### **COUNTRY INSIGHTS SERIES**



# CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC WEAPONS & AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT






In September 2017, the Government of the Central African Republic in cooperation with UNIDIR, the United Nations Mine Action Service [UNMAS] and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) implemented a national weapons and ammunition management baseline assessment in the Central African Republic. Led by national authorities, the objective of the objectives of these rounds of consultations were to establish a baseline of the existing Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) activities and procedures in place, to identify areas to be strengthened, and to present recommendations for policy and programmatic responses to build a national framework governing the management of arms and ammunition.

The national consultation offered the opportunity for representatives, experts, and practitioners from various institutions and security agencies in the Central African Republic to engage in dialogue, build trust, and improve needed cooperation between them to design and implement a strong national WAM framework. The exchanges and information provided in the course of the national consultation and bilateral meetings with senior representatives of relevant national institutions with WAM oversight, were consolidated into a report and shared with the Government of the Central African Republic to support its efforts in improving its national weapons and ammunition

framework. This publication an is extract of the baseline assessment shared with the national authorities of the Central African Republic. It is a snapshot of the summary of the main findings and options identified for the enhancement of weapons and ammunition management in the Central African Republic.



It presents the str-

ategic and operational WAM efforts in Central African Republic as identified during the baseline assessment in September 2017 and highlights the practical recommendations provided to authorities of the Central African Republic.





### **KEY STAKEHOLDERS**

National Commission for the Fight against the Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons United Nations Development Programme African Union European Union Military Advise Mission UN Regional Centre for Peace & Disarmament

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Regional Centre on Small Arms
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration
Coordination Unit

Inter-ministerial Technical Committee

COMNAT-ALPC

UNDP AU

EUMAM-RCA UNREC

RECSA DDR

IMTC

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic United Nations Mine Action Service Government of the Central African Republic

CA National Reconciliation Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Armed Forces of the Central African Republic Informal WAM technical working group

National Police Gendarmerie

Water and Forestry Services

Customs

### METHODOLOGY

UNIDIR defines WAM in a comprehensive manner covering the oversight, accountability and governance of arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle, including the establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes and practices for the safe and secure production and acquisition of materiel, stockpiling, transfers, end use control, tracing and disposal.

This holistic approach is essential in ensuring that efforts to better regulate arms and ammunition are undertaken in alignment with broader security sector, rule of law, armed violence reduction, counterterrorism, and peacebuilding processes, and not in isolation. Research emphasis is placed on national and regional approaches to WAM in pursuit of a national and regionally owned process, and to support a 'bottom-up' and evidence-based approach.

This Country Insight on the Central African Republic is part of a series of Country Insights that seek to promote knowledge, and raise visibility and awareness on the WAM context, progress made, and areas for enhancement in the African States that have conducted

WAM baseline assessments with support from UNIDIR. It is aimed to serve as a reference for international partners for providing assistance and technical support for improving weapons and ammunition frameworks in the relevant country.

Information contained in this Country Insight presents key findings and recommendations of the baseline assessment conducted in September of 2017. It does not reflect the progress made or any changes implemented after the assessment and should be taken to be indicative only of the situation at the time of the assessment.

Building on the multi-year WAM baseline assessments in Africa, UNIDIR in partnership with the African Union (AU) and the ECOWAS Commission aims to enhance knowledge and dialogue among States, regional organisations, the United Nations and expert NGOs on good practices and lessons learned, as well as on the means and methods to further strengthen national and regional approaches to WAM in Africa.

**MINUSCA** 

**UNMAS** 

CAR

RN

**MFA** 

**FACA** 

**IWKG** 

### NATIONAL CONTEXT

Years of conflict and insecurity have undeniably had a direct impact on the Central African Republic's (CAR) capacity to safely and securely store, manage, inventory, monitor and account for its national stockpile of arms and ammunition across its territory.

