Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Training
Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Training

Contributors: Virginia Gamba, Jakkie Potgieter, Ilkka Tiihonen, Barbara Carrai, Claudia Querner and Steve Tulliu

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UNITED NATIONS
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Secretariat.

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Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Psychological Operations and Intelligence
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Preface

Under the heading of Collective Security, UNIDIR has conducted a major project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR). The project examined the utility and modalities of disarming warring parties as an element of efforts to resolve intra-state conflicts. It collected field experiences regarding the demobilization and disarmament of warring factions; reviewed 11 collective security actions where disarmament has been attempted; and examined the role that disarmament of belligerents can play in the management and resolution of internal conflicts. The 11 cases are UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia), UNOSOM and UNITAF (Somalia), UNAVEM (Angola), UNTAC (Cambodia), ONUSAL (Salvador), ONUCA (Central America), UNTAG (Namibia), ONUMOZ (Mozambique), UNOMIL (Liberia), UNMIH (Haiti) and the 1979 Commonwealth operation in Rhodesia.

As an autonomous institute charged with the task of undertaking independent, applied research, UNIDIR keeps a certain distance from political actors of all kinds. The impact of our publications is predicated on the independence with which we are seen to conduct our research. At the same time, being a research institute within the framework of the United Nations, UNIDIR naturally relates its work to the needs of the Organization. Inspired by the former Secretary-General’s report on “New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era,” the DCR Project also related to a great many governments involved in peace operations through the UN or under regional auspices.

The disarmament of warring parties is mostly a matter of light weapons. These weapons account for as much as 90% of the casualties in many armed conflicts. UNIDIR published a paper on this subject (Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts, UNIDIR Paper No. 34, 1995). UNIDIR will continue to address issues related to controlling the dissemination and illicit trade in small arms, both on global and regional scales.

The present report assesses the status of military and civilian training for the conduct of peacekeeping operations, with particular emphasis on training for disarmament and control of weapons. The papers were written by Virginia Gamba (who led the DCR Project until March 1996), Jakkie Potgieter, Ilkka

\[\text{Document A/C.1/47/7, No. 31, 23 October 1992.}\]
Tiihonen, Barbara Carrai, Claudia Querner and Steve Tulliu. The need to write such an assessment emerged as a result of a DCR workshop which took place in October 1995 in the Republic of Malta. This workshop was entitled *The Training of Peacekeepers for Disarmament Operations*, and a copy of its agenda and list of participants figure as an annex to this volume.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views or conclusions expressed in the report. They are those of the authors. My final word of thanks goes to them: UNIDIR has been happy to have such resourceful and dedicated collaborators.

Christophe Carle  
Deputy Director  
UNIDIR
Acknowledgements

The DCR Project takes this opportunity to thank the many foundations and governments who have contributed financially and with personnel to the establishment and evolution of the research associated with the Project. Among our contributors the following deserve a special mention and our deep appreciation: the Ford Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, the Winston Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the governments of Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
Project Introduction

Disarmament and Conflict Resolution

The global arena’s main preoccupation during the Cold War centered on the maintenance of international peace and stability between states. The vast network of alliances, obligations and agreements which bound nuclear superpowers to the global system, and the memory of the rapid internationalization of disputes into world wars, favored the formulation of national and multinational deterrent policies designed to maintain a stability which was often confused with immobility. In these circumstances, the ability of groups within states to engage in protest and to challenge recognized authority was limited.

The end of the Cold War in 1989, however, led to a relaxing of this pattern, generating profound mobility within the global system. The ensuing break-up of alliances, partnerships, and regional support systems brought new and often weak states into the international arena. Since weak states are susceptible to ethnic tensions, secession, and outright criminality, many regions are now afflicted by situations of violent intra-state conflict.

Intra-state conflict occurs at immense humanitarian cost. The massive movement of people, their desperate condition, and the direct and indirect tolls on human life have, in turn, generated pressure for international action.

Before and since the Cold War, the main objective of the international community when taking action has been the maintenance and/or recovery of stability. The main difference between then and now, however, is that then, the main objective of global action was to maintain stability in the international arena, whereas now it is to stabilize domestic situations. The international community assists in stabilizing domestic situations in five different ways: by facilitating dialogue between warring parties, by preventing a renewal of internal armed conflict, by strengthening infrastructure, by improving local security, and by facilitating an electoral process intended to lead to political stability.1

The United Nations is by no means the only organization that has been requested by governments to undertake these tasks. However, the reputation of

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the United Nations as being representative of all states and thus as being objective and trustworthy has been especially valued, as indicated by the greater number of peace operations in which it is currently engaged. Before 1991, the UN peace operations’ presence enhanced not only peace but also the strengthening of democratic processes, conciliation among population groups, the encouragement of respect for human rights, and the alleviation of humanitarian problems. These achievements are exemplified by the role of the UN in Congo, southern Lebanon, Nicaragua, Namibia, El Salvador, and to a lesser extent in Haiti.

Nevertheless, since 1991 the United Nations has been engaged in a number of simultaneous, larger, and more ambitious peace operations such as those in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Mozambique and Somalia. It has also been increasingly pressured to act on quick-flaring and horrendously costly explosions of violence, such as the one in Rwanda in 1994. The financial, personnel, and timing pressure on the United Nations to undertake these massive short-term stabilizing actions has seriously impaired the UN’s ability to ensure long-term national and regional stability. The UN has necessarily shifted its focus from a supporting role, in which it could ensure long-term national and international stability, to a role which involves obtaining quick peace and easing humanitarian pressures immediately. But without a focus on peace defined as longer-term stability, the overall success of efforts to mediate and resolve intra-state conflict will remain in question.

This problem is beginning to be recognized and acted upon by the international community. More and more organizations and governments are linking success to the ability to offer non-violent alternatives to a post-conflict society. These alternatives are mostly of a socio-political/economic nature, and are national rather than regional in character. As important as these linkages are to the final resolution of conflict, they tend to overlook a major source of instability: the existence of vast numbers of weapons widely distributed among combatant and non-combatant elements in societies which are emerging from long periods of internal conflict. The reason why weapons themselves are not the primary focus of attention in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies is because they are viewed from a political perspective. Action which does notaward importance to disarmament processes is justified by invoking the political value of a weapon as well as the way the weapon is used by a warring party, rather than its mere existence and availability. For proponents of this action, peace takes away the reason for using the weapon and, therefore, renders it harmless for the post-conflict reconstruction process. And yet, easy availability
of weapons can, and does, militarize societies in general. It also destabilizes regions that are affected by unrestricted trade of light weapons between borders.

There are two problems, therefore, with the international community’s approach to post-conflict reconstruction processes: on the one hand, the international community, under pressure to react to increasingly violent internal conflict, has put a higher value on peace in the short-term than on development and stability in the long-term; and, on the other hand, those who do focus on long-term stability have put a higher value on the societal and economic elements of development than on the management of the primary tools of violence, i.e. weapons.

**UNIDIR’s DCR Project and the Management of Arms during Peace Processes (MAPP)**

The DCR Project aims to explore the predicament posed by UN peace operations which have recently focused on short-term needs rather than long-term stability. The Project is based on the premise that the management, control and reduction of weapons during peace operations can be a tool for ensuring stability. Perhaps more than ever before, the effective management of weapons has the capacity to influence far-reaching events in national and international activities. In this light, the management and control of arms could become an important component for the settlement of conflicts, a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and deflation of conflict, and a critical component of the reconstruction process in post-conflict societies.

Various instruments can be used to implement weapons control. For example, instruments which may be used to support preventive diplomacy in times of crisis include confidence-building measures, weapons control agreements, and the control of illegal weapons transfers across borders. Likewise, during conflict situations, and particularly in the early phases of a peace operation, negotiations conducive to lasting peace can be brought about by effective monitoring and the establishment of safe havens, humanitarian corridors, and disengagement sectors. Finally, after the termination of armed conflict, a situation of stability is required for post-conflict reconstruction processes to be successful. Such stability can be facilitated by troop withdrawals.

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the demilitarization of border zones, and effective disarmament, demobilization and demining.

Nevertheless, problems within the process of controlling weapons have cropped up at every stage of peace operations, for a variety of reasons. In most cases, initial control of arms upon the commencement of peace operations has not generally been achieved. This may be due to the fact that political negotiations necessary to generate mandates and missions permitting international action are often not specific enough on their disarmament implementation component. It could also be that the various actors involved interpret mandates in totally different ways. Conversely, in the specific cases in which peace operations have attained positive political outcomes, initial efforts to reduce weapons to manageable levels—even if achieved—tend to be soon devalued, since most of the ensuing activities center on the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. This shift in priorities from conflict resolution to reconstruction makes for sloppy follow-up of arms management operations. Follow-up problems, in turn, can result in future threats to internal stability. They also have the potential to destabilize neighboring states due to the uncontrolled and unaccounted-for mass movement of weapons that are no longer of political or military value to the former warring parties.

The combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of light weapons has marked peace operations since 1990. This combination poses new challenges to the international community and highlights the fact that a lack of consistent strategies for the management of arms during peace processes (MAPP) reduces the effectiveness of ongoing missions and diminishes the chances of long-term national and regional stability once peace is agreed upon.

The case studies undertaken by the DCR Project highlight a number of recurrent problems that have impinged on the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations. Foremost among these are problems associated with the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment early in the mission, and problems concerned with the lack of coordination of efforts among the various groups involved in the mission. Many secondary complications would be alleviated if these two problems areas were understood differently. The establishment of a secure environment, for example, would make the warring parties more likely to agree on consensual disarmament initiatives. Likewise, a concerted effort at weapons control early in the mission would demonstrate the international community’s determination to hold the parties to their original peace agreements and cease-fire arrangements. Such a demonstration of resolve would make it more difficult for these agreements to be broken once the peace operation was underway.
The coordination problem applies both to international interactions and to the components of the peace operation. A peace process will be more likely to succeed if there is cooperation and coordination between the international effort and the nations which immediately neighbour the stricken country. But coordination must not simply be present at the international level; it must permeate the entire peace operation as well. To obtain maximum effect, relations must be coordinated among and within the civil affairs, military, and humanitarian groups which comprise a peace operation. A minimum of coordination must also be achieved between intra- and inter-state mission commands, the civil and military components at strategic, operational and tactical levels, and the humanitarian aid organizations working in the field; these components must cooperate with each other if the mission is to reach its desired outcome. If problems with mission coordination are overcome, many secondary difficulties could also be avoided, including lack of joint management, lack of unity of effort, and lack of mission and population protection mechanisms.

Given these considerations, the Project believes that the way to implement peace, defined in terms of long-term stability, is to focus not just on the sources of violence (such as social and political development issues) but also on the material vehicles for violence (such as weapons and munitions). Likewise, the implementation of peace must take into account both the future needs of a society and the elimination of its excess weapons, and also the broader international and regional context in which the society is situated. This is because weapons that are not managed and controlled in the field will invariably flow over into neighbouring countries, becoming a problem in themselves. Thus, the establishment of viable stability requires that three primary aspects be included in every approach to intra-state conflict resolution: (1) the implementation of a comprehensive, systematic disarmament programme as soon as a peace operation is set-up; (2) the establishment of an arms management programme that continues into national post-conflict reconstruction processes; and (3) the encouragement of close cooperation on weapons control and management programmes between countries in the region where the peace operation is being implemented.

In order to fulfil its research mission, the DCR Project was divided into four phases. These were as follows: (1) the development, distribution, and interpretation of a Practitioners’ Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations; (2) the development and publication of case studies on peace operations in which disarmament tasks constituted an important aspect of the wider mission; (3) the organization of a series of workshops on policy issues; and (4) the publication
of policy papers on substantive issues related to the linkages between the management of arms during peace processes (MAPP) and the settlement of conflict.

The Project produced two series of publications: the case-study series and the policy paper series. The case-study volumes examined the disarmament components which affected operations in Somalia, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Liberia, Haiti, El Salvador and Nicaragua. The policy paper series includes a volume on *Small Arms and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa* (which presents three papers by different authors); a volume on the management of weapons during peace processes as seen from the perspective of different elements present in a peacekeeping operation, such as: consent, doctrine, procedures, rules of engagement, use of force, and tactical disarmament during consensual operations (six papers by different authors); a paper on the process of information gathering and its impact on a peacekeeping operation; and this volume which looks at the status of civilian and military training for peacekeeping operations with particular emphasis on training for the conduct of disarmament tasks.

My special thanks go to the authors of this volume which include two of the DCR Project's military experts, Lt. Col. (ret.) Jakkie Potgieter from South Africa and Lt. Col. (ret.) Ilkka Tiihonen from Finland, as well as Barbara Carrai, Claudia Querner and Steve Tulliu.

Virginia Gamba
Project Director
## List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBS</td>
<td>Bulletin Board System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Centre for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCR</td>
<td>Disarmament and Conflict Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMPT</td>
<td>Disaster Management Training Programme</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAPTC</td>
<td>International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>Infrared</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAPP</td>
<td>Management of Arms during Peace Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>Micropower Impulse Radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPSO</td>
<td>Multifunction Peace Support Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODHR</td>
<td>Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoners of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>RoE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPV</td>
<td>Remotely Piloted Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAVEM III</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission III</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDHA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEF I</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force I</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNITAR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Training and Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
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<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteers</td>
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<td>WAM</td>
<td>Wide Area Mine</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTVC</td>
<td>Wavelength Tunable Video Camera</td>
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Overview

Training for Civilian and Military Peacekeepers with reference to Arms Control, Disarmament and Demobilization

Virginia Gamba*

I. Introduction

The manner in which peacekeeping operations have evolved since 1956 suggests a theme that has run throughout the history of peace support operations: the story of a hesitant and reluctant participation by troop-contributing countries, attempting to cope with concepts and organizations of an unconventional nature in order to maintain, restore and enforce international peace.

Loopholes for collective action involving multinational peace forces were created in the invention of the peacekeeping concept itself. Techniques for a peace force to operate under certain conditions were also formulated, with certain troop-contributing countries leading the way in this respect, particularly in concepts related to the military observer mission. Despite this facilitation of ad hoc missions, however, what has been lacking is the taking into account of

* Virginia Gamba is now Project Director of the Towards Collaborative Peace (TCP) project at the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa.

† This introduction is a result of collaboration between UNIDIR and the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa. The comments in this section are a product of continuous research on the topic by Virginia Gamba, former project director of the DCR project at UNIDIR 1994-1996 and current project director of the TCP project at ISS. As part of this continuous research, the reader should see V. Gamba’s writings in the previous UNIDIR DCR series publications and the ISS publications on the same issue, particularly Monograph Number 8, January 1997, ISS Monograph Series, entitled “Multi-Functional Peace Support Operations” by Virginia Gamba and Jakkie Potgieter.
the multidimensional aspects and multifunctional needs of such operations in order to structure a workable and unified doctrine of use.

Peace support operations should be seen in a holistic way, including peacemaking and peacebuilding tasks. All functions overlap in time so that the actual deployment of a multifunctional peace support operation will involve, in varying degrees, tasks designed to buttress support for peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, and peacebuilding. The peace process is thus a continuum, permitting sliding rules for action so that each phase of the process can be reinforced as necessary.

The “sacred” ad hoc rules that have characterized traditional peacekeeping operations, namely those of impartiality, neutrality, consent, and self-defense have, by and large, constrained rather than guided discussions. At times these principles have also confused the underlying issues and hampered the ability (notably in terms of flexibility and adaptability) of the multinational forces to engage in the tasks intrinsic to their mandate. As long as the context for these operations remained in the realm of the Cold War and referred to international peacekeeping in the wake of a recognized and accepted peace process, the problems associated with such missions were kept under cover. Ad hoc problems which emerged during the operations were solved on a case-by-case basis. And yet, the inability of the system to appreciate what was specific to a particular mission, as opposed to what was inherent in all missions, prevented the UN from applying uniform rules for action. This, coupled with political uncertainty and lack of cooperation from the permanent members of the Security Council in engaging their forces in support of peacekeeping operations during the Cold War, sustained the belief that these operations could only happen on an unstructured basis, if they were going to happen at all.

With the end of the Cold War and the re-examination of the potential of peacekeeping operations as a practical means of assisting in the resolution of localized conflicts, the international community soon realized that its new-found enthusiasm for multinational cooperative and peace support actions had to be channelled through outdated, non-structured mechanisms. As the complexity and frequency of these operations increased, the flaws in the system became more apparent. And yet, contrary to international public opinion, the flaws apparent in operations such as those in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia, were not evidence of the inability of the international community to engage in large scale peace operations, but rather confirmation that all peacekeeping operations are complex and demand multi-tasking.

Since 1989, peace support operations have started to operate in a different context, according to a different format, and with different objectives and
schedules from those employed in the past. Above all, the relationship between the civilian and military components of a mission has changed. A new type of peacekeeping operation has emerged, more aptly described as a Multifunction Peace Support Operation (MPSO). MPSO’s today are found in different contexts because they have been increasingly mandated and deployed in situations of:

- internal conflict; and
- in the context of failed states.

MPSO’s operate according to a different format because:

- they are much larger than in the past;
- they tend to cover entire national geographic spreads rather than just borders or hot areas;
- they have a broad civil-military mix in their constitution;
- they are often concomitant with large humanitarian relief operations by international agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s); and
- they are mostly manned by personnel from non-traditional troop-contributing countries.

MPSO’s operate with different objectives because:

- they do not require the settlement of a conflict as a prerequisite for their deployment;
- they deploy in increasingly premature and volatile situations—more with the intention of peace pre-emption and peacemaking than of peacekeeping— which generates enormous pressure on their human resources;
- they seldom carry mandates for the protection of the local population and yet the way in which they are judged in the field depends on their ability to protect civilian populations; and
- they engage in peacebuilding activities concomitant with their peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-enforcing tasks.

The duration of MPSO’s is different because, due to their size and objectives:

- they have more time constraints than in the past;
- they must operate under an exit deadline, a fact well known to warring parties prior to deployment; and
they depend on financial and personnel contributions which are strictly conditional upon the types of tasks undertaken and the periods of time spent in the field.

Finally, civil-military interactions during an MPSO have become more complex, calling now for greater coordination between the civil affairs, military, and humanitarian operators in the field. Lack of coordination, perceptions and suspicions, as well as the belief on the humanitarian side that the military are now impinging on their traditional roles, might jeopardize the success of the mission itself. A transparent code of conduct to guide civil-military relations in peace operations, and clearer planning and organizational structures could improve the present situation.

In addressing these issues, UNIDIR’s Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR) study has clearly shown that although some issues will not be resolved easily or cheaply, some actions can be undertaken to improve the current functioning of operations while longer-term strategies are decided upon. The two areas where some improvement can be achieved at short notice are civil-military interactions (including the training of civilians for peacekeeping functions) and the training of troops to undertake their multifunction missions more efficiently. This last issue is particularly important and relevant for the successful management of weapons during peace operations.

In order to fulfil its research objective, the DCR project at UNIDIR created and distributed a Practitioners’ Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations. The questionnaire was divided into seven sections which explored 16 different issues relative to disarmament and peacekeeping operations. The topics covered were as follows: implementation of peace agreement, mandate, subsidiary disarmament agreements, top-down changes, bottom-up changes, protection of the civilian population, force composition and structure, operational procedures (rules of engagement), coercive disarmament, information collection, disarmament, demobilization, demining, training, interactions, and reflections. A copy of this questionnaire is reproduced at the end of this volume.

The questionnaire was distributed to peacekeepers of many nationalities who had served in eleven peacekeeping operations since 1979. The responses were analyzed and served to create individual case studies which have already been published by UNIDIR. In analyzing short-term improvements to peace operations with a disarmament component, the questionnaire responses have shed light on civil-military interactions and training needs. It was therefore
appropriate for UNIDIR to address these two topics in this last volume of the DCR series.

The DCR contribution to dealing with these issues is threefold: providing a guide to the types of training and equipment that could improve the chances of successful disarmament, arms control, and demobilization components of peace missions; recommending some improvements in the standard training for general peace support operations; and providing an indication of the status of civilian training for peacekeeping. The chapters in this volume deal with these topics successively.

II. The Challenges to Improving Civil-Military Interactions

One of the most difficult things to understand and accept today is the fact that most contemporary multifunctional peace operations are, above all, civilian operations with military and humanitarian components working closely together. This was not the case previously, at least not to the same extent or in the same proportions as today. Peacekeeping operations before 1989 were generally military in task and composition. Most of the time, the head of the mission was a military officer. As of 1989, however, the practice of appointing a civil affairs officer as head of mission became the norm. The change in both overall numbers and in the respective proportions of military and civilian personnel occurred when operations became more complex, multi-task, multi-component conglomerates, working in specific contexts which made humanitarian organizations work side by side with military and civilian peacekeepers. Civilians selected as heads of missions are normally appointed for their political ability and stature, rather than their expertise in the field, where they work with multi-component organizations. Having little or no experience of working with military commanders, they struggle to understand, and sometimes to relate, to the military frame of mind. Military commanders, on the other hand, like to know the parameters of their freedom of action, and will keep pushing the edge until these are established. This can, and indeed has, led to a total breakdown of communications between the two most important actors in any peace support

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operation. When one looks at the current operation in Angola, one cannot but wonder whether this is not two different operations (one civilian and one military) taking place in the same country. What is needed in the field are heads of missions that are trained to work with the different components of a mission, and that have been exposed to both the civilian and military milieu. It would, therefore, be advisable to have joint pre-deployment training exercises to this effect, as well as joint mission planning sessions before deployment.

The new relationship that MPSO’s have imposed on both civilian and military components of a peace support operation has not been an easy one. On the one hand, one can argue that the frequent interaction between the civilian and military components in the field might assist in a change of the military mind-set towards these types of interactions. On the other hand, such interactions can also have an impact on the normal course of action of humanitarian organizations. Thus, in contemporary conflict situations, where MPSO’s are concerned, the humanitarian objectives of different agencies and NGO’s cannot be separated from military and political objectives. Humanitarian aid has become an aspect of military objectives. Ultimately, there does exist a problem of different approaches by civilian and military peacekeepers, which can inhibit the efficiency of international action in areas of conflict and thus impact negatively on the mission itself.3

Respondents to the UNIDIR DCR Questionnaire reflected on civil-military interactions in the field. In response to the question: “Would you consider the relationship between humanitarian elements/organizations and the military personnel during the mission to have been very good, adequate or inadequate,” 23% agreed that the relationship was very good, 42% that it was adequate, and 35% that it was inadequate. Nevertheless, these responses correspond to a total of ten peace support operations, some of which have been successful and some not. When the answers are matched with the missions themselves, it is striking to note the difference in civil-military interaction according to the success or failure of an operation. Thus, for example, in the case of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the proportion of interactions reported as adequate was 85% versus 15% for interactions classified as inadequate. Almost

4 Cambodia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Liberia, Somalia, Mozambique, Haiti, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (CMF), Angola and Namibia. All of these except Angola and Namibia have been published in the UNIDIR DCR project series between 1995 and 1997.
the same proportions applied to the Commonwealth Monitoring Force Mission (CMF) in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (75% of interactions classified as adequate versus 25% classified as inadequate). In contrast, questionnaire responses for the Somalia operations clearly showed that only 16% of survey respondents considered civil-military interactions good or adequate, whereas 84% of respondents found them to be inadequate.

At this stage, it is possible to say without doubt that the two principal problems that have emerged in the context of civilian-military interactions in MPSO’s are those related to a) the lack of coordination between these components, and b) the extent to which each is able to accommodate the other, before and during an MPSO. As Slim indicates, the terms “military” and “humanitarian” encompass a range of different organizations, making operational planning and standardized practice more complicated than most generalizations on the subject recognize. Thus there is some overlap in today’s responses to emergencies which creates two types of special civil-military relationships, security relationships and technical ones, that can give rise to either consensus or tension. Moreover, civil-military relationships are complicated by the fact that military and civilian components in an MPSO are also following different mandates and procedures. On the civilian side, for example, UN agencies differ from wider international agencies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Red Cross movement, and both differ from the structures, goals and procedures of international and national non-governmental agencies which also operate in the field in an independent manner. Thus, tensions among civilian components and between civilian and military components may arise in the field because of different management styles. For example, the military, used to working in hierarchical command structures, may see the independent and consultative style of NGO management as muddled and indecisive.

