



LIBERIA

WEAPONS & AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT



INTRODUCTION

In April 2018, the Government of the Federal Republic of Liberia in cooperation with UNIDIR, implemented a national Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) baseline assessment in the Federal Republic of Liberia. Led by national authorities, the objectives of this round of consultations were to establish a baseline of the existing WAM activities and procedures in place, to identify areas to be strengthened, and to present recommendations for policy and programmatic responses to build a national framework governing the management of arms and ammunition.

The national consultation offered the opportunity for representatives, experts, and practitioners from various Liberian institutions and security agencies to engage in dialogue, build trust, and improve needed cooperation between them to design and implement a strong national WAM framework. The exchanges and information provided in the course of the national consultation and bilateral meetings with senior representatives of relevant national institutions with WAM oversight, were consolidated into a report and shared with the Government of Liberia to support its efforts in improving its

national weapons and ammunition framework.

This publication is an extract of the baseline assessment report delivered to the Liberian national authorities. It is a snapshot of the summary of the main findings and options identified for the enhancement of Weapons and Ammunition Management in Liberia. **It presents the status of strategic and operational WAM efforts in Liberia as identified during the baseline assessment and highlights the practical recommendations provided to the Liberian authorities as of April 2018.**

LIBERIA



POPULATION:	4.9 MILLION
REGION:	WEST AFRICA
CAPITAL:	MONROVIA
ANNUAL GDP:	2.76 BILLION
DATE OF ASSESSMENT:	APRIL 2018

METHODOLOGY

UNIDIR defines WAM in a comprehensive manner covering the oversight, accountability and governance of arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle, including the establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes and practices for the safe and secure production and acquisition of materiel, stockpiling, transfers, end use control, tracing and disposal.

This holistic approach is essential in ensuring that efforts to better regulate arms and ammunition are undertaken in alignment with broader security sector, rule of law, armed violence reduction, counterterrorism, and peacebuilding processes, and not in isolation. Research emphasis is placed on national and regional approaches to WAM in pursuit of a national and regionally owned process, and to support a 'bottom-up' and evidence-based approach.

This Country Insight on Liberia is part of a series of Country Insights that seek to promote knowledge, and raise visibility and awareness on the WAM context, progress made, and areas for enhancement in African States that have conducted WAM baseline assessments

with support from UNIDIR. It is aimed to serve as a reference for international partners for providing assistance and technical support for improving weapons and ammunition frameworks in the relevant country.

Information contained in this Country Insight presents key findings and recommendations of the baseline assessment conducted in April of 2018. It does not reflect the progress made or any changes implemented after the assessment and should be taken to be indicative only of the situation at the time of the assessment.

Building on the multi-year WAM baseline assessments in Africa, UNIDIR in partnership with the African Union (AU) and the ECOWAS Commission aims **to enhance knowledge and dialogue among States, regional organisations, the United Nations and expert NGOs on good practices and lessons learned, as well as on the means and methods to further strengthen national and regional approaches to WAM in Africa.**

KEY STAKEHOLDERS

Liberia National Commission on Small Arms
Office of the National Security Advisor
Ministry of National Defence
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Internal Affairs
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
Armed Forces of Liberia
Liberia National Police
National Security Agency
United Nations Development Programme
Mano River Union

LiNCSA
ONSA
MOND
MFA
MOJ
MOI
MOE
MOFDP
AFL
LNP
NSA
UNDP
MRU

Liberia Action Network on Small Arms
Executive Protection Service
Liberia Immigration Services
Drugs Enforcement Agency
Liberia Aviation Authority
National Port Authority
Inter-religious Council of Liberia
Press Union of Liberia
National Hunters Union of Liberia
Ministry for Gender, Children and Social Protection
ECOWAS Special Representative
Women in Peacebuilding Network and the Federation of Liberian Youth

LANSA

NATIONAL CONTEXT

Liberia experienced a 14-year civil war, which resulted in significant lives lost, detrimental damage to social and economic welfare, and a weakened security sector governance in the country. The uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of arms and ammunition was a key enabler to armed violence and to prolonging the conflict in Liberia as of April 2018. In the post-conflict period where peacebuilding and sustainable development efforts are high on the political agenda, the management of weapons and ammunition remains a critical priority and an integral part of peace, security and development processes in Liberia.

