Over six days, a team composed of diverse representatives (from UNIDIR, Interpeace, the Small Arms Survey, the Regional Centre for Small Arms Control, Kenya’s Ministry of Interior, National Defence University-Kenya, NEPCOH and local county authorities) conducted focus group discussions, stakeholder consultations, and community meetings. These took place in both urban centres and remote hotspots in Samburu, Baringo, Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, and West Pokot, where the State’s reach is limited and the presence of illicit weapons is not.

The team interacted with county commissioners, peace directors, National Police Service officers, elders, youth, women, and religious leaders. The findings were highly illuminating. In the Suguta Valley, one elder told the delegation:

Guns have brought more harm than good to our families. Nearly every home has lost someone.

Across all five counties, communities consistently identified three conditions for sustainable disarmament:

• simultaneous action across borders;
• credible post-surrender security guarantees; and
• concrete links between arms control and livelihood support.

Five counties, one picture

Meetings in Maralal, Samburu County, painted a detailed picture of the local security landscape, highlighting the linkages between livestock wealth, raiding and firearms possession. For households living more than ten kilometres from urban centres, guns are considered essential for protection.

A focus group with elders, youth, teachers, religious leaders, and local administrators in Suguta Valley in Turkana County’s Kapedo area highlighted:

• the widespread presence of firearms among young people;
• the uneven effects of Operation Maliza Uhalifu; and
• the urgent need for simultaneous disarmament across neighbouring communities.

The message was clear: unilateral community disarmament is perceived not as a pre-condition for peace, but as exposure and vulnerability.

In Baringo County, community members in Tangulbei and Kolowa in the Kerio Valley traced the roots of arms proliferation to cross-border inflows from Uganda during the 1970s and 1990s. They also reflected on recent voluntary arms surrenders, which followed the arrest of several high-profile individuals in neighbouring areas. That momentum reportedly contributed to the surrender of more than 100 weapons locally, reinforcing an important lesson from the field: accountability at higher levels can create space for meaningful community action.

In West Pokot County, County Commissioner, D.N. Saruni noted that 99% of recovered firearms had been voluntarily surrendered. This is a striking figure that underscores the potential of trust-based approaches to arms control. Community dialogues in Sigor and Orwa-Calabash brought together Pokot and Marakwet participants to share lessons learned and impact from joint farming initiatives between youth from both communities to build trust and cooperation.

What comes next

This first CLAC mission will directly inform the development of UNIDIR’s broader effort to develop a practical “menu of options” for use in community-led arms control initiatives across the globe. UNIDIR’s role in this process reflects its wider commitment to evidence- based and people-centred approaches to conventional arms control connecting global policy discussions to the everyday realities faced by communities most affected by insecurity and armed violence.

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Held under UNIDIR’s Roundtable for AI, Security and Ethics initiative and co-sponsored by Microsoft, the conference will bring together diplomats, policymakers, military officials, industry leaders, researchers and civil society to examine how AI is already shaping security – and what this means for global governance.

The conference takes place at a critical moment as governments move from conceptual discussions towards implementation. Advances in AI capabilities, coupled with growing international attention to its security implications, are accelerating efforts to develop shared approaches to risk management, accountability and international cooperation.

The challenge before us is no longer whether AI will influence international peace and security, but how we shape that influence. The pace of technological change is outstripping many existing governance frameworks. Bringing together diverse perspectives is essential to better understand emerging risks, identify opportunities, and strengthen international cooperation.

Dr Robin Geiss, UNIDIR Director

The two-day programme is structured around four thematic tracks:

• Technology foundations: Understanding AI systems, data practices, bias and dual-use technologies.
• Applications and integration: AI in military contexts, cyber operations and crisis response.
• Stakeholder perspectives: The roles of governments, industry and investors, including regional perspectives from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean.
• Future directions: Governance frameworks, accountability mechanisms and opportunities for cooperation.

Discussions will address issues including AI in warfare, cyber threats, deepfakes in conflict, and human oversight of automated systems. The programme will feature expert presentations, high-level panel discussions and demonstrations of emerging technologies.

Building on its inaugural edition in 2025, the Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics forms part of UNIDIR’s expanding work on AI, peace and security. It will be held consecutively to the informal exchanges on AI in the military domain in Geneva, offering a timely opportunity to connect broader policy discussions with ongoing multilateral processes.

The conference will also mark the launch of UNIDIR’s Centre of Excellence on AI, Peace and Security, which will serve as the Institute’s umbrella platform for research, dialogue and capacity-building on AI governance and security.

For further information, please contact Claudia Marquina, UNIDIR Head of Communications at claudia.marquina@un.org.

About UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems. For more information, visit unidir.org.

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The 4^th Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade of Small and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), held in 2024, established an open-ended technical expert group (OETEG) to develop recommendations for the full and effective implementation of these instruments in light of developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design. The first meeting of the OETEG takes place in New York this week and will examine measures to counter illicit 3D-printing of SALW, alongside other issues. Several considerations are outlined below for national and international experts as they seek to identify effective strategic and operational measures to enable States to implement the PoA and ITI in preventing the illicit 3D printing of SALW. 

Why is 3D-printing a problem for SALW control?

The UN PoA and ITI provide a series of measures that States should take to counter the illicit manufacture and trafficking of SALW. 3D-printing of SALW poses several challenges for PoA and ITI implementation, including: 

• the decentralized and unregulated production of these weapons; 
• the commercial availability of production machinery (i.e. 3D-printers);
• the production of unmarked weapons; and
• the intangible flows of knowledge online. 

While the first three challenges are also features for other types of craft-produced SALW, 3D-printing takes the issue from the physical to the virtual realm. The proliferation of digital blueprints online and the strong shift towards increasingly do-it-yourself designs that do not rely on the use of government-regulated components means that decentralized, undetectable networks can produce lethal 3D-printed SALW beyond the control of States.

