of the UN, major bilateral donors, troop contributors, regional actors and financial institutions can share information and achieve coherence.

The support for this proposal was uncontroversial and clear within the EU. The EU shared the ambition of generating sustained and well-coordinated support for states at risk of conflict or emerging from war. In the EC 2005 Communication on the UN Summit, the EC stressed that:

> consensus on establishing a Peace Building Commission is essential. Such a body would fill a gap in the UN system. The EU should support a broad mandate entailing a holistic approach to peacebuilding, i.e. covering the whole continuum from peacekeeping to longer-term development issues (European Commission 2005b).

During the negotiations on the Peacekeeping Commission proposal, the EU duly supported the most expansive mandate and argued that the final Outcome Document include agreements on the composition, mandate and the date for which it should become operational. This was achieved and PBC was one of the few reform proposals to emerge from the 2005 Summit, with a commitment to establish PBC by 31 December 2005. This is not to say that the idea was uncontested. Indeed, the final document includes a number of compromises.48 For instance, the mandate of PBC was limited to post-conflict peacebuilding and did not include the preventative function initially envisaged in the high-level report of 2004. Powerful countries, including permanent Security Council members that have consistently been reluctant to equip the UN Secretariat with early warning or intelligence-gathering capabilities, favoured the more limited mandate. A range of countries from the Global South were also reluctant to grant an open mandate for the Security Council to comment on domestic political conflict that “risked” becoming violent. This argument was, however, for the most part not made explicit. Rather, a number of countries argued that

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48 For a comprehensive account of the genesis of the Peacebuilding Commission, see Ponzio (2005, 2007).
conflict prevention was already covered by DPA and UN agencies. A second compromise generated during the 2005 Summit was that the PBC report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, thereby, increasing the Global South’s influence over its functioning and role. It followed that PBC was formally established by concurrent acts of the Security Council and the General Assembly.49 Its inaugural session took place on 23 June 2006.

3.1.2 A complicated start for EU engagement: Issues of representation

The EC Communication in preparation for the World Summit stated that “the EU will certainly contribute actively to the work of PBC, using EC and Common Foreign and Security Policy instruments, in line with the European Security Strategy”. It also argued that “given these experiences and its contributions to peacebuilding around the globe, the European Community should fully participate in all meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission” (European Commission 2005b:3). In practice, however, formal issues around EU involvement contributed to the PBC’s slow start and showcased the contentious nature of the EU relationship with the UN as well as its internal inter-institutional struggles.

The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document provided that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) should be invited to participate in all meetings of PBC. It also provided that “other institutional donors” should be invited, but it was not clear who the “other” referred to. The EC made its case that it should be included as “another institutional donor” in communications to agreed PBC members and in a letter from the president of the EC to the UN Secretary-General in June 2006. This was not in itself contested, however the subsequent request that the EU be granted not only the status of institutional donor but also a seat at the table as a political actor was perceived by the G–77 as a move to add even more OECD seats to PBC. Conversely, when the Organisation of the Islamic Conference requested that it be granted the same status as the EU on the basis of formal organizational equivalence, many western members of PBC thought it inappropriate. This issue contributed to the climate of suspicion during 2006 when procedural and organizational issues dominated the agenda. It was only eventually resolved in May 2007 when the four observers to PBC—IMF, World Bank, EC and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference—were all invited to

become full members of PBC and all in relation to their “institutional donor status”.

In parallel to discussions in New York about EU formal participation in PBC, in Brussels the “nameplate” issue of how the EU–EC should be represented in PBC was subject to intense negotiation. While the EC noted that EC participation was relevant given that the invitation was for “institutional donors”, the European Council countered that the EU should be represented in view of the importance of second pillar foreign and security policy competencies in peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery. The nameplate issue was eventually resolved with the UN insistence that PBC status arrangements only provided for the “European Community”. The PBC chair, PBSO and the UN Office of Legal Affairs also agreed on a “two chairs—one delegation” formation, where both the EU Presidency and the EC were invited. This was agreed in May 2007 and, in practice, it has worked smoothly (interviews with EC official in New York, August 2008, and with EC officials in Brussels, September 2008). The Presidency keeps all 27 member states informed of PBC developments and prepares EU coordination meetings. It normally intervenes on the basis of pre-agreed statements or positions prepared on the basis of coordination meetings or in the European Council Working Group on the United Nations, with assistance from the European Council General Secretariat. The EC intervenes on matters that relate to its role in-country, through close coordination with its country delegations or as a donor on thematic issues such as monitoring and evaluation. The Working Group on the United Nations, the EC UN Unit and the EC and EU delegations in New York evidently have greater knowledge of the politics of the UN than the local politics of peacebuilding in specific countries. This presents whole-of-government challenges to all PBC members, including the EU.

The acrimonious process of resolving issues of EU representation in PBC in the first year of its operation attests to the highly politicized nature of doing business in New York. It also attests to the sensitivities relating to EU institutional competencies and the dividing line between foreign and development policy that were particularly acute in 2006.\footnote{This was during the rapid rise in the institutional and executive importance of the European Council following the development of ESDP and shortly after the EC had taken the European Council to the European Court of Justice over the issue of the dividing line between the Common Foreign and Security Policy and development policy.} However, on
both counts the subsequent experience of actually working together in the context of PBC has been a relatively harmonious one and has, if anything, provided a venue for constructive debate on issues of relevance to peacebuilding, which has bridged OECD/G–77 divisions. EU officials testify that working groups and country meetings have highlighted shared interests across regions and rich–poor country divides, and have helped foster greater understanding of the challenges faced by donors and national governments in the peacebuilding context. More specifically, some have pointed to the opportunity that PBC provides for the EU to bring its expertise to the table and to present a combined position from a donor and political perspective. In other words, despite its fractious set-up phase, PBC has provided a rare, relatively neutral UN venue for addressing issues at the intersection of development, governance and security. This is politically useful for the EU (and the UN) even if PBC may not yet be optimally configured to address its mandate (see next section).

3.1.3 An overview of mandate and structures

**Peacebuilding Commission**

The formal mandate of PBC, the first element in the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, is detailed in paragraph 2 of its founding resolutions (United Nations 2005c, 2005d):

(a) to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;

(b) to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development; and

(c) to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery … .

Its mandate is, therefore, an ambitious one: it aims to provide strategic guidance in relation to specific countries, develop broader policy guidance, improve early and long-term resource mobilization, and enhance the
coordination of all relevant actors. Moreover, since it has no formal authority and functions as an advisory body, it must achieve these results through its informal influence based on the quality of process and the perceived value of its outcome.

Given the PBC objectives, the founding resolutions of 2005 provided that PBC meet in various configurations, with their composition reflecting their purpose. These included an Organizational Committee (OC), Country Specific Meetings (CSMs) and a Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL). An overview of these working configurations as well as the other elements of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBF and PBSO) follows.

The Organizational Committee

The OC is responsible for establishing the agenda of PBC, taking into consideration the requests of the Security Council, the Secretary-General and, in exceptional circumstances, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the General Assembly and a Member State in danger of lapsing into conflict. In June 2006, it adopted the rules of procedure that govern PBC (United Nations 2006a) and it has provided the framework for the country-specific and thematic work. It has 31 members, designed to represent key peacebuilding actors with broad regional representation. These include: (i) seven members of the UN Security Council, including all its permanent members; (ii) seven members of ECOSOC, elected from regional groups; (iii) the five top providers of assessed contributions to UN budgets and of voluntary contributions to UN funds; (iv) the five top providers of military and police personnel to UN missions; and (v) seven members elected by the General Assembly in order to take into account appropriate representation from all regional groups. Members serve for a renewable period of two years, and some 50% of the membership changed in mid-2008.

This OC is the cornerstone of the Peacebuilding Architecture in so far as it sets the broad agenda and approach of the other meeting configurations. For example, it was the OC that agreed how to interpret the PBC mandate to develop integrated approaches to peacebuilding when it adopted the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy (IPBS) concept in February 2007. This idea enjoyed the support of the EU. Ambassador Thomas Matussek, on behalf of the EU, argued that “promoting the development of a viable peacebuilding strategy which has broad ownership is where the EC can really add value” (quoted in Ponzio 2007).
In its first year of operation, with Angola as chair, the OC served mainly to define the role and operating methods of PBC. In the second year, after many of the procedural issues had been resolved the new chair, Japan, sought a more proactive role for the OC. This involved, for instance, PBC retreats in January 2008 and February 2009, which included senior UN representatives from the Secretariat and P-5 Member State ambassadors who are often absent from PBC meetings. These retreats served to review the function of PBC and tackle issues of strategic relevance such as how PBC could do better in relation to resource mobilization and coordination. It is likely that the OC will continue to take a proactive role in shaping and adapting the role of PBC in the future.

