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General and complete disarmament: relationship between disarmament and development

The relationship between disarmament and development in the current international context

Note by the Secretary-General

1. By its resolution 57/65 of 22 November 2002 the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts established on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, while seeking the views of States, to prepare for the consideration of the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session a report with recommendations reappraising the relationship between disarmament and development in the current international context, as well as the future role of the Organization in this connection.
2. Pursuant to that request, the Secretary-General has the honour to submit to the General Assembly the above-mentioned report on the relationship between disarmament and development, prepared with the assistance of the Group of Governmental Experts.

* A/59/50 and Corr.1.

Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the relationship between disarmament and development

Summary

The report of the Group of Governmental Experts provides a reappraisal of the disarmament-development relationship and the role of the Organization in this connection, taking into account all the major international changes that have taken place since the adoption of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in 1987. In particular, the review dwells on the pivotal role of security, the costs and consequences of military expenditure, the release of resources for development, the importance of multilateralism and the role of the United Nations, as well as other international organizations and institutions.

The report makes numerous recommendations. Notably, it calls for mainstreaming the disarmament-development relationship; raising awareness of this relationship within the international community; engaging in a wide range of conflict-prevention measures, including those related to illicit small arms and light weapons; promoting security through greater openness, transparency and confidence; and strengthening further the role of the United Nations and other international institutions, as well as the donor community, towards these ends. The recommendations also include specific topics for further research by specialized United Nations bodies and non-governmental organizations in order to enhance understanding of the relationship between disarmament and development.

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Foreword by the Secretary-General

The present report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the relationship between disarmament and development contains a series of important observations, ideas and recommendations that bring our understanding of this crucial issue into the current international context. I am especially gratified that the Group was able to adopt it by consensus.

As mandated by General Assembly resolution 57/65 of 22 November 2002, the report reflects a concerted effort by the Group of Governmental Experts to reappraise the relationship between disarmament and development, taking into account the major changes that have taken place since the International Conference on Disarmament and Development, held in 1987. The report also contains some specific recommendations regarding the role of the United Nations in this area.

The experts found that some issues are as relevant now as they were more than half a century ago. For instance, the report reiterates the importance of exercising restraint in military expenditure, so that human and financial resources can be used for the ongoing effort to eradicate poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. In this regard, we should recall Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, which envisages an international system based on the “least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources”.

But the report also contains a number of new elements. Among the most prominent are the adverse and multifaceted impacts of illicit small arms and light weapons and of international terrorism. Tackling these major global challenges is critical to creating security conditions conducive to development.

I hope this report will help to reinvigorate worldwide interest in this subject and provide a basis for undertaking disarmament and development activities that are more closely in tune with prevailing realities and challenges. I thank the members of the Group of Governmental Experts for this illuminating report, which I commend to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Letter of transmittal

28 May 2004

Mr. Secretary-General,

I have the honour to submit herewith the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the relationship between disarmament and development. The Group was appointed by you in pursuance of paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 57/65 of 22 November 2002.

The governmental experts appointed were the following:

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The report was prepared between November 2003 and May 2004, during which time the Group held three sessions: the first from 17 to 21 November 2003 in Geneva, the second from 8 to 12 March 2004 in New York and the third from 24 to 28 May 2004 in New York.

The members of the Group wish to express their appreciation for the assistance they received from members of the Secretariat of the United Nations. In particular, they wish to thank Nazir Kamal, Conventional Arms Branch, Department for Disarmament Affairs, who served as Secretary of the Group, and Kerstin Vignard, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, who served as consultant to the Group. The Group would also like to thank Sir Richard Jolly, Lawrence R. Klein and Sarah Meek for their presentations at the symposium on the relationship

between disarmament and development, organized by the Department for Disarmament Affairs on 9 March 2004 at United Nations Headquarters to assist the work of the Group. The Group is also grateful to Nobuyasu Abe, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, for the support received from him throughout its work.

I have been requested by the Group of Governmental Experts, as its Chairman, to submit to you, on its behalf, the present report, which was approved by consensus.

(Signed) José Nicolás **Rivas**
Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts on the
relationship between disarmament and development

I. Mandate

1. By operative paragraph 2 of its resolution 57/65 of 22 November 2002, entitled “Relationship between disarmament and development”, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts established on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, while seeking the views of States, to prepare for the consideration of the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session a report with recommendations reappraising the relationship between disarmament and development in the current international context, as well as the future role of the Organization in this connection.

2. In carrying out its work, the Group took into account the views of States communicated to the Secretary-General on the implementation of the action programme of the Final Document adopted at the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development,¹ as requested in General Assembly resolutions 57/65, 56/24 E of 29 November 2001, 55/33 L of 20 November 2000, 54/54 T of 1 December 1999 and 53/77 K of 4 December 1998.

II. Introduction

3. Under Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, Member States have undertaken to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armament of the world’s human and economic resources. In 1984, concerned about the magnitude of global military expenditure and its consequences for the world’s economy and its peoples, the General Assembly requested that an international conference be held to undertake multilateral consideration of the relationship between disarmament and development.² The 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development focused upon: defining the relationship between disarmament and development; examining the magnitude and consequences of military expenditure on the world economy and on development; and exploring ways to release resources for development through disarmament. Its action programme comprised a range of recommendations to be implemented by the United Nations, Member States and regional organizations. The Final Document, which was adopted by consensus,³ serves as the basis for the reappraisal undertaken by the Group of Governmental Experts.⁴

4. Disarmament and development are two of the international community’s most important tools for building a world free from want and fear.⁵ By controlling or reducing the availability or use of the implements of armed violence and armed conflict, disarmament policies and programmes can facilitate a decrease in military expenditure, defuse tensions and encourage trust in inter-State and intra-State relations, help to impede the development of and spending on new weapons and diminish the risk, incidence and severity of armed conflict and armed violence, thus improving stability and freeing resources for other activities, such as economic and social development. At the same time, by promoting economic and social progress and by generating opportunities for people, development policies and programmes can contribute to eradicating poverty, promoting economic growth and stabilizing economies and States, thereby creating conditions of increased security and well-

being. Security and stability serve as the foundation for disarmament and development.

III. The changed international context

5. The 1987 International Conference was held against the backdrop of a bipolar world. The cold war had divided the world's nations into strategic alliances and blocs, and the nuclear threat was widely perceived to be the most urgent disarmament challenge. The super-Powers were engaged in an arms race that was both a contributing factor to and a consequence of their confrontation and that sowed insecurity and stimulated massive defence spending. The year of the International Conference saw global military expenditure reach its peak of nearly \$1.1 trillion,⁶ representing 5.4 per cent of the world's gross national product (GNP), at a time when many countries faced chronic economic and social underdevelopment, stagnation and poverty.