It is therefore essential that the OETEG provides a platform for national and international experts to share current and emerging challenges posed by 3D printing for the full and effective implementation of the PoA and ITI, but also recommendations for: 

• legislation to ensure national control;
• international intelligence sharing and cooperation to enhance investigation protocols;
• the use of new technologies for disrupting illicit knowledge sharing; and 
• capacity-building, training and awareness raising to prevent the use of 3D-printers for illicit SALW production. 

Strengthening legal frameworks

A cornerstone of the effective implementation of international instruments is comprehensive national-level legislation. Several countries, such as Australia, Canada, Jamaica, North Macedonia and Singapore, have taken proactive measures to enhance their legislative frameworks by means of criminalizing digital blueprints for 3D production of SALW. The UK has proposed a similar bill to Parliament.

At the regional level, an EU Commission proposal from February 2026 to harmonize definitions and penalties to combat the illicit trafficking of firearms includes suggestions for EU Member States to introduce the following penalties in their national systems: 

• an upper limit of at least two years of imprisonment for the illicit creation, acquisition, possession and dissemination of 3D-printed SALW blueprints;
• five years for the possession of illicit firearms, components and ammunition; and 
• eight years for trafficking and manufacturing. 

While the criminalization of blueprints is a good first step, States should also ensure that their SALW control legislation covers the illicit manufacture, possession, use and trafficking of all forms of 3D-printed SALW and their components. 

Intelligence sharing and cooperation

Intelligence sharing and international cooperation between law enforcement agencies are crucial in stemming the proliferation of 3D-printed SALW. While many States already have national points of contact for PoA/ITI implementation, it does not appear that intelligence on 3D-printed SALW is moving beyond regional level exchanges between national firearms focal points and specialist units. States could consider ways of including information about illicit 3D-printed SALW in shared databases, such as INTERPOL’s ‘iARMS’. This all requires law enforcement agencies to develop and maintain approaches and protocols for data collection, analysis, and sharing related to seizures of 3D-printed SALW. 

Law enforcement agencies must also develop close cooperation with the 3D-printing industry. As stipulated in the outcomes from the 4^th Review Conference, bringing 3D-printing companies to the discussion table and promoting active dialogue without infringing on the legitimate uses of this technology is key. Cooperation must also be fostered with other stakeholders, such as postal services, e-commerce sites, and social media platforms, as these continue to be used to sell and promote 3D-printed SALW. 

New technologies to disrupt illicit 3D-printing

It is imperative for law enforcement agencies to use new technologies to detect and disrupt illicit networks involved in illicit information sharing and the production of 3D-printed SALW. Pilot projects are already underway that could lead the way. For example, the CEASEFIRE project, a three-year multidimensional project that was implemented during 2022-25 involving the EU, EUROPOL and INTERPOL, aimed to incorporate various cyber-detection methods, AI-driven tools, shared databases, information fusion and offline techniques to interdict illegal firearms trafficking, including the distribution of digital blueprints for 3D-printed SALW. Successful pilot projects could be expanded, replicated and sustained, while new initiatives should be developed.

Several US states are exploring the introduction of ‘blocking software’ to detect blueprints and block 3D-printing of SALW. At present, this has several limitations, including: 

• the need to be constantly updated to account for new designs;
• the susceptibility to circumvention;
• the risk of flagging false positives; and 
• the dependence on federal legislation mandating compliance by various stakeholders.

It remains to be seen if AI could help overcome the first two limitations. 

A promising development is the Secure Information Embedding and Extraction framework, which aims to embed unique fingerprints into 3D-printed objects that are resistant to physical tampering, breakage and digital interdiction. 

Capacity building, training and awareness-raising

States must also focus on training law enforcement officers to identify and document 3D-printed SALW and their components, develop standard operating procedures for evidence collection, and enhance forensic capabilities. While developments within the forensic space that are focused on chemical signature tracing of polymers, toolmark analysis of nozzle and print bed deposition artifacts and fingerprinting of printers are still limited, they remain useful in aiding investigations and enhancing prosecution. Future developments in nano-topographical and micro-CT analysis may enhance forensic identification of 3D-printed SALW. All of this requires adequate resources.

International organizations like INTERPOL and the UN play a crucial role in assisting Member States develop their capabilities to counter the illicit production, proliferation and misuse of 3D-printed SALW. INTERPOL’s Project Stonefish and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs’s SALW Fellowship Training Programme are examples of capacity-building programmes that aim to increase awareness and strengthen the investigative capabilities of Member States in this area. 

At the national level, States should consider introducing awareness programmes targeted at young people, given the increasing involvement of youths in the 3D-printing of firearms.

The way forward

Current proliferation trends suggest that the OETEG’s consideration of how to counter the threat posed by 3D-printed SALW is timely. UNIDIR has been actively supporting the preparations for all the issues under the purview of the OETEG, as can be seen in this recent report. Developments that seemed like a chimaera a decade ago have become a reality today. Therefore, it is imperative that we put the necessary preventive measures in place now to stem further misuse of this technology. 

At the same time, we have seen that 3D-printing has evolved rapidly and is not standing still. Therefore, we should already be considering how to ensure that opportunities like the OETEG, which brings together a unique group of national and international experts, can be used to address technological challenges as they emerge. The 2026 OETEG meeting will therefore be a useful “pilot” opportunity.  

The post Mitigating the proliferation of 3D-printed small arms and light weapons first appeared on UNIDIR.

As advances in AI raise increasingly complex questions for policymakers, regulators and international institutions alike, States and stakeholders are seeking shared understandings, common norms and coordinated approaches that can support responsible governance across security and defence contexts.

This growing momentum is reflected in an expanding ecosystem of international and regional initiatives. Recent developments, including the UN General Assembly resolutions 79/239 and 80/58, the Secretary-General’s report on AI in the military domain, REAIM and a growing number of national and regional AI strategies, point to a broader shift from abstract debates toward implementation, practical governance measures and sustained multilateral engagement.