**Country Specific Meetings**

Country-specific configurations of PBC were provided for in the founding resolutions of PBC. In early 2006, the Security Council suggested that Burundi and Sierra Leone be the first two countries on the PBC agenda, following requests from these countries. This was agreed by the OC and the first CSMs took place in September 2006. Whether these two countries were most appropriate for PBC has been subject to debate. Some argue that PBC was intended to support countries in the early recovery phase, while others argue that it is more suited to sustaining political attention in the later consolidation phase after peacekeeping forces have left. In any case, it is an academic debate in so far that these two countries were the first to request that PBC consider them. There were also clear operational advantages to working with countries that had legitimate, elected governments.

Nevertheless, the initial CSMs got off to a false start. They appeared to be perceived by the two countries concerned as a pledging conference and some donors (including EU officials) were dismayed that they were used to present a “shopping list” of requests for assistance. To dispel this misperception, PBSO sent missions to Burundi and Sierra Leone in November 2007 and redoubled its arguments to PBC members that CSMs should not serve as another donor forum, but instead seek to develop written, negotiated strategies that could serve as a standard against which to measure progress. This has, indeed, been the principal focus of CSMs. The first IPBS was agreed for Burundi in June 2007. Although the process was a difficult one, the resulting umbrella document “addresses political risks and priorities that were absent from other existing strategies” and “represents the closest thing to a consensus vision on the priorities for peace consolidation in Burundi”
according to one review (Centre on International Cooperation and the International Peace Institute 2008). In the Burundi CSM, a Norwegian chair led the process, while the Burundi government, with the support of the UN integrated mission (UN Integrated Office in Burundi) and PBSO, crafted the IPBS. Although also difficult, the development of a strategy for Sierra Leone followed a different process. Given the government’s parallel focus on upcoming elections and “strategy fatigue”, it sought to build on existing strategic documents to develop a Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework to serve as a “compact” in which the government and international community articulated their respective commitments. This strategy was adopted after the national elections in November 2007, also with intense support from the United Nations Integrated Office and PBSO. In both cases, CSMs subsequently adopted monitoring and evaluation frameworks against which progress on the IPBS was to be measured. While it remains unclear to what extent these strategies have served to guide national and international engagement (see next section), it is broadly recognized that that the CSM chairs have at times played an important political role, backed by PBC and the Security Council. In both Burundi and Sierra Leone, the chairs have influenced national decision-making on governance issues and, in the case of Burundi, the Norwegian CSM chair was able to broker a solution that arose when IMF threatened to delay completion of its Sixth Review (Centre on International Cooperation and the International Peace Institute 2008). Thus, on occasion, PBC has been able to bridge headquarters and field-level and development-security divides, and influence both national decision makers and donors in line with peace consolidation objectives.

In late 2007, the Security Council requested that PBC also consider Guinea-Bissau, and the Central African Republic was placed on its agenda in mid-2008. While both countries requested that they be put on the PBC agenda, the decision to do so was not automatic. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, it took the Security Council five months to transmit the request because it was not clear on what grounds countries should be placed on the agenda. This reflects confusion within the Security Council over what criteria should guide selection and over the role of PBC, including whether it should deal mainly with countries in relatively late peace consolidation phases.

In order to perform their task of “accompanying” specific countries, CSMs have addressed a range of thematic issues to inform PBC members, which have also served to highlight areas for further donor cooperation. The composition of CSMs includes a broader range of “relevant” actors than
the OC. CSMs have included additional member states, the international financial institutions, AU, ECOWAS and other actors. Despite the fact that the founding resolutions “encourage the Commission to work with civil society” and there was a lengthy debate on how this should be achieved, some countries insisted that New York-based PBC meetings should not be open to civil society organizations in any formal way. Their representation has, therefore, been limited to the field or to occasions where specific experts from civil society organizations have been invited to address the meetings. Representation of UN operational actors was also unusually limited to two officials: the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support and the most senior UN representative in the field. Unlike in other UN intergovernmental bodies there was no official seat for every UN fund programme or agency. Although this was intended to simplify and strengthen UN coordination, it made it more difficult to engage relevant operational actors in New York (who could attend as observers) and has contributed to the relative disengagement of UN departments and agencies from the work of PBC, arguably explaining why many agencies do not share a sense of responsibility for implementing the integrated strategies developed in CSMs.

The Working Group on Lessons Learned

This working group was established in January 2007 to address the PBC mandate “to develop best practices”. WGLL meets on an ad hoc basis to discuss thematic issues of relevance to the work of PBC and CSMs in particular. The subjects that the working group has addressed are listed in Table 3.

Although there has been criticism that these meetings have not always been directly linked to the country work of PBC and it is unclear to what extent these meetings have served to inform policy and/or operational developments in the broader UN system, they have provided a platform for reflection on key peacebuilding issues and have been used to introduce a number of constructive suggestions on how the work of PBC could be strengthened.51

51 Summary reports of these meetings are available on the web site of the Peacebuilding Commission at <www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding.pbc-lessons.shtml>.
### Table 3. Past WGLL meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting date</th>
<th>Meeting title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 May 2009</td>
<td>Lessons learned on sustainable reintegration in post-conflict situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 March 2009</td>
<td>Promoting collaboration and improving coordination between the PBC and regional and subregional organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 December 2008</td>
<td>Comparative experiences in developing national capacities after conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 November 2008</td>
<td>Learning from a regional DDR approach in the Great Lakes Region of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 October 2008</td>
<td>Comparative lessons from the United Nations rule of law assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 June 2008</td>
<td>Key insights, principles, good practices and emerging lessons in peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 2008</td>
<td>Environment, conflict and peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 March 2008</td>
<td>Comparative lessons from addressing internal displacement in peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 February 2008</td>
<td>Justice in times of transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 January 2008</td>
<td>Gender and peacebuilding: Enhancing women’s participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December 2007</td>
<td>Local governance and decentralization in post-war contexts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 November 2007</td>
<td>Fiscal capacities in post-conflict countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 September 2007</td>
<td>Strategic frameworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 June 2007</td>
<td>Regional approaches to peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 April 2007</td>
<td>Afghanistan compact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 February 2007</td>
<td>Sierra Leone elections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Peacebuilding Fund

PBF is the second element in the UN Peacebuilding Architecture established after the 2005 World Summit. It is separate from PBC and under the authority of the Secretary-General. It can, therefore, operate in any country deemed eligible by the Secretary-General, in addition to the countries on the PBC agenda. In October 2006, PBF was launched and achieved its funding target of US$ 250 million within the first year. It is a multi-donor fund intended to provide short-term support to countries in the early stages of a peace process or to address gaps in a process. Its original Terms of Reference specified that it should support:

- activities in support of the implementation of peace agreements;
- activities in support of efforts by the country to build and strengthen capacities that promote coexistence and the peaceful resolution of conflict;
- establishment or reestablishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities; and
- critical interventions designed to respond to imminent threats to the peacebuilding process (United Nations 2006d).