6. For many, the cessation of the cold war signified the end of the nuclear threat and international confrontation. At the same time, progress in disarmament and strengthened regional security arrangements resulted in the reassuring illusion that the work of disarmament was taking care of itself and that development opportunities for all would inevitably follow. This reduced the political will or sense of urgency with regard to the implementation of the recommendations contained in the 1987 action programme.

7. Some of the disarmament issues that dominated the cold-war period persist today. Global military expenditure, which had decreased during most of the 1990s, is currently increasing by more than 5 per cent annually. Little evident progress is being made towards nuclear disarmament, and there is widespread concern about the integrity and effectiveness of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Apprehension is growing about the spread of sensitive technologies and materials to both Governments and non-State actors.⁷ Destabilizing new weapons technologies, changing military doctrines and the possibility of an arms race in outer space have compounded these concerns.

8. However, the international context has also changed significantly since 1987. There is unprecedented international concern about the threat of terrorism, as reflected most notably in Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1377 (2001) and 1540 (2004). Terrorism often targets civilians and non-military facilities, creating a climate of insecurity, damaging trade and investment, destabilizing society and inflicting psychological harm. Expenditure on combating terrorism has increased significantly in many countries, particularly since the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America. Much of this spending is not reflected in estimates of global military expenditure.

9. Although the cold-war arms race came to an end soon after the 1987 International Conference, regional arms races gathered momentum — for the most part in regions that could scarcely afford them — and fuelled intra-State as well as inter-State conflict and violence. Some of these conflicts were related to the cold-war period, to the decolonization process or to the geopolitical marginalization of States and regions hitherto perceived as having key strategic value to the former super-Powers.

10. Over the past decade, the international community has brought the issues of anti-personnel mines and the destabilizing accumulation and illicit spread of small arms and light weapons to the forefront of the international agenda. Long-standing concern about the developmental and humanitarian crises caused by the use of anti-personnel mines resulted in the negotiation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. While much work remains to be done, since the Convention's entry into force in 1999 at least 36 countries that had been producers of anti-personnel mines have abandoned their production, more than 32 million stockpiled mines have been destroyed and humanitarian mine-action activities have significantly increased around the world.⁸

11. In the case of small arms and light weapons, the end of the cold war led to a decline in control over these weapons in many parts of the world, while an upsurge in the frequency and intensity of intra-State conflicts created a staggering demand for them. One of the important responses of the international community to address this serious problem was the negotiation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects⁹ in 2001. In 2003, at the first Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action, 103 States reported on their progress. Relevant parts of the Organization have undertaken efforts to further increase reporting at the 2005 meeting.

12. Despite these recent successes with cooperative approaches to disarmament and development issues, some countries have moved away from seeking multilateral solutions to questions of disarmament and security, as evident in the failure to negotiate a verification protocol concerning biological weapons and toxins and the lack of entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

13. Although it was a decade of relative prosperity, the 1990s witnessed a widening global poverty gap, with enormous wealth concentrated in the hands of a few. Worldwide, the number of people living on less than \$1 a day barely changed in the 1990s, and in some countries the situation worsened.¹⁰ Globalization has presented both opportunities and challenges for development; however, its costs and benefits have been unevenly distributed.¹¹ The legacy of the cold war also had a damaging impact on the social and economic development of some States, in particular those highly indebted countries where a significant portion of national debt was incurred fighting the proxy wars of the bipolar conflict.

14. Underdevelopment and poverty continue to haunt a large number of nations. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report 2003*, over 50 countries are poorer today than they were in 1990, human development indicators such as hunger, child mortality and primary school enrolment have worsened in some countries, and extreme poverty affects one fifth of humankind. In many countries, economic and social development has been thwarted by violent internal and regional conflicts, massive flows of refugees and internally displaced persons, problems of governance, illegal exploitation of conflict goods and natural resources, illicit trafficking of narcotics and weapons, and diseases such as HIV/AIDS.

15. Nearly all donor countries fall far short of the assistance goal of 0.7 per cent of GNP set in 1970. Official development assistance (ODA), as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) of donor countries, declined from 0.33 per cent to 0.22 per

cent during the period 1991-2001. The decline occurred mainly in the second half of the 1990s, and in 2002 it registered an increase of 7 per cent in real terms, representing 0.23 per cent of the GNI of donor countries.¹² According to the UNDP *Human Development Report 2003*, despite the recent improvement in the trend, such resources continue to be much less than what is needed. The *Human Development Report 2003* also noted that of the 49 least developed countries, 31 received less aid (8.5 per cent of their average gross domestic product) in 2002 than they did in 1990 (12.9 per cent). This trend is even more acute for the middle-income developing States. Yet, as estimated by UNDP, all the Millennium Development Goals could be met by the target date of 2015 if ODA were increased by \$50 billion per year and sustained at that level.

16. The international community has pledged both political will and financial support to meet these urgent development challenges. At the Millennium Summit, United Nations Member States unanimously committed themselves to making the right to development a reality¹³ through the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. The need for funding to meet these objectives was addressed at the International Conference on Financing for Development (Monterrey, 2002) and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002). In addition, the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (Doha, 2001) incorporated development perspectives into its negotiations.

IV. The relationship between disarmament and development since 1987: findings

A. Defining the disarmament-development relationship

17. Disarmament and development are two distinct, yet mutually reinforcing, processes that are linked by security in all its aspects. Their interrelationship is sophisticated and complex, and by no means automatic. The Group reaffirms the view expressed in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the 1987 Final Document that although disarmament and development have their own logics and exist independently of each other, progress in one can create a conducive environment for the other. Both should be pursued regardless of the pace of progress in the other; one should not be made hostage to the other.

18. Excessive armament and military spending can have negative impact on development and divert financial, technological and human resources from development objectives. Armaments in themselves may not be the root cause of violence and conflict. However, their spread and availability can threaten physical safety, endanger stability and welfare and diminish social and economic confidence, thus discouraging investment and economic development and contributing to a cycle of poverty, underdevelopment and distress. On the other hand, although often seen as a political and moral imperative, disarmament does not necessarily lead to development. There is no doubt that disarmament can help to create more stable international, national and local situations favourable to development. However, one can also conceive of circumstances in which disarmament could further reduce a weak State's ability to defend itself and its people against internal or external

aggression, or in which the high financial costs of disarmament appear to negatively affect short-term prospects for development.

19. The relationship between disarmament and development is manifested in different ways in different situations, dependent on the security and development priorities and conditions in each specific country or region. Every case must be examined on its own merits, especially with regard to the long-held expectation that expenditure withdrawn from military and defence budgets would or should be automatically transferred to finance development programmes. However, where appropriate, highlighting and strengthening the positive contributions that disarmament and development make to each other can support progress towards a more peaceful and secure world for all its inhabitants.