At the same time, the pace of technological innovation continues to challenge existing policy frameworks, making international cooperation and cross-sector dialogue increasingly necessary.

Amid this rapidly evolving landscape, UNIDIR’s Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics 2026 (AISE26) serves as an agile and inclusive space for bridging technical and policy communities and strengthening cooperative approaches to AI-related security challenges.

A platform for dialogue

The inaugural edition of the conference took place in March 2025, against a highly dynamic backdrop. Policymakers and regulators worldwide had begun to recognize the urgency of shared understandings, norms and regulations that transcend national borders and individual interests, including in the context of AI’s applications for security and defence.

In parallel, AI in the military and security domains were often, if not most of the times discussed at either end of the spectrum: as a question of governance, international law and global norms, or as a question of technical design and corporate governance.

In response, UNIDIR leveraged its existing network of experts – building on the work of the Roundtable for AI, Security and Ethics (RAISE) launched in 2024 – and giving a voice to under-represented perspectives from all five UN regional groups in an inclusive manner that transcends geopolitical barriers.

As such, UNIDIR’s Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics constituted a platform for independent, neutral and expert-led dialogue.

By fostering mutual understanding and cross-sectoral action, it established itself as a channel for substantive input feeding into multilateral, international, regional and national governance initiatives. The conference was also held ahead of the deadline for the submission of States’ and the multistakeholder community’s views to the UN Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 79/239 on AI in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security.

Unwavering commitment to AI and security

UNIDIR’s conference is also part of the Institute’s broader work on AI and autonomy. This explores these technologies’ evolution, their applications and implications on international, regional and national peace and security, and the policy options available to respond effectively – informing both the deliberations on lethal autonomous weapons systems and broader discussions on military AI.

Recent projects include the co-development with OHCHR of a voluntary framework that provides guidelines for industry actors in AI in the military domain. Acknowledging the private sector’s increasingly important role throughout these technologies’ lifecycle, UNIDIR seeks to collaborate with organizations, industry actors, civil society and Member States to formulate guidelines translating existing international law and norms into measures for their implementation and operationalization.

The Institute emphasizes regional engagement for the responsible development, deployment and use of AI in the military domain and for the application of international humanitarian law in relation to lethal autonomous weapons systems. It does so while preserving an inherently inter-disciplinary approach due to the multi-faceted nature of these technologies. This is reflected in its work surrounding large language models, decommissioning, as well as the publication of its roadmap encapsulating the Institute’s recommendations for future policy action.

Additionally, given the growing number of national initiatives in this space, UNIDIR has developed, over the past years, tools for furthering national capacity. These include its AI Policy Portal, which fosters transparency and information-sharing, and is complemented by the Draft Guidelines for the Development of a National Strategy on AI in Security and Defence. In addition, UNIDIR’s Women in AI Fellowship, taking place annually in Geneva, equips women diplomats with the expertise to explore the latest and emerging AI applications from policy, legal and technical lens.

What’s next for AI, security and ethics

UNIDIR’s Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics 2026 will convene policymakers, diplomats, military representatives, industry leaders, researchers, academia and civil society to address the evolving implications of AI for international security and resilience.

Taking place on 18–19 June at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, and online, the conference serves as a catalyst for action at a pivotal moment for global AI governance.

By bringing together technical and policy communities from across sectors and regions, the conference reflects a shared commitment to a more secure world. Through an expanded programme featuring technical deep dives, high-level panels, interactive roundtables, demonstrations and poster presentations, it seeks to create space not only for dialogue across disciplines, but also for practical exchange between technical and policy communities.

In the lead-up this year’s edition, UNIDIR is also expanding these discussions through the Road to AISE26 webinar series and the launch of the AISE Markers policy notes. Together, these initiatives aim to sustain dialogue ahead of the event, while helping to identify emerging questions, areas of convergence and issues that continue to require deeper reflection across policy and technical communities.

At a time when technological developments risk outpacing governance processes, spaces for inclusive, informed and action-oriented dialogue are critical. The governance of AI and its implications for international peace and security cannot be addressed in isolation. It requires sustained cooperation, shared understanding and continued engagement across the international community in the years ahead.

The post UNIDIR transcends geopolitical barriers on AI and security first appeared on UNIDIR.

The two-day training brought together 30 national officials from Angola’s ministries of defence, finance, human rights, and interior, as well as representatives of the armed forces, national police and customs authorities. It sought to improve reporting to the following international arms control instruments:

• the United Nations Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management (GFA);
• the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA) and its International Tracing Instrument (ITI); and
• the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).

During this workshop, it is expected that experiences, best practices, and technical knowledge will be shared to help improve the quality of national reports (…) [Reporting] serves as a diagnostic tool for assessing the current overall situation and for adjusting and enriching ongoing measures.

H.E. Marcos Correia, Secretary of State for the Protection of Strategic Objectives of the Ministry of Defence

Dr Paul Holtom, Head of UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme, noted that by helping States and other stakeholders to fulfil their commitments and obligations under conventional arms and ammunition control instruments: “We can help to build confidence and trust between States, reduce tensions around arms, and foster peace, security, stability and sustainable development.“

From capacity-building to concrete progress

The workshop focused on the practical steps required for Angola to prepare its national reports. Experts examined the types of data and information to be reported under each instrument, identified which national institutions hold relevant information, and considered how stronger inter-agency coordination can support reporting processes.

Participants developed first drafts of guidance for national reporting procedures and kick-started the process of developing Angola’s national reports for the GFA, PoA/ITI and UNROCA. Experts also discussed implementation gaps and identified national priorities for international cooperation and assistance.