On the issue of perceptions, international humanitarian organizations tend to be made up of people who have deep reservations about militarism. This means that, at a profound moral level, the humanitarian has more problems with the military than the military with the humanitarian. The result is a reticence and ambivalence in civil-military interactions on the part of the humanitarians that extends beyond questions of operational procedure to matters of ethics and

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identity. With respect to the military component *per se*, it is important to remember that military forces differ in force size, structure, capability and posture; that not all national militaries are the same; and that there are differences in competence, professionalism and democratic outlook. This becomes particularly evident in an MPSO environment made up of military contingents of many nationalities, cultures and levels of professionalism.

Some troop-contributing countries to MPSO’s see a benefit in the frequent interaction between their military and the large number of civilian operators in peace operations. It is argued that such interaction serves to demonstrate to the military the advantages of working closely with civilians, and in more extreme cases, might serve to democratize or humanize the military from countries which have had totalitarian or military regimes in the past, but which are now democratic. And yet, experience in the field demonstrates that the opposite often occurs. The structured military contingents of many countries have difficulty in interacting with civilians in a given operation, not because they are civilians, but because they are unstructured.

A more positive and constructive debate here would be to recognize that the type of task to which military contingents of an MPSO are exposed, fall under humanitarian policy and humanitarian affairs thus creating a new type of military profile. The role of the “humanitarian” military as seen in an MPSO can be divided between three main tasks: relief assistance, protection, and peacebuilding. All of these are tasks which can afterwards be applied internally in the context of their own countries. The paradox is that, more often than not, countries with a history of military intervention in domestic civil affairs do not wish to have their peacekeeping troops once again become involved in matters of internal political affairs upon their return. As a result, often, peacekeepers are constrained in developing their new-found skills at home.

This argument aside, it is interesting to note that civil-military relationships in the field will be affected by the type of humanitarian role adopted by the military. Sometimes the military are asked to operate like a relief agency becoming directly involved in the emergency provision of water, food, medical care and logistical support. Sometimes they are only involved in protection, and the like. Civil-military relations then depend on which role the military is playing at any one time, which provides the framework for characterizing a relationship as being one of technical assistance or of security provision.

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One aspect of the continued interaction between civilian and military components in MPSO’s is that consensus has emerged on a recognition by both sides of the limits of humanitarianism and of the need for long-term political and developmental solutions in achieving lasting peace. Yet, although there might be consensus on this issue, the civilian and military approaches towards this end differ from each other. For example, the military operational approach is not geared to implement development activities. The military aim to do something for, rather than with, people and tend to give little thought to the long term management implications of what they construct or repair. Civilian agents on the other hand—particularly NGO’s—are very much aware of such differences. At times, this can create additional tension between the civilian and military components of an MPSO.

Another factor resulting in tension is the sense of competition felt by civil agencies regarding the perception that the military is increasingly becoming the organization of choice for the international community in complex emergencies. They accuse Western armies of jumping on the humanitarian bandwagon in order to find a new role and so defer cuts in their budgets.7

At this point it is important to note that there are some issues in MPSO’s that equally affect the civilian and military components but which can also, in time, become sources of tension between the two. Of these, the most important concerns the degree of consent an MPSO has from local populations. When levels of consent run low and the MPSO becomes unwelcome and unpopular, civil-military relationships (which have a different profile locally) become strained and the civil humanitarians try to distance themselves from both the civil affairs officers of the mission and from the international military force (which alone embodies the image of a mission in the field).

To sum up, civil-military interactions in MPSO’s are characterized by the presence of civilians at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the operation. Sometimes it is difficult for military peacekeepers to understand that even at the most tactical of levels, they will have to cope not only with restraining belligerent parties but also with assisting the action of the humanitarian and civilian components of the mission. Even if they achieve this goal, the military will not always be welcomed or seen as successful by the humanitarian components which will, at worst, be defensive (because the military are taking on their own traditional roles) or derisive (because they do

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not understand the military operational structures). One very important way in which this obstacle can be overcome is by paying more attention to civilian peacekeeping training and coordination at the pre-deployment and on-site stages. An initial contribution to understanding the capacity we have to undertake this is reflected in the final chapter of this volume.

III. Training

The primary mission of military forces is to protect the national interests of their respective countries through deterrence and to engage in war should that become necessary. Recently, however, the international environment has evolved so that peace operations are a more common occurrence for armed forces than ever before. Most of the growing number of armed forces that have served in peace operations have realized that these operations are different from combat. Our research, however, has established the indisputable fact that professional armed forces, commanded by professional officers, properly trained for their primary mission (i.e. combat), properly equipped and well-disciplined, are the only forces to deploy in peace operations. Furthermore, it is clear that some specialized training is needed for successful participation in peace operations. Unfortunately, only a few countries have developed specialized means to prepare troops for peace operations. Specialized training must not replace traditional military training, which should, in fact, be modified to cover the unique tasks of peace operations.

Initial reading and interpretation of DCR questionnaire responses showed a number of contradictions related to the training of military peacekeepers deployed in ten multilateral missions. The questions analyzed are reproduced in Annex I at the end of this volume.

Questions 11.2 and 11.4 clearly show that a majority of peacekeepers believed that arms control and disarmament could have been conducted in the sectors they controlled and that these tasks could have been accomplished more efficiently. These answers prompted an intense study of the specific training responses.

As indicated in questions 14.1, 14.3 and 14.4 through 14.8, the most extensive training undertaken was in the area of classical peacekeeping observer tasks. In every other category, less than half of the respondents had been trained for the specific task they had to undertake. Of these categories, the greatest lack of training emerged in arms control and cantonment and in demobilization techniques.
Another interesting issue emerged from questions 14.10 and 14.11. Clearly, the peacekeepers felt that lessons had been learned at the end of the mission and that they were properly debriefed afterwards in their home countries. A contradiction emerges at this point: if lessons were learned and the peacekeepers debriefed, the level of training given should have been higher. This contradiction might show that national training programmes were not dynamic enough to take into account the lessons learned in the field in preparation for the next mission.

Finally, answers to question 16.4 indicate that less than half of all peacekeepers surveyed understood clearly the relationship between disarmament and post-conflict reconstruction. Of those that did, however, a majority felt that their disarmament task had a positive effect on the national reconstruction processes in the field.

On the interactions between civilian and military forces, the project asked very few questions. The answer, for example, to question 15.4, which focused on cooperation between these elements and local ones showed that much interaction does occur in the field. Yet, although cooperation and interaction exist at all levels of a peacekeeping mission, there are few training courses for civilian peacekeepers, or for joint training of civilian and military peacekeepers. Most of the contact between these groups is brought about during on-site training; whereas almost none occurs at the pre-deployment stage.

On the basis of these answers, the analysis identified needs regarding training, namely:

- to upgrade general pre-deployment training packages in existence at national levels;
- to create courses on specific arms control and disarmament techniques and add them to pre-deployment training packages; and
- to implement more integrated civil-military peacekeeping training in view of the greater interaction between civilians and military operators in a mission.

By the same token, the analysis also highlighted that very little training or de-briefing is actually conducted by the UN itself. Most of this is undertaken by the home countries. The experiences of these countries have not been fed back immediately to the training field. In addition, and more importantly, they have not been collected by the UN or other institutions to ensure that the lessons learned are made available to other participating countries or on a more general level.
There are, consequently, three principal items that must be understood in relation to training:

- most military peacekeepers were not trained for specific tasks in peace operations, since most national contingents believed that basic military training was all that was required to undertake these tasks;
- most military peacekeepers would benefit from an updated pre-deployment curriculum which would take into account the changing nature of peace operations and the increase in civil-military interactions during these operations; and
- most contemporary peace operations have a strong civilian component at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and yet little training for civilian peacekeepers is offered by the UN, troop-contributing countries, or relief organizations.

A last recommendation that emerged from the analysis of training for peacekeeping missions is that military peacekeepers must at times act as negotiators and diplomats in the field, brokering partial peace and disarmament agreements at the tactical level. There is no reason, however, why this specific task should not be undertaken by trained junior diplomats, who should be part of the mission, to facilitate and to improve interaction and communication between the warring parties and the mission, not only at the strategic and operational levels, but also at the more localized ones.

To sum up, training for a task remains the ultimate responsibility of the organization employing and deploying the personnel. In the case of UN missions, it is the responsibility of the Organization to ensure that the personnel it deploys are trained. With few financial implications, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations can contribute to ensuring that mission personnel are properly trained. To achieve this, the UN needs to develop and implement a mandatory national pre-deployment training package for all military and civilian personnel assigned to UN peace operations; structure and coordinate the proper utilization of the vast amount of training experience and knowledge available within the UN system to support missions; and develop and implement an easily accessible computerized information system that can provide analyzed data on lessons learned, hints on training, etc., and which can be accessed from the contributing countries.
IV. Conclusion

There are a number of issues which cloud the debate on what a UN multifunctional peace support operation should look like, taking into account the needs of the global context today and the precedents for UN military action in the past. All of these issues reflect the fact that the UN is comprised of Member States which contribute ideas, policies and forces for multifunctional operations. Thus, the debate is as broad and diverse as the membership of the Organization itself.

Nevertheless, the pressure on the international community to provide support and relief in intra-state conflict and to put failed states back on their feet is mounting. Until such a time as this pressure produces results related to a common standardized doctrine of operations and a common vision on what a “peacekeeper should do” rather than concentrating on what a “peacekeeper should not do,” there are still some areas where improvement is possible. Civil-military interactions and military and civilian training for peace missions are two of them.
I. Introduction

In the 1990’s, the established role of the traditional UN peacekeeper—that of monitoring the implementation of an honorable agreement between two or more parties to a conflict, of doing so usually unarmed, and of manning a distinctly marked observation post or patrol a demilitarized cease-fire line—has become the exception rather than the rule.

A shift from inter to intra-state conflict and the willingness of the UN to offer Blue Helmet assistance in conflict situations, even before firm cease-fire lines have been accepted by all parties, have generated a very constrained operational environment for troop-contributing countries.

Today, traditional principles guiding peacekeeping operations in the field are not always valid. For example, impartiality is no longer easily recognized by all parties to the conflict, consent has become increasingly problematic, freedom of movement is constantly denied, cease-fires are violated, no distinct front lines exist, and in some cases, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, peacekeepers are themselves targets of violence. Moreover, in the failed state scenario, no accountable or legitimate political authority exists in operational areas. This change in the environment in which military and civilian peacekeepers alike must execute their tasks indicates a need to review traditional training and equipment requirements if new UN peace support operations are to improve their record of success.

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II. New Missions, New Tasks; New Training and Equipment Needs

The changes that have occurred in the operational environment have added an array of new and challenging tasks to the mission of any current and future peace operation. These include:

- ensuring uninterrupted delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance to isolated populations;
- guaranteeing the safety and security of civilian and administrative personnel, national aid workers and non-governmental organizations (NGO) personnel;
- protecting the local population;
- undertaking demining operations;
- human rights monitoring;
- disarming, cantoning and demobilizing armed factions;
- executing police functions;
- undertaking preventive deployment; and
- elections monitoring and providing security of election points and workers.1

The patchy record of UN successes in the field since the early 1990’s seems to indicate that although there are new responsibilities attached to each mission, and that these evolve in a changed operational environment, the troop-contributing countries have not yet adapted their training, equipment or operational mind-set from traditional peacekeeping to new situations. The type of problems this generates in the field endangers not only the mission but the peacekeeping personnel themselves. The unwillingness to adapt is a self-imposed operational restraint which needs to be addressed as it seriously undermines the ability of peace forces to carry out their duty safely and fully.

Self-imposed operational restraints include:

- unclear and/or insufficient mandates;

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1 DCR Questionnaire Analysis, UNAVEM I and II, UNOSOM, ONUMOZ, UNPROFOR, UNTAG, UNTAC, ONUSAL, and ONUCA, published by UNIDIR DCR series (except for UNAVEM and UNTAG which were not published but which were analyzed extensively).
• the absence of one integrated strategy binding the different components of a mission, and the inability to work toward one common goal;
• the absence of, or incomplete, planning prior to deployment;
• restrictions on information gathering and intelligence operations;
• restrictions on the use of coercive measures and force in accordance with rules of engagement;
• the absence of a universal doctrine for UN peace operations;
• the absence of a universal training curriculum for UN operations;
• the reluctance to subject contributed manpower to adequate screening mechanisms before acceptance;
• difficult and inefficient logistical support systems; and
• the effects of geographical dispersal of military contingents and administrative personnel.\(^2\)

### III. The Enhancement of Training

The first task of a peacekeeping and peace support operation is deterrence. The peacekeepers must be able to deter aggression but not incite hostilities if a crisis erupts between belligerents. While this suggests that the introduction of peacekeeping troops in a crisis should be perceived as defensive in nature, it also suggests that the mere presence of ground forces neither provides new incentives nor inhibits the use of other military options.

A force deployed in a peacekeeping operation must have the capability to avoid being provocative while possessing the strength to deter warlike actions, and if necessary, counter any retaliation with minimal non-lethal force. The attributes needed by peacekeeping forces to provide deterrence are similar to those needed to fight, but the emphasis should be on perceived capabilities. Success requires quality troops and leaders, the right equipment furnished at the right time, and the ability to use men and material in the right way (doctrine, tactics, and training). Let us first look at what can be done to improve the training of current peace support operations personnel.

It has often been stated that peacekeeping duty is fundamentally different from traditional military operations. Therefore, it requires a different attitude

or mind-set. The justification for this argument has generally been that while combat forces usually try to destroy opposing forces and facilities and control terrain, peacekeepers attempt to cause hostilities to cease and help reconstruct societies. This may be a valid statement but it is very far removed from the current realities in the field during a peace support operation.

Although it is important to consider the change in mind-set needed for the effective running of multinational peace support operations (and there are guidelines to undertake this, as the next chapter in this volume indicates), there are other things to consider when planning and training for this type of mission. A good way of explaining this is by noting that although peace support and combat missions differ in objectives, the road taken to achieve these objectives is equally menacing.

What this really means is that many troop contributing countries attempt to train their military personnel with an emphasis on the change in mind-set needed to face what is perceived as a different objective to their normal combat mission. In doing so, they might place their military personnel in a contradictory situation. Soldiers might find themselves in a familiarly hostile environment, but with an unfamiliar thought pattern on how to act in that environment. As a result, they become so toned down that they can become inactive or ineffective in low-intensity environments where they would have performed exceptionally well had they been soldiering instead.

To illustrate this, a look at the data related to actions that caused most casualties during peace support operations is necessary. Here, some interesting facts begin to arise (see Table 1).

It is important to pause and explain some items associated with normal soldiering in war situations. The worst hazards for soldiers in the field over a long period of time are non-battle casualties, primarily from disease (especially in tropical and winter conditions), living conditions (including the level of sanitation, living in tents or without substantial cover, nutritious meals and clean and dry clothing), the level of medical care (without quick professional care minor ailments can become major ones), and injury or death by accident. Troops tend to get careless in the combat zone, and vehicle and weapon accidents are common.

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Table 1: Action-related casualties during peace support operations

(Due to problematic collection of reliable statistics, figures for non-combat related losses have been restricted to accidental losses only.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Action</th>
<th>Hostile</th>
<th>Accidental</th>
<th>Total Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Movement of Personnel</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement by sea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement by air</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement by land</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Military Related Action</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage situations</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military-Related Action</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrolling</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street fighting</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observing</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine incidents</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checkpoint manning</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mishandling of explosives</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidental discharge of weapons</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General military duties</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarming of belligerents</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1,167</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>2,505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4 This table is based on the information contained in Blechman and Vaccaro.
Historically an average 2% of a unit’s strength will be out of action on any day due to non-combat losses. Permanent losses due to non-combat casualties are 9,150 per 100,000 men.\(^5\) Combat losses over the duration of a war amount to 1.4% of total unit strength out of action daily, and losses are 7,869 per 100,000 men.\(^6\) Potentially, a military force could destroy itself just by deploying in a theater of operations and without ever facing combat. The factors that make the difference are leadership and training.

Looking at the casualty statistics for peace support operations, a similar ratio to that of war fighting is evident. 53.4% of all casualties were linked to accidents (non-battle loses) and 46.6% of all casualties were linked to hostilities. What is enlightening, however, is the fact that 60.3% of hostile and accidental casualties are caused by incidents related to normal combat action, and 5% of all casualties are caused by incidents related to non-combat action, 33.2% of all casualties are caused by movements of personnel, of which vehicle accidents by far cause the most casualties (31% of all casualties).

Without attaching too much value to statistics, it remains clear that most casualties in peace support operations up to 1993 were suffered due to actions related to normal combat actions like patrols, street fighting, observation and mine incidents, etc., and that almost half the casualties were caused by hostilities. This in a way defeats the argument that peace support operations differ markedly from combat. It is more a case of the soldiers entering the operation with the wrong mind-set, whereby Blue Helmets mean rubber bullets, leading to a slackening of the normal weariness of a soldier because he is now involved in an operation that differs markedly from combat. Such a mind-set is obviously detrimental if it is not shared by the belligerents.

The distribution of casualties across UN missions also indicates that 70% of casualties occurred during missions with mandates for peacekeeping, albeit in hostile environments. If troops approached these operations as normal military operations, the casualty rate might have looked different.


\(^6\) *Ibid.*
IV. Training to Manage Arms During Peace Processes

Research on eleven peace operations has shown that military practitioners were not as well prepared for their missions as they would have liked to be.\(^7\) Traditional peacekeeping training, and their military backgrounds had not prepared them for all the tasks they had to perform during their missions. Tasks such as negotiating skills, crowd and movement control, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance were particularly foreign to military personnel. Officers from countries that do not prepare systematically for peace support operation duties mentioned that their missions often suffered major setbacks due to their

\(^7\) Managing Arms during Peace Processes, the DCR series of publications at UNIDIR, Geneva, 1995-1997. 1500 questionnaires in English and French were sent out to military and civilian participants in 11 peace operations.
necessary reliance on trial-and-error methods to develop appropriate techniques. Practitioners indicated further that some commonly needed skills such as those involved in interactions with civilians and counter mine operations are covered within traditional training curricula, but are seldom given the emphasis required to develop sufficient proficiency for peace support operations. The understanding and application of international humanitarian law and the laws and protocols governing war are also much in need of more emphasis during preparation for peace support operations.

Peace support operations often present ambiguous situations, requiring officers, non-commissioned officers (NCO’s), and men to have a higher level of knowledge than they need during traditional combat to discern between legal issues. Most nations’ armed forces receive barely enough training to become familiar with these laws. These trends are particularly worrisome when applied to the problems associated with disarmament, demobilization and the management of weapons in peace support missions.

Management of arms during peace processes can take many forms, from the total elimination of all arms at one extreme to agreed minimal reductions at the other. It could include the establishment of demilitarized zones, areas of separation and/or limitation, protected and safe areas, no-fly zones, etc., as well as the dismantling and demobilization of military/police infrastructures, integration of forces and destruction of redundant military material, to give but a few examples. Therefore, the forces responsible for the management of arms during peace support operations need to be prepared and trained to execute their mission. But, little additional training is provided by contributing countries in relation to tasks that they consider specifically military in character. The assumption is that the normal military training in the provider country suffices for these tasks in the field, even if the objective of the operation is different in the case of a peace support operation.

And yet the level of peacekeepers’ awareness of the reality of their changed mission detracts from the alertness and decisiveness in which they are willing to perform their assigned tasks, particularly if these deal with more “coercive” needs such as searches, disarmament, arms control and arms destruction. In other words, peacekeepers might know how to perform the tasks needed for consensual disarmament operations in the field but they are unsure as to when and how to undertake their normal soldiering missions in an environment of peace support operations. The fear of endangering the objective of the mission detracts from their own capabilities to undertake actions at the tactical level. This inability to take their skills and apply them in the new environment results, ironically enough, in the weak
implementation of agreed terms, and a long list of peacekeeping casualties in the field. In other words, peacekeepers know what not to do better than what they should do in current Multifunction Peace Support Operations (MPSO’s).

Training of peace forces normally proceeds in accordance with the requirements of peacekeeping missions, which do not necessarily include the requirements for the management of arms. Because virtually no training is carried out to prepare soldiers for their tasks in managing arms during peace processes, many UNIDIR respondents indicated that they lacked the training to execute this specific part of their mission.

In order to be able to manage arms in a proper way, soldiers need to feel confident about the task, and therefore need proper, dedicated training. Many of the ordinary skills taught to any soldier are directly applicable to this process and should therefore not pose an obstacle to the operation—*they must just be applied in the field*. Other skills need modification or emphasis. To ensure that peace forces of the future are ready to meet the challenges posed by the management of arms during peace processes, they need to be trained in the appropriate techniques.

Since the findings of the DCR Project indicated that this is indeed the fact, and that none or very little training is conducted to prepare the men in the field for the type of mission they will have to accomplish, the following general guideline of skills that need to be developed and/or reinforced to give peacekeepers an edge in the implementation of MPSO’s has been developed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Training</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crowd control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negotiation skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administration of humanitarian relief</td>
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<tr>
<td>Handling flows of refugees or displaced persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safety and security tasks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection of local populations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demining operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human rights monitoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>Management of arms during peace processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demobilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cantonment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Execution of police and law and order functions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Election monitoring</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing Experience Which Needs to be Modified for UN Peace Operations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercive measures and use of force on tactical level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marksmanship</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban operation techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction with NGO’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Static defenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarming of civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordon and search operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countermeasures against snipers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immobilization or destruction of weapons and weapon systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Greater Emphasis Needed**

| Interaction with civilians   |
| Liaison with foreign forces  |
| Mine awareness programs      |
| Application of rules of engagement |
| Application of the laws of war |
| Weapon and equipment recognition |
| Pre-deployment intelligence briefings |
| Information gathering and reporting |

**Specific Training for Management of Arms**

| Recognition of weapons and weapon systems |
| Negotiation skills                      |
| Mine awareness                          |
| Movement control, including checkpoints, roadblocks, etc. |
| Cordon and search operations: urban and rural |
| Patrolling: standing/foot/vehicle/air    |
| Urban warfare techniques                |
| Crowd control                           |
| Law and order tasks (police duties)     |
| Ordnance disposal                       |
| Destruction and or immobilization of weapons and weapon systems |
| First aid                               |

Mission-specific training, to address the management of arms during a specific operation is also needed and could look as follows:

**Management of Arms: Mission-Specific Training**
Training to Manage Arms During Peace Processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political history of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population and cultural aspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic language skills</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belligerent/Warring Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniforms/insignia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons and weapon systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support base, internal and external</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical installations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detail of management of arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application of management measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of coercive management measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonment arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control and storage/disposal of weapons/amunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post conflict control arrangements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. Equipment and Technologies to be Used in the New Environment

Peacekeepers, however, need not only to be trained to do their job better, they also need to have the right equipment. Some of the UNIDIR questionnaire responses showed a marked emphasis on the use of technologies (particularly in disarmament and arms control activities) by some peace contingents while others, operating in the same scenario, were deprived of these or were not trained to use them.

Detailed studies of some of the most recent peace support operations show that equipment and technology, currently employed during these operations, need to be seriously reassessed from the point of view of both end-users and manufacturers. This need obviously arises at both ends of the scale. At the “black-magic” (high technology) end of the scale, money and the sophistication of troops employed are the only limitations. At the “slide-rule and logbook”
end of the scale, on-the-spot innovations often solve immediate needs which are seldom noted in “wish lists” for future development. For the purpose of this paper both ends of the scale will be explored to give some ideas for a reappraisal of equipment needs.

The following requirements were listed by personnel from three more recent UN peace operations:

**UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM):** Although many of UNOSOM’s needs could have been fulfilled with better training, increased resources and a more responsive command and control system, experiences in Somalia demonstrated a number of technological needs. Some of these included:

- better ways to prevent and counter short-range mortar attacks. Early warning of these and other attacks is essential to protect both military and civilian personnel;
- improved capabilities to detect and prevent intrusion, especially at night;
- more effective riot control equipment;
- advanced capabilities in the detection of mines, remotely operated explosive devices and ambushes;
- equipment and technology that can reduce the dangers to civilians having to operate alongside the military in semi-hostile to hostile environments;
- a system of overhead coverage with real-time feedback to ground forces to improve opportunities to impede hostile or illegal activities;
- more effective methods for moving people in a city with potential guerilla/terrorist threats;
- better ways for inspecting personnel and vehicles legally entering compounds; and
- secure, flexible and reliable means for communicating with both short and long distance sites (specifically to communicate with the local population).