B. The role of security

20. The Group believes that security in all its aspects continues to play a crucial role in both disarmament and development. As noted in paragraph 14 of the 1987 Final Document, security comprises not only military but also political, economic, social, humanitarian, human rights and ecological aspects. Security can therefore be enhanced through economic, social and institutional development, in addition to military means, based upon a comparative assessment of development needs and the diversity of threats — whether they are internal or external, military or non-military — faced by a country and its population.

21. Non-military threats to peace and security, which retard development and create social strain, tension and strife, include economic instability, health crises, environmental degradation and resource scarcity, and gross violations of fundamental human rights. The poor are generally more vulnerable to threats of every type. Non-military threats are among the root causes of armed conflict¹⁴ and are sometimes addressed through military means. The Secretary-General recently underscored the common interest of developed and developing nations in addressing these threats, as “a world of glaring inequality — between countries and within them — where many millions of people endure brutal oppression and extreme misery, is never going to be a fully safe world, even for its most privileged inhabitants.”¹⁵

22. Security is fundamental for both disarmament and development at the individual, national, regional and international levels. It was described in paragraph 13 of the 1987 Final Document as the third pillar of the disarmament-development relationship. It is difficult to envisage a State willing to commit itself to disarmament if it does not feel secure, just as it is difficult to imagine equitable and sustainable development occurring in an insecure environment.

23. The 1987 Final Document recognized the essential contribution of security to the disarmament-development relationship, stating in paragraph 14: “Enhanced security can, on the one hand, create conditions conducive to disarmament and, on the other, provide the environment and confidence for the successful pursuit of development.” By serving as a foundation for both disarmament and development, security plays the role of an intermediary, supporting both fields in such a way that progress in any one of them creates conditions for improvement in the other two.

24. Conversely, a deteriorating security situation can have detrimental consequences for both disarmament and development. Insecurity can lead to

increased military spending and armament. An insecure environment can also result in shrinking development opportunities as investors and donors abandon unstable areas and local economic activities are curtailed, resulting in additional insecurity as people are unable to meet their basic needs and as their future prospects become progressively limited.

25. There are circumstances, notably in post-conflict societies, in which disarmament is both a requirement for development and a supporting factor for it. Disarmament promotes safety and an environment of security, essential for the return to normalcy after conflict and for creating confidence in the peace process, thereby laying the groundwork for development and permitting the resumption of economic activities. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes serve to break the cycle of violence and foster the conditions for sustainable development and stability. In a fragile post-conflict situation, the widespread availability and use of small arms and light weapons can contribute to violence, crime and banditry, thus eroding the likelihood of lasting peace and stability. Landmines, explosive remnants of war and other munitions can also retard the prospects for economic development and investment by adding to the cost of building infrastructure, such as roads or power lines, as well as rendering vast tracts of land inaccessible. In these situations, disarmament activities such as demining and the collection and destruction of weapons eliminate not only the physical threat posed by these weapons, but also the fear and insecurity they engender.

C. The costs and consequences of military expenditure

26. With the end of the cold war, global military expenditure started to decrease. Many expected that this would result in a peace dividend¹⁶ as declining military spending and a less confrontational international environment would release financial, technological and human resources for development purposes. The 1987 Final Document, in paragraph 33, had theorized that the peace dividend could be obtained in a variety of forms, including trade expansion, efficient resource use, reduction of debt and technology transfer. This appears to have occurred in some countries, as the released resources fostered development through mechanisms such as research, investment, lower interest rates and economic growth.¹⁷ However, in practice the peace dividend was not systematically and directly applied to development assistance for the world's poorest nations, nor did each country realize the peace dividend in the same way.

27. After decreasing for several consecutive years, this trend changed and global military expenditure started to rise again in the late 1990s (see annex). It should be noted, however, that global figures conceal significant variations in trends and figures between countries and between and within regions; in many cases, military expenditure has risen, while in some countries and regions it has remained constant or decreased. Although the available data on world military expenditure continue to lack comprehensiveness, it is still possible to reach general conclusions about the scale and rate of increase of such expenditure. On the basis of available data,¹⁸ the Group estimates that world military expenditure in 2003 was nearly \$900 billion, representing 2.6 per cent of the global GNP, and it is expected to rise to nearly \$950 billion in 2004. The estimates would be substantially higher if the costs of the major armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were included.

28. Not only does military spending divert resources from other priorities, because of what was referred to in the 1987 Final Document as the competitive relationship between armaments and development, but excessive military expenditure can also affect a State's economy, including investment, as spending on armaments is often economically non-productive and inefficient and occurs in non-competitive conditions.

29. At a time when global poverty eradication and development goals are not being met due, inter alia, to a shortfall of necessary funds, rising global military expenditure is a disturbing trend. As in 1987, when, as stated in paragraph 3 of the Final Document, global military expenditure stood in dramatic contrast to economic and social underdevelopment, misery and poverty, there remains a commonality of interests in seeking security at lower levels of armaments and finding ways of reducing military expenditure.

30. There are other significant costs attributable to the research, development, production, deployment, purchase, maintenance and use of weapons systems and associated military programmes that are often overlooked when the level of military spending is examined in isolation. Considering merely the financial aspects of military expenditure underestimates the true costs of military expenditure and armaments. Some of these costs are described below.

31. The technological and human resources utilized for the research, development and maintenance of high-tech weaponry and new programmes (such as "mini-nukes" or space weaponization) impose a heavy opportunity cost on society, as scientists and researchers might otherwise be engaged in non-military pursuits.

32. The costs to human health associated with the use of armaments are high. The expense of treatment, rehabilitation and long-term care for those injured places a heavy burden on health systems, if such systems exist at all. Health costs incurred by research on, use of and clean-up relating to weapons of mass destruction are also considerable — and in the worst cases some of the ill effects might be transmitted to subsequent generations. The financial costs of treating injuries from some conventional weapons, such as landmines, are onerous.

33. The development, use and destruction of weapons have substantial costs for the environment. Contamination from nuclear waste or accidents, chemical and biological agents, landmines and explosive remnants of war can devastate the environment and pose significant social, financial, logistical and scientific challenges.

34. The cost of the destruction and conversion of weapons, and the verification systems put in place through arms control and disarmament agreements are often calculated as the cost of disarmament, rather than as a cost and consequence of armament itself. Disarmament can be extremely expensive, and the costs of conversion, the dismantlement or destruction of weapons, base closures, and demobilization and reintegration of forces can have an impact on a State's economic development in the short term. Some States require significant amounts of financial and technical assistance to meet their disarmament commitments. Viewed in isolation, the cost of arms control and disarmament is sometimes used to justify maintaining levels of armaments or military expenditure. These costs must be considered as part of a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account valuable benefits

such as peace, economic development and security, which are nearly impossible to quantify in monetary terms.¹⁹

35. All of these costs are present in the case of weapons of mass destruction, which pose a very real threat to peace and security in developed and developing nations alike. Developing or maintaining chemical, biological or nuclear weapons has extraordinary financial, human, environmental, opportunity and disarmament costs — and the costs and repercussions of their accidental or intentional use are immeasurable. Continued spending on the development of new nuclear weapons and the maintenance of existing arsenals is particularly disquieting in view of international commitments to nuclear disarmament.