Years of conflict have undeniably had a direct impact on the Government of Liberia's capacity to safely and securely store, manage, inventory, monitor and account for its national stockpile of arms and ammunition across its territory. Weapons and Ammunition Management in

Liberia since early the 2000s is guided by two specific security sector related transitions. First, the presence and the subsequent drawdown of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in March 2018. Second, the imposition and the eventual lifting of the United Nations (UN) arms embargo between 1992 and 2016.

UNMIL, which was deployed in October 2003 in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 1509 (2003), completed its mandate and drew down on 30 March 2018. Its final mandate included advising the Government of Liberia on the reform of justice and security institutions. UNMIL has previously advised, trained and assisted the Liberian security forces and relevant institutions in the management of arms; assisted the National Transitional Government in the implementation of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme; guarded weapons,

ammunition and other military equipment collected from former-combatants and assisted in their subsequent disposal or destruction. UNMIL's closedown—the third United Nations mission to conclude in West Africa—in this regard represents a significant benchmark from which to assess the WAM framework in Liberia.

The second security sector related transition concerns the lifting of the UN arms embargo in 2016. Since 1992, Liberia had been subject to three consecutive sanctions that included individual sanctions, such as asset freeze and travel bans, as well as sectoral sanctions, such as an arms embargo, diamond ban and timber ban. The United Nations Security Council incrementally eased the arms embargo applicable to national security forces of Liberia in 2006, together with introduction for Weapons and Ammunition Management requirements for the Government. These WAM requirements included the marking and registration of materiel, and notification by the Government to the Sanctions Committee on the

progress made in the implementation of arms embargo measures. UNMIL was mandated to inspect material obtained by the national authorities in compliance with the arms embargo exemption process. In addition to physical security measures, the adoption of a national firearms control legislation by the Government of Liberia was a key criterion for the United Nations Security Council to eventually lift the arms embargo in 2016.

The termination of the arms embargo, together with the closure of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, firmly places full responsibility and accountability of Weapons and Ammunition Management under the Government of Liberia. This critical transition represents a unique opportunity for the Government of Liberia to assess its Weapons and Ammunition Management framework, establish a baseline, identify areas for enhancement, and to develop a national roadmap to strengthen Weapons and Ammunition Management that is nationally led and owned.

OVERVIEW OF WAM ENHANCEMENT OPTIONS



TECHNICAL PILLAR 1: NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK



KEY FINDINGS

- Liberia adopted a Firearms and Ammunition Control Act on 11 July 2016. The law is comprehensive, covering issues of registration, possession and use, manufacture, repair, brokering, import and export, transit and transshipment, as well as marking. Materiel held by security forces are exemption from this law.
- Outreach and sensitization on the law efforts were ongoing as of April 2018.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

1.	In the framework of FACA, formulate national strategy on addressing illicit manufacturing and possession of arms	LiNCSA; ONSA; NSC
2.	Operationalize licensing mechanism, including implementation of basic safe and secure management training for licensed persons	LiNCSA; LNP; Technical Committee
3.	Continue sensitization of relevant stakeholders regarding FACA, including in collaboration with relevant ministries (e.g. Ministry of Education) as well as civil society; this may include educational campaigns designed in collaborating between LiNCSA and Ministry of Education	All, particularly civil society
4.	Clarify provisions for authorized hunters to acquire arms within the framework of the FACA	Hunters Union; LNP; LiNCSA; LIS; security services operating under MOJ
5.	Clarify regulatory provisions applicable for the safe and secure management of commercial explosives	MOD; LiNCSA; Technical Committee; ONSA; Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy
6.	Adequately enforce provisions of FACA applicable to private security companies	All relevant law enforcement agencies

