

**Disarmament and Conflict
Resolution Project**

**Managing Arms
In Peace Processes:
Cambodia**



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UNIDIR
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Geneva

**Disarmament and
Conflict Resolution Project**

**Managing Arms in Peace Processes:
Cambodia**

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NOTE

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Previous DCR Project Publications

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

Preface

Under the heading of Collective Security, UNIDIR is conducting a major project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR). The project examines the utility and modalities of disarming warring parties as an element of efforts to resolve intra-state conflicts. It collects field experiences regarding the demobilization and disarmament of warring factions; reviews 11 collective security actions where disarmament has been attempted; and examines the role that disarmament of belligerents can play in the management and resolution of internal conflicts. The 11 cases are UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia), UNOSOM and UNITAF (Somalia), UNAVEM (Angola), UNTAC (Cambodia), ONUSAL (El Salvador), ONUCA (Central America), UNTAG (Namibia), ONUMOZ (Mozambique), Liberia, Haiti and the 1979 Commonwealth operation in Rhodesia.

Being an autonomous institute charged with the task of undertaking independent, applied research, UNIDIR keeps a certain distance from political actors of all kinds. The impact of our publications is predicated on the independence with which we are seen to conduct our research. At the same time, being a research institute within the framework of the United Nations, UNIDIR naturally relates its work to the needs of the Organization. Inspired by the Secretary General's report on "New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era",¹ the DCR Project also relates to a great many governments involved in peace operations through the UN or under regional auspices. Last but not least, comprehensive networks of communication and co-operation have been developed with UN personnel having field experience.

Weapons-wise, the disarmament of warring parties is mostly a matter of light weapons. These weapons account for as much as 90% of the casualties in many armed conflicts. UNIDIR recently published a paper on this subject (*Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts*, UNIDIR Paper No 34, 1995). The Secretary General's appeal for stronger efforts to control small arms - to promote "micro disarmament"² - is one which UNIDIR will continue to attend to in the framework of the DCR Project.

¹ Document A/C.1/47/7, No 31, 23 October 1992.

² Document 50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995.

This report on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia deals with the first large-scale UN peacekeeping operation since the 1960's. In some ways, this is a report on a failed mission: in Cambodia, the disarmament of the warring parties had to be abandoned. Nevertheless, the UN mission did accomplish its primary goal: it enabled free and fair elections to be held in Cambodia. This report outlines the essential events leading up to the abandonment of the disarmament component of the mission's mandate and the fulfillment of the elections. The thorough and evenhanded research was undertaken by Jianwei Wang while staying at UNIDIR in the winter and spring of 1995. The text has been reviewed by Trevor Findlay from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Eric Berman from the United Nations, Col. Willem Huijssoon of the Netherlands, and the Project staff. The analysis also benefited from the visiting experts lecture series which included, in this case, Lt. Col. Damien Healy, General Sanderson, and Col. Karl Farris. The report is the fourth in a series of UNIDIR publications on the disarmament dimension of peace operations. There will be a Report on each of the cases mentioned above.

The authors of the case studies have drawn on the professional advice and assistance of military officers intimately acquainted with peace operations. They were Col. Roberto Bendini (Argentina), Lt. Col. Ilkka Tiihonen (Finland) and Lt. Col. Jakkie Potgieter (South Africa). UNIDIR is grateful to all of them for their invaluable contributions to clarifying and solving the multitude of questions and problems we put before them.

Since October 1994, the DCR Project has developed under the guidance of Virginia Gamba. Under her able leadership, the project has not only become the largest in UNIDIR history: its evolution has been a source of inspiration for the entire Institute.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views or conclusions expressed in this report. They are Dr. Wang's. My final word of thanks goes to him: UNIDIR has been happy to have such a resourceful and dedicated collaborator.

Sverre Lodgaard
Director, UNIDIR

Acknowledgements

The DCR Project takes this opportunity to thank the many foundations and governments who have contributed with finance and personnel to the setting up and evolution of the research associated with the Project. Among our contributors the following deserve a special mention and our deep appreciation: the Ford Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, the Winston Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the governments of Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

Project Introduction

Disarmament and Conflict Resolution

The global arena's main preoccupation during the Cold War centered on the maintenance of international peace and stability between states. The vast network of alliances, obligations and agreements which bound nuclear superpowers to the global system, and the memory of the rapid internationalization of disputes into world wars, favored the formulation of national and multinational deterrent policies designed to maintain a stability which was often confused with immobility. In these circumstances, the ability of groups within states to engage in protest and to challenge recognized authority was limited.

The end of the Cold War in 1989, however, led to a relaxing of this pattern, generating profound mobility within the global system. The ensuing break-up of alliances, partnerships, and regional support systems brought new and often weak states into the international arena. Since weak states are susceptible to ethnic tensions, secession, and outright criminality, many regions are now afflicted by situations of violent intra-state conflict.

Intra-state conflict occurs at immense humanitarian cost. The massive movement of people, their desperate condition, and the direct and indirect tolls on human life have, in turn, generated pressure for international action.

Before and since the Cold War, the main objective of the international community when taking action has been the maintenance and/or recovery of stability. The main difference between then and now, however, is that then, the main objective of global action was to maintain stability in the *international* arena, whereas now it is to stabilize *domestic* situations. The international community assists in stabilizing domestic situations in five different ways: by facilitating dialogue between warring parties, by preventing a renewal of internal armed conflict, by strengthening infrastructure, by improving local

security, and by facilitating an electoral process intended to lead to political stability.¹

The United Nations is by no means the only organization that has been requested by governments to undertake these tasks. However, the reputation of the United Nations as being representative of all states and thus as being objective and trustworthy has been especially valued, as indicated by the greater number of peace operations in which it is currently engaged. Before 1991, the UN peace operations' presence enhanced not only peace but also the strengthening of democratic processes, conciliation among population groups, the encouragement of respect for human rights, and the alleviation of humanitarian problems. These achievements are exemplified by the role of the UN in Congo, southern Lebanon, Nicaragua, Namibia, El Salvador, and to a lesser extent in Haiti.

Nevertheless, since 1991 the United Nations has been engaged in a number of simultaneous, larger, and more ambitious peace operations such as those in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Mozambique and Somalia. It has also been increasingly pressured to act on quick-flaring and horrendously costly explosions of violence, such as the one in Rwanda in 1994. The financial, personnel, and timing pressure on the United Nations to undertake these massive short-term stabilizing actions has seriously impaired the UN's ability to ensure long-term national and regional stability. The UN has necessarily shifted its focus from a supporting role, in which it could ensure long-term national and international stability, to a role which involves obtaining quick peace and easing humanitarian pressures immediately. But without a focus on peace defined as longer-term stability, the overall success of efforts to mediate and resolve intra-state conflict will remain in question.

This problem is beginning to be recognized and acted upon by the international community. More and more organizations and governments are linking success to the ability to offer non-violent alternatives to a post-conflict society. These alternatives are mostly of a socio-political/economic nature, and are national rather than regional in character. As important as these linkages are to the final resolution of conflict, they tend to overlook a major source of instability: the existence of vast amounts of weapons widely distributed among combatant and non-combatant elements in societies which are emerging from long periods of internal conflict. The reason why weapons themselves are not

¹ James S. Sutterlin, "Military Force in the Service of Peace", *Aurora Papers*, No 18, Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1993, p.13.

the primary focus of attention in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies is because they are viewed from a political perspective. Action which does not award importance to disarmament processes is justified by invoking the political value of a weapon as well as the way the weapon is used by a warring party, rather than its mere existence and availability. For proponents of this action, peace takes away the reason for using the weapon and, therefore, renders it harmless for the post-conflict reconstruction process. And yet, easy availability of weapons can, and does, militarize societies in general. It also destabilizes regions that are affected by unrestricted trade of light weapons between borders.

There are two problems, therefore, with the international community's approach to post-conflict reconstruction processes: on the one hand, the international community, under pressure to react to increasingly violent internal conflict, has put a higher value on peace in the short-term than on development and stability in the long-term; and, on the other hand, those who *do* focus on long-term stability have put a higher value on the societal and economic elements of development than on the management of the primary tools of violence, i.e., weapons.

UNIDIR's DCR Project and the Control of Arms during Peace Processes (CAPP)

The DCR Project aims to explore the predicament posed by UN peace operations which have recently focused on short-term needs rather than long-term stability. The Project is based on the premise that the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations can be a tool for ensuring stability. Perhaps more than ever before, the effective control of weapons has the capacity to influence far-reaching events in national and international activities. In this light, the management and control of arms could become an important component for the settlement of conflicts, a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and deflation of conflict, and a critical component of the reconstruction process in post-conflict societies.

Various instruments can be used to implement weapons control. For example, instruments which may be used to support preventive diplomacy in times of crisis include confidence-building measures, weapons control

agreements, and the control of illegal weapons transfers across borders.² Likewise, during conflict situations, and particularly in the early phases of a peace operation, negotiations conducive to lasting peace can be brought about by effective monitoring and the establishment of safe havens, humanitarian corridors, and disengagement sectors. Finally, after the termination of armed conflict, a situation of stability is required for post-conflict reconstruction processes to be successful. Such stability can be facilitated by troop withdrawals, the demilitarization of border zones, and effective disarmament, demobilization and demining.

Nevertheless, problems within the process of controlling weapons have cropped up at every stage of peace operations, for a variety of reasons. In most cases, initial control of arms upon the commencement of peace operations has not generally been achieved. This may be due to the fact that political negotiations necessary to generate mandates and missions permitting international action are often not specific enough on their disarmament implementation component. It could also be that the various actors involved interpret mandates in totally different ways. Conversely, in the specific cases in which peace operations have attained positive political outcomes, initial efforts to reduce weapons to manageable levels - even if achieved - tend to be soon devalued, since most of the ensuing activities center on the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. This shift in priorities from conflict resolution to reconstruction makes for sloppy follow-up of arms management operations. Follow-up problems, in turn, can result in future threats to internal stability. They also have the potential to destabilize neighboring states due to the uncontrolled and unaccounted-for mass movement of weapons that are no longer of political or military value to the former warring parties.

The combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of light weapons has marked peace operations since 1990. This combination poses new challenges to the international community and highlights the fact that a lack of consistent strategies for the control of arms during peace processes (CAPP) reduces the effectiveness of ongoing missions and diminishes the chances of long-term national and regional stability once peace is agreed upon.

The case studies undertaken by the DCR Project highlight a number of recurrent problems that have impinged on the control and reduction of weapons

² Fred Tanner, "Arms Control in Times of Conflict", Project on Rethinking Arms Control, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, PRAC Paper 7, October 1993.

during peace operations. Foremost among these are problems associated with the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment early in the mission, and problems concerned with the lack of coordination of efforts among the various groups involved in the mission. Many secondary complications would be alleviated if these two problems areas were understood differently. The establishment of a secure environment, for example, would make the warring parties more likely to agree on consensual disarmament initiatives. Likewise, a concerted effort at weapons control early in the mission would demonstrate the international community's determination to hold the parties to their original peace agreements and cease-fire arrangements. Such a demonstration of resolve would make it more difficult for these agreements to be broken once the peace operation was underway.

The coordination problem applies both to international interactions and to the components of the peace operation. A peace process will be more likely to succeed if there is co-operation and coordination between the international effort and the nations which immediately neighbor the stricken country. But coordination must not simply be present at the international level; it must permeate the entire peace operation as well. To obtain maximum effect, relations must be coordinated among and within the civil affairs, military, and humanitarian groups which comprise a peace operation. A minimum of coordination must also be achieved between intra- and inter-state mission commands, the civil and military components at strategic, operational and tactical levels, and the humanitarian aid organizations working in the field; these components must cooperate with each other if the mission is to reach its desired outcome. If problems with mission coordination are overcome, many secondary difficulties could also be avoided, including lack of joint management, lack of unity of effort, and lack of mission and population protection mechanisms.

Given these considerations, the Project believes that the way to implement peace, defined in terms of long-term stability, is to focus not just on the sources of violence (such as social and political development issues) but also on the material vehicles for violence (such as weapons and munitions). Likewise, the implementation of peace must take into account *both* the future needs of a society and the elimination of its excess weapons, *and also* the broader international and regional context in which the society is situated. This is because weapons that are not managed and controlled in the field will invariably flow over into neighboring countries, becoming a problem in themselves. Thus, *the establishment of viable stability requires that three primary aspects be included in every approach to intra-state conflict*

resolution: (1) the implementation of a comprehensive, systematic disarmament program as soon as a peace operation is set-up; (2) the establishment of an arms management program that continues into national post-conflict reconstruction processes; and (3) the encouragement of close cooperation on weapons control and management programs between countries in the region where the peace operation is being implemented.

In order to fulfill its research mission, the DCR Project has been divided into four phases. These are as follows: (1) the development, distribution, and interpretation of a *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations*; (2) the development and publication of case studies on peace operations in which disarmament tasks constituted an important aspect of the wider mission; (3) the organization of a series of workshops on policy issues; and (4) the publication of policy papers on substantive issues related to the linkages between the control of arms during peace processes (CAPP) and the settlement of conflict.

Between September 1995 and May 1996, the Project foresees four sets of publications. The first of these will involve eleven case studies, covering peace operations in Somalia, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Bosnia/Croatia, Central America (ONUCA and ONUSAL), Cambodia, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Liberia and Haiti. The second set of publications will include nine policy papers, addressing topics such as Security Council Procedures, Mandate Specificity, Doctrine, Rules of Engagement, Coercive versus Consensual Arms Control and Demobilization Processes, Consensus, Intelligence and Media, and Training. A third set of publications will involve three papers on the relationship between arms and conflict in the region of Southern Africa. The last of the Project's published works will be an overarching policy paper summarizing the conclusions of the research and delineating recommendations based on the Project's findings.

Taking into account the existing material on some of the case studies, the DCR project has purposefully concentrated on providing more information on the disarmament and arms control components of the relevant international peace operations than on providing a comprehensive political and diplomatic account of each case.

The first volume published by the DCR Project examined the way in which three international peace processes (UNOSOM, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II) struggled with the issue of controlling and managing light weapons in Somalia. The second volume focused on the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) in Rhodesia, and the third on the complex missions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR). This volume examines the way the UN mission

in Cambodia (UNTAC) dealt with problems of arms control and disarmament from March 1992 to September 1993. The volume is divided into three sections. The first section analyzes the evolution of the situation in the area with specific reference to arms control and disarmament needs and actions. The second section presents a full bibliography of primary and secondary material used in the making of this study. Finally, the third section provides a summary of the responses regarding this mission which were obtained through the Project's own *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations*.

My special thanks go to the researcher for this case study, Dr. Jianwei Wang, the compilers of the questionnaire responses, Col. Roberto Bendini and Lt. Col. Ilkka Tiihonen, and the analyst who interpreted the responses and wrote the commentaries, Lt. Col. Jakkie Potgieter. I also want to thank the project staff at UNIDIR, especially our Information Officer, Kent Highnam; our Specialized Publications Editor, Cara Cantarella; and our Assistant Editor, Lara Bernini, who prepared this volume.

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Geneva, March 1995

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List of Acronyms

ANKI	<i>Armée Nationale pour un Kampuchea Indépendent</i> (National Army of Independent Kampuchea)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BLDP	Buddist Liberal Democratic Party
CCWG	Cantonment Coordination Working Group
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CMAC	Cambodian Mine Action Center
CPAF	Cambodian People's Armed Forces
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
DK	Democratic Kampuchea
FUNCINPEC	<i>Front Uni National pour Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif</i> (National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia)
HQ	Headquarters
IJA	Interim Joint Administration
KPNLAF	Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front
KR	Khmer Rouge
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MCTU	Mine Clearance Training Unit
MMWG	Mixed Military Working Group
NADK	National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NUCP	National Unity of Cambodian Party
PDK	Party of Democratic Kampuchea
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SNC	Supreme National Council
SOC	State of Cambodia
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN	United Nations
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

Part I:

Case Study

Introduction

During the 18 months from 15 March 1992 to 26 September 1993, the United Nations had been engaged in a massive, comprehensive, and expansive peacekeeping operation in the war-torn Cambodia. The operation, known as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), was characterized by several salient features. First, it was the second largest UN operation in terms of scale.¹ At its peak, the operation involved almost 16,000 military personnel, 3,600 Civilian Police (CIVPOL), and 2,000 civilians, making it approximately 22,000 strong. In the period before and during the elections another 1,000 international polling station officers and over 50,000 Cambodian staff were added.² Second, it was the most multilateral of all missions. Its military, police, and civilian components were drawn from over 100 countries. A number of contributor states, such as Brunei, Bulgaria, Germany, Japan, Namibia and Uruguay, had never before participated in a peacekeeping operation.³ Third, it was the most expensive mission to date. The cost for UNTAC was estimated to be over \$1.6 billion, plus another \$92.5 million for refugee repatriation and rehabilitation programs which was raised through voluntary contributions.⁴ Fourth, it was the most comprehensive and intrusive operation in UN history. In terms of its mandate, UNTAC went far beyond the traditional peacekeeping in the line of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, namely mediating disputes and monitoring a cease-fire between

¹ Before UNTAC, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from July 1960 until June 1964 was the largest peacekeeping operation. It had a peacekeeping force of nearly 26,000 at its peak strength -- a military component of 20,000 and a civilian component of about 6,000. See the *UN Chronicle*, December 1992, p. 32. However, UNTAC has been dwarfed by the later operations of UNPROFOR and UNOSOM. See Hisako Shimura, "Perspective from the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO)", in *Conference Papers*, IPS/UNITAR International Conference on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: Debriefing and Lessons (hereafter cited as *Conference Papers*) Singapore, 2-4 August 1994, Geneva: UNITAR, December 1994, p. 151.

² Yasushi Akashi, "The Challenges Faced by UNTAC", *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Summer 1993, p. 187.

³ Trevor Findlay, *Cambodia, The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, SIPRI Research Report No. 9, Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1995, p. 27.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

independent states. UNTAC enjoyed "unprecedented authority"⁵ in exercising functions normally belonging to a country's internal affairs, such as political election, civilian administration, economic rehabilitation, and the guaranteeing of human rights. UNTAC was, therefore, a mixture of "peacekeeping, peace maintenance and peace building",⁶ representing a systematic effort at nation-building. Fifth, its political intrusiveness notwithstanding, UNTAC was clearly planned to be a Chapter VI operation in terms of using military force. It was never attempted as a Chapter VII operation in which military force could be used for purposes other than self-defense, such as peace-enforcement. The mandate did not even contain any measures to deal with non-compliance and contingent situations. Reflecting this combination of political intrusiveness and military conservativeness, UNTAC can be described as a "Chapter VI and 1/2" or second-generation operation. Sixth, UNTAC was the first major peacekeeping operation in the post-Cold War era and the first of its kind in Asia.⁷ The unique regional and global political environments brought new dynamics as well as problems to the mission, thus complicating its implementation.

When UNTAC withdrew from Cambodia in September 1993, it had reasons to declare that the mission was a triumph. The UN left behind a democratically-elected, and therefore legitimate, national government and a unified Cambodian Armed Forces. Cambodia was removed from the international agenda as a chronic hot spot, and was no longer a target for major power rivalry. Yet the success was a qualified one. UNTAC failed to fulfill one of its major tasks: disarming and demobilizing the warring parties. Consequently, one of the factions is still fighting the government today. Genuine peace, security and national reconciliation have yet to descend upon the Cambodian people.

The mixed bag of UNTAC makes it an intriguing case from which lessons can be drawn for disarmament and conflict resolution in particular and for future UN peacekeeping operations in general. Much has been said and written on the subject. This study is not designed to be a comprehensive analysis of the entire mission. That has been done elsewhere. Instead, I will focus on the disarmament aspect of the mission in a broad political and military context: its

⁵ Yasushi Akashi, "The Challenge of Peace-Keeping in Cambodia: Lessons To Be Learned", presentation at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York, 29 November 1993, p. 15.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁷ Shimura, *op. cit.*, n. 1, p. 152.

mandate, its implementation, its outcome, and its impact on the peacekeeping mission as a whole.

I. The Cambodian Conflict in Historical Perspective

The modern history of Cambodia, a small Southeast Asian kingdom with a population of about 9 million, bordering Thailand, Vietnam and Laos, has been characterized by conflict and war.⁸ After Cambodia gained independence in 1953, Prince Norodom Sihanouk painstakingly tried to build his monarchy into a neutral and peaceful country, only to witness his attempts repeatedly thwarted by both internal strife and international interventions. After 1970, Cambodia was plunged into a bloody and devastating civil war. Behind the war was the global confrontation among the major powers of the United States, China and the Soviet Union as well as deep-rooted historical animosities among the regional players of China, Vietnam, and Thailand. The vicious interaction of variables at domestic, regional and global levels shaped the tragic destiny of Cambodia.

In the late 1960's, Cambodia was drawn into the nasty and protracted war between Vietnam and the United States. As a result of its territories being used by Vietnamese troops as safe havens, the country suffered blanket bombing by the United States. In March 1970, Prince Sihanouk's government was overthrown by a US-backed military *coup d'état* led by General Lon Nol. Out of political necessity, Sihanouk formed an uneasy alliance with his former foe in the jungle, the Khmer Rouge, against Lon Nol's government. With China's moral and material support, the Khmer Rouge overthrew Lon Nol's Khmer Republic and established the government of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) in April 1975. The DK government, masterminded by the infamous Pol Pot, pursued radical and brutal policies of social transformation. The result was disastrous. It is widely believed that over one million Cambodians were killed by execution, torture, starvation, and disease during the Khmer Rouge's three years of rule. The Khmer Rouge became a synonym for mass murder and genocide.

In December 1978, against the backdrop of deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relations and haunted by the historical legacy of establishing a "Grand

⁸ For a history of modern Cambodia, see David P. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History, Politics, War and Revolution since 1945*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991; *A History of Cambodia*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.

Indochina", Vietnamese troops, endorsed by the Soviet Union, invaded Cambodia and installed the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime headed by Heng Sanrin and Hun Sen. The Khmer Rouge retreated to the mountains along the Thai-Cambodian border to continue its armed struggle against the Phnom Penh government. The Vietnamese invasion further internationalized the Cambodian crisis. The aggression was denounced worldwide, and for a long time, the international community did not diplomatically recognize the Phnom Penh Government installed by the Vietnamese. Democratic Kampuchea continued to occupy Cambodia's seat in the United Nations and other international organizations. Beginning in 1979, the UN General Assembly annually passed resolutions condemning the Vietnamese invasion.

Soon there emerged three resistance forces in Cambodia. Apart from the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK, also known as the Khmer Rouge) and its armed forces, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), there were two other smaller factions. The royalist National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) was founded by Prince Norodom Sihanouk and headed by his son Prince Ranariddh. Its armed wing was called the National Army for an Independent Kampuchea (ANIK). The Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) was led by Lon Nol's former Prime Minister Son Sann and its military forces were called the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF). Supported by China, Thailand and the West respectively, these three factions fought against the PRK regime⁹ and its Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF) which were backed by Vietnam, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc. In 1982, the three resistance parties forces formed a coalition party led by Prince Sihanouk. The party, known initially as the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, and later as the National Government of Cambodia, took the seat for Cambodia in the United Nations.

By the late 1980's, it became clear that the military conflict between the three resistance parties and the Phnom Penh government would lead to nowhere. While the Phnom Penh government was unable to defeat the Khmer Rouge and its coalition partners, the latter was not in a position to overthrow the former any time soon either. In the meantime, following the dramatic transformation of the international environment from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period, concerned regional and global powers perceived fewer and fewer rationalities for

⁹ After May 1989, it was renamed the State of Cambodia (SOC).

continuing their involvement in the conflict and for supporting their respective clients. In other words, both domestic military stalemate and international *détente* prepared the stage for a diplomatic settlement.

II. The Road to the Peace Agreement

The international community's effort to bring a peaceful settlement to the Cambodian conflict started soon after the Vietnamese invasion. However, it did not bear fruit until the major powers reached a consensus and were willing to pressure the warring factions to make a deal. The Cambodian issue was first discussed in the UN Security Council in 1979. But the discussion went nowhere due to disagreement among its five permanent members.¹⁰ In 1981 the General Assembly convened a five-day International Conference on Kampuchea, representing the first multilateral effort to address the issue. Seventy-nine member states attended the conference; however, the Phnom Penh Government (PRK) and its Soviet-bloc allies boycotted the meeting because it was aimed at addressing the issue of the Vietnamese invasion. No tangible results came out of this conference.¹¹

In the following years, while the UN did not take major initiatives on Cambodia, high-ranking UN officials visited the region many times. In early 1985, Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar did so personally. In his report to the General Assembly that year, he outlined for the first time the main elements of a comprehensive political settlement.¹² At the same time, some regional players tried hard to mediate among the Cambodian factions. In late 1987 and early 1988, Prince Sihanouk and Mr. Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Phnom Penh Government, met in France twice as a result of India and Indonesia's mediation.¹³ Building on this momentum, Indonesia convened two Jakarta Informal Meetings in July 1988 and February 1989 at which the four Cambodian factions (PRK, PDK, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF) talked to each other face-to-face for the first time. Vietnam, Laos, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

¹⁰ The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume II (hereafter cited as Blue Book II), New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1995, p. 5.

¹¹ Steven R. Ratner, "The United Nations in Cambodia: A Model for Resolution of Internal Conflicts?" in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), *Enforcing Restraint, Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, p. 244.

¹² Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 6.

¹³ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 4.

(ASEAN) countries also joined the discussion. The communiqués of the Informal Meetings outlined the key components of a comprehensive solution.¹⁴

By this time, some international rivalries underlying the Cambodian conflict started to ease. The Sino-Soviet rapprochement was on the agenda. In September 1988, a Sino-Soviet meeting was held in Beijing which paved the way for the reconciliation between China and Vietnam. The meeting was followed by talks between China and Vietnam, and between the PRK and Thailand, in January 1989. These meetings led to Vietnam's announcement, in April 1989, that it would withdraw its troops from Cambodia by September 1989.¹⁵

This development removed the biggest obstacle for a political solution to the Cambodian issue. France and Indonesia took the initiative of convening the Paris Conference on Cambodia from 30 July to 30 August 1989. Nineteen countries and the four Cambodian factions attended the conference. The conference made some progress on issues such as military arrangements, neutrality guarantees, and refugee matters, but there were two major issues which could not be resolved. One was the role of the PDK in future peace agreements. Some member states were opposed to including the PDK in an interim government due to its notorious record of human rights violations in the late 1970's. The other was the formula for power-sharing among the four factions during the transitional period before a new government was established. The three resistance factions were in favor of establishing a coalition government while Phnom Penh opposed any plan of power-sharing. Many countries, particularly ASEAN countries, insisted that a comprehensive settlement should address both internal and external dimensions of the issue. It was unacceptable to end the Vietnamese occupation while leaving the Phnom Penh regime in power, since it had been installed by foreign troops. The idea of letting the Phnom Penh government hold an election was also rejected on the ground that the election would not be free and fair. As a result of this deadlock, the first Paris Conference ended without a comprehensive peace agreement.¹⁶

The role of the United Nations at this conference was not significant. Mr. Raffeuddin Ahmed was only present as a representative of the Secretary-General in his personal capacity. The PRK (now renamed the State of Cambodia, SOC)

¹⁴ Ratner, *op. cit.*, n. 11, p. 245.

¹⁵ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 5.

¹⁶ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 7; Ratner, *op. cit.*, n. 11, p. 245; Findley, *op. cit.*, p. 5; Sylvie Bermann, "Crafting the Paris Agreements on Cambodia", in *Conference Papers, op. cit.*, n. 1, p. 19.

and Vietnam did not want a major role to be played by the United Nations.¹⁷ The idea of an enhanced role for the United Nations in the Cambodian peace process originally came from Prince Sihanouk who thought that the only solution would be to place the country under United Nations trusteeship. Initially nobody took this remark seriously since such a role was unprecedented in international law for a sovereign and independent country.¹⁸ In the wake of the failed Paris Conference, the idea was picked up first by US Congressman Stephen Solarz in his discussion with Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Evans then developed it into a formal and detailed proposal for establishing a UN-supervised transitional authority in Cambodia.¹⁹

In response to this proposal, the dynamics of the peace process shifted to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. With the Cold War drawing to an end, international conditions for a settlement of the Cambodian conflict became ripe. First, the perceptions of the Cambodian issue by the indirectly involved major powers (the United States, the Soviet Union and China) changed considerably. While in the past they saw some utility for their respective interests in sustaining the conflict, they now all wanted to remove the Cambodian issue from their foreign policy agendas. The gradual warming up of US-Soviet relations and Sino-Soviet relations removed the political rationale for their competition in Cambodia. Because of the crisis of the Soviet empire, the most important economic and military assistance to both the Vietnamese and Phnom Penh governments was drastically reduced and eventually ceased. China, still in the shadow of post-Tiananmen diplomatic isolation, had every reason to keep a distance from the infamous Khmer Rouge and was eager to improve its image as a responsible power. The United States, France and the United Kingdom, who once supported the resistance factions (including the PDK) to contain Soviet influence in the region, were now apprehensive that the PDK might regain power after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. Second, the significant regional players also perceived benefits from an early resolution to the conflict which had destabilized the region for decades. Vietnam realized the damage its costly expedition inflicted upon its own economic development and international position. Thailand and other ASEAN countries perceived a lesser danger of Vietnamese expansionism and hence were less inclined to sustain the resistance factions. Other related powers such as Australia and Japan also wanted to see a

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁹ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 6; Ratner, *op. cit.*, n. 11, p. 246.

successful conclusion of the peace process. In short, for the first time in two decades, both major and regional powers, although for different reasons, shared a common interest in pushing the warring factions in Cambodia to make compromises so that a peaceful agreement could be reached.

Starting in January 1990, the Permanent Five Members of the Security Council held a series of meetings in New York and Paris to discuss the Cambodia issue. During their consultations, four fact-finding missions were dispatched to Cambodia by the Secretary-General. Two of these missions were led by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to study communication and transportation infrastructure, water supply sanitation and housing. The administrative structure of the current Phnom Penh administration was the subject of a third mission, while a fourth studied modalities for the repatriation of refugees.²⁰ Meanwhile, parallel meetings were held among the four Cambodia factions at Jakarta in February 1990 and at Tokyo in June 1990. In particular, China and the USSR, respective patrons for the resistance forces and the Phnom Penh government, kept their allies informed of the Five's consultation and pushed them to accept the conditions the Five set for peace in Cambodia. In turn, they also conveyed the concerns of the four factions to the Five's discussions.²¹

At their sixth meeting on 27 and 28 August 1990, the Five reached an agreement on the Framework Document for a peace settlement in Cambodia.²² This document defined the key elements of a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict based on an enhanced UN role. These elements included the creation of the Supreme National Council (SNC) as a unique political body governing the country throughout the transitional period. They also included the establishment of UNTAC, the organization and conduct of free and fair elections, human rights protection, and international guarantees of the independent and neutral status of Cambodia. On 20 September 1990, the Security Council endorsed the framework in Resolution 668.²³ Subsequently, the four factions accepted the Framework Document and agreed to form the SNC which consisted of six members from the SOC and two from each of the three resistance

²⁰ UNHCR, Press Release, September 1990.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² See Statement of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations on Cambodia, A/45/472/-S/21689, 31 August 1990, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 88-92.

²³ Security Council Resolution on settlement of the Cambodia situation, S/RES/668 (1990), 20 September 1990, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 94.

factions. The SNC would represent Cambodia externally and occupy the seat of Cambodia at the United Nations.²⁴

The Five called upon France and Indonesia, the co-chairmen of the Paris Conference, to lead the negotiations of transforming the framework into a full-fledged peace agreement. On 26 November 1990, the Five agreed on a draft peace agreement, and the text was released.²⁵ The three resistance factions immediately accepted the draft while the SOC and Vietnam complained that the UN's authority was too broad and that a complete demobilization of the SOC's troops was unacceptable. The President of the SOC considered that accepting such a peace agreement would be an "invitation to commit suicide".²⁶ This can be seen as the first sign of the difficulties later encountered in disarmament. At the same time, the fighting intensified in early 1991 as all factions desired to maximize their respective positions on the ground before the signing of a peace agreement. On 22 April 1991, the UN Secretary-General issued a joint appeal with France and Indonesia for a temporary cessation of hostilities between the Cambodian factions as a gesture of good faith.²⁷ The first cease-fire in 12 years then went into effect in Cambodia. To resolve the remaining differences among the four factions, a series of talks was held during the summer of 1991 in Jakarta, Beijing, Pattaya, New York, and Paris. Prince Sihanouk was elected president of the SNC, and the Security Council modified the draft peace plan to ask for only a 70% demobilization of the four factions' armed forces instead of 100% to win the SOC's endorsement. By September, all remaining issues had been resolved.²⁸ A long-awaited peace agreement was ready for signature.

The second session of the Paris Conference on Cambodia was held from 21 to 23 October 1991. The historic Paris Accords on Cambodian, a product of a

²⁴ Joint Statement on Cambodia issued at the end of talks held in Jakarta, 9-10 September 1990, A/45/490-S/21732, 17 September 1990, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 93-94.

²⁵ Communiqué of the five permanent members of the Security Council concerning settlement of the Cambodia situation issued at the end of talks held in Paris, 23-26 November 1990; Letter dated 8 January 1991 from France and Indonesia transmitting statement issued at the end of a meeting between the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the Supreme National Council of Cambodia in Paris, 21-23 December 1990, A/45/829-S/21985, 6 December 1990, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 95-111.

²⁶ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 8; Ratner, *op. cit.*, n. 11, p. 247.

²⁷ Appeal for a voluntary cease-fire in Cambodia was issued on 22 April 1991 by the co-chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the United Nations Secretary-General, A/46/161-S/22552, 29 April 1991, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 113.

²⁸ For details of these negotiations, see documents 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 16 in Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10.

decade long diplomatic effort, were signed by nineteen countries including Cambodia (represented by the SNC), the five permanent members of the Security Council, the six members of ASEAN, and Vietnam. The United Nations signed the accords as a witness. It included: the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict; the Agreement concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality, and National Unity of Cambodia; and the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia.²⁹ On 31 October 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 718 to express its full support for the Paris agreements. The resolution authorized the Secretary-General to designate a special representative (SRSG) for Cambodia to act on his behalf and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report for a detailed implementation plan for the mandate envisaged in the agreements.³⁰

The chief goal of the Paris Agreements was to define the nature and function of a provisional body of authority to govern Cambodia during the period of transition from cease-fire to election and the conditions and modalities for a democratic election. The United Nations Security Council was granted the power and responsibility to establish UNTAC with civilian and military components under the direct supervision of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The accords stipulated the relationship between UNTAC and the SNC. The SNC was defined as "the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined".³¹ Yet the SNC "delegates to the United Nations all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this (Paris) agreement".³² The SNC could offer advice to UNTAC which would comply with this advice only if there was a consensus among the members of the SNC and when the advice was consistent with the objectives of the agreement. In case there was no consensus among the members of the SNC, the President, namely Prince Norodom Sihanouk, would be entitled to make the decision on what advice to offer to UNTAC. If the President was not in a position to make such a decision, his power of decision would transfer to the SRSG -- the head of UNTAC. In all

²⁹ For the text of the Paris Agreements, see A/46/608-S/23177, 30 October 1991, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 134-148.

³⁰ Security Council Resolution on political settlement of the Cambodia situation, S/RES/718 (1991), 31 October 1991, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 149-150.

³¹ Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict, Article 3.

³² *Ibid.*, Article 6.

cases, whether advice or action of the SNC was consistent with the agreement would be determined by the SRSG.³³ The relationship between UNTAC and the existing government structure was also defined. All administrative agencies in the field of foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security and information would be placed under the direct control of UNTAC to ensure their strict neutrality. For other administrative institutions, the SRSG, in consultation with the SNC, would determine which could influence the outcome of elections and therefore should be placed under direct control of UNTAC, and which could continue to operate in order to ensure normal daily life in the country.³⁴ It was over this issue of control that the UN, SOC and PDK later collided concerning the interpretation and implementation of the Paris Agreements.

The peace agreement provided UNTAC with an extensive mandate to exercise power in political, military, economic and other functional domains, ranging from organizing and conducting elections to coordinating the repatriation of Cambodian refugees; from disarming and demobilizing military forces of warring parties to guaranteeing the Cambodian people's human rights; from coordinating a major program of economic and financial support for rehabilitation and reconstruction to stopping outside military assistance and verifying the total withdrawal of foreign forces. In sum, the comprehensiveness of UNTAC's mission went far beyond the mandate of narrowly-defined traditional peacekeeping of partitioning warring parties to governing an independent country, thus representing the UN's greatest test of the so-called second generation peacekeeping operation.

III. The Paris Agreement in Action

A. UNAMIC -- Prelude to UNTAC

The UN presence in Cambodia started before the signing of the Paris Agreements. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the advocator of the UN trusteeship of Cambodia, was particularly eager to see an early UN presence in his country to prevent further deterioration of the political and military situation. At his request on 16 July, the UN Secretary-General sent a survey mission to Cambodia to evaluate the modalities of controlling the cease-fire and the cessation of foreign

³³ *Ibid.*, Annex 1, Section A.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Annex 1, Section B.

military assistance in cooperation with the SNC Military Working Group.³⁵ The survey mission, led by Major-General Timothy Dibuama and consisting of six military officers and six civilian staff members, visited Cambodia from 19 August to 4 September 1991. The mission, however, was unable to begin concrete preparations for the implementation of the military aspects foreseen for UNTAC since the warring parties were not ready to provide necessary information.³⁶

On 26 August 1991, Prince Norodom Sihanouk again requested that the United Nations send at least 200 UN personnel to Cambodia as "observers" in order to assist the SNC in controlling the cease-fire and the cessation of foreign military assistance.³⁷ In response to this request, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council establish the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). In its resolution on 16 October 1991, the Security Council approved the proposal and asked that UNAMIC be sent to Cambodia immediately after the signing of the Paris Agreements.³⁸

The mandate for UNAMIC was very limited. It was mainly designed to assist the Cambodian parties in maintaining the cease-fire and in resolving cease-fire violations. The mission called for a team of 50 military liaison officers, in their good offices role, to facilitate communication between the military headquarters of the four Cambodian parties in matters relating to the cease-fire. UNAMIC was also asked to serve as liaison with the SNC on preparations for the deployment of UNTAC and on other related matters. Another task was its mine-awareness role. A 20-person unit would be sent to train civilians in how to avoid land-mines and booby traps. The mission asked for 268 personnel and a budget of \$19.9 million. The duration of the Mission's mandate would extend from the signing of the Peace Agreement until the establishment of UNTAC by the

³⁵ Letter dated 18 July 1991 from the President of the Supreme National Council transmitting communiqué of the Council's Informal Meeting in Beijing, 16-17 July 1991, A/46/310-S/22808, 18 July 1991; Letter dated 8 August 1991 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, S/22945, 14 August 1991, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 115-116, 119.

³⁶ Report of the Secretary-General on proposals for a United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia, S/23097, 30 September 1991, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 125.

³⁷ Letter dated 23 September 1991 from the President of the Supreme National Council transmitting final communiqué of the Council's meeting in Pattaya, 26-29 August 1991, A/46/494-S/23066, 24 September 1991, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 122.

³⁸ Security Council resolution on UNAMIC and political settlement of the Cambodia situation, S/RES/717 (1991), 16 October 1991, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 131-132.

Security Council. It was expected that UNAMIC would merge into UNTAC less than six months after the signing of the agreement.³⁹

UNAMIC was formally established in Phnom Penh and became operational on 9 November 1991. Mr. A. H. S. Ataul Karim (Bangladesh) and Brigadier General Michel Loridon (France) were appointed as Chief Liaison Officer and Senior Military Liaison Officer respectively.⁴⁰ UNAMIC deployed military liaison officers to the four factions' military headquarters. These officers were controlled by a small headquarters to which was attached a handful of planning staff.⁴¹ The UNAMIC mandate was later expanded to include a mine-clearance program to make physical preparation for UNTAC. The mission required an additional 1,090 military personnel, 34 civilian staff, and budget of \$24.7 million.⁴² When the first peacekeepers arrived and Prince Sihanouk returned to Cambodia after more than two decades in November 1991, there were high expectations and popular euphoria among Cambodians. The peace process seemed to be making progress as 17 new diplomatic missions were opened and the three resistant factions opened their offices in Phnom Penh as members of the SNC.⁴³

However, UNAMIC's mission of maintaining the cease-fire soon ran into great difficulties due to its limited mandate and resources.⁴⁴ It was further weakened by the strained relationship between its civil and military components.⁴⁵ UNAMIC was unable to stop and investigate numerous cease-fire violations as well as political violence in the country. Because UNAMIC was created under the UN Security Council and was not actually mentioned in the Paris Peace Agreements, the warring factions, especially the PDK, in many cases refused to

³⁹ S/23097, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 125-130.

⁴⁰ Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIC, S/23218, 14 November 1991, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 130.

⁴¹ J. M. Sanderson, "UNTAC: Successes and Failures" in Hugh Smith (ed.), *International Peacekeeping-Building on the Cambodian Experience*, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994, p. 18.

⁴² Report of the Secretary-General on the expansion of UNAMIC's mandate, S/23331, 30 December 1991, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 152-154.

⁴³ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 23.

⁴⁴ For the analysis of UNAMIC, see Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, pp. 22-26; Jarat Chopra, John Mackinlay, and Larry Minear, "Report on the Cambodian Peace Process", *Research Report* 165, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, February 1993, pp. 16-17.

⁴⁵ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 26.

recognize UNAMIC's legitimacy.⁴⁶ The absence of an effective authority in this crucial early stage of the peace process left the four Cambodian factions at large. They took advantage of this lawless period of transition to expand their respective political and military influence. On 27 November, PDK leader Khieu Samphan was almost killed in a SOC-orchestrated riot against the Khmer Rouge only hours after he returned to Phnom Penh. He fled back to Bangkok and the PDK office in Phnom Penh was ransacked. In January 1992, civilian anti-corruption riots against the government erupted, and the Phnom Penh government responded with bloody suppression.⁴⁷ Cambodians soon became disappointed with UNAMIC's powerlessness. With the political and military situation further worsening, on 30 December, the SNC, including the PDK, asked the UN to accelerate the deployment of UNTAC.⁴⁸ Prince Sihanouk reiterated his wish to see an early arrival of UNTAC to prevent any erosion of the peace process.⁴⁹

B. UNTAC's Mandate

While fighting and violence in Cambodia were continuing, the UN headquarters in New York was busy putting together a detailed package for implementing the Paris Agreements. On 9 January 1992, the Secretary-General appointed Under Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi of Japan, head of the then UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, as his Special Representative and head of UNTAC. Lieutenant-General John Sanderson of Australia was appointed Commander of UNTAC's military force. The UN did very little substantial advance planning for UNTAC although diplomats and officials in the negotiating process were able to foresee an agreement as early as August 1991. UNAMIC planners were anxious to begin immediately preparing for deployment but their

⁴⁶ Col. Willem A. Huijssoon, "UNAMIC & UNTAC", unpublished manuscript distributed at a presentation at UNIDIR, Geneva, 9 March 1995, p. 2; Jerold Brown, *UN Peacekeeper in Cambodia, 1991-1992: An Interview with Major George Steuber*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992, p. 1.