As indicated in Table 4, PBF interventions have been divided into three “windows". Window I is dedicated to those countries that are on the PBC agenda, where PBC provides guidance on the priorities for PBF. Although PBF is not formally accountable to PBC, a number of PBC members argue that PBC should play a hands-on role in deciding how this money should be allocated. Window II has been used to support preventative actions in countries at risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict. Countries and projects have been selected based on analysis by PBSO and the decision of the Secretary-General. Window III is considered a rapid response facility and has been used to support dialogue, reconciliation and security measures in a range of fragile countries.
Table 4. Peacebuilding fund allocations and projects approved as of 6 July 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Window</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PBF Priority Plan</th>
<th>Allocation US$</th>
<th>Projects approved #</th>
<th>US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Burundi PBF Priority Plan</td>
<td>$35,000,000</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>$34,623,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF Window I:</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Central African Republic PBF Priority Plan</td>
<td>$10,000,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>$10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau PBF Interim Priority Plan</td>
<td>$6,000,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$5,686,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Sierra Leone PBF Priority Plan</td>
<td>$35,000,000</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>$34,774,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total PBF Window I:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$86,000,000</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>$85,084,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF Window II:</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Comoros PBF Priority Plan</td>
<td>$9,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire PBF Priority Plan</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Guinea PBF Priority Plan</td>
<td>$6,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Liberia PBF Priority Plan</td>
<td>$15,000,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>$14,287,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Nepal PBF Priority Plan</td>
<td>$10,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total PBF Window II:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$45,000,000</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>$19,287,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total PBF Window III: Emergency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$10,294,348</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>$10,294,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total PBF Window I, II &amp; III:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$141,294,348</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>$114,666,601</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “–” refers to no data available.

PBSO provides guidance regarding programme management, and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office of UNDP serves as its administrative agent in the same way as it does all other UN MDTFs.

There are some notable differences between the UN PBF and the EU IfS. PBF is often perceived to be more closely managed by PBC than the IfS is by the EU PSC. This is because PBC provides guidance regarding funding priorities for countries on its agenda (Window I), while, in the case of the IfS, members of PSC are informally consulted before any significant funding decisions are taken. In practice, PSC approval is required but it does not direct funding decisions.

Another difference between the UN PBF and EU IfS is that PBF does not have an equivalent to the IfS “Partnership for Peace” component, which is designed to build peacebuilding capacity in regional and non-state actors. This has been identified as a limitation of PBF, with CSMs recognizing the importance of regional actors, but unable to recommend that UN funds, including PBF, be used to support their interventions. For this reason, CSMs and WGLL meetings have advocated that other donors actively support the build-up of regional peacebuilding capacity. This is one area for strengthened EU–UN cooperation, and tri-partite EU–UN–AU and EU–UN–ECOWAS partnerships have been proposed to this end.

Otherwise, both PBF and IfS are designed to serve similar purposes. They both aim to provide catalytic funding, kick-starting recovery funding as well as addressing specific risk factors or providing support for priority long-term peacebuilding actions. Both also stress that they are not a substitute for the substantial funding required for early recovery. For this purpose, the EU and UN make use of humanitarian and emergency funding mechanisms as well as other UN-administered thematic and country-specific MDTFs specifically designed for early recovery. However, there are still weaknesses in transitional financing mechanisms and the issue of how best to scale up early recovery funding is under active consideration by donors and the UN.

Both PBF and the IfS may, therefore, evolve to better address the early recovery funding gap in future. Indeed, the Terms of Reference for PBF

52 The UN General Assembly revised the PBF Terms of Reference in June 2009 and the European Parliament, Council and Commission will review the IfS
were revised in June 2009 to this end. The revisions will broaden the scope of the fund to include “efforts to revitalize the economy and generate immediate peace dividends to the population at large” and the window structure will be revised so that there will be no window specifically dedicated to countries on the PBC agenda. Rather, both countries on the PBC agenda (Window I) and those declared eligible for PBF by the Secretary-General (Window II) will be eligible for funding under the proposed IRF and the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility. IRF replaces Window III and provides emergency funding for immediate peacebuilding and recovery needs. The Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility will provide longer-term peacebuilding and recovery support. Thus, PBF will be divided into a facility designed to address gaps in early recovery funding and a facility designed to support activities that are directly aimed at building national capacities to prevent the (re)lapse of conflict (and that cannot be funded under other humanitarian or development instruments). To date, both PBF and IFs have largely responded to early and late peace consolidation needs on an ad hoc basis. However, proposed reforms to PBF will strengthen its future role in providing early “bridging” funding for broader recovery efforts, while also ensuring continued support for long-term peacebuilding in line with PBF priority plans developed in-country.

The Peacebuilding Support Office

The third element of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture provided for in the 2005 founding resolutions is PBSO. The founding resolutions provided that it be “small”, established “within existing resources”, “staffed by qualified experts” and serve “to assist and support the Commission” (United Nations 2005c: 2005d: paragraph 23). For many Member States, the role of PBSO was clearly to provide support to PBC and PBF. However, from the outset the former Secretary-General insisted that it should also serve to improve internal UN coordination around peacebuilding. In addition to its secretariat function, PBSO was, therefore, expected to bring UN operational actors together to contribute to the development of strategies in the countries on the PBC agenda and to their implementation.

Given these expectations and its limited resources, PBSO has been overstretched. For the first five months, PBSO included only three professionals and the Assistant Secretary-General as the process of seconding
staff, re-allocating posts and hiring staff through the Galaxy system proved slow. Staff numbers have since increased with seven permanent, eight temporary and four seconded posts agreed for 2008–2009. PBSO has been principally occupied with the labour-intensive process of establishing and supporting PBC and PBF. It prepares substantive inputs for all the meetings of PBC, including analysis and mapping exercises for the preparation of IPBS and background briefings for the thematic and WGLL meetings. The number and frequency of these meetings has dramatically exceeded expectations. It meets in one form or another (OC, CSMs or WGLL) every second working day. This is arguably unsustainable (for PBSO and the members of PBC), especially if PBC is to cover additional countries. Furthermore, PBSO manages PBF with projects in some 15 countries, and provides policy research and guidance for strategic assessments and inputs into IMPP. In 2008, PBSO was also tasked with preparing the Secretary-General’s report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (see next section). Reflecting these priorities, the organigramme of PBSO dated October 2008 shows that a PBC support branch, a financing for peacebuilding branch, a policy planning branch and a Secretary-General Report Team support the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General (United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office 2008a).

PBSO also supports a fourth “virtual” element of the Peacebuilding Architecture. This is designed to capture and disseminate best practices and improve institutional learning through electronic “discussions” of the peacebuilding community of practice and through a web-based portal, the Peacebuilding Initiative. The community of practice draws together policy experts and practitioners from across the UN operational agencies and invites them to participate in moderated electronic debates on particular peacebuilding challenges. These are facilitated by an online expert who produces consolidated replies and recommendations that are then made available to the UN as a whole. This means of consultation also assists PBSO in its work. For instance, it was used to consult UN practitioners on some of the key issues to be addressed in the Secretary-General’s report *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*. The web portal (www.peacebuildinginitiative.org) is a project of the International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research with PBSO and the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research as partners. It provides news, reviews and analyses of thematic issues of peacebuilding that are considered to be of relevance to policymakers and practitioners as well country-specific analysis of the countries on the PBC agenda.
The internal interagency coordination function rests with the office of the Assistant Secretary-General within PBSO. While this function has not been of interest to Member States and has not been a priority of the work of PBSO, in May 2007 the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee agreed on certain convening functions of PBSO after consulting with UN operational actors including DPA, DPKO, UNDP, UNGD, OCHA and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. And, in 2008, PBSO set up a Senior Peacebuilding Group with representation from all the main UN operational actors and the World Bank with a view to improving the coordination of the UN peacebuilding responses. However, implementation and development of such interagency coordination has been slow for a number of reasons. First, PBSO did not proactively pursue it, given its limited resources and competing priorities. Second, it was not evident that all operational actors shared an interest in developing this role for PBSO. Although UNDP and UNGD have been encouraging, others have not (interview with UN PBSO official, Geneva, December 2008). Third, soon after PBSO had “staffed up” and the first Assistant Secretary-General Carolyn McAskie had been replaced by Jane Holle Lute in 2008, Lute was recruited to work in the new US Administration, thus leaving a leadership vacuum. It remains unclear how PBSO will pursue its internal convening role.

3.1.4 A review of reviews

There have been a number of reviews of PBC by scholars and practitioners.53 This section aims to highlight some of their findings and to identify key concerns that are likely to be addressed in the five-year review of PBC in 2010.