ANCAD timed the workshop to support Angola’s broader arms control efforts, as highlighted by H.E. Marcos Correia:

This initiative, carried out in strategic partnership with UNIDIR, forms part of the sector’s Biennial Action Plan for the Implementation of Arms Control Instruments, aimed above all at strengthening the national system for controlling arms of all types and categories by enhancing the capacity of relevant institutions, adapting existing legislation, and training personnel, based on international standards, recommendations, and best practices.

The workshop enhanced Angola’s engagement with international obligations and processes; supported a systematic stocktaking of national progress and challenges; and provided additional momentum to strengthen its legal framework through the development of a new Law on the Control of Conventional Arms and Ammunition and Related Materials.

Looking ahead

UNIDIR and Angola will continue to explore opportunities for cooperation to strengthen national arms and ammunition control. As Dr Holtom noted:

We hope that this capacity-building workshop is the first of many opportunities to work together to counter the threats posed by unregulated and illicit weapons to communities and the State of Angola.

The workshop forms part of UNIDIR’s broader efforts to support States in building sustainable, nationally owned capacities for effective reporting. Through its Conventional Weapons Programme, UNIDIR provides tailored advice and capacity-building to help States fulfil their commitments under international instruments on conventional arms and ammunition control.

The post UNIDIR and Angola strengthen arms transparency and control first appeared on UNIDIR.

This year’s meeting comes at a time of rising global insecurity and escalating armed violence around the world, with women and girls particularly affected. The effects are visible across a wide range of national contexts.

Each year, around 50,000 women and girls are killed by intimate partners or family members, accounting for more than half of all female homicides.

These deaths rarely occur without warning, they are the culmination of long cycles of abuse, threats and coercion, often involving firearms. Where firearms are present, violence is more likely to escalate in severity, to involve sustained coercive control and to end in death.

Research conducted in Mexico illustrates this stark trend, with firearm-related murders of women surging by 375% from 2004 to 2024. This reflects the increasing accessibility of firearms as well as their growing lethality in domestic and community settings.

Gender matters in the UN PoA

The UN PoA matters for efforts to prevent gender-based violence committed by firearms. From the outset, the UN PoA has acknowledged that the illicit proliferation of SALW affects both women and men. Over time, successive Biennial Meetings of States have sharpened this understanding, recognizing the differentiated impacts of illicit SALW on women, men, boys and girls.

This progress was significantly strengthened at the Third Review Conference in 2018, where States explicitly linked the illicit trade in SALW to gender-based violence and human rights violations. But it was the Fourth Review Conference, in 2024, which marked the most significant step forward to date.

There, States committed to go beyond recognition of differential impacts by addressing the gender roles, norms and expectations that shape how women and men acquire illicit arms. They also emphasized the importance of encouraging the participation of men and boys in the mainstreaming of gender perspectives within SALW policies and programmes.

For the first time, Member States also recognized that violence linked to the illicit proliferation of SALW is more than just a security issue, as there a range of complex links between armed violence and the physical and mental health of women, men, girls and boys.

Reporting trends suggest that these commitments have gained traction. In 2025, 74% of States reporting under the PoA indicated that they integrate gender considerations into national arms control efforts – up 62% from the previous year. However, gaps remain.

In 2025, only 29% of States reported that they collect gender-disaggregated data. This is essential in designing effective responses that reflect the distinct risks, needs and experiences of women, men, girls and boys.

New technology, old problems

At the Fourth Review Conference, States established the Open-Ended Technical Expert Group (OETEG) to examine developments in the manufacturing, technology and design of SALW – including polymer weapons, modular systems and illicit 3D printing of firearms. While gender is not explicitly included in this mandate, it remains highly relevant.

Emerging evidence suggests that some parts of the 3D-printed gun community overlap with hypermasculine and misogynistic online cultures. These dynamics sometimes translate into real-world violence.

A gender perspective can therefore strengthen the OETEG’s work by addressing critical questions: who is manufacturing and acquiring these weapons, who is affected by new forms of diversion, and who is excluded from technical decision-making?

It also helps ensure that tools for tracing, marking and recovery reflect the differentiated impacts of SALW, including patterns linked to intimate partner violence, femicide and conflict-related sexual violence.

These are not abstract concerns. They are practical questions central to whether technical work under the UN PoA can inform national implementation measures that are both technically sound and genuinely responsive to real-world patterns of armed violence, diversion and gendered harm.

From words to action

The task at BMS9 is straightforward but consequential: to hold on to what states have already agreed and to ensure that these commitments remain central as implementation moves into new areas, including those covered by the OETEG.

To that end, States gathering in New York should consider four key steps:

• Reaffirm their commitments on gender mainstreaming and ensure gender-responsive approaches are integrated into the implementation of the PoA, including in national laws, action plans and operational practices.
• Improve disaggregation by sex, gender, age and disability in data collection and analysis to enable a clearer understanding of how small arms are involved in different forms of violence, including intimate partner violence and conflict-related sexual violence. A stronger evidence base favours better-targeted and more effective responses.
• Collaborate with experts and civil society networks on further understanding and addressing gender norms, especially masculinities that shape the acquisition and use of weapons, including 3D printed firearms.
• Promote gender balance and the meaningful participation of women, gender experts and civil society at BMS9 and within expert groups like OETEG.

States attending BMS9 should focus on ensuring that these commitments are not treated as peripheral or optional. Instead, they need to be translated into concrete national measures, better data, inclusive decision-making and sustained political attention as the small arms landscape continues to evolve.

Natalie Briggs is a Program Officer at New York University’s Centre on International Cooperation (CIC), supporting the Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just, and Inclusive Societies and the coordination of the Gender Equality Network for Small Arms Control. Prior to joining CIC, she worked with organizations such as UNIDIR, Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just, and Inclusive Societies and the International Action Network on Small Arms on projects focused on disarmament and small arms control.