The Government of CAR has recently demonstrated its commitment to international arms control norms and to strengthening its Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) framework. In October 2015, CAR became a State Party to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). More recently, in February 2017, CAR created the National Commission for the Fight against the Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (COMNAT-ALPC), and while this Commission was not yet operational at the time of this assesment, this constitutes an important step for coordinated national policymaking on small arms and light weapons control. While the Government of CAR deserves to be commended for its efforts, WAM remains at an underdeveloped stage. Challenges remain at the strategic, operational and implementation levels, and a large amount of work is still needed to comply with international norms and to establish an appropriate and comprehensive arms and ammunition management system.

As of September 2017, there was no clear strategic framework at the national level and reportedly, no dedicated governmental budget allocated to support WAM at the operational levels. As a result, many initiatives and efforts have been ad hoc in nature and results in WAM have been achieved in particular areas or aspects of arms control where international support was provided. In particular, progress has been achieved by the Government of CAR, with support and in cooperation with international partners, in the area of physical security and management of stockpiles. In moving forward, CAR could benefit from strengthened national coordination and a clear national strategy on WAM. An Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee to coordinate matters relating to the arms embargo, which is expected to be formally established, and the

ongoing national security sector reform (SSR) process may provide appropriate entry points for high-level strategic national dialogue aimed at strengthening WAM institutions and processes.

With regards to priority WAM needs related to effective implementation of the UN arms embargo by the Government of CAR, several key measures are identified:

- 1. The need for a high-level steering body on WAM at the strategic level, inclusive of coordination on the implementation of arms embargo, such as centralization of procurement chain and records related to exemption requests;
- 2. The need to establish a national process for managing exempt imported materiel from the point of delivery/reception, initial storage, to their distribution down the supply chain. Concretely, initial considerations include establishment of a process for record-keeping at a centralized site in Bangui, and for the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons (COMNAT-ALPC) to establish a marking programme to make weapons uniquely identifiable to CAR security forces prior to their distribution;
- 3. The need for inventory inspection and verification capacity and mechanism at the national level, with support from international partners, in order to support good record-keeping practices as well as to provide oversight on disposal of captured and/or seized military equipment in Bangui and beyond;
- 4. The need for the establishment of relevant operational procedures and training based on those documents in order to ensure application of WAM measures for imported weapons as part of the exemption process, as well as for those arms already in possession or integrated by security forces.



### **OVERVIEW OF WAM ENHANCEMENT OPTIONS**



**TOTAL NUMBER OF OPTIONS: 38** 



### TECHNICAL PILLAR 1: NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK



#### **KEY FINDINGS**

- As of September 2017 the legal framework, composed of a 1964 law and numerous regulations that followed, was generally outdated, insufficiently detailed (e.g. on definitions, distinction between Stateowned arms and civilian weapons possession, as well as activities covered), and was inadequate to address security and challenges in WAM faced by CAR as of September 2017. Furthermore, there is a need for revising the national legal framework in order to incorporate and conform to United Nations arms embargo provisions. The revision of the national legal framework and regulations, applying to both State-owned as well has been recognized as civilian possession of
- arms and ammunition, by national stakeholders as a key priority in further strengthening the national WAM framework in CAR.
- There is a need and opportunity to initiate and complete a review process of the existing legal framework and to harmonize it with relevant international and regional instruments. In parallel, there exists an opportunity to develop and adopt national regulations, standards and written (administrative) procedures, in line with international standards and commitments, which can in the future be utilized to inform the legal review process.

### **OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

- Initiate a review process of the legal framework, including laws and regulations, aimed at its harmonization with relevant international and regional agreements and instruments.
- Organize a workshop on the legal framework, its scope and application (e.g. State-owned and civilian possession, arms and ammunition categories, activities covered), as well as the review process.
- 3. Sensitize national authorities, including the National Assembly, government authorities, as well as civil society and the civilian population, on the legal framework and review process.
- 4. Validate and adopt a new legislation, followed by a review of regulations governing arms and ammunition in line with the newly adopted legislation.