Integrated strategies

The mandate of PBC provided in the 2005 resolutions appears unclear in relation to PBC role in promoting integrated strategies. The first point suggests

53 See Centre on International Cooperation and the International Peace Institute (2008) and Ponzio (2007). A number of workshops have also been convened to review progress of PBC. These include at least three events in Geneva (hosted by the Geneva Peacebuilding Partnership and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, one in 2006 and two in 2008) and one in Berlin (hosted by the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention in cooperation with the Development and Peace Foundation on 7 March 2008).
that PBC plays a role in proposing integrated strategies for peacebuilding, and the second point states that PBC should play a supportive role in focusing attention on reconstruction and institution-building efforts and in the development of integrated strategies. Although these recommendations arguably point to different roles for PBC, in 2007 the PBC OC agreed that the focus of PBC country-specific work was to elaborate and agree to IPBS through its CSMs. This role has been and remains widely contested.

Although the EU was initially in support of the idea, a number of actors, including EU donors, are concerned that PBC, thereby, duplicates other processes without adding value. For example, while stressing that Germany strongly supports PBC, Dr Rudolf Fetzer from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development called for PBC to leave the preparation of country strategies to other organizations to avoid duplication (SEF News 2008). Similarly, one researcher (who later went on to work for PBSO) asked:

How could yet another strategic peacebuilding framework benefit a country such as Sierra Leone, which, with the support of the international community, already maintains a Poverty Reduction Strategy, a Medium Term Expenditure Framework and a Peace Consolidation Strategy? It would be difficult to name a candidate country for the PBC that does not already have similar home-grown, carefully developed plans in place. Local strategic planning exercises are a far better means of empowering local counterparts than efforts in New York, and such local exercises are likely to better analyse and reflect the core peacebuilding priorities of the country (Ponzio 2007:10).

Several researchers, practitioners and, most significantly, representatives of recipient states have echoed this concern. Reflecting on IPBS, a member of the High-level Panel that originally proposed the idea of PBC (United Nations 2004) noted that the panel had envisaged that the strategies would be developed in the field with additional support from New York. Yet, representatives of the Burundi and Sierra Leone governments have argued that the process has been New York centric and has not empowered local governments even if it intended to. Some also argued that “there is nothing in them that is not already in the Poverty Reduction Strategy”.54 This concern is shared by a number of researchers and practitioners (Picciotto 2005; McCandless 2008). More significantly, members of PBC and key UN actors,

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including PBSO, increasingly share the concern. For instance, the 2009 PBC retreat noted the need for immediate improvements (which do not require new legislative mandates), including “modified approaches to the purpose and scope of integrated strategies” (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2009). Key recommendations also included the need to: (i) revisit the PBCs advisory role to become relevant to a larger number of countries; (ii) support the development of nationally owned and developed peacebuilding strategies based on in-country assessment and planning processes; and (iii) to develop instruments of engagement with countries on its agenda, drawing on existing in-country strategies and identifying areas of immediate priority action. In short, a number of recommendations that emerged from the PBC retreat stressed the need for PBC to engage with a greater number of countries in a variety of “lighter” ways designed to support peacebuilding priorities identified by the countries. The case for supporting national efforts to develop peacebuilding strategies with the support of in-country UN leadership if necessary was also emphasized in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of War that was prepared by PBSO. It stated that “in all cases the Commission should build on and enhance existing country level strategy setting processes where they exist, and ensure that its work is closely linked to and driven by the specific needs and priorities of the country on its agenda” (United Nations 2009:paragraph 85). The thrust of the report’s argument is, therefore, at odds with a role for PBC in which it proposes and decides on country strategies in New York.

In conclusion, although all actors agree on the importance of fostering integrated and strategic approaches to peacebuilding that address political, development and security priorities, the role of PBC in developing integrated strategies is contested on the grounds that it does not empower national leadership, adds little value to other strategic exercises and is too labour-intensive—with this approach PBC would be limited to addressing very few countries. Hence, the 2010 review will likely address alternative, “lighter” ways in which PBC can “accompany” countries on their path to peace, or provide advice on peacebuilding priorities. This would downplay the PBC mandated role in proposing integrated strategies, but might seek to elevate its role for holding national actors and donors to account for the implementation of agreed priority peacebuilding commitments. This is also in line with the Secretary-General’s 2009 report which argued that PBC should enhance its advisory role in “monitoring progress in the implementation of national peacebuilding strategies and recovery frameworks developed…"
through common assessment and planning processes among national and international actors, and providing political support as necessary” (United Nations 2009:paragraph 83).

EU officials also suggest that they would welcome such a change. Some agree that strategies developed by PBC have added little to other pre-existing strategies, including World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategies and have questioned whether and when PBC should engage in a process of defining strategies (interviews with EC officials in New York, August 2008, and Brussels, September 2008 and April 2009).

Policy guidance and best practices

In its founding resolutions, PBC is simply mandated to “develop best practices”. As described above, this ambition has been pursued through WGLL meetings and thematic CSMs. PBSO staff have also provided policy input into the development of other UN strategic documents, including the civilian aspects of peacekeeping mission planning, and have stimulated reflection on key peacebuilding topics across the UN system through e-discussions of the peacebuilding community of practice. To date, therefore, the PBC architecture has served mainly to identify and explore key peacebuilding issues. This has no doubt had an educational role, particularly for members of PBC, but many argue that it is not sufficiently tailored to providing advice in relation to specific countries (for the Security Council or the countries on PBC agenda) or for developing policy guidance for UN operational actors. To improve the mainstreaming of peacebuilding at an operational level, some have recommended that PBSO work more closely with other best practices centres within the UN system, including the best practices section of DPKO, the policy section of UNDP–BCPR and the DPA Mediation Support Unit (Centre on International Cooperation and International Peace Institute 2008:25).

Recommendations proposed at the 2009 PBC retreat on how to improve the PBC role in mainstreaming peacebuilding ranged from serving as a “knowledge depository” to the development of policy guidance and recommendations on key peacebuilding issues. The majority of recommendations, however, related to how PBC could make better use of this knowledge through a strengthened advisory role. This was also a key message in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report, which emphasized that PBC could provide the Security Council with “integrated peacebuilding
perspective and specific suggestions for the Council’s own engagement with the country on its agenda” (United Nations 2009:paragraph 24). This is intended to ensure that peacekeeping mandates include a peacebuilding perspective.

In addition to providing advice to decision-making bodies in New York, PBC should examine how it might better support national and UN actors at the field level. A number of officials have argued that the agenda of WGLL should be geared toward addressing requests for advice from countries or to exploring strategic issues identified by the OC. The Secretary-General’s 2009 report also suggested that the PBC provide advice in relation to specific, more limited requests for assistance from countries, while local UN leadership should play a leading role in supporting national actors in identifying strategic priorities. By implication, the advisory role of PBC and the resources of PBSO should, therefore, also be tailored to supporting, monitoring and learning from experiences of working with national actors to identify and address peacebuilding priorities.55

Resource mobilization and sustained attention

The 2005 founding resolutions mandate PBC to “help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery”. Reviews of its work all agree that PBC has increased the attention of the international community, in general, and the Security Council, in particular, to the otherwise “forgotten countries” on the PBC agenda. It has also sustained attention in the cases of Burundi and Sierra Leone beyond the timeframe of the peacekeeping presence. However, as pressure for PBC to take on a wider range of countries increases, the issue of how and when to wind down, disengage or “graduate” a country from the PBC agenda, while sustaining international attention, have come to the fore. These considerations have contributed to the widely shared view that the level of PBC attention must be scalable and compatible with existing monitoring and tracking mechanisms.

55 To date, the support role has been the other away around: UN field operations have, with no additional resources, provided intense assistance to PBC in the development of integrated strategies by preparing PBC field visits, conducting extensive consultations and providing drafting input.
Independent reviews on the PBC record also typically share the view that PBC has not delivered on its resource mobilization mandate. There is some evidence that PBC engagement with countries on its agenda has led to increased resources from some of its members, notably Japan and Norway. PBC also played a role in ensuring that IMF funding was not delayed in Burundi, as mentioned above. However, PBC has not resulted in revisions to existing donor aid programming practices or priorities. This, as Part 2 shows, is also true of European Community assistance to the countries on the PBC agenda.

PBC has, however, highlighted some of the issues that are prerequisites for increased donor assistance for institution-building, for instance, through WGLL meetings on strengthening national fiscal capacities and through the efforts of PBSO to support countries’ efforts to track resource flows. These are not new concerns. For instance, the World Bank has considerable experience and capacity in operational issues related to public financial management and reform. Similarly, OECD DAC identified improving aid effectiveness in situations of fragility and conflict, including tracking resource flows as a priority at a high-level meeting in 2007 and its International Network on Conflict and Fragility is taking this work forward. PBC should link up with and build on these experiences in order to strengthen aid reform agendas. Providing countries with innovative tailored responses, such as the PBSO online Peacebuilding Assistance Database project (supported by the EC) may otherwise have limited utility beyond PBSO and the country in question.