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UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR):\textsuperscript{9} This operation once again highlighted the fact that proper doctrine, training and equipment are probably the most essential ingredients for the success of any peace support operation. Although the level of technology used by belligerents was clearly higher than in Somalia, the equipment needs of UNPROFOR were very similar. Some of these included:

- intelligence capabilities such as intelligence airborne collection platforms, surveillance equipment and detection equipment (these can greatly enhance the success of peace support operations);
- precision rather than area weapons (these are required to ensure selective engagement of targets and reduce collateral damage);
- sniper equipment needs (which could be enhanced and adapted to suit the needs for selective engagement);
- artillery and/or mortar locating radar that can accurately detect short range mortar attacks and long-range “sniper-guns” accurately enough to allow engagement and reduce the risks of collateral damage; and
- multimedia equipment to communicate the mission’s intentions to the population on a local and national level.

UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC):\textsuperscript{10} The operation in Cambodia was conducted in a different natural and technological environment from the above two missions, but experienced the same types of equipment needs. Some of these included:

- advanced capabilities in the detection of mines, remotely operated explosive devices, and ambushes;
- sufficient Command, Control, Communications and Computing (C\textsuperscript{4}I) capabilities (lack of which hindered the execution of the operation, and made verification almost impossible); and
- equipment to communicate the mission’s intentions to the population on a local and national level (i.e. it took a year to establish Radio UNTAC and it never functioned as it was intended, because of equipment limitations).


\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
An architecture should therefore be developed which covers the many facets of peace support operations: truce monitoring, cooperative military disengagement, confidence-building, humanitarian relief, refugee support, peace enforcement, and early steps of post-conflict rehabilitation. The structural elements of this architecture should rely on: intelligence, situation awareness, survivability, and a response capability of non-lethal force projection to threats. Development of the technology and equipment needed to support this architecture is an essential part of the prescription for the future success of peace support operations.

**Sensors.** There are a large number of specialized sensors that can provide peacekeepers with current situational awareness and intelligence. This real-time data can allow for sufficient response time if counteraction is required. A brief description of the variety of existing sensors follows.

**Micropower Impulse Radar (MIR).** The MIR is a new radar sensor that has numerous applications in peacekeeping operations. Based on emitting and detecting very low amplitude voltage impulses, it is the first active radar with continuous multi-year operation from small batteries. Its low power drain and wide bandwidth also make it very easy to camouflage, eliminating both interference and interception. The MIR motion sensor, for example, has a sharply defined detection range, multi-year continuous-use battery life, exceedingly low emissions, broad area or omni coverage, and a very low cost. It can be used for short-range intrusion detection or perimeter defense or other security applications. Another use of the radar is remote detection of human motion (by remotely detecting breathing and respiration rates or heart motion), making it an excellent tool for hostage rescue operations and for battlefield medical care. In addition, multiple MIR sensors can be combined for a wide range of imaging applications. MIR arrays and software for imaging people behind walls for surreptitious entry, buried mines, and determining the thickness and composition of walls have been developed. Their features include variable depth (range) resolution, wide band pulse for fine cross-range

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resolution, briefcase-size for portability, and two-dimensional imaging in less than 10 seconds.

**Wavelength Tunable Video Camera (WTVC):** The WTVC is a compact framing hyper-spectral imager with pointing and tracking capability designed for airborne spot survey applications in searches for stressed foliage and waterborne effluent from covert chemical plants and buried facilities. Stressed foliage could indicate camouflaged facilities or hidden armored vehicles and other items concealed under foliage. The system is extremely compact; the camera payload is housed in a 14-inch diameter 4-axis gyro stabilized gimbal and is ready for airborne deployment. The image handling system incorporates a frame grabber that digitizes the analog input. The framing architecture of this imager supports data collection modes that are consistent with real-time hyper-spectral image processing since, unlike conventional push broom and whisk broom multi-spectral scanners, the camera does not require platform motion to generate the image.

**Hand and Air Deployed Sensors for Field Intelligence:** A family of intelligent unattended ground sensors has been developed which could form the basis for a number of peace violation indications and warning systems as well as active defense control. The current family consists of seismic, infrared (IR), magnetic (2-axis) and nuclear sensors, with projects underway to include low power ultra wide band spread spectrum radar, and various chemical sensors. On-board multi-sensor data fusion techniques reduce the incidence of false identification and alerting. When suitably reduced in size, these sensors would provide a means for perimeter emplacement, and base camp monitoring, as well as the ability to locate threat forces in a pre-established grid of checkpoint sensors. Air delivered components and systems have been developed.

**Electronic Tags for Monitoring:** Micro-miniature, high security, electronic tags have been developed for identifying components in a unique way. Recent advances in this technology have added the capability to store information in the tag in non-volatile memory over extended periods of time. Remote interrogation via RF line of sight and satellite has been demonstrated. Connection to assess local indicators of readiness to perform is possible.

**Advanced Night Vision:** The next generation Night Vision System known as GENIV will have more than two times greater resolution than its predecessors and three times the gain with 40% higher signal-to-noise ratio. This will lead
to a threefold improvement in target detection and identification ranges under starlight conditions. It will also provide higher contrast images, night vision with a larger field of view, and operation in urban environments eliminating the halo effect, or blooming, when city lights are in the field of view.

**Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV’s):** For surveillance purposes there exists a wide spectrum of RPV’s that can act as scouts. These RPV’s can be as inexpensive as the largest model airplane equipped with a small video and a fibre optic link to much larger systems. The latter can carry tens to hundreds of pounds of sensor systems. The US Department of Defense has a significant development program underway to develop RPV’s and a whole host of sensors. These RPV’s will have long endurance and can operate at low to very high altitudes and in some cases are virtually undetectable. These RPV’s will carry state-of-the-art miniaturized imaging sensors in a variety of wavelengths (visible, long wave infrared, ultra-violet, etc.), as well as synthetic aperture radar for imaging. They will be accompanied by sophisticated computational capability to provide automatic target recognition.

**Robotic/Autonomous Systems:** The United States is developing a new system called the Wide Area Mine (WAM). WAM can detect, identify, and track targets. Although its original intent was to defeat these targets, it has the sensors and computer power to emulate many functions of peacekeeping troops acting as sentries by using this backbone as a surveillance tool. In the future we may see autonomous “sentries” the size of matchbox toys that patrol with sophisticated sensors and networked communication systems.

At the slide-rule and logbook end of the scale, in other words the real world, very genuine problems still need better solutions. Civilian and military peacekeepers alike are faced with the challenges of caring for the often abused and traumatized population in the theatre of operations.

**Cantonment Areas:** Most peace support operations after the collapse of the Cold War, included the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants. More often than not combatants are accompanied by their families to these areas, and keeping them in reasonably decent conditions is a serious challenge to military and relief organizations. If the current Angolan operation is any indication, the challenges are obvious. As of March this year the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) has quartered 65,967 troops. In addition to these there were also 118,789 family members present in the
quartering areas. Some of the more pressing issues that need a proper re-evaluation are the following:

- provision of food and “ready to eat meals” to people in cantonment areas;
- provision of potable water;
- provision of sustainable and environmentally friendly energy sources;
- provision of acceptable waste disposal and sewerage disposal;
- provision of mobile medical facilities that can serve a large amount of people;
- provision of sufficient mobile accommodation for administration and habitation; and
- hygiene equipment.

Disarmament: The legacy of sloppy disarmament operations is still present throughout Africa, Cambodia and Central Europe. According to the documentation of most operations where disarmament was not carried out in accordance with the mandate, lack of funds and/or capability are often cited as the main reasons for this failure. Relatively cheap mechanical equipment to destroy large amounts of weapons (especially light weapons) can make a real difference in post-conflict reconstruction processes. It would be far better to leave substantial amounts of scrap metal behind after an operation, rather than large unguarded weapon stockpiles.

Refugees: Masses of people on the move to nowhere pose challenges in terms of:

- movement control and channelling of movement;
- protection of mass exodus of people and early warning of threats to migrants;
- provision of essential services to people on the move;
- tracking of mass movements; and
- communicating information to large numbers of people spread out over broad areas.

13 UNAVEM III Liaison Office, 12 March 1997. Interview conducted in the field by the author.
There exists a wealth of technology to support peacekeeping operations. An overall architecture that includes intelligence, situation awareness, reconnaissance and surveillance, survivability, and non-lethal force projection to respond to hostile acts, is required to make effective use of these technologies. Among the enabling technologies is a wide spectrum of sensors, mine detection and clearing technologies, and equipment to permit crowd control and immobilization of the engines of war (in situations where the defense of the peacekeeper is at stake). Additional enabling technologies might include automatic language translators, miniaturized robotic vehicle sentries and scouts, electronic and information warfare equipment, invulnerable mobility, and precision delivery of food, water and fuel for humanitarian aid.

VI. Conclusion

In preparing the training and equipment needed for successful UN peace support operations today, we must remember that these differ from straightforward combat missions in their environment and in command and control.

Environment: What a soldier would think of as the battlefield or area of operations, has a different emphasis in peace support operations. Peace forces typically do their most important work in and among local populations. They often serve as the local civil authority as a result of the authority flowing from the UN mandate or because of the evolution of the mission. In this capacity, soldiers are required to make key sociological and political decisions relating to resettlement of displaced groups and the renewal of national and local governmental functions. Conversely, combat situations are usually polarized by definition. Furthermore, soldiers must be able to discern dangerous hostile forces from agitated people who are angry but have no actual hostile intent; they must know when an individual moves from one emotional state to another. Peace missions are normally inundated with requests for assistance from the local population that typically has just lived through a war. Combat forces, on the other hand, have significantly less interaction with local populations because the destructive nature of combat causes most civilians to move out of the paths of armies.

The peace support operation environment is further complicated by the many organizations with which soldiers must interact. There are UN-related agencies like the United Nations Children’s Fund and the United Nations Office
of the High Commissioner for Refugees, private relief groups, local grass-roots political organizations, and the often multiple parties to the dispute. All these entities operate quasi-independently, outside the mission’s command system. Yet these groups place heavy burdens on the military forces. The non-local groups often require security, help with transportation and communications, intelligence briefings, and medical support. The military component of a mission can provide these capabilities. Indeed, that is part of their job in a multifunction mission, but all of these interactions, both with international organizations and local groups, are conducted outside standard military procedures developed for combat.

Command and Control: The multinational character of peace support operations causes complex command and control relationships. Each national contingent added to a mission roster increases the complexity of conducting the Operation. Although this is not a new phenomenon, (given the two World Wars, coalitions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Warsaw Pact and other multinational operations of this century), UN peace support operations are usually far more diverse than typical combat coalitions. At its high point, the second UN Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM II) included troops from 35 different countries. This can be compared with NATO’s 16 countries or the 18 countries that provided the bulk of the ground forces for the Gulf War. Nations contributing to UN peace forces also tend to trust the overall command authority less than do states participating in ad hoc war-fighting coalitions. Units typically maintain back channels to their capitals and often question the UN commanders’ orders. Furthermore, commanders of national contingents receive a wide latitude of actions in their assigned territory. Each of these factors erodes unity of command, a time-honored and battle-tested military principle. Additionally, language barriers and doctrinal differences impair the horizontal interactions among national contingents, placing a premium on specialized training to familiarize troops and their officers with common UN procedures and means of carrying out their assigned tasks.

If these two fundamental differences between normal combat and multifunctional peace support operations are taken into account, it is easy to see

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14 Thomas B. Allen, F. Clifton Berry, Jr., and Norraan Polmer, War in the Gulf, Atlanta, Turner Publishing, Inc., 1991, p. 97. Seventeen countries provided 99% of the ground forces involved in the coalition against Iraq. Four countries provided the remaining 1%, 620 troops in all.
why MPSO’s require special coordination efforts in an ever changing and fragile environment. Although there are many things that can be done to achieve this end, most of them have yet to be undertaken as they must be part of a fundamental change in the manner in which the Member States of the United Nations contribute their troops, place them under UN command, and abide by a standardized doctrine—which does not yet exist. In the meantime, there are a few things which might drastically improve the existing capacity of UN forces, particularly in relation to managing arms during peace processes: training and equipment.
I. Introduction

It is customary today, in assessing the characteristics of UN peace operations, to draw a dividing line between the operations launched before and after 1987. During the early years, “peacekeeping” was the key term. Although this exact term was never employed in the UN Charter, it very soon, became an explicitly defined concept. Before 1987, two principles were always present in UN peacekeeping: the consent of the parties (most often two sovereign states) and a strict observance of the limitations in the use of armed force by the UN. The impartiality of the multinational UN force was taken for granted. These forces were usually deployed after a cease-fire had been established between the belligerents, to observe and monitor the cease-fire, establish buffer zones, carry out mediation and help in negotiations. Significant here is that the consent of the parties was already an indication of their willingness to settle their dispute by peaceful means using the UN presence as a vehicle and tool (sometimes as a face-saving device) to do so. Other collective security measures, such as sanctions regimes and peace enforcement, were conducted as well. In the early history of UN peace operations thus, there is only one example of peace enforcement, namely Korea, making such operations, a very rare exception.

New features came along with peace operations established in the late 1980’s. First, the number of peacekeepers deployed in the field rocketed from some 11,000 to well over 60,000, and the cost of operations also increased dramatically. More significantly however, the role of the UN as a whole and the characteristics of peace operations were subject to major changes. The UN Secretary-General, noted this evolution in his report:

... there have been qualitative changes even more significant than the quantitative ones.  
... One is the fact that so many of today’s conflicts are within states rather than between states. ... often of a religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence.
and cruelty. ... Another feature ... is the collapse of state institutions ... breakdown of
law and order, and general banditry and chaos. ... All too often it turns out that they
[hostile factions] do not yet want to be helped or to resolve their problems quickly.
...the use of United Nations forces to protect humanitarian operations ... relief of a
particular population is contrary to the war aims of one or other of the parties ... a new
kind of United Nations operation ... gives the United Nations a humanitarian mandate
under which the use of force is authorized, but for limited and local purposes and not
to bring the war to an end.1

In contrast to the early years of peacekeeping, lately, the UN has suffered
from a loss of authority and credibility on several occasions. Furthermore, the
concepts and terminology related to UN peace operations have become
increasingly opaque. In addition to the definitions elaborated in the Secretary-
General’s 1992 Agenda for Peace, other concepts like “peace support
operations,” “peace restoration” and “wider peacekeeping” emerged. In the
absence of a UN effort to clarify and define this new terminology, and in
particular because of its failure to produce a common doctrine for peace
operations, many Member States interpreted these concepts in their own way.
All of these factors have muddled the once clear picture of peacekeeping.
As such, there is still a certain confusion among Member States as to the
commitment assumed when asked by the Secretary-General to contribute to
new peace operations. This confusion together with the increasingly complex
nature of new peace operations are hampering national peacekeeping planning
processes and practical preparations, all the way from top political
considerations, down to the deployment of national contingents in the field.

One aspect of the practical preparations undertaken by states expecting to
be involved in peacekeeping operations, is training. In the early years of UN
peace operations, it was often argued that no special training for such
operations was required. In particular, officers of major, professional armed
forces used to assert that the basic military training already provided for their
personnel was sufficient. Many of those officers however, have now changed
their minds and widely agree that special training for peacekeeping operations
is indeed needed. The priorities in such training, however, vary. The French
document, for example, states that “... it is very obvious that fighting instruction
and training is the major part of the necessary instruction for troops involved

in UN operations... Some other countries, meanwhile, highlight the importance of introducing special, nonmilitary skills directly attributable to the character of peacekeeping operations.

In 1994, the United Nations Disarmament Research Institute (UNIDIR) through its Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR) project, undertook a worldwide distribution of a *Practitioners’ Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization During Peacekeeping Operations*. This author has analyzed a total of 171 returned questionnaires with a special focus on the findings pertaining to training. In the course of analyzing the questionnaires, it became clear that special training for peace operations is needed. Given the unique character of each operation, many features of peacekeeping training have to be tailored so as to meet the diverse requirements of each mission. Also, because of this diversity, lessons learned in one mission are not automatically transferable to other missions. Still, despite the need for attention to the individual particularities entailed by each situation, many training issues, at all levels, are common to all peace operations.

The aim of this paper is to identify the current status of training for peace operations, as well as the necessary targets of such training. A skeleton training package for pre-deployment training presented as part of this paper, will outline the possible contents of a training curriculum. Finally, consideration is given to some recommendations (in order of priority) pertaining to the role of the UN in enhancing the training of its peace operations personnel with the understanding that the final responsibility for the training of this personnel lies with the Member States, as also acknowledged by the UN itself.

The categorization of personnel groups in this paper is minimal. Without such categorization however, the introduction of even an elementary training package would be impossible. Similarly, the author does not differentiate between training for peacekeeping, multifunction, or peace enforcement operations. The two major groups of personnel deployed in UN peace operations, civilians and military, usually know their “own trade.” Both, however, have shortcomings in mastering the special skills required by such...
operations. Therefore, the solution to improving the training of the two groups of personnel is to identify their shortcomings and the kind of training, if any, that would “patch the gaps.” This is particularly true for missions involving disarmament. On the issue of disarmament and training it is important to note that, if demilitarization and disarmament are crucial for the success of a mission, this does not mean that coercive disarmament should be attempted. In fact, questionnaire respondents overwhelmingly believed that disarmament and demobilization can only take place with the full consent of all parties. Thus, when referring to special recommendations to upgrade the disarmament training of peacekeepers, I am referring to those issues that focus on improving the peacekeepers’ abilities to implement consensual disarmament agreements.

II. Assessment of the Current Training of Forces for Peace Operations

During the first few decades of peacekeeping operations, the UN did very little in terms of training its peacekeeping personnel. Civilian staff members dispatched from the UN Secretariat to field operations received their professional training background, guidelines and directives, but apart from this, Member States had to devise their own training solutions. Under such circumstances, different national and regional training systems emerged.

With the increase in UN peacekeeping activities in the late 1980’s and the growing number of new troop contributors however, despite existing national and regional training systems, it soon became apparent that the UN had to “take the bull by the horns” and assume more responsibility for the training of personnel involved in peacekeeping operations. New troop contributors, (the superpowers on the one hand, and developing countries on the other), possessed vastly disparate resources and, consequently, vastly disparate training standards. The raise in the UN’s profile in the handling of peace operations as a whole, and of training in particular, had its beginnings in the restructuring of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN headquarters in New York in the early 1990’s. One of the first steps taken was to identify the resources devoted by Member States to peacekeeping training. In June 1992, the UN approached the Member States in this respect and the findings were

\footnote{The UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), among others, has been responsible for this type of training.}
published in a General Assembly report⁶ and later updated by another document ⁷ in which 35 countries outlined the nature of their national training.

The Henry L. Stimson Center completed the picture with interviews of military representatives of some further 42 countries in New York and Washington in 1994. In general, the report classifies the level of training as high in only 8 countries, moderate in 15, low in 40 and minimal in the remaining 13. The compilation of the 77 countries’ answers reveals, among other things, the findings listed in the following two tables.⁸

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training for Civilians</th>
<th>Training for Military Personnel</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-deployment orientation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional skills</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police training</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training facility</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

At least one conclusion can be drawn from the above figures. It is obvious that military personnel were quite well prepared, all having been briefed in advance and even given training at unit level.

The next step, parallel to the above mentioned process, was the collection and dissemination of training information. This included the following:

- compilation of peacekeeping bibliographies;
- production of tutorial videos;
- compilation of training syllabi and curricula;
- organization of training workshops.

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In compiling its training syllabi and curricula, the newly established Training Unit of the DPKO did not have to “reinvent the wheel.” Some Member States had generously provided material that could be copied and/or modified and be rapidly put in circulation. The draft handbook Basic Information for Junior Ranks, published by the DPKO in the summer of 1994 and the first two draft training curricula9 relay the features and some of the contents of the national or regional training packages of the Member States experienced in peacekeeping. This means that these training methods have already been tried and found to be sound. Specifically, the military observer and civilian police curricula also provide useful hints for inexperienced nations pertaining to the practical arrangements to be made in carrying out such training.

One of the most useful and comprehensive (though not complete) training documents published by the DPKO is A Peacekeeping Training Manual. The manual is targeted at the military personnel of a peacekeeping operation during their pre-deployment training. In addition to guidelines that feature topics like background information, general military training, peacekeepers’ operating techniques, safety measures and special training areas, the manual provides eight training exercise packages, complete with a training guide, lecture notes and paper copies of view foils to be used in particular training exercises. The usefulness of the training packages is evident in that they provide not only useful building blocks but also good models for the final contents of a national training curriculum.

The DPKO currently also produces six training videos.10 These constitute an extremely helpful support to national training packages dealing with video subjects. The videos illustrate, (not only to new troop contributors, but also to inexperienced personnel of “traditional” peacekeeping countries), many of the special features of peacekeeping as a whole and the UN view on this, in particular.11

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11 All the material mentioned above is available from the DPKO. The training workshops are discussed below.
For a closer look at the issues concerning the evolution of training for peace operations, it is important to analyze the status of regional training arrangements, national arrangements, and the interaction between the two.

1. Regional Training Arrangements

The first regional cooperation system in UN peacekeeping was instituted by the Nordic countries in the early 1960’s. Following the United Nations Emergency Force Operation (UNEF I), established in 1956 in the Middle East, the UN Secretary-General called on the troop contributing countries to take new, potential peacekeeping tasks into account as part of their national military planning. In 1964, the governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden agreed on the creation of a so-called Nordic Stand-by Force and submitted their plan to the UN in spring 1968. A Nordic body, the “NORDSAMFN,” was established as a joint body for the follow-up, cooperation, coordination, advisory and supervisory actions of these four countries in future UN peacekeeping activities.

Parallel to the joint planning and founding of NORDSAMFN, cooperation in peace-keeping training between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, was also initiated. Although the training of troops remained (and still remains) a national responsibility, peacekeeping experiences and views were exchanged among the four countries. In addition, the responsibility for the training of certain officer groups was split such that Denmark was charged with the task of training all Nordic military police officers, Finland was to train military observers, Norway the transport and logistics officers, and Sweden all the Nordic UN staff officers. Later, non-Nordic countries were offered the possibility to participate in the training process described above. Due to limited resources, however, this kind of participation is considered on a case-by-case basis, and bearing in mind the needs and priorities of the Nordic countries.

Similar regional efforts have also been initiated elsewhere, especially in Europe. Until now, however, there have been no major breakthroughs, and certainly not to the extent to which the Nordic countries have developed their cooperation. Some European countries, most notably Austria, running various courses for UN personnel, have allotted seats for other nations, but there is no regional coordination to speak of.

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12 NORDSAMFN stands for: Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters.
13 By and large, the same set-up prevails today.
Having seen the benefits of regional training, the UN, most recently in February 1995, has encouraged Member States to establish this kind of training (and training centers) for both civilian and military personnel.\footnote{A/RES/49/37, p. 9.} In the same vain, the DPKO has organized two regional workshops pertaining to regional peacekeeping training, to:\footnote{United Nations, Executive Report, First United Nations Regional Peacekeeping Training Workshop, Europe and a similar report from the second workshop in the Americas.} 

- provide a comprehensive view of the training;
- provide a venue for the exchange of ideas;
- encourage future cooperation;
- identify training requirements in which the UN could provide assistance.

The first workshop, for Europe, was held in Denmark on 19-24 February 1995 with participants from 26 countries, plus Argentina and India who participated as observers. The second workshop, for the Americas, was hosted by Argentina on 3-7 April 1995 with participants from 16 countries and India as an observer. Two more workshops, one for Africa\footnote{Took place in February 1996 in Cairo, Egypt.} and the other one for the Asia-Pacific were also scheduled.

The executive reports of the first two workshops conclude, among other things, that:

- there is an obvious need to upgrade training, especially among the “higher echelons;”
- future peacekeeping training should more properly integrate the training of the civilian and military personnel;
- the UN Secretariat should develop mission-specific training programs;
- a list of national training publications should be made available;
- there should be a proficiency testing system for peacekeeping personnel;
- the development of the UN training assistance teams should be continued;
- common standards and techniques should be developed.
The disparities in national training standards and the differences in the performance capabilities of national contingents were also discussed in both workshops but these two topics proved to be so sensitive that no consensual conclusions were reached.

2. National Training

The Henry L. Stimson Center report\(^\text{17}\) reveals that the 72 countries either included in the General Assembly report\(^\text{18}\) or interviewed, all provided their national troops with some kind of pre-deployment training in the home country. The degree and standard of training, however, differed considerably.

A national training package for troops has proved to be the best and most natural solution. Regional cooperation and the exchange of experiences and views may enhance and harmonize this kind of training. The differences in national basic training standards and methods, however, make it virtually impossible to carry out training jointly among different national contingents. There are of course exceptions. The Nordic battalions of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), for example, have been subject to joint training, to a degree, prior to deployment. To achieve this, however, national standards must be close enough and a common language, understood by all, must exist.