## TECHNICAL PILLAR 2: NATIONAL COORDINATION BODY



### **KEY FINDINGS**

- As of September 2017, there were a number of national entities involved in the coordination of WAM activities. However, there was no single, centralized national WAM framework that governed coordination, planning and implementation of WAM activities at both the strategic and operational levels. Enhancing the national WAM coordinating mechanism, including the operationalization of the COMNAT-ALPC, has been recognized by national stakeholders as a priority in further strengthening the national WAM framework in CAR.
- In this regard, the Government of CAR would benefit from a high-level dialogue among political and military/security entities to develop a national WAM strategy, which should be aligned and embedded in the
- broader national security architecture and strategies. Such dialogue could be envisaged by the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee (IMTC) for enhancing coordination on matters pertaining to the arms embargo. The Government of CAR is encouraged to formally establish and operationalize the IMTC, which could benefit from further technical capacity-building, together with the COMNAT-ALPC.
- Further, once the COMNAT-ALPC is operationalized, it could greatly benefit from broad and continuous capacity-building and awareness-raising support, in order to increase its visibility and to foster coordination among the stakeholders represented in the COM-NAT-ALPC.

**NO TIME FRAME** 

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### **OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

- Maintain and vitalize the work of the WKG, until the operationalization of the COMNAT-ALPC; once operationalized, the COMNAT-ALPC can decide on the future of the Informal WAM technical working group, including its formalization under the COMNAT-ALPC's auspices.
- **6.** Review and refine the terms of reference and a work plan for the technical working group, including its composition and frequency of meetings.
- 7. Operationalize the COMNAT-ALPC, including appointment (by Presidential decree) of the president and executive secretary, budgeting (for personnel, infrastructure) and putting into place an appropriate infrastructure for the effective functioning of the COMNAT-ALPC.
- B. Develop and adopt a national WAM strategy that defines the goals, clear and measurable objectives, and implementation as well as a monitoring and evaluation mechanism.
- **9.** Review the draft national action plan (NAP) and develop, validate and adopt a new multi-year NAP on SALW control in CAR.
- Designate and communicate (a) national point(s) of contact for relevant international and regional instruments and agreements; and raise awareness among national authorities on their status and scope in order to ensure national coordination.

## TECHNICAL PILLAR 3: TRANSFER CONTROLS

### **KEY FINDINGS**

- As of September 2017, roles and responsibilities for transfer controls were decentralized across relevant Ministries. The proposed establishment of the IMTC for the coordination of arms embargo matters is expected to support the centralization of arms imports in CAR in the near future. The MFA, which is expected to preside over the IMTC, is tasked with submitting arms embargo exemption requests to the Security Council Sanctions Committee. As of September 2017 there was no standard operational procedure for arms imports, which posed a challenge, particularly in the context of the expected rearmament of the FACA.
- An opportunity exists for the Government of CAR, together with support from international partners, to

- develop and to adopt a procedure for the import of arms, in line with international standards, including pre-shipment and post-shipment cooperation and controls.
- Further opportunities exist for the Government of CAR to increase its participation in relevant international and regional arms control forums. The Government of CAR is encouraged to participate in reporting exercises under relevant instruments (e.g. the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), United Nations Programme of Action (PoA)/International Tracing Instrument (ITI), Kinshasa Convention).

### **OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

Enhance international and regional cooperation in relevant arms control forums at the regional and international levels, including information-exchange on the national WAM system, if necessary through international assistance.

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In Relation to the ATT:

- · Submit an initial, and then a first annual and subsequent ATT reports
- Request international assistance for the implementation of the ATT
- Participate in the fourth and following Conferences of States Parties to the ATT.

In Relation to the PoA:

- Submit a PoA/ITI report prior to the 3rd Review Conference in 2018
- Participate in the third Review Conference and share findings from the national WAM baseline assessment as well as implementation of WAM options and activities.

In Relation to the Kinshasa Convention:

- Submit an annual and subsequent reports on the Kinshasa Convention
- Participate in the first and following Conferences of States Parties.

In Relation to the Nairobi Protocol:

Participate in the next Ministerial meeting.