TECHNICAL PILLAR 2: NATIONAL COORDINATION BODY



KEY FINDINGS

- At the strategic level, the office of the national security advisor (ONSA) plays a central role in the oversight of WAM related policies and strategies. Coordination at operational level is facilitated by the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms, which includes a technical committee (TCA). Implementation of activities is decentralized across security forces, ministries and agencies. The baseline assessment revealed the essential role of LiNCSA in the development of a national framework on WAM, and the broad political buy-in it receives from national stakeholders, including from relevant security forces and agencies.
- A key challenge to national coordination on WAM is the decentralization of WAM coordination and implementation mechanisms at the region and county levels, which require significant resource mobilization. In this regard engagement with Security and Defence Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives is highly encouraged.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

7.	LiNCSA to more systematically engage with parliamentary bodies, in particular the Security and Defence Committee, on the activities of all of its members	LiNCSA
8.	Where possible, clarify and disseminate Programme of Work of Technical Committee so as to ensure members' active participation	LiNCSA
9.	Ensure through decentralization processes of SALW control responsibilities that the decentralized units adequately report and conduct oversight activity	All
10.	Ensure that decentralized units have dedicated, specialized and trained personnel on arms and ammunition management (see PSSM section)	All
11.	Keep ONSA informed of the implementation of this options roadmap	LiNCSA
12.	Ensure active participation of civil society in national coordination mechanism	Civil Society

TECHNICAL PILLAR 3: TRANSFER CONTROLS



KEY FINDINGS

- The baseline assessment revealed that not all security forces were fully aware and understood the ECOWAS exemption process for arms imports as of April 2018. This has resulted in challenges to compliance with the instrument.
- The assessment team encouraged the Government of Liberia to centralize its processes for arms imports, as

appropriate. This may include centralizing requests for acquisition, recordkeeping of imports and monitoring of assurances as part of end user agreements. The Office of the National Security Advisor plays an essential role in the implementation of this recommendation.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

13.	Forces who acquire weapons, adequately share information with LiNCSA, so LiNCSA can comply with its reporting obligations under ATT and ECOWAS Convention	All forces acquiring weapons
14.	Based on UNMIL model, establish on-site post-delivery verification mechanism of imported supplies against import authorization	All security services, in particular AFL and LNP, Liberian Seaport Police; ONSA

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

15.	When deploying to peace support operations, ensure compliance with Article 11 of ECOWAS Convention	AFL; LNP
16.	Continue to centralize information about imports and share information with LiNCSA	All security services; LiNCSA
17.	Prior to internal transfers being undertaken, establish a mechanism to ensure that the transfer does not violate the original end user agreement; this entails keeping adequate records that are accessible to relevant agencies	All security services
18.	Sensitize and conduct awareness raising on end-user agreement compliance	All security services, coordinated by Technical Committee
19.	In the case of transit/transshipment, ensure information sharing and coordination between relevant agencies in order to prevent diversion	LIS; Customs; Aviation, etc. (all agencies involved in border management)
20.	Provide joint inter-agency training on prevention, detection and response to diversion in the case of transit/transshipment; specialized attention should be paid to dangerous goods, in particular explosives and conventional ammunition	All security agencies involved in border management; LiNCSA
21.	Adequately equip services in order to prevent, detect and respond to diversion in the case of transit/transshipment	All security agencies involved in border management; LiNCSA
22.	Draft new law dedicated to implementation and compliance with ATT, including clarity on conventional arms covered and clarification on which entry ports arms are permitted to enter the country	LiNCSA; civil society; Office of the President
23.	When conducting needs assessments and in advance of transfer request for imports, work with LiNCSA to ensure that information required in ECOWAS Convention Form A is adequately captured	All security services; LiNCSA
24.	Post-delivery, security forces should coordinate with LiNCSA on post-delivery controls in order to comply with ECOWAS Convention Form B	All security services; LiNCSA

TECHNICAL PILLAR 4: WEAPONS MARKING



KEY FINDINGS

- As of April 2018, the Government of Liberia had marked all weapons held by its security forces, which represent a significant achievement.
- Opportunities for enhancement include developing guidance for marking of modular weapons, marking

of materiel recovered from law enforcement operations, as well as establishing a national standard for marking of ammunition, as required by the ECOWAS Convention.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