⁴⁷ In General John Sanderson's (Force Commander of UNTAC) view, these two events were the initial major infraction of the Paris Agreements, "A Review of Recent Peacekeeping Operations", paper presented to the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) XVIII Conference, Dacca, January, 1994, p. 6.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁴⁹ Letter dated 18 January 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, S/23458, 24 January 1992, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 156.

joint sessions with UN secretariat officials were not held until late January 1992.⁵⁰ The operational plan for UNTAC was eventually submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General on 19 February 1992, four months after the conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference.⁵¹ At an estimated cost of US \$1.9 billion, excluding costs for repatriation and rehabilitation, he recommended that some 15,900 troops, 3,600 CIVPOL monitors and 1,000 international staff be sent to Cambodia. In addition, 1,400 international election monitors and 56,000 Cambodians recruited locally to work with polling teams would join UNTAC at election time. These figures made UNTAC one of the largest and most expansive peacekeeping operations in UN history.

Based on the provisions stipulated in the Paris Agreements, the Secretary-General articulated the UN mandate for UNTAC's seven components in the following order: human rights, elections, military, civil administration, civil police, repatriation and rehabilitation. The human rights component was responsible for fostering an environment in which respect for human rights was ensured during the transitional period. For this purpose, several key measures would be taken. First, encouraging the SNC to ratify the relevant international human rights instruments so as to provide a framework in Cambodian law in which Cambodians could undertake activities for the protection and promotion of their rights and freedom. Second, conducting an extensive campaign of human rights education to promote respect for and understanding of human rights. Third, exercising general human rights oversight in all of the existing administrative structures in Cambodia especially in those agencies exercising law-enforcement and judicial functions. Fourth, providing a mechanism for the investigation of human rights abuses occurring during the transitional period in Cambodia.

The electoral component was entrusted with the task of organizing and conducting free and fair general elections in Cambodia. The objective was to facilitate the broadest possible participation of Cambodians in the election of their representatives. It was responsible for designing and implementing a system for every phase of the election of 120 members to the constituent assembly. This included establishing a legal framework that would consist of an electoral law and regulations to govern the electoral process; conducting large-scale civic education and training on the purposes and importance of the elections, particularly, the secrecy and integrity of the ballot; conducting registration of voters and political

⁵⁰ Chopra, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, n. 44, p. 19.

⁵¹ For details of the plan, see Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia containing his proposed implementation plan for UNTAC, including administrative and financial aspects, S/23613, 19 February 1992, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 158-184.

parties; and finally, organizing the polling to permit all registered voters to exercise their franchise rights conveniently and in the absence of fear.

The military component's objective was to establish the security situation and to build confidence among the four Cambodian factions during the transitional period. The achievement of these objectives was a necessary precursor to the successful conduct of the functions of the other components. Its functions included verifying the withdrawal and non-return of all categories of foreign forces, their arms, ammunition and equipment; supervising the cease-fire and related measures, including regroupment, cantonment, disarming and demobilization of the forces of the four Cambodian factions; weapons control, including monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance and locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia; and assisting with mine clearance, including training programs and mine awareness programs.

The civil administration component gave the United Nations an unprecedented level of involvement in a country's official activities during a peacekeeping operation. In order to ensure a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair elections, the United Nations was to exercise direct supervision or control over the SOC's administrative agencies, bodies and offices which could directly influence five key areas: national defense, finance, public security and information. A lesser degree of scrutiny was to be extended to other administrative structures, such as those concerned with public health, education, agriculture, fishing, transport, energy, tourism and historic monuments. The SRSB was to have the right of unrestricted access to all administrative operations and information, as well as the right to reassign or dismiss officials when necessary.

The police component was to ensure that law and order among the civilian population were maintained effectively and impartially and that human rights and fundamental freedoms were fully protected. Although responsibility for the management of Cambodia's police forces would continue to rest with the Cambodian factions, they were to operate under UNTAC's supervision or control during the transitional period. UNTAC CIVPOL monitors would be deployed in the field down to the district levels to ensure that the local police were functioning in the desired manner and also to enhance public confidence and help in fostering an atmosphere conducive to free and fair elections.

The repatriation component was designed to make sure that more than 360,000 Cambodian refugees and displaced persons would have the right to return to Cambodia and to live in safety, security and dignity, free from intimidation or coercion of any kind. They should be allowed to return

voluntarily and to the place of their choice with their human rights and fundamental freedoms fully respected. This component would be carried out by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as the lead agency, together with the Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO).

The rehabilitation component was aimed at addressing immediate needs and laying the groundwork for future development. Particular attention was given to humanitarian needs in terms of food, health, housing and other essential needs of all Cambodians; to resettlement needs, comprising essential agricultural inputs, improved access, drinking water supplies, health and education facilities, vocational training; and to essential restoration, maintenance and support of basic infrastructure, institutions, utilities and other essential services.

The plan also set a calendar for the whole operation. It was recommended that full deployment of the military component should be accomplished by the end of May 1992. The regroupment and cantonment processes, as well as the demobilization of at least 70 percent of the cantoned forces, would be completed by the end of September 1992. Then the registration of voters would commence in October 1992 and proceed for three months. Elections would be scheduled sometime between the end of April to the beginning of May 1993. On 28 February 1992, the Security Council approved the plan and UNTAC was formally established. The resolution decided that UNTAC shall be established for a period not to exceed eighteen months and the elections be held in Cambodia by May 1993 at the latest.⁵²

The Secretary-General in his report also outlined four essential conditions for a successful UNTAC mission. First, UNTAC must at all times have the full support of the Security Council. Second, it must operate with the full cooperation, at all times, of the Cambodian parties and all other parties concerned. Third, it must enjoy full freedom of movement and communication. Fourth, the necessary financial resources must be provided by Member States in full and in a timely manner.⁵³ Unfortunately, not all these conditions were met during the operation.

⁵² Security Council resolution on UNTAC and implementation of the Paris Agreements, S/RES/745 (1992), 28 February 1992, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 184.

⁵³ S/23613, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 179.

C. A Bumpy Start

Five months after the signing of the Paris Accords, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi, and the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General John M. Sanderson, arrived in Phnom Penh on 15 March 1992, and UNTAC kicked off its mission along the lines of the seven components set out in the mandate.⁵⁴

With progress in some areas such as drafting the Electoral Law and repatriation, UNTAC soon ran into two major difficulties. One was of the UN's own making. The deployment of UNTAC was unfortunately delayed because UNTAC's administrative structure was slow to take shape. Most UNTAC departments were only beginning to be established as late as May. Three of five section heads of the Administrative Division did not arrive until August, and only 20 percent of its staff were in Cambodia for the first three months of UNTAC's existence. The Information Division did not have a deputy director even a year after it was established. The Civilian Police were not fully in the field until October 1992. The Electoral Component, more than two months after the establishment of UNTAC, had only a handful of people. The military force's 12 battalions were still not fully deployed by June 1992 when the cantonment and disarmament of the factions were scheduled to commence.⁵⁵ The necessary vehicles, prefabricated housing, office and communications equipment, and other items were slow to arrive in Cambodia.⁵⁶ The 400-500 civil administrative staff was not fully deployed until 27 September.⁵⁷ As a whole, UNTAC was not fully operational until July or August 1992.

The Secretary-General attributed the delay to several factors. First, the sheer size of the UNTAC operation prevented a quick deployment. Second, the cumbersome procedures for procurement and budget authorization within the United Nations slowed deployment. Third, the difficulty of recruiting highly specialized personnel to fulfill UNTAC's various civilian functions impeded progress. Fourth, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in response to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The organization's ability to respond was stretched to the limit by

⁵⁴ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 15.

⁵⁵ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, pp. 33-35.

⁵⁶ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 35.

⁵⁷ Chopra, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, n. 44, p. 22.

two large and complicated peacekeeping missions at the same time.⁵⁸ The slowness in deployment reduced the chance of effective implementation of the UN mandate in some important areas. For instance, the lack of administrative personnel allowed factions, especially the SOC, to resist UN control of some key government institutions.⁵⁹

The other more critical challenge was the PDK's decision to stay out of the cantonment and disarmament process.⁶⁰ On 9 May 1992, the UNTAC Force Commander announced that Phase I of the official cease-fire, in effect since the signing of the Paris Agreement, would be followed by Phase II, namely the regroupment, cantonment, disarming and demobilization of forces, starting on 13 June. While the other three factions agreed to enter the process, the PDK declared that it would postpone its disarmament until the withdrawal and non-return of Vietnamese military personnel had been verified by UNTAC and until a neutral political environment was established through UNTAC's effective control of the SOC's administrative structure.⁶¹

Therefore the question arose of whether Phase II should be implemented as scheduled since the success of it depended on the cooperation of all parties and would not be sustainable for long without such cooperation. Largely out of concern over UNTAC's ability to adhere to the UN timetable, the Secretary-General proposed that Phase II should begin as scheduled regardless of the PDK's refusal to cooperate.⁶² His proposal was endorsed by the Security Council, and as a result, Phase II of the cease-fire officially commenced on 13 June 1992.⁶³

Meanwhile UNTAC tried to take some measures to address the PDK's concerns, including establishing more border checkpoints and strengthening mobile patrol. The international community also carried out a series of diplomatic activities in an attempt to resolve the impasse with the PDK. All these efforts failed to persuade the PDK to walk into the cantonment sites. Taking the PDK's non-compliance as an excuse, the other three factions, especially the SOC, became increasingly reluctant to continue the disarmament. Although in his

⁵⁸ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 16.

⁵⁹ Chopra, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, n. 44, pp. 3, 22-23. Its impact on disarmament will be discussed in the next section.

⁶⁰ For a more detailed analysis, see next section.

⁶¹ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 17, 22.

⁶² Special report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC and phase II of the cease-fire, S/24090, 12 June 1992, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 193.

⁶³ Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning difficulties encountered by UNTAC in implementation of the Paris Agreements, S/24091, 12 June 1992, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 194.

second Special Report on 14 July 1992, the Secretary-General suggested continuing the process and the Security Council endorsed his position, in reality the operation of disarmament soon came to a halt.⁶⁴ On 15 November, the Secretary-General had to announce that it was no longer possible to continue the cantonment process, and it had to be effectively suspended⁶⁵

D. Election Without Peace

With the failure of the cantonment operation, a more critical question came to the fore: should the electoral component be implemented as envisaged in the mandate? The circumstances were not at all conducive to a free and fair election which was supposed to be held under peaceful and neutral political conditions. The continuing existence of a large number of armed forces posed a potential threat to the electoral process; nevertheless, the Secretary-General and Security Council chose to carry out the electoral component without disarmament. On 13 October 1992, the Security Council confirmed that the electoral process should proceed according to the original schedule and again demanded that the PDK cooperate with UNTAC.⁶⁶ On 30 November 1992, the Security Council passed a resolution reconfirming that the elections for a constituent assembly would be conducted no later than May 1993. The resolution authorized UNTAC to proceed with preparations for elections in all areas of the country to which UNTAC had full and free access as of 31 January 1993.⁶⁷

Preparations for elections were therefore undertaken in the midst of political and military uncertainty and tension. The Electoral Law was adopted by the SNC on 5 August 1992 and promulgated one week later. The voter registration process began on 5 October 1992. To ensure the registration of the maximum number of voters, the registration period was extended from its original closing date of 31 December 1992 to 31 January 1993 in which some 4.6 million Cambodians registered to vote, representing nearly all of the estimated eligible voters to which

⁶⁴ Second special report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC and phase II of the cease-fire, S/24286, 14 July 1992; Security Council resolution on implementation of the Paris Agreements S/RES/766 (1992), 21 July 1992, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 203, 205.

⁶⁵ Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 783 (1992) on the Cambodia peace process, S/24800, 15 November 1992, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 231.

⁶⁶ Security Council resolution on implementation of the Cambodia peace process, S/RES/783 (1992), 13 October 1992, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 225-226.

⁶⁷ Security Council resolution on implementation of Cambodia peace process, S/RES/792 (1992), 30 November 1992, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 243-246.

UNTAC had territorial access. While the UNTAC electoral staff managed to enter some zones controlled by the PDK and register some voters, in most cases, UNTAC was denied access to the PDK-controlled areas which were considered to be inhabited by about 5 percent of the total population.⁶⁸

The provisional registration of political parties began on 17 August 1992. On 27 January 1993, 20 of the 22 provisionally registered political parties applied for official registration by submitting a list of at least 5,000 registered voters who were members of the party. The PDK announced in November 1992 the formation of a political party, the National Unity of Cambodia Party (NUCP), but it did not register for the elections. On 28 January 1993, the SNC decided that the election would be held from 23 to 25 May 1993. The Secretary-General recommended that three additional voting days be added to allow mobile polling units to reach remote areas. The election campaign would run from 7 April through 19 May 1993, followed by a four-day cooling-off period.⁶⁹ The UN Secretary-General visited Cambodia on 7 April to mark the start of the electoral campaign. Before his visit, the PDK officially announced that it would not participate in the elections. On 13 April 1993, the PDK closed its office in Phnom Penh, citing security reasons.⁷⁰ At the same time, training was under way for some 900 International Polling Station Officers from 44 countries and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, 130 more from the United Nations Secretariat and 370 from within UNTAC, as well as for more than 50,000 Cambodian electoral staff. Polling stations were also established in New York, Paris and Sydney for those voters overseas. By mid-May, all the necessary electoral equipment and supplies, including the ballot papers and boxes, had been delivered to various locations in Cambodia.⁷¹

The whole registration/campaign period, however, witnessed a high degree of violence, murders, intimidation, and coercion. First, cease-fire violations increased, mainly due to the clashes or exchange of fire between PDK forces and the SOC army in the central and western parts of the country. Second, several serious incidents of killing ethnic Vietnamese civilians, attributed mainly to the PDK, prompted more than 21,000 ethnic Vietnamese to flee their homes for safety. Third, politically motivated murders, abductions, bombings, threats and

⁶⁸ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 29. According to Findlay, thousands registered in PDK-controlled areas, including NADK soldiers and even some commanders. The PDK was able to tolerate the registration process. Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 55.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

other forms of intimidation also intensified. Most of them were carried out by soldiers, police or supporters of the SOC against FUNCINPEC and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP).⁷² On the other hand, other factions also engaged in various degrees in misleading propaganda and political coercion. They coerced the local population under their control to register as party members and to vote for them. The PDK intensified its propaganda and intimidation to discourage people from participating in the electoral process and also carried out violence and intimidation to disrupt the process. According to UNTAC investigations, just between the beginning of April and the middle of May, 100 Cambodians were killed and 179 injured as a result of violence. The victims included members of all four Cambodian factions as well as members of UNTAC itself. Finally, there was a growing reluctance on the part of the three factions, particularly the SOC to accept UNTAC control over their administrative structure for foreign affairs, public security, defense and information.⁷³

As a result of the political violence, the political antagonism among various factions had increased and UNTAC was blamed by all sides for the problems.⁷⁴ Prince Sihanouk, on 4 January 1993, informed UNTAC that the persistent violent attacks on FUNCINPEC offices and staff had obliged him to cease cooperation with UNTAC.⁷⁵ The following day, his son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, the President of FUNCINPEC, stated that he would suspend working relations with UNTAC until effective measures were taken to put an end to the climate of violence.⁷⁶ In facing the SOC's ruthless violent attacks, FUNCINPEC and the BLDP at one point considered pulling out of the process.⁷⁷ Sihanouk alleged that "in order to be able to tell the UN and the world that they have succeeded in their mission, UNTAC is going to have an election despite the fact that none of the

⁷² BLDP and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) were two parties that emerged from the KPNLF, one of the four parties which signed the Paris Agreements.

⁷³ Blue Book, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 29, 34-35, 41-42.

⁷⁴ People joked that UNTAC had finally managed to unite the factions in opposition to itself. James A. Schear, "Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping: The Case of Cambodia" in Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (eds), *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, p. 259.

⁷⁵ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 35-36.

⁷⁶ Letter dated 5 January 1993 from Prince Norodom Ranariddh to the Secretary-General, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 251-252.

⁷⁷ Akashi, *op. cit.*, n. 5, p. 13.

conditions for the election have been met. None. It is a hideous comedy".⁷⁸ On the other hand, the SOC called UNTAC a "paper tiger" which failed to control the PDK.⁷⁹ Hun Sen asked for the expulsion of the PDK from the SNC and for enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.⁸⁰

In sum, "there was an air of tense expectations on all sides in the final days before the polling started".⁸¹ Cambodians were stockpiling food and other supplies in fear of increasing violence during the elections. There were also reports of large-scale troop movements by PDK forces around the perimeters of Phnom Penh and intelligence reports about strategic locations being targeted during the weeks preceding the scheduled vote.⁸² Anticipating escalating violence, at one point UN headquarters in New York ordered families of UNTAC's international staff to leave the country until after the election.⁸³

Under such circumstances, questions of whether the election should be conducted and whether the result would have any legitimacy were repeatedly raised as late as the eve of election. However, the SRSG, the Secretary-General and the Security Council remained firm that the election should move forward. Mr. Akashi noticed that the PDK's disruptions were not nationwide, but were confined to certain provinces, most of which were sparsely populated. Since most Cambodians lived in the south and southwest of the country where the PDK strength was weak, at least 60% of the registered Cambodians would vote in the elections.⁸⁴ The Secretary-General concluded that despite the disturbing situations, the essential conditions for the election were present.⁸⁵ In his last two pre-election reports to the Security Council, the Secretary-General suggested that the international community had maintained unreasonable standards for a neutral election environment in Cambodia, given the country's internal divisions and traumatized population. He pledged that UNTAC would conduct the most

⁷⁸ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 February 1993, p. 21.

⁷⁹ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 80.

⁸⁰ Letter dated 5 January 1993 from Mr. Hun Sen to the Secretary-General, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 249.

⁸¹ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 42.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 81.

⁸⁴ Akashi, *op. cit.*, n. 5, p. 3.

⁸⁵ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 38.

impartial election possible under imperfect circumstances and that all steps would be taken to ensure maximum security.⁸⁶

For this purpose, UNTAC took a number of measures to maximize the neutrality and security of the political environment. For instance, to ensure fair access to the media during the campaign, Radio UNTAC offered weekly segments to each political party for the broadcast of political materials. UNTAC took particular issue with the SOC for its efforts to limit or deny other political parties access to SOC-controlled media and their right to freedom of movement. As a result of strong intervention by UNTAC, FUNCINPEC was able to obtain the release from the SOC of the television broadcasting equipment it had imported for campaign purposes. All political parties had access to UNTAC information media, and three political parties were granted assistance from UNTAC with air transport for campaign purposes.⁸⁷ To check political violence, an UNTAC directive was issued on 17 March 1993 prohibiting the possession and carrying of firearms and explosives by unauthorized persons. The resulting confiscation of firearms led to a significant decrease in reported serious crimes in Phnom Penh.⁸⁸ Also, security for all polling stations and their vicinity was provided and strengthened by the UNTAC military forces. No polling would be conducted in the area controlled by the PDK or in the remote, thinly populated areas in which PDK forces were operating.⁸⁹

The international community threw its weight behind UNTAC when the dates for the election drew near. On 23 April all the signatory states to the Paris Accords, including China, issued a declaration of support for the election and for UNTAC.⁹⁰ On 6 May, China, France and Japan organized a crisis meeting of the SNC in Beijing without the participation of the PDK. The three Cambodian parties agreed to proceed with the election despite pressures within both

⁸⁶ Fourth progress report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, S/25719, 3 May 1993; Report of the Secretary-General on preparations for the election for the constituent assembly in Cambodia, S/25784, 15 May 1993, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 300-301, 303-305.

⁸⁷ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 39.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁹⁰ Letter dated 23 April 1993 from France and Indonesia, as Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, transmitting statement by the signatory States of the Paris Agreements concerning implementation of peace process in Cambodia and acts of violence, S/25658, 23 April 1993, Blue Book II, p. 283.

FUNCINPEC and the BLDP to withdraw.⁹¹ On 20 May, three days before the election, the Security Council expressed full support for the measures taken by UNTAC to protect the polls and reminded all Cambodian parties of their obligation to comply fully with the election results.⁹² This resolution was a clear expression of the Council's determination to go forward with the elections as scheduled. The Foreign Ministers of ASEAN also issued a statement of support on 18 May.⁹³ On 22 May, one day before the election, the Security Council again called on the Cambodian people to exercise their right to vote.⁹⁴ On the same day, showing his personal support, Prince Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh from Beijing and urged Cambodians to vote for the parties of their choice.⁹⁵

To some extent, the election was a political gamble and at the mercy of the PDK's intention and strategy. To many people's relief, the worst possible scenario did not come to pass. Except for a few isolated incidents of violence and the killing of one Cambodian civilian when several mortar rounds were fired in Kampong Cham Province, the election was carried out in a generally peaceful atmosphere.⁹⁶ Obviously the PDK decided not to disrupt the process.⁹⁷ From 23 to 28 May, more than 4.2 million voters cast their ballots, representing nearly 90 percent of the registered voters. About 200 NADK soldiers and several hundred members of their families also voted.⁹⁸ It was reported that the PDK had sent hundreds of officials and civilians living in western and northwestern guerrilla zones to the nearest polling stations to vote for FUNCINPEC.⁹⁹

⁹¹ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, pp. 79-80.

⁹² Security Council resolution on the election for the constituent assembly in Cambodia, S/RES/826 (1993), 20 May 1993, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 306-307.

⁹³ Letter dated 19 May 1993 from Singapore transmitting statement by the ASEAN foreign Ministers on the elections in Cambodia, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 82.

⁹⁴ Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning the act of violence against UNTAC on 21 May 1993, S/25822, 22 May 1993, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 308.

⁹⁵ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 44.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ According to Findlay, outside pressure, especially from China, restrained the PDK from disrupting the voting process. China publicly announced in April 1993, that it would not support any Cambodian party that resumed the civil war. China also reportedly warned Khieu Samphan during his visit to Beijing in late May not to disrupt the election. China's support for a strongly worded Security Council resolution on the eve of the election was no doubt partly motivated by the fact that the PDK had accidentally killed several Chinese peacekeepers in attacks on SOC forces. Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 87-88.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

The election process was observed in its entirety by international observers. Addressing the SNC on 29 May 1993, Special Representative Akashi, on behalf of the Secretary-General, declared that the conduct of the election had been free and fair.¹⁰⁰ The Security Council endorsed this declaration on 2 June 1993 in Resolution 835.¹⁰¹ However, as an early account of the voting showed that FUNCINPEC was taking a lead, the Cambodian People's Party (CPP, the political party of SOC) subsequently asserted that the elections had been tainted by irregularities and fraud. It requested that UNTAC hold new elections in seven provinces, including the capital, Phnom Penh. UNTAC conducted investigations into the complaints. The final result of the election was released on 10 June 1993. FUNCINPEC won 45 percent of the vote, CPP came in second with 38 percent, the BLDP won 4 percent, and the rest of the vote was shared among the 17 other political parties.¹⁰² On the same day, the Secretary-General authorized the SRSG to declare that the results "fairly and accurately reflect the will of the Cambodian people and must be respected". The SRSG also stated that the alleged irregularities cited by the CPP did not amount to fraud and that "none of the CPP's allegations, even if true, would affect the outcome".¹⁰³ The Security Council endorsed the election results in Resolution 840 of 15 June 1993, fully supporting the new Constituent Assembly.¹⁰⁴ The SOC formally recognized the election results on 21 June 1993.¹⁰⁵

Riding on the momentum of the successful election, on 10 June 1993, the leaders of the armed forces of FUNCINPEC, the KPNLF and the SOC, through the coordination of the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG), agreed to merge their troops into a single army, the Cambodian Armed Forces. On 14 June, the new Assembly was sworn in to begin drafting a new Constitution. At its inaugural meeting Prince Sihanouk was proclaimed head of state. But the Constituent Assembly was immediately challenged by a "secession" movement in the eastern part of the country. On 12 June 1993, an "autonomous zone" of

¹⁰⁰ Letter dated 2 June 1993 from the Secretary-General transmitting statement made by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cambodia at Supreme National Council meeting on 29 May 1993, S/25879, 2 June 1993, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 311.

¹⁰¹ Security Council resolution on the completion of the election in Cambodia, S/RES/835 (1993), 2 June 1993, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 311-312.

¹⁰² Report of the Secretary-General on the conduct and results of the election in Cambodia, S/25913, 10 June 1993. Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 315.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

¹⁰⁴ Security Council resolution on the results of the election in Cambodia, S/RES/840 (1993), 15 June 1993, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 318.

¹⁰⁵ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 47.

seven eastern provinces was proclaimed by Prince Norodom Chakrapong, the Deputy Prime Minister of the SOC and a son of Prince Sihanouk. He rejected the results of the elections and asked UNTAC to withdraw from the seven provinces, saying that he could not guarantee the safety of UNTAC personnel. Following attacks on UNTAC officers and vehicles and threats to some civilian peacekeepers, UNTAC ordered a temporary withdrawal from three provinces and Prince Ranariddh prepared to use military force against the rebellion. It was believed that hard-line members of the CPP were involved. On 15 June, the secession movement collapsed and Prince Chakrapong fled to Vietnam.¹⁰⁶

Putting the first political crisis behind him, on 16 June, Prince Sihanouk announced the formation of an Interim Joint Administration (IJA) with Prince Ranariddh and Mr. Hun Sen as the Co-Chairmen of a Council of Ministers.¹⁰⁷ The administration would include representatives of all the parties which had won seats in the Assembly. The PDK would not be represented. The UN provided emergency financial assistance of \$10 million to the IJA. The IJA was accepted by the Constituent Assembly on 1 July and sworn in the following day. To make a political balance, Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen became Co-Presidents and Co-Ministers of Defence and the Interior and Public Security.¹⁰⁸

The high turnout in the election and its successful conclusion significantly weakened the PDK's political status. Its initial reaction to the election results seemed to be positive. It declared that it would accept the outcome of the election.¹⁰⁹ On 13 July 1993, Mr. Khieu Samphan returned to Phnom Penh, ending the PDK's three-month absence from the capital. At the meeting of the SNC on the same day, he spoke of the need for national reconciliation and said the PDK might be willing to merge its forces into a national army and end its resistance.¹¹⁰ Khieu Samphan held tentative discussions with Sihanouk and UNTAC to see if the PDK could play a role in the new government. Prince Sihanouk had been a strong advocate of including the PDK in the government. Now he retreated from his position, saying that it could only be involved in an "advisory" capacity. The PDK had originally said that it would be content with

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, pp. 92-93.

¹⁰⁹ Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 840 (1993) on the possible role of the United Nations and its agencies after the end of UNTAC's mandate according to the Paris Agreements, S/26090, 16 July 1993, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 321.

¹¹⁰ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 48.

this advisory role, but obviously it wanted more than that. The talks did not yield any results.¹¹¹

E. The End of the Mission

On 27 August, the Security Council confirmed that UNTAC's mandate would end upon the creation of a new Cambodian Government and took note of the request by the Interim Joint Administration to maintain UNTAC's mandate until the Constituent Assembly had completed its work on the Constitution and a new Government was established.¹¹² On 24 September 1993, the new Constitution was formally promulgated by Prince Sihanouk. The document established a constitutional monarchy, "The Kingdom of Cambodia". Prince Sihanouk was then elected King by the Royal Council of the Throne. In his first act, King Sihanouk named Prince Ranariddh and Mr. Hun Sen as First and Second Prime Ministers in the new government. The Constituent Assembly transformed itself into a legislative assembly. A late addition to the Constitution stipulated that the Council of Ministers had to be chosen from parties represented in the National Assembly, thus effectively preventing the Khmer Rouge from joining the new government. With the IJA turning into the Royal Government of Cambodia, the SNC formally handed sovereignty to the new government and dissolved itself.¹¹³

UNTAC's mandate officially ended on 24 September 1993 with the establishment of the new Cambodian Government. Leaving a successful election and other accomplishments such as the smooth repatriation of 362,209 Cambodian refugees,¹¹⁴ UNTAC started to pull out of the country. Special Representative Yasushi Akashi left Phnom Penh on 26 September. UNTAC troops began withdrawing from Cambodia on 2 August 1993. By this time, the repatriation component and most of the electoral staff had already left the country. The CIVPOL were completely gone by 30 September and the military withdrew completely by 15 November. By the end of 1993, most UNTAC personnel had

¹¹¹ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 95.

¹¹² Security Council resolution on the withdrawal of UNTAC, S/RES/860 (1993), 27 August 1993, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 330-331.

¹¹³ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, pp. 96-97.

¹¹⁴ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 33. These refugees returned to Cambodia from Thai camps. There were also several thousands of refugees repatriated from Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia.

left. Only a small number of administrative and other personnel stayed in Cambodia until the end of May 1994.¹¹⁵

However, the exclusion of the PDK from this process cast clouds over the political future of the new government. Also some UNTAC components such as the mine-clearance program needed more time to finish or transfer its task to Cambodians. In early October 1993, the two Prime Ministers of the Cambodian government asked the United Nations to consider dispatching some 20 to 30 unarmed military observers to Cambodia as a confidence-building measure contributing to the stability of the country and its new Government.¹¹⁶ On 4 November 1993, the Security Council adopted a resolution to extend the period of withdrawal of the mine-clearance and training unit until 30 November and for elements of the military police and medical components of UNTAC until 31 December. The Security Council also established a team of 20 military liaison officers for a single six-month period to report on matters affecting security in Cambodia, maintain a liaison with the Government, and assist the Government in dealing with residual military matters related to the Paris Agreements.¹¹⁷ In April 1994 at the request of the new government, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Benny Widyono (Indonesia) as his Representative in Cambodia to coordinate the UN presence there.¹¹⁸ On 13 May 1994, the Security Council decided not to extend the mandate of the 20-person Military Liaison Team but rather agreed that the Secretary-General should appoint three military advisers to assist the Secretary-General's Representative in Cambodia following the end of the Team's mandate.¹¹⁹ On 10 October 1994, the Security Council decided to

¹¹⁵ S/26090, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 321; Further report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 840 (1993), S/26360, 26 August 1993, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 321, 327-328; Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, pp. 98-99; Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 53.

¹¹⁶ Further report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 840 (1993) conveying request by the Government of Cambodia for the dispatch of 20 to 30 unarmed United Nations military observers to Cambodia for six months following the end of UNTAC mandate, S/26546, 7 October 1993; Further report of the Secretary-General on the establishment in Phnom Penh of a team of 20 military liaison officers, S/26649, 27 October 1993, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 335-337.

¹¹⁷ Security Council resolution on transitional period in Cambodia following the withdrawal of UNTAC, S/RES/800 (1993), 4 November 1993, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 339-340.

¹¹⁸ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 52.

¹¹⁹ Final report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Military Liaison Team in Cambodia, S/1994/645, 31 May 1994, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 345-346.

extend Mr. Widnyono's term for another six months to April 1995 and that he should continue to be assisted by three military advisers for the same duration.¹²⁰

IV. Aborted Disarmament

One characteristic that distinguishes UNTAC from other peacekeeping operations is that its military component was designed to serve a paramount political goal: fulfilling the UN timetable for election. Initially its major task was to disarm and demobilize at least 70 percent of the four Cambodian warring parties to create a neutral and secure political environment in which a "fair and free" election could be held. It was on this critical issue, however, that UNTAC encountered insurmountable difficulties which eventually led to the suspension of the entire disarmament operation. After this episode, the mission of the military component turned directly to protecting the election process, a task which was not foreseen in the Paris Agreements and UN mandate. To the UNTAC military component, the traditional function of peacekeeping *per se* was not always the first priority.

A. UN Mandate, Task and Plan

The basic framework of the UNTAC mandate on military functions in general and on disarmament of warring parties in particular, was provided in the Paris Agreement and its Annex 1 and Annex 2.¹²¹ As mentioned in the last section, the primary objectives of military arrangements during the transitional period were to stabilize the security situation and build confidence among the parties to the conflict. The achievement of these objectives was a necessary precursor to the successful conduct of the functions of other components.¹²² The Secretary-General, in his proposed implementation plan for UNTAC on 19 February 1992, divided the mandate into four main aspects:

¹²⁰ Letter dated 10 October 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council informing the Council of his decision to extend for six months the term of the Secretary-General's representative in Cambodia, S/1994/1182, 19 October 1994, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 346.

¹²¹ See Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict, Section IV, Annex 1 and Annex 2, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 136, 139, 140-144.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 136; S/23613, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 163.

- (a) Verification of the withdrawal and non-return of all categories of foreign forces and their arms and equipment;
- (b) Supervision of the cease-fire and related measures, including regroupment, cantonment, disarming and demobilization;
- (c) Weapons control, including monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance, locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia, storing the arms and equipment of the cantoned and demobilized military forces;
- (d) Assisting with mine-clearance, including training programs and mine awareness programs.¹²³

With regard to the withdrawal of foreign troops, the Paris Accords stipulated that by 23 October 1992, when the Paris Agreements were signed, all foreign forces, advisers and military personnel remaining in Cambodia, together with their weapons, ammunition and equipment, should have been withdrawn from Cambodia. After its deployment, the UNTAC military component would continue its effort to verify the non-presence and non-return of any foreign forces. To accomplish this mission, UNTAC would post military observers at fixed locations where foreign forces would be likely to enter Cambodia. Twenty-four such ingress/egress points were identified along the borders with Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, at the ports of Kompong Som and Phnom Penh, and at the airports of Phnom Penh, Battambang, Siem Reap and Stung Treng. These military observers would report to UNTAC headquarters in Phnom Penh regarding any movement of combatants or arms into Cambodia. In addition, UNTAC would deploy mobile monitoring teams of military observers to investigate allegations of the presence of foreign forces.

In terms of weapons control, the UNTAC military component was responsible for monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance. This would be accomplished by military observers at fixed posts at ingress/egress points and through the monitoring and investigative activities of the mobile teams. The naval unit within the military component would supervise the patrolling of coastal areas and inland waterways for possible transportation of weaponry. UNTAC mobile teams of engineers were charged with promptly investigating reports of weapons caches and military supplies inside Cambodia. Any such caches found would be confiscated and destroyed. Also, the military component should ensure that all the cantoned military forces were disarmed and

¹²³ S/23613, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 164. For more details, see pp. 164-167.

all of the discharged arms, ammunition and equipment were placed under UNTAC custody. Once in custody, measures should be taken to ensure that the arms were secure and progressively transferred to designated areas. For these purposes, secure facilities would be established at the designated cantonment areas to deposit the weapons, ammunition, and equipment of the forces.

With regard to mine-clearance, the Paris Agreement stipulated that UNTAC shall conduct a massive public education program in the recognition and avoidance of explosive devices; train Cambodian volunteers to dispose unexploded ordnance devices; and provide emergency first-aid training to Cambodian volunteers. As mentioned earlier, UNAMIC already started some mine awareness and clearance programs in late 1991. The UNTAC military component was supposed to take over those programs. Continuation and management of these programs would be entrusted to the engineer unit within the military component. It was required that the demining effort should be undertaken in the very early stages of the mission to facilitate UNTAC's deployment and its activities.

In addition, the military component was charged with the task of undertaking investigations, on complaint from one of the parties or on its own, of alleged non-compliance with any of the provisions related to military arrangements, providing assistance to the release of prisoners-of-war and to the repatriation of Cambodian refugees.

Among these four tasks, the second one, namely disarming the warring parties, was the "centrepiece"¹²⁴ since its success "was indispensable if UNTAC is to be able to carry out its mandate in an effective and cost-efficient manner".¹²⁵ The purpose was to "create a neutral security environment as a prelude to activities aimed at creating a neutral political environment".¹²⁶ The Paris Agreement required that all troops in Cambodia should be disarmed and at least 70% of them should be demobilized before the election.¹²⁷ This task was quite formidable in military terms even without facing any political problems.

Before the establishment of UNTAC in Cambodia, a UN Military Survey Mission visited Cambodia from 17 November to 16 December 1991 to collect data and negotiate preliminary arrangements with the four factions. In its report,

¹²⁴ John M. Sanderson, "UNTAC: The Military Component View", in *Conference Papers*, *op. cit.*, n. 1, p. 73.

¹²⁵ S/23613, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 164.

¹²⁶ Personal correspondence with Lt. Gen. John Sanderson (Force Commander) and Lt Col. J. D. Healy (Chief Secretariat of the MMWG), 26 May 1995.

¹²⁷ See Annex 2 to the Paris Agreement, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 142.

the four warring parties provided data on their respective armed forces.¹²⁸ Among the four factions, the Phnom Penh government (SOC) by far had the largest armed forces (Table 1). Its CPAF was 131,000 strong; organized into three services, the army, the navy and the air force; and classified into three categories, regular forces, provincial forces and militia. The army numbered some 126,000, all ranks. The navy had a total strength of about 4,000 of all rankings and was equipped with 18 naval and 38 riverine vessels. The air force had a total strength of about 1,999 all ranks and was equipped with 21 MIG fighter aircraft, 4 MIT helicopters and 32 anti-aircraft missiles. There was also a 220,290 man militia which operated in almost all villages in the territory under the control of the SOC. They were basically armed to protect their communities. The regular forces were equipped with 181,816 weapons of all types, 168 tanks, 210 armored personnel carriers and 499 artillery pieces while the militia was equipped with a total of 91,427 weapons. The total ammunition holding of the army was about 79,082,027 rounds of small arms and 123,048 of tank and artillery.

Table 1: Armed Forces of Four Factions

	Armed forces	Militia	Weapons	Heavy weapons*	Ammunition
CPAF	131,000	220,290	273,343	877	79,205,175
NADK	27,000		20,000	176	516,000
ANKI	17,500		13,500		742,000
KPNLAF	27,800		13,600		266,000
Total	203,300	220,290	320,443	1,053	80,729,175

* Including tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery.

Source: UN military survey mission report, December 1991.

The second strongest military force was the PDK's (Khmer Rouge) NADK. It had a total strength of about 27,000 (all ranks) consisting of a regular force of about 25,000 (all ranks) and an auxiliary force of some 2,000 (all ranks). It was deployed in more than 100 clearly defined areas and locations. The NADK was

¹²⁸ For more details, see Report of the United Nations Military Survey Mission to Cambodia (hereafter cited as Survey Mission Report), New York: United Nations, 24 December 1991, pp. 6-7.

equipped with a total of some 20,000 infantry weapons of different caliber, 172 artillery pieces and four tanks. It held about 513,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, about 3,000 artillery and tank rounds. It also had about 1,180 tons of ammunition in depots.

FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF's military muscle was relatively modest. FUNCINPEC's National Army of Independent Kampuchea (ANKI) had a total strength of about 17,500 (all ranks). The force was deployed over 35 locations. It was equipped with some 13,500 weapons ranging from pistols to medium mortars and held some 742,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and mortar rounds. The KPNLF's Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF) had about 27,800 personnel, all ranks, and was deployed in some 114 localities. It was equipped with some 13,600 weapons of all caliber and held some 2,666,000 rounds of small arms ammunition.

It was estimated that the SOC controlled 85% to 90% of Cambodia's territory. The PDK was believed to have about 10-15% of the territory under its control. The other two smaller factions only held some isolated territories in the north and west border areas. So far as the population is concerned, the SOC controlled the most populated areas in the country, and the population under the PDK control was believed to be only about 5%. However, the actual areas of control were constantly shifting.¹²⁹


Based on the data provided by the four factions, it was estimated that UNTAC would need to canton and disarm over 200,000 regular military forces deployed in some 650 separate locations and some 250,000 militia forces operating in almost every village in the country. It also had to secure over 300,000 weapons of all types and some 80 million rounds of ammunition.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Chopra, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, n. 44, p. 8; Interviews with Col. Willem Huijssoon (Chief of Plans of the Military Component), 22-23 May 1995, Apeldoorn, The Netherlands.

¹³⁰ S/23613, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 165, 167. There are different opinions regarding the accuracy of the data provided by the four factions. Findlay considered the figures vastly inflated, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 31. Lt. Col. Dukers, commander of the first Dutch battalion deployed closest to PDK areas, never saw many NDPK soldiers there. He suspected that one of the reasons why the PDK was reluctant to enter cantonment was for fear of its weakness being exposed. Col. Huijssoon, the Chief of Plans of UNTAC, however, held that it is going a little bit too far to say that the factions vastly inflated their numbers. They did their best to give the UN Survey Mission the information available. The problem is even the factions themselves did not know how many troops they really had. For instance, during Operation Paymaster after the election, UNTAC discovered military units in the field which were not known to their headquarters. Interview with Lt. Col. Dukers, 19-21 May 1995, Den Helder, The Netherlands; and with Col. Huijssoon, *op. cit.*, n.129.

To disarm such huge armed forces and arsenals, the Secretary-General in his implementation plan for UNTAC asked for a massive deployment of military forces for an extended period in Cambodia. It required a strength of about 15,900, all ranks, to carry out the mandate. This force included (a) 204 force headquarters officers, (b) 12 infantry battalions (850, all ranks, each), (c) 485 military observers, (d) 582 signals unit members, (e) an engineer unit of 2,230, (f) an air support group of 326, (g) a naval unit of 376, (h) a logistic battalion of 872; (i) a medical unit of 541; and (j) a military police company of 160.¹³¹ All together, 34 countries contributed uniformed personnel. The twelve battalions came from eleven different countries: Bangladesh, Bulgaria, France, Ghana, India, Indonesia (two), Malaysia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Tunisia and Uruguay (Figure 1 and Table 2).¹³²

Figure 1: Force Structure of the UNTAC Military Component



For the purpose of deployment, Cambodia was divided into nine sectors. Each sector had its share of infantry personnel and military observers and was supported by appropriate engineer, aviation signal, medical and logistic subunits. In seven of the sectors, one battalion each was deployed. Two bigger sectors had two battalions each, thus requiring the establishment of separate sector headquarters. One battalion was served as the force reserve.¹³³ Each battalion was

¹³¹ S/23613, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 167.

¹³² Lt. Col. Steve Ayling, "UNTAC: The Ambitious Mission", in Hugh Smith (ed.), *International Peace Keeping: Challenges for the Future*, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993, p. 79.

¹³³ S/23613, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 168.

responsible for five cantonment sites within its area of operation and was at least five companies strong.¹³⁴

Table 2: Countries Contributing Military Personnel to UNTAC (as of June 1993)

Country	N	Country	N
Algeria	16	Japan	605
Argentina	2	Malaysia	1,090
Australia	685	Namibia	43
Austria	17	Netherlands	809
Bangladesh	942	New Zealand	67
Belgium	5	Pakistan	1,106
Brunei	3	Philippines	127
Bulgaria	748	Poland	666
Cameroon	14	PRC	444
Canada	218	Russia	52
Chile	52	Singapore	35
France	1,350	Senegal	2
Germany	137	Thailand	716
Ghana	912	Tunisia	883
India	1,336	United Kingdom	130
Indonesia	1,779	USA	49
Ireland	11	Uruguay	940
		Total	15,991

The force headquarters was located at Phnom Penh. It comprised the traditional branches of military staff of an operational-level headquarters. Below it there were two sector headquarters and seven sectors.¹³⁵ The battalion commanders were also Sector Commanders. Other units in the sector were under

¹³⁴ United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, *Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations: Cambodia*, UNIDIR/UNTAC/002 (Geneva: United Nations, unpublished draft), p. 18. Normally a battalion consists of three companies. The battalions were thus structured for their specific tasks.