Hana Salama is a Researcher at UNIDIR’s Integrated Approaches Programme. She is the co-author of Women Managing Weapons, a report which investigates the previously unexplored area of women’s participation in Weapons and Ammunition Management. Currently, Hana is leading several projects on gender in conventional arms control and disarmament. She is conducting a study on gender responsive arms control in conflict prevention and investigating good practices for gender equality in decision-making and implementation of conventional arms control and disarmament.

The post What next for the UN Programme of Action? Gender perspectives and the future of small arms control first appeared on UNIDIR.

In 2025, one in six people were exposed to armed conflict, and firearms account for nearly half of all violent deaths worldwide. In regions affected by armed extremism, armed groups cause the majority of civilian fatalities. Where illicit SALW proliferate, such groups flourish and can sustain violence for longer, driving demand for more weapons. This is a vicious cycle.

Policy responses have struggled to address this complexity. Global SALW control debates have for decades prioritized measures to curb illicit weapon supply, with little attention paid to why people take up arms. Tackling armed violence, notably violent extremism, tends to be over-securitized and reactive, addressing symptoms more than causes. In recent years, while necessary, neither approach has proofed to be sufficient.

In 2024, the Pact for the Future brought prevention back to the fore, calling on Member States to address the root causes of violence. That same year, the fourth Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms (RevCon4) pushed States to examine what drives weapons demand, not just supply. These were promising signs of a paradigm shift.

But how can these commitments be implemented locally and lessons from the field be fed back into global policymaking? As States approach the ninth Biennial Meeting of States under the Programme of Action (BMS9) and the ninth review of the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy in June this year, West Africa shows global policymakers what integrating prevention and SALW control can practically look like and how the puzzle could be pieced together

West Africa spotlight

Driven by the rise of armed groups and their continuing spread from the Sahel to the littoral States of the Gulf of Guinea, armed violence has intensified across West Africa. It hosts four of the world’s most terrorism-affected countries and an estimated 11 million civilian-held firearms, the highest concentration on the continent.

The West African evidence is clear: fragmented and over-securitized approaches fall short in preventing armed violence sustainably.

At a 2023 regional workshop by UNIDIR and partners, West African stakeholders called for an integrated approach to tackle both the root causes of violence and the weapons (primarily SALW) that fuel it. This echoes the New Agenda for Peace’s appeal for comprehensive and more prevention-focused approaches to these issues. To support this change, a recent study by UNIDIR, the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs documents what joined-up efforts look like in practice.

What comes out clearly is that demand for arms and engagement in violent extremism share common drivers – which mainly affect communities in border areas – and these include:

• Weak state presence,
• Economic hardship,
• Distrust in public institutions
• Absence of effective state security.

This convergence is a key, often overlooked entry point for joining up armed violence prevention and SALW control. Translating integrated approaches into practice hinges on three mutually reinforcing dimensions: policy, institutions, and operations.

Integration in practice to learn from

At the policy level, West African practices show that developing and reviewing strategic frameworks are important for integrating approaches. Benin’s Draft National SALW Action Plan (2020-2024) is a good example, addressing both weapons demand and supply.

National frameworks only deliver if they are grounded in local realities and co-created by those who live them. Community leaders, women’s groups, youth, and local authorities must therefore be partners in the design and implementation of plans to address violence and weapons proliferation.

For instance, Mali illustrates this in its upcoming SALW National Action Plan (2026–2030) – which was co-developed through inclusive dialogue with customary and religious leaders.

Institutions must follow. Integrated frameworks mean little if bodies responsible for delivery operate in silos. Coordination of government mechanisms for violence prevention and SALW control goes a long way, as witnessed in Nigeria. The Office of the National Security Adviser houses both the National Centre for the Control of SALW and the National Counter Terrorism Centre, easing interaction. Representation in respective governance boards could also play a bridging, still underutilized role. Inclusive representation has – here too – proved useful for integrated thinking. In Sierra Leone for instance, the Advisory Committee of the National SALW Commission brings various government agencies together with local government, civil society, paramount chiefs, and youth and women’s representatives, as part of a whole-of-society approach.

In operations, integrated activities concretize most impactfully at the community level. In Côte d’Ivoire, the SALW Commission engages dialogue with communities not just to sensitize to the risks of weapons proliferation, but also to non-violence and the prevention of radicalization, often with traditional leaders and women’s groups as key players. Likewise, the voluntary surrender of SALW has proved most sustainable when combined with the provision of socio-economic alternatives addressing drivers for weapons demand, as seen in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire.

Looking ahead, community-led arms control holds particular untapped potential. It can build trust and local agency to reduce armed violence at their roots, with peace or civil-military committees as entry points for dialogue.

When communities are involved and see tangible benefits, prevention becomes a collective engagement with more sustainable outcome.

Advancing integrated approaches can come with teething troubles, including:

• The lack of shared understanding and space for exchange among stakeholders,
• Conflicting responsibilities,
• Limited political will and ownership,
• Capacity constraints,
• And many others.

West African practices demonstrate what potential is unlocked when clearing some of these hurdles.

The puzzle needs all its pieces

Policy shapes implementation and implementation must shape policy. In 2024, States made promising commitments at RevCon4 and in the Pact for the Future toward holistic, prevention-centred approaches to armed violence. The recent study by UNIDIR and partners, alongside initiatives in West Africa like the UN Development Programme – Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre’s work on conflict prevention and weapons and ammunition management,  as well as the Saving-Lives Entity’s support to armed violence reduction in Ghana and Mali, demonstrate how to put these commitments into practice. The missing piece is to feed lessons from these efforts back into global frameworks to scale what works, adapted to context. The 2026 meetings should close the loop.

BMS9 is an opportunity for considering good practices to deliver on RevCon4 commitments. It could emphasize that joined-up responses to both issues deliver best when done across all dimensions: from policymaking to institutional cooperation and implementation. It could also go further, affirming the role of genuine multi-stakeholder processes in making joined-up efforts effective and sustainable – with communities and dialogue as central levers.