### TECHNICAL PILLAR 4: WEAPONS MARKING



#### **KEY FINDINGS**

- As of September 2017, there were no marking operations ongoing in CAR, yet there was reportedly the political will to start marking State-owned weapons. Ad hoc capacity-building and training has been provided to CAR security services on weapons marking by international partners, including UNMAS. As of September 2017, CAR lacked a defined process and procedure for marking weapons that are likely to be imported into CAR as part of the exemption process of the United Nations arms embargo. Further, the Government of CAR did not yet develop a national plan and standard for the marking of State-owned
- weapons, including the marking format. The need to develop domestic regulation, national standards and procedures for weapons marking was clearly expressed by national stakeholders, as well as the need for further international support, capacity-building and training in this domain.
- In moving forward, the Government of CAR, through the COMNAT-ALPC, is encouraged to develop a plan for a national marking programme. There is also a need for procedures for marking of weapons, including for marking at the time of import as well as for those weapons as of September 2017 in State stocks.

### **OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

- Ensure that all arms under the control of State actors, including seized or recovered arms and arms maintained for CAR by international partners, have at least a unique serial number.
- Use a technical working group to develop national marking Standard Operating Proceedures (SOPs) in line with relevant international instruments and international standards.
- **18.** Ensure that the SOPs specify the marking format and the placement of necessary markings for each model and type of arm.
  - Develop and implement a national marking plan to ensure that each arm under the control of State actors or legally held by civilians is marked in conformity with the SOPs (and in line with international instruments and standards).

### TECHNICAL PILLAR 5: RECORD KEEPING



#### **KEY FINDINGS**

- As of September 2017, each CAR security service maintained its own register for arms and ammunition under its control and in its custody. As of September 2017, there was no centralized, national registry bringing together the entity-specific registries. The record-keeping system was paper based, whereby records were kept by each individual unit, and reportedly centralized at the level of the respective Ministries. Reportedly, there was not much domestic movement of significant quantities of arms, due to the security situation and logistical challenges faced. While an electronic register is foreseen for the FACA, the process had not yet started at the time of the assessment.
- In moving forward, there is an opportunity for the Government of CAR to develop a record-keeping system and to establish a comprehensive accounting system. The Government of CAR, and COM-NAT-ALPC, could use a national technical working group to identify the type of information required to be recorded in registries by CAR security services,
- in line with international instruments and standards. Another opportunity exists in the development of a national standard procedure for entering and maintaining records by CAR State actors. While it is recognized that as of September 2017 there was little domestic movement of arms, the forward-looking establishment of an "issue and receipt voucher" system would ensure that future movements of arms are accompanied by continuous, cross-verifiable records of all arms in the national stockpile. Eventually, there is an opportunity to create electronic registries within each CAR security service, as well as an electronic national registry.
- The establishment of such an accounting system (paper or electronic) will enable CAR to inventory weapons in the national stockpile, i.e. quantify weapons; identify surplus, obsolete, or unserviceable weapons; forecast arms and ammunition requirements accurately; and increase operational efficiency while reducing government expenditure.

### **OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

- Use a technical working group to identify the type of information required for registries maintained by State actors, in line with international instruments and standards.
- **21.** Develop an SOP for entering and keeping of records by State actors using a common terminology and consistent information maintained in databases.
- Proceed to the creation of electronic registries within each State security service, as well as an electronic national registry that collates registers of all State security services.
- 23. Identify needs and, if judged desirable and feasible, proceed to the creation of supplementary registries for seized/recovered weapons and arms legally held by civilians.

## TECHNICAL PILLAR 6: IDENTIFICATION & TRACING



#### **KEY FINDINGS**

- Identification and tracing of illicit weapons has so far not been a major focus area of WAM in CAR. As of September 2017, there existed no mechanism or pool of trained specialists in the identification and tracing of illicit arms. There were reportedly no domestic nor international tracing operations ongoing. CAR also lacks capacity to respond to international tracing requests. National capacity in this area has yet to be developed. In this regard, CAR, and its security services, could greatly benefit from further operational guidance on domestic and international tracing procedures.
- National stakeholders expressed a need for enhancing national capacity and to receive international support in this area of work. There exists an opportunity, for the COMNAT-ALPC, together with relevant national entities, to develop a mechanism to identify seized or recovered weapons. The Government of CAR could also benefit from a procedure in this area, together with a guide to identify illicit arms most often encountered in CAR. This could go hand in hand with further development and implementation of capacity-building and training activities, in line with international standards.

