



Applying Global Guidelines and Standards on Weapons and Ammunition in Conflict Affected Settings

International Small Arms and Ammunition Management Platform

First Committee

UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Monday 26 October 2015



Purpose

- Introduce the ISAP project
- Share and discuss observations on application of ISACS/IATG in conflict affected settings
- Demonstrate the ISAP Prototype



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
Acknowledgement

Germany

Switzerland



Federal Foreign Office





About UNIDIR

- Wide Mandate
- Cross Cutting
- Convening Power
- Framing Agenda
- Practical and Effective

About this project

The objective of this project is to:

- **Improve field practitioners' ability to quickly and practically apply targeted global guidance**—namely ISACS and IATGs—on small arms and ammunition control in conflict affected settings;
- Develop a package of tools under one interface—known as the **International Small Arms and Ammunition Guidance Platform (ISAP)**—designed to assist in the implementation efforts of practitioners in the area of arms and ammunition management; and
- Develop **shared understandings that inform, legitimate and motivate collective action** on the effective management of weapons and ammunition in conflict affected settings.

In close cooperation with MSAG, UNODA, ISACS-ISU and UNMAS

Framing the issue

Within the past decade, over **250 conflicts** have affected all parts of the world. About **55,000 people perish annually** as a direct consequence of armed conflict.

The number of those displaced by conflict has reached levels not seen since the Second World War: currently, **more than 33 million people are displaced** because of conflict and violence.

The widespread availability of illicit small arms and light weapons and their ammunition is a **key enabler of conflict**.

The UN has developed two sets of key guidelines: **ISACS and IATG**. Together, the two documents provide concrete guidance to assist states in their effort to exercise effective national controls over the full life-cycle management of arms and ammunition.

Effective management of arms and ammunition, however, are not without challenges, especially in conflict affected settings.

What we observed

UNIDIR field research reveal that:

There is a **lack of shared understanding and varying interpretation among actors over how best to define and implement arms and ammunition control requirements in conflict settings**, especially where national regulations and procedures may be underdeveloped, unenforced or in some cases, not established.

Field practitioners expressed the need for an **improved method to quickly identify and apply relevant control measures from global standards and guidelines** to support their field operations on arms and ammunition management.

Technical survey conducted in 2015 indicate that there is a **wide range of interpretation among field practitioners over the technical application of security and safety control measures** of arms and ammunition when applying the global guidelines and standards in conflict affected settings.

What the findings indicate

A need to further explore shared understandings on how best to implement arms and ammunition control requirements in conflict affected settings, including on the use of global guidelines and standards in fragile settings, in order to improve their applicability and to ensure consistency in their use among actors.



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Session 1: Panel discussions



1. How could existing global guidelines and standards be applied in conflict-affected settings where capacity and technical knowledge may be limited?

- Are there existing standards/guidelines designed for conflict affected settings?
- Are there existing mechanisms that states can utilize to use standards/guidelines in conflict affected settings?
- How have these standards/guidelines being used?

Example cases:

Somalia

National frameworks development

Libya

Development of technical arms and ammunition control papers

DRC

Standardizing information to be recorded on captured weapons and training on weapon ID

Key observation: applying guidelines/standards in context requires adequate level of technical expertise and a good understanding of what type of arms and ammunition control interventions are required.

What this indicates: further discussion to explore development of or improvement in existing standards / mechanisms may be useful for those conflict affected states.

2. If a requirement from the global guidelines cannot be met, what alternative options could be considered?

Three general practices observed:

1. **Abandonment:** Do not consider the measure, as control requirement is too high and/or not relevant to context
2. **Adjustment:** Adjust the control requirement to need and capacity, drawing from the international guidelines/standards
3. **Postponement:** Decide to postpone implementation of the control measure until further resources are available.

Key observation: Depending on the capacity and knowledge of the individual, implications of these action can have negative consequences. Who decides the action? How are temporary solutions or alternative measures decided?

What this indicates: Further discussion needed to better define what alternative actions could be considered, how it should be applied and who would be qualified to take such action

3. How might the interpretation and application of the global guidelines change when operational contexts evolve rapidly?

- How might control requirements be different in operational context?
- What type of flexibility do the standards and guidelines have to adjust to changes in context?
- Should development of such guidance on arms and ammunition be considered for operational support in first place?

Examples from Somalia and DRC:

Discussions to establish:

- Rapid response teams;
- Mobile armouries;
- Mobile marking machines

Key observation: There is currently limited guidelines available to address such cases. This may result in control measures being implemented on assumptions, experience or in some cases, not implemented at all.

What this indicates: Need to determine if this is an area that policy makers and field practitioners want to further examine. What type of guidelines could be desirable and feasible?

4. How can all stakeholders ensure that there are no wide varying technical interpretations of the global guidelines control requirements?