The troop contributing countries in the early years of UN peacekeeping learned their lessons “the hard way.” In the absence of UN guidance, they invented their own training doctrines and methods as they saw fit. The situation has, by and large, remained unchanged until very recently. With the changes in the nature of UN peace operations, difficulties and failures in the field, and in particular with the major powers’ participation, training for peace operations has suddenly attracted the attention it deserves. The UN, has however, continued to overlook the growing needs of troop contributors. As a result, (and this is a very recent development), guidelines, handbooks, manuals, training syllabi and curricula are being drafted and published on a national basis in many parts of the world.

As these books and manuals usually serve the training purposes of a particular nation only, there cannot be any common pattern in them. National priorities are reflected in their contents, further contributing to the disparities in training standards. Some of them are very good. The Nordic manuals are in

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17 Blechmann and Vaccaro.
18 A/48/708.
a class of their own, but they are not the only ones. One particular American booklet (bearing in mind the influence of the national doctrine) is an outstanding example of compiling a simple, straight forward training guide portraying practical examples and possible solutions, mainly at the platoon level.19

3. Other Training Programs

In addition to the training programs already discussed, there exist other training programs, some of which are very well institutionalized. Certain non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) run extensive pre-deployment training schemes in preparing their personnel for service in the field. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) training programs as well as those executed by its national bodies deserve to be commended in this context. NGO’s, by their nature, however, tend to operate independently and in a self-supporting way. Therefore, the possible “lessons learned” by NGO’s are very seldom passed on to others.

Since 1993, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been one of the major organizers of training programs for UN peace operations. These courses are aimed either at officers from NATO countries or are arranged under the auspices of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.

4. Interactions and Networks

All of the above would suggest that there is indeed a great deal of information, experience, training schemes, courses, programs and material available throughout the world for the purpose of promoting the training of peace operations personnel. Unfortunately, there is no simple way of finding out what is available and where. The traditional peacekeeping countries have long institutionalized their exchange of information. Their training personnel meet at regular intervals to discuss pertinent issues. It is the new players in the peacekeeping field that find themselves at a loss. There is no single point of contact or interface through which the newcomers could benefit from the experience of the others. In late 1995, the DPKO published a compilation of

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training events run by the UN Member States in which the name of the course, host country, duration and the main contents of the training were identified.\textsuperscript{20} This compilation, however, does not provide any information about the organizers, institutes, addresses or other contact details.

Another, and far more useful, set of training data was published by the NACC Clearing-House in 1994.\textsuperscript{21} The NACC booklet contains information on:

- individual courses arranged;
- individual courses planned;
- individual courses/course description;
- individual courses, students and instructors;
- unit courses arranged and planned;
- unit courses, training description;
- unit course, instructors;
- information for observers and visitors;
- list of peacekeeping training publications.

The compilation of the NACC training information is based on the returns of a questionnaire sent to the NACC member states.\textsuperscript{22} Unfortunately, they are the same member states that were initially on the distribution list of this rather useful booklet.

\textsuperscript{20} DPKO memo, 8 December 1995.
\textsuperscript{22} A total of 22 countries submitted information on their training programs (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom).
III. Personnel Selection and Execution of Training

1. Personnel Selection

It has often been stated that when evaluating the efficiency and usefulness of an individual member of a UN peace operation one looks at a product comprised of two factors: selection and training. Although this paper focuses on training aspects, the importance of personnel selection should not be overlooked. The author has argued that, more often than not, the importance of selection surpasses that of training. Good people in the right places need a minimum amount of training to carry out their duties satisfactorily.

Since the peace operation in Namibia, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), the UN has issued detailed instructions to troop contributors for national planning purposes. These instructions, *Guidelines for Troop Contributors*, specify features like the proposed composition of the peace force, unit/subunit capability requirements, equipment performance requirements, instructions on the movement of troops and material, UN responsibility description, reimbursement rules and other coordinating instructions. The guidelines, however, do not portray validation criteria for personnel; this is left to the discretion of the troop contributing countries. Only exceptionally, and particularly in the recruitment of civilian specialists and military observers, have some very general standards been outlined. Depending on the mission and assignment, these criteria may include:

- age bracket;
- physical health requirements;
- language skills;
- proficiency requirement in map reading;
- working experience in a particular job;
- driver’s license and driving skills requirements;
- experience in using automatic data processing equipment.

Even these simple requirements, however, are sometimes ignored by the troop contributing countries. For example, in Cambodia some members of the UN civilian police “spoke neither of the two languages specified—English or French—still less Khmer, while others lacked the six years of community
Many countries, on their own initiative, go well beyond the minimum described above. They carry out careful and laborious screening of their own personnel before they are accepted for duty in UN peace operations. Finland, for instance, has set the following norms for the selection of military personnel recruited from the reserves:

- age between 20 and 35 years old;
- above average marks from completed conscription service;
- good citizen reputation;
- good physical and mental health;
- proven language skills according to the planned appointment;
- successful completion of a pre-deployment training course.

All Finnish personnel, including regular officers of the armed forces, must volunteer and apply for service with UN peace operations.

Naturally, there are also examples to the contrary. During the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) operation, one particular national contingent proved to be a source of constant problems. Some members of this contingent had been sent to Cambodia against their own will, mission language skills were non-existent and the citizen reputation of many members was, to say the least, questionable. “Composed, it would seem of few regular soldiers, supplemented by ill-trained and poorly disciplined recruits, the battalion quickly achieved a poor reputation within UNTAC and, unfortunately, amongst Cambodians,”24 The situation was eventually corrected, “but only after substantial damage to UNTAC’s standing and credibility in the province in which they were deployed, and more broadly.”25

As a UN peace force is expected to occupy a moral high ground, mishaps like the one described above must be avoided at all costs. Many countries work hard to send the best individuals or elite units as their representatives in the eyes

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25 Ibid.
of the international community. Failure or unwillingness to do so does not only tarnish the image of the country itself, but is bound to hamper the success of the peace operation as a whole.

2. Training for Peace Operations

It is a widely accepted principle that training for UN peace operations should comprise the following three phases:

- basic training;
- pre-deployment training;
- on-site training.

The better these three components are integrated, the more satisfactory the final product will be, that is, both the individual member of a national contingent of a peace operation and the contingent itself. In particular, the last two phases should be seen as two complementary stages of one training package.

**Basic training:**
In this phase of training very little can be done to improve “the final product.” Basic training, regardless of the personnel category, is what an individual has learned before being earmarked for duties in a UN peace operation. Each soldier receives training according to his or her current career grade. As already discussed, the UN can always try to influence the national selection process and the screening of personnel by establishing international validation standards for individual members and elements of peace operations. But to do this for each and every job description may prove to be too ambitious. This is particularly true for the civilian personnel working in the field. By the end of 1994, nearly 10,000 civilians in more than 120 different appointments were employed by these operations.26 This, and the fact that all peace operations differ considerably, would suggest that the focus should be placed on pre-deployment and on-site training.

**Pre-deployment training:**
As the name implies, pre-deployment training takes place before the personnel are dispatched to the mission areas. At this stage, the final destination and the mission are known. All countries providing troops or individuals for

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26 Blechmann and Vaccaro.
UN peace operations provide some sort of training for their military personnel.27 This ranges from short briefings to extensive and intensive training courses prior to deployment.

Until the late 1980’s, only the four Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and Austria maintained a special training facility (or a training centre) for peace operations. The number of countries offering such training now appears to be rising. The advantages of having a permanent, or at least a semi-permanent, training facility specialized in training for peace operations are evident. First, the “know-how” involved in peacekeeping training is not dispersed, otherwise it becomes very difficult to maintain a complete and up-to-date picture of all aspects pertaining to training. Second, as realistic special training calls for simulation exercises which, in turn, may require substantial investments in training structures for “mock-ups” and the like, the cost efficiency of a standing facility is obvious.

The standard and quality of the trainers also need special attention. At least the key individuals must have working experience from operations in the field, the more recent, the better. An ideal solution would be to dispatch one or several of the trainers directly from an ongoing mission back to the home country where their expertise could be fully exploited. In pre-deployment training for a new mission the situation is more complex. Trainers from the field do not exist, and the expertise of trainers from other, previous operations may not be fully applicable to the new working environment. Yet, the assistance of such experienced personnel is preferable as an alternative to trainers with no experience whatsoever in peace operations.

3. Considerations on Pre-deployment Training Curricula

In assessing training curricula, the possibilities of ensuing on-site training must be kept in mind. Certain topics are either impossible or unrealistic to be taught in the home country. For example, when joining a newly established peace operation, one cannot tell in advance how action and reaction will work in specific situations before these methods are put to the test. Similarly, some matters related to future operating environments can be more easily perceived on the spot. Therefore, the best timing for pre-deployment training is immediately before departure, in which case the on-site training can be more logically merged with the training given at home.

27 Ibid.
Two initial points have to be well defined before any training curriculum can be drafted. First, one has to know the precise skills needed and their priority order. With an ongoing mission, this is easy providing there is an appropriate feedback from the field. Newly established missions however, may present unpleasant surprises. Second, the expertise of different personnel categories in required skills has to be identified. Once the state of these two variables is known, deducing what needs to be done to patch the gaps is simple.

This paper deals with the two major categories of personnel involved in peace operations, namely civilian and military personnel. The following two tables provide a broad overview of the strengths and weaknesses of these two categories of personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian</strong></td>
<td><strong>Military</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional skills</td>
<td>Professional skills, to a degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job characteristics remain the same regardless of the environment</td>
<td>Chain of command at lower levels remains unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of action at one’s own discretion, to a degree</td>
<td>Duties and responsibilities of individuals remain largely unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not, by appearance, constitute a threat to the belligerents</td>
<td>Individuals and units are part of a self-supporting system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Familiar with potential risks and hazards of the crisis area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Useful mechanisms (i.e. intelligence) built in to the military system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of strengths, civilians tend to work in the same type of job both nationally and with the UN. Therefore, they are more often able to fully utilize their professional skills than the military. Also, the working concept of peace operations increasingly contains more new profession-related features, which the military may not have learned during basic training. The military on the other hand, works within a system it knows and on which it can rely, while its chain of command, which is crucial for a swift and effective transition to peace operations duties, remains virtually untouched. Both civilians and the military, however, also have weaknesses, as illustrated in the table below.
WEAKNESSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crisis area environment, its risks and hazards are unfamiliar</td>
<td>Controversial role as a member of a peace operation compared to traditional soldiering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacking or inappropriate knowledge of military organizations and their functions</td>
<td>Lacking or inappropriate expertise in new, additional tasks required in peace operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few cooperation and interaction capabilities with other force elements, especially military</td>
<td>Few cooperation and interaction capabilities with other force elements, especially civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of backup in trying to establish one’s own, personal support system</td>
<td>Limits in action and reaction abilities resulting from the military hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Varying standards in national basic training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May be seen as “the third enemy”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

None of the weaknesses in the civilians’ column are overwhelmingly difficult to overcome with proper and even quick training. The major difficulties lie on the military side.

In addition to the weaknesses of the military mentioned above, one should, perhaps, note one further shortcoming that is not necessarily derived from the military structure itself but is a part of any multinational operation system, namely, the deficiencies in the unity of command. These deficiencies were very clearly identified in the UNIDIR DCR project questionnaire. Although slightly over 50% of the respondents regarded the command and control structures of the forces as adequate, further inquiry into this question showed that the missing unity of command was one of the biggest, single sources of many different problems.

The tension between traditional soldiering and the duties assumed as a member of a UN peace operation appear to be an eternal source of problems. Some countries use “elite units” in UN peace operations. These are units of a professional army with a high degree of training, good reputation, battle readiness and a solid “esprit de corps.” The paradox is that such units may not always be the best choice in peace operations. Their dignity cannot stand reproach, something that frequently happens in the field in peace operations. Also, a good soldier would instinctively use maximum available power to reach his objective and return fire with “everything available” when being attacked.
The rules of engagement in peace operations however, are much more complicated and restrictive.

The “military muscle” in the form of arms with which the military component is equipped may trigger hostile fire more easily than the force elements that are known to operate without arms. Frequently, UN military observers (who are always unarmed) feel uncomfortable in the proximity of armed UN troops and prefer to use their own vehicles, which are known to be harmless by the local population.

The duties of the members of peace operations, be they civilian or military, differ from those to which they are accustomed. In considering training curricula, it is useful to look into the features of new duties and those of a more familiar nature. The two tables below summarize some of the most obvious points.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian Duties in Peace Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRADITIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Techniques of own profession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Citizen skills”, such as:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>first aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>preventive medicine</td>
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<tr>
<td>fire-fighting</td>
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<tr>
<td>fighting natural hazards</td>
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<tr>
<td>basic community functions</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Civilian Duties in Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRADITIONAL</th>
<th>NEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survival under primitive conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking at the new features of civilian duties during peace operations, one can see that most of them are related to the military-like environment of these operations while others derive from the very special nature of these operations and are common for both civilian and military personnel. Significant here is also the fact that some features such as the establishment and supervision of civilian infrastructure, have no standard solution, and are therefore difficult to anticipate.

Although, as argued above, the duties and responsibilities of military personnel during peace operations remain largely unchanged, they do contain some new features.

### Military Duties in Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRADITIONAL</th>
<th>NEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observation and reporting</td>
<td>Interpositioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrolling</td>
<td>Protection of civilian personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denying entry or access</td>
<td>Monitoring and supervising agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defending certain areas and locations</td>
<td>Verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection and search</td>
<td>Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive disarmament, to a degree</td>
<td>Negotiation and mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action under fire</td>
<td>Marking of agreed boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine awareness</td>
<td>Conduct of investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine awareness</td>
<td>Supervision of consensual disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine awareness</td>
<td>Maintenance of law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine awareness</td>
<td>Supervision of weapons custodies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many of the new features listed above are technical in nature and are thus rather easy to execute if proper training is given. More significantly, there exists standard training for most of the new skills required. Therefore, and in spite of the military weaknesses described earlier, it appears that training is the answer to solving most of the military challenges.
On-site training:
As stated before, pre-deployment training and on-site training should be seen as two complementary pieces of one training package. Because of the fact that on-site training should be merely an extension of the training provided in the home country, the integration of these two parts plays a crucial role. On-site training in the operational area is always related to the mission and the task of an individual, unit or element. It will adapt to the environment and the conditions under which the mission is conducted. In the past, these conditions may have differed significantly within a particular mission. There may be sectors or areas where the situation is relatively peaceful and calm and the local elements are cooperating with the UN. Any high-intensity type of operation however (coercive measures, a high-profile display of military muscle, etc.) would quickly deteriorate the peacekeepers’ working environment.

As all peace operations are different and on-site training can be so fragmented even within one mission, this paper will proceed to focus on pre-deployment training only.

IV. Suggested Pre-Deployment Training Curricula

A wide vision and scope is needed in the planning and execution of pre-deployment training for UN peace operations. A particular, potential problem in such planning arises when the training curriculum is organized by someone with limited, one mission, field experience. In such a case, the resulting curriculum tends to mirror the personal experiences derived from that one operation, with little regard being given to the likely requirements of future missions. This in turn, may well lead to concentrating training on marginal issues.

1. Composition and Time Frames

The content of the suggested training curriculum is divided into seven sectors or topic areas, as shown below.

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28 The author has benefited, in addition to his own training experience, from the well-developed Nordic training programs, in the drafting of the pre-deployment training curricula presented in this chapter. It is emphasized, however, that this training package is only a skeleton and merely a “check list” of the issues that should be considered in the final drafting of national training curricula.
Training Package Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic Area</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General information on UN peace</td>
<td>PopInfo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General information on the mission</td>
<td>MsnInfo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational background information</td>
<td>BkgInfo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special techniques in peace operations</td>
<td>SpeTech</td>
<td>Different topics for civilian and military personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>Logs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area information</td>
<td>AreInfo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal administrative matters</td>
<td>PersAdm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The contents of the main topic areas are largely identical regardless of whether the personnel targeted is civilian or military (apart from the Special Techniques section where there is a substantial difference between the two). It would have been possible to combine the first three areas into one topic, “background,” but as they are clearly distinguishable, it is more practical to assess them separately.

It should be noted that the above topic areas (though not necessarily all of their contents) should be included in pre-deployment training regardless of one’s rank, status and appointment in the mission. The levels at which the training is conducted may differ. There are countries which have even more ambitious training packages than the one described above in that they provide training for their peacekeepers in what might be called “vocational skills.”

The time to be allotted to each topic depends on the basic training of the personnel targeted, the characteristics of the peace operation, and, naturally, the time available. In the following pie chart, there is a recommended time allocation which suggests that about one half of the time should be used in the teaching and training of special techniques needed in a peace operation.
2. General Information on UN Peace Operations

This topic area covers the UN framework within which the members of a peace operation operate. Starting with the provisions of the UN Charter, international law and conventions, it explains what UN peace operations can and cannot accomplish. It would be useful to connect the legal framework with the evolution of UN peace operations in order to see how the two have been functioning in relation to one another. The special terminology pertaining to the UN peace operations must be fully understood by all. Unfortunately, as there is no UN doctrine on peace operations, national interpretations may turn out to differ.

The UN chain of command in peace operations also needs exploring. This does not affect individual members of large national contingents, but the commanders and the civilian personnel will have to understand the complexities, powers and limitations of this command structure. The existence and influence of parallel civilian and military chains of command and the links to national capitals, if not promptly explained, are extremely confusing, to say the least.
Another key issue to be covered in this topic area is that of attitudes and codes of conduct for UN personnel. It is here that the tension between soldiering and peacekeeping has to be resolved. It has been the case over and over again that a good, professional soldier, acting on instinct, may trigger an escalation in tension if not prepared for the new environment. Some armed forces prefer to leave these soldier’s instincts untouched and are rather reluctant to indoctrinate their troops and individuals in fear of downgrading their usefulness. In the beginning, during the low-intensity lull of the Somalia operation, “many US military officers were unconvinced of the need for specialized peacekeeping training and were concerned that such training would detract from training for combat.”\(^{29}\) The author would argue that the soldier’s role in peacekeeping is often more demanding than in combat and calls for discipline beyond the ordinary. Although the topic “Code of Conduct” is under the heading of “General Information,” its application should be extended throughout the whole pre-deployment training phase.

### General Information on UN Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terminology and conceptual definitions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms and abbreviations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisions of the UN Charter for peace operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International law and legal aspects</td>
<td>Incl. status of force and individuals; also to include the human rights aspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of the UN peace operations</td>
<td>Including typology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN peacekeeping chain of command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel validation requirements</td>
<td>Must be defined by the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes and the code of conduct</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{29}\) Blechmann and Vaccaro, p. 10.
3. General Information on the Mission

In brief, this topic area takes those undergoing training from the overall framework of peace operations to a specific mission by introducing the background of the crisis, its evolution and the current status, from the UN point of view. Here, the mandate or mandates of the operation are discussed in detail. Similarly, the key features of concepts such as the Terms of Reference, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) and Rules of Engagement (RoE), are introduced. Some of these concepts may not always exist. SOFA’s which spell out the relations between the host country (or countries) and the UN force have rarely been provided. Also, SOP’s and RoE’s may be worked out at a much later stage than the launching of the operation. Meanwhile, examples from earlier UN peace operations and applications of national solutions have to be used.

**General Information on Mission**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History and the current status of the peace operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms of reference</td>
<td>Key features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of forces - agreement (SOFA)</td>
<td>Key features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)</td>
<td>Key features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules of Engagement (RoE)</td>
<td>Key features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other agreements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Operational Background Information

This area contains a wide range of topics that illustrate the operational ways and means used by UN forces in the field. The organization of the force, its principal units and elements and their functions are all explained here. Operational maps or sketches are used to depict the force deployment. At this
stage, the map (military) symbols used by the operation are introduced, as they may differ significantly from national military symbols. Special attention must be given to the study of the UN chain of command as it is entirely different and unique from what any national solution would feature.

For the civilian personnel, there are several areas in which complete ignorance can be expected. For example, civilians are not used to liaising with the military which means that they have to be taught how to do this, at what level and through which channels. Similarly, it is not very likely for civilians to be knowledgeable in mine awareness or the construction of field defenses which they may face during the mission. Depending on the assignment, some civilian personnel may be required to use military communications system, i.e. telephone, voice radio, teletype and the like. This system which at times has turned out to be a real challenge for the military, is bound to be even more of a challenge for civilians.

**Operational Background Information**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Force organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Force chain of command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of the force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal tasks of the force elements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RoE</td>
<td>In detail to military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with other UN and int’l organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field engineering</td>
<td>Incl. mine awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics and techniques required in peace operations</td>
<td>Key features</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the military, the presence of several elements, agencies and NGO’s that operate in the same area but that are completely independent and beyond any military control, is one particular operational feature which could pose difficulties. In military thinking, in each geographical area of responsibility, irrespective of the level, there is always someone who will exercise final control over all activities. This is not the case in UN peace
operations. In fact, it has sometimes been the case that some NGO’s denounce all cooperation with the military and do their best to dissociate themselves from the military side of the operation. The consequences of such an attitude are bound to hamper the efficiency of the operation and may result in unpredictable risks to security.

5. Special Techniques for Civilian Personnel

Most of the special techniques related to UN peace operations, regardless of the category of personnel, mission or assignment involved, are taught through lecture, in the case of theory, and practical simulation exercises, in the case of application. The more practice received, the better. Many of the techniques required from the civilian personnel are directly attributable to the characteristics of the mission itself and the particular assignment these individuals will have. Depending on the proficiency level in the planned assignment, it may well turn out that only a minimum amount of training is necessary. However, a number of necessary skills have little direct bearing on the mission or the assignment. These are the skills that deserve to be further explored.

Surprisingly, many civilian personnel in UN peace operations fall short on basic leadership skills. And yet, these skills are essential for the organization and execution of tasks. The introduction of a simple sequence in the decision-making process would go a long way in enhancing one’s ability to tackle daily problems in the field. An additional factor affecting the quality of leadership in UN peace operations is improvisation in a fast-changing situation. The tools available to carry out a task may not be adequate but action must be taken quickly to avoid catastrophe. When there is no time to find the best solution, any workable plan in accordance with the resources at hand will do. To be able to do all this takes some training which can be initiated during the pre-deployment phase.

As UN peace operations take place in crisis areas, the risks and hazards of hostile action have to be seriously considered. Very seldom has this been a part of a civilian’s basic training and education. This may lead to serious miscalculations, either by underestimating the risks, thus creating life-threatening situations, or by exaggerating the risks, thereby paralysing a process that would otherwise have worked smoothly. There is no easy or quick way to teach one all the knowledge needed to assess security risks and to act accordingly. While many facets of this issue are more easily perceived during the on-site training, certain basic facts and standard emergency procedures should be taught in the home country. A good collection of pocket size “What if-cards” would not only provide a much needed boost to a person’s self-
confidence but may eventually save his or her life in a real situation. One particular field problem is the existence of land mines. It would be completely inappropriate to start training civilians as to how to handle these vicious things. Efforts should concentrate instead on teaching precautionary measures such as how to identify the presence of mines and how to avoid them, and finally, how to ensure a safe return from mine-contaminated areas.

Cooperation with the military (which is probably indispensable) is much easier for civilians if they are familiar with military structures and organization. Civilians should be able to identify contact points to which they could turn to in case assistance is needed. Also, a fair knowledge pertaining to military resources and capabilities may prove to be very useful. It would be certainly beneficial if civilians, in their home country, were trained together with the national military contingent. This kind of training would establish contact between civilians and the military at an individual level and would promote mutual understanding between the two groups.

Elementary issues like field hygiene and sanitation, field billeting and cooking do not usually present surprises to the military. Civilians though, are often handicapped in this respect. It does not take much effort however, to attain a reasonable proficiency level in being able to survive even under primitive conditions. Lists introducing survival, evacuation and field hygiene kits can be easily produced and a small stock of some half a dozen easy-to-make cooking recipes may make life in the field much more comfortable.