36. But the highest costs occur when armed conflict or armed violence actually erupts. In the short term, these costs include death, injury and trauma, as well as the cost of caring for the wounded; escalating military expenditure; and destruction of civilian infrastructure. Armed conflict also has other human costs, in the form of famine, migration or displacement, malnutrition and disease. The long-term cost of armed conflict and armed violence is a legacy of prolonged underdevelopment, affecting both the present and future generations. The international community also bears a considerable burden if it is called on to intervene in a conflict or if it offers humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, the negative consequences of armed conflict or armed violence can cross borders, generating regional instability, refugee flows, the disruption of trade and communication, reductions in investment and environmental degradation.

37. The financing of armed conflicts can have a direct negative impact on sustainable development. In some countries, in addition to borrowing or reallocating resources for military expenditure, Governments overexploit or mortgage their country's natural resources in order to fund responses to internal or external conflict. In a similar manner, non-state actors often plunder these same resources or engage in illegal and destabilizing activities, such as trafficking narcotics, weapons or precious minerals.

D. Releasing resources for development

38. In view of the objective of maintaining security at lower levels of armaments consistent with legitimate security interests, as well as the need for additional resources to meet development goals, there are a number of ways in which disarmament can release or increase the financial, human or physical resources available for development. Notably, these include the following: reducing military expenditure; conversion; strengthening security by building confidence; creating conditions for economic, scientific and technological cooperation; and preventing conflict and building peace. These five elements are reflected in the 1987 Final Document, but incorporate new realities and understanding of the complex relationship between disarmament and development.

Reducing military expenditure

39. Despite decades of discussions and proposals on how to release resources from military expenditure for development purposes, the international community has not been able to agree on limiting military expenditure or establishing a ratio of military spending to national development expenditure.

40. Military expenditure is a reflection of political and policy choices, influenced by numerous factors, such as threat perceptions, the dynamics of the arms industry, international commitments, regional arrangements and strategic alliances. It is important that military expenditure be weighed against competing priorities in a transparent and open political decision-making process.

41. The acquisition of arms is rooted in a State's concern for its security and independence, which are protected under the Charter of the United Nations. A State is unlikely to willingly reduce or eliminate weapons without its security being ensured by other means. In this regard, weapons reduction or collection, confidence-building, adherence to international law, cooperation in multilateral and regional forums, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and good governance are examples of possible ways to promote peace and security at lower levels of military expenditure. A higher level of security at lower levels of armament can create an environment conducive to economic and sustainable development, paving the way for trade and technological cooperation and freeing resources for more productive activities and for combating non-military threats to peace and security.

42. A State will reduce its arms expenditure only if it feels secure and/or it can better utilize its already existing defence and security infrastructure. A national review of security requirements and military expenditure is often a prerequisite for reductions in military spending, and helps to achieve accountable, affordable, appropriate and transparent security sectors.

43. Lack of transparency is one of the main obstacles to understanding the magnitude and consequences of military expenditure and levels of armament. Reliable data on military expenditure, on arms production, imports and exports and on the means to verify them are scarce. The diversion of resources through such means as corruption, off-budget expenditure and mismanagement can also disguise the true level of military expenditure.

44. Although an internationally agreed method for calculating and reporting military spending exists in the form of the United Nations System for the Standardized Reporting of Military Expenditures,²⁰ which has been in operation since 1981, participation in this voluntary instrument remains far from universal, and the data provided are not comprehensive in a number of cases. Thus, despite the encouraging progress achieved recently towards greater participation, this transparency instrument currently remains limited in terms of its global reach. However, greater progress has been achieved in the transparency of international arms transfers through the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms,²¹ which has been in operation since 1992. In recent years, a majority of Member States have been reporting regularly on their exports and imports of major conventional arms, though the objective of universal participation has not been achieved as yet. So far, 164 Member States have reported to the Register at least once since 1992.

45. It should be noted that an increase in military spending does not necessarily mean a rise in the volume of armaments, as more technologically complex and therefore more expensive weapons make up a growing share of military expenditure. Nor is it as simple as stating that rising expenditure is by definition a negative trend, particularly in the short term. For example, a rise in military expenditure might include funds for the disposal of outdated military material, weapon destruction programmes, better training or improved conditions for military personnel, or demining activities. It could also include the cost of new equipment or personnel to

respond to natural disasters, to deliver humanitarian assistance or to participate in peacekeeping operations. In some countries the military contributes to civil infrastructure projects, such as road-building and bridge construction. Spending on military research and development has also resulted in the development of technologies that have peaceful applications.

46. Lastly, reducing military expenditure in itself does not necessarily mean that additional resources will be available for development. There must be a decision at the national level to reallocate released resources to development, for either national socio-economic spending or ODA. Furthermore, a State might choose to reduce its military expenditure in order to utilize the resulting savings for other purposes, such as debt reduction.

Conversion

47. The 1987 Final Document stated, in paragraph 34, that “conversion from military to civilian production need not present insurmountable problems” and recommended in paragraph 35 (c) (vi) that issues related to conversion be kept under review and further researched. Since then, the international community has gained experience with the process and the potential for conversion in a variety of contexts and with mixed results. The view expressed in 1987 was perhaps overly optimistic; most notably, the costs of conversion were underestimated. Conversion has several dimensions and is a complex process with sizeable short- to medium-term financial, social and environmental costs, which are a significant drawback for it as a method to release financial resources for development. However, conversion should be encouraged as a long-term strategy that contributes to both disarmament and development.

48. There are a number of conditions that determine the ease of and prospects for successful reorientation of the military industry towards civilian production. There is a general understanding that industrial conversion is a complex and costly process, and one that is not always economically viable. In some cases, it is more efficient to shut down military industry facilities than to convert them for civilian purposes, as they are simply too costly to transform or else they produce items for which there is little or no demand in the civilian economy. Conversion of the military industry appears to be less difficult in cases in which the equipment, processes, specifications and materials are similar to those utilized in the non-military sector. Experience has shown that strong coordination and commitment at the national level, as well as the availability of resources, increase the possibility of successful conversion processes.

49. The conversion of military industries necessitates the reorientation and/or retraining of researchers, scientists and engineers for relevant work in the civilian sector. This has proved to be one of the largest conversion challenges arising since the end of the cold war. The need is particularly acute in regard to personnel with specialized knowledge of weapons of mass destruction, especially in the light of heightened fears of terrorism using such weapons. Creative bilateral and multilateral approaches to assisting and supporting researchers, scientists and engineers have been developed, and it has been considerably easier to do so in fields where the military and civilian sectors have strong similarities.