Although the PBC mandate specifically mentions resource mobilization for early recovery, PBC has not addressed this issue, mainly because the first countries on its agenda were in the late recovery stage. Also, PBF was not mandated to fund early recovery efforts, for which far larger sums are evidently required. However, there is widespread recognition of gaps in early recovery funding and the issue is being addressed by a number of donors. For instance, the United Kingdom proposal for an early recovery fund was discussed by the Security Council in 2008 and an OECD DAC working group is due to present recommendations on transition financing in 2009. Moreover, the question of how PBF could contribute to early resource mobilization has been thoroughly addressed in a number of recent
reviews. As mentioned in the overview of PBF above, these have resulted in revisions to PBF’s mandate that increase the scope of its role in bridging early recovery funding gaps, while also maintaining a role in providing funding for peacebuilding priorities in late peace consolidation phases. In the same vein, the Secretary-General’s 2009 report recommended that:

in the immediate aftermath of conflict a first quick release of funds could be requested by the senior UN official in the country, working closely with national authorities, to catalyze concrete activities in an early integrated strategic framework, or its equivalent. A second allotment could be made available once a national peace consolidation and recovery framework has been established … to help bridge delays in donor disbursements (United Nations 2009:paragraph 75).

Thus, although PBF has only partially been used for early peacebuilding funding in countries that are not on the PBC agenda to date, there is agreement that it will be used for early recovery funding in the future. There is also broad support for the idea that the identification of priority action plans be conducted in-country, with PBF also used to support the build-up of government secretariat capacities and accountability mechanisms (steering committees) for this purpose.

In future, the PBC role will likely be clearly separated from the management of PBF. Instead, PBC could provide a role in mobilizing political support for new approaches to funding early recovery and peacebuilding. For instance, the Secretary-General’s 2009 report recommended that PBC work with the General Assembly and ECOSOC to address the funding challenges that arise when conflict ends and calls for PBC to:

i) promote innovative approaches to mobilizing resources in countries that receive inadequate attention;
ii) advance aid effectiveness and mutual accountability between donors and programme countries around national peacebuilding compacts and priorities; and

56 The United Nations Office for Internal Oversight Services conducted an evaluation of PBF in 2008 and the PBSO management response to it has led to new Terms of Reference for PBF. In addition, in early 2009, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom jointly commissioned a review of PBF (Ball and van Beijnum 2009).
iii) encourage donors to provide faster, more flexible and more risk tolerant funding to address the specific funding challenges and gaps that arise when conflict ends (United Nations 2009:paragraph 84).

These recommendations are consistent with other initiatives to address aid effectiveness in situations of fragility and conflict, including those developed within the framework of OECD DAC. They build on findings regarding the challenges in transitional financing that are widely acknowledged by donors and non-donors. The challenge for PBC will be in how it can generate additional political support for this reform agenda and mobilize non-traditional donors to provide assistance for early recovery efforts.

As indicated by the EC experience in Part 2, the UN MDTF arrangements have proved useful for this purpose since they provide donors with an administratively light and relatively risk-averse means by which to provide assistance to fragile states. Their increased use will likely form part of the solution to the recognized challenges of early recovery funding and strategic coherence. The Secretary-Generals 2009 report argued for the establishment of in-country MDTFs, emphasizing that:

> evidence has shown that when resources are channelled through such funds, they can contribute significantly to predictability and coherence and facilitate alignment by directing funds toward a focused set of agreed priorities. If well supported, MDTFs and other pooled funds can be the muscle behind a common strategic approach (United Nations 2009:paragraph 78).

This is not to suggest that the record of MDTFs is entirely positive. In the past, MDTFs managed by the World Bank and UNDP have often been slow to release funds because of administrative and legal obstacles. The Secretary-General’s 2009 report recognized this, but argued that many of these obstacles have been addressed in the World Bank–UN Framework Agreement so that disbursement should be “fast” and “smooth” in the future. If PBC is to deliver on its early resource mobilization, it will need to recognize that its aid mobilization role is not linked primarily to PBF. Rather, it will need to consider how it can engage with the broader aid effectiveness reform agenda and generate support for the establishment of country-specific MDTFs.
Coherence and coordination

The 2005 founding resolutions charge PBC with providing “recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN”. As identified in Part 1, the challenge of coordinating all relevant actors within the UN when PBC is not formally linked to any of them is a formidable one. The first Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, Carolyn McAskie, confirmed this. She noted in her review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture that when establishing the internal coordination mandate of PBSO “account was not fully taken of the extent to which bringing all the actors together around new approaches would take more than hiring a new conductor, especially when some of the players did not want roles in the orchestra” (United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office 2008b:23). Interviews and reviews further suggested that there is still “no established pattern of working with DPKO, UNDP, the World Bank and other critical actors in helping to shape strategy or in monitoring implementation” (Centre on International Cooperation and International Peace Institute 2008:7).

PBC’s mandate is, in any case, unrealistically ambitious in relation to its internal coordination role. Given PBC’s institutional location and composition, it is clearly not designed to bring UN operational actors together, nor does it have the authority to direct them. Moreover, so long as the nature of the PBC advisory role is evolving and likely subject to change, it is difficult to identify the practical objectives of the PBSO’s internal convening function. As reviews of integrated approaches to peace operations have found, the form of cooperation should follow its function (Eide et al. 2008). Once the PBC advisory role becomes clearer, it will be easier to identify the added value to all actors of convening under the umbrella of PBC, the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee or the Inter-Agency Peacebuilding Contact Group. Recent reviews on the role of PBC are tellingly silent or unspecific on this issue. For instance, the 2009 PBC retreat recommended vaguely that PBC should “provide advice on how to improve in-country UN coordination”. The Secretary-General’s 2009 report reiterates the intention that PBC “promote greater coherence and synergies

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57 The Inter-Agency Peacebuilding Contact Group consists of representatives of DPKO as chair of the Integrated Mission Task Force, DPA as chair of ECPS, OCHA as chair of ECHA, UNDP as chair of UNDG as well as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office.
between the different parts of the UN system and other relevant actors outside the UN system”, but provides no guidance as to how this should be achieved. This indicates that PBC is not the right forum for country-specific, interagency coordination.

However, the objective of improving interagency coordination is being achieved in relation to another element of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture—that is, PBF, where the Inter-Agency Peacebuilding Contact Group has a clear role in reviewing priority plans for the use of PBF, in particular in countries where there is an effort to avoid duplication with ongoing or planned interventions. Should the role of PBF evolve as indicated above, this interagency role will likely evolve with it.

There are a number of other dimensions to the peacebuilding coherence challenge (Picciotto 2005:13–14). Picciotto has broken down the coherence challenge into four dimensions: (i) internal coherence; (ii) whole-of-government coherence; (iii) donor coherence; and (iv) country-level coherence. In addition to addressing internal UN coherence as explored above, PBC has been mandated to improve horizontal coherence between external actors (donor coherence). Indeed, PBC was designed to bring together key external actors including institutional donors and its working level meetings typically include a number of other “relevant” actors. Which additional external actors are invited to join its deliberations, evidently has and will depend on the case and purpose of the consultation. For example, if PBC identifies aid reform for peacebuilding as a strategic objective, coordination with OECD DAC will be required. Alternatively, if PBC identifies building peacebuilding capacity in regional actors as a priority, it should work with the relevant regional actors and donors, including the EC, that have funding mechanisms and policies in place to support capacity-building for peacebuilding at a regional level. If PBC takes on the role of developing policy guidance specifically in relation to institution- or state-building, for instance, it will need to work with a broad network of actors, both within and outside the UN, who are willing and able to support the initiative and to translate lessons learned into institutionally sanctioned practice. In short, the form of external coordination will also depend on its purpose and, given that PBC is an advisory body that brings together sovereign actors, it will only work so long as all relevant actors perceive that the benefits of such cooperation outweigh the inevitable transaction costs involved.
The EU has been willing to invest significant resources, including the internal transaction costs of agreeing common positions and harnessing external expertise, in support of the work of PBC. This has had indirect benefits for the EU in New York, for instance, helping it forge constructive working relationships with non-donors. In addition, as described in Part 1, EU engagement with the UN in the area of peacebuilding is backed by its development and foreign policies under the respective frameworks of aid effectiveness and effective multilateralism. This, coupled with the pragmatic realization that the establishment of any new institutional arrangement takes time, explains the strong EU engagement in and support for PBC in New York. However, EC delegation staff in-country are less convinced of the benefits of EC engagement. One questioned “Tout ça pour ça?” (All that for only that?) and argued that the added value of EC work in relation to improving the coherence of external interventions (in Burundi) did not justify the internal transaction costs associated with participating in it.