¹³⁵ S/23613, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 168.

the command of the Sector Commander for security matters, but the functional command remained with the UNTAC HQ military component.¹³⁶

Twelve infantry battalions were mainly responsible for disarmament. Military observers would check the numbers of troops and weapons in cantonment areas, supervise the demobilization process, and establish verification teams, check-points, and liaison offices in neighboring countries for the purpose of investigating non-compliance and monitoring cessation of outside military assistance. Engineer units were in charge of the demining programs. The signals unit would establish the force's communication network. The air support unit would be responsible for providing support to all components of UNTAC. The naval unit would take care of patrolling waterways to monitor outside military supply and disarm SOC naval forces. The logistic battalion and medical unit would provide support to the military component as well as other civilian components.¹³⁷

The key mechanism through which the UNTAC military component coordinated its various operations with Cambodian factions was the MMWG. The MMWG was established in December 1991 under the chairmanship of the Senior Military Liaison Officer of UNAMIC. It would be taken over by the commander of the military component of UNTAC. As the scale of UNTAC's activities increased, similar liaison arrangements would be made at other command levels.¹³⁸ During the UNTAC mission, the MMWG consisted of several levels. At Phnom Penh HQ level, the MMWG was chaired by the Force Commander and included commanders of the faction armies. A secretariat, composed of a senior UNTAC military staff officers and military staff of the faction armies, was established under MMWG HQ to handle the coordination and negotiations between the UNTAC military component and the factions on daily basis. At the sector level, the MMWG was chaired by Sector Commanders and consisted of local military representatives of factions. The lowest level of MMWG was located at the cantonment site and coordinated by the local UNTAC military commander.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ Personal Correspondence with Col. Willem Huijssoon, 11 and 17 May 1995.

¹³⁷ S/23613, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 169.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

¹³⁹ Personal correspondence with Mary Eliza Kimball (Political Affairs Officer and Desk Officer, UNTAC), 7 June 1995; Personal Correspondence with Capt. Peter A. Bartu (Special Assistant to the Force Commander), 22 May 1995. The MMWG at HQ level became Force Commander's main instrument for dealing with the armed forces of the factions. Many major initiatives (such as UNTAC redeployment, cooperative arrangements for security during the election, unification of the armed forces) were negotiated through it. The MMWG at sector

The Paris Accord and UN mandate contained a detailed plan for the implementation of disarmament and demobilization. During its visit prior to UNTAC, the Military Survey Mission negotiated and worked out preliminary arrangements of disarmament with the four factions. The factions submitted their requests for sites first. The UN then renegotiated the number of sites in relation to the total UN force. On the one hand, the factions asked for a large number of regroupment and cantonment areas. They wanted to stay close to their villages and families. They also did not want to mix their own troops with other factions in regroupment and cantonment areas.¹⁴⁰ On the other, the UN had to man each site and therefore could only manage a finite number of sites, approximately five per UN battalion. The UN also rejected some sites due to their unsuitability (e.g. the site was subject to inundation, too remote or beyond logistic support) and made sure that all the sites were accessible by car.¹⁴¹ After negotiations, the four factions agreed to reduce the number of regroupment areas from their desired total of 325 to 95 and the number of cantonment areas from their desired total of 317 to 52.¹⁴² The 95 regroupment areas and 52 cantonment areas were distributed among the four factions:

- (a) 48 regroupment areas and 33 cantonments for the CPAF;
- (b) 30 regroupment areas and 10 cantonments for the NADK;
- (c) 8 regroupment areas and 6 cantonments for the KPNLAF;
- (d) 9 regroupment areas and 3 cantonments for the ANKI.¹⁴³

In light of the Paris Agreements, disarmament was a part of the general process of cease-fire. The Phase I of the cease-fire entered into effect with the signing of the Agreement. The four factions would observe a cease-fire and

level, however, was not very effective largely due to NADK's non-cooperation. Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126; Dukers interview, *op. cit.*, n. 130.

¹⁴⁰ Interviews with Col. Huijssoon, 10-11 March 1995, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

¹⁴¹ Bartu, *op. cit.*, n. 139; Huijssoon interviews, *op. cit.*, n. 129.

¹⁴² In February 1992, it was agreed that all cantonment information be placed on one map, providing transparency to all parties. Later evidence suggested that the SOC might have used this information to launch attacks on the NADK. The NADK liaison officer who had agreed this arrangement was never seen again. Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126.

¹⁴³ S/23613, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 165. Following further discussion with the Cambodian parties, the number of cantonment areas increased to a total of 55. See First progress report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, S/23870, 1 May 1992, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 188.

would immediately order their armed forces to disengage and refrain from all hostilities and any deployment, movement or action that would increase the amount of territory they control. The disarmament would take place in Phase II of the cease-fire and pass through four consecutive stages: regroupment, cantonment, disarmament and demobilization.¹⁴⁴ As soon as the Phase II of the cease-fire started, regroupment of forces would begin simultaneously nationwide in accordance with the timetable to be drawn up by the commander of the military component of UNTAC. The regrouped forces would then proceed with their commanders to the designated cantonment areas. At this stage the four parties were expected to produce all declared troops, weapons, ammunition and equipment. When the commander of the military component of UNTAC concluded that proper account had been rendered by all parties, the demobilization process would be conducted according to the timetable to be drawn up by UNTAC in consultation with the four factions.¹⁴⁵

In principle, troops of all four factions would be regrouped and cantoned in the same manner; however, some special arrangements were made for the CPAF's navy and air force, the Ministry of Defence and its personnel located in Phnom Penh, and the engineer and logistic units.¹⁴⁶

The SOC militia members were also subject to modification of standard procedure. They were organized and armed to protect their communities and villages. Yet their main work was farming and other civilian activities. If they had to leave their village to enter the cantonment sites as regular forces did, the disarmament would disrupt the normal social and economic life of Cambodia. To reduce the negative social impact of disarmament, all militia forces would not be physically cantoned. Instead they would be asked to report to the local headquarters designated by UNTAC in order to turn in their weapons.¹⁴⁷

To fulfill these tasks of disarmament, the UNTAC mandate also specified the sequence and timetable for the force deployment and mission completion. The deployment of the military force would start with engineer units who would continue and expand the mine program and undertake rehabilitating vital infrastructure. It would be followed by the arrival of logistics units who would establish a logistic base for UNTAC. The remaining military personnel would be deployed by one week prior to the start of Phase II of the cease-fire, namely the

144 A/46/608-S/23177, Annex 2 to Paris Agreement, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 140.

145 S/23613, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 165.

146 For details, see *Ibid.*

147 *Ibid.*

disarmament. The infantry battalions would be deployed at the designated regroupment and cantonment areas. Other military personnel of UNTAC would be deployed mainly at the ingress/egress points. It was proposed that full deployment of the military component be accomplished by the end of May 1992. The regroupment and cantonment processes, as well as the demobilization of at least 70% of the cantoned forces, should be completed by the end of September 1992.¹⁴⁸

The original implementation plan foresaw a quick force reduction following an effective regroupment, cantonment and demobilization process. The numbers of military observers and infantry personnel would be reduced to approximately 330 and 5,100 respectively after 30 September 1992, the designated date for the completion of demobilization. At the same time, the sizes of the signals unit, air support group, engineer element and logistics and medical units would not change significantly in order to support the other components of UNTAC throughout this period. After the election, it might be possible to reduce considerably the size of each of the elements of the military component.¹⁴⁹

B. Inadequate Preparation for Disarmament

While the UN mandate for the military component and its implementation plan was miraculously articulated and mechanically rationalized, the reality on the ground was often too difficult to be solved even by the best plan on paper. In both the deployment of the UNTAC military component and the conduct of its mission of disarmament, the Force Commander had to constantly make adjustments to adapt to the changeable circumstances.

Both practitioners and scholars agree that the commencement of Phase II of the cease-fire in June 1992 did not have a solid human and material basis. Among other things, the deployment of the military component was far behind schedule. As of the end of April 1992, the total number of troops within Cambodia was only 3,694. Of the 24 checkpoints planned to monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces and verify the cessation of external weapon supplies, only three had been established. By 13 June when Phase II was supposed to start, 2 out of 12 battalions had not yet arrived in Cambodia. Only 4 UNTAC battalions were fully deployed to their sectors with all equipment ready to start cantonment. The logistic units were not operational and the medical system consisted of only battalion aid posts and a hospital in Phnom Penh. Until April 1992, there were

¹⁴⁸ S/23613, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 169.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 168.

only three officers in Phnom Penh to look after all the logistics aspects of UNAMIC and to plan for the arrival of UNTAC. Anticipating the difficulties in supply, the UN mandate required that all battalions should arrive in Cambodia with 60 days' self sufficiency without resupply. But some units did not do so. One battalion arrived with 850 men with just rucksacks and rifles. The deployment was poorly coordinated. Contrary to the original plan, infantry battalions arrived before the logistic and engineering units. The procurement of transport and tenders for vital logistic support contracts had fallen behind schedule.¹⁵⁰

On the Cambodian side, the physical conditions for a large scale cantonment were simply not present. According to the UN plan, the four factions would take the responsibility for the preparation of cantonment sites and for providing food and services to the cantoned troops.¹⁵¹ In practice, this was an impossible task for them. As early as November/ December 1991, the factions informed the UN Military Survey Mission that they would have great problems in providing adequate shelters for their forces in the cantonment areas. This problem would be even more serious if it was not addressed before the start of the rainy season. They also stressed that the resupply or feeding of all the troops cantoned would also be difficult. Unless this problem was adequately resolved there would be a large incidence of deserters in search of food. Such a development would have had a very negative effect on the whole disarmament aspect.¹⁵²

These predicted difficulties emerged soon after UNTAC went into effect. Col. Huijssoon estimated that by June 1992, the factions had only constructed 10% of the required shelters in the cantonments.¹⁵³ Lt. Col. Dukers "never found anything (in his sector) which resembled preparation for cantonment".¹⁵⁴ If all faction forces were cantoned, about 200,000 soldiers would arrive in the cantonment areas. They had to build their own shelters. Most cantonment sites were not located near fresh water supplies. The factions had the responsibility for the supply of food and medical care, but none of them had normal military logistic and medical capabilities. A lack of daily necessities could have caused serious trouble. There was also a shortage of human resources on the UNTAC side. On the average, each UNTAC infantry platoon of 35 men faced 1200 faction

¹⁵⁰ See *Ibid.*; S/23870, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 187; Col. Willem Huijssoon, Briefing on Cambodia and UNTAC, 9 March 1995, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland; Briefing to the Countries' Representatives Providing Contingents to UNTAC, 6 April 1992, New York, p. 1/9; Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, pp. 33; 36; Chopra, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, n. 44, pp. 19-20.

¹⁵¹ UNTAC Military Component SOP, p. 3.29.

¹⁵² Survey Mission Report, *op. cit.*, n. 128, p. 11.

¹⁵³ Huijssoon briefing, *op. cit.*, n. 150.

¹⁵⁴ Dukers interview, *op. cit.*, n. 130.

soldiers. In some cases, one platoon assisted by an UNMO team had to canton and disarm 3000 faction soldiers.¹⁵⁵

In summary, as General Michel Loridon (Deputy Force Commander) pointed out, "even had they [Khmer Rouge] agreed to disarm, we would have had major problems in carrying out the operation because it had been so badly prepared at the technical and psychological level".¹⁵⁶ That was why when the cantonment process was eventually abandoned in face of the lack of cooperation by the PDK. Many in the UNTAC military forces felt relieved and the Force Commander even said, "They saved us".¹⁵⁷

Against this background of inadequate preparation, the Force Commander, General Sanderson, announced on 9 May that Phase II of the cease-fire -- the regroupment, cantonment, disarming and demobilization -- would start on 13 June. He and his senior staff were caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, he realized that the troops were not fully deployed and operational yet. So from the military point of view, Phase II should be postponed. As he later recalled, he made "the 'perilous decision' to begin (disarmament) on 13 June with only 8 1/2 infantry battalions".¹⁵⁸ On the other hand, he could not delay the start of the disarmament for two reasons. First, the delay would frustrate the UNTAC schedule which required that the demobilization should be completed by the end of September 1992 to avoid delaying the election. Second, he was concerned that if the disarmament was not carried out during the rainy season, there was a risk of the return of warfare in the dry season beginning in November.¹⁵⁹ As he described it, "13 June was the earliest possible date to begin Phase II. It was also the latest possible date to have cantonment and disarmament completed before the beginning of the [dry] season".¹⁶⁰ In the final analysis, political considerations prevailed over military rationales.

¹⁵⁵ Huijssoon briefing, *op. cit.*, n. 150.

¹⁵⁶ Brig. Gen. Michel Loridon, Letter dated 8 March 1995.

¹⁵⁷ Huijssoon briefing, *op. cit.*, n. 150. However, it is interesting to note that people on the civilian side do not always share this concern of the military side. Mary Eliza Kimball, for instance, held that UNTAC would not have faced any major difficulties in carrying out disarmament, had the PDK cooperated. Kimball personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 139.

¹⁵⁸ Janet E. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition, the United Nations in Cambodia*, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994, p. 69.

¹⁵⁹ Huijssoon briefing, *op. cit.*, n. 150.

¹⁶⁰ Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126.

C. The PDK's Non-Compliance

The disarmament phase of the mission was further confounded by the PDK's refusal to enter Phase II. In the initial stage of the UNTAC mission, the PDK seemed to be cooperating though without enthusiasm. The cease-fire was generally maintained. There were some armed clashes in Kompong Hom where forces of all four Cambodian parties were present. The UNTAC investigation indicated that the PDK was responsible for the clashes, but the PDK denied it. UNTAC forces were able to restore the cease-fire by deploying 200 UN troops in the town of Kompong Thom to verify the withdrawal of opposing forces. The PDK also started removing some restrictions on access by UNTAC to proceed with the reconnaissance and identification of sites for the regroupment and cantonment of forces.¹⁶¹ It permitted deployment of Military Liaison Officers who were still there and operating as Military Observers.¹⁶² The PDK, like other factions, agreed to deploy military representatives to the other factions' headquarters.¹⁶³ Khieu Samphan actively participated in SNC meetings. The PDK accepted UNTAC's repatriation program and UNTAC civilians in contested areas. It did not object to the SNC's decision to join international human rights instruments and attended UNTAC's police training program.¹⁶⁴ Before the Force Commander announced the date of Phase II, he obtained assurances from the factions, including the PDK, that they would grant freedom of movement to UNTAC personnel, vehicles and aircraft; mark minefields in the areas under their control; and provide UNTAC with information on their troops, arms, ammunition and equipment by 20 May 1992.¹⁶⁵ In fact, the PDK was the one who insisted on the earliest date of commencement of Phase II of the cease-fire.¹⁶⁶ Although Mr. Akashi was "not fully satisfied at the freedom of movement" in PDK-controlled areas, he acknowledged that at the outset of the UNTAC operation, "there was still a distinct impression that DK was willing to cooperate with UNTAC".¹⁶⁷

However, it soon became quite clear that the PDK had changed its attitude toward disarmament. Increasingly it chose not to fulfill its commitments in this

¹⁶¹ S/23870, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 188.

¹⁶² Ataul Karim, "A Political Analysis of the Cambodian Situation", in *Conference Papers*, *op. cit.*, n. 1, p. 67.

¹⁶³ Frank Frost, "The Peace Process in Cambodia: The First Stage", Background Paper Number 14, Australia: Department of the Parliamentary Library, 24 June 1992, p. 5.

¹⁶⁴ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 51.

¹⁶⁵ S/24090, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 191.

¹⁶⁶ Karim, *op. cit.*, n. 162, p. 67.

¹⁶⁷ Frost, *op. cit.*, n. 163, p. 5; Akashi, *op. cit.*, n. 2, p. 189.

respect. After the Force Commander announced the date of Phase II, the PDK refused to allow the Dutch battalion into Sector 1, the Pakistani battalion into Sector 3 and other battalions into the area under its control and planned cantonment sites. The Dutch battalion was responsible for Sector 1 which was largely controlled by the PDK. The troops were sent to Thailand in May. From there they were supposed to enter Sector 1 and establish Sector Headquarters in Pailin, the official headquarters of PDK. However, they were stopped at the border by NADK and forced to remain in the reception area in Pattaya in Thailand.¹⁶⁸ On 30 May, the SRSG, the Force Commander, and other senior UNTAC officials tried to get to the Thai border from Pailin to meet the Dutch troops. Nevertheless, NADK soldiers prevented them from doing so. The PDK also failed to provide information about its troops to UNTAC and mark minefields in its areas.¹⁶⁹ On 3 June, the day that officially kicked off Phase II, the Secretary-General sent Mr. Khieu Samphan a personal appeal for the implementation of Phase II. The response from the PDK was not committed.¹⁷⁰ On 9 June, Mr. Akashi received a letter from the PDK stating that it was not in a position to allow UNTAC forces to proceed with their deployment in the areas under its control.¹⁷¹ On 10 June, the PDK formally announced that it would not participate in Phase II.¹⁷²

Exactly why the PDK changed its strategy remains anybody's guess even today.¹⁷³ First of all, although hard evidence never emerged in a systematic way, observers and practitioners alike believed that the PDK was not a monolithic body

¹⁶⁸ The Dutch battalion commander and a few of his staff managed to get in the area and even visited Pailin by using various tactics, but later on they were denied all the entrances. Dukers interview, *op. cit.*, n. 130.

¹⁶⁹ S/24090, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 192-193. As a result of PDK's non-cooperation, the Dutch troops had to deploy themselves in Cambodia in June along the rim of the PDK-controlled areas with the Sector Headquarters in Ssophon. One Dutch company was also able to establish a limited presence in the Southern part of Sector One (Sok San) with the help of KPNLF. This was an enclave surrounded by PDK-controlled areas and was believed to be very close to the PDK's real headquarters. The UNTAC presence proved to be a nuisance to the PDK which repeatedly threatened it. UNTAC maintained a company there even when the battalions were redeployed according to new sectors and until the end of its mission. Before its withdrawal, the KPNLF troops asked UNTAC to help them evacuate. For unknown reasons, their request was refused. It is said that these people were all killed by the PDK after the UN pulled out. Dukers interview, *op. cit.*, n. 130.

¹⁷⁰ S/24090, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 192.

¹⁷¹ S/24090, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 192.

¹⁷² Frost, *op. cit.*, n. 163, p. 9.

¹⁷³ For a general discussion of various theoretical explanations, see Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, pp. 49-51.

but was divided on the issue of the peace process from the very beginning. The moderates probably saw the Paris Agreements as the only way to retain some of the PDK's power while the hard-liners might have been uninterested in any arrangements which might eliminate their chance to regain power.¹⁷⁴ The balance between the moderates and hard-liners was often tipped by internal power struggles and external developments.

The situation immediately after the signing of the peace agreements certainly did not help the moderates within the PDK. The attempts by the SOC and Prince Sihanouk to outmanoeuvre the PDK alarmed the hard-liners. Upon his return to Phnom Penh in November 1991, Sihanouk declared an alliance with Hun Sen and repudiated his earlier alliance with the PDK, suggesting that the top leadership of the PDK should be put on trial.¹⁷⁵ This was followed by the SOC-orchestrated riots against Khieu Samphan and his associates on 27 November. These two incidents, according to Sanderson and Healy, undermined any ascendancy that the moderates in the PDK might have commanded.¹⁷⁶

The hard-liners' hand was further strengthened by the unfortunate delay of UNTAC's deployment. It was well-recognized that the delay lost the PDK's confidence in and respect for UNTAC and enhanced its defiance. The PDK was among the most active in advocating an early deployment of UNTAC. The failure to quickly establish a credible UN military presence in Cambodia especially around DPK-controlled areas was seen by the PDK as an indication of weakness. For instance, when the Dutch battalion first approached Pailin by road from Thailand, the NADK was unimpressed by its slowness and unpreparedness and turned it back. By the time a more impressive arrival was planned to coincide with the presence of the SRSG and the Force Commander in Pailin, the NADK position had irrevocably hardened.¹⁷⁷ Another incident that might have made the PDK unhappy was that in April 1992 when the PDK requested that a particular contingent from ASEAN countries instead of the Dutch battalion be sent to its territory. They promised to facilitate immediate deployment if their request was

¹⁷⁴ Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126; Kimball personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 139; Huijssoon interview, *op. cit.*, n. 129.

¹⁷⁵ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 24; Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ See Chopra, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, n. 44, pp. 20-21.

satisfied. This demand was turned down on the ground that UNTAC must have the final say on such matters and the parties had no right to choose.¹⁷⁸

It was also widely believed that the PDK's lack of cooperation was related to the unofficial support the PDK had received from the Thai military on the western border of Cambodia. The PDK was provided fuel, food, and machinery from Thailand. UNTAC at once perceived the financial needs of the Cambodian factions as soft spots to cultivate their cooperation and designed an extensive rehabilitation component to guarantee steady rewards for cooperative behavior. However, the PDK's highly profitable log and gem trade for weapons and other necessities with the Thai military made it financially better off than other factions, and thus the UN economic aid less attractive.¹⁷⁹ As an American military observer said, "As long as the KR are making money, there's no incentive for them to follow any of the stipulations in the peace agreement".¹⁸⁰ Lt. Col. Dukers also held that Thai support was the key to the problem. If Thailand shut down its border to PDK, the conflict could be over very soon. As it was, the PDK did not see much benefit in turning this rich sector over to the UNTAC and sharing it with other factions. Moreover, Dukers believed that NADK did not have as many soldiers as it claimed. By keeping UNTAC out, they could avoid exposing their weakness.¹⁸¹

The reasons officially presented by the PDK for its non-compliance were related to its confidence and trust in UNTAC. Among other things, the PDK asserted that Vietnamese troops were still present in Cambodia. For security reasons, the PDK had to defer its obligation in participating in the disarmament until the Vietnamese withdrawal and non-return had been verified by UNTAC.¹⁸² To some extent, this view was also shared by two other resistance parties although they did not make it a condition for their participation in Phase II. The

¹⁷⁸ Karim, *op. cit.*, n. 162, p. 68; Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126. According to them, UNTAC could not respond to the PDK's attempts to identify "good UNTAC's" which could enter its zones and "bad UNTAC's", which could not. Factions cannot be given authority to manipulate the UN command in this way. In Lt. Col. Dukers' opinion, the PDK once tried to make a deal with the Dutch battalion through the Thai military. After the Dutch refused to do so, the PDK requested the replacement of the Dutch battalion. Dukers interview, *op. cit.*, n. 130.

¹⁷⁹ Frost, *op. cit.*, n. 163, p. 11; Michael W. Doyle, "UNTAC: Sources of Success and Failure", in Hugh Smith (ed.), *International Peacekeeping, Building on the Cambodian Experience*, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994, pp. 94, 97.

¹⁸⁰ Brown, *op. cit.*, n. 46, p. 21.

¹⁸¹ Dukers interview, *op. cit.*, n. 130.

¹⁸² S/24090, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 193.

difficulty with this issue was what the PDK and other factions had in mind was not just Vietnamese troops in uniform but the large quantity of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. Many of them settled in Cambodia following the tanks of Vietnamese troops. Thousands also entered the country to take advantage of the economic opportunities created by the UNTAC presence.¹⁸³ After centuries of antagonism with Vietnam, Cambodians had acquired a strong anti-Vietnamese sentiment. The three resistance parties and many other Cambodians opposed their participation in the political process, including the election, fearing that it would affect the neutral political environment.¹⁸⁴ Mr. Son Sann, the leader of KPNLF, noted: "To state that there is no evidence of the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia is equivalent to the declaration by the Cambodians that there is no evidence of the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops". He demanded that all Vietnamese settlers who came to Cambodia since the Vietnamese invasion in 1979 must return to Vietnam before the election.¹⁸⁵

UNTAC denied the charge that there were still military troops in Cambodia; however, it did take some measures to address the PDK's concerns. It established Strategic Investigation Teams (SIT's) to follow up allegations of the continued presence of foreign forces.¹⁸⁶ It established 10 border checkpoints, one more than envisaged in the implementation plan, on the Cambodia-Vietnamese border. It invited the representatives of the four parties to participate in manning these checkpoints. On 30 May, UNTAC launched mobile military teams to carry out investigations of any alleged violation of the provisions of Annex 2 to the Paris Agreement and invited the parties to submit any such allegations regarding the presence of foreign troops. On 1 June, the PDK submitted a list of allegations regarding the presence of foreign forces in Cambodia. UNTAC requested the PDK to send people to accompany UNTAC's investigation of these allegations. The PDK did not do so.¹⁸⁷ As Force Commander Sanderson pointed out, although the PDK complained about Vietnamese troops, it never helped in any way to investigate the matter. No allegation was ever substantiated and no forces with

¹⁸³ Doyle, *op. cit.*, n. 179, p. 87.

¹⁸⁴ Karim, *op. cit.*, n. 162, p. 67; Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, pp. 45, 48; *Phnom Penh Post*, 7 August 1992, p. 4.

¹⁸⁵ Contribution dated 30 September 1992 by Mr. Son Sann to the search for a solution to the deadlock in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, Document 48, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 224.

¹⁸⁶ S/25719, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 291.

¹⁸⁷ S/24090, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 193.

any significance in terms of the agreements were ever found.¹⁸⁸ However, seven Vietnamese soldiers were identified in early 1993.¹⁸⁹ While the number was insignificant, UNTAC's credibility was questioned by the Cambodians.¹⁹⁰

The second major allegation lodged by the PDK was that UNTAC did not exert effective control of SOC's administrative structures as stipulated in the Paris Accords and the UN mandate. As a result, a neutral political environment did not exist for the disarming of its troops. In his letter dated 27 June, Khieu Samphan argued that there should be no government in Cambodia during the transitional period. Authority in Cambodia should emanate from the cooperation between UNTAC and the SNC. He proposed to establish a Consultative Committee of the SNC within the existing administrative structures and the police forces of all the Cambodian parties.¹⁹¹ In a proposal dated 12 July 1992, the PDK further required that necessary measures be taken without delay to enable the existing administrative structures of the four Cambodian parties to function free from the directives and policies of any "government". It more specifically related the implementation of the cantonment of its armed forces week by week in conjunction with the so-called "depoliticizing" of the five main Ministries of National Defence, Public Security, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Information, and the People's Assembly.¹⁹²

This demand, of course, was a political issue beyond the capacity of the military component. UNTAC regarded the PDK demand as asking for "the

¹⁸⁸ Sanderson, "UNTAC: The Military Component View", *op. cit.*, n. 124, p. 74.

¹⁸⁹ UNTAC, Military Component, Spokesman's Office, 30 April 1993; S725719, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 291.

¹⁹⁰ Conversation with Mark Lemieux (UNTAC Volunteer, District Electoral Supervisor), 7 March 1995, UNIDIR, Geneva.

¹⁹¹ Letter dated 7 July 1992 from Mr. Khieu Samphan, member of the Supreme National Council, transmitting proposal of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) on cooperation between UNTAC and the Supreme National Council. Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 198-199.

¹⁹² He proposed the following timetable for disarmament: 1st week, the PDK would accept the regroupment and cantonment of 10 percent of its armed forces if the SOC agreed to de-politicize the Ministries of National Defence and Public Security; 2nd week, disarmament of another 20 percent of its armed forces with the de-politicization of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance; 3rd week, disarmament of another 30 percent of the troops with the de-politicization of the Ministry of Information; 4th week, disarmament of remaining 40 percent of the troops with the de-politicization of the People's Assembly, the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers, the presidency of the State of Cambodia and other ministers. Proposal dated 12 July 1992 of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea on the implementation of phase II of the cease-fire and the regroupment and cantonment of the forces of the PDK, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 200-201.

dissolution" of the main SOC structures and institutions and therefore going beyond the mandate of the Paris Agreements, which asked that UNTAC control be exercised through the "existing administrative structure" of each of the four Cambodian parties rather than abolishing or dismantling them.¹⁹³ In reality, only the SOC had a nationwide administrative structure and apparatus. FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF had very little and the PDK's was localized and not accessible.¹⁹⁴ While the PDK's standards might be too high and prejudiced, it is widely recognized that UNTAC's control and supervision of the SOC government was ineffective.¹⁹⁵ Due to lack of sufficient administrative staff and political will, as well as SOC's resistance, UNTAC was unable to exercise control over the five key ministries required by the UN mandate, especially SOC's security and police forces which were systematically used for the political intimidation and violence described in the last section.¹⁹⁶ The SOC long resisted disarming its 36,000 strong police forces. As General Sanderson pointed out, these were not community police, but the politicized forces of a one-party state. With the armed forces of the parties cantoned, the relative power of the police would have been greater. In his words, "With the SOC police intact and still under Party control, the Khmer Rouge could not allow UNTAC to disarm the NADK without making themselves vulnerable".¹⁹⁷

D. Coping with the Renegade PDK

PDK's refusal to enter Phase II presented UNTAC with a difficult choice: whether it should postpone the mission until the PDK agreed to cooperate or follow the original schedule even though the PDK's military forces would remain armed. The UN chose to follow the original dates announced by General Sanderson. In his special report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General argued that "any significant delay in the implementation of the military aspects of the plan would result in a loss of the momentum that has been carefully built up in recent weeks and would jeopardize UNTAC's ability to organize the

¹⁹³ Second special report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC and phase II of the cease-fire, S/24286, 14 July 1992, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 202.

¹⁹⁴ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 59.

¹⁹⁵ Since this study focuses on disarmament, no detailed analysis of this issue is attempted. Those interested can read Chopra, *op. cit.*, n. 44, pp. 22-23; Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, pp. 59-63; Doyle, *op. cit.*, n. 179, pp. 88-89.

¹⁹⁶ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 60.

¹⁹⁷ Sanderson, "UNTAC: The Military Component View", *op. cit.*, n. 124, pp. 73-74.

elections by April or May 1993".¹⁹⁸ The Security Council endorsed his position on 12 June.¹⁹⁹ Consequently Phase II of the cease-fire, namely the disarmament of warring parties, formally commenced on 13 June 1992 without the participation of the PDK.

However, the Secretary-General was aware that the operation would not be sustainable for more than a brief period without the cooperation of all parties. So he regarded the adherence to the original schedule as a short term solution and asked for full-fledged efforts be made to draw the PDK onto the board.²⁰⁰ Diplomatic attempts were made in this regard through several channels. At the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia held in Tokyo on 22 June 1992, an informal "proposal for discussion" (Tokyo proposal) was presented to the Cambodian factions, setting out a number of measures designed to respond to the concerns expressed by the PDK, including having the SNC assume a more active role in advising the Special Representative, accelerating UNTAC's deployment of its civil administration staff and having observers from each of the four factions work with UNTAC in investigating allegations concerning foreign forces and other military matters. Three Cambodian factions accepted the proposal at an emergency meeting of the SNC convened in Tokyo that same day, but the PDK was not satisfied.²⁰¹

Facing the PDK's continuing resistance to disarmament, on 14 July 1992 (one month after the kick off of Phase II), the Secretary-General again raised two possible courses of action to the Security Council: the first was to suspend the operation of disarmament until all parties could be persuaded to fulfill their obligation, and the second was to continue the process to demonstrate that the international community remained determined to implement the Paris Agreements according to its timetable. Again he was preoccupied with whether the election could be held as scheduled. He recommended the continuation of regroupment and cantonment wherever possible although he limited the operation to areas where there was no military confrontation. Also, some cantoned troops might be permitted to keep their weapons until the situation was clarified. In the meantime, he asked for continuing efforts to persuade the PDK to join the process.²⁰²

¹⁹⁸ S/24090, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 193.

¹⁹⁹ S/24091, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 194.

²⁰⁰ S/24090, Blue Book II; *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 193.

²⁰¹ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 21.

²⁰² S/24286, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 203.

Another round of diplomatic effort was made to mediate the disagreement between the PDK and UNTAC. The Security Council invited Japan and Thailand to carry out this mission and report the results to the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference by 31 October 1992. Japan and Thailand undertook four consultations with the PDK during late October. In the dialogue, the PDK noted that considerable progress had been made by UNTAC in verification of the withdrawal from Cambodia of all categories of foreign forces and their non-return to the country. However, they were still not satisfied with the weak supervision and control of the existing administrative structures by UNTAC. The PDK asserted that UNTAC cooperated with only one of the Cambodian parties rather than with the SNC in its implementation of the Paris Agreements. Therefore, on 31 October 1992, Thailand and Japan reported that they had been unable to resolve the difficulties.²⁰³

The repeated diplomatic frustration triggered debates within UNTAC and the international community about whether stiffer actions should be taken to deal with the PDK. The Paris Agreements did not contain any explicit provisions to deal with non-compliance. They were premised on the "good faith" of the factions to carry out their obligations. The only thing that allowed room for more discrete interpretation was Article 29 which says:

Without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Security Council of the United Nations, and upon the request of the Secretary-General, the two Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, in the event of a violation or threat of violation of this Agreement, will immediately undertake appropriate consultation, including with members of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, with a view to taking appropriate steps to ensure respect for these commitments.²⁰⁴

This article was cited by some parties to advocate stronger measures to force the PDK enter the disarmament. As Secretary-General noted, "that debate -- over whether peacekeeping should at some point become something more assertive -- was joined at several points during the course of the operation".²⁰⁵

One possible course of action was to put economic pressures on the PDK. In his letter to the Secretary-General dated 27 July, SRSG Yasushi Akashi

²⁰³ Report by the Governments of Japan and Thailand addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Co-Chairmen of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia dated 31 October 1992, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 234-235.

²⁰⁴ Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 138.

²⁰⁵ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 18.

concluded that "So long as we stand firm on the strict implementation of the Paris Accord, there is not too much we can do to satisfy the DK". He suggested that the Security Council should take stronger resolutions against the PDK. UNTAC could use economic pressures on the PDK by strengthening the border checkpoints adjacent to the DK zones in order to control the inflow of arms and petroleum and the outflow of gems and logs which were the major source of the PDK's income. He believed that under such external pressure, the PDK might well change its mind in two months or so and allow UNTAC to enter their zones and start cantonment.²⁰⁶ His idea was echoed by a proposal put forward by Australia in September. The document, entitled: "Cambodia: next step", suggested that the Security Council should set a date to impose economic sanctions against the PDK. If the PDK remained uncooperative, UNTAC should move the peace process ahead even if it meant an election without the PDK.²⁰⁷ This approach of imposing economic pressure was partially adopted by the Security Council. On 30 November 1992, the Security Council called for measures to prevent the supply of petroleum products from reaching areas occupied by any Cambodian faction not complying with the military provisions of the Paris Agreements. The Council also began to consider other measures, such as freezing PDK assets held outside Cambodia, should the PDK continue to obstruct implementation of the peace plan.²⁰⁸ As Findlay put it, the resolution was a compromise between the hard-line approach of the USA and the UK, a softer-line French draft, and the opposition of the UN Secretary-General to any type of sanctions at that stage.²⁰⁹ The measure was not effective simply because UNTAC

²⁰⁶ Letter dated 27 July 1992 from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cambodia to the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Cambodia, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 206-207.

²⁰⁷ "Cambodia: Next Steps", Australian paper dated 16 September 1992, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 208-210.

²⁰⁸ Security Council resolution on implementation of Cambodia peace process, S/RES/792 (1992), 30 November 1992, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 244. The measure, however, was more symbolic than substantial. To avoid China's possible veto, the motion was passed as a non-binding resolution. China cast its only abstention in the whole process by saying that it fully supported the agreements' implementation, but could not support the resolution's provisions that seemed to encourage an economic embargo or raised the possibility of proceeding with an election that would have the participation of only three Cambodian parties. See *UN Chronicle*, March 1993, p. 25.

²⁰⁹ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 44.

had no access to PDK-controlled areas. More important, Thailand refused to allow UNTAC to establish checkpoints on its territories.²¹⁰

A more radical approach was to turn the operation from peacekeeping to peace-enforcing by using military force to disarm the NADK. Within UNTAC, "from beginning to end", the Force Commander "was plagued by appeals for the UNTAC military component to become involved in internal security operations".²¹¹ The pressure mainly came from the civilian side. In the military component, Deputy Force Commander General Loridon was the one who advocated such an approach. He was quoted as suggesting that he would accept the deaths of up to 200 soldiers, including his own, to end the PDK threat once and for all.²¹² Under pressure and frustrated by the impotence in carrying out the mission in the PDK area, Mr. Akashi at one point contemplated this option. Sometime in July, he ordered the military component to draw up a contingent plan called "dovetail". The plan pointed out that after all options to persuade the NADK to join Phase II had failed, it was necessary to take measures to break the impasse. One such step was to establish border check points northwest of Pailin on the Thai-Cambodian border to exercise the right of freedom of movement and to ensure that the civil components were permitted to carry out their tasks without hindrance. More specifically, the Dutch battalion with affiliated military and civil components was responsible for establishing border check points at Ban Bung Chanang and Khao Katoï both of which were major crossing points in this area. The plan envisaged various contingencies that might arise. Force could be used to overcome possible resistance by the NADK. The objective was to demonstrate that UNTAC was in control in Cambodia by showing force. In August, reconnaissance was made for the operation.²¹³

The Force Commander Sanderson, and most of his senior military staff, thought that such an operation was ill-advised. It was also opposed by the Dutch battalion commander who would be responsible for carrying out the operation. They argued that such an operation could gain little from success but lose a lot from failure. With casualties, UNTAC might be able to fight its way in and build some check points in the PDK-controlled areas. However, the troops would stay

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ Sanderson, "UNTAC: The Military Component View", *op. cit.*, n. 124, p. 76.

²¹² He was later relieved of his position, Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, pp. 37-38. However his advocating of the use of force in dealing with the PDK was not the only reason for his dismissal. He and the Force Commander obviously did not agree on other matters such as the command and control of military observers. His successor was largely kept out of the decision-making process. Huijssoon interview, *op. cit.*, n. 129.

²¹³ Dukers interview, *op. cit.*, n. 130; Huijssoon interview, *op. cit.*, n. 129.

in a no-man's land, surrounded by mines, and unable to do anything. Also, because of the existence of a large number of UNTAC civilian and police staff in the area, they would be vulnerable to a NADK attack, and therefore UNTAC would be creating its own hostage situation. More importantly, establishing check points by force without a positive change in NADK's attitude would get nowhere near bringing the PDK into the process of disarmament. Rather the confrontation between the PDK and UNTAC would escalate. Lacking support from the military component, the operation was finally cancelled in September.²¹⁴

On a more general level, the military component believed that using force in Cambodia was beyond UNTAC's mandate and capacity. As General Sanderson and Col. Huijssoon indicated first, because the Paris Agreements did not provide any mechanism for peace-enforcement in the event of a violation or threat of violations, peace-enforcement would require a totally new mandate from the Security Council. The international community as well as Cambodians were split over who should be blamed for the problem. If enforcement became necessary, the Security Council consensus would collapse and many countries such as Japan would certainly pull their contingents out. Second, the UNTAC military component did not have the right force structure, right color and right attitude. It was not organized for offensive operations. The military component did not have air force, artillery, combat engineer capabilities, etc. The officers and soldiers were trained and instructed for peacekeeping and not for peace-enforcing.²¹⁵ In General Sanderson's words, peace-enforcement "would have required a force several times larger than the one we had, one structured and equipped for a protracted conflict, and at a significant greater cost".²¹⁶ Yet he was convinced that even if such a force had been available, it "would have been doomed to disaster, even if it had been given wide international support, since it would have required a UN force to take sides in an internal conflict".²¹⁷ In other words, he did not believe that UN military forces were able to resolve a domestic conflict.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵ Huijssoon briefing, *op. cit.*, n. 150; Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126.

²¹⁶ Sanderson, "UNTAC: The Military Component View", *op. cit.*, n. 124, p. 75.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

E. A Short-Lived Phase II

Phase II of the cease-fire was thus carried out under very precarious political circumstances with one major faction reneging on its commitments. This surely further complicated the already difficult task of disarmament even if all factions cooperated. The UN military component had very detailed Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) for regroupment, cantonment and disarmament.²¹⁸ As mentioned earlier, for operational purposes, Cambodia was divided into nine sectors. Each of these sectors had a number of sites where the armed forces of the four factions would be cantoned. One battalion each would be deployed in each sector except Sectors 5 and 9 which would each have two battalions. Where possible, the cantonments of various factions were kept distinct from each other and were grouped in such a way that their identity was maintained. The implementation was divided into a cantonment phase and a demobilization phase. During the cantonment phase, UNTAC Cantonment Area Commanders were supposed to meet with local Cambodian commanders or their representatives at an early opportunity before D-Day to form a Cantonment Coordination Working Group (CCWG). The CCWG should start functioning well before the commencement of regroupment and continue till the end. Through the CCWG, the regrouped and cantoned troops would be briefed on what was to occur and their responsibilities and necessary directions, instructions and policies would be passed to those troops. Regroupment was defined as a process in which Cambodian faction forces pull out of their tactical deployment and concentrate at pre-selected checkpoints/rendezvous under the command and control of their own arrangements for further cantonment and demobilization. The complete responsibility of pulling out and relocating within the checkpoints lay with the factions themselves. Regroupment points would be those points on ground manned by UNTAC personnel from where the status of Cambodian Forces changed and UNTAC personnel assumed the responsibility of escorting these forces from regroupment points to cantonment sites.

On receiving clearance from the Cantonment Area Commander, the forces to be cantoned would depart for the cantonment area under UNTAC escort. The regroupment center commander would turn over the forces to the escort commander. At the designated entrance to the cantonment area, a reception center

²¹⁸ Even the speeches that were to be delivered to the troops to be disarmed were prepared in SOP's. For details, see UNTAC Military Component SOP, Part 3 Operations. They were largely adapted and expanded from the SOP's used in the UN mission in Namibia. Ayling, *op. cit.*, n. 132, p. 81.

would be established where the Escort Commander reported and handed over responsibility for the escorted forces to the cantonment area commander. The forces would then be directed to a processing area and the Cambodian Forces Commander would then be requested to order his soldiers to prepare their weapons for storage. Each soldier's individual details would then be recorded and his weapons and ammunition handed in to UNTAC custody and a receipt would be given to him. The weapons would then be moved to a location for storage. The handing in of weapons could be followed by payment of a sum of money or a quantity of food as an inducement to others to turn in their weapons. This would be followed by a brief medical check of each soldier's basic conditions. They would also be issued with any clothing, food and necessities which would be immediately required in the cantonment area. Following this, the soldiers would be moved under unit arrangements to the designated accommodation area.

The cantoned forces must remain in the Cantonment Area until demobilized, or until responsibility was accepted for them by the legitimate Cambodian Government following the election. UN forces were responsible for making sure that these troops remained in cantonment sites and were not rearmed. These forces, however, would remain under the command of their own officers and any incidents requiring UNTAC intervention should be resolved. In the event of non-cooperation of any member of the Cambodian forces, the matter should be taken up to the next highest Cambodian forces and raised at the MMWG if necessary. UN forces should avoid becoming involved in conflict in any way other than in legitimate self-defense. Should a situation become out of control, evacuation of UNTAC personnel might be warranted.

Following withdrawal from the Cambodian forces, weapons and ammunition must be secured and placed under UN control. The buildings should be locked and under effective 24-hour surveillance. Access to weapons should only be permitted for routine maintenance reasons under arrangements determined by the CCWG. Any access beyond this should only be in accordance with policies laid down by the MMWG. The infantry battalions would be responsible for the movement of weapons and ammunition from cantonment sites to the nominated collection points under adequate security.

Prior to demobilization, the policy on forces to be demobilized would be determined by the MMWG. The MMWG policy would be defined in detail progressively by the regional MMWG and the CCWG. The ultimate destination of each individual would need to be determined by UNHCR in consultation with Cambodian authorities. The Cambodian faction forces would be demobilized in phases. Thirty percent of the forces would remain in cantonments or would be carrying out their functions in important assignments.