50. Since 1987, the demobilization and resettlement of armed forces have occurred in a large number of countries. Some countries have chosen these measures as a

consequence of the modernization of the military's structure, changes in threat perception, new and more sophisticated weaponry, technological advances and new doctrines, among other reasons. Demobilization as a result of downsizing, which involves the resettlement of military personnel into civilian occupations, is expensive initially but should lead to reduced expenditure in the longer term.

51. Military base closures and options for redevelopment are likely important consequences of the downsizing process. Physical assets, including land, buildings and equipment, can sometimes be sold or transferred, or the physical infrastructure can be reallocated to a non-military use. There are several examples of former military bases being successfully "recycled" into productive civilian or private use. However, the conversion of military bases is not always possible or desirable, due to location, financial constraints or environmental contamination. Base closures often necessitate local or regional support for the absorption of former soldiers and support personnel and for the provision of benefits, such as medical services, housing and schooling, that were previously provided by the military.

52. Conversion is rarely a solution for surplus weapons. In only a few cases, such as that of delivery systems, are there components that potentially have peaceful uses, making it possible for conversion to be successfully pursued. Otherwise, weapons determined to be surplus to a State's needs can be exported, stockpiled or destroyed. While the short-term economic benefit of exporting surplus weapons might appear enticing, little has changed since the 1987 Final Document stated, in paragraph 23, that "The adverse development implications of such transfers outweigh immediate trade benefits to the suppliers and security gains to the recipients."

53. The end of the cold war and reductions in military forces and requirements in several countries resulted in weapon surpluses that in some cases helped to fuel the conflicts of the 1990s. A decision to keep surplus weapons requires careful management and protection of stockpiles. Some weapons or their components, in particular munitions, deteriorate or become unstable with time, making stockpiling dangerous as a long-term solution. Destruction is the only way to guarantee that surplus weapons do not return to circulation or use, and the destruction of all stocks is a requirement of agreements such as the Chemical Weapons Convention. Destruction can be a costly process, as it must take into account legal, safety and political factors as well as environmental concerns.

Strengthening security by building confidence

54. The 1987 Final Document, in paragraph 35 (c) (v) (d), encouraged States to give further consideration to the importance of greater openness, transparency and confidence with a view to facilitating progress in both disarmament and development.

55. Confidence-building processes are an important element for strengthening security. They can take place bilaterally between States as well as through global or regional forums. These measures are voluntary and specific to the needs of the participating States. Respect for adherence to international treaty obligations constitutes an important element of confidence-building processes. Voluntary reporting, as well as reporting obligations linked to international treaties and their verification mechanisms, also contribute to transparency and confidence-building, thus promoting security and stability.

56. Bilateral and regional confidence-building measures have the potential to reduce inter-State tensions, thus facilitating the development of mutual security arrangements at lower levels of armaments and at reduced levels of military expenditure. Regional organizations play an increasingly important role in building confidence among neighbours. The varied experiences of regional organizations and arrangements have demonstrated that regional approaches to development, disarmament and security often result in successful strategies for ensuring and maintaining peace and dealing with complex cross-border issues. A number of regional organizations and institutional processes work to address peace, security and disarmament issues within the broader context of sustainable development.

Creating conditions for economic, scientific and technological cooperation

57. Technical cooperation and assistance can help to establish favourable conditions for collaboration at the regional and international levels. Such activities can promote transparency, accountability and confidence while accomplishing practical objectives and contributing to the development of human resources. They can be provided in a variety of forms, including training, expert missions, scientific visits, evaluation and supply of equipment, with the objective of developing the necessary skills and materials to build and further improve national capacities.

58. Lack of national capacity and appropriate technology can hamper the implementation of disarmament commitments. Therefore, technical cooperation and assistance are particularly relevant in the context of commitments undertaken by States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Additional areas of cooperation in the field of disarmament have included assistance in developing national legislation, sharing best practices, agreeing on common minimum standards and establishing codes of conduct. The Group emphasizes the importance and potential of South-South and triangular cooperation, as recommended in paragraph 43 of the Monterrey Consensus²² and exemplified by mine-action activities in a number of countries and regions.

Preventing conflict and building peace

59. The Secretary-General has cautioned that “Nothing is more inimical to pro-growth, anti-poverty objectives than armed conflict.”²³ Thus, an obvious way to minimize the development-related costs and consequences of armed conflict and military expenditure is to invest in conflict prevention. By preventing conflict, not only are fewer resources utilized for armaments, but economic and social development can advance as stability and confidence are maintained. In this regard, the Group notes the importance of the report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict.²⁴ The 1987 Final Document also highlighted, in paragraph 35 (c) (i), that bilateral, regional and global initiatives for the peaceful resolution of conflict are “appropriate measures” to implement disarmament and development commitments.

60. Curbing the availability of illicit armaments, especially small arms and light weapons, contributes to conflict prevention. In this regard, the Group underlines the importance of the 2001 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. More attention

has recently been paid to the possible consequences of the trade in armaments, having in mind their possible diversion to non-authorized recipients, including non-State actors.

61. Disarmament has a key role in the peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction process. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is designed to support a country's overall strategy for recovery by reinserting former combatants into society in a productive capacity. Other disarmament activities that contribute to peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction include mine action and the collection, destruction or appropriate disposal of surplus or illicit weapons. Additionally, activities to improve the effectiveness, affordability and accountability of security institutions, such as the police and the armed forces, address the security needs of both the State and its citizens at lower levels of armament and expenditure.

E. Education, awareness and research

62. The Final Document of the 1987 International Conference, in paragraph 35 (c) (viii), recognized that an informed public has an invaluable role in promoting the objectives of disarmament and development, and noted the crucial importance of education and awareness to that end. This was echoed in 2002 by the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on disarmament and non-proliferation education.²⁵ Much more could be done to raise awareness of the relationship between disarmament and development.

63. The 1987 Final Document called for further research and studies in several areas, notably in regard to conversion and identifying the benefits to be derived from the reallocation of military resources. Since 1987, the United Nations and its specialized bodies such as the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), as well as international and regional organizations, universities and institutes, have undertaken research and activities on a variety of the topics addressed in the Final Document, including conversion, the effect of conflict on development, the true costs of armament, methods to promote transparency and build confidence and ways to address non-military threats to peace and security.