### **OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

- **24.** Develop and adopt a guide to identify categories, models and types of arms in CAR, in order to support State actors in record-keeping practices and procedures by use of a common terminology.
- **25.** Develop further and implement capacity-building and training courses for State actors in identifying categories, models and types of weapons, as well as in weapons tracing.
- **26.** Create an SOP for seized or recovered weapons to be traced domestically in national registries in order to identify whether, at any point in time prior to seizure/recovery, the weapon was held by a State security service.
- 27. Develop a mechanism to identify seized/recovered weapons of which, following a domestic tracing operation, information is not found in registers of the security services at the national level, and for which an international tracing operation could be useful.

### TECHNICAL PILLAR 7: PROCESSING OF SEIZED WEAPONS



#### **KEY FINDINGS**

- As of September 2017, in cases where arms were seized, recovered or captured by CAR security services in the course of operations, they were reportedly registered in local accounts and the information, including date of seizure or recovery and quantities with serial numbers (if available), was communicated to the central national authorities. Reportedly, at the local level de facto integration into local stocks seems to be common practice among CAR security services, which raises concerns and signals a greater need for State control and management of the integration process for all security services.
- In moving forward, the Government of CAR should ensure that each seized, recovered or captured weapon is registered in a local weapons account with relevant information, including at minimum the serial number. The transmission of such information from the local level to a nationally centralized register should be ensured. Furthermore, there is a need for the Government of CAR to develop rules and procedures for processing seized, recovered or captured weapons, which should take into account logistical considerations as they pertain to operations.

#### **OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

- **28.** Ensure that each arm seized, recovered or captured is registered locally with the relevant information, including the serial number of weapons, if available.
- **29.** Ensure that State actors at the local level transmit relevant information on seized/recovered/captured weapons to the (nationally) centralized register(s).

## TECHNICAL PILLAR 8: PHYSICAL SECURITY & STOCKPILE MANAGMENT



### **KEY FINDINGS**

 Since 2014, international partners have assisted CAR authorities in the rehabilitation and construction of physical infrastructure as well as capacity-building and for stockpile management of both weapons and ammunition. Notable progress has been made in this area. Efforts to expand physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) activities beyond Bangui are of importance in the context of recent changes in the national defence doctrine and the adoption of the new national defence plan, which foresees PSSM to be rolled out alongside the expansion of the FACA across the territory. The current lack of mechanism

- for the physical verification of arms and ammunition constitutes a challenge. There was agreement among stakeholders in the September 2017 consultative process that further capacity-building in PSSM should remain a key priority area for WAM in CAR.
- In moving forward, the Government of CAR, together with international partners, are encouraged to further assess and implement PSSM in the provinces. In this regard, a technical WAM working group could be utilized to identify additional physical security requirements. In order to expand the group of training beneficiaries and build sustainable capacity, there is an opportunity to adopt and implement a "train the trainers" approach in future training activities. Further, the Government of CAR is encouraged to develop national PSSM standards and procedures, in
- line with international standards, which would help to codify good national practices.
- There exists an opportunity for the Government of CAR to develop and implement a "stocktaking exercise" to evaluate and to inventory stockpiles and the conditions under which they are stored, taking international standards as reference. The Government of CAR may further consider the establishment of an internal physical verification mechanism, focusing on physical inspections of arms and ammunition, inventory records, and the chains of weapons supplies. The purpose of this system is to mitigate diversion of arms and ammunition to entities outside the security services of CAR.