To some extent, these well-articulated SOP's had not even been really tested on the ground due to the very limited implementation of disarmament. Initially, irrespective of the PDK's non-compliance, the other three factions still agreed to enter the process. Nevertheless, seeing no signs of the PDK's compliance, the other three factions became increasingly reluctant to disarm. The UNTAC timetable anticipated the completion of the regroupment and cantonment process within four weeks. However, barely 5 percent of the estimated 200,000 soldiers had been cantoned by 10 July, one month after the commencement of Phase II.²¹⁹

There was evidence that many NADK soldiers were willing to join the disarmament process.²²⁰ Those low level commanders told UNTAC that they were just waiting for the order to walk into cantonment sites.²²¹ The PDK occasionally also sent out some mixed signals. For instance, on 27 August, a senior PDK spokesman announced that NADK was prepared to enter cantonment even before full verification of the withdrawal and non-return of foreign forces although without setting a date.²²² On 17 September, the NADK liaison officers returned to the MMWG meetings in Phnom Penh after a three months' absence. This greatly facilitated crisis management (e.g. hostage-taking) and detailed negotiations on a range of issues aimed at finding common ground.²²³ However, the promise about disarmament was never substantiated. By 10 September UNTAC had only cantoned a little more than 50,000 troops and taken into custody approximately 50,000 weapons (Table 3).²²⁴

²¹⁹ S/24286, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 201.

²²⁰ *Phnom Penh Post*, 24 July 1992, p. 3.

²²¹ Huijssoon interview, *op. cit.*, n. 129. His opinion is that the PDK originally ordered its troops to get ready for the disarmament. When it changed its policy and decided to stay out of the process, the new order did not get communicated effectively to all levels. Some NADK units were not aware of it. Plus, many soldiers were tired of war and wanted to have a peaceful life. In the third quarter of 1993, NADK strengthened its control by reorganizing small units into large units and sending more officers and political commissars from Pailin to its units.

²²² S/24578, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 213.

²²³ Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126.

²²⁴ S/24578, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 213.

**Table 3: Cantoned and Disarmed Forces of the Four Factions
(as of 10 September 1992)**

	N	%
CPAF	42,368	81.08
NADK	3,445	6.58
KPNLAF	6,479	12.39
ANIK	0	0
Total	52,252	100

Source: The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995, p. 213.

By November, the Secretary-General reported that some 55,000 troops of the three participating factions, or approximately a quarter of the estimated total number of troops, had entered the cantonment sites and handed over their weapons. Although the PDK refused to enter Phase II, some 200 personnel of the NADK spontaneously presented themselves to UNTAC.²²⁵ About 80 percent of these troops belonged to the CPAF.²²⁶ The estimation of how big a percentage of each faction's armed forces had been disarmed varies due to the lack of accurate information on their actual strength. It is believed that FUNCINPEC and KPNLF cantoned roughly 50 percent of their forces while merely 25% of the SOC's forces was disarmed.²²⁷ As a result, while the two small factions no longer existed as meaningful fighting forces, the CPAF and NADK remained two significant armies which could plunge the country again into a civil war.

The actual cantonment process did not always follow the SOP's. For instance, most cantoned troops did not stay in cantonment sites until demobilization as required by the SOP's. As mentioned earlier, the factions prepared very little for cantonment. In many cantonment sites, there was nothing to accommodate cantoned soldiers: no huts, no water and no food. Most faction commanders were not even aware that they had to prepare anything for

²²⁵ S/24800, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 231.

²²⁶ Huijssoon briefing, *op. cit.*, n. 150.

²²⁷ See Akashi, *op. cit.*, n. 2, p. 196; Judy L. Ledgerwood, "UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Lessons from Cambodia." *Asia Pacific Issues* 11 (March 1994), p. 6. According to Chopra, *et al.*, however, the ANS cantoned the largest element of its forces estimated at 28%, the KPNLF 25%, the CPAF only 14%. Chopra, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, n. 44, p. 21.

cantonment. Moreover, many of these soldiers were not regular armed forces. They were so-called farmer soldiers. They lived in villages and had to take care of their families, look after their cows, and so on. UNTAC also had difficulty feeding these soldiers if they had to stay in the cantonment sites. To adapt to the situation on the ground, many soldiers were allowed to go home after they registered their names and turned in their weapons. They just returned to the cantonment occasionally for a head count. In Phnom Penh, the SOC air force was cantoned. All the weapons were turned in. But the soldiers did not stay in cantonment sites even a single day. Also, no soldiers were ever given any money or other material incentives when they handed over their weapons as required by the SOP's.²²⁸

About 38,000 of the cantoned troops were granted so called "agricultural leave" in order to harvest the rice crop after handing over their weapons and identification cards.²²⁹ This idea first came from the CPAF in July 1992 when about 40,000 of its troops were cantoned but with no immediate prospect of demobilization. It was later endorsed by UNTAC for several reasons. First, it was a normal practice for CPAF soldiers to help rice planting during the wet season when military activity slowed down, and they were particularly needed for that year due to the floods in 1991 which caused a poor harvest in early 1992. Second, logistic problems in terms of feeding troops, taking care of soldiers' families and so on were anticipated if these troops remained in cantonment sites when the wet season was coming. The SOC did not have the financial resources to do so indefinitely. Third, these troops could also cause social problems if they had nothing to do and just hung around.²³⁰

Upon the approval from the SRSG and Force Commander, the idea was developed into a two-phase policy. In the preparatory phase (1-15 August 1992), instructions were given to all troops about the agricultural leave program. Then those troops interested in the program moved into cantonments. The lists and leave certificates were also prepared. In the implementation phase (16-25 August 1992), joint inspection of personnel, weapons and their documents were carried out by UNTAC and the factions. Then soldiers were asked to deposit their weapons, documents and faction ID cards (with photographs). Afterwards, leave certifications were issued to soldiers with ID cards. Engineers, logistics, command and control elements, and specialist personnel, such as doctors, were

²²⁸ Huijssoon interviews, *op. cit.*, nn. 129, 140; Dukers interview, *op. cit.*, n. 130.

²²⁹ S/24578, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 213.

²³⁰ Huijssoon personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 136; Bartu, *op. cit.*, n. 139; Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126.

not allowed to take "agricultural leave". Finally, Sector HQ's should send detailed reports concerning the soldiers on leave to UNTAC Military Component Plans Branch by 30 August. The duration of the leave was not specified. But they were subject to recall at two weeks' notice to return to cantonment at the date specified by the Force Commander before the process of formal demobilization began.²³¹ Since demobilization never formally happened, these troops were never called back. Many of them, instead of helping harvesting, picked up hidden weapons and became bandits, illegally collecting money for a living.²³²

While the majority of CPAF soldiers were released on "agricultural leave", soldiers of the two small factions, ANKI and KPNLAF, did not participate in this program and more or less stayed in cantonment although most of them never became real camps. So it turned out that only several thousand soldiers stayed in cantonment sites and some of them remained there until the integration of the three faction forces after the election. The World Food Program rather than factions themselves fed these cantoned soldiers.²³³ The families were allowed to camp on the outskirts of the sites, but usually they were not provided food or supplies from the UN.²³⁴ For these soldiers, some vocational training and civic action programs were carried out to prepare them for a post-demobilization career. These included a functional literary program, entrepreneurship development projects, a cottage industry development project, a driver training project, industrial employment projects, and so on.²³⁵ For instance, some cantoned soldiers completed a training course in literacy teaching and were sent out to the countryside to teach their fellow cantoned soldiers and nearby villagers to read and write.²³⁶ However, the UN civil administration was reluctant to release money for training soldiers in cantonment. They were even unwilling to provide simple distractions like volleyball and football kits. The UN also vetoed a request for

²³¹ S/24578, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 213; Bartu, *op. cit.*, n. 139.

²³² Huijssoon interviews, *op. cit.*, nn. 129, 140.

²³³ *Ibid.* In September, the United States gave UNTAC 1.5 million "Meals Ready to Eat" to feed cantoned Cambodian soldiers. Worth US \$4.5 million, this food was left over from the Gulf War. The packets of spaghetti, chicken stew, and macaroni with beef came with goodies like chewing gum, Kool-aid, cheese cake and cherry crumb cake and were a "nice treat" for the cantoned soldiers. Each soldier received one Meal Ready to Eat a week to supplement the fish and rice they were given by the World Food Program. The soldier's adult relatives each received two of the meal packets a week and their children one a week. *Phnom Penh Post*, 25 September 1992, p. 3.

²³⁴ Bartu, *op. cit.*, n. 139.

²³⁵ UNTAC Spokesman's Office, Vocational Training for Cantoned Soldiers and Military Component Civic Action Programmes, 4 May 1993.

²³⁶ *Phnom Penh Post*, 1-14 January 1993, pp. 1, 14.

cantonment T-shirts as a way of giving a positive identity to the soldiers. Those training programs were largely supported by the UNDP and other non-governmental organizations (NGO's).²³⁷

The whole process of disarmament was short-lived. The diplomatic failure to persuade the PDK to enter Phase II, the reluctance of the CPAF to continue the cantonment in light of the PDK noncompliance, and the unfeasibility of other more effective options, forced the Secretary-General to announce in November that it was not possible to carry the cantonment process towards its conclusion.²³⁸

F. The Impact on Peacekeeping Mission

The abortion of Phase II seriously undermined the prospect of establishing a peaceful and neutral political environment prior to the election. Security conditions deteriorated steadily since November 1992. First, the continuing existence of the two largest armies of the CPAF and NADK made large-scale military conflict possible. With the beginning of the dry season, cease-fire violations increased and tensions rose in some parts of the country, especially the armed clashes between the NADK and CPAF. Both sides tried to gain a strategic advantage *vis-à-vis* the other side.²³⁹ The SOC claimed that NADK had made territorial gains. However, reports from UN military and naval observers in the countryside did not confirm this claim, but indicated that the CPAF had tried to restore the territory over which NADK extended its influence during the rainy season, while NADK was attempting to consolidate its gains and interrupt the CPAF's communication.²⁴⁰ In December 1992, frequent exchanges of shelling took place between the NADK and CPAF throughout the month in the Bavel area of Battambang province, causing about 15, 000 local residents to flee their homes.²⁴¹ In February 1993, the CPAF launched attacks on the NADK in at least 10 provinces, focusing on the west-central Battambang province, the northwestern Kompong Thom, and the south-central Preah Vihear provinces. Using combinations of artillery, armoured vehicles and tanks, the CPAF drew closer to the PDK-held district town of Pailin in the province of Battambang. It

²³⁷ Bartu, *op. cit.*, n. 139; p. 8; Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126; *Analysis Report: Cambodia*, *op. cit.*, n. 134, pp. 7, 35.

²³⁸ S/24800, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 231.

²³⁹ Third progress report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, S/25154, 25 January 1993, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 255.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

was described by UNTAC officials as the largest cease-fire violation it had registered and as going "beyond the SOC's right to defend itself against any hostile action by the PDK".²⁴² Apparently UNTAC could do very little to stop the CPAF's military offensive other than lodging a protest and asking the SOC to refrain from violating the cease-fire and to exercise self-restraint.²⁴³

Second, with the resentment and frustration over UNTAC's failure to meet its conditions increasing, the PDK mounted hostile actions against UNTAC in the form of armed attacks on UNTAC personnel and vehicles. From September 1992 to January 1993, 11 attacks on UNTAC helicopters took place.²⁴⁴ In one case, an UNTAC helicopter suffered a loss in hydraulic pressure as a result of small-arms fire above a village and was forced to land.²⁴⁵ On several occasions, UNTAC had to evacuate its military and civilian personnel under heavy artillery shelling.²⁴⁶ In a number of incidents, UNTAC military personnel and other personnel were detained or kidnapped. Between 15-18 December 1992 alone, a total of 67 UNTAC hostages were taken. Another 11 were kidnapped on the 19th.²⁴⁷ In early February 1993, especially since the CPAF attacked the Pailin area where its headquarters were located, the NADK tightened restrictions on a group of 12 UNTAC personnel (including military observers, mine-clearance personnel, signals staff and interpreters) deployed in the town. They were virtually subject to house arrest.²⁴⁸ In his letter dated 20 December 1992, Khieu Samphan asserted that UNTAC should not enter PDK-controlled zones without prior authorization and that UNTAC must assume full responsibility for incidents that occurred as a result of its failure to obtain such authorization.²⁴⁹

More seriously, starting in March and April 1993, the NADK directly attacked UNTAC troops and personnel using military forces. On 27 March 1993, an UNTAC post in the Angkor Chum district in Siem Reap Province occupied by

²⁴² *UN Chronicle*, June 1993, pp. 23, 25; Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 792 (1992), S/25289, 13 February 1993, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 270; Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 47.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ S/25154, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 260.

²⁴⁵ S/24800, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 231.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 231, 259.

²⁴⁷ Jarat Chopra, "United Nations Authority in Cambodia", *Occasional Paper* 15, Providence: The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1994, p. 27.

²⁴⁸ S/25289, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 270.

²⁴⁹ Letter dated 20 December 1992 from Mr. Khieu Samphan to the Secretary-General transmitting statement by PDK on violation by UNTAC of the PDK-controlled zones, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 146-148.

a unit of the Bangladesh contingent came under mortar and small-arms attacks by the NADK for about one hour. A Bangladeshi soldier was killed and became the first UNTAC casualty from enemy fire.²⁵⁰ On 2 April a more serious incident occurred in which three Bulgarian soldiers were killed at an UNTAC post at Phum Prek in Kompong Speu Province.²⁵¹ In May, even Chinese peacekeepers suffered casualties. In an attack on a SOC police station in Kompong Cham, two Chinese soldiers were killed and seven others wounded by rocket fire.²⁵² On 15 May 1993, the Secretary-General reported that 13 UNTAC civilian and military personnel had lost their lives and 52 were wounded as a result of hostile action.²⁵³

Third, banditry and robbery imposed a big security threat resulting from the failed disarmament. After the factions stopped cantonment, a large number of soldiers from all four factions turned to banditry for survival. They formed heavily-armed bandit groups to rob helpless citizens. Faction leaders were losing control over their troops.²⁵⁴ Many soldiers were on duty during the day and became bandits at night.²⁵⁵ All this armed violence, plus violence against political opponents described in Section III seriously eroded public confidence in UNTAC's ability to maintain peace and security before the election.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁰ Letter dated 26 April 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council transmitting information relating to recent incidents which resulted in the deaths of members of UNTAC. S/25669, 27 April 1993; S/25719, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 284, 290.

²⁵¹ S/25669, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 284. The incident was a deliberate murder. In the evening of that day, the local NADK commander, accompanied by two soldiers, joined the 11 members of the Bulgarian battalion for dinner. Relations between the Bulgarian soldiers and the local NADK members had previously been good. After dinner the NADK commander left and returned with 10 to 15 armed soldiers. They opened fire on the unarmed Bulgarian soldiers with automatic weapons and hand grenades. It was believed that this local NADK commander had to prove himself as still loyal to the PDK by killing UNTAC soldiers because of his previous friendly relations with the battalion. Huijssoon interview, *op. cit.*, n. 140.

²⁵² Letter dated 28 May 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council reporting further on the shelling in Kompong Cham Province, Cambodia, 21 May 1993, S/25871, 1 June 1993, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 309.

²⁵³ S/25784, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 304.

²⁵⁴ *Phnom Penh Post*, 7 August 1992, p. 4; United States General Accounting Office, *UN Peacekeeping, Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions*, Washington DC, December 1993, p. 50.

²⁵⁵ Interview with Gerard Fischer (Senior Economist, UNCTAD), 8 May 1995, Geneva, Switzerland.

²⁵⁶ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 47.

G. Changing the Function of the Military Component

The most important consequence of the abortive disarmament, however, was the subsequent change of the function of the military component. When Phase II was given up, the original mission of the military component was brought into question. As envisaged by the original UN mandate and specified in the military component's SOP, the primary task of the military component was to create a stable security situation and neutral environment by disarming and demobilizing the warring parties. As soon as this task was finished, the strength of the military component would be reduced by more than one half. The role of supporting election was not emphasised.

Since the disarmament was incomplete, UNTAC and the international community realized that the mandate in this regard had to be modified. The Australian paper on Cambodia, dated 16 September 1992, suggested that UNTAC infantry battalions would need to be redeployed to cooperate with the three factions' forces to protect the voter registration and elections process throughout non-PDK territory. Instead of reduction, this might mean an increase in the UNTAC military budget.²⁵⁷ Force Commander General Sanderson also realized by September 1992 that the PDK was unlikely to enter the Phase II cease-fire and that the secure environment for the elections could not be guaranteed without the military component behind it.²⁵⁸ On 15 November, the Secretary-General approved his Special Representative's recommendation that UNTAC should adjust the deployment of its military component to foster a general sense of security among the Cambodian people and to enhance its ability to protect the voter registration and the polling process. Therefore he proposed that the present level of military deployment be maintained until the elections.²⁵⁹ With the decision to hold the election as scheduled irrespective of the failed disarmament, UNTAC decided that all other components, including the military and the police, should support the electoral component.²⁶⁰

Consequently, as a high UNTAC official put it, "ensuring the security of the electoral process in its entirety is now.... the principle mission of the military component...".²⁶¹ The first crucial move in fulfilling this new mandate was to redeploy battalions. Originally, they were deployed around regroupment and

²⁵⁷ "Cambodia: Next Steps", Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 209.

²⁵⁸ Sanderson, "UNTAC: The Military Component View", *op. cit.*, n. 124, p. 79.

²⁵⁹ S/24800, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 233.

²⁶⁰ Akashi, *op. cit.*, n. 5, p. 21.

²⁶¹ Sanderson, "UNTAC: The Military Component's View", *op. cit.*, n. 124, p. 80.

cantonment sites. Now the pattern changed to correspond with the borders of the Cambodian provinces in conformation with the deployment of electoral components. This redeployment was mainly aimed at dealing with potential threat from the NADK forces to disrupt the elections. As Findlay put it, the purpose was to keep a "reasonable line of distance, both physically and psychologically, between areas of KR operation and those where electoral preparations were taking place".²⁶² In General Sanderson's words, the new military deployment would serve as a deterrent, make more effective the protection of UNTAC activities through escort and patrol operations, ensure rapid reaction at potential trouble-spots and permit direct contact and negotiation with those threatening the electoral process.²⁶³ While the redeployment as a whole went smoothly, it encountered some administrative and logistics difficulties. In addition, the military units had to re-establish liaisons and a working rapport with the existing administrative structure and factions controlling the area.²⁶⁴ The redeployment of the military component was completed on 31 December 1992.²⁶⁵

There was also a change of focus of the military component from the cantonment process to more active patrolling, movement control and more security-oriented tasks. Specifically, the new function of the military component was reflected in several dimensions. First, there was improving coordination between the military component and electoral and other components. A mechanism of coordination in planning and control was formed around the Military Plans Branch in Phnom Penh, which included the Electoral Component, Information and Education Division and CIVPOL. Similar structures were established around the military component Sector Headquarters in provincial capitals.²⁶⁶

Second, security was provided for the registering, campaigning, and voting processes. Military observers were now supposed to accompany electoral teams in order to negotiate with local authorities or forces that might hinder

²⁶² Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 40.

²⁶³ John M. Sanderson, "Preparation for, Deployment and Conduct of Peacekeeping Operations: A Cambodia Snapshot", International Seminar on UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, Canberra 21-24 March 1993. p. 12.

²⁶⁴ Kimball personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 139.

²⁶⁵ S/25154, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 259.

²⁶⁶ Sanderson, "UNTAC: The Military Component View", *op. cit.*, n. 263, p. 80; Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126.

registration.²⁶⁷ The coordination between the military components and the CIVPOL component was also strengthened. Teams of military observers worked with UNTAC civilian policemen in monitoring political rallies and gatherings throughout the country, and personnel from both components assisted electoral staff with the civic education campaign.

The key for a successful election, of course, was the security of polling stations. A very detailed plan was worked out to provide for the fullest possible security during the polling process. The whole country, except PDK controlled areas, was rated as high (red), middle (orange) or low (green) risk zones. The security measures involved fixed guards, mobile patrols and general area security. Each infantry battalion and strategic investigation team established a mobile reserve unit capable of responding to threats within 1 hour and other mobile reserve units capable of responding within 6 hours. In addition to establishing 12 local area mobile reserves, General Sanderson also created a force Commander's Mobile Reserve on "60 minutes" notice. The central feature of the arrangements was that the security of the polling stations and their immediate vicinity was provided exclusively by UNTAC forces. In high-risk zones, armed UNTAC military personnel were stationed at and around polling stations. Physical fortifications were strengthened and staff was issued protection gear. Quick Reaction Forces and medical support units were also organized.

However, due to the very dispersed locations of the polling stations, UNTAC military personnel fell short of providing security other than polling stations. As a result, the military forces of three cooperating factions were allowed to play a role in providing security for the election. In April 1993, the UNTAC military component reached an agreement with three factions through the MMWG on participating in protecting the election process from possible military attack. A division of labour was assigned. UNTAC was responsible for all security measures to be taken to protect polling stations as well as UN personnel and property. Permitted to use minimum force and proportionate response, the armed forces of three factions were responsible for general security in the zones under their control and for providing information on possible or actual threats to the election.²⁶⁸ In other words, faction troops became an extension of the UNTAC peacekeeping force. UNTAC used "the armed elements of three factions against

²⁶⁷ S/25154, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 259.

²⁶⁸ See S/25719, S/25784, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 290, 304; Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126; Sanderson, "A Cambodian Snapshot", *op. cit.*, n. 263, p. 12.

the fourth in a way that did not jeopardise (the UN's) impartiality".²⁶⁹ This measure served two purposes. First, it committed the factions' forces to the election process. Second, it supplemented the manpower shortage of the military component. Such a function for the warring factions, however, was never foreseen in the Paris Accords and the original UN mandate. They were created out of necessity on the ground.

Third, the military component provided not only security but also logistic support for the election. For instance, engineering units repaired roads and bridges needed by electoral teams for access to remote areas.²⁷⁰ In a senior UNTAC military officer's words, "if we sent 6 battalions home according to the mandate, we could never send all needed materials to all the polling stations with only six battalions".²⁷¹ During the election period, UNTAC battalions turned into transportation teams to bring all the necessary equipment, ballot boxes, chairs, generators, tables and so on to the polling stations. There were several more reasons which made the participation of military component indispensable. First, after the materials arrived in the local areas, they had to be guarded all the time. Otherwise, Cambodians would take everything away. Second, anticipating the PDK's disruption, the location of polling stations was kept secret as long as possible until the last day. Therefore, everything had to be on the spot the same day, which could only be accomplished with the high mobility of the military component. Third, during the voting period, all the ballot boxes had to be taken away everyday and stored in UNTAC military locations under the watch of all the factions. The two smaller factions would not feel safe if ballot boxes were stored in a SOC police station. Then the next morning, all the ballot boxes were sent to the polling station again by helicopters and vehicles. The same military officer argued that even if UNTAC had successfully done the disarmament and demobilization, battalions might still have been needed to simply provide the logistics for the election.²⁷²

After the election, the UNTAC military component was devoted to helping the newly integrated Cambodian Armed Forces function. Operation Paymaster was one of such efforts. The mission was set up to ensure that all military, police and civil service employees from all factions were paid during the transitional period after the elections so as to facilitate the integration process, consolidate the

²⁶⁹ Karl Farris, "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, A Success", in *Parameters*, *US Army War College Quarterly* 1, Spring 1994, p. 47.

²⁷⁰ United States General Accounting Office, *op. cit.*, n. 254, p. 54.

²⁷¹ Huijssoon interview, *op. cit.*, n. 140.

²⁷² *Ibid.*

power of the new government, and promote a stable political environment in Cambodia. The operation was planned and executed through the MMWG. The military component was responsible for sending salaries to the new armed forces. The operation involved large-scale logistic support. Between 26 July and 10 September 1993, 150 helicopter missions totalling 1,350 flying hours were tasked to distribute 60 tons of money. The total sum distributed to pay 120,623 officers and soldiers during the two month period was Riels 10,741,058,500. The major problem encountered in this operation was the lack of accurate information on unit designations and locations. This made it very difficult to verify troop strength. The operation was the first time that declared strengths were required to be supported by nominal rolls and validated on the ground. All the military factions attempted to cheat by widespread recruiting efforts to increase unit strengths to match previously declared totals, by doubling entries of names on nominal rolls, by issuing false ID cards, by employing demobilized soldiers to bolster numbers, and by using women, children and invalids as "soldiers". In addition, there were attempts by senior officers to deduct soldiers' pay for unauthorized and unaccountable expenses.²⁷³

Finally, the functional change of the military component was also reflected in the way conflict resolution and escalation was handled. In this regard, as in other UN peacekeeping missions, the UNTAC Force Commander "has no legal jurisdiction over international contingents under his operational command".²⁷⁴ National contingents from different countries usually place instructions from their own government ahead of the rules of engagement (ROE) and SOP's issued by UNTAC. During the first few months of UNTAC, there were no mission-wise ROE available.²⁷⁵ Some contingents such as the Dutch battalion invented their own ROE.²⁷⁶ But even after the SOP and ROE had been issued by UNTAC, "there was interpretation of the meaning of self-defense among contributing countries ranging from just handing over your weapons to anyone who points a gun at you, to opening up with everything at the slightest provocation" and

²⁷³ "Operation Paymaster-Post Operation Report", M/Plans/4/53, 20 September 1993; Sanderson, "UNTAC: Successes and Failures", in H. Smith (ed.), *International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience*, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994, p. 28.

²⁷⁴ Sanderson, "Successes and Failures", *op. cit.*, n. 273, p. 29.

²⁷⁵ According to Major Steuber, when he left Cambodia after six months, neither UNAMIC nor UNTAC had yet published a SOP for doing anything. Brown, *op. cit.*, n. 46, p. 5.

²⁷⁶ It was mainly an adaptation of the Dutch national ROE for peacetime conditions to the local situation. Dukers interview, *op. cit.*, n. 130.

"actions in UNTAC covered the full spectrum".²⁷⁷ Some contingents such as Dutch, French, and Pakistani battalions won the reputation of being tough in dealing with attacks and provocation. Others such as the Indonesian and Japanese battalions were perceived as weak in conflict control. They were particularly reluctant to incur any casualties.²⁷⁸ Overall, before the change of military function, the UNTAC military exercised the ROE in a quite passive fashion and interpreted the right of self-defense in the strictest sense. UNTAC troops did not resist detention of their soldiers and even handed over their weapons and vehicles to the PDK.²⁷⁹ In General Sanderson's view, those military units that were not prepared to defend themselves emboldened elements opposed to the peace process and therefore added to the insecurity of other military units and civil components.²⁸⁰

The abandonment of Phase II of the cease-fire and the shift of the military focus from disarmament to protection of the election changed the rules of the game. The military component's mission was revised into what Sanderson called "an interposition strategy, but not between opposing forces. Rather, it was between a highly moral act sanctioned under international law and supported by international consensus, and any person or group which might threaten it".²⁸¹ The implication was that the UNTAC would do "peacekeeping" between the area under its control and the PDK rather than between faction forces. There were some misgivings among battalions in early 1993 about this new mission. Several nations indicated that their troops were not to be employed to protect the election. This included the Japanese, Chinese and Thai engineering battalions and some of the non-combatant units involved in medical duties. But by May 1993, all infantry battalions participated in securing the elections.²⁸²

Two direct consequences of the failed disarmament were the intensification of NADK's direct attacks on the UNTAC military and the fighting between the SOC and the PDK. The UNTAC military became more assertive in defending itself. All units of the military component in all locations were directed to increase vigilance and enhance their security measures. The military component reinforced its defensive position all over Cambodia, particularly in Siem Reap and

²⁷⁷ Sanderson, "A Review of Recent Peacekeeping Operations", presentation to PAMS XVIII. Conference, Dacca, January, 1994, p. 8.

²⁷⁸ Steven Ayling, *op. cit.*, n. 132, p. 81; Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 133.

²⁷⁹ Akashi, *op. cit.*, n. 5, p. 24.

²⁸⁰ Sanderson, "A Review of Recent Peacekeeping Operations", *op. cit.*, n. 277, p. 8.

²⁸¹ Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126.

²⁸² Bartu, *op. cit.*, n. 139.

Kompong Thom Provinces. These positions had been expanded to allow the construction of bunkers and overhead protection as well as firing bays from which soldiers can return fire.²⁸³ The military units were more ready to return fire when directly attacked and incurred casualties on the enemy.²⁸⁴

However, the military interpreted its mission as mainly protecting the electoral process rather than UNTAC civilians. Suffering from the faction attacks, civilian personnel, especially the UN volunteers, demanded greater military protection. They complained that some military units were too passive in protecting their security and that it was very difficult to communicate with the military. But the military argued that its principle role was to protect the electoral process and that it lacked the resources to protect all UN personnel in the field.²⁸⁵ General Sanderson considered that the UNTAC civilians made unrealistic demands for their own security while at the same time were rarely prepared to sacrifice any freedom of action on their own part which might enhance their own security and avoid placing the peacekeepers' lives at unnecessary risk.²⁸⁶

The military was also reluctant to be involved in peacekeeping in its traditional sense. Hun Sen at one point called for UNTAC forces to be deployed between the SOC and the PDK as a "buffer zone".²⁸⁷ Akashi reportedly also proposed the same idea to UN headquarters to end the fighting. But General Sanderson thought it was impossible for his troops to fulfill such a role.²⁸⁸ Some senior military staff argued that the situation for a classic peacekeeping mission between warring factions simply did not exist. The NADK units were very dispersed, and in most areas, it was very difficult to draw a line between the two factions. As Col. Huijssoon put it, "if you would cycle them all with UNTAC separation force, you would have needed maybe 50 battalions".²⁸⁹

²⁸³ S/25719, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 290.

²⁸⁴ Akashi, *op. cit.*, n. 5, p. 24; Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 133; S/25669, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 284; Huijssoon interview, *op. cit.*, n. 129.

²⁸⁵ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 79.

²⁸⁶ Sanderson, "Successes and Failures", *op. cit.*, n. 273, p. 24.

²⁸⁷ S/25289, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 270.

²⁸⁸ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 47.

²⁸⁹ Huijssoon interview, *op. cit.*, n. 129.

H. Other Aspects of Disarmament

1. Weapons Control

Another dimension of the UNTAC mission in disarmament was weapons control. To be sure, with the abandonment of cantonment and demobilization, an effective weapons control became impossible. All three factions made efforts to maintain the teeth of their forces. The weapons surrendered by the CPAF were mainly old spares and reserves so that the fighting capability of "disarmed" units could be easily restored.²⁹⁰ A journalist described a cantonment ceremony of the KPNLAF in the following words:

The guerrillas brought an array of largely ancient and rusting carbines, assault rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and mortars -- 7,648 in total -- most of which would probably be more dangerous to the user than the target. More impressive were nine field artillery pieces, a T-54 tank, and an armoured personnel carries--all captured from Phnom Penh government forces. Gen. Dien Del admitted that his forces were keeping back some of their better equipment and men for self defense. If UNTAC can protect us 100 percent, we wouldn't need soldiers out of cantonment.²⁹¹

During the election period, some weapons were even handed back to the factions so that they could provide security for the polling process.²⁹² It was not just the NADK which attempted to maintain their arsenal. Other factions did the same. For instance, because the SOC police were not included in the cantonment process, they held stocks of weapons in depots.²⁹³ Although they were supposed to provide a comprehensive list of all weapons and ammunition for every cantonment site and to provide assistance in finding and clearing weapons caches, those cantoned troops mostly turned in unserviceable old weapons while hiding their better arms at home or in caches. Most respondents to UNIDIR's Practitioners' Questionnaire got the impression that there were hidden caches of weapons in their sectors. Even the very cooperative faction such as the KPNLF cheated UNTAC by stockpiling weapons it never reported. In a battalion commander's words: "everyone cheated everyone else".²⁹⁴

²⁹⁰ Chopra, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, n. 44, p. 21.

²⁹¹ *Phnom Penh Post*, 24 July 1992, pp. 1, 3.

²⁹² Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 43.

²⁹³ Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126.

²⁹⁴ Dukers interview, *op. cit.*, n. 130; *Analysis Report: Cambodia*, *op. cit.*, n. 134, pp. 13-14, 19, 32.

The UNTAC mandate required that all external supply of weapons should be suspended during the peacekeeping operation. Although there was no solid evidence that Cambodian factions had any substantial external military assistance from their former patrons such as China, Vietnam, and the United States,²⁹⁵ many military observers and personnel believed that the factions still had access to an external supply of weapons and it was very difficult to control these supplies.²⁹⁶ For instance, the PDK continued to enjoy a supply of weapons. First, in anticipating the change of China's policy, the PDK began stockpiling ammunition and weapons several years ago in secret jungle caches throughout Cambodia. They were thought to have stocked enough ammunition to last two to five years of continued warfare.²⁹⁷ Second, the PDK never lacked the financial sources to purchase weapons from across the Thai-Cambodian border. The profitable border trade of hardwood timber and gemstones with the Thai military provided money for arms.²⁹⁸ UNTAC was supposed to establish check points around the border areas to monitor the possible flow of weapons and foreign troops. Such a mandate, as a military officer points out, looked good on paper, but not implementable on the ground given Cambodia's length of border, terrain and vegetation, let alone the PDK's denial of access to the border area under its control.²⁹⁹ Moreover, the Thais never allowed adequate monitoring of their borders and did not allow the UN to establish check points in their territories. As a result, the monitoring of external weapons supplies could never become effective.³⁰⁰ Thirdly, there was a prosperous black market of weapon throughout the country where readily available weapons such as AK-47's, M-16 rifles and grenades exchanged hands for quite low prices.³⁰¹

Even if the disarmament had been a success for the regular forces of the four factions, weapons control outside of cantonment sites was not going to be easy. After more than two decades of conflict, all of Cambodia became a big arsenal. As a military observed remarked, "you cannot imagine how many weapons there are here. You can find every kind of Kalashnikov (rifle)-Czech, Yugoslavian,

²⁹⁵ Kimball personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 139; Akashi, *op. cit.*, n. 2, p. 198. As early as November 1990, China announced that it had stopped supplying arms to the PDK. *Strategic Survey 1990-1991* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies), p. 211.

²⁹⁶ *Analysis Report: Cambodia*, *op. cit.*, n. 134, p. 32.

²⁹⁷ *Phnom Penh Post*, 22 August 1992, p. 4.

²⁹⁸ Chopra, *et al. op. cit.*, n. 44, p. 9.

²⁹⁹ Huijssoon personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 136, and interviews, *op. cit.*, n. 129.

³⁰⁰ Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126; *Analysis Report: Cambodia*, *op. cit.*, n. 134, p. 33.

³⁰¹ *Phnom Penh Post*, 26 March-8 April 1993, p. 3; Chopra, *et al. op. cit.*, n. 44, p. 10.

Chinese... It's enough for years of war. Here weapons are power".³⁰² The war-seasoned Cambodians developed a sort of gun-culture and were very reluctant to give up their weapons. An interview with journalists, soldiers, policemen, schoolboys, women and doctors found that nobody thought the elimination of guns was a good idea, regarding them as a symbol of power and pride.³⁰³ This was also a necessity under constant military and bandit attack. Most homes had at least one weapon.³⁰⁴

So weapons control in Cambodia was not simply a military issue, but a social problem as well. Officially, other than the formal cantonment process, UNTAC troops initially had no authority to take weapons from individuals. Therefore UNTAC soldiers sometimes ran into problems in implementing weapons control.³⁰⁵ Some military battalions, however, did take discrete measures to confiscate weapons in their controlled areas. For instance, after receiving a lot of complaints from civilians who were stopped on the road by former CPAF soldiers for money and illegal taxes, the Dutch battalion in Sector 1 reported the situation to the UNTAC HQ. At the sector MMWG meeting, the Sector Commander declared that from a certain day on, nobody would be allowed to walk around armed except authorized personnel. Soldiers were driving around to confiscate weapons from individuals.³⁰⁶ With the increase of violence before the election, UNTAC took tougher measures to control the possession of guns, ammunition and explosives. Mr. Akashi issued a directive which required owners of weapons to get a licence from the police force of the relevant ruling faction. Possession of weapons became illegal as of midnight 18 March. But there would be a three-week grace period to allow people either to surrender their weapons or to get their papers in order. Gun holders were supposed to surrender their arms at the local UNTAC, CIVPOL, or military contingent where they would be given a receipt for their weapon and would face no legal action. Those who wished to retain their weapons could apply to the police force of the relevant authorities for a firearms licence. After 9 April, any person found illegally holding weapons, explosives or ammunition would incur the confiscation of these items and imprisonment from six months to three years.³⁰⁷ UNTAC also at one point contemplated a weapon buy-back program; however, the idea was soon dropped because it was realized

³⁰² *Phnom Penh Post*, 7 August 1992, p. 4.

³⁰³ *Phnom Penh Post*, 25 September 1992, p. 4.

³⁰⁴ *Phnom Penh Post*, 26 March-8 April 1993, p. 3.

³⁰⁵ *Analysis Report: Cambodia*, *op. cit.*, n. 134, p. 7.

³⁰⁶ Dukers interview, *op. cit.*, n. 130.

³⁰⁷ *Phnom Penh Post*, 26 March-8 April 1993, p. 3.

that the supply of weapons was so abundant that speculators could start a profitable business of selling weapons to UNTAC.³⁰⁸

2. Demining

Another important aspect of weapons control is demining. As a war-torn country for twenty years, Cambodia literally became a land of mines. Estimates of the number of mines vary, ranging from 2 million to 10 million.³⁰⁹ In fact, it is very difficult to figure out the exact number since the factions usually did not take record. But even taking a middle number like 4 million as the approximation, there is nearly one mine for every two Cambodians.³¹⁰ Roughly half the country has a dense concentration of land mines, which claim from 100 to 700 victims each month. As a result, Cambodia has more than 40,000 amputees, and mines have handicapped 1 out of every 236 Cambodians, giving Cambodia the highest proportion of amputees in the world. Most of them are civilians who were injured in the course of making their living tending their rice fields, cattle and children, fishing, or gathering firewood. The Cambodian conflict may be the first war in history in which land mines have claimed more victims than any other weapon.³¹¹

Large quantities of mines in Cambodia were imported from China and Vietnam and the most common is the M-72, a small plastic anti-personnel mine which is difficult to find with a metal detector. Mines were used in Cambodia for many purposes, including to close border routes, to enhance the security of villages, garrison perimeters, roads and bridges, and also to terrorise farmers and villagers.³¹² Cambodian faction troops were heavily supplied with mines. For instance, the NADK was usually equipped with about ten mines per man.³¹³

³⁰⁸ Huijssoon interview, *op. cit.*, n. 129; *Analysis Report: Cambodia*, *op. cit.*, n. 134, p. 33.

³⁰⁹ Susan Aitkin, "Getting the Message About Mines, Towards A National, Public Information Strategy and Program on Mines and Mines' Safety, Volume I: Report", September 1993, p. 2; United States General Accounting Office, *op. cit.*, n. 254, p. 25; Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Arms Project", Advanced Press Copy, p. 59.

³¹⁰ Heininger, *op. cit.*, n. 158, p. 73.

³¹¹ Aitkin, *op. cit.*, n. 309, p. 2; Human Rights Watch/Asia, *op. cit.*, n. 309, p. 59; Heininger, *op. cit.*, n. 158, p. 72; Susan Ruel, "The Source of Land Mines, UN Tackles Hidden Peacetime Killers", United Nations Focus, (United Nations Department of Public Information, October 1993, p. 1; Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 72.

³¹² Chopra, *et al. op. cit.*, n. 44, p. 10.

³¹³ Human Rights Watch/Asia, *op. cit.*, n. 309, p. 60.

To clear such huge numbers of mines is a daunting task. Even if everything goes according to plan, experts have concluded that it will take 30-40 years to rid Cambodia of most of its mines, and the country may never be completely clear of them.³¹⁴ From the very beginning, the United Nations was aware of the seriousness of this problem.³¹⁵ Before the establishment of UNTAC, the UNAMIC mandate already included a mine-awareness and mine-clearance program. In his implementation plan submitted to the Security Council on 19 February 1992, the Secretary-General stressed that "the magnitude of the mine problem in Cambodia requires that a sizeable and intense effort should be undertaken in the very early stages to facilitate UNTAC's deployment and its manifold activities".³¹⁶ UNTAC itself suffered from the mine problems. Its casualties from mine explosions between 19 June 1992 and 6 June 1993 amounted to 2 dead and 29 injured.³¹⁷ Almost all the respondents to UNIDIR's Practitioners' Questionnaires experienced mine problems during their mission.³¹⁸ However, UNTAC was widely criticised for its slow pace in mine-clearance and the low priority the job was given in the mission.³¹⁹

There are several reasons for this problem. First of all, compared to other military tasks, the UNTAC mandate in this respect was defined in a quite general fashion in the Secretary-General's implementation plan. It only mentioned that once UNTAC was established and deployed, the mine-programs initiated by UNAMIC would be taken over by its military component and expanded. The engineer unit was in charge of these programs.³²⁰ Yet no timetable or specific tasks were set up from the very beginning. The responsibility for mine-clearance was not clearly defined. Secondly, the slowness was a function of the abortion of the cantonment and demobilization process. The Paris Agreement had anticipated that after the completion of the regroupment and cantonment processes, a large number of cantoned soldiers would join mine-clearing teams which, under the supervision and control of UNTAC military personnel, would leave the cantonment areas in order to assist in removing, disarming, or deactivating the

³¹⁴ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 72.

³¹⁵ S/23331, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 153.

³¹⁶ S/23613, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 167.

³¹⁷ UNTAC Spokesman's Office, "UNTAC Casualties Resulting from Mine Explosions", 10 June 1993.

³¹⁸ *Analysis Report: Cambodia*, *op. cit.*, n. 134, p. 36.

³¹⁹ Aitkin, *op. cit.*, n. 309, p. 7; United States General Accounting Office, *op. cit.*, n. 254, p. 25; Ledgerwood, *op. cit.*, n. 227, p. 8.

³²⁰ S/23613, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 167.

remaining unexploded ordnance devices.³²¹ Since the disarmament of troops were effectively suspended, these human resources, as well as their knowledge and experience, were unavailable for demining activities. Moreover, because the fight between the CPAF and NADK never stopped, the clearance work was often wasted as new mines were laid in freshly demined areas, especially if they were conflict zones.³²² Thirdly, insufficient funds and resources had been allocated to demining programs. Mine-clearance is both a dangerous and expansive business. Funds were needed not only for monthly wages for deminers, but also for compensation for families in the case of death or disablement.³²³ It was estimated that a demining team cleared about 1,300 square meters each week at a cost of about \$2,000. Clearing one mine, including the training of deminers, would cost \$300 to \$1,000.³²⁴ Donor countries usually were reluctant to put money into the demining program. UNTAC itself did not have enough resources.³²⁵ Fourth, it was very difficult to get and coordinate accurate information from the four factions about the number and location of mine fields. The Paris Agreement asked that soon after its arrival in Cambodia, the military component should ensure that all known minefields were clearly marked.³²⁶ This condition was never realized. To some extent, the information was simply unavailable. Soldiers usually did not map or mark minefields when they laid down mines. It was not unusual for the faction forces to be hit by the mines they laid down themselves.³²⁷ Many practitioners' considered it would be a good idea to have the exchange of mine maps as a part of the peace agreement at the outset. Finally, UNTAC was quite reluctant to get its own personnel directly involved in demining. Most troop-contributing countries were unwilling to authorize their troops to participate in this dangerous business and they were also not trained for the task. The prevailing attitude was that Cambodians had created the problem and should therefore bear the responsibility for solving it. The Force Commander concluded that there could be no quick solutions to the problem. UNTAC, therefore, should apply its limited resources to training a significant mine-clearing force rather than carrying out the

³²¹ Paris Agreement, Annex 2, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 143.