64. Through education, research and practical experience, the international community has a much more comprehensive understanding of many aspects of the disarmament-development relationship, such as the developmental consequences of conventional weapons (including small arms, landmines and explosive remnants of war); stakeholder involvement in both development and disarmament projects and the effectiveness of aid in this context, and people-centred development, micro-disarmament and security. Much of this work was not undertaken in the specific context of the relationship between disarmament and development, but rather was the fruit of new partnerships and increasing cooperation, as well as a greater understanding of the root causes of conflict and of the roles that disarmament and development can play in conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

F. Multilateralism

65. The Group underlines the 1987 Final Document's affirmation, in paragraphs 19 and 35 (b), that collective approaches and multilateralism provide the international framework for the relationship between disarmament, development and security. In 2000, States Members of the United Nations unanimously endorsed the Millennium

Declaration, stating their shared responsibility for managing economic and social development as well as threats to peace and security.²⁶ The international rededication to finding multilateral solutions to security and development challenges, as illustrated by the Millennium Development Goals, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration and the 2001 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, among others, demonstrates that there is political commitment at the highest levels to work collectively to achieve a more peaceful, safe and just world.

G. The role of the United Nations and other organizations

66. The 1987 Final Document, in paragraph 35 (c) (ix), emphasized the need to strengthen the central role of the United Nations and its appropriate organs in the fields of disarmament and development. It tasked the United Nations with promoting the interrelated perspective of these issues within the Organization's overall objective of promoting peace and security. Specific recommendations included giving increased emphasis to the disarmament-development perspective in public information, promoting collective knowledge of non-military threats, monitoring trends in military spending and facilitating an international exchange of views and experience in the field of conversion.

67. The 1987 Final Document, in paragraph 35 (c) (ix) (d), recommended that the ongoing work of the United Nations for a systematic examination of various problems of defining, reporting and comparing military budget data be intensified. Action on this recommendation was carried out in the framework of General Assembly resolutions on objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures, in accordance with the standardized instrument for reporting established in 1980. In order to promote wider participation by Member States, the Secretary-General held occasional consultations with other international agencies and regional bodies that also receive reports on military expenditure by national Governments. In addition, since 2000, the Department for Disarmament Affairs has been engaged in intensive efforts, including the holding of regional and subregional workshops, to encourage wider participation in the reporting instrument. Since then, the participation level has increased by more than 100 per cent, though still falling far short of universality. The Group expresses its appreciation for the sustained efforts made by the Department for Disarmament Affairs and the support provided by interested States to organize seminars and workshops to enhance familiarity with these mechanisms with a view to promoting greater participation.

68. Since the 1987 International Conference, the Organization has strengthened existing mechanisms and established new ones to address various aspects of the disarmament-development relationship. The Secretary-General created an interdepartmental task force to foster and coordinate the incorporation of a disarmament-development perspective in the activities of the United Nations system. In 1999, as part of the restructuring of the political and economic sectors of the Secretariat, the Secretary-General established the high-level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development,²⁷ composed of the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, the Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, the Administrator of UNDP and the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. The Department for Disarmament Affairs was designated to provide

coordination and substantive servicing to the Steering Group. The Steering Group identified several potential programmes and activities and undertook outreach initiatives such as organizing symposiums. However, the financial constraints of the Organization have restricted the Steering Group's scope and activities.²⁸

69. The Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism, established in 1998, assists the relevant United Nations departments and agencies in working together to implement a wide range of disarmament and development activities related to small arms and light weapons.

70. UNDP has taken a specific role within the Organization in supporting a range of regional and national activities that tackle issues relating to small arms and light weapons from a development perspective — for example, programmes that offer either communities or individuals development incentives in exchange for weapons. Likewise, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes of UNDP are embedded in longer-term development programming.

71. With regard to weapons of mass destruction, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization are key actors in promoting the relationship between disarmament and development, notably through technical assistance and cooperation.

72. Additional support for the disarmament-development relationship has come from the United Nations economic commissions, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Mine Action Service, the United Nations Children's Fund and UNIDIR. The International Labour Organization has undertaken work on demobilization and reintegration, and the World Health Organization has organized capacity-building activities at the national and regional levels to respond to deliberate use of chemical and biological agents.

73. There is a real need for increased cooperation between the disarmament community and the development community, including among donors and the international financial institutions. These communities are becoming more aware of how disarmament relates to and supports development objectives. However, only some of the actors address disarmament issues in their programming or funding activities, due to concerns, for example, about impartiality, mandate, human and financial capacities and the limitations of resources and experience with security matters, and concern that disarmament and security will be seen as priorities competing with traditional development issues.

74. The 1987 Final Document, in paragraph 35 (c) (vii) (d), urged regional organizations and institutions to carry out analyses with a view to encouraging regional disarmament and development measures. Since then, the work of regional organizations has assumed much greater importance and influence. Their contribution goes far beyond analysis to developing and implementing successful region-specific disarmament and development solutions.

75. Recognition of the interwoven nature of the disarmament-development relationship is evident in the New Partnership for Africa's Development. While a relatively new process, the New Partnership is committed to pursuing a comprehensive cooperative and cross-disciplinary approach to meet Africa's peace and security agenda through the promotion of sustainable development and security.

This promises to bring a new perspective and integration to what have customarily been treated as separate challenges by affected countries, the international community, donors and recipients.

76. Civil society groups and non-governmental organizations are valuable partners in both disarmament and development. They have made important contributions to facilitating policy debates, raising awareness, engaging and mobilizing the public, disseminating public information and implementing projects. Additionally, these groups have been very successful at reaching new audiences in creative ways, such as through the use of the Internet.

V. Recommendations

77. **The Group recognizes the importance of multilateral approaches to questions of disarmament and development as well as the central role of the United Nations in the disarmament-development relationship. In order to fulfil this role, the necessary political will, adequate resources, and continued and effective coordination and close cooperation between the relevant United Nations departments, agencies and sub-agencies are of the essence.**

78. **In this regard, the Group recommends that the Secretary-General consider further strengthening the high-level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development in order to encourage relevant departments and agencies, including at the operational level, to share best practices, seek shared understanding and increase cooperation, coordination and joint programming.**

Meeting disarmament and development commitments

79. **The Group calls for the universalization and implementation of, as well as compliance with, internationally negotiated multilateral arms control agreements with the objectives of increasing security, freeing resources currently dedicated to military expenditure for other activities, and building confidence.**

80. **The Group also calls for adherence to and the implementation of internationally agreed development commitments. In this regard, the Group urges each Member State to assess its progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and undertake the action necessary to meet them by 2015.**

Assessing security needs of Member States

81. **Member States should implement with transparency their 1987 commitments to assess their political and security requirements and levels of military spending, taking into account the need to keep their expenditure at the lowest possible level, as well as to carry out regular analyses of the economic and social consequences of their military spending and to inform their public and the United Nations about them. In addition to their participation in the United Nations System for the Standardized Reporting of Military Expenditures and the Register of Conventional Arms, Member States should periodically publish defence white papers and defence policy reviews.**

82. **Upon request, the relevant departments and agencies of the United Nations should continue to develop capacity-building programmes to assist**

States in undertaking the assessment of their security needs and to promote more complete and regular national reporting on military spending or other relevant areas. In this regard, other relevant international institutions and bilateral donors should also support capacity-building.