ONGOING	25.	Continue to ensure that markings are done in compliance with ECOWAS Convention	All security services; TCA
SHORT TERM	26.	Ensure adequate maintenance and repair of marking machines	LiNCSA
	27.	Decide on marking standards of ammunition in line with the ECOWAS Convention	All security services, with TCA
	28.	Ensure marking on legally possessed arms by civilians	LiNCSA; LNP; TCA
SHORT - LONG	29.	Sensitize marking obligations as it relates to internal transfers	TCA
	30.	In the case of integration of serviceable seized or recovered weapons, ensure appropriate marking prior to integration	All security services, with TCA

TECHNICAL PILLAR 5: RECORD KEEPING



KEY FINDINGS

- As of April 2018, recordkeeping on arms and ammunition within each security forces were being undertaken by all forces that bear arms. AFL and LNP in particular demonstrated full competency in this regard.
- Sharing of records and centralizing information pertaining to arms remained a challenge for the Nation-

al Commission on Small Arms as of April 2018. Liberia would benefit from standardized reporting template across the security services in order to promote accurate and timely sharing of information, which is essential for developing security and crime prevention strategies.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

SHORT TERM	31.	Establish and implement periodic reporting to LiNCSA on the agreed scope of arms (imports, holding, internal transfers, integration, destruction, and illicit weapons)	All security services; LiNCSA
	32.	LiNCSA to establish a standardized reporting template at the national level on the six abovementioned categories	LiNCSA
	33.	LiNCSA to develop a standardized recordkeeping procedure at the national level	LiNCSA

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

34.	Establish centralized database for every security service	All security services
35.	Put in place specialized personnel to maintain databases for records of arms for each security service	All security services

TECHNICAL PILLAR 6: IDENTIFICATION & TRACING

KEY FINDINGS

- The baseline assessment revealed that while tracing and investigative activities were undertaken in cooperation with UNMIL during the time of United Nations peace operations, such activities have been limited since 2016 following the drawdown of the mission.
- Participants of the baseline assessment agreed that capacity building on accurate identification of arms and ammunition would be greatly beneficial across all security services. A national policy on tracing illicit weapons would be an essential starting point to drive this work forward.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

36.	LiNCSA to share with ONSA analysis of the profiling of illicit weapons for intelligence purposes	LiNCSA; ONSA
37.	Establish national policy on tracing illicit weapons	ONSA in coordination with LiNCSA and relevant entities
38.	Undertake inter-agency training on accurate identification of arms and ammunition, in particular for those recovered in crime and security operations	All Security Services; LiNCSA
39.	Establish dedicated profiling database on illicit weapons to be maintained by LiNCSA	All Security Services; LiNCSA
40.	Establish profiling of illicit manufacturers, trafficking routes and users	LiNCSA; ONSA; All security agencies
41.	Establish clear SOPs for law enforcement to undertake domestic and international tracing operations	LiNCSA; TCA; All security services
42.	Establish inter-agency coordinating mechanism dedicated to implementing international tracing operations	All security services; LiNCSA

TECHNICAL PILLAR 7: PROCESSING SEIZED WEAPONS



KEY FINDINGS

- The baseline assessment revealed that management of seized materiel was fragmented across security forces and agencies. Further, security services revealed that no clear SOP exist for weapons recovered from communities or crime scenes as of April 2018.
- Opportunities for enhancement range from develop-

ing national policy on processing recovered materiel, clarifying processes to disposal, and profiling these weapons to build a better intelligence picture.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

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| 43. | Clarify domestic policies and procedures for integration and permanent destruction of serviceable captured, seized and/or received weapons | LiNCSA; TCA; AFL |
| 44. | Clarify procedure for processing weapons held as evidence from crime | LiNCSA; LNP; TCA; Judiciary |

TECHNICAL PILLAR 8: PHYSICAL SECURITY & STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT



KEY FINDINGS

- PSSM represents an area where most progress is witnessed across all security forces. However, it also represents the area that requires significant support to make further progress. As of April 2018, ammunition management, in particular, required urgent attention.
- The assessment revealed the need for security sector wide capacity and needs assessment on storages, training and equipment. Based on such an assessment, a prioritization plan would be beneficial to identify measures that can be taken in short, medium and long term, including with international support.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

GENERAL

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| 45. | All security services shall ensure regular inspections of all of their holdings and verify against records | All security services |
| 46. | Ensure strict compliance and implementation of procedures by all security forces on transport of ammunition | All security services |
| 47. | LiNCSA, through the TCA, to establish standardized inspection template at the national level for arms and ammunition that can be used by security forces | LiNCSA; TCA; Security Services |
| 48. | For those ammunition sites that pose safety threats to civilians and critical infrastructure (i.e. where safety distances are not met) to immediately undertake risk-reduction measures of stocks within those sites to reduce the risk and examine options for relocation of site | LiNCSA; All security services |
| 49. | Ensure that those security forces that are expecting to receive weapons that those agencies are provided with all established SOPs and that personnel working in these agencies receive inter-agency training on PSSM prior to receiving weapons | All security services expecting to receive weapons |
| 50. | Clarify procedures for storage of weapons recovered from crime and security operations | All security services; Judiciary |

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

GENERAL

51.

Conduct nation-wide needs assessment on storage sites (includes assessment of current storages and their conditions, assessment of needs for relocation and creation of new storage sites) and ensure that results of assessment forms the basis of domestic and international prioritization of storage needs

All security services;
LiNCSA; ONSA

52.

Establish an inter-agency inspection unit composed of representatives of all security services capable of conducting inspections

LiNCSA and all security services

53.

Ensure that results of joint inspection team are maintained securely by LiNCSA

LiNCSA and all security services

54.

Establish procedures for undertaking technical surveillance and serviceability of ammunition

LiNCSA; AFL

EQUIPMENT

55.

Ensure provision of gun safes for stations and positions in border areas

All relevant security agencies working at the border

56.

Ensure that armouries are adequately equipped with weapons racks

All security services

57.

Based on the needs assessment of all security forces, implement storage plans (new, refurbished, relocation)

LiNCSA; all security services; relevant ministries

TRAINING

58.

Establish inter-agency training-of-trainer (TOT) programmes using trained officers, especially training of decentralized officers

All security services

59.

Utilize and strengthen police and military academy for small arms training for all security services while developing dedicated training centre

All security services

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

TRAINING

60.	Undertake, in inter-agency format, training on conducting inspections	All security services; LiNCSA
61.	Undertake, in inter-agency format and in line with ISACS, training dedicated on armouries dedicated to storekeepers and store manager	All security services
62.	Ensure nomination and participation, through support of LiNCSA, in ECOWAS PPSM Training Centre (six-year plan)	All security services; LiNCSA
63.	Ensure specialized training on maintenance and repair of arms	All security services
64.	Coordinate with Ministry of Finance and Development Planning as well as national legislators for Security and Defence Committee to explore appropriate compensation standards for store keeper and store managers to ensure sustainability of trained personnel	Relevant ministries and national legislators; LiNCSA
65.	Organize and conduct training dedicated to building capacity technical surveillance and serviceability of ammunition	Forces authorized to manage conventional ammunition
66.	Put in place specialized training and mentoring programme on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capability, especially Level 3 (addressing UXOs and ERW)	EOD Units (AFL)
67.	Establish dedicated training centre in Liberia on Weapon and Ammunition Management	All security services

TECHNICAL PILLAR 9: CRAFT WEAPONS



KEY FINDINGS

- Craft weapons—illicitly manufactured firearms—represent a growing threat in Liberia and in the sub-region. As of April 2018, there was no dedicated strategy to address this threat in Liberia.
- In addition to developing appropriate strategy, there

is a need to gather better data on the sources and drivers for the production and acquisition of craft weapons in Liberia. This may require engagement with border communities, as well as civil society organizations, as appropriate.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