³²² *Analysis Report: Cambodia*, *op. cit.*, n. 134, p. 36; Huijssoon interview, *op. cit.*, n. 129; Heininger, *op. cit.*, n. 158, p. 73; Aitkin, *op. cit.*, n. 309, p. 7; *Phnom Penh Post*, 7 August 1992, p. 3; Human Rights Watch/Asia, *op. cit.*, n. 309, p. 63.

³²³ S/23870, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 188.

³²⁴ Heininger, *op. cit.*, n. 158, p. 73.

³²⁵ *Analysis Report: Cambodia*, *op. cit.*, n. 134, pp. 9, 15. Aitkin, *op. cit.*, n. 309, p. 7; Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 73; S/25719, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 292.

³²⁶ Paris Agreement, Annex 2, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 143.

³²⁷ Human Right Watch/Asia, *op. cit.*, n. 309, pp. 60-61.

mine-clearance itself.³²⁸ Consequently, as UNTAC's force engineer, Col. Neil Bradley put it, "plenty were prepared to supervise but none to actually do mineclearing".³²⁹ For most of 1992 and 1993, the only groups regularly engaged in mine-clearance operations were NGO's. Not until August and September did UNTAC personnel themselves start demining.³³⁰

UNTAC's mission of demining was carried out under these constraints. The mine-awareness program was begun even before the establishment of UNAMIC in November 1991. It was carried out among Cambodian refugees and displaced persons in the camps along the Cambodia/Thailand border.³³¹ The initial mission of UNAMIC was to deploy small teams of military personnel with experience in training the civilian population on how to avoid injury from mines or booby traps. The priority was given to populations living in or close to areas of recent military confrontation and then expanded to repatriation routes, reception centers and resettlement areas.³³² In December 1991, this mandate was expanded to include training in mine clearance and the initiation of a demining program to prepare for the safe and orderly repatriation of refugees, taking the advantage of the dry season at that time.³³³ The work was carried out in cooperation with the UNHCR and a mine-clearance commission established by the SNC.³³⁴

During the tenure of UNTAC, the Mine Clearance Training Unit (MCTU) was established to teach Cambodians to identify, locate, and destroy land mines and mark mine fields. The MCTU comprised more than 100 military personnel from eight countries: Bangladesh, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Each national contingent was organized into Mine Clearance Training Teams (MCTT's), which taught the course, and Mine Clearance Supervisory Teams (MCST's), which oversaw the mine clearance work of the teams trained, or Mine Marking Teams (MMT's), which supervised mine marking operations. The MCTU also addressed

³²⁸ Sanderson, "Successes and Failures", *op. cit.*, n. 273, p. 23.

³²⁹ Heininger, *op. cit.*, n. 158, p. 72. It is interesting to note that while most respondents to the Practitioners' Questionnaire thought the UN and their host country were interested in demining, only 2 out of 24 respondents said that his or her unit played a role in the demining process. On the other hand, all the respondents considered that local groups should be encouraged to undertake demining tasks. *Analysis Report: Cambodia*, *op. cit.*, n. 134, p. 37.

³³⁰ *Analysis Report: Cambodia*, *op. cit.*, n. 134, p. 37; Heininger, *op. cit.*, n. 158, pp. 73-74.

³³¹ S/23097, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 126.

³³² *Ibid.*

³³³ S/23331, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 152.

³³⁴ Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 11.

schoolchildren and villagers throughout the countryside and lectured UNTAC military and police personnel on mine awareness and mine avoidance.³³⁵ In his first progress report on UNTAC on 1 May, the Secretary-General estimated that UNTAC would train 5,000 Cambodians for mine-clearance by the end of the year.³³⁶ By September 1992, only some 850 soldiers were fully trained, and even by January 1993, only 1,323 had been trained, far below the target of 5,000.³³⁷ Only 542 of these were really employed due to a shortage of supervisors.³³⁸ When UNTAC was about to leave the country, although 2,330 Cambodians had been trained in mine-clearance techniques, only about 1,400 were employed for that purpose.³³⁹ To make up for the shortage of supervisory teams, some UNTAC trainers were requested to act as supervisors while some of the trained mine cleaners were receiving additional training to become supervisors.³⁴⁰ The mine-clearance activities by those employed were either done directly by UNTAC or by one of four non-governmental organizations (HALO Trust, Mine Awareness Group, Norwegian People's Aid and Handicap International) involved in mine clearance in Cambodia.³⁴¹

The Cambodian deminers were paid about \$100 per month, much higher than other soldiers who received mere \$15-20 a month. They also received free food, health care, and disability and life insurance protection. This relatively well-off condition sometimes caused tensions between deminers and other military personnel. There had been a few instances in which deminers were killed or attacked by SOC soldiers. The PDK also occasionally attacked or kidnapped deminers, taking away their equipment.³⁴²

The speed of actual demining was not very encouraging in 1992 and early 1993. By September 1992, only an area of some 22,000 square metres was cleared of more than 1,000 mines.³⁴³ By May 1992, 15,000 mines and other pieces of unexploded ordnance, out of an estimated 2-4 million, had been

³³⁵ UNTAC Spokesman's office, "Mine Clearance Training Unit", 27 April 1993; S/25719, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 292.

³³⁶ S/23870, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 188.

³³⁷ S/24578, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 213.

³³⁸ S/25154, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 259.

³³⁹ S/26360, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 329.

³⁴⁰ S/25154, S/25719, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 259, 292.

³⁴¹ S/25669, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 292.

³⁴² Human Rights Watch/Asia, *op. cit.*, n. 309, p. 64.

³⁴³ S/24578, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 213.

cleared.³⁴⁴ By December 1992, 43 hectares had been cleared by UNTAC.³⁴⁵ The rate of mine-clearance accelerated significantly during the summer of 1993. By 26 August, before UNTAC's withdrawal, the Secretary-General claimed that more than 4 million square meters had been cleared of mines, about 37,000 mines and other unexploded devices had been destroyed.³⁴⁶ A better job was done along major highways and in association with road repair.³⁴⁷ However, this figure only represented roughly 0.2% of Cambodia's mines.³⁴⁸

Soon after its deployment, UNTAC started its "Cambodianization" of demining activities. In May 1992, the Secretary-General pointed out that the mine problems should be addressed increasingly by Cambodians themselves.³⁴⁹ On 20 April, the SNC agreed to the establishment of the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) with Prince Norodom Sihanouk as the president and Mr. Akashi as the vice president.. It was supposed to assist in undertaking long-term programs in mine awareness, mine-marking and mine-clearance. It was managed by a 10-member Governing Council with 5 Cambodian members appointed by Prince Sihanouk and 5 other members appointed by Mr. Akashi.³⁵⁰ Initially, CMEC was still basically run by UNTAC. Later on, more Cambodians were recruited and trained to take eventual responsibility for the four main branches: information and policy, operations, training, and administration. Cambodians were also trained on the computer-assisted mine database.³⁵¹ This effort also included training the most qualified graduates to become supervisors or instructors.³⁵² To make CMAC also financially independent, UNTAC made efforts to seek international funding for the organization. It was no easy job. The result, in the Secretary-General's words, was "disappointing".³⁵³ In August 1993, the Secretary-General decided to maintain the United Nations Trust Fund for Demining Programmes in Cambodia until alternative funding arrangements could be made.³⁵⁴

³⁴⁴ S/25719, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 292.

³⁴⁵ Heininger, *op. cit.*, n. 158, p. 73.

³⁴⁶ S/26360, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 329.

³⁴⁷ Findlay, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 74.

³⁴⁸ Aitkin, *op. cit.*, n. 309, p. 7.

³⁴⁹ S/23870, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 188.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁵¹ S/25719, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 292.

³⁵² UNTAC Spokesman's office, "Mine Clearance Training Unit", *op. cit.*, n. 335.

³⁵³ S/25719, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 292.

³⁵⁴ S/26095, Blue Book II, *op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 329. CMAC requires approximately \$10 million each year to field about 40 platoons of deminers. In October 1993, CMAC almost stopped operating as it made the transition from UNTAC to independent status because of a lack of funds and arrangements to transfer equipment and foreign advisers. As of February 1995,

Since UNTAC's withdrawal, CMAC has acted as the focus and coordinating agency for all demining activities in the country. In October 1993, it was announced that all foreign employees of CMAC would be withdrawn by November, although this deadline was extended for another month. Until April 1996, CMAC will be working under the auspices of the UNDP Trust Fund for Demining. After that, CMAC is expected to be a fully indigenous and autonomous Cambodian government agency. By February 1995, CMAC consisted of 41 demining platoons (32 man teams). Each unit could clear between 500-1000 square meters per day, depending on the terrain. There are 10 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams and 16 mine marking and survey report teams.³⁵⁵

Conclusion

On balance, UNTAC fulfilled its mandate. The United Nations managed to carry out its primary mission and to follow the original timetable without much delay. It realized its major objective of establishing a legitimate Cambodian government through democratic election. It also bore accomplishment in repatriation, human rights and rehabilitation. While military conflict continues, the probability of it escalating again into a large scale regional conflict is very low. However, from the perspective of disarmament, UNTAC failed to carry its mission to the end. As a result, two years after UNTAC left the country, Cambodia is still suffering from chronic military clashes, and the country is not unified. Although people have heard a lot of reports that the PDK has been considerably weakened since the peacekeeping operation, it remains a military or even political force that the new government seems unable to eliminate by military means. Also "we must not underestimate the popular support that the Khmer Rouge has within Cambodia".³⁵⁶ In July 1994, after the national assembly outlawed it, the PDK announced the formation of a provisional government of national unity in Preah Vihear province. In short, the failed disarmament operation has serious consequences for Cambodia's national reconciliation and for its role as a coherent state in the world community.

CMAC still lacked the \$8 million necessary to operate through its proposed cycle ending April 1996. Human Rights Watch/Asia, *op. cit.*, n. 309, p. 64.

³⁵⁵ Heininger, *op. cit.*, n. 158, p. 73; Special paid supplement to the *Phnom Penh Post*, Volume 4, Number 3, 10-23 February 1995.

³⁵⁶ Brown, *op. cit.*, n. 46, p. 22.

As many scholars as well as practitioners have pointed out, no single reason can be pointed at for the abortion of disarmament. Rather it was a result of the interaction of multiple factors at multiple levels. Putting things in the broader perspective of post-Cold War international relations, the United Nations underestimated the ability of local forces to derail the peace agreements brokered by major powers. The underlying assumption was that if major powers and the UN could bring the warring parties together to sign a peace agreement, they might also have the clout to make them turn the agreement into reality. Therefore, the Paris Accords and UN mandate for UNTAC had not even foreseen the possibility of non-compliance, let alone prepared for how to deal with it. It can be argued that if the agreements had included clear definitions of non-compliance and penalties for it, the UN and international community would have been in a much stronger position to handle or even preempt the problem. One argument suggested by UN officials for not building this mechanism in peace agreements is that any preventive measures or contingency plans would imply that the UN distrusted one or more of the parties involved, and thus would be viewed suspiciously by the factions.³⁵⁷ However, given the profound mistrust among factions, such a mechanism could also be positively viewed by them as a check on their adversaries. Of course, non-compliance might occur anyway even with such definitions and deterrents, but UNTAC would at least have had the legal basis to take actions against non-compliance. It is remarkable that the major powers, namely the Permanent Five Members of the Security Council, were able to maintain a consensus throughout the operation on an issue that once profoundly divided them. Their consensus prevented any faction, even the PDK, from formally and publicly breaking away from the peace process. Yet major power consensus was not a sufficient condition to bring peace to Cambodia. When the major powers stopped providing military and economic support to their respective proxies in Cambodia, their influence on these factions also diminished.³⁵⁸ Consequently, the tail wagged the dog. Moreover, once the UN began to invest money and resources in the operation, as Michael Doyle put it, the bargaining relationship altered its balance. The larger the UN investments, the greater the influence of the parties became and the greater the possibility of their defiance.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁷ Heininger, *op. cit.*, n. 158, p. 43.

³⁵⁸ For instance, China had repeatedly told the PDK to adhere to the Paris Agreements and cooperate with UNTAC. The effect, however, was marginal. See Akashi, *op. cit.*, n. 2, p. 198.

³⁵⁹ Doyle, *op. cit.*, n. 179, p. 97.

There is no doubt that the PDK should be blamed for the failure of disarmament. To be sure, the PDK was sceptical about the peace settlement from the very beginning because it realized that there was no chance for it to regain power through a democratic election given its notorious track-record. On the other hand, the PDK realized that if it was left out of the peace process while the other three factions got on board, it would be internationally isolated. Therefore, if the peace process could provide an adequate incentive for the PDK to maintain its minimum political viability and to significantly weaken the SOC's power, the PDK would choose the lesser of two evils. As reflected in the mixed signals sent by the PDK at various phases of UNTAC's mission and the policy paralysis since April 1992, the internal struggle for compliance or noncompliance persisted within the PDK throughout the operation.³⁶⁰ If the right signals had been cultivated at the right time with the right incentives, there might have been a possibility of the PDK walking into the cantonment sites and disarming at least a portion of its armed forces.

Such an incentive structure, however, was never really sufficient to convince the suspicious PDK to lay down their arms. Western countries were reluctant to include the PDK in the peace process. With the end of the Cold War, they felt less and less compelled to accommodate the PDK's concerns. As Peter Bartu observed, France and the United States, after strenuously arguing for the inclusion of the PDK in the process initially, moved away from a "neutral" posture to one of public condemnation of the PDK.³⁶¹ This mentality was also reflected in the UN mission in Cambodia. UNAMIC, at the critical early stage, was perceived as biased against the PDK. It tended to indiscriminately blame the PDK for cease-fire violations without serious investigations.³⁶² The PDK also became the easy target to pick on for initiating the breaches of the peace process due to its notorious international image.³⁶³ As a result, they felt that General Loridon was not impartial in his dealings with them in the MMWG.³⁶⁴ All this let the PDK believe that the UN favored the SOC's side and was not a neutral force. When UNTAC arrived, the PDK hoped that it would be more stern with the SOC and more lenient with itself. However, it was soon disappointed. UNTAC seemed to

³⁶⁰ Bartu, *op. cit.*, n. 139.

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*

³⁶² Sanderson, "UNTAC: The Military Component View", *op. cit.*, n. 124, p. 73.

³⁶³ According to General Sanderson, it was the SOC and Sihanouk that first corrupted the peace agreement by maneuvering to squeeze the PDK out of the process. John Sanderson, "A Review of Recent Peacekeeping Operations", *op. cit.*, n. 277, p. 6.

³⁶⁴ Bartu, *op. cit.*, n. 139.

be unwilling to accommodate its demands in small things such as dispatching an Asian battalion to PDK-controlled areas.³⁶⁵ Moreover, especially in the initial stage, UNTAC failed to effectively neutralize the SOC's key government agencies. The control of the SOC was seen as a test of UNTAC's neutrality and hence the determining factor in the PDK's compliance.³⁶⁶ In fact, during the pre-treaty negotiations, the PDK dropped its insistence on power-sharing only after the Agreement promised this control-mechanism.³⁶⁷ Only after the SOC had been sufficiently weakened in both political and military terms, did the PDK see a possibility for its survival in the forthcoming political competition after disarmament. Yet UNTAC did not do much substantially to address this issue. Besides technical issues, UNTAC was also unenthusiastic in pursuing this course. Privately UNTAC officers recognized what the PDK claimed was true; however, they thought that maintaining the SOC's support was more important than addressing the PDK's concerns. Some also doubted that the PDK would cooperate even if UNTAC exercised tougher control of the SOC administrative structure.³⁶⁸ Therefore, when Phase II started in June, the PDK perceived that the process could offer nothing for its survival.³⁶⁹

Some deficiencies at operational levels certainly did not help the course of disarmament. Many who were involved in the UNTAC mission believe that if the UN could have had a precipitate deployment and forceful UN presence after the signing of the peace agreement and carried out the disarmament soon after, it would have been much more difficult for the PDK and SOC to degenerate from the peace agreement they had just signed.³⁷⁰ In fact, from the very beginning, factions including the PDK repeatedly asked for a quick deployment. The slow

³⁶⁵ Col. Huijssoon, however, argued that the demand was turned down out of fear that Asian troops had a tendency to make deals with the NADK. Interview, *op. cit.*, n. 129.

³⁶⁶ Bartu, *op. cit.*, n. 139.

³⁶⁷ Sanderson, "Successes and Failures", *op. cit.*, n. 273, p. 19.

³⁶⁸ Conversation with Eric Berman (Assistant Spokesman, Office of the Special Representative, UNTAC), 1 May 1995, United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland.

³⁶⁹ Bartu, *op. cit.*, n. 139.

³⁷⁰ Among others, the Force Commander, General Sanderson considered the excessive delay of the UNTAC deployment the key reason for the failure of the disarmament. Sanderson and Healy personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 126. Mary Kimball also pointed out that the delay permitted factions to have second thoughts on aspects of the agreement that did not suit them (including disarmament) and renege on their promises. Kimball personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 139. When citing three reasons for the failure of disarmament, some military officers involved in the operation also mentioned that if the disarmament could have been carried out in due time, the result could have been much better. The delay led to a lack of will of all factions to comply; *Analysis Report: Cambodia*, *op. cit.*, n. 134, p. 5.

and less than effective start of UNTAC both increased factions' doubt about the UN's seriousness and emboldened PDK and SOC defiance. The lack of adequate administrative personnel, on the other hand, made UNTAC powerless in controlling the SOC administrative structure. It was this flaw which "served up on a silver platter spurious justification for the PDK not to comply with key provisions of the Paris Agreements".³⁷¹ The possibility for a successful disarmament was further compromised by an extremely tight and somewhat unrealistic timetable for the whole operation. To some extent, UNTAC became the hostage of its own timetable. Apparently, sticking with the original schedule sometimes became UNTAC's first priority irrespective of whether the conditions were ready for implementation. General Sanderson had to start Phase II although his battalions were not fully deployed. The cantonment was then to be finished within a month although facilities for large-scale cantonment were simply not there. Even if all conditions were met, the time-frame for completing the process was too rushed.³⁷² It seems that UNTAC just had the wrong rhythm of implementation. It started too slow and then raced through the main steps. Yet the momentum lost in a sluggish deployment could not be regained by simply hastening the subsequent operations. In retrospect, UNTAC should have made more efforts to minimize the time gap between the signing of the peace agreement and the actual deployment while adopting a more evenly phased approach in the following implementation. Such an approach might allow more time for consultation before making major decisions on issues such as the commencement of Phase II. A more decisive start and a less ambitious timetable could reduce the uncertainty prior to the operation and increase confidence and stability once it takes off.

To a great extent, the unsatisfactory outcome of disarmament was a political rather than a military issue. The UNTAC military component, especially the Force Commander, firmly believed that an international military force is unable to solve domestic conflict if those concerned parties failed to strike a deal. It is interesting to note that it was the civilian component which advocated more strongly the use of more forceful means to deal with the PDK, while the military component resisted the temptation to turn peacekeeping into peace-enforcement and plunge itself into a potentially costly and prolonged war against a guerrilla faction. In this respect, sometimes UNTAC was even more conservative than traditional peacekeeping missions as the military component was reluctant to put its troops between the PDK and CPAF to stop the fighting. What distinguished

³⁷¹ Ken Berry, "UNTAC: A Flawed Paradigm/Success", in *Conference Papers*, p. 179.

³⁷² Kimball personal correspondence, *op. cit.*, n. 139.

UNTAC from other peacekeeping missions was the functional change of the military component from disarming warring parties to providing security for the election process. Judging from the result, this functional transition was quite effective and successful. The coordination between the military and civilian components, which had been quite weak before the functional change, was considerably enhanced during the whole process of election as all the resources were devoted to a single objective. A peaceful polling process would have been very unlikely without this change of mandate. To some degree, a relatively secure environment, at least around polling stations, was created not by disarming warring factions but rather by protecting the electoral process with military forces.

With the failure of disarming and demobilizing faction forces, other dimensions of the military mandate such as weapons control and demining became more difficult to implement. However, this was not the only reason. The above analysis revealed numerous gaps between the mandate on paper and reality on the ground. In some UNTAC military officers' words, many parts of the mandate, such as massive regroupment and cantonment, effective monitoring of external weapons flow, detailed data on mine fields, and so on, "were unexecutable", and UN decisions were often made with no regard to the operational consequences.³⁷³ The Paris agreement and UN mandate after all were the product of politicians and diplomats. Not a few military personnel involved in UNTAC suggested that in future peacekeeping operations, more military experts and officers should have more input during negotiation and planning stages so that many unrealistic mandates could be eliminated and problems minimized before the operation takes off.

³⁷³ Huijssoon interview, *op. cit.*, n. 129; *Analysis Report: Cambodia*, *op. cit.*, n. 134, p. 20.

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
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- United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, *Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations*, Nos. K005, K021, K023, K029, K037, K038, K039, K053, K061, K064, K065, K066, K067, K068, K079, K081, K083, K102, K105, K124, K125, K128, K143, K162, K170. Geneva: United Nations, unpublished survey responses.



Part III:

Questionnaire Analysis

DISARMAMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROJECT
The Disarming of Warring Parties
as an Integral Part of Conflict Settlement

PRACTITIONERS' QUESTIONNAIRE ON:
WEAPONS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, AND
DEMOBILIZATION DURING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

ANALYSIS REPORT: CAMBODIA

COMPILED BY: COL R. BENDINI AND LT COL I. TIIHONEN

COMPLETED BY: LT COL J.W. POTGIETER

DATE: 31 MAY 1995

Note to Readers: The responses which appear in this analysis have been reproduced directly from the respondents' answers to the DCR *Practitioner's Questionnaire*. Changes, if any, have been made only to correct spelling, grammar, and sentence structure; all efforts have been made to maintain the integrity of the original responses. Illegible portions of the original written responses have been indicated with ellipses.

Reference Number: UNIDIR/UNTAC/02

Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaires

Number of questionnaires analyzed: 25

IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION

1. OPERATION

a. Name of operation: UNTAC

b. Location of operation: Cambodia

c. Time frame covered by questionnaires:

(K005) 01/05/92 - 11/11/93
(K021) 01/12/92 - 01/11/93
(K023) 01/02/92 - 01/02/93
(K029) 01/05/92 - 01/12/92
(K037) 14/08/92 - 04/08/93
(K038) 14/08/92 - 04/08/93
(K039) 14/08/92 - 04/08/93
(K053) 09/01/93 - 28/10/93
(K061) 01/11/92 - 01/10/93
(K064) 01/05/92 - 01/07/93
(K065) 01/05/92 - 01/07/93
(K066) 01/05/92 - 01/07/93
(K067) 27/05/92 - 19/07/93
(K068) 06/12/91 - 18/12/92
(K079) 10/11/91 - 28/07/92
(K081) 01/05/92 - 15/11/93
(K083) 01/05/92 - 01/12/92
(K102) 01/12/92 - 01/10/93
(K105) 20/05/92 - 20/01/93
(K124) 01/06/92 - 01/06/93
(K125) 01/04/92 - 01/03/93
(K128) 12/12/92 - 01/10/93

(K143) 06/12/91 - 06/06/92
 (K162) 01/08/92 - 01/02/93
 (K170) 01/06/92 - 01/03/93

2. RESPONDENTS

a. Primary Role:

UN Civilian: 04

Chief : 03
 Other : 01

Military Officer: 21

Commander : 08
 Other : 13

Humanitarian Relief Operator and/or NGO personnel: 00

National Official: 00

b. Primary Mission:

Military: 21

HQ Staff	: 05	Military Observer	: 09
Infantry	: 05	Armor	: 00
Artillery	: 00	Engineer	: 02
Medical	: 00	Aviation	: 00
Transport	: 00	Logistics	: 00
Military Police	: 00		

Civilian : 04

Civil Affairs	: 00	Staff HQ	: 00
Representative	: 00	Relief Coordinator	: 00
Relief	: 00	Volunteer	: 01
Other: electoral districts	: 01		
Other: unspecified	: 02		


c. Regular Activities:

Convoy Operations	: 22	Convoy Security	: 20
Base Security	: 09	Patrolling	: 20
Search Operations	: 04	Checkpoint Operations	: 14
Cease-fire Monitoring	: 15	Cease-fire Violations Investigations	: 11
Weapons Inspections	: 09	Weapons Inventories	: 09
Weapons Collection - Voluntary			: 12
Weapons Collection - Involuntary			: 02
Weapons Elimination	: 02	Cantonment Construction	: 13
Cantonment Security	: 11	Disarmament Verification	: 08
Information Collection	: 17		
Police Operations (Military policemen)			: 04
Special Operations	: 02	Humanitarian Relief	: 08
Other: Planning all military component operations			: 01
Other: Coordinating planning of all components			: 01
Other: Planning HQ organization			: 01
Other: Mine awareness training			: 01
Other: Visits to faction areas to collect information and build confidence			: 01
Other: Visits to faction areas to verify demining training and demining operations			: 01
Other: Develop plans for CMAC creation and funding			: 01
Other: Minefield clearance training and clearance supervision			: 01
Other: Explosive ordnance disposal			: 01
Other: Electoral organizing, registration			: 02
Other: Human rights teaching			: 01
Other: Electorate registration			: 01
Other: Political campaign monitoring			: 01
Other: Liaising with local officials			: 01
Other: Vote observation, ballot counting			: 01
Other: Election security			: 02
Other: Special investigations			: 02
Other: Liaison with surrounding countries			: 01
Other: Liaison to all factions			: 02
Other: Preparation of NADK disarmament			: 01
Other: Member of the Mixed Military Working Group, 2nd Level			: 01
Other: Naval operations			: 01

Other: Civic action - public radio	: 01
Other: Training of military police	: 01
Other: Building activities (schools, etc.)	: 01
Other: Building roads and bridges	: 01
Other: Escorting returning refugees	: 01
Other: Controlling food distribution	: 01
Other: Rebuilding and training coastal naval forces	: 01
Other: Anti piracy	: 01
Other: Coastal security	: 01
Other: Coastal resupply	: 01
Other: Border liaison	: 01
Other: Border checkpoints	: 01

Military Statistics

Force Composition: UNTAC



Strength: Maximum strength of force, Formed units and HQ's 15, 191;
UNMO's 485.

Contributing countries:

Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Malaysia, Namibia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Tunisia, Uruguay: 1 infantry battalion each.

Ghana, India, Indonesia: 2 infantry battalions each.

Chile and France: 1 infantry battalion each plus logistical elements.

Canada, China, Ireland, Japan, the Philippines, Poland, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand: 1 engineering battalion each.

Germany: Medical elements.


UK and USA: UNMO's.

Casualties:

	<u>Died</u>	<u>Wounded</u>
UN Civilian Personnel	5	1
UNCIVPOL	3	7
Military	39	43
UNMO's	3	1

Costs:

Total cost of the operation from 1 November 1991 to 30 September 1993: US\$ 1,523,696,000.



SECTION ONE

(Note to readers: Two caveats should be kept in mind when surveying the respondents' answers to the Practitioner's Questionnaire. First, in answering the questionnaire, respondents were instructed to answer only those questions which pertained to their specific mission and/or function; as a result, most respondents did not answer all of the "yes" or "no" questions. The number of responses for each question, therefore, will not always add up to the total number of respondents. Second, respondents often provided additional commentary for questions they should have skipped -- they may have answered a question with "no", for example, and then elaborated on their answer in the space provided for the "yes" respondents. For this reason, certain questions may contain more responses than the number expected.)

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT:

**Q1.1 Was there a disarmament component in the original peace agreement and/or relevant UN Security Council Resolution?
(If no, go to Section II.)**

Yes: 21 No: 02

(K067) [Yes.] But only until September 1992.

(K105) [No.] This activity was assigned to the military component.

Q1.2 If yes, was the disarmament component a central feature of the agreement?

Yes: 20 No: 00

(K067) [Yes.] But after NADK refused, [the disarmament was] cancelled.

Q1.3 Describe the desired outcome of the disarmament component vis-à-vis the peace agreement.

- (K005) Because of the withdrawal of one of the four factions, the disarmament of the forces of the other three factions was quickly disrupted.
- (K021) Disarmament and cantonment was to minimize the threat between the multiple factions.
- (K023) Disarmament [was] linked to cantonment, then to demobilization before [the] elections and reconciliation/nation-building.
- (K029) Disarmament, cantonment and training, demobilization, [and then] integration of [the] rest of [the] armed factions into national armed forces.
- (K053) To disarm 70% of the armed combatants of each of the 4 military/political factions.
- (K061) Disarmament and cantonment were seen as essential in order to provide the neutral security environment for the conduct of elections.
- (K064) Stable cease-fire; regroupment and cantonment of all military factions; disarming of cantoned forces and militia; store and secure all surrendered weapons, ammunition, and equipment; return of refugees; and after all [this], to conduct free and fair elections.
- (K065) Could not be implemented due to the fact that [the] Khmer Rouge didn't take part in the elections.
- (K066) See [the] UNTAC mandate: cease-fire, regroup and canton, etc.

- (K067) Cease-fire, demobilization, cantonment, disarming of factions, mine clearing, [...] instruction in farming, storing of surrendered and registered weapons and ammunition, return and resettlement of more than 300,000 refugees, [and the] guaranteeing of free and fair elections.
- (K068) Demobilization of all faction forces down to 30%.
- (K079) Echec complet en raison: 1.) du refus du Parti du Kampuchie Démocratique de se plier aux accords; 2.) d'une mauvaise préparation.
[Complete failure because of: 1.) the refusal of the PDK to submit to the accords; and 2.) poor preparation.]
- (K081) All troops of the opposing factions were to be regrouped at pre-arranged locations, disarmed and cantoned, to create a peaceful and congenial environment for the registration of voters and conducting of an election.
- (K083) Disarmament of [the] factions, cantonment, and organization of a new army.
- (K102) It was intended that all weapons would be handed in before the commencement of registration.
- (K124) Locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia. Disarmament of armed groups [and then] demobilization and eventual resettlement.
- (K125) 1.) To create an atmosphere of peace and security for the return of normal peace-time life. 2.) To encourage previous combatants to return to civil life patterns and occupations. 3.) To facilitate elections and the electioneering process.
- (K143) Disarmament and demobilization of 70% of the factions.

(K170) All four warring factions were to surrender their arms to allow a free and fair election to take place.

Q1.4 Was there a timetable planned for implementation?

Yes: 20 No: 00

Q1.5 If so, did it go as planned?

Yes: 00 No: 20

Q1.6 If not, why? Give three reasons.

(K005) See Q1.3.

(K021) 1.) The NADK did not comply at all. 2.) For survival, [the] other factions then could not [either]. 3.) There was no real pressure by the UN for compliance.

(K023) 1.) Factions did not cooperate. 2.) Mission prepared to go ahead without disarmament. 3.) Mission not prepared to withdraw if no cooperation, nor to enforce disarmament, nor to "guarantee" safety of the disarmed, etc.

(K029) 1.) UNTAC HQ and infbn's [infantry battalions] not deployed/operating [in a timely manner]. 2.) Distrust between [the] four factions.

(K053) 1.) [The] Khmer Rouge pulled out due to a too close working relationship between [the] Hun Sen government and the UN which was to try to administer much of [the] Hun Sen government's functions, and due to the claim of Vietnamese troops still in Cambodia.

(K061) 1.) The NADK (Khmer Rouge) did not disarm. Therefore, neither did anyone else. 2.) The UN deployed late. 3.) The factions had poor communication with their troops.

- (K064) 1.) Deployment of UNTAC forces too delayed. 2.) NADK (Khmer Rouge) did not comply with the peace agreement. 3.) There was no firm cease-fire.
- (K065) NADK didn't agree because [the] faction indicated that [there were] still Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia. [Thus the] Paris Agreement [was] not fulfilled.
- (K066) 1.) Delays in deployment. 2.) Logistic problems. 3.) Problems with one of the factions (Khmer Rouge).
- (K067) 1.) Delays of forces (especially supply units) in the field. 2.) NADK stepped out of [the] agreement. 3.) Demobilized CPAF soldiers joined groups in robbery. 4.) UNTAC became a target of NADK operations. 5.) No cease-fire.
- (K068) Non-cooperation of NADK.
- (K079) 1.) Impossibilité politique. 2.) Manque de préparation des camps de rassemblement des combattants. 3.) Manque de détermination des responsables ONU.
[1.) Political impossibility. 2.) Lack of preparation of camps for the regroupment of the combatants. 3.) Lack of determination on the part of those responsible in the UN.]
- (K081) The timetable for [the] registration of voters was adjusted for all voters in the UN-controlled areas to be fully registered.
- (K083) [The] factions refused to cooperate, starting with [the] Khmer Rouge [and] eagerly followed by [the] others. After all, everybody delayed and "cheated".

- (K102) 1.) The Khmer Rouge failed to canton. 2.) The three other factions thus refused to continue the process. 3.) The Khmer Rouge claimed that Vietnamese troops were among the other factions.
- (K124) 1.) Lack of mutual trust between factions. 2.) Feeling of insecurity after disarmament. 3.) Too ambitious a goal to be achieved by UNTAC given [the] background of [the] conflict.
- (K125) 1.) Intransigence on the part of the warring factions, especially the NADK. 2.) Mutual suspicion among the various combatants. 3.) UN forces not being ready/available to implement [the] timetable.
- (K128) Failure [of the] warring factions to hand in all [of] their weapons due to mistrust of each other.
- (K143) 1.) Refusal of NADK to participate. 2.) Lack of international pressure on NADK. 3.) Inability of UNTAC to enforce NADK to disarm.
- (K170) 1.) [Not enough] trust between factions to hand weapons in. 2.) Only old and mostly unoperational weapons were handed in.

Q1.7 If there were delays in the implementation, summarize their impact on the disarmament process.

- (K029) Delays led to lack of will of all factions concerned, to upsurge in small-scale military action, [and] to banditry (failure of disarmament process).
- (K061) Only a small percentage were disarmed in low-tension areas due to the stance of the NADK. The weapons were unserviceable.

- (K064) There would have been a better result if the disarmament process had been made in due time.
- (K066) The disarmament process took place only partly.
- (K067) Since NADK didn't comply with [the] Paris Agreement, it wasn't possible to disarm other factions.
- (K081) NADK refused to disarm.
- (K083) Disarmament never really came through, [and the] whole operation had to be readjusted.
- (K124) UNTAC had to go through its program without complete disarmament as planned.
- (K125) 1.) Lack of confidence in the peace process. 2.) Fear and insecurity among the locals. 3.) Lack of cooperation [and] interest on the part of the factions.
- (K128) The disarmament phase was not completed; nonetheless, the force went ahead with the other components of the agreement.
- (K143) UNTAC was not allowed by NADK to deploy troops in their area.
- (K170) Disarmament went by the wayside as the political push for the election went ahead.

Q1.8 Did the existing agreements hinder you at any time from conducting disarmament measures?

Yes: 04 No: 12

Q1.9 If so, mention some of the ways in which you felt hindered.

- (K021) It was not the agreement, but complete lack of enforcement.
- (K023) 1.) There were no provisions for the supply of maps. Very difficult to navigate and to plot/record mined areas. 2.) There were no provisions for incremental compliance, small actions were allowed to not get done, [and] eventually, major non-compliances were accepted. 3.) The largest problem, however, remained [the] failure of [the] UN to release resources from UN HQ and local civilian control.
- (K029) 1.) Totally dependent on [the] cooperation and information of [the] parties concerned. 2.) No impartial intelligence information at hand to verify.
- (K079) Le désarmement n'aurait été possible qu'avec l'accord de toutes les factions, alors qu'il a essayer de débiter malgré le refus du PKD d'y participer.
[The disarmament would only have been possible with the agreement of all the factions, but the mission tried to begin even though the PDK refused to participate.]
- (K083) Officially, we had no authority to take weapons from civilians. In spite of that, we carried on, running the risk of small-scale "problems". [This] meant there [were] weapons of former soldiers, thieves, [...], money-collectors.
- (K124) What was to be done if disarmed troops were [...] attacked? Were they to be given back their arms to defend themselves? Also, the state of weapons to be handed over - [they were] sometimes unserviceable.
- (K143) 1.) Agreements signed by faction leaders which had to renegotiate them with their own warlords. 2.) No

incentives or disarmament enforcing measures in the agreements.

Analyst's Comments:

All the basic elements of the mandate and mission force are indicated in the answers given to Q1.3. Although some answers may be a bit simplified, it appears that the different commanders had the correct perception of what was expected of them during the operation.

From the Secretary-General's Special Report on UNTAC dated 12 June 1992, it is clear that NADK was doing its best to disrupt UNTAC.¹ Allegations about Vietnamese troops on Cambodian soil were repeatedly made by NADK, but requests by both UNTAC and the Secretary-General for NADK to accompany UNMO's to the alleged sites were repeatedly turned down by the faction. The other parties held back both forces and weapons to counter any disadvantages which they might suffer vis-à-vis NADK and in doing so disrupted the whole demobilization plan.

II. MANDATE:

Q2.1 At the start of your mission, were you informed of the part of the mandate regarding disarmament?

Yes: 18 No: 04

Q2.2 How was the disarmament component expressed in your mission mandate? (Summarize.)

(K005) Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict. In Annex 1, Section C: Military Functions; further detailed in Annex 2: Withdrawal, Cease-fire and Related Measures.

¹ *The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995*. The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume II (hereafter cited as Blue Book II) (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1995), p.193.

- (K021) [I] do not remember specifically as it became insignificant by the time I arrived.
- (K023) Specific mission mandate [of the CMAP] was demining (record mined areas, train deminers and conduct demining operations eventually, safety of civilians, etc.).
- (K029) Not defined in clear actions to be taken by military of UNTAC in order to achieve mandate objectives.
- (K053) Military observers deployed to monitor cease-fire.
- (K061) The factions were to disarm upon entering cantonment sites controlled by the UN. The UN was to store the weapons until after elections when the weapons were to be returned to the new government and the new national army.
- (K064) Supervise and monitor [the] cease-fire; liaison; monitor and observe ingress/egress points; [and] verify that all forces as declared by the factions are cantoned.
- (K065) 1.) Cantonment. 2.) Disarmament. 3.) Weapons elimination.
- (K066) See [the] UNTAC mandate.
- (K067) 1.) Verifying of weapons registered by UNAMIC MLO's [military liaison officers]. 2.) Surrendered weapons to be stored and guarded by forces. 3.) Demobilization and cantonment process (never took place). 4.) Verifying of foreign forces (Vietnamese as announced by NADK).
- (K068) In the SOP and Ops [operations] orders.
- (K079) Très succinctement. Désarmer et démobiliser les militaires des quatre factions.

[Very succinctly. Disarm and demobilize the soldiers of the four factions.]

(K083) Very well. Even the speeches to be delivered to the people (who had to be disarmed/cantoned) were prepared.

(K102) 1.) Supervision of external supply of weapons to Cambodia. 2.) Supervise the turning in of weapons and ammunition by the factions. 3.) Location and confiscation of weapons caches.

(K105) URUBATT [Uruguay Battalion] was to receive (together with the observer teams) the weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment in specific places. All the collected material would be deposited in the battalion's headquarters.

(K124) Locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia. Arms control and reduction after troops cantonment.

(K125) Warring factions were to be disarmed in stages: they were to check in through regroupment centers, come under UN control, and move into cantonment sites where they surrender their weapons to UN personnel within a set time frame.

(K143) Prepare disarmament and demobilization.

(K170) It was to occur prior to the commencement of enrolling personnel for the election.

Q2.3 How did you interpret the mandate you received?

(K005) As it was part of a treaty, the military functions were interpreted literally.

- (K021) It was specific, but not complied with or enforced.
- (K023) As above [Q2.2] - developed from [the] direction of the Force Commander's broad general concept.
- (K029) As insufficient. As a result, [...] one unit came up with [its] own interpretation as to the execution of this part of the mission. So did other infbn's [infantry battalions].
- (K061) It was very clear - as above [Q2.2].
- (K064) In the first stage of the operation, the mandate seemed to be very ambiguous. Later (after about half a year), there was no discussion at all about the cantonment process.
- (K065) In case of total agreement between the factions, [it would have been] easy to implement.
- (K067) Fight the increasing robbery by collecting illegal weapons (non-registered).
- (K068) We executed the mandate.
- (K079) Comme il avait été décidé que la mission de l'ONU était l'AUTORITE provisoire des Nations Unies au Cambodge, j'ai pensé que le mandat était clair et que le moment venu, il faudrait être en mesure de procéder à cette phase (celle du désarmement).
[As it had been decided that the UN mission was to be the UN's provisional authority in Cambodia, I thought that the mandate was clear and that at the right moment, it would have been necessary to be ready to proceed to this phase (that of disarmament).]
- (K083) According to the letter! (Although Thai authorities told me there was such a thing as an "Asian" way of looking at a mandate!) In other words, cannot we "arrange" something with [the Khmer Rouge] faction!

(K102) The mission was to plan and execute the holding of free and fair elections. Cantonment was a preliminary step in the process.

(K105) Just as expressed in Q2.2.

(K124) It was going to be a voluntary exercise based on previously agreed modalities.

(K125) 1.) Come to a common understanding with the factions regarding the processes involved. 2.) Establish cantonment sites to receive the weapons. 3.) Establish a framework (committee) to resolve conflicts.

(K143) 1.) Negotiation to implement disarmament [of the] factions. 2.) [Construct] cantonment sites. 3.) Location of weapons.

(K170) That it was not possible, as fighting continued, but best efforts to disarm groups through discussion and format meetings were to be made.

Q2.4 Did the way the disarmament component was expressed hinder or assist your disarming task?

Hindered: 05 Assisted: 13

Q2.5 If it was a hindrance, how would you have preferred your mandate to read?

(K021) I would need a copy to comment on it. The NADK interpreted it to their advantage not to comply. It [should be] written in absolute terms, not conditional; maybe even to address consequences of non-compliance.

(K023) Could have [made] more specific reference to actions, to factions, and [to the] UN: 1.) providing all mined area records and locations of depots, 2.) providing full-time liaison officers, for CMAC members, from factions, 3.)

providing demobilized soldiers to volunteer as contract deminers, 4.) initiation of mined area marking, demining, etc., and 5.) UN role to provide training, equipment, etc.

(K029) Down to earth, realistic orders/directives [as to] what to achieve and political-military back-up at the time of execution.

(K079) Il aurait fallu laisser aux responsables sur place plus d'initiative pour juger du moment opportun et des modalités d'application.

[One should have given those responsible in the field more initiative in order to judge the opportune moment and the modalities of application of disarmament.]

(K105) [Assisted.] Even though the orders were clear and easy to carry out, it would have been preferable [if] the disarmament was compulsory.

(K143) No coextensive measures in case of non-compliance. No incentives for disarmament.

Q2.6 Were your actions/freedom of action during disarmament operations influenced by external factors other than the mandate?

Yes: 14 No: 02

Q2.7 If so, which ones?

(K005) Refusal of one of the four factions to cooperate, problems with [the] construction of shelters in the cantonments, [and] problems with water and food supply and medical care for cantoned soldiers.