83. Taking into account the climate of insecurity that terrorism creates and its devastating effects on disarmament and sustainable development, the Group calls for increased multilateral cooperation and international assistance to combat terrorism and address its root causes. In this regard, the use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is a particularly worrying possibility. While Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), on weapons of mass destruction and non-State actors, is an important effort to address this threat, the Group encourages the international community to continue to tackle this issue in other multilateral forums.

Mainstreaming the disarmament and development relationship

84. United Nations organizations and other international organizations should make greater efforts to integrate disarmament, humanitarian and development activities. In this connection, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework²⁹ should, for example, incorporate disarmament and security measures where appropriate.

85. Developing countries are encouraged to take into account disarmament and security concerns when preparing their poverty reduction strategy papers with the donor community. UNDP could assist with this at the country level.

86. When reviewing its progress towards the Millennium Development Goals in 2005, the international community should consider making reference to the contribution that disarmament could make in meeting them, as well as the importance of the disarmament-development relationship itself.

87. The donor community is invited to examine the feasibility of new concepts for providing specific assistance in relation to weapon destruction, conversion, and mine action and unexploded ordnance activities, including the idea of debt-for-disarmament swaps, with a view to increasing development opportunities.

88. Regional organizations and institutions could undertake greater coordination of activities relating to disarmament and development, which could have the dual benefits of raising confidence within regions and improving the effectiveness of these activities in this field. Greater support and assistance would facilitate these activities.

89. Non-governmental organizations are encouraged to continue to be engaged on the disarmament-development relationship. The Group also encourages support for non-governmental organizations working in this field.

Increasing awareness of the relationship between disarmament and development

90. The Group encourages the international financial and development institutions to build upon the work of disarmament to further the objective of sustainable development, peace and security. Similarly, conflict prevention, peace-building, security-building and disarmament activities should take into account development perspectives.

91. The Group concludes that more needs to be done to engage bilateral and multilateral donors to work closely with countries on the interrelationship between development, disarmament, security sector reform and military expenditure, without adding conditionalities to development assistance.

92. The United Nations should place increased emphasis on promoting public awareness of the relationship between disarmament and development through its outreach activities, while also taking into consideration the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education. The international focus on the Millennium Development Goals offers a clear opportunity to promote understanding of the disarmament-development relationship.

Facilitating research and dialogue on issues relating to the relationship between disarmament, development and security

93. The United Nations, its agencies and specialized research institutes should facilitate dialogue and continuing research on issues such as:

- (a) The potential contribution of disarmament to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals;
- (b) The impact of armaments on the natural environment and thus on development;
- (c) Ways to facilitate and promote conversion;
- (d) Methodologies for calculating the costs of armaments, incorporating not only development, procurement, training and maintenance costs but also the costs of destruction and disposal as part of the life cycle of weapons, as well as modalities for meeting the costs of destruction and disposal;
- (e) International responses to halt the illicit funding of conflicts;
- (f) Lessons learned from regional security arrangements;
- (g) Developing common understandings of evolving concepts such as human security;
- (h) Security sector reform.

94. As specialized research bodies of the Organization, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and the United Nations University could play a valuable role in this regard. The Group also encourages relevant research institutes, regional and subregional organizations and research-oriented non-governmental organizations to undertake objective studies. The Group calls upon foundations and other donors to consider providing support for such studies.

Promoting security through openness, transparency and confidence

95. The Group affirms the importance of continued progress towards achieving universal participation in the United Nations System for the Standardized Reporting of Military Expenditures and recognizes the value of providing it with more comprehensive data.

96. The Group also urges universal participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and supports efforts for the further enhancement of its relevance, thereby increasing its significance as a global confidence-building measure.

97. Member States should enhance and support arms control verification regimes through the relevant treaty bodies, as well as develop appropriate capacities at the national level, in order to strengthen mutual confidence.

Conversion and surplus weapon destruction

98. The Group supports the concept of conversion in its various forms and encourages relevant States to take the corresponding decisions and steps, as appropriate. It also encourages the international community to assist those States in that endeavour. Regarding the destruction of armaments, their components and munitions, similar assistance should be considered, where necessary. Member States should consider making their experiences with conversion available to other countries.

99. The donor community and United Nations specialized agencies (whenever appropriate) should support and contribute to initiatives and approaches for the reorientation of scientists, researchers and engineers with specialized knowledge of weapons of mass destruction. This issue should be considered as part of a country's larger socio-economic development programme.

100. The Group encourages the destruction or appropriate disposal of surplus weapons, their components and munition stocks. These activities should be completed in accordance with legal and environmental norms and should be verifiable.

Preventing conflict and promoting peace

101. The Group also expresses concern on the lack of progress in efforts by the international community to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, which continue to pose a very real threat to peace and security in the world.

102. Given the enormous scale of destruction often associated with armed conflicts and the political, social, economic and financial difficulties of post-conflict peace-building, the Group emphasizes the importance of conflict prevention and, in this context, calls for the strengthening of the rule of law within States as well as further reliance on international law in arbitration and adjudication, particularly through the International Court of Justice. Additionally, the Group calls attention to the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict.³⁰

103. The Group encourages further action by the international community and the United Nations to halt the illicit funding of conflicts through activities such as illegal fund-raising and traffic in illicit drugs. Mechanisms similar to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme on conflict diamonds could serve as an example for more action to halt the illicit funding of conflicts.

104. The United Nations should continue its efforts to create effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration policies and processes in post-conflict situations, taking into account the importance of local ownership,

public information, coordination, financial and logistical support, the needs of dependants and support workers in addition to those of former combatants, and the inclusion of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration provisions in peace agreements. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration should also be considered as part of a country's broader development programme. In particular, a review of the issues and processes, resulting in the updating of guidelines by the United Nations, would be timely.

105. The Group encourages Member States to follow the recommendations contained in the 2002 report of the Secretary-General on small arms³¹ to support efforts aimed at developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace illicit small arms and light weapons; to assist the United Nations Secretariat in establishing the small arms advisory service; and to establish the necessary legislative or other measures, including the possible use of authenticated end-user certificates, to ensure effective control over the export, import, brokering and transit of small arms and light weapons, as well as corresponding ammunition.

106. The Group recognizes the potential for arms transfers to have an adverse impact on conflict prevention and peace-building and to add to military expenditures, and recommends, in connection with small arms and light weapons, that this issue be considered further at the United Nations review conference in 2006 with a view to discussing arrangements for arms transfers.