The ninth review of the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy is expected to build on the UN Secretary-General’s call to avoid siloing the prevention and countering of extremism. The eighth review addressed SALW control mainly in terms of countering supply to terrorist groups. The ninth review could recognize that SALW control also has a preventive dimension in reducing demand for weapons, thereby helping to address local drivers of extremism.

The evidence is there. The entry points are clear. The policy windows are open. Whether 2026 marks an upscale in policymaking – or a missed beat – is now the question on the table.

Vedika Pillai was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme. She holds a Master’s in International Development from the Geneva Graduate Institute, and degrees in sociology, international relations, and peacebuilding from Lady Shri Ram College and Sciences Po Paris. She has worked across research and policy roles with UNICEF, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and Legal Action Worldwide. Her published work includes research on social protection in Ethiopia with UNICEF Innocenti, and on rural livelihoods, conflict and gender in South Asia.

Ursign Hofmann is a Senior Researcher with UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme. Previously, he served as a Programme Officer at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, as a Policy Advisor at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and as a Research Assistant at the Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations System. He holds a Master’s degree in History and French and a Bachelor’s degree in History and Political Science from the University of Lausanne.

The post Time to piece together prevention and small arms control first appeared on UNIDIR.

Moderated by UNIDIR Director, Robin Geiss, the discussion featured opening remarks by the Mayor of Hiroshima and President of Mayors for Peace, Kazumi Matsui, who highlighted the importance of nuclear disarmament. He was followed by UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, who emphasized that the review conference represents a significant opportunity for State Parties and in particular nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm their commitments under the treaty.

Minister Kimitake Nakamura, Director-General of the Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to the NPT. He highlighted the importance of the disarmament and non-proliferation education as a key tool for promoting a world without nuclear weapons, especially for the younger generation.

Examining the state of the three pillars

Dr Chen Zak Kane, Head of UNIDIR’s Middle East WMD-Free Zone Project covered the non-proliferation pillar, noting that this is an area where the treaty’s tools have been most visibly tested. She stressed the importance of universalizing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and ensuring that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the resources to implement them effectively. She also emphasized the need for safeguards to adapt to emerging technologies. While AI could lower barriers to WMD development, real constraints remain on how far it enables new actors to build nuclear weapons.

Turning to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Dr Shun Oshita, a Senior Lecturer with the Hiroshima Peace Institute, argued that Article IV has historically served as a “built‑in stabilizer” for the NPT’s “grand bargain”. However, there was a risk that this was leading to the stagnation of nuclear disarmament. He argued that the “good faith” obligations of Article VI must be scrutinized potentially through some form of institutional body. 

Focusing on nuclear disarmament, Dr Randy Rydell, Honorary Advisor at Mayors for Peace drew attention to the fundamental “principles” that the UN General Assembly adopted to guide the negotiation of the treaty. He also highlighted some of the persistent challenges of implementing disarmament commitments. While recognizing that Article VI is not the only legal instrument to advance disarmament, he stressed the extent that the entire treaty depends on demonstrable fulfilment of these obligations – as observed at its review conferences.

What to expect from the review conference

During the discussion, the panellists and audience members discussed possible outcomes of the review conference. Participants also discussed the importance of nuclear weapons States demonstrating good faith in their commitment to the treaty, as well as the possibility of convening a fourth Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament if the NPT Review Conference fails.

The event was part of an ongoing partnership between UNIDIR and Mayors for Peace, as well as of a dynamic series of side events organized by UNIDIR and its partners during the 2026 NPT Review Conference. These events aimed to enhance understanding of key issues and deepen engagement with processes, procedures and potential outcomes.

The post Taking stock of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at a pivotal moment first appeared on UNIDIR.

This intense global interconnectedness clearly comes with great benefits, but it also brings great risks.

A successful hack against a small Ukrainian software company might not sound like a big deal for the rest of us, but within a year of M.E.Doc’s servers being breached in 2017, the NotPetya incident had cost businesses around the world over $10 billion. The WannaCry attack hit the UK’s National Health Service first and hardest, but within days it had spread to over 150 countries. And when the ICRC was targeted in 2022, sensitive data related to more than half a million people worldwide was exposed.

Though much of the damage is the result of a global cybercrime epidemic whose costs already rise into the trillions, the increasing frequency of state-linked cyber attacks on civilian and humanitarian infrastructure means that the picture is not so straightforward.

On the contrary, today’s cyber domain is characterized by impacts cascading across networks, industries and borders, with an incredibly diverse range of actors affected and involved. The growing scale and the sophistication of these challenges mean that narrow, technical solutions to cybersecurity are no longer enough.

The seriousness of these impacts and the need for a concerted, collective response is clear from the fact that the UN Security Council has, in recent years, repeatedly been briefed on cyber threats to international peace and security.

Recognition of the gravity of the situation has also driven a conceptual shift towards the idea of cyber resilience over cybersecurity. The focus has today moved beyond individual networks and onto the broader and better question of how systems and societies can collectively react, adapt, and recover when successful attacks do occur.

Cooperation in times of fragmentation

While businesses and governments alike increasingly understand the need for an intersectoral, global approach, their task is made more difficult by the growing fragmentation of the digital domain itself.

This is driven by rapid technological developments and differences in political posture, regulatory approach, and organizational capacity. Together, these factors create faultlines that make cyber infiltration more likely, as seen in the following areas:

• Political volatility: Political tensions have knock-on effects for cyber risk, with geopolitical considerations the most important influence on cyber risk mitigation strategies for two-thirds of organizations.
• Patchwork regulation: Though regulation itself is seen as having a positive effect, three-quarters of chief information security officers report that the current global patchwork of regulatory approaches significantly hampers their efforts to achieve proper compliance.
• Capacity gaps: There are major differences in capacity levels among countries, with some still lacking even basic legal frameworks and cybersecurity incident response teams.
• SME resilience: Small organizations are twice as likely to have insufficient resilience as compared to larger counterparts. The potentially destabilizing effects of any one player’s security deficiencies are also significantly amplified when they are embedded in the complex, globally diversified, poorly understood digital supply chains behind many of the services and systems we rely on today.
• Emerging tech: Technological advances in different areas also expand the range of vulnerabilities and entry points open to attack, with increasingly sophisticated generative AI the overwhelming concern in 2026 and quantum technology posing a particular threat to existing forms of encryption.