68.	Formulate national strategy to address local manufacturing taking into account the FACA and ECOWAS Convention	LiNCSA; National legislators; ONSA
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OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

69.	By encouraging civilian registrations utilizing existing unions, gather better information on type and amount of craft weapons by engaging communities and unions	Civil society; unions; community leaders; local authorities; MOI; LiNCSA; religious leaders
70.	Design community-based intervention to encourage engagement of users and producers to promote arms and ammunition control, including through support of civil society actor	Civil society; unions; community leaders; local authorities; MOI; LiNCSA; religious leaders
71.	Raise awareness in communities where craft production is prominent of the existing law, in coordination with relevant ministries and civil society (repeated point from level framework)	Civil society unions; community leaders; local authorities; MOI; LiNCSA; religious leaders
72.	Examine scope for “arms for development” alternative livelihoods initiatives in communities where local craft manufacturing is prominent	Civil society unions; community leaders; local authorities; MOI; LiNCSA; religious leaders
73.	Change in custody should be reported and document in the case of “heritage weapons”	LiNCSA; MOI; LNP; Unions

TECHNICAL PILLAR 10: BORDER CONTROLS



KEY FINDINGS

- Liberia struggles with monitoring illicit flow of arms across its porous borders. Re-circulation of illicit arms within the subregion represents a grave threat to security in Liberia.
- Inter-agency teams to address small arms flows at border points represent one option given the large

number of competing priorities for the Government. This may include trainings undertaken under inter-agency format, dedicated to techniques focusing on monitoring and detection of illicit flows, based on risk assessment.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

GENERAL

74.	Utilize arms and ammunition profiling information captured by relevant security agencies working at border to inform preventive and early warning systems (see recordkeeping)	All security services; LiNCSA; ONSA
75.	Develop SOPs for small arms and ammunition control in the context of border management	All security operating at border points

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

GENERAL

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| 76. | Establish a joint small arms control team dedicated to border management, taking into account different border crossing methods (air, land and sea) | All security agencies |
| 77. | Engage communities and unions in various border points to inform law enforcement agencies on the evolving threats and risks associated with arms and ammunition | Community leaders; Hunters Unions; Civil Society |
| 78. | Explore with national security institutions, the establishment of mutual legal assistance framework to facilitate cross-border cooperation (profiling, investigations) targeting the land borders with Guinea and Sierra Leone | MOJ; MRU; LiNCSA; MFA; ONSA |
| 79. | Explore national small arms control strategies in the context of border management, taking into account inputs from border communities | LiNCSA; TCA; ONSA; Civil Society |

TRAINING

- | | | |
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| 80. | Conduct inter-agency training on small arms control in the context of border management, including cargo inspections, in line with existing standards and practices, e.g. SARPs | All security services |
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EQUIPMENT

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| 81. | Examine domestic and international assistance support to enhance detection technologies for key border points | MOFDP; National legislators; International partners; LiNCSA |
| 82. | Examine domestic and international assistance support to increase mobility of specialized personal at key border points (i.e. vehicles) | MOFDP; National legislators; International partners; LiNCSA |

LIBERIA



LOOKING AHEAD

The exchange of good practices and lessons learned in strengthening WAM policy and practice in Africa seeks to enhance the knowledge of States, regional organisations and international partners on ways to establish and implement comprehensive national and regional frameworks governing the full lifecycle of arms and ammunition.

This publication presents a holistic approach to Weapon and Ammunition Management with a special focus on the Federal Republic of Liberia. This holistic approach to WAM contributes to achieving broader peace, security, and development goals including but not lim-

ited to conflict prevention, armed violence reduction, accountable security sector, protection of civilians, and advancing the Agenda 2030.

UNIDIR encourages the Community of States, regional organisations, and relevant international partners to examine the options suggested for enhancing WAM in each Country Insight and use them as a basis to inform the planning, implementation, and assessment of future WAM projects in the relevant country.

ABOUT UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems.

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