107. The Group encourages Member States to lend their support to the Secretary-General in responding to requests from States wishing to collect and destroy small arms and light weapons in post-conflict situations. In this regard, the Group recognizes the importance of the work accomplished in this field by the Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures and calls for the strengthening of the Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measures.

108. Taking into consideration the often devastating consequences of the use of landmines for the development efforts of affected countries, the Group encourages all Member States to adhere to and/or fully implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, as well as the 1980 Inhumane Weapons Convention, in this context in particular its Protocol V, on explosive remnants of war.³² Non-State actors should comply with the spirit of these instruments.

Notes

- ¹ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.8.
- ² See General Assembly resolution 39/160.
- ³ It should be recalled that the United States of America refused to participate in the 1987 International Conference. In its explanation of vote against General Assembly resolution 57/65, the United States representative stated, “We continue to believe that disarmament and development are two distinct issues that do not lend themselves to being linked” and reiterated that the United States of America did not consider itself bound by the Final Document of the 1987 International Conference.
- ⁴ The Group also took into consideration other relevant documents, including but not limited to: the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament (1978), the United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000), the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development (2002), the Monterrey Consensus (2002), documents from the World Trade Organization’s recent Ministerial Conferences (Doha, 2001, and Cancún, 2003), the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (2001), the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries (1998) and the final document of the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (2000).
- ⁵ According to the Secretary-General, freeing the world’s peoples from fear and want are among the most pressing tasks before the Organization and the international community today. See A/54/2000.
- ⁶ \$1.061 trillion was estimated at current 1987 prices by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1988*, p. 27. The UNDP *Human Development Report 1994*, table 3.1, estimated \$995 billion for 1987 at 1991 prices and exchange rates.
- ⁷ For the purpose of this report, “non-State actor” is defined as an individual or entity not acting under the lawful authority of any State.
- ⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2003*, Executive Summary, pp. 3-5.
- ⁹ See A/CONF.192/15, chap. IV.
- ¹⁰ See UNDP *Human Development Report 2002*, table 1.2.
- ¹¹ See *Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August-4 September 2002* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.II.A.1 and corrigendum), chap. I, resolution 1, annex, para. 14.
- ¹² See http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_37413_31504022_1_1_1_37413,00.html.
- ¹³ See General Assembly resolution 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration, para. 11.
- ¹⁴ See A/58/323, para. 32.
- ¹⁵ Kofi Annan, “In a Unipolar World”, *International Herald Tribune*, 4 December 2003.
- ¹⁶ Referred to as the “disarmament dividend” in para. 33 of the 1987 Final Document.
- ¹⁷ See Lawrence Klein, “World peace and economic prosperity”, paper presented at the symposium on disarmament and development held at United Nations Headquarters on 9 March 2004.
- ¹⁸ Notably those compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, as well as those made available by Member States to the United Nations System for the Standardized Reporting of Military Expenditures.
- ¹⁹ For a methodological exploration of how to calculate these costs, see Susan Willett, *Costs of Disarmament — Rethinking the Price Tag* (Geneva, UNIDIR, 2002).

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- ²⁰ Established by General Assembly resolution 35/142 B. For details, see <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/milex.html>.
- ²¹ Established by General Assembly resolution 46/36 L. For details, see <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register.html>.
- ²² *Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, 18-22 March 2002* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.02.A.7), chap. I, resolution 1, annex.
- ²³ A/54/2000, para. 88.
- ²⁴ A/55/985 and Corr.1.
- ²⁵ See A/57/124.
- ²⁶ See General Assembly resolution 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration, para. 6.
- ²⁷ See A/54/254.
- ²⁸ See A/57/167, para. 4.
- ²⁹ In July 1997, the Secretary-General introduced a wide-ranging reform programme for the Organization, including the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which was established to strengthen the coherence and effectiveness of the United Nations system's contribution to a country's development efforts. UNDAF is a planning framework for the development operations of the United Nations system at the country level. It identifies the common objectives, common strategies of development assistance and a common time frame for follow-up activities shared by all resident United Nations agencies.
- ³⁰ A/55/985 and Corr.1.
- ³¹ S/2002/1053.
- ³² CCW/MSP/2003/2.

Annex

Military expenditure by region and by income group, 1993-2002

(Billions of United States dollars, at constant 2000 prices and exchange rates)

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
I. Geographical region										
Africa	7.4	7.7	7.2	6.9	7.1	7.6	8.4	8.8	8.9	9.6
North Africa	2.5	2.9	2.7	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.6		
Sub-Saharan Africa	5.0	4.8	4.5	4.1	4.1	4.4	5.1	5.82		
Americas	385	365	347	328	328	321	322	333	338	368
North America	365	344	324	306	304	298	299	310	313	344
Central America	2.8	3.4	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.3
South America	17.6	17.4	20.0	18.3	20.9	20.1	19.6	19.5	21.5	21.1
Asia and Oceania	120	121	123	128	128	127	129	134	140	147
Central Asia	..	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5		0.5			
East Asia	99.8	101	103	107	107	105	106	111	116	122
South Asia	12.0	12.0	12.6	12.8	13.4	13.5	14.6	15.2	16.2	17.3
Oceania	7.7	7.7	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.7	7.5	7.3	7.4	7.4
Europe	196	192	178	177	177	175	177	180	181	181
Central and Eastern Europe	25.6	25.9	20.1	18.8	19.6	16.9	17.8	18.9	20.1	21.4
Western Europe	171	166	158	158	157	158	159	161	161	160
Middle East	53.5	54.1	50.9	51.7	56.5	60.7	60	67.3	73.8	
II. Income group (by per capita GNI for 2000)										
Low^a	27.5	28.9	29.7	30.7	29.9	27.4	28.8	32.2		
Lower middle^b	56.2	58.3	51.0	51.7	53.9	54.3	58.4	66.6	76.1	
Upper middle^c	65.6	64.2	65.5	64.7	71.5	72.9	71.5	73.9	77.5	79.3
High^d	613	588	561	544	541	536	538	550	554	585

Source: *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 2003*. The definition of military expenditure adopted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), based on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) definition,^e is used as a guideline. Where possible, SIPRI military expenditure includes all current and capital expenditure on (a) the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; (b) defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and (d) military space activities. Such expenditure should include: (a) military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; (b) operations and maintenance; (c) procurement; (d) military research and development; and (e) military aid (in the military expenditure of the donor country).

^a \$755 or less.

^b \$756 to \$2,995.

^c \$2,996 to \$9,265.

^d \$9,266 or more.

^e The NATO definition covers military-related expenditure of the defence ministry (including for recruiting, training, construction and the purchase of military supplies and equipment) and other ministries. Civilian-type expenditure of the defence ministry is excluded. Military assistance is included in the expenditure of the donor country, and purchases of military equipment on credit are included at the time the debt is incurred, not at the time of payment.