Special Techniques, Civilian Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission-related techniques as detailed below:</td>
<td>Only those applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring of agreements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision and monitoring of elections</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Supervision of the return of refugees</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Verification</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct of investigations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Basic leadership skills</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Functions of a military staff, chains of command</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Map reading and land navigation, use of technical aids, i.e. Global Positioning System (GPS), where available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of mission communications equipment, transmitting and receiving messages, phonetic alphabet, code words and logging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation and reporting techniques</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic field craft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine awareness, recognition of mines and booby traps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precautions pertaining to physical security, action under hostile fire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field hygiene and sanitation measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparations for lodging under field conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of interpreters, introduction of language or phrase cards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working language tuition where applicable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with the media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Including liaison with the military component                                                                     |
| Inclusive protective constructions                                                                                |
| Including emergency evacuation preparations                                                                       |
| Including first aid                                                                                                |
| Including own cooking                                                                                            |

### 6. Special Techniques for Military Personnel

There are some common features between the training in special techniques for civilians and for the military, such as cooperation and liaison, use of interpreters and language tuition. Joint training with civilians would also be beneficial, but, unlike with the civilian personnel, the special techniques to be introduced to the military are mostly mission-related. These are duties where basic military training does not meet the requirements of the special features of UN peace operations. Negotiation and mediation, for example, are the art of diplomats, not the military. And yet, in practice, this is what some of the military will have to accomplish in the field. Similarly, the military may not be
fully familiar with some policing operations like riot control and the maintenance of law and order which it may have to conduct or to assist. As these are serious and demanding tasks which must succeed once initiated, proper training is crucial.

All special techniques should be drilled first and then simulated in scenario-driven field exercises. The training of national contingents for peace operations would typically begin at the individual and squad level, but, if a soldier’s basic training has been conducted properly, this phase may be passed rather quickly. Then the focus should be placed on platoon and company level exercises. During this phase, all components of the national contingent should be integrated in the training. For example, the battalion headquarters, reconnaissance structures, military observers, police and other civilian components should function in their own task and role. This will provide a realistic picture of the complexities of the new environment, unfamiliar to all. Very often, the UN peace force is supposed “to hit the ground running,” that is, to become fully operational on deployment. Therefore, it is preferable that shortcomings be rectified in the home country rather than be faced in the field.

An important part of simulation-training is the use of mock-up constructions. Some national training centers that are specialized in training for peace operations have gone into great detail in trying to duplicate the environment in the field. This, naturally, is recommendable but not absolutely necessary. The minimum requirement, however, would be that audiovisual aids such as films, videos and slides be used to draw a picture of the future working environment.

### Special Techniques, Military Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission-related techniques as detailed below:</td>
<td>Only those applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of humanitarian aid delivery</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection of local civilian personnel</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interpositioning</td>
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<td>Verification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct of investigations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Supervision of agreements</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Practical disarmament measures</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Provision of disarmament incentives</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Marking of boundaries</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Enforcement of an arms embargo</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Search of vehicles, locations and personnel</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prisoners of War (POW) exchange</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hand-over of the battle casualties</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiation and mediation techniques</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maintenance of law and order</strong></td>
<td>Including riot control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supervision of the return of refugees</strong></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Working with the media
- Cooperation and liaison with the civilian components
- Delivery of information to local population
- Use of interpreters, introduction of language or phrase cards
- Working language tuition where applicable

### 7. Logistics

Individual members of national contingents do not usually need much information about the UN logistics system as they are part of a self-supporting national scheme. However, they may need to understand some special logistics features deriving from the unusual working set-up. The principal target groups for logistics training would be the logistics specialist of a national contingent, military observers, military and civilian police, civilian monitors and other small groups and individuals who will be working outside the national support system.
The UN logistics system is unique and unlike any national military structure in this respect. Even the very term logistics itself has a peculiar, although informal, definition in UN jargon: “everything that is not operations.” Consequently, the national logistics officers are likely to benefit from their own, national background and experience only to a limited degree. And yet, ignorance or inadequate knowledge of the UN logistics system not only hinders the national contingent’s efforts to establish an appropriate backup for the support of operations, but may also induce substantial financial losses. Therefore, these logistics specialists have to know the details of the UN guidelines pertaining to troop and material movements, in- and out-survey processes, evaluation of material and equipment, procurement and replenishment rules, reimbursement prerequisites plus a number of other small but important issues.

The small groups and individuals who operate outside the national support systems are often at a loss in dealing with the UN logistics system. They have to be briefed on issues that have an immediate effect on their personal well-being. For example, as they often travel alone, it has to be seen that their travel arrangements are in accordance with the UN regulations. In addition, they must know what kind and how much national backup can be expected under different circumstances. All this can be clarified in advance although the majority of these logistics issues for individuals will have to be addressed during the training period in the mission area.

### Logistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN logistics system</td>
<td>Differences with national systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN logistics sub-areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-and out-survey processes</td>
<td>Including reimbursement rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition and replenishment procedures</td>
<td>Including reimbursement rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National back-up</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Area Information on the UN Mission

To ensure at least a relatively “smooth landing” in the mission area and to avoid even the slightest cultural shock, an area information package should always be included in the pre-deployment training. There are several practical ways as to how this issue should be handled, though it cannot be expected that any training, no matter how extensive or intensive, would be able to portray all facets of another culture. If one can provide the personnel participating in peace operations with a short but valid list of “do’s and don’ts” before their deployment, major mistakes can be avoided.

Many components of area information may belong to the “nice-to-know” category while others are more serious by nature. Religion, for example, which is also very often one of the sources of conflict, should always be considered with tact and discretion. In the past, considering the number of UN peace operations and of personnel who have taken part in them, there has been very few cases in which the sensitive area of religious traits and habits has been abused on purpose. When there is conflict, the reason, more often than not, has been either ignorance or indifference to the issue. In particular, places of worship, temples and shrines, in the eyes of the local people, may become violated by an outsider’s mere presence. It should be noted here that caution should also be observed when dealing with other national contingents of the UN force.

Mastering local languages is very seldom a necessity, but familiarity may make life a great deal easier. For mediation and negotiation, interpreters are available if there is no common language. In day-to-day life, however, be it business or pleasure, knowledge of certain phrases may be not only useful but inevitable. For example, UN personnel must be able to identify their organization and their own personal status using the local language. Similarly, simple orders like “stop,” “step back,” “step out of your vehicle,” given in the local language, instead of the working language of the mission, can have quite an immediate and explicit effect. To be able to do this, the use of language cards or phrase pamphlets should already be initiated during the home country training period. Finally, the area information should also include information on recreational features which can be exploited during time off in the mission area.
Area Information on the UN Mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brief history of the country/countries</td>
<td>Including current infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topography</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People and cultures</td>
<td>Including ethnic diversities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Language cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel and traffic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential risks and hazards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO’s and DON’Ts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: As appropriate, the ethnic diversities, languages, religions and cultures of other national UN contingents should be discussed here.

9. Personal Points of Interest

As people’s personal preferences, inclinations and expectations vary, the best way to handle this topic is the use of interactive “questions and answer” sessions (perhaps once a week). Also, because all personnel working in UN peace operations are under contract with the UN, either directly or through the contributing government’s arrangement, the terms of this contract should be discussed. Every individual must be aware of his or her rights and responsibilities, privileges and immunities, disciplinary matters and punitive action in case of failure to meet these responsibilities.

Another issue that needs addressing prior to deployment is compensation in cases of loss or injury. The UN (and even national) insurance policies are not very familiar to most personnel. And it is not only those who participate in peace operations who need this information. The relatives, at least the next of kin, must know how to file a claim should something unfortunate happen.
Personal Administrative Matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terms of the peacekeeping contract:</td>
<td>UN and national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- rights and responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- privileges and immunities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- salary and compensations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- leave and time-off</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- disciplinary matters</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- termination of service contract</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical preparations</td>
<td>UN and national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation of loss and injury</td>
<td>Including insurance policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel to and from mission area</td>
<td>Including travel documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefing and debriefing requirements</td>
<td>To be institutionalized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. Recommendations

The following recommendations are suggested for peacekeeping training at the UN, regional, and national levels.

1. The UN

The responsibilities of the DPKO and its Training Unit have often been discussed. Some of the wildest interpretations portray this unit as a board of trustees for a UN Training Academy which would eventually assume a comprehensive responsibility for the planning, coordination and supervision of worldwide UN training. The Academy would actually train all key personnel earmarked for UN peace operations or provide the Member States with a professional training staff for this purpose. It is unlikely however that Member States can be convinced of the cost-efficiency of such an academy. The author would argue that the current tasking and role, as described in the General
Assembly resolution of 1995\(^\text{30}\) are sufficient, when *properly run*. There are, however, additional features that should be addressed.

It appears that the UN still does not take the significance of training seriously enough. Had it done so, other backup facilities, priorities and resources would have been assigned to the DPKO and its Training Unit. To date, the work of this unit from which Member States could have benefited has remained moderate, reflecting the modest resources available. Whatever the expectations of the Training Unit may have been, the designers have overlooked this old fact: “If you wish to buy something that is good and cheap, it entails two different deals. First you will buy the cheap thing and then, after a while, the good one.” What, then, could more money buy here? Here are some suggestions:

- First, it could bring *more qualified personnel on a permanent basis* to look after all aspects of the training issue. As it stands, the permanent staff of the Training Unit is too small. As a consequence, in order to be able to manage the challenges of an ever-growing workload, temporary staff members on short-term contracts have been used. These experts and officers are often provided by Member States at no cost to the UN. As they are usually contracted for a limited period only, typically one year, a substantial amount of time is bound to be wasted. The first weeks and months pass with “getting acclimatized,” both with the substance and the working environment, and during the last part of the contract period, the person tends to look towards the return home. When the next incumbent arrives, the same episode is likely to recur. There is no continuity.

- Second, it seems that the DPKO, when collecting and disseminating information pertaining to training, has neglected, to a degree, the evaluation and rating of this material. Its impressive-looking bibliographies contain books and papers that, if not entirely useless, have little value for training in practice. Obviously, there has not been sufficient expertise or time available to do any proper screening. As a result, Member States have to assess the usefulness of the training material themselves. It works well with countries that have a long history of participation in UN peace operations, but inexperienced

\(^{30}\) A/RES/49/37.
troop contributors will be confronted with an unfair challenge. Therefore, instead of randomly distributing all possible information, it is suggested that consideration be given to establishing an evaluation body that, with its expertise, could select from among all training documentation that which has substantial value to countries whose experience in peace operations is minimal or nonexistent. Once this evaluation is done, a proper training data bank with full access by all Member States should be established.

• Third, major armed forces maintain area information data (some from around the world), which can be utilized in pre-deployment training. The UN could do the same and make sure that such area information is available to Member States prior to deployment. Simple audiovisual material such as slides and videos, could support this information without resorting to overly sophisticated solutions like virtual reality terrain walks that are available only to the very few. The guidelines that the UN is currently issuing to the troop contributors have little bearing on this issue and are merely a set of operational and administrative requirements.

• Fourth, unity of command, or rather its absence, in UN peace operations has often been one of the major obstacles plaguing the efficiency of UN peace operations. It has been argued earlier that this shortcoming does not necessarily derive from the force (military) structure itself but is a part of any multinational system. Therefore, the roots of the problem should be identified and all personnel made aware of its existence. Proper training of the mission leadership in this respect by the UN, preferably having the representatives of all force components present at the same time, would seem to be essential in enhancing the interaction capabilities of the civilian, military and other elements of the mission.

2. Regional Arrangements

Regional training systems serve two important purposes. First, they provide a useful, standing platform for the exchange of experiences and information. Depending on their cohesion, this exchange may be extended to joint planning and execution of training for peace operations and the sharing of responsibilities. Second, as such systems understand the resources, capabilities
and limitations of their own region much better than any UN-controlled training system, it would be easier for these regional systems to promote the harmonization of national training curricula and personnel validation criteria.

There appears, however, to be some reluctance to take advantage of regional arrangements. This is probably due to ignorance regarding the benefits of a well-functioning regional training system, fears of losing national identity and control, and prejudice. Therefore, in addition to the pertinent UN measures and recommendations for regional cooperation, these systems themselves could do two things. First, they should more extensively and actively invite participants from outside their own region to attend their training programs. Second, they could act as “midwives” in the establishment of new, regional training systems. Provision of models and examples, as well as relevant training know-how and material, would help these new systems overcome some of their initial difficulties and develop more rapidly. An outsider may also turn out to be very helpful in resolving possible prejudices between neighbors.

3. National Arrangements

Far more important than trying to enhance the standard of national training packages are two issues that call for attention. First, many troop contributing countries should re-examine their personnel selection criteria and the screening process applied. Second, they should also try to establish contact between the civilian and military components of their national contingents as early as possible. At the national level, and particularly during the pre-deployment training phase, is one of the few chances to do so. Having done the above and found the appropriate solutions, the problems of national training may be addressed.

It has been argued throughout this paper that information, experience and support in training matters for UN peace operations are available and easily accessible. And yet, surprisingly, many countries have chosen the hard way of inventing the concepts of training on their own. It appears to be difficult for some countries (often for the sake of national pride) to refer to other countries’ experience in the training of their national contingents, and their military elements, in particular. At the practitioners’ level there is, perhaps, the willingness to learn from others but policies adopted at the executive level may deny this possibility.

Ibid.
VI. Conclusions

The following conclusions are drawn from this paper:

• The first is that troop contributors, be they experienced or new, including the major powers and developing countries, have realized and admit that UN peace operations go beyond what their national civilian and military contingents can control with the basic training they may have received. More widely than ever before, therefore, they have acknowledged the importance of proper pre-deployment training for these operations. Unfortunately, however, they often struggle through the challenges of their national training programs on their own.

• Second, there is a sufficient amount of experience, training material and support available. The UN and some regional cooperation bodies have taken steps to establish collection and dissemination systems to utilize this information. They have produced guidelines, training curricula, hand books, manuals and other tutorial help. The exploitation of existing assets, however, in the absence of appropriate resources at the UN, lacks coordination and proper screening. The establishment of a new body for this purpose or the upgrading of these resources at UN Headquarters should be undertaken as an immediate measure for the enhancement of training for UN peace operations.

The dissemination system itself should be carefully reconsidered. Laborious and time-consuming distribution and updating of documents can be substituted by electronic means. As there are countries with limited or non-existent access to universal systems like, for example, the Internet, a less sophisticated and more customer-friendly information exchange platform should be created. One possibility would be the establishment of a Bulletin Board System (BBS) because of its cost-effectiveness and relative simplicity. From the users’ point of view, all that is required is a PC equipped with a modem, suitable software and a telephone line.
Third, it is understood that all UN peace operations are unique in nature, environment, *modus operandi* and other characteristics. Consequently, the lessons learned in one particular operation are not fully transferable to another mission. Mr. Cedric Thornberry, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, commented to a visiting Australian general in late 1989, that “we would not even apply the Namibia blueprint to Namibia today, let alone to Cambodia.”

This being the case, while there are blueprints, lessons learned and experiences compiled, it takes a capable person or body to assess all the information available today. It cannot be done properly using personnel on short-term assignments or those whose wisdom derives from personal experience in one single peace operation. Even if an appropriate body or personnel was available to carry out the assessing, clear-cut and practical priorities should be put forward in order to take immediate effect.

These are the factors to be taken into account in the planning and execution of training for UN peace operations, regardless of the level involved. It is hoped that the UN will draw the right conclusions and act accordingly.
Chapter 3

Civilian Peacekeeping Training and Civil-Military Interactions

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I. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the context of international peacekeeping operations has undergone profound changes. Before 1987, UN peacekeeping operations (PKO’s) were limited in number, in function and in terms of personnel involved. In those days, the UN’s impartiality went unquestioned.

In the late 1980’s, peacekeeping operations began growing both in number and in scope. Many new peace missions were launched and their nature became more complex. In fact, due to so-called multifunctional missions, new responsibilities were assumed, including: the disarmament of warring parties, refugee and humanitarian assistance, human rights promotion and monitoring, supervision of elections and administration of territories. These were added to the traditional tasks of monitoring cease-fires, maintaining buffer zones between hostile forces and monitoring troop withdrawals.

This evolution in UN peacekeeping missions involved an increase in the duties of the civilian component of such operations. As a result of the changing nature of PKO’s, the number of civilians recruited for multifunctional missions grew enormously, reaching the current level of more than 10,000. The number of military personnel involved in peace efforts also increased, climbing from about 10,000 to over 80,000.

In the first decades of the UN’s operation, the term “training” was virtually absent. No special training was thought to be necessary for UN missions. Civilian staff members assigned to the field only needed the background furnished by their professional qualifications and experience. On the military side, the basic training provided in national academies was considered sufficient. However, with the increase in the number and scope of PKO’s, it became obvious that training was key in terms of preparation, for both the military and civilians, alike.
In regards to the military, it became evident that peacekeeping duties differ from tasks in traditional military operations and that traditional military training should therefore be adapted so as to include specific peace mission tasks. The military must not only be trained for combat, but also to: control crowds, administer humanitarian relief, validate compliance with accords, negotiate, manage refugee flows, disarm and demobilize, establish and administer the rule of law, interact with civilians and coordinate its efforts with other elements operating in the same area, such as UN agencies and Non-governmental Organizations (NGO’s). Moreover, the significance of increased military support in humanitarian actions has brought about a new relationship between civilian peacekeepers and the military. It has also indicated a need for a new type of humanitarian mission training for the military.

Without any support or guidance from the UN, some countries have defined their own training doctrines. As a result, countries rarely share the same attitude towards the similar tasks for which they are expected to provide their contingents with guidelines, manuals, handbooks and curricula. As a consequence, no coordination between the different national contingents exists. However, in the field, these contingents are expected to take on the same duties and to act together in a harmonious fashion.

Presently, the need for special training has been acknowledged both by the UN and by military officers. As stressed by the Secretary-General in his 1992 “Agenda for Peace,” civilian, police and military personnel must all receive appropriate training. In this context, the UN Secretariat approached the Member States to determine the amount and the nature of their national training. In June 1992, and then again in July 1993, a letter was addressed to each Member State by the Secretary-General, asking each to provide information on eventual national peacekeeping training courses. On this subject, the General Assembly then stated in a 1993 resolution that the training of peacekeeping personnel is primarily the responsibility of the Member States.

Some Member States responded to the request of the Secretary-General and organized specific training for their national contingents before sending them to the field. States such as Austria, Italy, Great Britain and others currently provide their troops with \textit{ad hoc} training. Still, states that provide their

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\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Ibid.}
contingent with similar training are few in number and are generally not developing countries. Therefore, when developing countries increased their contribution of troops to PKO’s, a problem of unequal preparation and equipment levels, different codes of conduct and North-South differences of perception, emerged.

In July 1994, the Henry L. Stimson Center published a study on: *Training for Peacekeeping: The United Nations’ Role*, in which options were evaluated both for military units and individual officers that participate in peacekeeping missions, and also for civilians who served as election monitors, administrators, logisticians and police. The Stimson Center’s analysis made it clear that the job of peacekeeping requires skills that are not developed during traditional military training and that, as a consequence, special training is needed. Although some 77 countries declared that they provide some kind of training for their personnel, only 8 of them have a high and adequate level of training, 13 medium, 15 low, with the rest (41) being substandard. The report concluded that it would be feasible and not overly costly to adapt traditional military training techniques to the new tasks that the military is supposed to deal with in peacekeeping operations. Existing national training systems can be used to carry out specialized peacekeeping training along with traditional training courses. Nevertheless, such an adaptation has been slow to take place.

Parallel to national military training, cooperation between different states is needed on a regional level. In fact, national troops, more often than not, now have to work together within multinational forces. This may result in complex command and control relationships. Currently, only the Nordic countries have undertaken an initiative in this direction. A Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters (NORDSAMFN) was established in 1968 between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden to coordinate and supervise the activities of these four countries in UN peacekeeping activities. In other countries no such initiative exists.

### II. Training for Peacekeepers
**from an Analytical Perspective**

Each peacekeeping operation comprises different components, such as humanitarian, military and political. Actors within these components share the same overall goal, but often possess a different understanding of how to

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interpret and achieve that goal. Civilian peacekeepers and the military are not natural partners. In practice and in the field, however, they increasingly have to interact with each other and learn how to work as a team.

As the General Assembly stated, the training of peacekeeping personnel is primarily the duty of the Member States. Accordingly, Member States are supposed to provide their national personnel with adequate training before sending them on a mission. And yet, as stated above, few countries provide specialized peacekeeping training to their armed forces. As for the training of civilian peacekeepers, even fewer Member States acknowledge and deal with this need. Worth noting is also the difficulty of finding qualified trainers for civilian peacekeepers, for, whereas military and police instructors are easy to find because of the strong training culture present within these professions, among humanitarian UN agencies and NGO’s, no such training culture exists.

In order to understand what is available in the field of civilian peacekeeping training, we will review and comment on national, UN and other organizations’ existing civilian training programs.4

1. National Civilian Training Institutes

As of this writing, only three institutes in the world offer peacekeeping training programs for civilians: the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre and the Italian Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento S. Anna.5 All three institutes are located in the Western world and all three are fairly recent in their inception. The oldest one is the Austrian Center which began its training program in the autumn of 1993. The Canadian Centre followed in March 1995, while the Italian Centre held its first training course in the autumn of 1995.

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4 In 1996 two new peacekeeping academies were created: the Argentina Peace Keeping Training Academy and the Zimbabwe Peace Keeping Training Academy. Although both academies are run by the military for military training in peacekeeping, both offer (as of this writing yet to be finalized) courses for civilian peacekeepers as well. Both academies serve their respective countries and their respective sub-regions.

5 The information below is provided for indicative purposes. More details can be obtained from each institute, whose contact addresses are provided in Annex II at the end of the volume.
The Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution

The Austrian Center seeks to provide civilians interested in understanding and in participating in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, with at least some general-level instruction. For those participating in a mission, function-specific preparation is also provided. Graduates of the Center are expected to form a pool of trained civilian personnel available for deployment in peace operations according to their particular qualifications and skills.

The Austrian Center training program aims at a transnational, interdisciplinary and inter-agency perspective. The training program is divided into a two-week Foundation Course and a selection of two-week Function Oriented Specialization Courses. The Foundation Course aims at providing participants with basic knowledge on civilian peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, and with experience in conflict analysis and conflict transformation strategies and models. The course explores primarily three main areas: (1) the principal civilian strategies and practices of international conflict transformation, including the nature of conflicts in the 1990’s and the role of the UN and other governmental and non-governmental organizations in conflict resolution; the basic requirements for peacekeepers, including intercultural understanding and communication; and the main civilian tasks involved in peace missions, including mediation and human rights protection.

The Function Oriented Specialization Courses provide participants with details about the major functions involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. The courses examine topics such as: mediation and confidence-building among conflict parties; human rights protection; information dissemination; and post-conflict reconstruction, rehabilitation and repatriation.

The Austrian Center training program is open to participants from different professions, regions and organizations, possessing a graduate degree and some background in the field. Special emphasis is placed on recruiting candidates from Central and Eastern Europe, the developing world and particular conflict-prone regions. Participants must be fluent in English in order to take part in the training program.

The Austrian Center training program is organized in cooperation with the European University Centre for Peace Studies and is sponsored by the Austrian government which decided to support the training program on a regular basis in the spring of 1993.
The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre

The aim of the Pearson Centre is to strengthen the Canadian contribution to international peace, security and stability. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre is an independent organization which was established by the Canadian government in 1994, as a division of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. The Centre is funded, in part, by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence.

The Pearson Centre training program is organized on the basis of a selection of “standard” two-week courses and a six-week Peacekeeping Management, Command and Staff Course. Courses cover a wide range of topics, including a general overview of contemporary peacekeeping, peacekeeping negotiation and mediation, administration and logistics in peacekeeping operations and military operations in modern peacekeeping. Courses can be taken individually or can be combined in different manners according to needs. Enrolment in each course is limited to approximately thirty participants who attend lectures, engage in small group discussions and take part in role-playing exercises. In addition to training courses, the Centre conducts research on different aspects of peacekeeping and holds an extensive schedule of conferences, seminars and workshops. The Centre also sponsors a research program that includes field research with deployed peacekeeping missions and a Visiting Scholar Program.

Participants in the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre training program come from many different backgrounds. They include candidates from the military, civil police, government and non-government agencies dealing with human rights and humanitarian assistance, as well as from diplomatic circles, the media and various organizations sponsoring development and democratization programs. Usually, approximately half of the participants come from Canada, and the remainder from several other nations involved in peacekeeping activities. A course profile has been developed to provide a balance of participants who are representative of the full range of peacekeeping stakeholders.

The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre staff is composed of a core faculty, an associate faculty and an adjunct faculty. The core faculty is concerned with policy, program planning and administration. The associate faculty consists of professionals with relevant academic backgrounds and peacekeeping experience drawn from national and international government and non-government sources. The adjunct faculty makes up the majority of the Centre’s academic staff. Adjunct faculty staff are recruited internationally from members of specialized areas including the military, diplomatic circles, politics, humanitarian organizations,
academia, the media and police, and are employed on a part-time basis to research, develop and deliver courses, seminars and other programs.