(K021) It had already failed by my arrival.

- (K023) 1.) How well [the] factions could control [their] own troops. 2.) How well arms crossed the border. 3.) Interest of border states in maintaining trade, conflict, etc. 4.) How much money [the] UN [was] prepared to invest in demining activities [was] never made clear. Very slow UN decisions.
- (K029) 1.) Total refusal of one of the factions to cooperate [...] with [the] peace agreement. 2.) No chance to enter/operate part of bn [battalion] mission area.
- (K061) It depended completely on the cooperation of the factions. If there was no cooperation, there was no authority for disarmament in the mandate.
- (K064) There was no freedom of movement into Khmer Rouge territory. It was always necessary to take some [...] to go there and to keep liaisons with the Khmer Rouge leaders.
- (K066) 1.) Logistic problems. 2.) Restrictions of freedom of movement by one of the factions.
- (K067) 1.) Partly no freedom of movement (NADK-controlled areas). 2.) Steady support of one faction by Thailand and China. 3.) Liaison with NADK was cut off (weapons and ammunition bought with timber and emeralds). 4.) Registration was disturbed by NADK [during the] pre-election phase. 5.) Mines and clashes.
- (K079) 1.) Le refus du PKD. 2.) La pression de New York pour entamer le processus alors que rien n'était prêt sur le plan psychologique, matériel et politique.
[1.) The refusal of the PDK. 2.) The pressure from New York to begin the process while nothing was ready in the field psychologically, materially or politically.]
- (K083) 1.) Unwilling factions. 2.) (Unofficial) Thai cooperation with [the] Khmer Rouge.

- (K102) The Khmer Rouge did not permit the UN to enter territories under their control. This applied to cantonment and the elections.
- (K105) The factions decided not to comply with what they had agreed in Paris. All of them kept their weapons, maintained their positions, resupplied their units, and carried out skirmishes.
- (K124) Neighboring countries to Thailand had economic and military interest in the conflict. Some participating countries were known to be supporting some factions.
- (K143) 1.) Negative attitude of NADK. 2.) Lack of confidence from the other factions in the disarmament process and in the ability of [the] UN to enforce disarmament.
- (K170) Corruption of high-ranking Cambodian Naval and Military officers who stood to gain more by [the] retention of [their] arms than their surrender and corresponding loss of armed personnel.

III. SUBSIDIARY DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS:

Q3.1 Did the warring factions enter into a separate disarmament agreement?

Yes: 01 No: 20
(If not, go to question 4.)

(K083) [No.] However, some factions agreed to "partial" disarmament.

Q3.2 If so, describe the agreement.

(K105) One of the factions had logistics problems (food), so it unilaterally decided to send part of the troops on

"agricultural leave" so that the men could help harvest the rice in their home towns.

Q3.3 Was the agreement formulated with the mandate in mind or independent of the mandate?

Mandate-oriented: 04

Independent of mandate: 01

Q3.4 Were there any contradictions between the mandate and the agreement?

Yes: 01

No: 05

Q3.5 If so, which ones?

[No responses.]

Q3.6 What was the impact of the agreement on the mandate?

(K005) Agreement and Mandate were the same document.

(K061) Both were complementary. The Paris Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict was very clear.

(K083) Integral part of [the] agreement.

(K105) It collaborated with the agreement because the men that went on leave handed their weapons over to UNTAC.

Analyst's Comments:

From the answer given to Q3.2 it is clear that the respondent misunderstood the question. It was not so much warring factions going into a disarmament deal

*separate from the Paris Agreement, but a grant by UNTAC to get the much needed rice crop from the fields.*²

IV. TOP-DOWN CHANGES: CONSISTENCY OF THE MANDATE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DISARMAMENT COMPONENT:

Q4.1 Did the mandate change while you were engaged in the UN/national operation?

Yes: 09 No: 13
(If not, go to question 5.)

Q4.2 If so, what was(were) the change(s)? (Describe the most important aspects.)

(K021) [No.] However, there were necessary changes after the CPP (party) lost the election and FUNCINPEC (party) won.

(K023) [No.] But, elections went ahead without disarmament [or] demobilization and without [the] support of all factions.

(K029) Skip the disarmament/cantonment/demobilization part where it did not work. Create a security environment to make at least election phase possible and successful.

(K053) UN military (Australians, New Zealanders, Dutch) became more readily armed to defend themselves. UN dependents were sent home. Recommended bunkers by offices and homes. Joint patrols. Fewer patrols.

² Blue Book II, p. 213. Secretary-General's second progress report on UNTAC, 21 September 1992.

(K061) Cantonment and disarmament ceased. The UN military force then switched to a "protection" role of the election process in an insecure environment.

(K064) The cantonment process did not take place.

(K066) No complete disarming of [the] factions. Main task was preparation and security for [the] elections.

(K067) Disarmament was changed to farming leave [in] September 1992. No cantonment process.

(K083) During 1½ years of operations, [the] mandate [and] tasks were adjusted to [the] "real time" situation. In other words, we had to react, following events, instead of act.

(K105) From the original disarming, cantoning and demobilization of [the] factions, the battalion was ordered to protect and supply the civilian police and the electoral component.

(K170) It was superseded by the wish to get the election going on time.

Q4.3 Did this(these) change(s) affect your disarmament operations?

Yes: 08 No: 01

Q4.4 If so, how? (Name the three most important effects.)

(K023) No motivation to cooperate [for the] factions and very low UN funding [for] demining.

(K029) 1.) We did not bother any longer to discuss/try to settle this part of the mission. 2.) Some factions retook possession of their arms and ammunition which we had kept for them until that time.

(K061) 1.) Disarmament and cantonment operations ceased. 2.) Factions who had disarmed some of their weapons asked for them back. 3.) There was theft of some weapons held in storage.

(K064) 1.) To conduct elections in a hostile environment. 2.) Difficult to explain the situation to the civilians in Cambodia. 3.) The outcome of the election was not accepted by the Khmer Rouge.

(K066) No disarmament of one of the factions [and] only partial disarmament of [the] other factions.

(K067) 1.) Registration and also election under pressure and in hostile environment. 2.) Most of the villagers voted in other polling stations ([out of] fear).

(K083) Only partial disarmament by some of the factions.

(K105) All efforts were directed to accomplish this new mission, leaving too little means available for the disarmament operations.

Q4.5 If disarmament was affected, was it still possible for you to implement disarmament measures as first envisaged?

Yes: 03 No: 06

Q4.6 In the context of 4.5, did you have to change or abandon procedures?

Change: 04 Abandon: 05

Q4.7 If you changed procedures, what were the changes? (Mention the three most important ones.)

(K023) Continue to collect mined area data through direct and indirect means and [to] conduct training and demining operations in areas where factions agreed. Increased

cooperation with non-governmental offices/non-UN offices who/which had funds and resources.

(K083) Factions remained partially armed which meant everybody was still armed out on the street.

(K105) 1.) All the electoral component's activities were accomplished by armed custodies. 2.) All air assets (only means of transportation in the area) were assigned to these missions.

(K170) 1.) On an opportunity basis only. 2.) When troops were not paid, they handed weapons in for money.

Q4.8 Were you adequately informed of changes when and as they occurred?

Yes: 05 No: 02

(K067) [No.] Too late.

Q4.9 Were you able to implement alternative measures immediately?

Yes: 04 No: 03

(K023) [No.] Not immediately - by deduction.

(K083) [Yes.] Just followed new orders from [the] FC [Force Commander].

Q4.10 If not, why? (Give the three most salient points.)

(K061) 1.) Peace was fragile. 2.) Factions prepared for war.

V. BOTTOM-UP CHANGES: DISPUTES AMONG THE WARRING PARTIES ARISING DURING THE MISSION:

Q5.1 Was there a mechanism or a provision for the settlement of disputes if and when these emerged?

Yes: 18 No: 02

Q5.2 If so, what type of mechanism/provision did you have (i.e., mission, special agreement, the UN process, special commission, etc.)?

(K005) In Annex 2 to the Agreement, under Article II, "a Liaison system and a Mixed Military Working Group" were established.

(K021) Very weak. It was strictly UN negotiations which [were] virtually ineffective (especially with the NADK).

(K023) Three of the four factions had liaison officers assigned to [the] Cambodian Mine Action Center. They "assisted" in visits throughout the country, visited CMAC at least weekly, and set a model for reconciliation after [the] elections.

(K029) 1.) UN military observers added by faction liaison officers. 2.) Sector Commanders conferences.

(K061) All disputes were to be settled in a forum where each faction was represented called "The Mixed Military Working Group".

(K064) At the provincial and national level with the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG). Representatives from each [of the] warring factions under UN control.

- (K065) Immediate talks to end the disputes. Following investigation with conclusion about responsibility [for the] dispute.
- (K066) Local regulations according to [the] orders of [the] SSMO [Senior Sector Military Observer].
- (K067) 1.) Liaison. 2.) MMWG (Mixed Military Working Group, 2nd Level).
- (K068) Conflict resolution task force.
- (K081) Settlement of disputes was done through: a.) SNC, b.) Mixed Military Working Groups (MMWG), and c.) UNMO's, Sector Commander, [and] provincial directors in close liaison with opposing groups.
- (K083) Regular meetings at sector HQ with [the] factions. During my 6½ months, one faction (Khmer Rouge) only showed up once, although one day late. Local Mixed Working Party.
- (K102) The Mixed Military Working Group was set up by the FC [Force Commander] [of] UNTAC to ensure liaison between all the factions and the various UN agencies [...] in the transitional government.
- (K105) There was a provision for "Mixed Military Working Groups" at local levels where all conflicts were discussed with the military leaders of the area.
- (K124) 1.) A Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) established to resolve any problems. 2.) Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate violations and resolve conflicts.

(K125) At the lower levels, there were Cantonment Coordination Working Groups (CCWG). At the highest level, there was the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG).

(K143) SNC (Supreme National Council) and SRSG if SNC failed.

(K170) Generally occurred by the KR [Khmer Rouge]. Given specific permission by the FC [Force Commander] to conduct talks with [the] KR [Khmer Rouge] in our area of interest. This permission was only given to Naval UNMO's, not land UNMO's. The mechanism was a [...] of confidence building discussions.

Q5.3 What kind of regulations were agreed between the parties and the peacekeepers for the collection of arms?

(K005) In Annex 2 to the Agreement, under Article III, the "Regroupment and cantonment of the forces of the Parties and storage of their arms, ammunition and equipment" was detailed.

(K021) Up front there was an agreement on disarmament and cantonment.

(K023) Collection of information: "all" agreed to provide details on mined area, "all" agreed to mark mined areas, [and] "all" agreed to produce (demobilized) soldiers for demining training and operations.

(K029) Two out of [the] four factions cooperated initially as in the Paris Agreement, one faction refused, [and] one faction [was] not in [the] initial area of responsibility. We registered and kept the arms and ammunition that they were willing to hand over. Arms and ammunition had to stay in area's under their control.

- (K061) 1.) Each faction had to provide comprehensive lists of all weapons and ammunition for each cantonment site. 2.) Each faction was to provide assistance in locating and confiscating weapons caches. 3.) 100% of weapons would be stored and collected by the UN.
- (K064) For all faction forces, specifically designated cantonment areas, on the basis of an operational timetable to be agreed upon.
- (K065) No special regulations because the faction I was responsible for, the NADK, didn't agree.
- (K066) In some areas, complete collection of arms.
- (K068) According to the SOP.
- (K079) C'est bien ce qui a manqué. Il fallait disposer de modalités précises respectant: 1.) La configuration du pays et la connaissance des mentalités cambodgiennes. 2.) L'équilibre du désarmement entre les factions. 3.) La progressivité (la progression) du déroulement du processus.
[That is exactly what was missing. It would have been necessary to prepare precise modalities respecting: 1.) the configuration of the country and familiarity with the Cambodian mentality, 2.) the balance of disarmament between the factions, 3.) the progress of the process.]
- (K081) 1.) Only regroupment and cantonment sites approved by all parties would be used. 2.) All troops should be disarmed and cantoned until demobilization was conducted.
- (K083) Numbers to be delivered [and] locations where to store them. This happened mostly on company level.

- (K102) One hundred and two cantonment sites were established, mainly in principal towns. The factions agreed to bring their weapons to these sites.
- (K105) 1.) The weapons would be stored in [sealed] containers which were placed in predetermined cantonment sites. 2.) UNTAC was responsible [for securing] these weapons.
- (K124) Once troops were demobilized, they were to voluntarily hand over their weapons to UN personnel before cantonment.
- (K125) 1.) Weapons collected were to be under UN control. 2.) Factions could conduct weapons cleaning periodically under the supervision of [the] UN. 3.) Factions could have access to their weapons in [the] event of their being attacked. [This was for] self-defense only.
- (K143) 1.) Registration of weapons and redistribution. 2.) Protection and organization [of] cantonment sites. 3.) Demobilization modalities.
- (K170) Mostly disputes were of a kidnap nature with [the] safe return of local hostages for food. Occasionally, deals were made on the coastal region for weapons in exchange for medical assistance and basic food (rice). This worked well, limiting the groups activities to set areas.

Q5.4 What kind of negotiations/regulations were agreed at the top and lower levels with respect to the storage of arms?

- (K005) See Q5.3.
- (K021) UN PK battalions secured the weapons.
- (K029) Local storage; no removal; no destruction except for unstable explosives and mines.

- (K061) UN troops would guard the arms. Factions could request access to arms through the MMWG if they felt threatened.
- (K064) The weapons [were] registered and secured by UN infantry platoons. The figures of arms were provided by UNTAC based upon the Paris Agreement.
- (K065) Stores were built in cooperation [with the] factions and responsible UN units. [They were] guarded by UN units. In my sector, it was prepared, but NADK didn't comply to the Paris Agreement so [there was] no collection of weapons and no storage.
- (K066) Local level, one faction: complete storage of arms in UN compound.
- (K067) 1.) Registration of weapons. 2.) Storing of weapons by UN forces. 3.) Watch-guarding of warehouses [...] of CPAF.
- (K068) According to the SOP.
- (K079) Création de camps de cantonnements et de dépôts. Mais en fait, seulement 20% de ces installations étaient prêtes, quand le désarmement a été entamé, alors que toutes les troupes de l'ONU n'étaient pas arrivées et que la situation politique ne permettait pas la mise en oeuvre [du stockage des armements.]
[The creation of cantonment camps and of storage facilities. But in fact, only 20% of these installations were ready when the disarmament began, but all of the UN troops had not arrived yet, and the political situation did not permit the implementation of the storage of weapons.]
- (K081) Storage should be only at the approved cantonment sites.

(K083) See Q5.3.

(K102) The UN would protect and maintain all weapons handed over by the factions.

(K124) UNTAC [was] to control and guard all arms, ammunition and equipment of the parties throughout the transitional period.

(K125) 1.) Weapons were to be stored under [UN] control. 2.) Storage facilities were to be provided by the factions in the first instance. Where these facilities were found inadequate, [the] UN supplied containers. 3.) Weapons could be moved to a central and more secure place for maximum security.

(K143) Not during my [period] of duty.

(K170) All weapons collected were itemized and the owner given a receipt. Weapons were then taken to one of two sites: the coastal Naval Base under [the] protection of the Cantonment Party and the River Naval Base under [the] protection of the Cantonment Party.

Q5.5 Was there a conflict between these *new* agreements and the *original* agreement and/or mandate?

Yes: 02 No: 15

(K021) [Yes.] Disarmament was just abandoned after it became obvious the NADK would in no way comply. This created too much risk for the other parties to comply.

(K079) [Non.] Mais le plan et les modalités du désarmement n'étaient pas logiques et fonctionnels.
[No, but the disarmament plan and modalities were not logical or functional.]

VI. PROTECTION OF THE POPULATION DURING THE MISSION:

Q6.1. Did you consider the protection of the population when negotiating disarmament clauses with the warring parties?

Yes: 08 No: 09

Q6.2. Was the protection of the population a part of your mission?

Yes: 09 No: 09

(K067) [Yes.] Together with [the] force and CIVPOL.

(K083) [No response.] Not really. [The] aim was to create a stable and secure environment.

Q6.3. If so, did you have the means to do so?

Yes: 05 No: 09

(K067) [No.] Only by assisting.

Q6.4. What were the three most important means at your disposal to achieve this objective?

(K021) I felt it was part of my mission, but the UN battalions were not concerned with [the] protection of [the] local population, nor hardly with [the protection of] other UN members. I could only advise HQ Phnom Penh in hopes on effective negotiations. Otherwise, I could only advise people or hope my presence would make a difference.

(K023) 1.) Not adequate funds to acquire, in time: mine signs and other marking equipment, demining equipment and dogs, payment of demining teams, public relations/publicity campaign [on] mine awareness, [nor] communication early with NGO's. 2.) Note: Demining activities should/could have started with [the] start of UNHCR or other UN activities. CMAC could have

moved from UNHCR to UNTAC if necessary. This model should be studied.

(K029) 1.) Infantry presence and infantry tactics. 2.) Cooperation with local faction leaders, combined patrolling, etc. 3.) Scattered military outposts.

(K061) 1.) The UNTAC Force Commander had negotiated with the contributing counties to enable assistance to the local population if they were threatened by faction troops/bandits. But only within the context of the rules of engagement. 2.) According to the mandate the factions had the responsibility for internal security.

(K064) Fortnightly, a conference of UNTAC members and all local military and civilian leaders who complied with the peace agreement took place in order to discuss all security matters.

(K079) Les questions posées ne correspondent pas à la réalité rencontrée. Je m'explique: dans toute opération de désarmement il faut penser à protéger les combattants désarmés, les familles de combattants, les populations autrefois protégées par ces soldats. Rien n'avait été précisé en ce qui concerne les populations, ou les combattants quand ils rentreraient chez eux désarmés, en matière de protection.

[The questions posed do not correspond to the reality I encountered. My point is the following: in any operation of disarmament, it is necessary to think of protecting the disarmed combatants, the families of the combatants, and the population that had been protected by these soldiers. Nothing had been clearly specified concerning the protection of the population or the combatants when they returned home disarmed.]

- (K081) 1.) Infantry troops [and] UNTAC Civil Police. 2.) Demining engineer units. 3.) UNHCR for repatriation of refugees. 4.) Human rights component.
- (K083) 1.) Tried to get [the] local army [or] local police [or] CIVPOL to take responsibilities (they got paid for that). 2.) Could only safeguard a small number of people if needed. Cannot protect a population against local groups with great local knowledge of [the] terrain [and the] population. 3.) Could only protect at a certain time and place [and] not for too long [a] period.
- (K105) Observer teams [and] battalion personnel (if [the] mission had to be carried out anyway).
- (K125) 1.) Negotiations with warring factions and [other] leaders. 2.) Confidence patrols. 3.) Safe custody of surrendered weapons and confiscation of weapons after a particular period.
- (K143) 1.) Organization of the security by the population and the factions. 2.) UN troops. 3.) International pressure on the faction leaders.
- (K170) 1.) The sight of no threat by UNMO's so they did not carry weapons. 2.) Careful but deliberate discussions on a routine basis along the coast and rivers. 3.) The use of senior [...] as Naval UNMO's who scouted the villages with locals while the officers conducted official talks with village elders.

SECTION TWO**VII. FORCE COMPOSITION AND FORCE STRUCTURE****Q7.1 Was the force composition for your mission area unilateral or multilateral?**

Unilateral: 01 Multilateral: 19

(K083) [Unilateral.] Besides [the] UNMO's in [the] sector.

Q7.2 Describe the three most important advantages in acting in the manner described in 7.1.**Multilateral force composition:**

(K005) 1.) The composition of the UNTAC MilCom [Military Component] ensured a balance which allowed a strongly neutral stance. Great and regional powers displayed an ability to act neutral. [The mission] was made easier by their direct involvement. 2.) The multilateral composition showed to the parties and the population that "the whole world" was concerned about their situation. Batts [battalions] from Uruguay and the Netherlands (small countries and far away) demonstrated that no neo-colonialism was the case. 3.) A blended way of operating and a development.

(K021) 1.) Demonstrates world concern. 2.) Spreads the burden. 3.) Gave us a chance to talk to other cultures.

(K023) 1.) Shared experiences to improve performance of mission. 2.) Access to more supporters. 3.) Model of languages and cultures in cooperation for Cambodians - notably when factions could see their "previous" allies now in "cooperation".

- (K029) 1.) Connection of Eastern and Western customs. 2.) Availability of many language experts, including [the] native language. 3.) Clearly a United Nations effort.
- (K061) 1.) Broad breed. It meant that no faction could accuse the UN force of being partisan. The force was neutral. 2.) From this neutrality came [the] commitment [which brought] the Security Council to consensus and the required resolutions. 3.) It reinforced the notion of "collective security" and commitment.
- (K064) 1.) Impartiality. 2.) No political or military advantages for different countries. 3.) To make sure that all measures are UN measures and not serving different state interests.
- (K065) 1.) Neutrality. 2.) Responsibility given to different nations.
- (K066) Impartiality.
- (K067) Balance and impartiality/neutrality.
- (K068) International character.
- (K081) 1.) UNTAC enjoyed international confidence [and] respect. 2.) All armed factions exercised restraint in dealing with UNTAC.
- (K083) 1.) Everybody [had the] same language [and] way of speaking, [and there was] one "boss" in the sector. Unity of command.
- (K102) 1.) All P5 [Permanent Five] members involved. 2.) Diversity of nationalities made the force more appealing to the factions. 3.) Ensured that no particular point of view prevailed.

- (K105) 1.) There was only one command which corresponded to the largest organization (the battalion). 2.) Personnel of different nationalities and with experience in PKO [peacekeeping operations] contributed to solving problems.
- (K124) 1.) To have a broad based force. 2.) Neutrality of forces. 3.) Exchange of experience from multinational force.
- (K125) 1.) Gives the force an international nature (multinational). 2.) Allows the force to act independently from the perceived interest of a power block. 3.) Enjoyed the support [and] confidence of all the factions.
- (K128) 1.) Enforced fairness. 2.) Determination to see [the] force through [the] mandate. 3.) Competition.
- (K143) 1.) Credibility of the involvement of the world community (size of troops). 2.) Credibility of [the] peaceful intentions of [the] UN. 3.) Variability of culture, i.e. [a] way to fulfill the mission.
- (K162) 1.) Provides multinational commitment. 2.) Less national commitment.
- (K170) 1.) High professionalism of some of the navies involved. 2.) Diverse knowledge base.

Q7.3 Describe the three most important disadvantages in acting in the manner described in 7.1.

Multilateral force composition:

- (K005) 1.) Language problems. 2.) No world standard for decision making procedures and formats for Operations Orders. The NATO standards were used but a lot of personnel had to adjust to these. 3.) [Multilateral force composition] can cause racial problems.

- (K021) 1.) All had own agenda (often hidden). 2.) Too many had "no risk, no casualty policy". 3.) Not even capable [of fighting] as a total force.
- (K023) Slow to develop common procedures - but it worked.
- (K029) 1.) To create a difference in skills/equipment scales to perform more than the first generation peacekeeping operations. 2.) National objectives were pursued. 3.) Inefficient staff and combat support.
- (K061) 1.) Mixed abilities. 2.) Communication problems. 3.) Incompatible equipment and operating procedures.
- (K064) 1.) No clear chains of command. 2.) Different cultural and military backgrounds.
- (K066) Some problems between different nations.
- (K067) 1.) No strict and clear chains of command. 2.) Language problems/understanding. 3.) Difficulties in verifying [...] violations of human rights. 4.) Partly low level (cultural and military) of troops (forces of Namibia, etc.).
- (K068) Incompatibility of command and control structures. Different levels of military skills.
- (K081) Language difficulties.
- (K083) None.
- (K102) 1.) Lack of cohesion due to different operational procedures. 2.) Language difficulties particularly in the troop-supplying contingents. 3.) Impact of national policy impinged on UNTAC policy.
- (K105) 1.) Difficulties with the language caused communication problems within UNTAC. 2.) The mixture of some

nationalities and religions caused problems in the normal functioning of the organization.

(K124) 1.) Language problem. 2.) Racial discrimination (at times). 3.) Different rules of procedure.

(K125) 1.) Efficiency could suffer. 2.) Speed could be affected/sacrificed. 3.) Harmony and cohesion could not be achieved easily.

(K128) 1.) Language. 2.) Different *modus operandi*.

(K143) 1.) Unequal quality of troops. 2.) Different national interests [and] involvements. 3.) Variability of culture, i.e. [a] way to fulfill the mission.

(K162) 1.) Reduced operational effectiveness. 2.) Different operational practices and procedures. 3.) Language.

(K170) 1.) Differing military standards between the 7 nations involved in the Naval Unit. 2.) Language barriers - some could not speak English or French at all.

Q7.4

If you worked in a multilateral context: how important was consensus (with peacekeepers from other countries) for the achievement of disarmament and demobilization components during the operation?

(K005) Very important.

(K021) Consensus was always sought, rarely attained and contributed to virtual ineffectiveness.

(K023) Must have to agree on aim and means and degree of commitment.

(K029) Very important; no use to disarm at my location and to rearm in other sectors.

- (K061) Critical. The whole mandate, the authority for the mission, was based on consensus.
- (K064) Consensus was the only way to achieve our tasks.
- (K065) No problems.
- (K066) Very important.
- (K067) Eminent: no consensus - no tasks (no verification).
- (K068) Very important.
- (K081) Consensus was achieved through teamwork by all components of UNTAC - Military, Civil, UNHCR, Human Rights. SRSG's directives and FC's [Force Commander's] directives and regular coordinating conferences, visits, etc.
- (K083) Worked in an unilateral environment. Only problems arose with "unguided" UNMO's. From other countries with their "own boss" in Phnom Penh but operating in [the] sector!
- (K102) It was essential if the mission was to be successfully concluded.
- (K105) This is a basic subject, and we believe that in our case it was well managed.
- (K124) Have to consult and reach consensus guided mainly by UNTAC standing operational procedures.
- (K125) Cohesion was important so that we could all be seen as speaking with one voice, maintaining a uniform stand and working for one organization.
- (K143) Good.

(K162) Essential.

(K170) Did not enter the equation. You worked within the guidelines given by the Naval HQ.

Q7.5. Was adequate consideration given to the disarmament component as the mission evolved?

Adequate: 14 Inadequate: 05

Q7.6 If it was inadequate, explain how this affected your mission (mention the three most important issues).

(K021) Before my arrival.

(K023) 1.) [It] increased [the] risk of violence during and after [the] election. 2.) [It made it] hard to identify faction [from] bandit activity (if a difference). 3.) [The] UN "accepted" levels of intimidation, etc., simply due to the scale of the problem.

(K029) 1.) Disarmament failure was partly seen as UNTAC's failure. It discredited [the] troops efforts on the ground [and was] bad for moral. 2.) Lots of armed groups in camps and wandering around. 3.) Pressure on [the] local population/security situation.

(K124) Demobilized troops were not paid compensation. It was assumed troops would voluntarily surrender weapons. The state of weapons was not considered, i.e., sometimes unserviceable weapons were surrendered.

(K128) Since factions were intransigent, [the] force went ahead with the electoral phase. If [the] force had insisted on completing [the] disarmament, [the] electoral phase would have been unduly delayed.

(K162) Lack of initial funding for demining meant that the first mine cleared by UN-trained Cambodians was not lifted until 6 months into the mission. A very slow start, giving doubts to [the] UN commitment. It got better.

Q7.7 Did the force composition identify a specific structure to support the disarmament component of the mandate?

Yes: 17 No: 02

Q7.8 If so, what was it?

(K005) The force composition was geared for the disarmament, after that the force should be [disbanded].

(K021) Only with respect to local procedures for disarmament and cantonment.

(K023) Cantonment plans, facilities, troops, etc.

(K061) Each battalion was responsible for five cantonment sites within its area of operations. Each BN [battalion] was thus at least five companies strong. Normally, a BN [battalion] has only three operational COY's [companies]. Each BN [battalion] was therefore 850 strong, including support elements.

(K064) Preface: if there [had been] a compliance of the Khmer Rouge, enough infantry battalions mixed with military observers.

(K065) Mainly infantry units for security [and] engineering units for construction of destroyed roads, etc.

(K066) Battalions in different sectors.

(K067) 1.) Mixture of forces and observers and CIVPOL. 2.) Border control/customs, UN navy to control on the Tonle Sap, Bassak, and Mekong rivers. 3.) Not efficient:

deployment of supply units later than battalions. Drinking water (only one purification station) supply wasn't efficient at all.

(K068) Specific sector organization.

(K081) Infantry battalions about 800 strong (each). About 10 such units were deployed effectively [and] supported by: UNTAC Logistic Support Group, UNTAC Air Force, UNTAC Maritime Support Group, UNTAC Civilian Component, [and] UNTAC CIVPOL.

(K083) Focus on infantry.

(K102) MMWG.

(K124) Infantry battalions were tasked to collect and store surrendered weapons.

(K125) Every battalion was to pursue this vigorously - it was an important phase [in] the entire peace program in Cambodia.

(K128) 1.) Formed units were to take custody of weapons handed in. 2.) Military observers monitored [the] process.

(K143) Monitoring teams.

(K170) Two enhanced Marine platoons (one on the river, one on the coast) for the two HQ's for disarmament and cantonment. They were dedicated to the Naval Group.

Q7.9 Did the force composition allow for verification and monitoring measures for the control of weapons and disarmament?

Yes: 16 No: 02

(K143) [No response.] I left the mission before the start of the disarmament operations.

Q7.10 If so, what were they?

(K005) Especially the large number (485) of UNMO's.

(K021) [Yes.] In theory. Done by UNMO's and Sector BN's [battalions], but not with respect to NADK.

(K061) Twelve battalions for the verification tasks augmented by 400 military observers for monitoring tasks.

(K064) Like Q7.8.

(K065) 1.) Equipment. 2.) Training. 3.) Multilingual.

(K066) Battalions, monitoring teams, border checkpoints, [and] investigation teams.

(K067) As shown in Q7.8.

(K068) Sector troops together with military observers.

(K081) 1.) Border Control Checkpoints manned by UNMO's.
2.) An elaborate network of Military Observers. 3.) Strategic Investigation Team manned by UNMO's.

(K083) Mobile infantry, good communications equipment, helicopters (only [the] factions didn't want to play).

(K105) These activities were specifically to be carried out by the observers.

(K124) Military observers to verify and confirm disarmament.

(K125) Military observers had this task, and they went about their duties meticulously with assistance from the battalions where possible.

(K128) The use of military observers to monitor.

(K170) Same as Q7.8 but monitored by the Area Naval Commander (Coastal or River Commander).

Q7.11 Was the chosen force structure appropriate for executing the mission?

Yes: 17 No: 01

(K083) [Yes.] For old-fashioned "peacekeeping", that is, with factions obeying.

Q7.12 Were the units efficient for the mission given?

Yes: 16 No: 02

(K066) [Yes.] Most of them.

Q7.13 Were the units appropriate for conducting the disarmament operations?

Yes: 15 No: 03

Q7.14 Were your units augmented with specific personnel and equipment for the disarmament mission?

Yes: 06 No: 11

(K066) [Yes.] Some of them.

Q7.15 If so, what additional capabilities did they provide? (List the five most important ones.)

(K061) 1.) Extra personnel. 2.) Explosive ordnance personnel for unsafe munitions. 3.) Demining capabilities. 4.) Extra medical staff. 5.) Extra transport.

(K081) 1.) Weapons experts (arms artificers). 2.) Ammunition/bomb disposal experts. 3.) Military engineer teams. 4.) Medical teams. 5.) Military police detachments [and] legal personnel.

(K162) 1.) Supervision and training of deminers. 2.) Clearance operations [...]. 3.) Explosive ordnance disposal. 4.) Reconnaissance of suspected mined areas.

(K170) 1.) Well trained Marine forces. 2.) Backup to Naval Observers. 3.) Resource of manpower and transport.

Q7.16 If you were a commander, were you briefed by HQ's prior to your disarming mission and before your arrival in the area of operations?

Yes: 08 No: 02

Q7.17 Did the security situation in the mission area allow for weapons control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 05 No: 13

Q7.18 If not, what steps were required in order to establish and maintain a secure environment?

(K005) The regroupment and cantonment should bring all soldiers under control "out of the field" and so improve the security situation in the country.

- (K021) It never was secure in my area. As SS [Sector Senior] UNMO, I normally could not get security assistance from the UN BN's [battalions] if they felt it was "dangerous". I worked with three different BN's [battalions].
- (K029) First: cooperation of all factions concerned. Second: if first does fail, protection for cooperating factions and local population. Mission/mandate changes [regarding the] "professional" military component.
- (K061) There was no provision in the mandate to force compliance with disarmament. Thus, when the NADK (Khmer Rouge) did not disarm, the security situation deteriorated.
- (K064) If one faction is not complying with the agreement, you have to solve this problem at the political level.
- (K066) Reinvolvement of factions in the peace process.
- (K067) Political steps [and] SNC not operating (absence of Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan!).
- (K081) 1.) Close liaison between UNTAC authorities and Cambodian authorities. 2.) Control, direction and training of Cambodian police by UNTAC police. 3.) Checkpoints [manned] jointly by Cambodian [and] UNTAC police to check movement of personnel and weapons. 4.) Effective security at all cantonment sites and conduct of patrols by infantry units. 5.) Rapid deployment of UNTAC troops in support of any threatened location and conduct of negotiations.
- (K083) [We] were not allowed by one of the factions to enter their area. Higher HQ couldn't arrange this as well. (Besides, if someone wants to hide a lot of weapons in a county like Cambodia, it cannot be a problem to do so!)

- (K105) The battalions did not have adequate equipment to protect themselves (armored vehicles, AT [anti-tank] missiles, TOW's, etc.). With this equipment, the units would have been able to carry out disarmament activities in a secure way.
- (K124) Use had to be made of [the] accommodations of some of the factions due to unavailability of structures from UN sources.
- (K125) 1.) Instilling in [the] factions confidence in [the] UN's ability to provide maximum security for the locals once disarmament started. 2.) Constant consultation with [the] factions. 3.) Strict and prompt sanctions in event of violations.
- (K128) The acquiescence of all the factions should have been sought. Even though one of the factions did not agree, the UN proceeded nevertheless.
- (K162) Negotiations with factions concerned. Demining was always conducted with factions consent.
- (K170) We took over the "magazine" at each of the Naval Bases. Additionally, in one camp the marines built their own armory for weapons handed in.

Q7.19 Did these force protection measures affect the accomplishment of the disarmament operations positively or negatively?

Positively: 07 Negatively: 03

Q7.20 Elaborate on the impact mentioned in 7.19 above.

- (K021) The factions soon learned there was nothing to fear from the UN BN's [battalions].

- (K029) Not enough troops of sufficient quality in key areas. No control.
- (K061) Force protection measures were adequate in a "consensus environment" and given that, in the event of non-compliance, there was no mandate for the use of force to disarm.
- (K081) Relative peace and sanity prevailed, [and] UN casualties were minimal.
- (K124) Peacekeepers had to compromise on storage facilities and provide relatively few troops to guard arms in areas under factional control.
- (K125) 1.) It created an environment where [the] factions could readily address grievances [and] misunderstandings. 2.) [It] created an atmosphere of trust [and] confidence in the [attempt] to handle the task of disarmament.
- (K170) On the coast, weapons were not handed in until we could demonstrate that we could protect them in case of [an] attack from one of the other factions.

Q7.21 Were command and control/operational procedures adequate for your task?

Yes: 17 No: 02

Q7.22 If not, mention three examples which demonstrate their inadequacy.

- (K021) 1.) UN decisions were usually with no regard to operational consequences. 2.) There appeared to be a definite reluctance from HQ in Phnom Penh to give "specific" guidance or orders. 3.) There was no real command and control. It was more a "cooperate if you please".

(K029) 1.) No HQ available during [the] first months of operation. 2.) No intelligence available. 3.) No control over local faction commanders/units.

Q7.23 Summarize your salient experiences with command and control/operational procedures while on this mission.

(K005) UN NY (UN headquarters in New York) is not a Higher Command structured and organized to command and control different missions in different time zones. For UNTAC, it was not possible to contact UN NY during the day.

(K021) The BN's [battalions] were never "ordered" to do their tasks. The different elements of the UN were never effectively tied together. Operations and logistics were completely disjointed.

(K029) UNTAC SOP's available only months after deployment. Orders from HQ MilComp [Military Component] showed [a] lack of time appreciation. Cooperation of MilComp [Military Component] and Civil Component was poor (competence struggle). Coordination with neighboring military units was difficult due to different intentions/mobility/hierarchy.

(K061) 1.) The Force Commander (FC) used "directive control", allowing each battalion/sector commander to implement the mandate in the most suitable way given [the] terrain, equipment, [and] security in each sector. 2.) There were operational orders issued for each phase of the mission. 3.) There were regular sector command conferences for feedback and comparison with the other sectors.

(K064) Effective in providing our information to higher HQ (communication). On the other hand, we also got information summaries about events in Cambodia. In our area of operation, we had excellent relations with [...] forces and commanders of those forces.

- (K065) Strength of troops not sufficient.
- (K068) Sufficient.
- (K081) 1.) Elaborate SOP's, FC's [Force Commander's] directives and regular conferences and daily briefing sessions. 2.) Regular mandatory reports from units to UNTAC HQ. 3.) Control of flow of information, regular staff visits [and] inspections. 4.) FC's [Force Commander's] visits. 5.) Joint security plan for all UN personnel. 6.) Good communication.
- (K083) [We] got several "formal orders" from [the] Force Commander. Furthermore, monthly meetings at [the] HQ of [the] Force Commander. Good communications. We were more or less "on our own" in our sector. This worked well.
- (K102) The command and control of the sectors was vested in the Battalion Commander in the sector. He exercised this control through the Sector Coordination Committee of which the various component heads were members.
- (K105) 1.) Whatever was impracticable in this sense was corrected by the Force Commander during staff meetings or visits. 2.) Orders were simple and easy to carry out. 3.) Battalion CO's [commanding officers] were given "space" to act with flexibility in their AO [area of operation].
- (K124) [The] existing military command structure was effective; however, some friction existed between the military and civilian counterparts [regarding] meeting logistics requirements and sometimes [the] payment of allowances.

- (K125) 1.) Instructions were clear and concise. 2.) Commanders on the ground were allowed a measure of initiative in dealing with situations. 3.) Some of the concepts in the SOP's were relatively new to a number of participants, and this created a problem of double standards in the interpretation.
- (K128) 1.) Disarmament sites were designed for all the factions. 2.) Cantonment sites were also designed for troops. 3.) Comprehensive operational procedures were put in place.
- (K143) Daily briefing [and] contact with [the] Force Commander. Coordination with factions leaders about disarmament implementation (military national council).
- (K162) Operational procedures tended to be based on national procedures. Command and control [was] very difficult due to communication problems. Responsibilities [were] delegated to subunits.
- (K170) Firm direction from Naval HQ but giving enough scope for the field operator to react within given guidelines. As [the] Coastal Commander, I had [the] freedom to achieve the mission aim to the best of my ability keeping my supervisors informed of [my] progress.

Q7.24 What additional support (special capabilities/force multipliers) did you receive which helped the disarmament mission? List the three most important ones.

- (K005) Support from the Information and Education Component (posters, videos, etc.).
- (K021) None.
- (K029) None.

(K061) 1.) Extra command and control helicopters due to the difficulty of land travel. 2.) Engineering support for storage facilities. 3.) Defense stores (sandbags, barbed wire, timber).

(K081) UNTAC Air Force and UNTAC navy [and] effective communication facilities.

(K102) Nil.

(K125) 1.) Vehicles/transport for patrols, checking on weapons, etc. 2.) Communications equipment. 3.) Creation of reserves of forces/quick-reaction forces to influence situation that crop up out of the ordinary.

(K128) Logistic support.

(K170) 1.) Reliable and good sized (7 m) fast boats. 2.) Maritime HQ communications.

Q7.25 Were they adequate?

Yes: 05 No: 03

Q7.26 If not, what other capabilities would you have needed to make your mission more effective? (List the most relevant.)

(K005) The UNTAC-radio was scratched from the budget by UN NY. When finally agreed, it became active just before the elections. It should have been operational at the start of the mission period (preparation during [the] UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC).

(K021) Unrestricted access to all factions' areas (NADK a problem). Real support/security from UN BN's [battalions]. Appropriate weapons for the BN's [battalions] to defend (too light, too restricted). Covered means of communication (often at risk in the clear). Adequate and appropriate transportation (distribution

based on "fair share", not operational requirements. Secretaries in Phnom Penh had the vehicles we needed).

(K061) As mentioned but more timely provision. Less time spent on contracts.

(K170) 1.) More boats with the appropriate maintenance support. 2.) Maintainers for the boats' engines who were not UNMO's. 3.) Allocation of more vehicles to Naval UNMO's (ration of 1 vehicle per 8 persons is too high).

Analyst's Comments:

Overall the military plan was well put together, and in a classical peacekeeping context, it covered the tasks identified in the Paris Agreement with sufficient resources. These resources also proved adequate, again in the peacekeeping context, for a new strategy of electoral security when events did not unfold as envisaged in the Paris Agreement. The plan, and thus the force composition, did not foresee enforcement. The UN military component could not have done this with the force composition as it was on the ground by the time of the non-compliance of NADK. There was also no mandate for the UN to do this.

VIII. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES/RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Q8.1 Did you abide by national or UN rules of engagement/operational procedures during the pursuit of your mission?

National: 03

UN: 18

(K023) [Checked both]. Whichever procedures minimized violence.

(K083) [UN.] In the beginning of operations, not all UN rules were known (e.g. ROE). During that period, we used national rules adapted to [the] local situation.

Q8.2 Were these rules/procedures adequate for the performance of your task?

Yes: 15 No: 04

(K023) National - yes. UN - no.

Q8.3 If not, what other rules should you have had?

(K021) [Yes.] But each nation interpreted [the] ROE in their own way [and] disparities surfaced at critical times.

(K023) 1.) UN ROE did not exist for the longest time. 2.) UN safety rules (vehicle, aircraft, etc.) were poor at best. 3.) There were no aids to help [the] civilian population in the event of medical needs, etc.

(K083) UN rules tend to be very "neat" while factions can act as they please.

(K170) Due to the nature of Naval Operations - patrolling in rubber inflatables proved hazardous if the Naval escort could return fire. One puncture and the boat sinks. Formed units were given ROE that differed [from those of the] UNMO mission.

Q8.4 If and when the situation changed, were your rules altered accordingly?

Yes: 10 No: 05

Q8.5 If so, summarize the relevant changes.

- (K061) 1.) Rules of engagement (ROE) changed from personal protection to protection of the electoral process. 2.) The ROE stayed the same, i.e., a warning had to be issued before engaging a target, but the scope for engaging a target increased with the responsibility.
- (K064) Cantonment and disarmament did not take place. The new task [was to] advise and support the electoral teams.
- (K067) 1.) No disarmament. 2.) No cantonment. 3.) Difficulties in protecting villagers (NADK clashes [and] kidnappings). 4.) Disturbance of registration and elections in/near NADK-controlled areas.
- (K068) Reorganization of the force.
- (K083) We followed local circumstances [and were] not always backed by UN regulations!
- (K102) The rules of engagement were appended to permit UN forces to defend themselves and other UN personnel to greater effect.
- (K124) Troops applied UN rules of engagement as much as possible. Where necessary, these were supplemented with national rules if there were no conflicts.
- (K125) The operation was in phases. As one phase was completed, the emphasis was shifted to the subsequent phase. At one time, the emphasis was on disarmament, then on registration of persons for the elections, and at other times, on monitoring cease-fire violations.