### **OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

- Continue efforts to revise and implement PSSM measures (construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure, including armouries and depots, capacity-building and training by use of a "train the trainers" approach).
- **31.** Utilize a technical working group to identify additional physical security measures that are required in line with international standards and directives.
- **32.** Develop, based on the needs and requirements identified by the technical working group, SOPs on PSSM in CAR.
- **33.** Develop and agree on terms of reference and plan and implement a stocktaking exercise for the State security services.

### TECHNICAL PILLAR 9: WEAPONS COLLECTION

### **KEY FINDINGS**

- As of September 2017, no formal national DDR process and voluntary disarmament was taking place in CAR. Several international partners continue to undertake community violence reduction (CVR) activities, which may encourage the laying down of arms.
- In moving forward, there exists an opportunity for CAR and the COMNAT-ALPC to utilize a technical WAM working group to identify the needs and conditions for a weapons collection programme, which could be informed by in-country research studies. It will be important to ensure that civil society, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) repre-
- senting women and children, as well as communities, are involved in all phases of a weapons collection programmes. Careful consideration should be given to the design of targeted collective or individual weapons collection incentive structures, as well as to
- the management of expectations. The Government of CAR, and the COMNAT-ALPC, are encouraged to identify, at an early planning stage, national entities and international partners to be involved in such voluntary disarmament and weapons collection programmes.

### **OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

- **34.** Utilize a WKG to identify needs for the planning of collection programmes (e.g. to identify when, where and under what conditions weapons collection programmes can be implemented).
- Ensure that weapons collection is based on agreed criteria (e.g. requiring the hand-in of a weapon of war ("arme de guerre") to be accepted in the DDR programme).

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Ensure the involvement of the civilian population and civil society, including NGOs representing women and children, in the sensitization, planning and implementation of collection programmes.

### TECHNICAL PILLAR 10: DISPOSAL



#### **KEY FINDINGS**

- As of September 2017, CAR lacked relevant regulations and policies for weapon and ammunition disposal. There was a lack of clarity across CAR security forces on how weapons and ammunition were to be identified for disposal, or what methods of disposal were to be used, and which authority is authorized to approve disposal processes. International standards recommend destruction as the preferred method of disposal. As of September 2017, destruction operations were undertaken on a needs basis, supported by international partners. The destruction of obsolete, unserviceable weapons and outdated ammunition is undertaken with support from UNMAS.
- An opportunity exists for the development of relevant regulations and policies on disposal of weapons

and ammunition. Furthermore, the Government of CAR could greatly benefit from the development of national guidelines and procedures for the identification as well as the destruction of obsolete, unserviceable and surplus arms and ammunition, in line with international standards. These could be developed through a technical WAM working group, convened by the COMNAT-ALPC once operationalized. The need for the identification and designation of a permanent destruction site was also clearly recognized by national stakeholders. In moving forward, national stakeholders also expressed a need for further support, capacity-building and training in this domain.

### **OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

Ensure, in relevant SOPs on WAM that each arm that is processed to be newly integrated or reintegrated into State stockpiles is duly and adequately marked and recorded.

Utilize a technical working group for the development of an SOP on the identification of obsolete or surplus weapons and outdated ammunition, via a security and defence needs evaluation, and the procedures for their destruction.

### **COUNTRY INSIGHTS SERIES**

### CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC





The exchange of good practices and lessons learned in strengthening WAM policy and practice in Africa seeks to enhance the knowledge of States, regional organisations and international partners on ways to establish and implement comprehensive national and regional frameworks governing the full lifecycle of arms and ammunition.

This publication presents a holistic approach to weapons and ammunition management with a special focus on the Central African Republic. This holistic approach to WAM contributes to achieving broader peace, security, and development goals including but not limited to conflict prevention, armed violence reduction, accountable security sector, protection of civilians, and advancing the Agenda 2030.

UNIDIR encourages the Community of States, regional organisations, and relevant international partners to examine the options suggested for enhancing WAM in each Country Insight and use them as a basis to inform the planning, implementation, and assessment of future WAM projects in the relevant country.

### **ABOUT UNIDIR**

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems.

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