**The Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento S. Anna**

The Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento S. Anna of Pisa, Italy, is a public institution for university education whose aims are to promote and advance scientific knowledge both through university study and also through doctoral research. The Scuola Superiore S. Anna confirms the special vocation of Pisa as the seat of academic institutions on the model of a university college, working side by side and in mutual support with the University of Pisa, as centres for the promotion of scientific knowledge and attracting eminent scholars from every region of Italy and from abroad. The Scuola Superiore S. Anna is composed of two branches: the Faculty of Social Sciences (Economics and Management; Law; and Political Science), and the Faculty of Experimental and Applied Sciences (Agrarian Studies; Engineering; and Medicine). The tuition schemes of the Scuola are composed of regular courses for those registered in university degree programs, and doctoral courses. The Scuola also organizes master courses and topic sessions on issues of particular cultural and scientific value.

The Civilian Personnel of Peace-keeping/Humanitarian Operations and Election Monitoring Missions: Volunteers, Officers, Observers is a postgraduate program of the Scuola Superiore S. Anna. The program serves as the framework for a series of training, educational, and research activities in the field of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, human rights monitoring missions and electoral observation missions. The training program is held under the patronage of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Information Centre for Italy (Rome), the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the European Commission Office for Italy (Rome), and the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Rome). Currently, specific cooperation arrangements have been established with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UNHCR, and with the United Nations Volunteers (UNV).

Specific training courses, lasting from three weeks to two months, are organized within the framework of the training program. The main purpose of the training courses is to train, at a postgraduate level, personnel for the tasks usually assigned to the civilian component of peacekeeping/humanitarian operations. Training courses consist of:
1. Lectures on: the meaning and categories of peace support operations; international organizations and peacekeeping; mission life-cycle; command and control of a peacekeeping operation; and civilian and military partnership in peacekeeping operations.

2. Seminars on: education, promotion, and observation of human rights; election monitoring; humanitarian assistance; refugee assistance; techniques and procedures of inspection; and observation and reporting.

3. Seminars and practical training on: selection, recruitment, and legal status of the civilian peacekeepers; fundamental rules of conduct; preventive medicine; personal security; mine awareness; stress management; and gender relations in peacekeeping.

4. Seminars, simulations, and role-playing sessions on: conflict resolution; and facilitating/mediating/negotiating skills.

5. Case studies on: the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL); the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ); the Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA); the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES); and the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The training program is open to participants from all over the world, of different academic and professional backgrounds, possessing a graduate degree and some field experience and a working knowledge of English. The program is conducted by international staff from both academic and applied settings. Teachers are chosen among academics, diplomats, international organizations personnel, police and armed forces officers, and NGO experts. Strong links are maintained with the military. These links stem from the fact that the program is organized in cooperation with the Centro Militare di Studi Strategici (Military Centre of Strategic Studies), which is the main think-tank of the Italian Armed Forces on security issues, and which provides the Scuola with lecturers and educational material. Some specific classes are offered on the subject of command and control in peacekeeping operations and on the relationship between the civilian and military components of peace support missions. The Brigata Paracadutisti “Folgore,” Livorno, Italy, a special corps of paratroopers, plays a special role in familiarizing students with personal
security and communications. The Brigata provides classes on *Personal Security: Orientation, Radio Procedures, Mines Recognition, Survival in the Field*. The Brigata also organizes and coordinates a role-playing session conceived as a hypothetical scenario faced by the civilian component of a peacekeeping mission in an emergency situation. The simulation involves the use of telephones, radios, rules of engagement (RoE’s), medical evacuation procedures, arms recognition and interaction with the military component.

At the end of the training program the Scuola keeps an updated list of the participants and of their subsequent positions and assignments. In the period October 1995-April 1997 many graduates of the program served as civilian officers in various field operations, including MINUGUA, the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya, the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Italian Election Monitoring Mission to Albania, the Mission of the UN Centre for Human Rights in Rwanda, the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and the 1997 OSCE Mission to Albania.

As already noted, the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre and the Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamneto S. Anna, Pisa, Italy, are the only institutes that provide civilians with some kind of peacekeeping training. All three institutes stress the following aspects of peacekeeping in their curricula: (1) *general basic knowledge* of civilian peacekeeping activities and of conflict analysis, conflict resolution models and conflict transformation strategies; and (2) *function-oriented activities* on the major aspects of PKO’s (promotion, education and observation of human rights; electoral monitoring; humanitarian assistance; refugee assistance, mediation and negotiation). Among the three institutes however, some major differences can be observed. The Canadian Centre organizes its courses according to themes, among which features also an interesting course on the *Maritime Dimension of Peacekeeping*.

The Austrian Centre remains more conceptual and political in its training approach, analysing in detail the mechanisms of conflict and strategies of negotiation. The Scuola Superiore S. Anna of Pisa focuses on the principle of mission readiness and encompasses operational classes. The Scuola S. Anna also draws on experiences from previous PKO’s and analyses and studies these as case studies.

Despite the efforts of the three institutes at providing peacekeeping training for civilians however, the training provided is by and large neither sufficient nor systematic. The Canadian Centre provides many courses on different matters, but none of these courses focuses specifically on practical training for
peacekeepers, especially for civilian peacekeepers. The Austrian program appears slightly more systematic in its training approach. It provides two sets of courses per year, but it offers little in terms of practical training. As mentioned above, the program is more politically orientated. Finally, the program of the Scuola Superiore S. Anna is very practically and operationally orientated but, although it is regularly held, the number of the people trained is not sufficient for the increasing demand.

Another difficulty affecting the centres is the lack of coordination among themselves, UN agencies and Military Training Academies. In this connection there are many differences among the three institutes. The Canadian Centre is a division of the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, and maintains strong links with the military, but not with UN agencies. The lecturers at the Canadian Centre are mainly military, and so are the participants. In this sense the Canadian Centre is not “civilian”-orientated. The Austrian Centre does not seem to have strong links either with the military world or with UN agencies. It is sponsored by the Austrian government, and lecturers are mainly academics. This in turn, gives the program a more theoretical and conceptual character. The Scuola Superiore S. Anna is a public institution for university education. The Scuola has strong links both with the military and with UN agencies, each of which provides lecturers and educational materials. Of the three institutes, the Scuola S. Anna thus seems to provide the best civil-military balance.

In addition, there appears to be little coordination among the three Institutes themselves. Steps have been taken by the Canadian Centre which hosted in July 1995 the first meeting of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). The aim of the IAPTC is to promote understanding of peacekeeping, its goals and objectives and the methods used in training for peacekeeping operations. The Scuola Superiore S. Anna joined the association as a founding member and hosted the second meeting in April 1996. The third meeting was hosted by the Foundation of International Studies in Malta in April 1997. Representatives of civilian and military training centres from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the US and Zimbabwe took part in this meeting. Also present were representatives of international and regional organizations such as: the UN, UNV, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Western European Union (WEU), the European Union (EU), the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) and the Implementation Force (IFOR). IAPTC, which is actually coordinated by a
secretariat at the Canadian Centre, is making strong efforts towards standardizing training and increasing civilian and military partnership.

The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre, the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, and the Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento S. Anna of Pisa, Italy, can be seen as a response by the Member States to the Secretary-General’s request to have national personnel trained before being sent out on a mission. On the other hand, these training institutes are preparing “international” rather than national staff “readily available for the field.” This might raise some problems in the future, like for example the status of the trained personnel or the eventual modalities of their participation in UN operations. In fact, strong links among these national training efforts and the UN system do not exist, and the UN does not automatically benefit from this pool of trained personnel.

2. UN Agencies Providing Training

Many UN agencies participate in PKO’s. Some of these, such as the DPKO, UNV, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Centre for Human Rights, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the United Nations Training and Examination Section in Geneva, UNDHA and UNHCR, actually do provide some training for their personnel before sending them to the field. In addition, two UN agencies, UNITAR and the United Nations Training and Examinations Section in Geneva, provide training to UN personnel in general and upon request when necessary.

Training within UN agencies takes place on a highly disparate basis. For instance, UNV only provides some training for those leaving on a mission when they can be easily grouped in a larger number. A Program Manager who coordinates the action of the Volunteers on-site is responsible for drafting and putting together a “briefing kit,” which includes all relevant background information on the destination and the mission of the Volunteers. UNV presents the most articulate example of one of the most important aspects of de-briefing: the management of traumatic experiences. The available medical insurance does not cover the Volunteers in terms of psychological, post-trauma counselling and support. When money is available at the end of a mission and there is a need for such support, the funds for such activities are allocated. This, however, is decided on a case-by-case basis by civil servants with little experience of such situations and needs. On the other hand, at the end of the mission and still on-site, the Volunteers are requested to inform the Program Manager of their experiences and
impressions. These are then compiled in the “End of Mission Report” produced by
the Program Manager himself.

In the case of IOM, an interesting approach to training in the field is adopted.
The personnel are trained only after they have had the opportunity to travel to the
mission area and to acquire a personal “feeling” and impression of the new living
and working environment. After this phase of “recognition of the field,”
appropriate training by local resources, UN staff members and also by those staff
members fielded before the arrival of their successors, is provided at the
headquarters of the mission. IOM appears to have established the most effective
formula for debriefing. “Lessons Learned Exercises” have been set up, on the basis
of questionnaires, the results of which are analysed and compiled in a report. This
internal, and therefore not official exercise, serves not only the purpose of
evaluating the whole operation, but also that of measuring the performance of the
staff deployed.

The Training Service in New York also organizes debriefing efforts. This is
largely due to the presence of the UN Headquarters in New York. However, only
the feedback of the New York UN staff is taken into consideration in this process.
The lack of on-site debriefing seems to be linked to the high costs of keeping the
staff in the area of the mission beyond the end of their postings.

The UNHCR provides a one-week induction course when time and resources
permit and the DPKO has published a training manual on “Mission Readiness and
Stress Management” which addresses training issues. The Training Unit at the
United Nations in New York provides regular training courses to all personnel
going, or eligible to go on a mission. The training proceeds in two parts: first,
general training (mission awareness) for 1-2 days, followed by specific training (up
to 3 months) relevant to the administrative tasks and the organization modes and
rules of a mission in the field. These training modules are held twice a year.

UNITAR organizes training programs, during which UNITAR staff members
go to the field to train either local resources or UN posted staff. Other UN agencies
usually organize training courses for their staff, when the need occurs (when a
mission is decided upon) and when time and budget permit.

In terms of training methods, “Train the Trainers” is the most popular approach.
The Centre for Human Rights uses exercises and simulations which ask
participants to perform some very practical tasks such as writing up reports,
learning how to recognize a human rights violation, etc. Some agencies use other
pedagogical methods such as videos or training manuals. This is the case with
UNHCR.

UNITAR has developed correspondence courses under the name of
Programme of Correspondence Instruction (POCI) courses. These courses are
self-financing, with a US$ 70 application fee. The first four curricula in the series on peacekeeping include Logistics, the History of Peacekeeping, UNPROFOR and the Doctrine of Peacekeeping. Two more curricula are being planned. This initiative is relatively recent and only dates back to February 1994. UNITAR provides the material, pedagogical structure, format, and design of the courses, and ensures dissemination. The courses are available to anyone interested.

For most UN agencies however, no significant budget allocations for training are envisaged. UNHCR, for instance, allocates less than 1% of its budget to training. For UNV, the possibility of organizing training depends on the availability of funds. This is even more so when needs arise for support or counselling at the end of a mission.

Participants in UN agencies training courses are usually UN staff members sent by their agencies to implement assigned tasks. The UN Volunteers, recruited under significant time pressures, are selected according to the need in numbers. The POCI courses of UNITAR represent a particular case, since these correspondence courses are open to anybody.

As a rule, training lecturers are UN staff members, but once training takes place on-site, the trainers may come from the different components of the mission: military or humanitarian. For the humanitarian aspect of a mission, some NGO representatives active in the mission area might figure among the lecturers. Local personnel are also hired to brief the newcomers in the field on the particularities and difficulties characterizing the mission.

In certain instances, cooperation between UN agencies and agencies outside the UN system can be observed. The main such example is that of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. This committee operates under the framework of a Task Force established jointly by UNDHA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) called the “Disaster Management Training Programme (DMPT).” Its aims are to raise worldwide disaster management awareness, to raise UN professionalism in disaster management, to develop institutional memory, to increase disaster planning and response capabilities, and to increase national disaster-response training capabilities. The audience towards which this program is directed comprises government officials, UN personnel, NGO’s and the international donor community. The learning formats include group workshops, structured briefing and self-directed learning. The DMPT enjoys the benefits of a multi-agency cadre of trainers from UNDHA, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNDP, UNHCR, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO). All these agencies are represented in the Inter-
Agency Advisory Board, whose Standing Committee is located in Geneva. The DMPT initiative was launched in January 1993. Since then, some 15 training modules have been developed in several languages (the five official UN languages, plus Portuguese and Turkish).

UNDHA is currently working on a new initiative of cooperation called the “Complex Emergency Training Programme” which aims to build a common system for all those under the UN umbrella or partners with the UN (including NGOs, ICRC, etc.).

The Centre for Human Rights has launched a joint program with the DPKO for the training of military and police personnel. The aim is to produce training material to be used by the trainers of peacekeepers. The training course for 15 military and 15 police officers, would comprise two aspects: a course on general peacekeeping issues which would be provided by the DPKO; and a course on human rights monitoring provided by the Centre for Human Rights. The Centre for Human Rights is also planning to publish three training manuals on Law Enforcement, Human Rights Monitoring and on Human Rights for the Military.

Although many UN agencies involved in PKO’s attempt to offer some training for civilians participating in peace operations, these attempts remain largely sporadic and inadequate. In most cases, whether training can be given depends on the availability of funds and time, the requirements of the mission and the component of the mission entrusted to the different agencies. Moreover, in general, the training provided is neither systematic nor coordinated, and with few exceptions, no official debriefing is provided.

Most UN civilians acquire new skills “the hard way,” through a process of trial and error in the course of their duties in the field. In fact, in most cases the UN simply deploys its personnel hoping that they would develop the necessary skills. With the increase in the number of UN peace operations however, the concept of training has changed completely and the need for readily available, trained personnel, has become imperative. It is now a widely accepted principle that specific training for UN peace operations should be provided, and that such training should comprise the following three phases: (1) basic training—the education and training the participant has received as part of his or her career grade; (2) pre-deployment training—the preparation of personnel for the particular mission tasks and mission environment, before dispatchment to the field; and (3) on-site training—training for specific mission tasks following dispatchment to the field. Debriefing should also be considered as part of training.
Within UN agencies however, pre-deployment training seems to take place as an exception rather than as a rule. Even when provided, its substance seems to remain vague and general. This means that the pre-deployment training received is often of little relevance for the staff sent to the field.

All UN agencies sending staff to the field prefer to rely on the on-site training formula. This enables a more specific, sectoral and specialized training, according to the needs which characterize the mandate of the mission and the environment within which the mission takes place. This formula also enables the grouping of all participants on site, which can otherwise be difficult when they are being drafted from different countries. The staff, because of time and budget constraints, cannot easily be brought together to be trained before the mission takes place at the headquarters of the agency which fields them. The training provided usually includes personal protection and field staff training.

An important aspect of training and evaluation is that of debriefing. Debriefing is an issue whose need and importance are recognized by all agencies, but which none has managed to address in a systematic way. Debriefing presents two sides. The staff returning from a mission must be given the opportunity to communicate their experiences and impressions. On the personal level, this could help returning personnel deal with experiences which might have been very different from what they might have had to deal with before, and difficult to integrate into their personal lives. Their experiences also need to be built into their professional expertise. The problems of adjustment met by those who have been fielded also relate to their jobs. Mission experience is rarely considered enriching for their careers, as bringing in, for instance, new skills and expertise. It seems as though in many cases, the mission period is considered by the UN agency, or by work colleagues, as a period of absence or as lost time. The second aspect of de-briefing, refers to the “lessons learned” dimension. Agencies which have sent people to the field, as well as those responsible for designing the mission, could benefit from the practical, personal feedback collected on a day-to-day basis by peacekeepers in their different assignments.

In conclusion however, it can be said that although generally UN agencies do not provide their personnel with adequate training, they are starting to realize the need for doing so.
3. Alternative Training Models

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Outside the UN system, the only institution that provides an efficient training program for civilians is ICRC. Before more specialized training is provided to all the professionals of different backgrounds, a general so-called “Integration Course,” which lasts 10 days, is held outside Geneva. The aim of the course is to provide future delegates with an intense learning and personal experience of community life and group dynamics.

Course lectures are provided by professionals from the ICRC headquarters on the following themes: the structure, organization and history of ICRC; the activities, structure and organization of the International Federation of Red Cross Societies and their relationship with ICRC; basic knowledge in international and humanitarian law; an overview of ICRC’s main activities, namely, medical activities; mines awareness and security issues; preventive medicine and first aid; communication skills and relations with the media; and stress management. Additional training relating to the specific tasks of the individual staff members is provided later on, still as part of the pre-deployment training. The working and course languages are English and French.

In terms of debriefing, special post-traumatic stress disorders which might occur are given serious attention and consideration. These possible disorders are dealt with to an important extent before the mission begins in order to make future delegates aware of what they might experience. The accent is put on dialogue and communication among the members of a delegation. On-site training is not usually provided due to the often difficult context in which the delegates operate. De-briefing as such is organized on site at the end of the mission and later at headquarters, in Geneva.

The training process is formulated and defined in terms of the concept of integration. The idea is to provide a first integration course, before the first mission in the field. After the first year of experience, on the basis of a questionnaire to measure how relevant both theory and practice were for the delegates, a second course serves as a follow-up and when necessary, as a refresher. This is the so-called “post-integration” course. The aim is to make the delegates responsible for their own ongoing training throughout their careers. The delegates are thus expected to move towards growing specialization and competence.
III. Recommendations

1. Selection and Training

Two major stages emerge as important and relevant elements in the process of the recruitment of readily available, trained personnel, to be fielded in PKO’s. These are the selection and the training stages, which are intertwined. It appears sensible to recommend that the selection be globally administered at the UN level, whereas the training could be fashioned as a mixed competence shared between the national and the UN levels.

More specifically, the selection should be divided into two stages. The first relates to the national selection of personnel made readily available via national training. In this context, the Member States are expected to undertake a “pre-selection” on the basis of criteria of the basic training provided. On the basis of these qualifications, a selection should be made to determine who is apt to undertake general training provided on a national level. General training refers to knowledge and skills given in the perspective of providing possible future UN personnel for UN operations with an overview and understanding of the main characteristics of the UN Organization (history, institutional structure, Charter, interactions with the military, NGO’s and Member States), and its operations. In this sense, attention should focus on tasks specific to operations such as human rights monitoring and protection, election monitoring, humanitarian assistance and the administration of territories. Moreover, training modules should instruct personnel on personal security, communication skills and procedures, health issues (preventive medicine and first aid), mediation and negotiation techniques, body language and psychology and stress management. These issues should be illustrated with examples taken from previous UN peacekeeping experiences. The general training curriculum should be defined by the UN who should supply Member States with the guidelines and directives to provide this training. This should ensure the necessary harmonization, coordination and coherence between different national contingents.

Given the fact that few Member States currently provide any training, national training centres cannot focus exclusively on the training of national personnel. In this sense, training courses should be open to candidates of other nationalities. At the end of each course, the students should be evaluated according to criteria established by the UN. Those having undergone successful training should be listed by the Member States. Two lists should be established: one for the national staff and one for the staff from other states. These lists should then be
communicated directly by the training centers to those UN agencies involved in sending staff to the field in the framework of UN operations.

As a second step in the first selection stage, the UN becomes involved. On the basis of the lists sent by the training centers and according to existing needs, the UN should select the experts expected to undertake pre-deployment training. Pre-deployment training should take place before the personnel are dispatched to the mission areas. At this phase, the final destination is already known and the training should address the preparation of personnel for the particular mission and its environment. At this stage, military and civilian personnel should be trained jointly. This should enable the civilian and the military components of a mission to meet, to get acquainted with the modalities of cooperation in the field and to induce an attitude and reflexes of partnership, instead of competition, in the field. This aspect seems especially important, since previous experiences have proven the difficulty of constructive cooperation between the military and civilians. These difficulties have often negatively affected the overall results of a mission.

For the practical modalities of providing joint pre-deployment training to the military and the civilian components, it is suggested that this training be organized on a regional basis. Trainers (from the UN, police, military and NGO communities) should gather in one Member State possessing the adequate training infrastructure. The costs should be covered by the Member States. It must be noted that so far no such regional training initiative has been undertaken for military and civilian personnel. Training should be considered from two angles: that of providing readily trained personnel, and that of providing readily available trainers, specialized in specific issues and geographical areas, and stemming from different backgrounds.

Another important aspect of training is represented by on-site training. On-site training is an extension of pre-deployment training. It is related to the mission and the tasks of the individual, unit or element acting within the PKO framework. At this stage the exact location of a prospective mission is known, and the type of training provided should thus be very specific. At this stage as well, the civilian and the military should be trained jointly so to establish in advance the exact modalities of their cooperation. This stage of training should be under the UN’s responsibility. In the course of the mission, training opportunities should be made available for those staff members who need, or request to undertake, training on a continuous basis (i.e. proficiency course for the use of radios, additional language courses, stress management seminars, etc.). This is all the more necessary, and becomes imperative, in the case of a change or a redefinition in the UN’s mission mandate.
At the end of the mission, debriefing should take place. Two stages can be envisaged: debriefing in the field, and debriefing at the UN. Debriefing would have three aims: gather the “lessons learned,” deal with the personal, at times traumatic, experiences in the field and evaluate the performance of the staff deployed.

The first debriefing effort should be carried out in the field, before the staff leaves the mission area. For practical reasons, it is suggested that this debriefing take place on the basis of questionnaires. At this moment, the staff is still complete, and later on many experiences cannot be translated as effectively, since they have been forgotten or transformed by the memory of each individual. Follow-up debriefing should take place at the UN Headquarters. This debriefing stage should include the “lessons learned” aspect from the mission and be carried out in greater depth via interviews and narrative, or analytical reports for instance.

For future reference, the UN should evaluate its staff after each mission in order to retain in its roster only those members who are suited for missions and who have proven effective in the execution of their assignment. The evaluation process should include the staff member’s code of conduct and morality, communication skills and sociability with other staff members and members from the other components of the mission as well as with the local population, language ability, endurance capacity and the effective realization of the tasks assigned.

Special attention should be dedicated to dealing with post-trauma disorders whenever they occur. On the personal level, staff members should be helped in dealing with experiences which were probably very different from those they might have encountered before and which are difficult to integrate into their individual lives. The problems of adjustment met by those sent to the field might also relate to their jobs.

In this sense, an effort should be made to reintegrate the staff returning from a mission back into their previous professional environment. The mission experience is rarely considered enriching for their jobs as bringing in, for instance, new skills and expertise. The mission experience needs to be valued as a genuine part of an individual’s career.

2. The UN’s Role

The following keywords should summarize and illustrate the role the UN should assume, in terms of devising training for the requirements of its operations. It goes without saying that the following keywords, put forward for clarity purposes, must be considered as a whole, and that each keyword is closely related to the others:
• **Independence**: The UN should have the competence to define training programs. UN decisions should be executable in terms of training. The UN should have the necessary margin of manoeuvre and the budgetary resources to conduct pre-deployment and on-site training according to its needs. The final selection of the staff should fall entirely under UN competence.

• **Coordination**: The UN should ensure links between the training of civilians and of the military as well as the coordination in the field under strict UN auspices of pre-deployment and on-site training. Coordination should also be ensured in terms of the relations between the UN and the national training centers at the stage of general training and in terms of personnel selection. The UN should suggest efficient basic prerequisites (academic, language skills, professional background, etc.) and the criteria for the selection of those designated to go on missions.

• **Coherence**: The UN should set up some international convention on “codes of conduct” and devise the curricula, guidelines and directives for general training. The UN should provide a body of readily available trainers, as well as educational material (manuals, videos, etc.).

• **Efficiency**: The UN should have explicit and common definitions of the terms of training in order to ensure flexibility and the capacity of the staff to adapt to changing environments, needs and mandates. Debriefing should also enable a higher degree of efficiency in terms of staff evaluation. Consequent reintegration efforts should ensure efficiency for individual careers.

• **Transparency**: The UN should favour transparency over national sovereignty, especially in the training of the military.