Pulling on the fabric of cyber resilience from a variety of different angles, these diverse pressures and structural gaps mean that no one company, government or international body has the visibility, authority or capacity to fully manage international cyber risks on its own. Yet the same fragmentation that makes cooperation so difficult also makes it more urgent than ever.

Making good on the promise of cyber resilience

Of course, collective, cooperative efforts are already underway, and they provide a solid foundation for the cyber resilience architecture we need. But to really make a difference, we need to move beyond negotiation to the concrete work of implementation.

Take, for example, the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace that were endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2015 and reaffirmed in 2021. To realize the potential of its norms around the protection of critical infrastructure, states need first to identify and designate what qualifies as critical infrastructure, assign responsibility for it to a competent agency, build up effective cyber capacity within such agencies, and create rules around incident reporting and cooperation to ensure that attacks and their spread are properly tracked and addressed.

Another complimentary, concrete step that governments can take is to bolster their participation in confidence-building measures like the global points of contact directory. This initiative establishes channels of secure, direct communication on cyber incidents, including those affecting critical infrastructure to de-escalate tensions, clarify misunderstandings, and promote more effective, collective responses by sharing information and capacity.

This capacity itself is a prerequisite for proper compliance and cooperative assistance, and so it must be built up. This could take the form of skills development for one’s own technical staff, the creation of dedicated cyber incident response teams, support from established companies and public institutions for small and medium-sized enterprises in their own capacity-building efforts, and pooling of knowledge and skills to support less well-resourced countries and regions around the world.

Effective cooperation will also depend on treating industry, civil society and academia as operational partners. Initiatives such as the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, the Paris Call, the Internet Governance Forum and the World Economic Forum’s Centre for Cybersecurity already point the way forward, as do inclusive platforms like UNIDIR’s Cyber Stability Conference and the wider Geneva Cyber Week, both held annually in May.

The coming months will also see the launch of the UN’s Global Mechanism on ICT Security, which will provide a single permanent track for governments to ensure that steps towards more concrete progress stay on track, to further strengthen confidence‑building measures and to redouble efforts to improve capacity‑building across the board.

It is only this kind of concrete, cooperative and collective effort that can truly build cyber resilience across every link in the chain, and protect the vital digital infrastructure that today plays such a key role in our lives as individuals, and our life as a species.

An earlier version of this article was originally published by the World Economic Forum.

The post Why cyber resilience needs to be concrete, cooperative and collective first appeared on UNIDIR.

With the emergence of the internet and a wave of personal computers, the evolution of ICTs that started at the end of the 20th century transformed how people and societies interacted and how information was created, stored and shared. What started as a small military and academic research network expanded into a global web connecting millions of devices and, eventually, billions of people.

Building on this expansion, the subsequent phase of digital development saw the consolidation of search engines, web browsers, and email as core tools for accessing and exchanging information at scale. Alongside these developments, early cyber risks emerged, including malware and basic intrusion techniques disseminated through physical media and early network infrastructures. In the early 2000s, the wider adoption of wireless connectivity and mobile devices further increased the volume, speed and reach of digital communications, expanding digital opportunities while also introducing additional layers of security vulnerabilities.

AI at the heart of today’s security

Keeping up with past technological innovation, the contemporary global cyber threat landscape is undergoing another major shift driven by rapid advances in new and emerging technologies, with significant implications for international peace and security.

UNIDIR’s Insights into Cyberthreats and International Security in 2025 highlighted how these new and emerging technologies are reshaping both offensive and defensive cyber operations. These advancements, especially AI, bring new opportunities but also new multi-dimensional risks and challenges, underscoring that its disruptive potential is no longer theoretical.

The safety and security concerns anticipated in UNIDIR’s Innovations Dialogue 2022 on AI disruption, peace and security have now become immediate and tangible vulnerabilities, expanding attack surfaces and multiplying threat vectors that stakeholders must confront.

To better understand the AI-ICT security nexus, UNIDIR introduced a technical framework showing how AI can influence both perpetrator and defender postures in the ICT environment. However, governance of this nexus does not clearly fit into the five-pillared framework of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace – which comprises of existing and potential threats, voluntary norms, international law, confidence-building measures, and capacity building. This gap warrants further deliberation, including in the UN Global Permanent Mechanism in the context of international security which is a single‑track, and State‑led mechanism operating under the auspices of the United Nations, aimed at promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful and interoperable ICT environment. It conducts consultations through substantive plenary sessions, dedicated thematic groups, intersessional meetings, and periodic review conferences.

Where algorithms meet tomorrow

Looking ahead, quantum technology is identified as one of the most transformative technological innovations on the horizon in UNIDIR’s compendium on enabling technologies and international security. The year 2025, designated the International Year of Quantum Science and Technology, marked a century since the initial research and development of quantum mechanics.

Despite its century-long history, the full implications of quantum technology remain uncertain. Multi-stakeholder discussions during UNIDIR’s Innovations Dialogue 2024 underscored the need for careful deliberations, structured governance, proactive policy-making, and inclusive capacity building to reduce the quantum divide and manage the emerging quantum arms race.

In this context, UNIDIR’s research on quantum technology, peace and security highlights several major threats to international peace and security, including the potential decryption of sensitive data from critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, quantum-enabled intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and the integration of AI models with quantum algorithms.

In the recently concluded second UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICTs in the context of international security, the potential threats emanating from quantum technology were consistently highlighted by Member States.