Another level of the peacebuilding coherence challenge, which PBC is confronted with but has little influence over, is the issue of national-level “whole-of-government” coherence. One review of PBC noted that:

one of the persistent criticisms of PBC deliberations is that the major donors have at times been inconsistent in the policies promoted by New York and field representatives or that their political and development representatives in the field send contradictory messages regarding the PBC (Centre on International Cooperation and International Peace Institute 2008:18).

The ability of PBC to achieve its coordination mandate is predicated on the ability of national actors to act coherently. Most member states recognize the importance of whole-of-government approaches to fragile states, but many have not yet made the necessary institutional investments to ensure consultation across development and foreign and defence ministries. This is true of many members of the EU and the EU itself. But PBC can do little about this; even when members can agree on broad priorities within PBC, this does not in itself ensure coherence of action. For example, in the case of Guinea-Bissau it was widely recognized that one of the key peacebuilding priorities was SSR and EU positions were entirely consistent with PBC priorities on this. However, agreement on priority areas alone did not prevent what many perceived as duplication between the EC SSR intervention and the launch of the ESDP SSR mission shortly thereafter. Indeed, unless the strategic prioritization within PSC is accompanied
by internal whole-of-government and country-level efforts to promote coherence, they may, in fact, increase the likelihood of duplication in certain areas.

In summary, PBC is not institutionally well placed to fulfil its coordination mandate because it does not have the authority that centralized, hierarchical coordination would require. Nor does it necessarily have the legitimacy to pursue this role through persuasion in the eyes of the main UN operational actors or other donors who base their operational decisions on processes of consultation (with national actors), whom they view as equally if not more legitimate. The main institutional weaknesses of PBC in this respect are its location in New York and the fact that its membership does not necessarily reflect the principal “stakeholders”. In short, PBC arguably exacerbates the coherence challenge rather than reducing it, by adding yet another set of external actors to the “stakeholders” that have a direct interest in a country’s political, social and economic development. At an operational level, it has also increased the coherence challenge for participating Member States (and institutional actors) by requiring a complex chain of consultations in-country, in capitals and in New York in order to agree on broad priorities that are not in themselves controversial and do not provide much guidance in relation to the critical questions of how best to address the broad priorities identified.

In conclusion, the reason why PBC struggles to achieve its coordination mandate is linked to the fact that it fails to meet the (EU) principle of subsidiarity. PBC does not meet at the appropriate level (or place) to make decisions regarding country priorities and how they should best be implemented. This is, in turn, an important argument for addressing the issue of prioritization and coherence at the country-level through inclusive negotiations. It is also a key reason for supporting the Secretary-General’s 2009 report, in which he argued precisely for this reorientation and for additional support for national and UN in-country actors to drive sustainable peacebuilding processes. Given the importance of this report for the continuing evolution of the UN approach to peacebuilding, the next section provides a brief overview of the analysis and recommendations presented in it.
In its Presidential statement of 20 May 2008 (S/PRST/2008/16), the Security Council encouraged the Secretary-General, PBC, international and regional organizations and Member States to consider how to support national efforts in affected countries to secure a sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively, including in the areas of coordination, civilian deployment capabilities and financing (United Nations 2008a). These were some of the areas in which it was widely perceived that the international response had been inadequate and that it had missed an early “window of opportunity to provide basic security, deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts” (United Nations 2009: paragraph 3). These areas were also for the most part not addressed by the PBC that had focused on countries in the late peace consolidation phase.

The Secretary-General’s report Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, published on 13 July 2009, is the UN response to the Security Council request (United Nations 2009). It was the result of a year of extensive consultations between the drafting team from PBSO and relevant actors, mostly from within the UN. These included PBC members (including the EU) as well as UN humanitarian, political, security and development operational actors and a number of external experts. The report was, therefore, born out of an internal UN consultation process—the first of its kind since the UN Peacebuilding Architecture had been agreed through an intergovernmental negotiation in 2005. This process served to bring UN operational actors back into the discussion of how to address some of the fundamental peacebuilding challenges that the international community and the UN share, notably coherence, capacities and resource mobilization.

The first half of the Secretary-General’s report (Sections I–IV) provided an analysis of the principal lessons learned and early peacebuilding challenges. It began (in Section II) with a strong statement of the operational imperative of national ownership, recognizing “that only national actors can address their society’s needs and goals in a sustainable way”. It also highlighted the challenges of political uncertainty and insecurity that often characterize the early post-conflict period in which the peace process is often ongoing and fragile. It noted the importance of bringing local elites as well as marginalized domestic actors to the table for priority setting in such
contexts, and recognized the important role that regional and international actors can play in supporting a peace process. Although the report made no explicit mention of a particular “approach” to peacebuilding, it appeared to support the position that the international community can and should serve as guardian or manager of a sustainable and inclusive peace process through the development of mechanisms for mutual accountability in the form of contracts or “compacts” between international and national actors. As noted earlier, this approach is closely linked to a top-down crisis management approach. While it might incorporate elements of the transformational approach, for instance, by ensuring that planning processes include marginalized groups, it is fundamentally designed to deliver stability and incremental reform through a process of ongoing review and bargaining between national elites and the international community.

The report also reaffirmed the importance of tailoring interventions to the local context noting that “over the past two decades we have learned that no single template can be applied to fluid and complex situations” (United Nations 2009:paragraph 22). It argued that “priority setting must reflect the unique conditions and needs of the country rather than be driven by what international actors can or want to supply” and must reflect “a clear understanding of existing capacities on the ground, whether they are national, subnational or international” (United Nations 2009:paragraph16). Nevertheless, while context is all-important and “there will always be country-specific priorities such as organized crime or natural resources”, it noted that experience has demonstrated that there are “recurring peacebuilding priorities” associated with the “core objectives” of establishing security, building confidence in a political process, delivering initial peace dividends, and expanding core national capacity (United Nations 2009:paragraph 15). In all these areas, it emphasized the importance of national capacity development “from the outset” while also pointing to the difficult balance of building confidence and exacerbating tensions, arguing, for instance, that support for electoral and SSR processes has at times been too rapid. The report (Section IV) also provided a review of the UN efforts to date to address the internal challenges to achieving coherence and clarity on roles and responsibilities. It noted that progress has been made within the UN humanitarian, development and security communities, but that these are not sufficient to ensure that the UN “delivers as one” given the different mandates and approaches of its operational actors.
Following from the analysis, which stresses the imperative of national ownership, the fluidity of post-conflict contexts and the fragmented nature of UN operational capabilities, the report argued that peacebuilding must be anchored at the country-level. It developed “an agenda for action” around the central message that the UN needs to strengthen its in-country capacity to define priorities, together with national counterparts, and to align UN and international resources behind that strategy.

One of the core elements of this agenda is the need for “stronger and better-supported UN leadership teams on the ground” (United Nations 2009:paragraph 30). These are seen as a prerequisite for generating UN coherence and also coherence beyond the UN. They would seek “to bring together the senior leadership of the political, peacekeeping and development elements of the UN country presence, where relevant” and would “be supported by analytical, planning and coordination capacities in the form of small unified teams of experts”. In order to empower in-country UN leadership with the authority to agree priorities and division of responsibilities, the report recognized that it must build up improved mechanisms for holding senior leadership to account. It recommended strengthened accountability to the Secretary-General along the lines of the “senior managers compacts” that have been used for Under Secretaries-General and Assistant Secretaries-General at Headquarters. It also recommended that the UN integrated strategic framework be used as a mechanism for mutual accountability in which “the senior representative is held accountable for his or her performance by the system and at the same time he or she can hold each part of the system accountable for implementing agreed roles and activities” (United Nations 2009:paragraph 38).