3. **The Concept of Training**

All training steps, even the debriefing and reintegration stages, should be considered as effective training phases. It is important for those trained to take on the responsibility of processing their experiences and knowledge as part of their work. Furthermore, they should claim their rights to proper and comprehensive training in all its phases. Finally, training should be considered as an ongoing process. The training steps suggested are the following: Step 1:
Basic Training; Step 2: General Training; Step 3: Pre-Deployment Training; Step 4: On-Site Training; Step 5: Debriefing; and Step 6: Reintegration.

IV. Conclusion

At present, the training of civilians sent to the field is organized neither according to a systematic pattern, nor within an institutionalized framework. The number of national training centers is still low, and little cooperation (such as on a regional basis) exists between them.

Furthermore, no joint systematic civilian/military training exists. This points to a lack of interaction and an absence of cooperation between the actors involved in UN peace operations. Civilian, military and NGO personnel share the same goals in a mission, but they are not partners in a strategy leading to the achievement of those goals.

In the future, national training institutions and UN agencies must recognize the need to give more attention to the training of staff, making this more comprehensive and part of an ongoing process throughout the duration of a mission or even of a career.
Annexes
Annex I: Information on Respondents and Responses to Selected Questions

Personal Role of Respondents

- Other Military (57.14%)
- Military Commander (33.33%)
- UN Civilian Other (3.57%)
- UN Civilian Chief (2.28%)
- National Officer (2.98%)
- Human or NGO (0.69%)
Principal Mission of Respondents
(Total of Military = 91.06%)
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<tr>
<th>Question No</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Blank</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1.1</td>
<td>Was there a disarmament component in the original peace agreement and/or SC resolution?</td>
<td>138 (80.7%)</td>
<td>24 (14.0%)</td>
<td>9 (5.2%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q7.7</td>
<td>Did the force composition identify a specific structure to support the disarmament component of the mandate?</td>
<td>61 (35.6%)</td>
<td>79 (46.2%)</td>
<td>31 (18.1%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q7.21</td>
<td>Were the command/control procedures adequate?</td>
<td>99 (57.8%)</td>
<td>34 (19.8%)</td>
<td>38 (22.2%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9.1</td>
<td>Did you use force (coercive disarmament) to achieve the mission as mandated?</td>
<td>26 (15.2%)</td>
<td>115 (67.2%)</td>
<td>30 (17.4%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9.2</td>
<td>Is it possible to use coercive disarmament in these types of operations?</td>
<td>62 (36.2%)</td>
<td>71 (41.5%)</td>
<td>38 (22.2%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9.3.1</td>
<td>Do you believe force can be used to enforce disarmament agreements?</td>
<td>85 (49.7%)</td>
<td>38 (22.2%)</td>
<td>48 (28.0%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9.3.2</td>
<td>Do you believe force should be used to enforce disarmament agreements?</td>
<td>67 (39.1%)</td>
<td>58 (33.9%)</td>
<td>46 (26.9%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10.6</td>
<td>Did you use sensor mechanisms for verification/information purposes?</td>
<td>36 (21.0%)</td>
<td>98 (57.3%)</td>
<td>37 (21.6%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10.7.2</td>
<td>Could sensors play a useful role in weapons control and disarmament aspects of a peacekeeping operation?</td>
<td>102 (59.6%)</td>
<td>14 (8.1%)</td>
<td>55 (32.1%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10.8</td>
<td>Could/should information collection assets (intelligence) be used for peacekeeping and disarmament purposes?</td>
<td>132 (77.1%)</td>
<td>5 (2.9%)</td>
<td>34 (19.8%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10.10</td>
<td>Is there a need for satellite surveillance in peace operations?</td>
<td>125 (73.1%)</td>
<td>20 (11.7%)</td>
<td>26 (15.2%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11.2</td>
<td>Did the security situation in the mission area allow for arms control and disarmament?</td>
<td>94 (54.9%)</td>
<td>42 (24.5%)</td>
<td>35 (20.4%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11.4</td>
<td>Could weapons control and disarmament have been more efficient?</td>
<td>80 (46.7%)</td>
<td>49 (28.6%)</td>
<td>42 (24.5%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11.6</td>
<td>Were opportunities missed to implement weapons control and disarmament?</td>
<td>46 (26.9%)</td>
<td>72 (42.1%)</td>
<td>53 (30.9%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11.8</td>
<td>Did national diversity of contributed troops create problems for command and control during disarmament operations?</td>
<td>53 (30.9%)</td>
<td>78 (45.6%)</td>
<td>40 (23.3%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11.17</td>
<td>Were illicit (not in your inventory) weapons a problem?</td>
<td>89 (52.0%)</td>
<td>39 (22.8%)</td>
<td>43 (25.1%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11.18</td>
<td>Was there continued access to weapons by warring parties through external channels of supply?</td>
<td>89 (52.0%)</td>
<td>43 (25.1%)</td>
<td>39 (22.8%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11.19</td>
<td>Could you control external channels of weapons supply?</td>
<td>16 (9.3%)</td>
<td>109 (63.7%)</td>
<td>46 (26.9%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11.21</td>
<td>Do weapons continue to flow after sanctions, inspections, checks?</td>
<td>103 (60.2%)</td>
<td>18 (10.5%)</td>
<td>50 (29.2%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Question No</td>
<td>Question</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q11.27</td>
<td>Were any weapons collected against cash or land?</td>
<td>19 (11.1%)</td>
<td>93 (54.3%)</td>
<td>59 (34.5%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11.38</td>
<td>Can weapons be collected effectively?</td>
<td>83 (48.5%)</td>
<td>51 (29.8%)</td>
<td>37 (21.6%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11.45</td>
<td>Did you suffer sniper problems?</td>
<td>59 (34.5%)</td>
<td>78 (45.6%)</td>
<td>34 (19.8%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13.1</td>
<td>Did you experience mine problems?</td>
<td>100 (58.4%)</td>
<td>37 (21.6%)</td>
<td>34 (19.8%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14.1</td>
<td>Did your units undertake any specific pre-deployment training related to disarmament operations?</td>
<td>56 (32.7%)</td>
<td>87 (50.8%)</td>
<td>28 (16.3%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14.3</td>
<td>Were you trained specifically for arms collection and cantonment?</td>
<td>32 (18.7%)</td>
<td>98 (57.3%)</td>
<td>41 (23.9%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14.4</td>
<td>Were you trained in on-site inspection and observation techniques?</td>
<td>70 (40.9%)</td>
<td>67 (39.1%)</td>
<td>34 (19.8%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14.5</td>
<td>Were you trained in verification technologies nationally?</td>
<td>44 (25.7%)</td>
<td>89 (52.0%)</td>
<td>38 (22.2%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14.6</td>
<td>Were you trained for specific weapons control and disarmament operations?</td>
<td>63 (36.8%)</td>
<td>74 (43.2%)</td>
<td>34 (19.8%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14.7</td>
<td>Were you trained for specific demobilization operations?</td>
<td>37 (21.6%)</td>
<td>100 (58.4%)</td>
<td>34 (19.8%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14.8</td>
<td>Were you trained for specific demining operations?</td>
<td>44 (25.7%)</td>
<td>92 (53.8%)</td>
<td>35 (20.4%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14.9.1</td>
<td>Were you technically prepared to accomplish your mission?</td>
<td>102 (59.6%)</td>
<td>31 (18.1%)</td>
<td>38 (22.2%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14.9.2</td>
<td>Were you tactically prepared to accomplish your mission?</td>
<td>118 (69.0%)</td>
<td>13 (7.6%)</td>
<td>40 (23.3%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14.10</td>
<td>Was there anything done to gather lessons learned at the end of the mission?</td>
<td>100 (58.4%)</td>
<td>31 (18.1%)</td>
<td>40 (23.3%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14.11</td>
<td>Were you debriefed in your home country?</td>
<td>98 (57.3%)</td>
<td>39 (22.8%)</td>
<td>34 (19.8%)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q16.4*</td>
<td>Do you think that the disarmament related tasks which you undertook had an impact in the national reconstruction processes which followed the end of the mission?</td>
<td>34 (20.2%)</td>
<td>14 (8.3%)</td>
<td>120 (71.4%)</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This question was answered only by respondents who had participated in a completed UN/national peacekeeping mission.
Annex II: Civilian Peacekeeping Training Institutes:
Contact Addresses

The Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution
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Austria

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Fax: (43.335) 526.62
E-mail: ipt@aspr.ac.at

The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre
Contact Address: The Registrar
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
Cornwallis Park
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Clementsport, Nova Scotia
B0S 1E0
Canada

Tel: (1.902) 638.8611
Fax: (1.902) 638.8888
E-mail: registrar@pc.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca
The Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento S. Anna

Contact Address: The Civilian Personnel of Peace-keeping Humanitarian Operations and Election Monitoring Missions
Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento S. Anna, via Carducci, 40
56127 Pisa
Italy

Tel: (39.50) 88.33.12
Fax: (39.50) 88.32.10
E-mail: pkocorso@sssup1.ssup.it
Annex III: Practitioners’ Questionnaire

UNIDIR’s Project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution
The Disarming of Warring Parties as an Integral Part of Conflict Settlement

PRACTITIONERS’ QUESTIONNAIRE ON Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization During Peacekeeping Operations

UNIDIR
Palais des Nations
CH-1211 Geneva 10
Tel. (41.22) 917.12.34
Fax (41.22) 917.01.76
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Introduction

The post-Cold War world is characterized by an upsurge in violent intra-State, rather than inter-State, conflict; and by the availability and use of light weapons in such conflicts. To deal directly with these issues and with the humanitarian needs which emerge as a consequence, States have increasingly resorted to collective security actions, mostly within the UN framework. As a result, UN operations have multiplied in number, complexity and comprehensiveness.

The combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of light weapons, however, is threatening the effectiveness of these operations. This combination also poses new challenges to the international community. In this context, disarmament has become an important element of global stability. Perhaps more than ever before, disarmament has the capacity to influence far-reaching events in national and international activities. In this light, disarmament has proven to be an important component for the settlement of conflicts, a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and deflation of conflict, and a critical component of the reconstruction process in post-conflict societies.

For these reasons, the need for more substantial research into the problems of disarmament, and more particularly “micro-disarmament”, is now pressing. In the words of the UN Secretary-General, the international community should concentrate on “practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands”.¹

In order to better understand the dynamics and linkages between disarmament and the settlement of disputes, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has initiated a two-year research project entitled Disarmament and Conflict Resolution. This Questionnaire is the first part of this project.

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is an independent research institute within the framework of the United Nations. UNIDIR conducts applied research in three fields of study: arms control and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional confidence-building measures; and disarmament and conflict resolution processes.

The Project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution focuses on the problems associated with disarming warring parties during peacekeeping operations. The Project has divided its work into four phases. These are as follows: development, distribution and interpretation of a Practitioners’ Questionnaire on weapons control, disarmament and demobilization during peacekeeping operations; production of case studies in which disarmament tasks were important aspects of wider peacekeeping operations; a series of workshops; and publication of a number of policy papers on substantive issues related to the linkages between disarmament during peacekeeping operations and the settlement of conflict. Each Project phase is designed to assist in the development of subsequent phases.

The Project analyses UN peacekeeping operations as well as other national/regional efforts at disarmament and peacekeeping. Thus, the case studies under research are: UNPROFOR (former Yugoslavia), UNOSOM (Somalia), UNAVEM (Angola), UNTAC (Cambodia), ONUSAL (El Salvador), ONUCA (Central America), UNTAG (Namibia), as well as the 1994 US operation in Haiti and the 1979 Commonwealth Ceasefire Monitoring Force in Rhodesia.

Due to the variety of case studies to be analyzed, the Practitioners’ Questionnaire is constructed in a manner that permits input from a wide variety of sources and experiences. This means that specific phrasing and/or references have to be limited. Instead of more technical and specific terms, we have chosen a more general format. For this reason, it is imperative that those completing the questionnaire look at the glossary provided as guidance.

Although the Questionnaire will be distributed primarily to military peacekeepers, it will also be answered by various senior civil officials from international organizations and governments. For this reason, when filling out the Questionnaire, the recipient should skip those questions that do not relate directly to his/her experience.
The Practitioners’ Questionnaire is a very important part of UNIDIR’s Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project. It will be a primary source of information on field experiences involving the control of weapons, disarmament, demining, and demobilization tasks which often accompany national/multinational peacekeeping processes. UNIDIR hopes to glean both quantitative and qualitative information which will be interpreted by civilian and military researchers during the course of 1995. Access to this information will be crucial to the development of the case study and policy analysis papers to be published in the final phases of the Project.

The ultimate objective of the Project is to look into the seldom-researched issue of disarmament operations as undertaken by multinational peacekeeping forces. By looking in depth at this issue, the Project hopes to identify ways in which to improve the implementation of disarmament, as well as to draw attention to the linkages that exist between the disarmament process and national/regional stability.

By accepting to fill out this Questionnaire, you are directly contributing to the successful completion of our efforts.
GLOSSARY

Note: The definitions given below are not official definitions used by any one country or service, but rather terms and concepts as used for the purpose of this Questionnaire.

------------------------

DISARMAMENT Understood here as a component of a multilateral or national peacekeeping operation which can include one or more of the following measures: control of weapons (such as dual-key arrangements, weapons exclusion zones, weapons withdrawal/storage, no-fly zones, etc.); disarmament (such as weapon destruction, arms embargoes, cash/land for weapons activities, demining, disarming of irregular units and/or individuals, etc.); and demobilization (such as disbanding of combat units and reintegration—see definition below).

PEACE AGREEMENT Agreement between warring parties which involves the start of a negotiated process with the objective of finding a long-term solution to an ongoing dispute.

MANDATE Task and authority given to a multinational or national peacekeeping force by a political authority. A mandate is a legal concept which translates into mission orders, tasks, etc.

MISSION Task given by a political authority to implement the mandate. The mission clearly indicates actions to be taken by peacekeeping forces/units in order to achieve mandate objectives.

FORCE COMPOSITION Refers to the type of the units forming a peacekeeping force. It also refers to nationalities and types if applied to a UN peacekeeping force (i.e.: Belgian engineer company).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>FORCE STRUCTURE</strong></th>
<th>The table of organization and equipment (TO&amp;E) of a peacekeeping force including organic and attached elements. It can refer to a standing force or to a force composed for a specific mission.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES</strong></td>
<td>Measures taken with the purpose of protecting a peacekeeping force by establishing and maintaining a safe environment for its operations. This does not include measures taken with the purpose to facilitate the overall accomplishment of a peacekeeping mission or measures to protect civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FORCE MULTIPLIERS</strong></td>
<td>Capabilities that boost the overall effectiveness and optimal allocation of resources of a force or of a part of a force for the accomplishment of its mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RULES OF ENGAGEMENT</strong></td>
<td>Directives issued by the competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations bearing upon military units for the execution of their mission (i.e. when and how to use military assets).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COERCIVE DISARMAMENT</strong></td>
<td>Disarmament operations executed with no prior agreement or consent between the warring parties. This definition does not necessarily imply straightforward military intervention but rather the disarming of individuals, bandits, and renegade armed units operating within the confines of a peacekeeping operation. Coercive disarmament might also emerge as a result of changes and/or reversals in the terms of the original circumstances, agreements or mandates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEMOBILIZATION</strong></td>
<td>Activities aimed at dissolving regular or irregular combat units; such activities can include national reintegration processes (see below: Reintegration).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REVERSIBLE DISARMAMENT PROCESSES
Disarmament mission aimed at controlling weapons only temporarily (i.e. weapons stored by the peacekeeping force but accessible to the parties until a final settlement is reached).

NATIONAL REINTEGRATION PROCESSES
The reintegration of regular and irregular units of the different warring sides into national forces (military, police, etc.).

VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES
Technical means used in the verification of the compliance with the provisions of an agreement; can include airborne or space-based systems.

TECHNICAL PREPARATION FOR A DISARMAMENT MISSION
Refers to the training received in the use of military equipment relevant for the implementation of the disarmament component of a peacekeeping mission.

TACTICAL PREPARATION FOR A DISARMAMENT MISSION
Refers to the training received to make best use of both material and personnel assets in the field.
Instructions on How to Complete the Questionnaire

No personal names will be used or mentioned when processing the information supplied in this questionnaire.

If the questionnaire asks you to state issues which are irrelevant to your experience, skip the item number and/or page.

Read the WHOLE questionnaire before attempting to answer each section. This will give you a better idea of the information that is needed.

The questionnaire has two types of questions: those that can be answered by marking the appropriate box; and those that ask for a more qualified opinion. In the latter case, please make sure you answer as clearly and briefly as possible.

Sometimes you will be required to provide three reasons, priorities or items of information as part of your qualified answer. In these cases, provide what is requested by order of importance, according to your experience. If you believe there is only one reason/issue/item instead of three, write the one that you consider as important in that section.

Should you have disarmament experiences in more than one peacekeeping mission, choose the one that is more relevant to the case studies mentioned above. If you have relevant experience in two of these cases, we would be grateful if you could fill out two questionnaires: one for each mission (you may xerox the original if you lack a second copy). If this is not possible, then please complete the questionnaire with the mission experience you think most relevant to the objectives of UNIDIR.

When you finish answering the questionnaire please return it to the appropriate person/organization that submitted it to you in the first place. OR send it directly to:

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution
Room A-218, Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland
Tel. (41.22) 917.16.03/12.93
Fax (41.22) 917.01.76
IDENTIFICATION PAGE:

About the UN/National Operation:

a) Title and location of the UN/national peacekeeping/peace-enforcing operation you participated in:

   Operation Title: ____________________________________________

   Location of Operation: _______________________________________

b) The time frame of your involvement in the mission:

   From ___________________   To ___________________

About Yourself:

c) At the time, were you a:

   (    ) Civilian UN personnel  (    ) Chief
   (    ) Other

   (    ) Humanitarian Relief operator and/or
   Non-governmental organization person

   (    ) National official

   (    ) Military officer  (    ) Commander
   (    ) Other

   (    ) Infantry

   (    ) Armour

   (    ) Artillery

   (    ) Engineer

   (    ) Medical

   (    ) Aviation

   (    ) Transportation

   (    ) Logistics

   (    ) Headquarters/staff

   (    ) Military police

   (    ) Military observer
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil components</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil affairs</td>
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<td>Staff HQ’s</td>
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<td>Representative</td>
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<td>Relief coordinator</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>Relief</td>
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<td>Volunteers</td>
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<td>Other:______________________________________</td>
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<td>Other:______________________________________</td>
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<td>Other:______________________________________</td>
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<td>e) Please indicate all activities listed in which you and your organization participated on a regular basis:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Convoy operations</td>
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<td>Convoy security</td>
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<td>Base security</td>
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<td>Patrolling</td>
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<td>Search operations</td>
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<td>Checkpoint operations</td>
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<td>Cease-fire monitoring</td>
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<td>Cease-fire violations investigations</td>
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<td>Weapons inspections</td>
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<td>Weapons inventories</td>
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<td>Weapons collection—voluntary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weapons collection—involuntary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weapons elimination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cantonment construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cantonment security</td>
<td>(      )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disarmament verification</td>
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<td>Information collection</td>
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<td>Police operations (military policemen)</td>
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<td>Special operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian relief (distribution of emergency provisions to local populations)</td>
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<td>Other:______________________________________</td>
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<td>Other:______________________________________</td>
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</table>

**SECTION ONE**
I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT:

Q1.1 Was there a disarmament component in the original peace agreement and/or relevant UN Security Council Resolution? (Yes or No.) (If no, go to Section II.)

Q1.2 If yes, was the disarmament component a central feature of the agreement? (Yes or No.)

Q1.3 Describe the desired outcome of the disarmament component vis-à-vis the peace agreement.

Q1.4 Was there a timetable planned for implementation? (Yes or No.)

Q1.5 If so, did it go as planned? (Yes or No.)

Q1.6 If not, why? Give three reasons.

Q1.7 If there were delays in the implementation, summarize their impact on the disarmament process.

Q1.8 Did the existing agreements hinder you at any time from conducting disarmament measures? (Yes or No.)

Q1.9 If so, mention some of the ways in which you felt hindered.

II. MANDATE:

Q2.1 At the start of your mission, were you informed of the part of the mandate regarding disarmament? (Yes or No.)

Q2.2 How was the disarmament component expressed in your mission mandate? (Summarize.)

Q2.3 How did you interpret the mandate you received?

Q2.4 Did the way the disarmament component was expressed hinder or assist your disarming task?
Q2.5 If it was a hindrance, how would you have preferred your mandate to read?

Q2.6 Were your actions/freedom of action during disarmament operations influenced by external factors other than the mandate? (Yes or No.)

Q2.7 If so, which ones?

III. **SUBSIDIARY DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS:**

Q3.1 Did the warring factions enter into a separate disarmament agreement? (Yes or No.) (If no, go to question 4.)

Q3.2 If so, describe the agreement.

Q3.3 Was the agreement formulated with the mandate in mind or independent of the mandate?

Q3.4 Were there any contradictions between the mandate and the agreement? (Yes or No.)

Q3.5 If so, which ones?

Q3.6 What was the impact of the agreement on the mandate?

IV. **TOP-DOWN CHANGES; CONSISTENCY OF THE MANDATE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DISARMAMENT COMPONENT:**

Q4.1 Did the mandate change while you were engaged in the UN/national operation? (Yes or No.) (If not, go to question 5.)

Q4.2 If so, what was(were) the change(s)? (Describe the most important aspects.)

Q4.3 Did this (these) change(s) affect your disarmament operations?
Q4.4 If so, how? (Name the three most important effects.)

Q4.5 If disarmament was affected, was it still possible for you to implement disarmament measures as first envisaged? (Yes or No.)

Q4.6 In the context of 4.5, did you have to change or abandon procedures?

Q4.7 If you changed procedures, what were the changes? (Mention the three most important ones.)

Q4.8 Were you adequately informed of changes when and as they occurred? (Yes or No.)

Q4.9 Were you able to implement alternative measures immediately? (Yes or No.)

Q4.10 If not, why? (Give the three most salient points.)

V. BOTTOM-UP CHANGES: DISPUTES AMONG THE WARRING PARTIES ARISING DURING THE MISSION:

Q5.1 Was there a mechanism or a provision for the settlement of disputes if and when these emerged? (Yes or No.)

Q5.2 If so, what type of mechanism/provision did you have (i.e. mission, special agreement, the UN process, special commission, etc.)?

Q5.3 What kind of regulations were agreed between the parties and the peacekeepers for the collection of arms?

Q5.4 What kind of negotiations/regulations were agreed at the top and lower levels with respect to the storage of arms?

Q5.5 Was there a conflict between these new agreements and the original agreement and/or mandate? (Yes or No.)
VI. PROTECTION OF THE POPULATION DURING THE MISSION:

Q6.1. Did you consider the protection of the population when negotiating disarmament clauses with the warring parties? (Yes or No.)

Q6.2. Was the protection of the population a part of your mission? (Yes or No.)

Q6.3 If so, did you have the means to do so? (Yes or No.)

Q6.4 What were the three most important means at your disposal to achieve this objective?

SECTION TWO

VII. FORCE COMPOSITION AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Q7.1 Was the force composition for your mission area unilateral or multilateral?

Q7.2 Describe the three most important advantages in acting in the manner described in 7.1.

Q7.3 Describe the three most important disadvantages in acting in the manner described in 7.1.

Q7.4 If you worked in a multilateral context: how important was consensus (with peacekeepers from other countries) for the achievement of disarmament and demobilization components during the operation?

Q7.5 Was adequate consideration given to the disarmament component as the mission evolved?

Q7.6 If it was inadequate, explain how this affected your mission (mention the three most important issues).
Q7.7 Did the force composition identify a specific structure to support the disarmament component of the mandate? (Yes or No.)

Q7.8 If so, what was it?

Q7.9 Did the force composition allow for verification and monitoring measures for the control of weapons and disarmament? (Yes or No.)

Q7.10 If so, what were they?

Q7.11 Was the chosen force structure appropriate for executing the mission? (Yes or No.)

Q7.12 Were the units efficient for the mission given? (Yes or No.)

Q7.13 Were the units appropriate for conducting the disarmament operations? (Yes or No.)

Q7.14 Were your units augmented with specific personnel and equipment for the disarmament mission? (Yes or No.)

Q7.15 If so, what additional capabilities did they provide? (List the five most important ones.)

Q7.16 If you were a commander, were you briefed by HQ’s prior to your disarming mission and before your arrival in the area of operations? (Yes or No.)