- **How do actors ensure that recipient states are not receiving different control recommendations and implementation support due to varying technical interpretation?**
- **What harmonization efforts have been made to ensure consistency in the implementation of control measures, including in the use of global guidelines?**
- **What preparatory measures could be organized for those actors providing assistance to states?**

Example findings:

- UNIDIR survey;
- MSAG training;
- Donor requirements;
- M&E initiatives.

Key observation: There is a growing awareness to challenges related to the lack of shared understanding over the technical interpretation and application of guidelines/standards but how best to approach these challenges remains to be examined.

What this indicates: The international community could greatly benefit from an inclusive dialogue that seeks to establish shared understanding over effective arms and ammunition management based on existing global guidelines and standards.



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Session 2: Prototype demonstrations



Purpose of the Platform

Learn & promote

- Access existing guidelines, standards and related mechanism

Provide a service with practical tools to support field practitioners

- Operationalize the ISACS and IATGs
- Provide practical tools that are specifically designed to support controls of arms and ammunition
- Make global guidelines and standards applicable to field operations in conflict and post conflict settings



Who are the potential users of the platform?

Voluntary basis

- **States**
- **United Nations**
- **Regional organizations**
- **Expert NGOs**
- **Training Institutes**





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In-dept look into one of the prototype:

**Security Assessment of
Arms and Ammunition Storage**



Context

- UNIDIR, has initiated the development of a practical weapons and ammunition security assessment tool, which aims to **design a basic common criteria** of security assessment driven by the ISACS and IATGs and **facilitate a systematic approach** to conducting assessments.

Why?


- Security assessment is conducted to determine the existing security conditions of the arms and ammunition storage in order to determine the risk and threats posed.
- States in conflict affected setting often lack adequate security regulation in place, capacity to implement it, or in limited cases, have not established one
- In the absence of national security regulation, the criteria to assess security of storages may be based on assumptions/experience, which may affect the results of the assessment.
- There are also often changes in actors. This entail that a new or different security assessment criteria may be applied based on the changes in actors. This may also entail that the guidance provided for improvement may become inconsistent, and in worse cases, inaccurate.
- Development of a common criteria could help ensure quality control among actors, that guidance provided on improvements are consistent, and that no pertinent areas are omitted.



Added value

- **Provide users with common criteria for assessment based on international guidelines and standards**
- **Keep track of what has (or has not) been achieved**
- **Identify priority needs and potential gaps**
- **Manage and analyze data on implementation progress**
- **Facilitate evidence-based planning and solutions**
- **Assist in the monitoring and evaluation**
- **Support communication and reporting**

Criteria design methodology



Inputs requested from national experts (Austria, Germany, UK, Sweden and Switzerland), the UN system (UNMAS, UNODA, ISACS ISU), and expert organizations.

Field testing in Somalia (Mogadishu), Tunisia/Libya, DRC (Goma) and Armenia.



Example security assessment criteria

KEY:

- Implemented: Measure that you are certain has been implemented (100%)
- Temporary measures in place: Measures that you observe have been undertaken, but not completely implemented. For this category, please provide remarks.
- Not Implemented: Measures that you are certain have not been implemented based on the information provided and/or observed.
- Not applicable: Measures that are not applicable to the context you are dealing with.




Generic Area	Question	Implemented	Not Implemented	Temporary measure(s) in place	Not applicable	Remarks
Risk Assessment	1. Are risk assessments being carried out for the storage?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	X	No information available

Generic Area	Question	Implemented	Not Implemented	Temporary measure(s) in place	Not applicable	Remarks
Separation of weapons and ammunition	2. Are weapons and ammunition stored separately in different buildings?	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Only ammunition stored
	2.1. Secure rooms / cabinets					
	2.1.1. A secure room or secure cabinet is used to separate arms and ammunition when stored in same building	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

Generic Area	Question	Implemented	Not Implemented	Temporary measure(s) in place	Not applicable	Remarks
ACTO items	3. Are items that may be classified as being attractive to criminals and terrorist organizations (ACTO), such as MANPADS, Detonators, Bulk Explosives, Mortars, Hand grenades subject to more stringent security than other weapons and ammunition?	<input type="checkbox"/>	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	3.1. General principles					
	3.1.1. For weapons with explosive components (such as MANPADS), their delivery platform is separated from the explosive component	<input type="checkbox"/>	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	3.1.2. Delivery platforms and their explosive components are stored in different buildings	<input type="checkbox"/>	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	



Benefits of systematic assessment





Proposed next steps: Phase II

- **Finalize and launch the Platform**
 - Finalize development of tools, including for:
 - Security assessment
 - Basic safety assessment
 - Weapons Identification exercise
 - ISACS National Assessment Tool, Version 2.0
- **Initiate series of technical discussions**—building on preliminary findings from Phase I—to:
 - seek shared understandings that inform, legitimate and motivate collective action on the effective management of weapons and ammunition in conflict affected settings, including on the application of global guidelines and standards.



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Live Demonstration



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