A core element of the agenda to promote more coherent action beyond the UN is the promotion of common assessment methodologies that provide a framework for a more rationalized approach to aid coordination, while also “situating local actors at the centre of the assessment process”. The PCNA methodology developed by the UN and World Bank and also used by the EC, is cited as a positive example of such a methodology. It can be successively expanded and detailed over time, with ever greater national involvement, so that it provides the basis for a “compact” or “framework” that can be used by national and international actors in monitoring progress against commitments. This is an approach that the EC actively supports, a point that was made clear to the Secretary-General’s report drafting team.
Although the Secretary-General’s report argued that the UN should support the development of a national peace consolidation and recovery framework derived through the PCNA methodology, it also accepted that the UN IMPP would take place in parallel since both planning processes “follow different timelines and serve different purposes”. It argued that the UN leadership team should “ensure the strategic coherence and appropriate links between PCNA and the UN internal planning processes by maintaining an ongoing dialogue around a common vision with the key national, regional and international stakeholders” (United Nations 2009:paragraph 43). This places the responsibility of ensuring coherence between UN programming and missions firmly in the field with the UN in-country leadership. This is a tall order given their limited authority over mission planning. However, its chance of success is greater if IMPP builds on established, if provisional, operational programming priorities. The Secretary-General’s report also argued that local UN leadership, together with the World Bank, should work to identify immediate national priorities, using an early iteration of an integrated strategic framework where a UN mission is being planned. To implement these immediate priorities, it should draw on an early disbursement from PBF.

Noting that “a coherent strategy is meaningless without the capacity and resources to implement it” the report goes on to discuss how the UN should go about developing national and UN capacities. It stresses that the international community must do better at finding existing national capacities and strengthening them rather than substituting for them, and argues that this will require a commitment to and resources for developing and supporting national capacity development strategies from the outset.

With regard to UN operational engagement it also argues that interventions build on systems that are already in place, focusing on how these capacities can be strengthened (through surge arrangements) and transitioned toward early peacebuilding priorities. It also acknowledges that the UN presence may evolve with the deployment of additional capacities through multidimensional peacekeeping operations or special political missions. To improve the predictability of the international support it identifies a number of areas where greater clarity regarding existing capacity and roles is required within the UN. In addition, it argues that: the international community should clarify and increase its support for civil administration capacity-building; the UN needs to generate standing capacity for justice and corrections; and that cooperation between roster managers should be
strengthened to enhance inter-operability between expert rosters and to broaden the pool of civilian experts that can be drawn on (with particular attention given to mobilizing civilian experts from the Global South and women). As mentioned in the section on resource mobilization above, the Secretary-General’s 2009 report also addressed the issue of funding, arguing that: PBF be used to bridge an early recovery funding gap; greater use be made of country-specific MDTFs; and that donors pursue efforts (in the context of OECD DAC deliberations) to establish more flexible, rapid and predictable funding modalities for countries emerging from conflict.

The Secretary-General’s 2009 report argued that PBC has a critical role in championing the agenda outlined above. It will, for instance, be involved in developing an implementation plan for the report, including possible financial aspects. In addition, the report pointed to a number of ways PBC can serve as a champion for a peacebuilding agenda with key actors. It argued that it develop its advisory role in relation to the Security Council, support ongoing efforts to promote coherence within and beyond the UN, and promote aid reform among key donors. In relation to its engagement with specific countries, its main function would be to monitor progress in implementing national peacebuilding strategies or frameworks. Although it would no longer have a role in developing strategies, it would play an important role in helping to hold all parties (within and outside the UN) to account for the commitments they have made.

The report’s conclusions stated that:

the United Nations will always be one among many actors involved in efforts to support countries emerging from war and therefore relies on strong partnerships based on a clear comparative advantage. The World Bank is a critical strategic partner in the initial post-conflict period …. Regional and sub-regional organizations also have vital political, security and economic roles to play in the immediate aftermath of conflict. We must build on our nascent partnerships in the peacemaking, peacekeeping and development spheres to promote engagement of regional and sub-regional organizations in peacebuilding (United Nations 2009:paragraph 91).

The following conclusions reflect on how the EU might respond to this report, including its call to promote coherent peacebuilding engagement in order to build on existing partnerships with regional organizations.
3.3 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU

3.3.1. Conclusions

The aim of this report is to explain past EU and UN institutional behaviour with a view to identifying practical recommendations for how to improve operational partnerships and coherence. Part 1 of the report shows that despite conceptual confusion and internal fragmentation, the EU and UN both seek to marry a top-down crisis management approach to peacebuilding with a transformative approach that uses development assistance to promote “structural stability” by addressing core risk factors or “root causes”. Although different actors have different conceptions about how to go about this, it argues that the key to ensuring a workable level of coherence is the agreement of common matrices or contracts that serve as a framework for the collective (national and international) peacebuilding effort.

Part 2 of this report shows that, in practice, EC–UN operational partnerships are determined at the field level. The strength of these partnerships depends on the UN capacity and comparative advantage as well as the administrative “fit” between the organizations. It finds that, while the EC has a policy preference for strong operational partnerships with the UN in fragile situations, in practice, EC operational partnerships are only “naturally” aligned where the UN plays a coordinating role through the use of MDTFs. In the relatively “forgotten crises” that have been on the agenda of PBC, the EC is an important institutional donor, but its strategies are not necessarily aligned with those of the UN PBC.

It follows from these findings that the most practical place in which to tackle the issue of external coherence and the EU–UN Peacebuilding Partnership is in the country concerned. This is where most operational decisions are made and the strategic alliances between external and internal actors are forged. Similarly, since all development actors use planning frameworks derived from needs assessments, the easiest way to ensure their coherence is through common needs assessment processes. These too are elaborated in-country. In accordance with the EU principle of subsidiarity, the EU should, therefore, focus its efforts strengthening its peacebuilding capacity and partnerships, including with the UN, at the country level.
This report further argues (in Part 3) that while the UN PBC was mandated to improve coherence through integrated peacebuilding strategies, it does not have the authority or proximity to operational UN actors to ensure coherence of the UN system. Nor does the evidence suggest that peacebuilding strategies developed by PBC have served to guide the actions of other external actors, including the EC. Rather, PBC has introduced another complicating layer in efforts to promote coherence through integrated strategies, and one which is more easily embroiled in the politics of global governance played out in New York than in the domestic politics of peacebuilding. In short, it finds that PBC is not the most appropriate forum to tackle the governance challenge associated with the coordination of “sovereign” external peacebuilding actors in relation to country-specific interventions. Rather, the analysis of the coherence challenge in this report is consistent with the recommendations made in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report that peacebuilding strategies should be anchored “in-country” as part of the peace process.

The argument in this report for moving assessments, planning, priority setting and resource allocation to the country concerned, and negotiating strategies for peacebuilding upon them, is not based on evidence that this will produce the “best” results. Rather, it is based on evidence that one cannot assume unity of interest or purpose among external actors or domestic ones. In this case, the argument is that negotiated strategies based on common needs assessments, with mechanisms for national and international actors to hold each other to account, are likely to be more politically workable and sustainable than strategies developed externally. In other words, in the absence of clear evidence about what works, it is better that the process of identifying priorities be informed by local perceptions of need and local politics than driven by supply-side politics and unexamined assumptions about what is needed and what works.

In addition to examining the approach to improving the coherence of the external efforts, this report also highlights some of the internal structural challenges to “delivering as one” that both the EU and UN face and the challenges to mobilizing financial and human resources for peacebuilding. It finds that many of these organizational challenges to peacebuilding are common to the EU and UN. If, as this report argues, the Secretary-General’s analysis of the peacebuilding challenge in the immediate aftermath of conflict is sound, then it follows that the Secretary-General’s
2009 recommendations will also be relevant to EU internal development and its analysis of how best to support the UN peacebuilding agenda.