(K143) Flexibility in [construction] and organization [of] cantonment sites. [Construction of] NADK cantonment sites in accord with diplomatic schedule.

(K170) When hostilities increased, units were allowed to return fire if property or life was in danger.

IX. COERCIVE DISARMAMENT AND PREVENTIVE DISARMAMENT

Q9.1 Did you have to use force (coercive disarmament) to achieve the mission as mandated?

Yes: 00 No: 18

(K029) [No response.] Mission was not achieved.

(K079) [Non.] Puisque le plan a été très vite arrêté.
[No, because the plan was quickly stopped.]

Q9.2 Judging from your experience, is it possible to use coercive disarmament in these types of operations?

Yes: 06 No: 12

Q9.3 Do you believe that force can and should be used to enforce the disarmament components of an agreement?

Can:	Yes: 13	No: 04
Should:	Yes: 04	No: 13

(K023) [Can], but more costly in troops, losses, etc.

Q9.4 Mention three reasons why force can/cannot and should/should not be used to enforce the disarmament component of an agreement.

- (K021) 1.) Limited force must be a consideration or we must withdraw from the mission if [there is] no compliance. 2.) I felt any threat of force in this scenario would have motivated compliance. 3.) If felt force should not be used, shut down the mission. If [there is] no compliance [or] if one faction does not comply, take action until they comply. Neutrality must be based on compliance.
- (K023) 1.) Can: higher cost and shift in UN philosophy - help those who want peace. 2.) Should not: too costly and [there will be] no lasting peace.
- (K029) 1.) Can and should: if numbers and situation permit such action and this action does not hamper [the] agreement. Should: when armed groups pose a threat/obstacle to UN mission goals. Should not: if no threat exists and other ways are still available. Cannot: if [the] UN Military Component and [the] UNSG representative [SRSG] are too weak.
- (K061) [Can but should not]. A UN force deploys usually on the basis of consensus and is usually lightly armed. It trains for this task and is generally not prepared for defensive action. It does not deploy with indirect fire weapons and in a multinational environment is definitely not suited for offensive action. Once committed in such a way, the UN force then becomes unsuited for the peace role: its moral authority [is] eroded.
- (K064) 1.) You will find yourself trapped in a marshland of skirmishes. 2.) Loss of impartiality. 3.) You will be a target for other factions. 4.) The same environment will be lost very soon.

- (K065) First agreement, then implementation. Using force makes no sense [because it] doesn't change anything.
- (K067) 1.) No confidence. 2.) UN forces will soon be clashing [with] factions (see experience in Somalia). 3.) Weapons only for self-defense. UNMO's [and] MLO's [military liaison officers] not armed at all.
- (K079) Parce que l'ONU était l'AUTORITE. Parce que tout le monde avait signé les accords. Parce que les factions ne constituaient pas en terme militaire de réel danger pour les forces de l'APRONUC.
[Because the UN had the authority. Because everyone had signed the agreements. Because the factions did not constitute a real danger in military terms for the forces of UNTAC.]
- (K081) [Force can but should not be used because:] 1.) Enforcement of disarmament will involve combat operations alien to normal peacekeeping methods. The neutrality of the UN force will be compromised. 2.) The casualty rate of the UN troops may be unacceptable to the troop-contributing countries.
- (K083) Only in the case of a "full-scale" operation with 100% means/personnel may one try to force factions to hand in weapons. After that, "revenge" is to be expected. [...] if factions do not want to cooperate, everything will be in vain.
- (K102) 1.) There should be no question of coercion on peacekeeping missions. 2.) It is difficult to do in a hostile environment. 3.) It would make the overall mission difficult to complete successfully.
- (K105) It can because it was tried and it was successful. It should because as long as the factions have weapons, they are liable to use them.

- (K124) It would turn peacekeeping into peace-enforcement. The advantages could only be temporary. Animosity would develop to affect other phases.
- (K125) 1.) Force produces/results in/begets force, and this is not helpful as at times casualties could be high. 2.) Cooperation is not achieved when force is used. 3.) Results achieved with force are at best temporary. They are not genuine results and are easily offset.
- (K128) 1.) The warring factions may become suspicious of the whole process. 2.) UN forces will incur unnecessary casualties. 3.) [It] will affect similar future operations.
- (K143) Enforcing disarmament on a large scale is not possible. This has to be done by the population towards their own fighters. Disarmament on a small scale (disarmament of small troops of fighters) can/should be enforced in the frame of large-scale voluntary disarmament.
- (K170) It can be used by formed units but not UNMO's. Basically, if you use force to remove force you are putting the UN forces on a war footing with all factions [and] placing all UN personnel, armed or unarmed, civilian or military, at risk. This could defeat the purpose of the mission.

Q9.5 If fighting was an ongoing process, was it possible for you to continue with your disarmament tasks?

Yes: 06 No: 11

Q9.6 If so, describe how it was possible to continue with your disarmament tasks.

- (K023) Very limited; in areas where factions allowed demining, visits, etc.

(K081) The UN Security Council must utilize other means such as sanctions to compel opposing sides to agree to a cease-fire and cooperate in the disarmament process. Failing that [the] UN should declare war such as occurred in the liberation of Kuwait.

(K124) Fighting was not continuous and only one faction complied with the disarmament. Also, unused weapons were handed over which materially did not affect fighting capability.

(K125) 1.) Continued discussions/negotiations within the framework of the peace agreement . 2.) Soliciting the cooperation of the factions. 3.) Appeals to opinion leaders to intervene.

(K143) 1.) Continue disarmament where [there is] no fighting. 2.) Include disarmament in the peace negotiations during the fighting. 3.) Monitor weapons (heavy) used by factions during the fighting.

(K170) Troops were not being paid. We offered them money and food and the prospect of returning to their province to recommence farming.

Q9.7 Were you involved in any preventive deployment operations (i.e., as an observer, preventive diplomacy official, etc.)?

Yes: 06 No: 10

Q9.8 If so, was disarmament a major concern of this deployment?

Yes: 04 No: 03

Q9.9 If so, were there already arms control agreements (i.e., registers of conventional weapons, MTCR, etc.) in place within the country where you were operating?

Yes: 01 No: 04

SECTION THREE

X. INFORMATION: COLLECTION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AND THE MEDIA

Q10.1 Did you receive sufficient relevant information prior to and during your disarming mission?

Prior:	Yes: 11	No: 08
During:	Yes: 14	No: 05

Q10.2 Was information always available and reliable?

Yes: 09 No: 10

(K023) [No to Q10.1 and Q10.2.] No maps. Had to buy maps at local markets.

Q10.3 How did you receive/obtain your information prior to and during the mission? (Describe the three most important ways.)

(K005) Reports from the units in the field [and] reports from other components. Both based on reconnaissance and information from the population.

(K021) 1.) UNMO's in [the] field: most reliable. 2.) Local police, government, etc.: unreliable. 3.) UN HQ, UN BN [battalion], CIVPOL: shaky.

- (K023) [We] used [our] own funds to buy maps, [and] eventually [the] UN paid for [the] local purchases.
- (K029) [With our] own observation and [our] own intelligence gathering.
- (K061) 1.) Operational orders from HQ. 2.) Sector command briefings with Force Commander. 3.) Force Commander visits to the field.
- (K064) 1.) To gather information on the spot. 2.) Briefings immediately after arriving in the mission area.
- (K065) 1.) Preparation before start of mission in own country. 2.) Briefings in Cambodia.
- (K066) 1.) Radio Australia (during). 2.) BBC (during). 3.) Preparation training in Austria (prior).
- (K067) 1.) Partly prepared in Austria (UNTC/Vienna). 2.) Briefing before deployment. 3.) Information handed over (information by UNAMIC). 4.) Liaison to all factions (until December 1992, also with NADK).
- (K068) Personal [and] radio communications.
- (K081) 1.) Briefing sessions by UNTAC, HQ OPS [Operations] Branch. 2.) Forward units and UNMO's. 3.) Close liaison with local authorities and other UN agencies such as UNHCR, UNICEF and the Red Cross.
- (K083) Prior: through UN NY and [my] own sources. During: from force HQ (Phnom Penh) and own gatherings.
- (K102) Briefings, liaisons, [and] observation.
- (K105) 1.) Uruguay army staff. 2.) Military attachés in Uruguay. 3.) UNTAC staff.

(K124) Relied, as an observer, on field troops who physically disarmed. Verified numbers by physically checking. Physically present at some of the disarmament ceremonies.

(K125) 1.) Briefings and up-to-date literature prior to the operations. 2.) Commanders routine briefings [and] conferences. 3.) Literature from the force headquarters.

(K128) 1.) Through local intelligence sources. 2.) Through defectors from the various factions. 3.) Through daily briefings and intelligence updates.

(K143) 1.) National information. 2.) UN mission reports. 3.) Faction reports.

(K170) Prior - from serving personnel just returned [and from the] media. During - daily briefings, field operations, [and] local people talking.

Q10.4 Was there a structured information exchange between HQ's and the units in the field?

Yes: 17 No: 02

(K023) [Yes.] CMAC provided information on mined areas to HQ, but HQ [was] slow to provide [it] to CMAC.

(K066) [Yes and no.] Daily reports from units and UNMO's, [but] almost no information to units and UNMO's.

(K083) [No.] Not really.

Q10.5 And between the various field commanders?

Yes: 10 No: 07

(K067) [No.] Only partly when handing over [...] responsibilities.

(K083) [No.] Only occasionally with neighboring sectors.

Q10.6 Did you use sensor mechanisms for verification/information purposes?

Yes: 02 No: 15

Q10.7 If so, list which ones and for what purpose. (Mention not more than three.)

(K061) Night-vision goggles [and] infrared goggles.

(K143) Photo/video.

Q10.7.1 Was the use of on-site and remote sensing an adequate tool for verifying and monitoring weapons control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 04 No: 03

(K061) [No response.] Not used.

Q10.7.2 In your opinion, could sensor systems (acoustic, radar, photo, video, infrared, etc.) play a useful role in monitoring the weapons control and disarmament aspects of a peacekeeping operation?

Yes: 15 No: 01

Q10.7.3 If so, give some examples of phases of the peacekeeping process in which such sensors could be used.

(K021) [To] verify movements [and to] verify cease-fire violations.

- (K023) All phases, including cross-border movement. At all phases the border was open for movement of [people] and equipment.
- (K029) Prior to actual agreement [and] during [the] whole operation.
- (K061) For self-defense. For aiding defense of installations, but it is only a passive system and will never replace patrolling.
- (K064) One of our tasks was to locate and confiscate caches of weapons and military supplies (or forces) throughout the country.
- (K065) During night hours. Due to few personnel, technical equipment may help in security purposes.
- (K067) Locate troops, weapons, [and] ammunition. Find hidden weapons and ammunition. Locate support/supply routes.
- (K081) 1.) Pre-deployment via satellite. 2.) During [and] post-deployment of peacekeeping forces. 3.) Withdrawal stage.
- (K083) In [general], anything which helps a field commander in his task is welcome (at all times)!
- (K102) Video to record the handing in of weapons. Satellite photography to monitor the movement of weapons.
- (K105) In detecting caches [and] to control border lines.
- (K143) Anytime, in any phase, there is always a need of this [kind of] information.

(K170) 1.) Initial force detection and location (IR, photo, radars, video). 2.) Monitoring (IR, video). 3.) Cease-fire violations (video, photo).

Q10.7.4 What would you suggest about the possible organizational set-up of the use of such sensor systems (i.e., UN, regional organization, national, etc.)?

(K021) May require a specific country's responsibility, as many Third World countries lack the skills. Teams to set up and control as requested and approved.

(K023) Any set-up which worked.

(K061) Not worth it. Ultimately unreliable. Can never replace patrolling and active ground forces. Thermal/infrared imagery [is] best for aiding "early warning" of activity.

(K065) Only UN.

(K081) Countries approved by the UN and accepted by the warring factions may deploy units with the appropriate sensor systems.

(K083) UN or coming from countries who own systems.

(K102) UN.

(K105) UN.

(K143) UN.

(K170) Formed units - national responsibility enhanced by UN. UNMO's - UN with national support if applicable.

Q10.8 Do you think that normal information collection assets (i.e., intelligence) could and should be used for peacekeeping and disarming purposes?

Yes: 18 No: 00

Q10.9 Why? (List three reasons.)

(K005) 1.) The parties to the conflict don't know their own situation exactly. 2.) To be capable [of acting] instead of [reacting]. 3.) To detect what a party might be hiding.

(K021) 1.) Would make the mission more effective. 2.) Would create a safer environment. 3.) Hopefully, lead to better decision making.

(K023) Cannot operate effectively without intelligence.

(K029) Should be considered a full military operation. No intelligence [means] no verification/anticipation/reflection [and] no adequate operation.

(K061) 1.) Security reasons. 2.) Feedback from locals on perceptions of process. 3.) "Forewarned is forearmed." It is essential.

(K064) You should use all possibilities to gather information.

(K065) For proper implementation. Own protection and security.

(K067) 1.) Important to use all means to fulfill tasks. 2.) Verification purpose. 3.) Investigation. 4.) Fact finding.

(K081) 1.) The normal information collection assets have been tried and the chances of error have been reduced to the minimum. 2.) The UN force must make a correct assessment to UN HQ.

(K083) Act [rather than] react! UN is playing 100% "pure" role while factions are "out there" and do as they please (unnoticed!).

(K102) 1.) To ensure best possible information. 2.) Updating database. 3.) Identify possible areas of conflict.

(K105) 1.) It is the only way in which to ensure that the disarmament is complete. 2.) It is a means to monitor the disarmament procedures.

(K124) 1.) Needed to plan operations. 2.) Intelligence needed to monitor operations.

(K125) 1.) Establishes liaison and cooperation. 2.) Increases confidence of factions in [the] UN. 3.) Creates a basis for compiling further information.

(K143) 1.) Assess the situation. 2.) Provide information to the factions (confidence building). 3.) Own security.

(K170) Better assessment. Human Int [intelligence] is always a good source as long as it is monitored.

Q10.10 Is there a need for satellite surveillance in peacekeeping/peace enforcing operations?

Yes: 19 No: 00

Q10.11 Did you use the local population for information collection purposes?

Yes: 18 No: 01

(K023) [Yes.] Indirectly via NGO's, etc.

Q10.12 Did you implement any transparency measures to create mutual confidence between warring parties?

Yes: 16 No: 02

Q10.13 If so, did you act as an intermediary?

Yes: 13 No: 01

(K023) [Yes to Q10.12 and Q10.13.] Faction liaison officers to CMAC, on CMAC visits, etc.

(K083) [Yes.] Tried to!

Q10.14 Was public affairs/media essential to the disarming mission?

Yes: 15 No: 03

Q10.15 Were communication and public relations efforts of importance during your mission?

Yes: 15 No: 02

(K023) [Yes to Q10.14 and Q10.15.] But very limited use due to funds shortage.

Q10.16 If so, give three reasons why this was so.

(K005) 1.) To reach the soldiers with correct information to avoid the clutter in the parties military channels. 2.) To inform the population of the ongoing mission. 3.) To influence the minds of the soldiers.

(K021) [No.] Note: they influenced world opinion but did little in the areas where there was fighting.

- (K023) 1.) Mine awareness: safety. 2.) Cultural change: responsible citizens no longer use mines and report mined areas. 3.) National reconciliation.
- (K029) 1.) International awareness of the situation. 2.) Opportunity for [the] local population to form [their] own opinion.
- (K061) 1.) Feedback from locals. 2.) Prevents/fights propaganda from the factions. 3.) Lets [the] UN give clear message of intent.
- (K065) Local radio and TV not neutral. Information in time for all UN personnel.
- (K067) Analphabets [illiterates], instruction, information to all villagers (donation of radios), preparing registration [for] elections, [and] political information in general.
- (K081) 1.) The UN HQ requires an accurate and sustained source of information. 2.) The need to create mutual confidence between the UN force and the warring factions and local population.
- (K083) 1.) People have to know what is going on! 2.) You cannot expect ignorant people to obey!
- (K102) 1.) Inform local population of progress. 2.) Counter Khmer Rouge propaganda. 3.) Educate local population on procedures.
- (K105) 1.) Local population got to know why UNTAC was there and so their support was gained. 2.) Cambodians were taught everything about the election process.
- (K124) Information spread to other factions about [the] process. Public confidence was built between UN troops and factions/populace. Other intransigent factions saw [the] positive intentions of UNTAC.

(K125) 1.) This minimized the effect of rumors. 2.) Increased confidence in UN efforts as each side received adequate information on the process. 3.) Provided a basis for further UN actions.

(K128) 1.) Helped in wide dissemination of UN activities. 2.) Motivated [the] populace to rally behind [the] UN. 3.) Basis for receiving further support and cooperation from [the] warring factions.

(K143) 1.) Disarmament has to be enforced by the population; [therefore, we] need information [about] the population. 2.) Step forward in the process which has to be shown. 3.) Means to convince [troops to undergo] voluntary disarmament.

Q10.17 Was there a well-funded and planned communications effort to support and explain your activities and mission to the local population?

Yes: 14 No: 05

(K061) [Yes.] Average.

(K067) [Yes.] In Kampong Cham. [No.] In Svay Rieng.

(K083) [Yes.] Later on in mission.

Q10.18 If not, should there have been one?

Yes: 09 No: 00

(K061) [Yes.] A better one.

Q10.19 Did media attention at any time hamper or benefit your disarming efforts?

Hamper: 03 Benefit: 11

Q10.20 Summarize your experience with the media.

(K005) [The] media were at the start positive. When the disarmament did not take place, the media reported in a negative way. Before the elections, they forecasted a disaster. When the elections went well, they left Cambodia in great numbers.

(K021) More for international benefit. Not really coordinated, but not a problem either. Had both good and bad.

(K023) Usually the media wondered why we did not do more. There were great expectations and limited funding.

(K029) National and international media: many contacts [and] no problems. No contact with local/native media: all state controlled.

(K061) [The] media was biased towards one faction or another. Sensationalist. Very "negative" oriented. Inexperienced. Generally a "mixed bag" - UN requires dedicated PR section.

(K064) Once [thanks to] the media, we had access to [a] Khmer Rouge controlled area.

(K065) Good communication with international media. Important for information abroad. Sometimes media people do everything to collect any information to fill the papers.

- (K067) UN radio station. Access to all areas (also NADK-controlled areas). Good training and first step [toward] democracy.
- (K068) Excellent.
- (K081) 1.) The media assisted a great deal in passing information to the local population and the world at large. 2.) Media coverage won sympathy for the UN mission and support of the local population. 3.) Movements of media personnel need to be controlled to avoid unsafe areas.
- (K083) Treat them normally, let them do their job in a normal way, and they will listen to you and you will profit from them as they do from you. Treat them openly (no hidden agendas).
- (K102) They had free access to the mission area. In many cases, they were on site when difficult situations occurred. Their presence interfered with efforts to resolve conflict. Some of the reporting in the world press was exaggerated and caused unnecessary anxiety for relatives in their home countries.
- (K105) Most of the media was serious in carrying out their jobs and collaborating with UNTAC.
- (K124) UNTAC had a radio station which broadcasted important information in local languages. Though not too popular, it assisted [in educating the] populace. Use was also made of print media.
- (K125) Provided a rallying point and focus for further negotiations. Provided each faction the opportunity to make their views [and] positions known [and] understood. Provided a medium of expression.

(K128) 1.) Helped tremendously in educating [the] populace on [the] peace process. 2.) Facilitated [the] support of [the] locals for [the] UN and the peace process. 3.) Medium of expression for [the] locals as well as [the] warring factions.

(K143) Good contacts with both national and international press. Transparency benefits for the whole operation.

(K170) Ensure they only talk to one person who is properly briefed. Ensure that [the] person's comments are accurate and reassured. Do not talk off the record. Ensure the reporter is properly cleared through HQ to be where he is and [covering] the topic he is covering.

Q10.21 Was there sufficient briefing to the general public in the conflict area on the disarming process?

Yes: 10 No: 08

Q10.22 If so, who organized this and who carried it out?

Organized:

(K029) UNTAC Civilian Component.

(K061) UN information.

(K065) UN HQ, UN regional HQ.

(K066) UN.

(K068) Military observers, force, UN PR [Public Relations].

(K081) UNTAC HQ Operations Branch.

(K102) UNTAC HQ.

(K105) Force staff.

(K125) UN agencies.

(K128) UN.

(K143) UN [and] faction leaders.

(K170) UNIDIR.

Carried it out:

(K029) UNTAC Civilian Component.

(K061) Military spokesman/UN spokesman.

(K065) All UN members.

(K066) Radio UNTAC.

(K068) Military observers, force, UN PR [Public Relations].

(K081) UNTAC HQ Operations Branch.

(K102) UNTAC radio, UNMO's, CIVPOL.

(K105) Force staff and battalion.

(K125) Battalions with video films from UN sources and printed literature in local languages.

(K128) UN agencies and units.

(K143) UN [and] faction broadcasts [and] newspapers.

(K170) CIVPOL/UNMO's.

Q10.23 Was there cooperation with the local media in explaining the steps of disarmament you were carrying out?

Yes: 12 No: 05

(K061) [Yes and no.] Average.

(K083) [No.] There was no [local] media!

(K105) [No.] There was no local media.

Q10.24 Were leaflets distributed?

Yes: 17 No: 01

SECTION FOUR

XI. EXPERIENCES IN THE CONTROL OF WEAPONS AND IN DISARMAMENT DURING YOUR MISSION:

Q11.1 Describe, by order of importance, your specific tasks, if any, in weapons control and disarmament during this mission.

(K021) Ceased by my arrival.

(K023) 1.) Collect information on mined areas (safety of UN troops and local population). 2.) Mine awareness training. 3.) Demining training and operations.

(K029) Sector infantry battalion: specific task was to disarm and control before cantonment phase started.

(K061) 1.) Receiving weapons and ammunition - some in dangerous condition. 2.) Cooperation-organization with local authorities. 3.) Prevention of theft/duplicity. 4.)

Verification of faction weapons lists. 5.) Information in advance of process and basic control measures.

- (K064) Supervise the various regroupment points, supervise the function of cantonment sites, record personal data and weapons, monitor [and] supervise the daily routine of cantonment sites, [and] liaise with the factions.
- (K065) 1.) Disarmament of factions. 2.) Storage of weapons. 3.) Elimination of ammunition and weapons.
- (K066) 1.) Contact with faction (KPNLF). 2.) Registration of all weapons and weapon stores [...]. 3.) Transport to UN command (Dutch battalion).
- (K081) 1.) Liaison/reconnaissance jointly by UNTAC units and warring faction representatives to confirm regroupment and cantonment sites. 2.) Deployment of troops to regroupment/cantonment sites. 3.) Reception of troops of warring factions into cantonment sites, [...] collection of weapons and ammunition, and securing [the] same.
- (K083) Collection [and] counting.
- (K102) UNMO's supervised the turning in of weapons and prepared lists of all items which were surrendered.
- (K105) Identification of weapons [and] determination of importance and condition of weapons.
- (K124) 1.) Locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia. 2.) Supervising [the] regrouping and cantonment of forces and initiating [the] process of arms control and reduction.
- (K125) 1.) Confirm details of weapons declared by factions. 2.) Safe custody of weapons. 3.) Destruction of unserviceable weapons on a timetable.

(K128) 1.) Monitoring/confirming types of weapons handed in. 2.) Ensuring safe custody of weapons. 3.) Destruction of unserviceable weapons.

(K143) 1.) Negotiate cantonment sites. 2.) [Reconstruct NADK] cantonment sites. 3.) Negotiate peace agreement including weapons control after local fighting.

(K170) 1.) Disarm the CPAF naval force. 2.) Register and hold all weapons and ammunition. 3.) Care for all sailors and marines who had surrendered their weapons. 4.) Retrain the naval force for coastal peacekeeping operations.

Q11.2 Did the security situation in the mission area allow for arms control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 07 No: 10

(K066) [Yes.] Only in some areas!

(K083) [Yes.] Partly.

Q11.3 If not, what steps were required to establish and maintain a secure environment?

(K021) Pressure on non-complying factions. Needed BN's (battalions) capable and willing to assume some risk. BN's [battalions] too light in organic weapons.

(K029) Full-scale military operation.

(K061) 1.) Active patrolling - showing the flag. 2.) Information/intelligence gathering. 3.) Civic action projects with local population. 4.) Liaison with local commanders.

(K068) No steps could be [taken] due to the non-cooperation of NADK.

(K081) 1.) Maintenance of 24-hour guards to secure weapons and ammunition. 2.) Conduct of foot and mobile patrols. 3.) Standby of a Quick Reaction Force to support any unit threatened by armed groups.

(K102) The UN were not permitted to enter areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge, thus no disarmament took place in those areas. There were no security problems in the rest of the country.

(K105) Manage a credible cease-fire [and] dislodge units from combat positions.

(K124) Some of the factions (the Khmer Rouge) reneged on the agreement and declared their areas no-go, no UNTAC. Disarmament could not take place in those areas.

(K128) The UN should have ensured that all the warring factions agreed to the letter of the mandate.

(K143) Local peace agreement.

Q11.4 Do you think your weapons control and disarming tasks could have been handled more efficiently?

Yes: 10 No: 07

Q11.5 If so, mention three ways in which your task could have been improved.

(K021) It would not work without NADK cooperation. [The] UN was too lenient with NADK.

(K029) 1.) Information on faction units' disposition and numbers. 2.) "Control" over faction commanders. 3.) In general: military rule by UNTAC Military Component, if need be, coercive.

- (K061) 1.) Better coordination with local authorities. 2.) Obtain authority to destroy unserviceable weapons. 3.) Better/quicker information campaign.
- (K081) 1.) Central storage of weapons [and] ammunition to relieve more troops for patrols and other humanitarian duties. 2.) If NADK or [the] Khmer Rouge has cooperated more.
- (K083) Before you start, make 100% sure everybody involved (factions) want to "play the game".
- (K102) Troops in position and properly supported before operation commenced.
- (K105) A closer and more effective collaboration of the factions [and] that disarmament was compulsory.
- (K124) 1.) Efforts should have been made to get intransigent forces on course. 2.) Classes of weapons and their state should have been clarified initially. 3.) Enough accommodation should have been provided for arms storage.
- (K128) 1.) [The] UN should have ensured that [the] mandate [was] acceptable to all [the] factions. 2.) Participation of external interested parties should have been increased.
- (K143) 1.) More international pressure on NADK. 2.) Incentives for disarmament. 3.) Air-lifted sensor systems.

Q11.6 Were opportunities missed to take advantage of or implement weapons control and disarmament measures?

Missed: 07 Not missed: 08

Q11.7 If opportunities were missed, mention the main reasons why this happened.

- (K029) 1.) Deployment of UN HQ and troops too late. 2.) No food, stores, money, [or] training available for cooperating factions. 3.) No military control of key areas.
- (K061) 1.) Late deployment of UN. 2.) Contributed to decrease in authority of the UN and meant continued fighting by factions. 3.) Program for demobilized soldiers did not offer enough incentives - lack of attraction to cantonment.
- (K066) Delay in deployment.
- (K125) 1.) Non adherence to time schedule laid down by [the] UN. 2.) [The] UN's inability to deploy to targeted areas in good time. 3.) Difficulties with agreeing on the interpretations of the UN mandate and [the] factions' commitment [and] responsibilities.
- (K128) 1.) [The] timetable could not be strictly adhered to. 2.) [There were] problems with [the] deployment of UN forces to targeted areas. 3.) [There were] difficulties with factions agreeing to [the] mandate. 4.) [The] warring factions [were] suspicious of one another.
- (K143) 1.) Lack of international reactions in time [to correct the] attitude [of] NADK. 2.) Lack of determination [from] providing countries and factions leaders.
- (K170) Unsure (before I arrived [on the] mission) but I believe the initiative was not taken early enough and the local generals managed to hide away weapons and personnel for their personal use of [...] and corruption along the coast.

Q11.8 Did you find the national diversity of contributed troops a problem for command and control during disarmament operations?

Yes: 06 No: 13

(K083) [No.] Not in [my] own sector, that is.

Q11.9 If so, mention the three problems you considered most challenging.

(K021) 1.) Most BN's [battalions] [were] not willing to assume any risk. 2.) Most BN's [battalions] appeared independent of [the] UN force. 3.) [The] UN is organized grossly inefficiently and ineffectively.

(K029) 1.) Intentions. 2.) Military handling/procedures.

(K061) 1.) Communications. 2.) Procedures. 3.) Work ethic. 4.) Different abilities.

(K083) For national Sector Commander, almost impossible to correct misbehavior or bad carrying out of tasks by other nationalities (one had to stay "polite").

(K102) 1.) Language. 2.) Level of competence. 3.) Influence of home governments of troop contributing countries.

(K105) 1.) Military Observers and troop commanders received orders through different channels. 2.) Communication problems due to level of knowledge of English. 3.) Deep differences in cultural and professional backgrounds.

(K125) 1.) Aiming at a common understanding of assigned tasks and [of the] UN mandate. 2.) Degree of initiative allowed local commanders. 3.) Sympathies to the cause of the factions.

(K128) 1.) [The] actions of some contingents reflected [the] stand of [their] home countries. 2.) Different interpretations of some aspects of [the] mandate. 3.) Disagreement on some aspects of [the] UN's *modus operandi*.

Q11.10 Was the disarmament process reversible (i.e., were there instances where devolution was foreseen or requested)?

Yes: 08 No: 06

Q11.11 If so, were there provisions to this effect in the mandate, mission or agreement?

Yes: 03 No: 06

Q11.12 Which types of weapons were in use, and by whom (e.g., your own unit(s), warring parties, individuals, irregular units, national officials, etc.)? (If applicable, list the five principal ones for each category.)

Weapons:	AK-47's T-54 tanks BTR's B-10/B-11 recoilless guns RPG-7's 82mm to 240mm mortars	Used by : CPAF
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Weapons:	AK-47's T-59 and 54 tanks BTR's B10 recoilless guns RPG-7's 60 to 82mm mortars	Used by : NADK
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Weapons:	M-16's AK-47's B-40's	Used by: KPNLAF
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	RPG-7's	
	AKM's	
Weapons:	AK-47's	Used by: ANKI
	M-16's	
	AKM's	
	Mortars	
	12.7mm heavy machine guns	
	DK-57 heavy machine guns	
Weapons:	Light machine guns	Used by: UN Forces
	Rifles	
	Pistols	
	Limited anti-armor weapons	

Other comments:

- (K021) If UN forces had standard machine guns, mortars, weapons like MK-19 grenade machine guns, it would have been able to defend itself against [the] factions. Night observation devices and local air assets would also help.
- (K029) [The] fear of death [was a weapon] used by [the] warring factions towards [the] local population.
- (K061) UN forces were all lightly armed (no indirect weapons). Basic light battalion weapons. Some had mortars, not all.
- (K064) All possible types of land mines (AT, AP) were used by all warring factions.
- (K065) NADK and CPAF were mainly equipped with Russian and Chinese manufactured weapons. ANKI and KPNLF with "Western" manufactured weapons.
- (K067) All possible types of landmines (China [and] USSR).

(K083) How useful is it to go for a disarmament in which factions (after 20 years of unrest) may themselves tell (in advance) how many weapons they've got? What can one expect of such an approach? Anyway, literally all factions cheated.

(K102) UNMO's were unarmed. There should be no change in this policy. The unarmed observer has greater mobility in the MA [mission area] and is [better] suited to peacekeeping than heavily armed troops.

(K143) Mines were not too much used as weapons, but their presence was a hazard to the mission. Demining is not seen as a part of the disarmament, but it's still a weapon.

Q11.13 Were you given priorities as to the type of weapons you should disarm first?

Yes: 03 No: 11

Q11.14 If so, how were priorities assigned (i.e., on what basis)? (List three reasons.)

(K124) Personal weapons of demobilized troops. Other offensive weapons to achieve a 70% disarmament.

(K143) Heavy weapons first. Small weapons were necessary to provide security, and [the] weapons registration program was only possible after providing ID cards.

Q11.15 At the beginning of your mission, were you able to have sufficient information on military capabilities in regard to numbers and quality of equipment used by warring parties?

Yes: 13 No: 05

Q11.16 Did you have the impression that there were caches of weapons in your sector or adjoining sectors?

Yes: 17 No: 02

(K023) [Yes.] Mining was probably ongoing.

(K083) [Yes.] We were sure!

Q11.17 Were illicit weapons a problem for you (illicit as in: not in your inventories)?

Yes: 14 No: 04

(K023) [Yes.] Mines.

(K021) [Yes.] Speaking for the UN BN's [battalions].

(K067) [Yes.] And robbery!

(K083) [No.] Even if they had turned in the "official" numbers, there [would have been] enough weapons left.

Q11.18 Was there evidence in your sector that the warring parties continued to have access to weapons through external channels of supply?

Yes: 12 No: 05

(K083) [No response.] Don't know. One thing was certain: they had enough weapons.

Q11.19 Could you control external channels of weapons supply in your sector?

Yes: 01 No: 16

Q11.20 How important was the control of external channels of supply for the success of the mission?

Very Important: 10 Important: 03
Unimportant: 01

Q11.21 In your experience, do weapons continue to flow during the conflict even after sanctions, inspections, and checks have been applied?

Yes: 13 No: 00

Q11.22 Were there any security zones established?

Yes: 03 No: 06

(K021) [Yes.] Only for the NADK.

Q11.23 If so, were you able to control your sector effectively?

Yes: 00 No: 05

(K021) [No.] Not in NADK-held areas.

(K061) [No.] Not always.

(K083) [No response.] As stated before, [we] had no access to Khmer Rouge controlled areas.

Q11.24 Depending on your answer under 11.23, elaborate on how you were able to control the sector or on why you were unable to control it.

(K021) We were extremely limited in our access to NADK territory. They had their sanctuaries.

(K029) T o o l a r g e f o r U N T A C / o w n numbers/mobility/surveillance capability. Too many uncontrolled border crossings.

(K061) Many sectors bordered with foreign countries. [The] UN did not have [enough] freedom of movement. [The] UN was not allowed in NADK zones along [the] Thai border.

(K081) The NADK which refused to disarm launched several assaults on CPAF locations and even attacked certain UNTAC troops.

(K128) 1.) Factions had better knowledge of terrain and therefore were quite evasive. 2.) External sympathizers were suspected of being involved.

Q11.25 Were you involved in any monitoring of arms embargoes/sanctions?

Yes: 04 No: 08

Q11.26 What was your experience in this respect?

(K029) Embargoes/sanctions taken in New York did not reflect actions on the ground, i.e., fantasy.

(K061) Ineffectual. The Thai government did not allow UN checkpoints on Thai soil. The UN could not approach the Thai border from the Cambodian side and therefore the embargo was not monitored completely.

(K083) [We] had to check flow of "foreign" troops. This was impossible due to [the] vastness of [the] area, the vegetation, etc. and [the] limited number of [my] own troops.

(K105) This was a very difficult task to monitor and control as boundaries with neighbor countries [were] almost

impossible to reach. There [were] many secondary paths crossing the borders which [were] hidden from aerial view and only known to [their] scarce users.

(K124) The declaration of no-go areas by the Khmer Rouge made it impossible to monitor their arms hold-up and made [the] whole exercise one-sided.

(K170) Searching coastal [...] of all sizes inside the territorial waters for weapons and ammunition.

Q11.27 Were any weapons collected for cash or land during your mission?

Yes: 06 No: 08

Q11.28 If so, comment on the effectiveness of this incentive.

(K023) Must ensure that no one handles mines. Want information on location and will help in marking areas.

(K029) Limited but sometimes useful.

(K061) The option was not available. The region is awash with small arms transactions.

(K102) Those of the CPAF, ANKI, and Khmer Rouge factions who turned in weapons were given courses in the various trades and activities applicable to Cambodia.

(K124) It was difficult for [the] national government to finance [a] cash-for-weapons exercise.

(K125) Quite effective as even combatants from factions, e.g. NADK, who had refused to comply totally with the provisions of the UN mandate, defected and surrendered to UN troops.

(K128) Very effective since many soldiers on their own handed in their weapons and stopped fighting.

(K170) Good when it was introduced but we found that generally old, rusty, and broken weapons were handed in.

Q11.29 Were national police involved in the collection of arms?

Yes: 01 No: 15

Q11.30 Were other organizations involved in the collection of arms?

Yes: 04 No: 13

Q11.31 If so, which ones?

(K021) This was joint between UNMO's and BN's.

(K061) Faction police were responsible for the collection of illegal weapons with the assistance of UN civilian police - in agreed areas.

(K083) UNMO's.

(K170) Sector Battalions. CIVPOL (if handed in). UNMO (land).

Q11.32 If involved in Chapter VI operations (peacekeeping), were military observers used in the collection of arms?

Yes: 11 No: 02

Q11.33 If so, what type of military observer was used (i.e., UN, regional, other organization, etc.)?

(K005) UNMO's were attached to all cantonments to monitor the cantoned troops, to support the UNTAC troops, and to watch for human rights.

(K021) UN.

(K029) UN.

(K061) [No.] Only monitoring. The battalions did the collection tasks. UNMO's were used.

(K081) UNMO's responsible for liaison, monitoring and supervision of the cease-fire and disarmament.

(K083) UN.

(K105) UNMO's.

(K124) UN.

(K128) UNMO's.

(K143) UNMO's.

(K170) UN: both land and naval.

Q11.34 Answer if applicable: was there satisfactory coordination between military observers and yourself as unit commander/chief of operation?

Yes: 10 No: 01

(K021) [Yes.] I was SS (Sector Senior) UNMO. Usually we coordinated; they just would not provide security.

(K083) [Yes.] Most of [the] time.

Q11.35 Were the warring factions themselves involved in the collection of arms?

Yes: 09 No: 03

(K083) [No.] Only handed in personal [...] weapons.

Q11.36 Did you use opposite party liaison officers so that all factions were represented in the collection of arms and the disarming process?

Yes: 07

No: 04

Q11.37 If so, reflect upon your experiences in this issue.

(K005) Although the disarmament did not take place, it was planned that all factions should have liaisons at the cantonments of the other factions.

(K029) If top-level faction leaders disagree, [the] low-level presence of LO's [liaison officers] does not do much good.

(K061) Other factions were invited to participate. Some did, some didn't. It is a standard confidence building measure.

(K102) The coordination between troops [and] observers was very much dependent on personalities. The role of [the] Sector Commander was filled by the BN [Battalion] Commander. This put an added load, without additional resources, on an already overworked individual. In future UN operations, it would be better if the Sector Commander was independent of both the BN [battalions] and the observers. He should also coordinate the activities of the CIVPOL and [the] civil administration, to [...] electoral workers if that is applicable.

(K124) Though [the] Khmer Rouge had liaison officers, their mandate was limited. As it had to be within the framework of overall (intransigent) policy of their higher command.

(K125) Opposite party liaison officers were not directly involved in the collection of arms. They were, however, present at the various coordinating conferences at which progress of the disarmament in various sectors was discussed and problems [were] addressed.

(K143) It is very important to gain confidence [in the] disarmament [by negotiating] step by step with all factions. Therefore, the presence of LN OFFR [liaison officers] of the factions is very important.

(K170) Without a reliable interpreter who knew his way around, you did not know if the wool was being pulled over your eyes or not. I felt that mostly the high ranking officers of the parties were using the mission as a massive money gathering exercise through rockets.

Q11.38 With regard to the UN/national mission you participated in, do you believe arms can be effectively collected?

Yes: 15 No: 04

(K021) [No.] Not really, but [they] can be limited and reduced.

(K023) [Yes.] But not all. Could do better on collecting information on mined areas.

Q11.39 Were you involved in the disarming of individuals, private and irregular units, and/or bandits?

Yes: 08 No: 09

Q11.40 Was the UN police involved in these tasks?

Yes: 07 No: 10

(K021) [No.] I don't think so.

(K067) [No.] Only for special investigation tasks.

Q11.41 Were local authorities involved in disarming individuals?

Yes: 10 No: 06

Q11.42 If so, what was their role?

(K005) Internal security was a Cambodian affair. UNTAC supported their efforts to collect illegal weapons by patrolling together.

(K029) First, independent action: no statement about intentions. Second, sometimes in cooperation with UNTAC troops: in direct support.

(K061) Local police and military did collect arms, but the effectiveness was suspect. The bandits were often the arms collectors. In urban areas, however, this was effective, especially in Phnom Penh where UN police worked with the local police.

(K064) To seize bandits.

(K067) 1.) Disarmament of village guards and militia. 2.) Disarmament of bandits. 3.) Disarmament of surrendered NADK soldiers.

(K081) The local police (i.e. Cambodian police) actually confiscated any weapons with unauthorized persons. UNTAC CIVPOL provided direction, supervision, and monitoring. UNTAC military provided protection.

(K083) Local police were part of mixed patrols.

(K102) To assist [the] UN in the cantonment process.

(K105) They spread the news that there was an operation to collect weapons.

(K143) Police disarming bandits.

Q11.43 Were there regulations in the mandate or peace agreement with respect to how to deal with private and irregular units?

Yes: 05 No: 11

(K083) [No.] Only official factions.

Q11.44 If not, do you think your task would have improved if there had been such an accord?

Yes: 07 No: 04

(K021) [Yes.] Could have if carried out properly.

Q11.45 Did you experience problems with snipers?

Yes: 06 No: 14

Q11.46 If so, how did you counter this?

(K021) You did not counter it. You just tried to use good judgement.

(K064) During the protection period, UNTAC had many losses. [I] got a bullet-proof jacket from the Netherlands army but more than [...] had mortar or rocket launcher fire.

(K067) Flak jackets and helmets (bullet-proof, issued to UNMO team).

(K124) Did not manage to counter it. Resulted in general feeling of insecurity, making some civilian personnel want to leave [the] area of operation and even some military units.

(K143) Permanent protection measures.

SECTION FIVE

XII. DEMOBILIZATION EXPERIENCES

Q12.1 Did the disarmament component of your mission include or infer demobilization?

Yes: 19 No: 00

(K143) [Yes.] Started after [I left] the mission area.

Q12.2 If so, what types of demobilization operations were conducted during this UN/national operation (i.e., cease-fire monitoring, weapons cantonment, etc.)?

(K005) The Agreement ordered a balanced process of demobilization of at least 70% of the forces after the cantonment and disarmament of all forces.

(K021) Weapons cantonment.

(K023) There was to be cantonment [and] disarming and then demobilization, [but] this did not work.

(K029) Partly conducted: cantonment [and] demobilization.

(K061) Cease-fire monitoring, disarmament, cantonment, demobilization of 70%, reintegration of 30% of forces remaining of all forces.

- (K065) Cease-fire monitoring, cantonment of troops and weapons partly, [and] demobilization of troops. [But] not NADK.
- (K066) Cantonment.
- (K067) As already shown.
- (K068) Cantonment was planned.
- (K079) Pratiquement aucune puisque la tentative s'est rapidement soldée par un échec.
[Practically none because the attempt quickly ended in a failure.]
- (K081) The following were conducted: cease-fire monitoring [and] cantonment of weapons and personnel.
- (K083) Cantonment (only partially/marginally successful).
- (K102) Monitoring of cease-fire violations. Investigation of incidents. Weapons cantonment.
- (K105) Cease-fire monitoring [and] coordination meetings with faction leaders.
- (K124) Withdrawal of foreign forces - monitoring and verifying. Supervise, monitor and verify cease-fire, troop cantonments, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement.
- (K125) 1.) Weapons cantonment. 2.) Reduction in forces. 3.) Formation of [a] unified army. 4.) Back to the land (weapons for cash/land) program.
- (K128) 1.) Weapons cantonment. 2.) Encampment. 3.) Unified army.