Q7.17 Did the security situation in the mission area allow for weapons control and disarmament operations? (Yes or No.)

Q7.18 If not, what steps were required in order to establish and maintain a secure environment?

Q7.19 Did these force protection measures affect the accomplishment of the disarmament operations positively or negatively?

Q7.20 Elaborate on the impact mentioned in 7.19 above.
Q7.21 Were command and control/operational procedures adequate for your task? (Yes or No.)

Q7.22 If not, mention three examples which demonstrate their inadequacy.

Q7.23 Summarize your salient experiences with command and control/operational procedures while on this mission.

Q7.24 What additional support (special capabilities/force multipliers) did you receive which helped the disarmament mission? List the three most important ones.

Q7.25 Were they adequate? (Yes or No.)

Q7.26 If not, what other capabilities would you have needed to make your mission more effective? (List the most relevant.)

VIII. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES/RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Q8.1 Did you abide by national or UN rules of engagement/operational procedures during the pursuit of your mission?

Q8.2 Were these rules/procedures adequate for the performance of your task? (Yes or No.)

Q8.3 If not, what other rules should you have had?

Q8.4 If and when the situation changed, were your rules altered accordingly? (Yes or No.)

Q8.5 If so, summarize the relevant changes.

IX. COERCIVE DISARMAMENT AND PREVENTIVE DISARMAMENT
Q9.1 Did you have to use force (coercive disarmament) to achieve the mission as mandated? (Yes or No.)

Q9.2 Judging from your experience, is it possible to use coercive disarmament in these types of operations? (Yes or No.)

Q9.3 Do you believe that force can and should be used to enforce the disarmament components of an agreement? (Can: Yes or No.) (Should: Yes or No.)

Q9.4 Mention three reasons why force can/cannot and should/should not be used to enforce the disarmament component of an agreement.

Q9.5 If fighting was an ongoing process, was it possible for you to continue with your disarmament tasks? (Yes or No.)

Q9.6 If so, describe how it was possible to continue with your disarmament tasks.

Q9.7 Were you involved in any preventive deployment operations (i.e. as an observer, preventive diplomacy official, etc.)? (Yes or No.)

Q9.8 If so, was disarmament a major concern of this deployment? (Yes or No.)

Q9.9 If so, were there already arms control agreements (i.e. registers of conventional weapons, MTCR, etc.) in place within the country where you were operating? (Yes or No.)

SECTION THREE

X. INFORMATION: COLLECTION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AND THE MEDIA
Q10.1 Did you receive sufficient relevant information prior to and during your disarming mission? (Prior: Yes or No.) (During: Yes or No.)

Q10.2 Was information always available and reliable? (Yes or No.)

Q10.3 How did you receive/obtain your information prior to and during the mission? (Describe the three most important ways.)

Q10.4 Was there a structured information exchange between HQ’s and the units in the field? (Yes or No.)

Q10.5 And between the various field commanders? (Yes or No.)

Q10.6 Did you use sensor mechanisms for verification/information purposes? (Yes or No.)

Q10.7 If so, list which ones and for what purpose. (Mention not more than three.)

Q10.7.1 Was the use of on-site and remote sensing an adequate tool for verifying and monitoring weapons control and disarmament operations? (Yes or No.)

Q10.7.2 In your opinion, could sensor systems (acoustic, radar, photo, video, infrared, etc.) play a useful role in monitoring the weapons control and disarmament aspects of a peacekeeping operation? (Yes or No.)

Q10.7.3 If so, give some examples of phases of the peacekeeping process in which such sensors could be used.

Q10.7.4 What would you suggest about the possible organizational setup of the use of such sensor systems (i.e. UN, regional organization, national, etc.)?

Q10.8 Do you think that normal information collection assets (i.e. intelligence) could and should be used for peacekeeping and disarming purposes? (Yes or No.)
Q10.9 Why? (List three reasons.)

Q10.10 Is there a need for satellite surveillance in peacekeeping/peace enforcing operations? (Yes or No.)

Q10.11 Did you use the local population for information collection purposes? (Yes or No.)

Q10.12 Did you implement any transparency measures to create mutual confidence between warring parties? (Yes or No.)

Q10.13 If so, did you act as an intermediary? (Yes or No.)

Q10.14 Was public affairs/media essential to the disarming mission? (Yes or No.)

Q10.15 Were communication and public relations efforts of importance during your mission? (Yes or No.)

Q10.16 If so, give three reasons why this was so.

Q10.17 Was there a well-funded and planned communications effort to support and explain your activities and mission to the local population? (Yes or No.)

Q10.18 If not, should there have been one? (Yes or No.)

Q10.19 Did media attention at any time hamper or benefit your disarming efforts?

Q10.20 Summarize your experience with the media.

Q10.21 Was there sufficient briefing to the general public in the conflict area on the disarming process? (Yes or No.)

Q10.22 If so, who organized this and who carried it out?
Q10.23 Was there cooperation with the local media in explaining the steps of disarmament you were carrying out? (Yes or No.)

Q10.24 Were leaflets distributed? (Yes or No.)

SECTION FOUR

XI. EXPERIENCES IN THE CONTROL OF WEAPONS AND IN DISARMAMENT DURING YOUR MISSION:

Q11.1 Describe, by order of importance, your specific tasks, if any, in weapons control and disarmament during this mission.

Q11.2 Did the security situation in the mission area allow for arms control and disarmament operations? (Yes or No.)

Q11.3 If not, what steps were required to establish and maintain a secure environment?

Q11.4 Do you think your weapons control and disarming tasks could have been handled more efficiently? (Yes or No.)

Q11.5 If so, mention three ways in which your task could have been improved.

Q11.6 Were opportunities missed to take advantage of or implement weapons control and disarmament measures?

Q11.7 If opportunities were missed, mention the main reasons why this happened.

Q11.8 Did you find the national diversity of contributed troops a problem for command and control during disarmament operations? (Yes or No.)

Q11.9 If so, mention the three problems you considered most challenging.
Q11.10 Was the disarmament process reversible (i.e. were there instances where devolution was foreseen or requested)? (Yes or No.)

Q11.11 If so, were there provisions to this effect in the mandate, mission or agreement? (Yes or No.)

Q11.12 Which types of weapons were in use, and by whom (e.g. your own unit(s), warring parties, individuals, irregular units, national officials, etc.)? (If applicable, list the five principal ones for each category.)

Q11.13 Were you given priorities as to the type of weapons you should disarm first? (Yes or No.)

Q11.14 If so, how were priorities assigned (i.e. on what basis)? (List three reasons.)

Q11.15 At the beginning of your mission, were you able to have sufficient information on military capabilities in regard to numbers and quality of equipment used by warring parties? (Yes or No.)

Q11.16 Did you have the impression that there were caches of weapons in your sector or adjoining sectors? (Yes or No.)

Q11.17 Were illicit weapons a problem for you (illicit as in: not in your inventories)? (Yes or No.)

Q11.18 Was there evidence in your sector that the warring parties continued to have access to weapons through external channels of supply? (Yes or No.)

Q11.19 Could you control external channels of weapons supply in your sector? (Yes or No.)

Q11.20 How important was the control of external channels of supply for the success of the mission? (Very important, Important or Not important.)
Q11.21 In your experience, do weapons continue to flow during the conflict even after sanctions, inspections, and checks have been applied? (Yes or No.)

Q11.22 Were there any security zones established? (Yes or No.)

Q11.23 If so, were you able to control your sector effectively? (Yes or No.)

Q11.24 Depending on your answer under 11.23, elaborate on how you were able to control the sector or on why you were unable to control it.

Q11.25 Were you involved in any monitoring of arms embargoes/sanctions? (Yes or No.)

Q11.26 What was your experience in this respect?

Q11.27 Were any weapons collected for cash or land during your mission? (Yes or No.)

Q11.28 If so, comment on the effectiveness of this incentive.

Q11.29 Were national police involved in the collection of arms? (Yes or No.)

Q11.30 Were other organizations involved in the collection of arms? (Yes or No.)

Q11.31 If so, which ones?

Q11.32 If involved in Chapter VI operations (peacekeeping), were military observers used in the collection of arms? (Yes or No.)

Q11.33 If so, what type of military observer was used (i.e. UN, regional, other organization, etc.)?
Q11.34 Answer if applicable: was there satisfactory coordination between military observers and yourself as unit commander/chief of operation? (Yes or No.)

Q11.35 Were the warring factions themselves involved in the collection of arms? (Yes or No.)

Q11.36 Did you use opposite party liaison officers so that all factions were represented in the collection of arms and the disarming process? (Yes or No).

Q11.37 If so, reflect upon your experiences in this issue.

Q11.38 With regard to the UN/national mission you participated in, do you believe arms can be effectively collected? (Yes or No.)

Q11.39 Were you involved in the disarming of individuals, private and irregular units, and/or bandits? (Yes or No.)

Q11.40 Were the UN police involved in these tasks? (Yes or No.)

Q11.41 Were local authorities involved in disarming individuals? (Yes or No.)

Q11.42 If so, what was their role?

Q11.43 Were there regulations in the mandate or peace agreement with respect to how to deal with private and irregular units? (Yes or No.)

Q11.44 If not, do you think your task would have improved if there had been such an accord? (Yes or No.)

Q11.45 Did you experience problems with snipers? (Yes or No.)

Q11.46 If so, how did you counter this?
SECTION FIVE

XII. DEMOBILIZATION EXPERIENCES

Q12.1 Did the disarmament component of your mission include or infer demobilization? (Yes or No.)

Q12.2 If so, what types of demobilization operations were conducted during this UN/national operation (i.e. cease-fire monitoring, weapons cantonment, etc.)?

Q12.3 Was the demobilization process accompanied by a national reintegration process involving government forces and opposing forces? (Yes or No.)

Q12.4 If so, were sufficient means available for an effective reintegration process? (Yes or No.)

Q12.5 If not, elaborate on the problems you experienced with this task.

Q12.6 Which organizations assisted you in demobilizing (i.e. other services, international organizations, national organizations, or non-governmental organizations)? List by order starting with most assistance to least assistance.

Q12.7 Was there a person or a branch responsible for plans for demobilization? (Yes or No.)

Q12.8 If so, who or which branch was it?

XIII. DEMINING EXPERIENCES

Q13.1 Did you experience mine problems? (Yes or No.)

Q13.2 If so, what did you do to counteract them?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q13.3</th>
<th>Was there an exchange of maps of minefields at the outset when the agreements were signed? (Yes or No.)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q13.4</td>
<td>If not, was it feasible to have such maps? (Yes or No.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13.5</td>
<td>If so, do you think there should have been an agreement for the exchange of maps at the outset as part of the agreements signed? (Yes or No.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13.6</td>
<td>If no maps were available and it was not feasible to chart the location of minefields, did you consider yourself adequately prepared to deal with the demining of haphazard minefields? (Yes or No.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q13.7</td>
<td>Did your unit play a role in the demining process? (Yes or No.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q13.8</td>
<td>Was the UN involved in demining? (Yes or No.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13.9</td>
<td>Was the UN interested in becoming involved in demining? (Yes or No.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13.10</td>
<td>Was the host nation involved in demining or interested in becoming involved in demining? (Yes or No.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13.11</td>
<td>Were local groups/militias involved in demining? (Yes or No.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13.12</td>
<td>Do you think local groups and militias should be encouraged to undertake demining tasks? (Yes or No.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13.13</td>
<td>Why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13.14</td>
<td>Were humanitarian organizations or private firms involved in demining? (Humanitarian organizations: Yes or No.) (Private firms: Yes or No.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13.15</td>
<td>In your opinion, who should undertake demining processes and why?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION SIX

XIV. TRAINING

Q14.1 Prior to deployment, did your units undertake specific training programs related to disarmament operations? (Yes or No.)

Q14.2 If so, were these training programs based on guidance from the UN forces already in the field, from the UN in general, or from your national authorities?

Q14.3 Were your units trained specifically for the collection of arms and cantonment of factions? (Yes or No.)

Q14.4 Were you and/or your units trained in on-site inspection and observation techniques? (Yes or No.)

Q14.5 Have you been trained in verification technologies nationally? (Yes or No.)

Q14.6 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific weapons control and disarmament operations (i.e. weapons searches, inventories, elimination, etc.)? (Yes or No.)

Q14.7 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific demobilization operations? (Yes or No.)

Q14.8 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific demining operations? (Yes or No.)

Q14.9 On the whole, did you consider yourself technically and tactically prepared for the accomplishment of your mission? (Technically: Yes or No.) (Tactically: Yes or No.)

Q14.10 Was there anything done at the end of the mission to gather lessons learned? (Yes or No.)

Q14.11 Back in your own country, were you debriefed? (Yes or No.)
SECTION SEVEN

XV. INTERACTIONS

Given that there are three common elements to a UN mission—the military, the humanitarian agencies, and the political branch:

Q15.1 Would you consider the relationship between humanitarian elements/organizations and the military personnel during the mission to have been very good, adequate, or inadequate?

Q15.2 If you think it could have been improved, specify three ways in which this could have been achieved.

Q15.3 How was the overall cooperation of the three elements of the UN components achieved during your mission? Summarize.

Q15.4 Did cooperation exist between the UN military, private and irregular elements, and existing police forces (UN or local)? (Yes or No.)

Q15.5 If so, describe which components cooperated with whom and the level of their cooperation.

XVI. PERSONAL REFLECTIONS

On reflection,

Q16.1 What was the overall importance of the disarmament task for the overall success of the mission? (Very important, Important or Not Important.)

Q16.2 What were the three major lessons you learned from your field experience?
Q16.3 What other question should we have asked here and how would you have answered it?

To be answered only by those who participated in completed UN/national peacekeeping missions:

Q16.4 Do you think that the disarmament-related tasks which you undertook had an impact on the national reconstruction processes which followed the end of the mission? (Yes or No.)

Q16.5 If so, briefly explain how and why.
UNIDIR Workshop on the Training of Peacekeepers in Disarmament Operations

The Training of Peacekeepers in Disarmament Operations

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), in the context of its ongoing DISARMAMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROJECT (DCR Project), has concluded its workshop on The Training of Peacekeepers in Disarmament Operations. Co-sponsored by UNIDIR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Malta, the Foundation for International Studies of Malta, the Republic of South Africa and the Ploughshares Fund, this Workshop was held in the city of Valetta from 16 to 19 October 1995. The international orientation and sensitivities of Malta, with its important geographical and intellectual position between Europe, the Middle East and Africa, allowed for frank and positive discussion.

The workshop was organized in cooperation with the Training Unit at the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. Workshop participants included officers, trainers and practitioners from 19 peacekeeping academies or training facilities, four UN agencies with peacekeeping and disarmament responsibilities, and several other humanitarian relief agencies and other international organizations. During the week’s meeting of five sessions, a number of presentations were heard and issues discussed, including:

- Introduction and Welcome

  S. LODGAARD, Director, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland
  P. LEENTJES, Colonel, Chief, Training Unit, Department of Peace-keeping Operations, United Nations, New York, USA
  S. BUSUTTIL, Director-General, Foundation for International Studies, University of Malta, Valetta, Malta
  V. CAMILLERI, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malta

First Session
• Comparing the Way in which Existing Peacekeeping Training Academies Prepare their Officers for Disarmament and Peacekeeping Duties

F. ISTURIZ, Lieutenant Colonel, Director, Argentine Peacekeeping Academy (CAECOPAZ), Buenos Aires, Argentina

L. BUJOLD, Colonel, Director-General, Reserves and Cadets, Canadian Armed Forces, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada

M. PANTLITSCHKO, Colonel, Assistant Director, Department for International Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Vienna Austria

A. TUREK, Lieutenant Colonel, Director, UN Department, Foreign Relations Directorate, Ministry of Defence, Prague, Czech Republic

P. HANNUKKALA, Lieutenant Colonel, UN Training Centre, Niinisalo, Finland

P. KÖRSTROM, Lieutenant Colonel, Chief Officer, Training Section, Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT), Södertälje, Sweden

T. LOESETE, Colonel, HQ Norwegian Armed Forces, Chief of Defence, Oslo Mil-Huseby, Norway

O. MACDONALD, Lieutenant Colonel, Executive Officer, UN Training School (UNTSI), The Military College, Co. Kildare, Ireland

H. NOORDHOOEK, Lieutenant Colonel, Commander, Netherlands Centre for Peacekeeping Operations, Ossendrecht, Netherlands

R. RATAJCZAK, Lieutenant Colonel, Chief Specialist Department of International Security, Ministry of Defence, Warsaw, Poland

G. WILLIAMS, Lieutenant Colonel, Staff Officer Operations, Land Forces Command, New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, New Zealand

K. FARRIS, Colonel, Director, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks (PA), USA

X. GUÉRIN, Lieutenant Colonel, Operations and Doctrine, Chief of Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence, France

A. MALLINSON, Colonel, Special Project, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Development and Doctrine, Wiltshire, UK

A. LI GOBBI, Lieutenant Colonel, Chief of Section, Military Policy and Doctrine Office, Italian Army General Staff, Stato Maggiore Esercito, Rome, Italy

C. GAFFIERO, Commander, Armed Forces of Malta

Second Session
• Training to Meet New Challenges for the International Community: Disarmament Needs of Peace Operations

D. Fraser, Political Affairs Officer, Centre for Disarmament Affairs (CDA), UN, New York, USA
J. Potgieter, Lieutenant Colonel, Military Expert, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland
I. Tiithonen, Lieutenant Colonel, Military Expert, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland
V. Gamba, DCR Project Director, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland
N. Azimi, Deputy to the Executive Director, UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), Geneva, Switzerland
L. Geiger, Major-General, Adviser to the Armed Forces, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Switzerland
P. Leentjes, Colonel, Chief, Training Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York, USA

Third Session

• Peacekeeping and Disarmament Operations in Southern Africa

C. Gumbo, Brigadier, Commander of Defence Forces, Secretary for Defence, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Harare, Zimbabwe
A. Saayman, Colonel, Senior Staff Officer Area Defence, Directorate of Operations, South Africa Defence Force (SANDF), Pretoria, Republic of South Africa
K. Modise, Staff Officer Air Force, Botswana Defence Force Headquarters, Gaborone, Botswana
W. Nhara, Coordinator, Conflict Prevention and Research, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

• Disarmament Issues in the African Region

D. Fraser, Political Affairs Officer, Centre for Disarmament Affairs (CDA), UN, New York, USA
M. Badr, Ambassador, Deputy Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Cairo Centre for Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo, Egypt
• **Practical Application of Disarmament Training in Africa as per the UNIDIR DCR Project**

J. POTGIETER, Lieutenant Colonel, Military Expert, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland  
I. TIIHONEN, Lieutenant Colonel, Military Expert, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland  
V. GAMBA, DCR Project Director, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland

**Fourth Session**

• **How to Make the Training of Peacekeepers More Compatible with the Missions and Needs as Reflected in the Practical Case Study**

R. MONTANARO, Colonel, Deputy Commander, Armed Forces of Malta  
N. AZIMI, Deputy to the Executive Director, UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), Geneva, Switzerland  
L. GEIGER, Major-General, Adviser to the Armed Forces, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Switzerland  
P. LEENTJES, Colonel, Chief, Training Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York, USA

• **Conclusions and Recommendations on Disarmament Training for Peacekeepers**

S. GUDGEON, Deputy Director-General, Multinational Force and Observers, Sinai Monitoring Force, Rome, Italy  
P. LEENTJES, Colonel, Chief, Training Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York, USA  
I. TIIHONEN, Lieutenant Colonel, Military Expert, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland
Fifth Session

- **Recommendations for Cooperative Disarmament Procedures and Training for Nations in the Southern Africa Region**

K. MODISE, Staff Officer Air Force, Botswana Defence Force Headquarters, Gaborone, Botswana

J. CILLIERS, Director, Institute for Defence Policy, Johannesburg, South Africa

Comments and discussion during the workshop eventually led to several broad lines of reasoning. For example, it became evident that current training for peace operations also applies to demobilization, arms control and disarmament of warring factions. However, more specific training is needed for application of particular arms control techniques.

The workshop identified a range of arms control methods, including a number of incentive schemes for voluntary hand-over of arms. Since no two cases are alike, general conclusions are difficult to draw. Rather, the aim should be an annotated repertory of techniques from which the organizers of new operations may draw when designing new missions. Participants encouraged UNIDIR to enlarge and elaborate on the preliminary list of disarmament methods derived from its DCR Project, which could be included in peacekeeping training packages.

Demobilization and disarmament must be closely coordinated with humanitarian assistance and other parts of the broader peace operation. The challenge is to design and connect these activities so that they become mutually supportive. In many countries, humanitarian assistance has always been an important element in the training of peacekeepers.

The workshop culminated in several **conclusions** and recommendations, the most important of which include:

- The need to improve the study, understanding, and training for disarmament actions during international peace operations.
- The importance of achieving better interactions and information flows between governmental, non-governmental, and international agencies involved in peace operations.
- The need to support regional training efforts in Southern Africa for peacekeeping and arms control in the region.
• The need to understand the links between peace processes, development, internal conflict and the proliferation of light weapons in certain regions of the world, particularly sub-Saharan Africa. There is a major requirement for the control and elimination of the overflow of weapons in Africa.

Recommendations:

1) To hold a follow-up conference in the spirit of the Malta Conference during 1996;
2) To generate and improve the flow of information and exchange to assist international peacekeeping academies and centers to standardize their programs and to be sensitive to each others’ needs and requirements;
3) To encourage the DPKO to improve the validation of international peacekeeping training programs;
4) To provide support to new generations of peacekeeping academies;
5) To improve and standardize the use of technologies for monitoring and verification of disarmament agreements and peace processes;
6) To keep peacekeeping academies and interested agencies informed of parallel efforts and meetings, amongst which participants mentioned the following initiatives:
   a) the Swedish Peacekeeping Courses Series, hosted by the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre;
   b) two regional meetings on peacekeeping training in Africa and India, held by the DPKO during 1996;
   c) the seminar on the OAU in peacekeeping, to be hosted by the OAU in December 1995 in Addis Ababa;
   e) UNITAR’s workshop on civilian police and peacekeeping;
   f) the yearly courses held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom;
   g) the UN Military Observer Courses running throughout 1996, hosted by the UN Training Centre, Niinisalo, Finland.
7) To disseminate the results of the DCR Project to a wide audience of governments, institutes and individuals worldwide;
8) To enlarge on the DCR Project’s list of disarmament training techniques and to offer this to Member States for national consideration.
Biographical Notes

**Barbara Carrai** is the Executive Director of the Civilian Personnel of Peacekeeping/Humanitarian Operations and Election Monitoring Missions training program at the Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento S. Anna, Pisa, Italy. Between 1994 and 1996, she also served as an elections observer for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe, and for the European Union in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mozambique, respectively. From October 1995 to January 1996, she was a UNIDIR research assistant for the Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR) project.

**Virginia Gamba** is Head of the Small Arms Programme at the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa. Previously she was Director of the Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR) project at UNIDIR, lecturer at the Department of War Studies in King’s College, London, and program officer on Arms Control, Disarmament and Demobilization for the MacArthur Foundation in Chicago.

**Jakkie Potgieter** is senior field researcher and analyst for the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa. His areas of expertise are peacekeeping and multi-functional peace support operations, sub-equatorial African defense and security concerns, conflict-mapping, disarmament and problems associated with light weapons control throughout the region. Previously, he served as a military expert at UNIDIR working for the Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR) project on the Managing Arms in Peace Processes monograph series, and formerly he served as an artillery officer.

**Claudia Querner** is an “Expert-en-Formation” with the Commission of the European Union in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau. Previously she served for one year as a Junior Professional Officer with UNIDIR working on the Institute’s Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East and Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR) projects. She has a Master of Arts in European and Administrative Studies from the College d’Europe, Bruges, Belgium.
Lt. Col. (ret.) Ilkka Tiihonen served with the Finnish UN Training Centre for some twenty years, for thirteen of which he acted as the Centre’s Commanding Officer. As a military officer he also spent two and a half years in two UN peace operations: UNMOGIP (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) and UNFICYP (United Nations Force in Cyprus). In addition, he has acted as a military consultant on peacekeeping training matters to the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, and Germany. After retiring in 1993, he worked as a Peacekeeping Adviser to the Swiss Federal Department of Defense. Most recently, Lt. Col. (ret.) Tiihonen acted as a UNIDIR research fellow and military expert for the Institute’s Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR) project.

Steve Tulliu is a graduate of the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études Internationales (IUHEI), Geneva, Switzerland. Previously he studied at the University of Ottawa and the University of Toronto, Canada. Since 1996 he has been working with UNIDIR.