In some respects, the EU is on a complementary path to reform in line with the Secretary-General’s 2009 recommendations. As noted in Parts 2 and 3, the EC is already a champion of the PCNA methodology—a principal means by which the Secretary-General’s report aims to promote country peacebuilding frameworks. There is also broad recognition of the internal structural challenges to EU coherence and a clear window of opportunity—with the establishment of EEAS—to promote cross-pillar coherence, especially at the country level. Ongoing efforts to develop an Action Plan to implement the European Council and EC conclusions on Development and Security and their positions on EU engagement in fragile states promise concrete recommendations to this end. In addition, the EC is party to OECD efforts to promote funding reform for situations of fragility and the 2010 review of EC financial instruments, including the IFs, will offer an opportunity to translate some of OECD recommendations into practice.

However, as demonstrated in Part 2, there is still a range of organizational obstacles to implementing these commitments. For instance, EC delegations are often not suitably configured or resourced for national capacity-building in fragile situations. Moreover, as in the UN, EU efforts to “integrate” the EU response where a peace operation is deployed are organized from the “top down” in line with military planning protocol. It is possible that future reforms associated with the creation of an EEAS may reinforce the cleavage between security-led planning processes and development-led ones. While both military and civilian mission planning will be “integrated” at the strategic level within the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate in the European Council, this will most likely be institutionally separate from EEAS and DG DEV. ESDP mission planning will not, therefore, be automatically informed by joint needs assessment and planning processes that inform EC programming decisions. As in the UN, this places a premium on member states to ensure that ESDP plans are consistent with internationally agreed strategies and support the conclusion that the authority and capacity of in-country EU leadership should be enhanced to address internal coherence as well as in-country partnerships with other actors, notably the UN.

58 Although it has yet to consistently implemented in EC practice.
Finally, Part 1 also shows that the dynamics of institutional change in the area of peacebuilding have been driven largely by internal politics rather than outputs. In other words, the development of peacebuilding policy in the EU and UN has not been evidence based. This raises a number of important questions. What would have to happen to have evidence-based peacebuilding given that we still know remarkably little about what works and why? And who should do this? And why strive for coherence in something that is not evidence based?

Although this report does not directly address these important questions, it nevertheless reveals some weaknesses in current institutional approaches to learning. For example, in the EU context, the European Council and EC maintain separate processes of institutional learning through lessons learned exercises and evaluation processes. It is, however, widely recognized that these mechanisms have not been influential in informing policy development to date and could be improved. Rather, learning tends to take place informally, through networks of practice and cooperation, especially in the context of the development of OECD DAC policy guidance (for development actors) or NATO doctrine (for security actors). Yet, despite the fact that the UN is a leading operational actor in peacebuilding, opportunities and resources for EU engagement with UN networks for policy development are limited. This suggests that the EC Peacebuilding Partnership approach to promoting institutional learning through partnerships with other actors is a sound one and should be expanded. Similarly, it highlights the importance of the EU engagement in PBC as a means to promote evidence-based policy. Indeed, in addition to its potential political value in supporting the implementation of peacebuilding agreements, PBC also provides an important entry point for evidence-based feedback. PBC and PBSO are both rare and useful in so far as their institutional incentives and legitimacy are linked to providing impartial advice. They, therefore, have the potential to play a critical role in bringing evidence into peacebuilding discourse and policy development within and beyond the UN. Strengthening EU engagement with the UN on peacebuilding practice, including through active engagement in PBC,

59 For example, there are ongoing discussions about how to strengthen lessons learning for ESDP missions, and the recent evaluation of the EC Peacebuilding Partnership introduced recommendations to tailor evaluation processes for peacebuilding. Moreover, future reforms, including the establishment of an EEAS, provide an important opportunity to strengthen EU internal learning processes, perhaps through the establishment of a best practices centre.
therefore, also offers an important opportunity for evidence-based learning for the EU.

3.3.2 Recommendations for all EU actors, especially EU member states and the Council General Secretariat

In addition to the six sets of recommendations for the reform of EC support to peacebuilding in Section 2.6, the EU should increase its efforts to:

1. Prioritize national capacity-building

- Needs assessments should be, as far as possible, informed by local processes to identify priorities and be conducted jointly with other external actors. The PCNA methodology, which serves as a common platform for UN, World Bank and EC recovery planning, is a positive step in this direction. It should inform EC and ESDP planning.
- Local peace/political reform processes should be supported. These include but are not limited to electoral processes. The EU should also promote inclusive dialogue and reconciliation and support the development of conflict-management capacity at national and subnational levels, e.g. national and local peace committees.
- Public administration and finance should be supported at national and subnational levels, given that it is a precondition for budget support. The EU and EC should draw on their experience (developed in the context of enlargement and ESDP) to strengthen their support for national capacity-building in the area of public administration in fragile situations.
- Community-level state-building. Building state capacity to deliver basic services should be implemented at the local level as well as the state level. This may require the revision of ESDP planning practices and EC funding rules so that the EC can directly support regional or local level state entities. The latter will require the support of member states and the European Parliament.

2. Strengthen EU Special Representatives

- Strengthen the leadership capacity of EUSRs. For the EU to be linked to local political processes and able to support them, including by providing support for UN leadership, the capacity of EUSRs and the “reach-back” support in Brussels needs to be enhanced. EUSR offices should be
reinforced with extra staff, ideally in the form of multifunctional teams drawn from the EC, European Council and contracted staff (or the future EEAS) with negotiation and mediation expertise, in-depth local and regional knowledge and language skills, and experience in strategic planning for national capacity-building as well as knowledge of EU and EC management systems.

- **Strengthen the authority and accountability of EUSRs.** EUSRs spend most of their time and energy trying to coordinate the EU effort without any authority to do so. This could be addressed through structural changes, providing EUSRs with greater authority vis-à-vis ESDP heads of mission or EC heads of delegation. Within the current structure, the European Council should redistribute staff from the Secretariat to the offices of EUSRs in the field. In addition, to improve the coherence of EU and bilateral actions by EU member states, the EU should develop a mechanism for mutual accountability between EUSRs and EC and EU member states based on nationally agreed strategic frameworks.

3. **Strengthen ESDP missions for local capacity-building**

For ESDP missions that have the objective of building state capacity in the area of police and rule of law, missions should support nationally defined priorities. To this end:

- ESDP pre-planning should build on national and international priority assessments and consult local UN leadership as a matter of course.
- ESDP should promote the programming approach to mission design and implementation, which builds on local capacity and input (e.g. the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo). As far as possible, mission planning should be moved from Brussels to the field.
- Where ESDP missions substitute for local capacity, the EU must ensure they are accompanied by “flanking” measures to build that capacity (in contrast, the chain of payments project that was part of the EU’s SSR mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was not sustained after the mission left).
- Regular reviews of all missions and mandates should be mandatory and feed into PSC reflections on their adaptation.
- There should be expanded support for third country participation in ESDP missions by supporting the development of regional civilian rosters and by supporting EU member states to include international
experts in their rosters, in particular in relation to women and experts from the Global South.

4. **Promote internal coherence and learning**

Promote structural conditions for coherence in post-Lisbon reforms through:

- linking EEAS and strategic planning for ESDP and linking EEAS and DG DEV, including through the use of country and thematic teams;
- promoting a best practices facility within EEAS with the authority and capacity to promote institutional learning in relation to coherence and best practices across EU external action; and
- ensuring that each ESDP mission and EC delegation has staff responsible for institutional learning and who report to the best practices facility and their hierarchy.

5. **Support the adaptation of the UN PBC**

The EC and EU member states should actively support the Secretary-General’s recommendations for UN peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of war and support efforts to adapt the role of PBC in the 2010 review. To this end they should:

- support reforms to strengthen UN in-country leadership;
- support efforts to move the UN assessment, strategic planning, priority setting and resource allocation to the country level;
- support efforts to expand the PBC role in monitoring the implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding strategies; and
- support an enhanced advisory role for PBC, vis-à-vis the Security Council and in response to requests from UN Member States.

6. **Develop joint EU–UN actions to build peacebuilding capacity**

- build peacebuilding capacity for regional organizations, including through the proposed EU–UN–AU and EU–UN–ECOWAS tri-partnerships;
- support, together with the UN and EC, the development of regional peacebuilding resource centres, which should also help the EU (and other international actors) identify experts with relevant local and
thematic knowledge to develop and implement capacity-building processes; and
• support joint in-country training efforts for EU and UN leadership teams in addition to implementing existing commitments in the area of training (in line with the EU–UN crisis management declaration).
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<th>ACRONYMS</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific countries</td>
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