(K170) Weapons cantonment followed the cantonment of troops for demobilization, registration for the election, and return to their province.

Q12.3 Was the demobilization process accompanied by a national reintegration process involving government forces and opposing forces?

Yes: 18 No: 00

(K023) [Yes.] Was to happen after elections.

(K081) [Yes.] Partially.

(K083) [Yes.] In a later stage.

Q12.4 If so, were sufficient means available for an effective reintegration process?

Yes: 05 No: 10

Q12.5 If not, elaborate on the problems you experienced with this task.

(K005) If the demobilization of 140,000 [had] taken place, only 25,000 could be accommodated in training programs of [the] ILO [International Labor Organization], UNDP, and others.

(K021) [Yes.] However, one faction (NADK) did not participate and is still fighting.

(K023) 1.) Military factions assigned liaison officers to CMAC. After demobilization some joined as civilians. 2.) Demobilized soldiers took training as deminers, but there were no funds to equip or employ them.

- (K029) No experience in our sector, but means/training etc. were scarcely available.
- (K061) NADK were not included. The other three factions integrated. [The] process was controlled by them with [the] UN's assistance. Factions inflated numbers [and] argued for positions of authority. They integrated without demobilization due to war with the NADK.
- (K064) Sooner or later we had to decide either to work together with one main faction (CPAF) or to be isolated.
- (K065) NADK: no demobilization, therefore, no reintegration. For government troops, nothing [was] done by Cambodian authorities.
- (K067) NGO's: WFP (World Food Program), IRRI (rice organization), [the] Red Cross and *Médecins sans frontières*.
- (K081) The NADK did not cooperate. So reintegration was achieved only between CPAF, KPNLAF, and ANKI.
- (K102) UN observers should have remained for a longer period. International support (financial) was slow to come.
- (K105) 1.) Little or no information. 2.) Lack of coordination with local authorities. 3.) Insufficient transportation means and food.
- (K124) Theoretically yes, but [the] intransigence of one faction made [the] application one-sided.
- (K170) Nobody knew where the troops had to go when demobilized. They had nothing, no news of transport and no food.

Q12.6 Which organizations assisted you in demobilizing (i.e., other services, international organizations, national organizations, or nongovernmental organizations)? List by order starting with most assistance to least assistance.

(K005) ILO [International Labor Organization] and UNDP took part in the planning of training of demobilized soldiers.

(K023) 1.) UNHCR and other non-UNTAC agencies provided funds, equipment and support for demining. 2.) NGO's provided information on mined areas and some employed deminers.

(K029) None.

(K061) UNDP, ILO [International Labor Organization], NGO's, [and] interested countries.

(K066) Only UN troops.

(K068) Demobilization was not possible [because] NADK did not join Phase 2.

(K081) It was mainly between UNTAC and CPAF in my sector (Sector 4).

(K102) 1.) Sector troops. 2.) CIVPOL. 3.) Civil administration.

(K105) International organizations [and] NGO's.

(K124) 1.) ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross]. 2.) UNHCR. 3.) WHO [World Health Organization]. 4.) Amnesty International.

(K125) 1.) UN sources. 2.) UNHCR. 3.) NGO's committed to assisting the combatants acquire trades and return to the land.

(K128) 1.) UN sources. 2.) UNHCR. 3.) Other NGO's.

(K170) 1.) UN Battalions. 2.) Local Force HQ. 3.) NGO's.

Q12.7 Was there a person or a branch responsible for plans for demobilization?

Yes: 17 No: 00

Q12.8 If so, who or which branch was it?

(K005) Demobilization was to be done by the faction commanders. The planning for the training was a task of UNTAC/MilCom [Military Command]/Plans Branch.

(K029) In UNTAC HQ, Military Component. No details.

(K061) Plans Branch in UNTAC HQ. [The] ILO [International Labor Organization] subcontracted for this purpose under [the] UNDP.

(K064) Ops [Operations] Branch.

(K065) Plans and Operations Branch (only military, not civilian).

(K066) Military.

(K067) Ops [Operations] Branch. UNHCR for resettlement of refugees.

(K068) Ops [Operations].

(K081) UNTAC HQ (Plans).

(K083) I suppose "Plans" of staff [in] Phnom Penh.

(K102) Ops [Operations] Branch UNTAC. Mixed Military Working Group [was] set up to coordinate the process.

(K105) Force HQ staff included this activity in one of its branches.

(K124) Plans Branch, UNTAC HQ.

(K125) A plans cell at the Force Headquarters.

(K128) Plans cell at UNTAC HQ.

(K170) FC [Force Commander's] staff.

XIII. DEMINING EXPERIENCES

Q13.1 Did you experience mine problems?

Yes: 21 No: 00

Q13.2 If so, what did you do to counteract them?

(K021) Restricted most movement to daylight and tried to exercise caution.

(K023) 1.) Mine awareness training (for UN, NGO's and Cambodians). 2.) Collect and distribute mined-area information. 3.) Start demining under Cambodian Mine Action Center.

(K029) Be careful, gather information, brief and train [my] own troops, [and] destroy where possible.

(K053) 1.) Use of helicopters. 2.) Dry season joint patrols after consultations with local officials on security risk. 3.) Drive behind government military vehicles.

(K061) 1.) Mine clearance training units to teach Cambodians to demine. 2.) Demining capability with battalions. 3.) NGO demining groups. MAG, Halo Trust, etc. 4.) Information programs.

- (K064) To gather all information from UNTAC and civil training and organizations. In addition, interviews were made with locals and after direct mine menace [...] (because they used AT mines).
- (K065) To avoid entering mined areas (as long as it was known).
- (K066) Contact with local commanders.
- (K068) Follow regulations.
- (K081) Units cleared own mines. All units were on mine alert: roads, paths, living/working areas [were] checked for mines.
- (K083) Cleared all ground we had to use as camps. Tried to be careful [and] stuck to the rules.
- (K102) 1.) UNMO's were briefed on known mine fields. 2.) Mine identification [...]. 3.) UN mine clearance teams trained local personnel in mine clearance techniques.
- (K105) Disseminate information regarding mines and minefields both to civilians and military personnel belonging to UNTAC.
- (K124) British engineer company was on location solely for demining exercise.
- (K125) 1.) The battalion had a mines/explosives disposal team [which] cooperated with the Force Mine Clearance Team in the disposal of explosives/mines. 2.) A lot of education on mine awareness was carried out.

(K128) 1.) Movement permitted on used roads only. 2.) Education on mines and how to counteract them.

(K143) Request mine clearance. Detect and mark.

(K162) 1.) Trained and supervised locals to clear minefields. 2.) Gave mine awareness lectures to everyone. 3.) Established [a] mechanism to collate information.

(K170) Practiced mine extraction of personnel and reported the positions.

Q13.3 Was there an exchange of maps of minefields at the outset when the agreements were signed?

Yes: 05 No: 11

(K023) [Yes.] Very limited - poor records and discipline of military factions.

(K068) [No.] No maps available.

Q13.4 If not, was it feasible to have such maps?

Yes: 08 No: 07

(K083) [Yes.] If reliable, that is.

Q13.5 If so, do you think there should have been an agreement for the exchange of maps at the outset as part of the agreements signed?

Yes: 12 No: 00

(K061) [Yes.] There was.

(K068) [Yes.] See Q13.3.

(K083) [Yes.] If reliable.

Q13.6 If no maps were available and it was not feasible to chart the location of minefields, did you consider yourself adequately prepared to deal with the demining of haphazard minefields?

Yes: 05 No: 12

(K023) [No.] [There was] no real UN plan or resources to react to such a contingency. [The] UN did not provide maps of any type. Maps were purchased at [a] local Cambodian market. Some nations of [the] UN mission provided their own national copies "illegally" to [the] Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC). CMAC provided traces of mined areas to [the] UN, NGO's, etc.

(K061) [No.] Maps were atrocious when available.

(K083) [No.] Wasn't our task.

Q13.7 Did your unit play a role in the demining process?

Yes: 04 No: 16

(K023) [No.] But CMAC did.

(K083) [Yes.] Collection of not-planted mines in armories of factions.

(K143) [Yes.] Detecting and marking.

Q13.8 Was the UN involved in demining?

Yes: 20 No: 00

(K023) [Yes.] Training mainly and then some demining.

(K053) [Yes.] UNHCR.

(K067) [Yes.] UNMOD (Mine Ordnance Department).
Instructing teams for Cambodians.

Q13.9 Was the UN interested in becoming involved in demining?

Yes: 19 No: 00

(K021) [Yes.] Limited.

(K023) [Yes.] Said "yes" but very slowly provided resources.

(K061) [Yes.] Absolute necessity.

(K066) [Yes.] Mine clearance training units.

Q13.10 Was the host nation involved in demining or interested in becoming involved in demining?

Yes: 19 No: 01

(K021) [Yes.] Limited.

(K023) [Yes.] Said "yes" but limited cooperation.

(K061) [Yes.] Where demining converged with partisan interests.

(K067) [Yes.] But for salary!

(K083) [Yes.] As long as they were paid handsomely!

Q13.11 Were local groups/militias involved in demining?

Yes: 16 No: 03

(K023) [No.] It was expected that mining operations continued.

(K105) [Yes.] Mostly individuals, not groups.

Q13.12 Do you think local groups and militias should be encouraged to undertake demining tasks?

Yes: 21 No: 00

Q13.13 Why?

(K021) First they must be taught. It is their home. They must live with the consequences. They can also get better local intelligence.

(K023) 1.) Viable skill for post-UN activities. 2.) Nation rebuilding. 3.) UN and NGO's cannot do it all.

(K029) They are probably the only ones who know what lies where, and they benefit most from mine-free local areas.

(K061) No one else wants to. They lay the mines - they supposedly knew where they were.

(K064) [The] UN has to train some locals in demining services. This [...] can be used for future demining.

(K065) UN or private organizations, as well as NGO's are not able to demine even a small part due to lack of personnel.

(K067) 1.) Know-how is passed to locals. 2.) Saves farming in all areas. 3.) Builds up other sources (tourism, etc.).

(K068) It's their country!

(K081) 1.) Local groups/militia have a good incentive to clear all mines to render all areas safe. 2.) The locals may have good knowledge of minefield locations.

- (K083) If peace really "brakes out", it's also in their interest to have mine-free areas.
- (K102) It is [in] their interest to clear minefields. It offered locals an opportunity to earn money.
- (K105) Because they are the ones who suffer the consequences of uncharted and untracked minefields, [and] they are the ones that know where minefields are most likely to be found in their territory.
- (K124) Since UN forces cannot be permanently on location, it was necessary to have locals trained for demining exercises.
- (K125) 1.) Locals have a good idea of areas that had been mined previously even if maps were not available. 2.) It's possible to train a lot of locals to assist in the demining effort over and above the UN numbers. 3.) Even after [the] UN leaves, the locals could use the knowledge and complete demining of their areas.
- (K128) 1.) At least [the] locals have [a] good knowledge of mined areas. 2.) Involving them means training them as well, hence [there will be] continuity of [the] program even after [the] UN [has] departed.
- (K143) This is the best way as [the] first step toward peace after [the] cease-fire. When factions are demining together, they are unlikely to remine afterwards.
- (K162) Local knowledge [is] invaluable. Demining operations will exceed [the] length of time [that the] UN [is] in [the] theatre.
- (K170) It's their land. To farm it they had to be sure the land was free of mines.

Q13.14 Were humanitarian organizations or private firms involved in demining?

Humanitarian Organizations:	Yes:	13	No:	05
Private Firms:	Yes:	13	No:	06

Q13.15 In your opinion, who should undertake demining processes and why?

(K021) [The] UN can instruct. [The] UN can demine as tactically necessary, but [the] host nation must clean [its] own country. Cambodia will need many years.

(K023) 1.) There is room for all. The UN can help coordinate.
2.) [The] UN should focus on standards for: training (including mine awareness), safety, quality/inspections, and [the] coordination of databases on mined areas, "cleared" areas, etc.

(K029) 1.) UN and private firms [in] key areas [are] necessary for [the] execution of [the] UN mandate/mission and [as a] moral obligation. 2.) All warring factions [because of their] knowledge of mined areas, responsibility, and [the work will] keep them busy/earn their keep.

(K053) Government, inter-government and non-government bodies should all coordinate efforts to demine countries from the start of a peace settlement. There should be a global ban on manufacture, storage, transport and sale of mines. There should be an economic incentive for demobilized soldiers to demine for property rights or money or both. The Security Council members should buy back all unexploded mines and deduct this from their UN budget.

(K061) The local people - trained by [the] UN [because]: 1.) they know best where they are, 2.) it is a long-term, labor-intensive, expensive business, 3.) assistance can be given with prioritizing effort and with data base

collections, 4.) private firms are too expensive, [and] 5.) fighting often continues.

(K064) All operations that are able to demine should do [so] under command or at least supervision of [the] UN.

(K065) Civilians from own country trained and equipped by any kind of organization. Locals are much more informed and more interested in demining their own country.

(K066) Each possible organization should be involved in the demining process, but only one organization should [coordinate] the demining process.

(K067) Locals trained and supervised by governmental, non-governmental or UN organization.

(K068) All.

(K079) Cela dépend du pays et des conditions du conflit. Le plus souvent, le déminage devra être fait par des groupes locaux, contrôlés, aidés et assistés par des spécialistes de l'ONU.

[It depends on the country and on the circumstances of the conflict. In most cases, the demining shall be done by the local groups, under the control of and with the help and assistance of UN specialists.]

(K081) The demining process should be undertaken by the UN peacekeepers assisted by the locals and international organizations because mines pose a serious threat to all persons and animals.

(K083) Preferably the same people/factions who planted them. They should know locations of minefields, etc.

- (K102) The overall coordination of mine clearing should be the responsibility of the United Nations.
- (K105) Mines have been sown by thousands, so it is better to have as many people as possible in the demining activity. For safety reasons, the battalions should become involved in demining in their AO [area of operations].
- (K124) UN troops initially, [and then] UN troops to train locals later to take over.
- (K125) Locals assisted by the UN forces. 1.) Locals have a good knowledge of mined areas. 2.) Knowledge can be passed down quickly. 3.) Raises consciousness of locals on [the] subject. 4.) Some locals could have been involved in the initial mining and so without maps, could be helpful in the demining. 5.) Locals can undertake the complete demining of their areas even after the UN has withdrawn at the expiration of its mandate.
- (K128) 1.) Initially [the] UN to prove to locals [the] possibility. 2.) [The] UN to work in conjunction with locals, which serves as [a] means of training for locals. 3.) Subsequently, home government using trained locals with funding from UN, NGO, and external sources. 4.) Para 3 to be supervised by UN/NGO to ensure efficacy.
- (K143) The local fighters [because] they know where to demine, they are demining their own land, [and] they will be unlikely to remine afterwards. They must be organized and trained by UN PERS [personnel].
- (K162) Any competent organization provided it is properly coordinated and a degree of guarantee [is] provided that the area demined is clear of mines.
- (K170) Military: experience and specific equipment. Then educate the locals to do the task after the mission is

complete. Equipment for locals should be provided by the UN and left at the end of [the] mission as a goodwill gesture.

Analyst's Comments:

One must accept that the mining pattern in Cambodia was similar to the pattern found elsewhere in Third World conflicts. The different armed groups consisted mostly of poorly trained guerilla fighters with little or no regard for national or international laws and agreements. The requirements of the different conventions regulating the use of mines in conventional war had no effect in this conflict, and normal sound military procedure, in terms of the laying, marking and plotting of minefields, did not endure. They usually planted mines in a random manner and according to the needs at that specific moment in the conflict. They ranged from single, anti-personnel mines in a foot path to extensive minefields protecting an area of interest. None of these were normally recorded. It was pretty much a "plant and forget" tactic. On the other hand, the government forces and their allies during the time of the conflict had a certain degree of training and tended to adhere to normal military practices. This may explain why some information on mines and minefields was available and why in some instances it was unavailable.

Demining, especially in a case like Cambodia where the terrain and vegetation are as much of an obstacle as the mines themselves, requires specialized training and equipment. Only one questionnaire was received from a trained military engineer: he naturally felt competent and equipped to handle the situation. The other respondents were normal infantry soldiers with limited demining training. It is common practice to train infantry soldiers in mine awareness and "first-aid" mine clearing, i.e., just enough to get the soldier out of a tight spot in an emergency situation. These respondents indicated quite correctly that they were not trained or equipped for demining operations.

The magnitude of the mine problem was realized from the very beginning of UN involvement in Cambodia. It was also evident that it will take much longer to demine the country than the time allotted for UNTAC's mission. The best solution to the problem would have been to train and equip the local authorities to handle the situation themselves in the years to come. This was the solution that UNTAC pursued and with great success.

The mine problem in Cambodia was an emotive issue and understandably a matter of great concern. The repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Cambodians from the border camps and the settlement of these people in an

unsafe environment was unacceptable. The military component was tasked under the Paris Agreements with both clearing mines and training the Cambodia people in mine clearance and mine awareness.³ The Paris Agreements outlined UNTAC's responsibilities further:

The military component of UNTAC shall ensure, as a first step, that all known mine fields are clearly marked. The Parties agree that, after completion of the regroupment and cantonment process, they will make available mine clearance teams which, under the supervision and control of UNTAC military personnel, will leave the cantonment areas in order to assist in removing, disarming, and deactivating remaining unexploded ordnance devices.... UNTAC shall: conduct a mass public education programme in the recognition and avoidance of explosive devices..., train Cambodian volunteers to dispose of unexploded devices..., provide first-aid training to Cambodian volunteers.⁴

The intention of the Agreements was clearly that the task would mainly be the work of other agencies, but if these were uncoordinated, they would have been unlikely to achieve their best effect. The magnitude of the problem was first grasped by the military survey mission in November 1991. It was clear to the Force Commander that only a long-term coordinated approach would succeed in improving the mine situation. The Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) was established and designed to continue well beyond the UNTAC mandate. At its meeting on 20 April 1992, the Supreme National Council (SNC) agreed to the establishment of CMAC under the presidency of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the SRSG. It was to be managed by a ten-member Governing Council, and its fundamental objectives were:

- to act as a focal point for mine information;*
- to coordinate the training of Cambodian mine clearers (10,000 was the initial objective);*
- to coordinate the funds for mine clearing; and*
- to take responsibility for the long-term coordination of the mine clearance program.*

In addition, a Military Engineering element consisting of 2,230 personnel was envisaged. The unit was to be responsible for the following:

³ Annex 1, Section C, paragraph 1e of the Paris Agreements.

⁴ Annex 2, Article IX, paragraphs 1-3 of the Paris Agreements.

- the continuation and expansion of the mine program already established by UNAMIC, namely, the conducting of a mass education program, the training of Cambodia volunteers to dispose of unexploded devices, and the rendering of assistance with mine clearing;
- the disposal of unexploded ordnance devices and the destruction of armed caches; and
- the provision of assistance to Infantry Battalions in all engineering tasks (such as water purification, site preparation, construction, etc.).

In his first progress report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General mentioned that 10 training teams were already active in Cambodia and that 5,000 mine clearers will have been trained by the end of 1992. In the Secretary-General's second report (dated 21 September 1992), he mentioned that eleven training centers had been established and that 850 soldiers had been trained in demining. Three hundred and fifty had been deployed in mine clearing operations, and more than 1,000 mines had already been cleared. An important fact mentioned was that the length of the course was doubled for safety reasons. This statement implied that the target of 5,000 trained deminers would not be reached in the first year. By May 1993, two thousand Cambodians were trained in mine clearing, and six hundred of these were actually deployed in mine clearing (the main barrier to employing more trained mine clearers was a staff shortage in supervisory teams) and some 15,000 mines had been cleared. The Secretary-General's report of 26 August 1993 (on the withdrawal of UNTAC) stated that 2,330 Cambodians were trained in mine clearance and that 1,400 of these were employed in clearing tasks. An estimated 37,000 mines were cleared.

SECTION SIX

XIV. TRAINING

Q14.1 Prior to deployment, did your units undertake specific training programs related to disarmament operations?

Yes: 07

No: 10

(K021) [Yes.] Limited for UNMO's.

(K023) [No.] UN operations in general.

(K079) [Non.] Aucune unité n'avait été préparée.
[No, none of the units had been prepared.]

(K162) [Yes.] Most but not all.

Q14.2 If so, were these training programs based on guidance from the UN forces already in the field, from the UN in general, or from your national authorities?

UN forces in field:	02	UN in general:	02
National authorities:	08	Other:	01

(K061) [National authorities.] Part of basic training.

Q14.3 Were your units trained specifically for the collection of arms and cantonment of factions?

Yes:	05	No:	11
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(K143) [No response.] Not unit: HQ/LN OFFR [liaison officer].

Q14.4 Were you and/or your units trained in on-site inspection and observation techniques?

Yes:	07	No:	08
------	----	-----	----

(K021) [Yes.] Very limited, inadequate.

Q14.5 Have you been trained in verification technologies nationally?

Yes:	02	No:	13
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Q14.6 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific weapons control and disarmament operations (i.e., weapons searches, inventories, elimination, etc.)?

Yes: 07 No: 07

Q14.7 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific demobilization operations?

Yes: 03 No: 11

Q14.8 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific demining operations?

Yes: 08 No: 07

(K083) [Yes.] Only our engineers.

Q14.9 On the whole, did you consider yourself technically and tactically prepared for the accomplishment of your mission?

Technically :	Yes: 15	No: 06
Tactically :	Yes: 19	No: 02

(K021) [Yes.] But how to apply my skills to the mission was basically left up to me; the UN could have better prepared us.

Q14.10 Was there anything done at the end of the mission to gather lessons learned?

Yes: 15 No: 04

(K023) [Yes.] Not by the UN. Report to national authorities.

Q14.11 Back in your own country, were you debriefed?

Yes: 17 No: 04

(K067) [Yes.] Only senior officers for report to Austrian government.

(K079) [Non.] Ce qui est certain, c'est qu'il y a eu de graves lacunes à tous les niveaux pour la préparation des opérations de désarmement et de démobilisation. Méconnaissance du pays; méconnaissance des modes de vie des habitants; délais de préparation des camps de cantonnement et moyens insuffisants; manque de préparation des bataillons pour cette opération; manque de coopération. Au point que même si les factions avaient été d'accord, ce qui ne fut pas le cas, l'APRONUC aurait rencontré les plus grandes difficultés pour remplir correctement le mandat au plan national, technique, au plan des délais, au plan psychologique. Cet aspect de la mission a été particulièrement MAL PREPARE en amont.

[No. It is clear that there were severe failures on all the levels regarding the preparation of the disarmament and demobilization operations. Misreading of the country; misreading of the ways of life of the population; time-lags for the preparation of the cantonment camps and insufficient means; lack of preparation of the battalions for the operation; lack of cooperation. To the extent that even if the factions had agreed, which was not the case, UNTAC would have met the greatest difficulties in trying to execute properly its mandate on the national, technical, and psychological levels and on the level of the time-lags. This aspect of the operation was particularly badly prepared up-stream]

Analyst's Comments:

General comments on the mission: ill-prepared; little knowledge of the country, the inhabitants, or their way of life; inadequate preparation for the cantonment; and a lack of coordination. The mandate could not be implemented because of material, psychological, and technical difficulties.

SECTION SEVEN

XV. INTERACTIONS

Given that there are three common elements to a UN mission -- the military, the humanitarian agencies, and the political branch:

Q15.1 Would you consider the relationship between humanitarian elements/organizations and the military personnel during the mission to have been very good, adequate, or inadequate?

Very good:	08	Adequate:	09
Inadequate:	03		

Q15.2 If you think it could have been improved, specify three ways in which this could have been achieved.

(K005) 1.) Establish a Mission HQ with the components subordinated. 2.) A mission is a 7 days-a-week, 24 hours-a-day activity, so skip the peace-time office hours/coffee times routine and mentality of the civil components. 3.) Redress the MSA system to create [an] equal allowance system for all HQ personnel.

(K021) 1.) There must be a "CMOC" type organization at the senior and sector levels. 2.) We must interrelate more at home prior to a mission. 3.) There is [a] definite need for a "UN University" to bring all elements together.

(K029) Sharing of intelligence. Infinite information on intended actions.

(K053) After the disarmament failure in Cambodia, UN men should have given more logistics assistance to the electoral component - flight priorities especially, patrolling cooperation.

- (K061) 1.) Better coordination between the three and their chiefs. 2.) Common interpretation of mandate is required. 3.) Command function and authority between the three needs to be sorted out. "Who's in charge?"
- (K066) Military and police components should be under one command.
- (K067) 1.) Joint briefings for electoral staff and UNMO's, forces (leaders), and CIVPOL. 2.) Military advisers to all civilian staff. 3.) Safe driving lessons. 4.) Habit and behavior [for] negotiations with parties and factions. 5.) Conflict resolution training for all.
- (K079) C'est surtout un problème de rapports humains. Il y a complémentarité entre les uns et les autres. Il faut l'admettre pour être efficace en travaillant ensemble. Le militaire est le bras armé de l'humanitaire.
[This is above all a problem of human relations. Complementary relationships exist between the ones and the others. To be efficient cooperation must allowed. The military is the armed arm of the humanitarian.]
- (K081) The relationship was about the best possible.
- (K083) Let everybody else know what you are doing. Let troops behave in a decent manner.
- (K105) 1.) Specific mission should be assigned to each segment. 2.) Individuals of each element should become acquainted with what other people in the organization [are doing]. 3.) Good working relations between elements should be developed.
- (K124) Difference in allowance which brought envy could be explained. Others could be educated to know and understand functions of others. Education that all are working towards [the] same objective [would help the situation].

(K143) The UN humanitarian agencies should be controlled by [the] SRSG and link their development efforts towards disarmament (development as incentive) as part of the UN goals in the area.

(K170) A greater understanding of military planning is required. You don't just ask for transport to a place like getting on the bus each morning. Some forethought and planning by NGO's or humanitarian elements giving at least 24 hours notice would ease the tension.

Q15.3 How was the overall cooperation of the three elements of the UN components achieved during your mission? Summarize.

(K005) Finally, the MilCom [Military Component] achieved [...] very good cooperation with the Electoral Component. The cooperation with UNTAC Civilian Police was adequate. The cooperation with the Administrative Division was inadequate mainly because of the poor performance of the personnel involved and the uncooperative mentality of many UN civilians.

(K021) It was based entirely on personalities. I found it better in sector between electoral, humanitarians, and UNMO's. I felt politicians [were] our greatest threat, i.e., the senior UN Volunteer representative from Geneva. Those playing politics were often oblivious or unconcerned with operational consequences.

(K029) Military Component [and] Civilian Component (including UN Civilian Police): poor coordination. [The Civilian Component was] overplayed, mostly not interested in [the] task, overly demanding, not realistic, not involved, [without] organization, [without] control, [and did not consider] consequences.

- (K053) There was close cooperation between military and political elements. The humanitarian element kept a sideline profile but with a longer term commitment to the country, a profile that depended on a political success after the military failure. The May 1993 elections brought about a coalition government in Phnom Penh. So humanitarianism co-exists with this new government.
- (K061) Daily meetings of chiefs. Conferences/committee discussions/debates. Exhausting rounds of discussions over responsibilities particularly when the initial mandate changed to protection of [the] election process.
- (K065) In my sector, there weren't any problems regarding [the] relationships. You can achieve almost everything in [the] case [where] all elements are willing to work and to cooperate [with] each other.
- (K066) In some districts [there were] problems in cooperation between military and police components.
- (K067) Partly not efficiently. Good during registration and elections.
- (K068) Good, sufficient cooperation.
- (K079) Je ne répondrai pas à cette question, pour des raisons de déontologie.
[I shall not answer this question for reasons of deontology.]
- (K081) Overall direction of UNTAC was given from the office of the SRSG. The Military Component and the other UNTAC components (Civil, CIVPOL, Human Rights, Rehabilitation, Repatriation, etc.) all worked together as a team. This was achieved through [...] close supervision, consultation and cooperation.

- (K083) Adequate. [I was] not impressed by the standards of some "professional" UN personnel (i.e. the gravy train).
- (K102) There was no formalized structure for the coordination of the Civil, Military and Police elements of the UNTAC force. An ad hoc Joint Coordinating Center was set up in the Military Component HQ. This was partially successful. However, there were tensions and future UN missions of this magnitude should have defined command and control structures.
- (K105) There were many "ups and downs", but it is also true that in many sectors individuals [made] a good effort so that the mission could be carried out.
- (K124) Whereas there was generally [a] feeling of belonging, each seemed to be working within their own specialization, knowing little or caring to know little about each other's functions. Differences in allowances worsened [the] situation by creating envy.
- (K125) Regular liaison between components. Coordination of activities between components. Harnessing of resources. Cooperation among components. Joint programs, integration of resources/programs.
- (K128) While the UN peacekeeping troops took care of the military aspects of the mission, the other elements took care of other aspects like refugees/displaced persons [and] providing welfare facilities. There was [a] division of labor [which resulted] in efficacy.
- (K143) Only cooperation coordinated on the highest level.
- (K170) In the end with close coordination at the unit level and at least weekly briefs with all the humanitarian elements in the sector to allow cross pollination of thoughts and plans. This worked exceptionally well in the sectors.

Q15.4 Did cooperation exist between the UN military, private and irregular elements, and existing police forces (UN or local)?

Yes: 16 No: 02

(K067) [Yes.] In Kampong Cham province. [No.] In Svay Rieng province.

(K105) [No response.] It existed at times so this question cannot be answered yes or no.

Q15.5 If so, describe which components cooperated with whom and the level of their cooperation.

(K005) UNTAC/MilCom [Military Component] cooperated with three faction armies to secure the elections. UNTAC/CIVPOL cooperated with the police of the State of Cambodia because of their monitoring and training mission.

(K021) I felt UNMO's, electoral [staff], and NGO's worked well together. Often BN's [battalions] gave no support if any risk [was] involved. I found some senior CIVPOL outstanding, but most of their forces [were] virtually useless and detrimental.

(K029) Sector infbn [infantry battalion] with provincial chief of police, with provincial chief of faction forces, with provincial civil governor, and with UN civil police cdr [commander].

(K053) In my district, the military observers, CIVPOL, and armed UN battalion dialogued daily or weekly with local officials, police and military. Everyone knew each other and knew their residences. The electoral component benefitted from this fact. Had these men been redeployed or transferred to another district or province, this would have jeopardized the confidence-

building element essential to a peaceful coexistence and successful election.

- (K061) Local cease-fire committees. National Mixed Military Working Group and National Mixed Police Working Group and local police committees. No contact with bandit groups [or] private armies (usually). Local committees depended on the drive of UN personalities. Some functioned well, some didn't function at all.
- (K065) There was only cooperation between regular forces, UN as well as local units. Irregular units weren't involved in any cooperation.
- (K066) UN police deployed on border checkpoint manned by UNMO's.
- (K068) [The] force [cooperated with the] factions, [and the] civilian police [cooperated with the] factions' police.
- (K081) UNTAC military cooperated with CPAF, NADK, KPNLAF and ANKI as well as Cambodian police and civilian administration at provincial, district, and town levels.
- (K083) Local level, UN police and local police.
- (K102) The MMWG liaised with all the factions in Cambodia, including the Khmer Rouge. This was an excellent vehicle for liaison and greatly assisted the successful conclusion of the mission.
- (K105) In the specific sector in which URUBATT [Uruguay Battalion] was responsible, there was a good relationship established amongst all components (Military, Civilian, CIVPOL, and Electoral) as well as with the local population and its military and political leaders. Nevertheless, this did not always guarantee good results.

- (K124) [The] Electoral Component cooperated well with field units and military observers during [the] electoral phase. Also, there was close cooperation between military observers and battalions (field units) during [the] disarmament and cantonment phases.
- (K125) Local Cambodian police cooperated with UN police elements and UN forces. UN forces also cooperated with NGO's.
- (K128) UNHCR cooperated with UNTAC in respect of refugees/displaced persons. Cambodian civil police cooperated with UN CIVPOL to maintain law and order.
- (K143) COMD [commander of] CIVPOL as "part of" MIL [military] HQ.
- (K170) The head of each element/branch/unit as his/her delegated representative. Chaired by the UN Sector Administrators. Attended by: CIVPOL, Sector battalions, naval UNMO's, land UNMO's, election personnel, Human Rights, Logistic Battalion, Communications Coordinator, Port Authority (UN).

XVI. PERSONAL REFLECTIONS

On reflection,

Q16.1 What was the overall importance of the disarmament task for the overall success of the mission?

Very important: 08 Important: 08
Not important: 02

- (K021) [Important.] We held the election successfully anyway, but people are still being killed.

(K023) [Very important:] Still violence which impedes stability.
[Not important:] Elections held anyhow.

(K053) [Important.] But less and less.

Q16.2 What were the three major lessons you learned from your field experience?

(K005) 1.) The UN is a useful organization with the capacity to influence situations in a positive way. 2.) The UN should be reformed and revamped to a leaner, more flexible, less bureaucratic organization. 3.) A multinational force is a strong neutral force that can stand united and achieve objectives.

(K021) 1.) All forces have national agendas, usually hidden. 2.) The UN will not become effective until it can reshape and improve its own bureaucracy. 3.) Regardless of initial circumstances, UN forces must have the weapons and capability to defend [themselves] if the situation turns more negative. 4.) There is no incentive for some UN bureaucrats or some countries to complete the mission: it is their golden goose.

(K023) 1.) Demining considerations and resource deployments do not have to wait and should not wait for [the] military mission to deploy. Advance teams can go with other UN offices and NGO's. 2.) Must coordinate and cooperate with other UN offices and NGO's in theatre. 3.) Senior bureaucrats in theatre must not be allowed to impede operations. 4.) Must plan for demining early and collect resources before [the] mission deploys.

(K029) 1.) No disarmament [means] no chance of lasting control, [and] only partial execution of mandate/mission possible. 2.) No intention [on the part of the] warring factions to stick to [the] agreements [means] no way UN troops can execute their mission unless perhaps with [the] use of force.

- (K053) 1.) Be ready for any political failure. 2.) Maintain a straightforward continual dialogue with local officials. 3.) Make yourself seen and known to build up local confidence in your mandate.
- (K061) 1.) Coordination is paramount. 2.) Expect duplicity. 3.) Don't promise what you cannot deliver. 4.) Importance of an agreement prior to deployment. 5.) Importance of confidence building. 6.) Critical necessity for UN propaganda and radio [...].
- (K079) PLANIFICATION et PREPARATION doivent être conduites avec rigueur MAIS la plus grande INITIATIVE doit être ensuite laissée au chef militaire chargé de faire appliquer les résolutions sur le terrain. [Planning and preparation must be conducted with rigor, but the greatest initiative must then be left to the military chief in charge of the application of the resolutions in the field.]
- (K081) 1.) UN peacekeepers must thoroughly understand the mission. 2.) All components of the force (i.e. UNTAC) must cooperate fully. 3.) The local population MUST be treated with respect, compassion and understanding (local customs).
- (K083) If factions/people do sign UN agreements but afterwards refuse to cooperate, the ultimate goal of [the] mission will never be reached. If people cooperate, everything will turn out to be possible.
- (K102) 1.) Sector Commanders should be independent of elements in the sector. 2.) Standardization of language, in particular troop contributing countries should have an adequate number of personnel fluent in the language of the mission. 3.) UN interpreters should not be local.

- (K105) 1.) That it is imperative to gain the "hearts and minds" of the locals. 2.) Disarmament must be effective and is a basic element of success. 3.) It is basic that warring factions are convinced that they really want peace.
- (K124) 1.) [It is] important to get all factions committed to [the] agreements before implementation. 2.) It is bad to make assumptions [about the] goodwill of all factions to cooperate. 3.) Planning should cover all likely eventualities.
- (K125) 1.) The importance of cooperation between UN forces and combatants to the success of [a] UN mission. 2.) The place of understanding in resolving conflicts among factions. 3.) The importance of [a] regular flow of information and conferences/briefings to the success of [a] UN mission.
- (K128) 1.) [The] UN must always ensure that the basis for all its operations, i.e. the mandate, is accepted and understood by all. 2.) All known sympathizers must be involved in the negotiation process. 3.) Security should be able to sanction recalcitrants, especially external sympathizers.
- (K143) 1.) Disarmament is dependent on the ability of the population to force their own fighters to disarm. 2.) This is dependent on the culture and on the incentives (economic future). 3.) Disarmament should be a major item in the survey missions (determination of the incentives).
- (K162) 1.) Patience. 2.) Negotiation. 3.) Coordination of effort.
- (K170) 1.) Personnel management: getting locals motivated to help themselves. 2.) Dealing with other nationalities within the UN. 3.) Always verify a report by a responsible UN personnel.

Q16.3 What other question should we have asked here and how would you have answered it?

Questions:

(K005) Is disarmament essential for the success of a mission?

(K021) What type of preparation is required?

(K023) 1.) Would you volunteer for another UN mission? 2.) Should there be a military demining cell at UN HQ? 3.) Should all cells and units have faction liaison officers to watch, assist, etc.?

(K029) 1.) What is a realistic alternative for the disarmament of warring factions? 2.) What other courses of action are possible?

(K081) Can a UN peacekeeping/enforcement mission succeed with the active cooperation of the belligerent groups?

(K102) Did UNTAC give value for money?

(K105) Is [the] UN focusing its missions adequately.

(K124) What was the reaction of the populace to [the] UN presence?

(K125) How adequate was UN logistic support to units involved in the disarmament process?

(K143) [What was the] major difficulty with disarmament?

Answers:

- (K005) As all missions are different, the possibilities for and the effects of disarmament can vary. In Cambodia, disarmament and the following demobilization would have put about 140,000 jobless men on the streets and the internal security would have suffered because the inadequate police couldn't cope with the situation. Maybe that controlling, disciplining of the units and [afterwards using them] for all types of security and public works could have been a better option.
- (K021) Minimal [preparation] is required of trained troops. They need additional negotiations/conflict resolution skills, additional medical [and] cultural training. What is critical is at the senior levels. We need a UN university to bring all elements together so they better understand one another and can learn to work together for the common good.
- (K023) 1.) Yes. 2.) Yes. 3.) Yes.
- (K029) 1.) None, but it could be phased later in time, after "concentration" and some stability and trust have been reached. 2.) Concentration of armed groups, separation of armed groups, improvement of internal command/control structure of armed groups, [and/or] adequate protection by UN troops against bandits, loose groups, etc. who threaten families of concentrated armed groups.
- (K081) All preliminary negotiations leading to the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution should address the following issues: 1.) acceptance of the UN mission by the belligerent parties and 2.) close liaison during all stages of the mission with the locals (i.e. the belligerent parties).

- (K102) The mission to supervise the holding of free and fair elections was successful. There was much waste in the manner in which the mission was administrated. However, on balance, 2 billion dollars was well spent.
- (K105) Maybe [the] UN should be reasonably sure that its effort will be successful. No good results will be obtained by imposing solutions to problems which have roots even outside the country where the conflict has appeared. In other words, [the] UN should attack all the problems and not only what is visible [...].
- (K124) [The] level of illiteracy of [the] populace made them seem unappreciative of the role of [the] UN. They were exploitative (economically). [The] UN should have concentrated on raising the level of literacy towards national development.
- (K125) UN logistic support arrived in the mission area late and this affected the smooth take off of implementation of various phases of the peace process.
- (K143) Convincing the fighter (and his chief) to give his weapon, which allows him to survive and to take what he wants, and to go back to a civilian life is only possible if a decent future is provided [for] him (incentive, amnesty, economic future, education,...).

To be answered only by those who participated in completed UN/national peacekeeping missions:

Q16.4 Do you think that the disarmament-related tasks which you undertook had an impact on the national reconstruction processes which followed the end of the mission?

Yes: 08

No: 06

Q16.5 If so, briefly explain how and why:

- (K005) Difficult to say because the disarmament failed and the three factions that cooperated are still confronting the faction that withdrew from the peace process. But the national reconstruction has started in major parts of the country.
- (K021) Our failure to disarm has left the country in constant struggle and danger. If King Sihanouk dies soon, they will be right back where they started [with] armed factions and a civil war.
- (K023) NOTE: 1.) I disagree with the preamble to this study. Many of the sample conflicts have their roots in inter-state Cold War conflicts. Their magnitude of violence and arming (including mines) is the result of foreign "assistance". It was not clear to me that countries neighboring Cambodia saw benefit or profit in conflict resolution. If and when they do, there may be a better chance for conflict management to a lower level. 2.) Disarmament and demobilization (in country and on cross-border movement) are indications of military/political faction commitment to peace. BUT, the UN must do more to "buy peace" through creating jobs and stopping corruption.
- (K061) [No.] National integration occurred without disarmament. Cambodia is still not disarmed, but the local authorities are trying to implement their own control weapons.
- (K079) Elles auraient dû être capitales mais hélas, elles n'ont pas eu lieu. Le but d'une opération de désarmement et de démobilisation est d'abord d'apporter la paix aux populations et de leur rendre confiance. Si cette opération réussit, tout est ensuite possible pour rapatrier les réfugiés, remettre de l'ordre dans l'économie, l'administration du pays, préparer des élections etc. C'est

donc l'opération capitale qui doit être réussie avant tout quand elle s'inscrit dans le mandat.

[They should have been capital, but alas they did not take place. The goal of a disarmament and demobilization operation is first to bring peace back to the population and to restore their confidence. If that operation succeeds, it then becomes possible to repatriate the refugees, to return order to the economy and the administration, to prepare elections, etc. The disarmament is therefore the capital operation that must succeed, all the more when it is written into the mandate]

- (K081) The successful Cambodian elections resulted in: 1.) the restoration of the monarch to his rightful place, 2.) the new constitution and new government provided new hope to the population, and 3.) the world community is now prepared to deal with Cambodia.
- (K102) [No.] Most of the weaponry held by the factions became the weaponry of the National Army. The elections were successfully concluded despite the fact that only 30% of CPAF, ANKI, and [the] KPNLAF's weapons were cantoned and none at all from the Khmer Rouge.
- (K124) [No.] Plans did not materialize as envisaged. [The] UN troops therefore had to "push on" with other phases without full success in [the] preceding phase. This gave a semblance of success (elections) but problems still persisted after [the] UN withdrawal.
- (K125) The disarmament paved the way for elections and reintegration of previous combatants into [the] civil pattern [of] life/activities. Disarmament created a sense of security and took away the previous feeling of uneasy peace in the country (Cambodia).

- (K128) The disarmament process restored confidence in the people to participate massively in the electoral process which in turn facilitated the national reintegration process.
- (K143) Disarmament of 50,000 fighters allowed the reunification of 3 factions into 1 national (royal) army which is now providing peace against NADK attacks.
- (K162) Clearance of mined areas provides land for villagers and agriculture. Also, [it] provides confidence in [the] international community that normality is returning.
- (K170) It started the peace process and probably removed 2 of the 4 warring parties from the picture. The remaining two parties held on to enough arms/personnel to continue fighting but got rid of a lot of surplus weapons, albeit old and broken, and personnel.