Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Posture, Politics and Arms Control

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Definition

- All nuclear weapons not covered by US-Russian nuclear arms control treaties (START and INF)
- It is diverse weapons, including for platforms of intermediate range
- This is why they are often called non-strategic or sub-strategic weapons

Apart from this


- □ The concept of TNW does not include delivery systems
- It is nuclear munitions (warheads)
- TNW are non-deployed weapons stored separate from their platforms
- The delivery systems themselves are multi-purpose and are also designed for conventional missions

Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs)

- □ The comprehensive TNW definition was underlying the PNIs of 1991 and 1992
- According to PNIs, TNW were
 - moved to central storage facilities and
 - partially retired and destroyed

TNW reductions under the PNIs

(deployable weapons)



Russia's TNW arsenal

- ☐ Is not only more sizeable but also more diverse
 - Air Force frontal and intermediate aircraft
 - Navy tactical and intermediate aircraft
 SLCMs
 anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons
 naval air defence
 - Air and Missile defence
- The greater diversity of maintained TNW is an indication of more diverse military options

Two challenges to TNW arms control

Would Russia agree to abandon associated military options?

What measures should be elaborated to verify limitations and reductions of non-deployed warheads?

The mission of TNW

- Deterrence and/or termination of a conventional attack which exceeds Russia's conventional capabilities
- Is seen as a temporary policy until Russia's conventional inferiority is overcome
- It appears to remain a long-term factor determining Russia's posture
- TNW reductions are not in Russia's interest until other disparities are addressed in a comprehensive manner

Other disparities

- Missile defences
- Conventionally armed long-range strategic systems (Global Prompt Strike Capability)
- Weaponization of outer space
- Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) for stand-off war fighting
- Conventional disparities in Europe (CFE)


TNW arms control measures

- Shall provide for the verification of non-deployed warheads
 - in nuclear storage facilities, and
 - in transfer between nuclear sites
- □ This is the major challenge as it addresses the most sensible area

Recent proposals

- Russia's TNW should be stored away from NATO and EU borders
- The follow-on negotiations to START shall address the issue of non-deployed nuclear warheads, both strategic and TNW

Effect on the US upload capability



Gradualist approach

- Resumption of information exchange under the PNIs
 - Data exchange
- Consultations within the NRC
 - Data exchange
 - Discussion of nuclear postures
 - Confidence-building measures
 - Cooperative measures
- Consolidation of TNW in centralized storage facilities
- Resumption of Lab-to-Lab cooperation concerning warhead and fissile material verification