What’s next for cybersecurity

Since its inception in 2012, UNIDIR’s annual Cyber Stability Conference fosters multistakeholder dialogue to harmonize the policy, legal, technical and diplomatic perspectives on existing and potential cyber threats while exploring ways to enhance cyber resilience through the implementation of the UN Framework of Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace.

This year’s conference will reflect on more than two decades of digital evolution and multilateral discussion, while delving into the future trajectory of digital transformation, the cyber threat landscape, and the Global Mechanism emerging out of it. Under the theme “Cyber governance in an era of technological revolution: Past lessons, present realities and future frontiers,” the Cyber Stability Conference 2026 will be held on 4–5 May as part of Geneva Cyber Week. This flagship event is a cornerstone of UNIDIR’s 45-year-long commitment to meaningful collective action towards a more secure world.

The post The evolving road from dial ups to qubits first appeared on UNIDIR.

It highlights the importance of data centres and of access to computing power (“compute” for short) as enablers of AI-driven capabilities. It also points to a clear step up in the steadily growing role and responsibility of private technology actors in 21st century warfare.

The role of the commercial cloud in warfare

It is first worth setting out why commercial data centres may be seen as targets, and what role they – and cloud computing more generally – play in modern military operations. Data centres are the physical backbone of the digital infrastructure that enables much of the digital capabilities now required by military operations.

Cloud computing enables access to the vast quantities of compute needed to train and deploy AI algorithms as well as to store, move and analyse data. Data centres are therefore a key element in the ability of modern militaries to leverage AI for autonomous capabilities, decision-support systems, data-fusion, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and targeting. No public information, however, exists to ascertain whether these specific data centres were directly contributing to ongoing military operations.

The role of AI in military operations is continuing to expand as battlefields produce ever more sensor data and require more compute. Operations are thus becoming increasingly reliant on ever more – and faster – collection, fusion and analysis of data. With these changes, the role of commercial cloud service providers (CSPs) – the only ones currently capable of managing such scale – is only likely to grow.

Security implications of targeting data centres

Targeting data centres has clear security implications.

• First, the reliance by armed forces on commercial CSPs intertwines military applications with the infrastructure that supports civilian digital applications. As the same data centres support both military and civilian workloads, strikes against them carry a dual risk: they elevate the threat to civilian infrastructure and they lead to cascading effects across civilian life, triggering service outages and possible material effects.

• Second, the targeting of data centres raises questions about how to defend such infrastructure. Hyperscalers – the companies operating the largest data centres – boast advanced cybersecurity capabilities and contingency plans for natural disasters that enable them to ensure service continuity. However, these data centres are built for and considered as commercial enterprises. They are not equipped – or even conceptualized – to deal with military threats. Often the size of small cities, data centres are both difficult to hide and extremely costly to secure against kinetic threats.

• Third, as a globally distributed network, data centres need not reside within a State’s borders to serve their purpose. The free flow of data and workloads across borders is, in many respects, a defining feature of modern cloud architecture. Yet, this means that the digital backbone underpinning military capabilities may be distributed geographically across the territory of neutral States. This carries profound implications for conflict should data centres increasingly become targets. A belligerent may, theoretically, be compelled to target infrastructure well beyond the theatre of active hostilities to deny its adversaries access to their cloud enabled-capabilities. Such strikes risk expanding the borders of a conflict, and so may contribute to escalation dynamics and negatively affect regional security.

Legal ramifications of targeting data centres

The legal implications that stem from these strikes relate in particular to international humanitarian law and the extent to which the private sector may be affected. While States remain the primary subjects of international humanitarian law, a host of implications emerge for industry.
First, a data centre that serves both civilian and military purposes may constitute a legitimate target as a consequence of its potential status as a military objective if it is found to

“make an effective contribution to military action and [if its] total or partial destruction . . . in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”

as a result of its nature, location, purpose or use. In the context of data centres and, more generally, digital infrastructure, the crux lies in the extent to which their destruction would offer “definite military advantage”. The assessment of this advantage must be independent of the existence of redundancy measures in the event of damage to this particular facility.

Second, the destruction of digital infrastructure in war points to States’ obligation to take

“all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and civilian objects under their control against the effects of attacks”.

This issue is of particular importance given the potential second- and third-order effects that their destruction may have on civilian life and the humanitarian sector, where connectivity may constitute a critical enabler. Whether feasible precautions would require the strict, physical separation of civilian data centres from the military or even added measures (either by the States hosting or benefitting from a data centre or by the technology provider) to secure and protect these facilities. Regardless of which actor takes which steps, the importance of clarifying these questions and the expected distribution of roles and responsibilities is further emphasized by the “increased meshing” of civilian and military cloud technologies.

Third, in addition to destruction of the physical hardware, another question arises as to whether the data hosted in dual-use data centres could, itself, constitute a lawful military objective. If this is the case, then the data could be subject to attack by way of (partial) destruction of the infrastructure that hosts it. This issue is of particular relevance due to the increased integration of AI into military systems – and the dependence of these technologies on data throughout their life cycle.

Beyond the technology, the possible targetability of staff working at these data centres arises. While civilians are, in principle, protected from attacks under international humanitarian law, they may lose their protection if they are found to be directly participating in hostilities. Independently of whether contributing to the operation of a dual-use data centre could constitute direct participation in hostilities, this question is of particular importance in the light of today’s technology-heavy defence landscape.

This trend may, subsequently, require the presence of technical personnel, such as engineers, in or near the frontlines for maintenance and other operational functions critical to the deployment and use of military capabilities. There is precedent of such maintenance workshops being established by governmental armed forces. However, States’ dependence on the private sector for military capabilities – extending beyond weapon systems to data centres and other technological infrastructure – is growing. This may lead in the foreseeable future to the deployment in the battlefield of civilian engineers and technicians from technology suppliers to ensure the continued operation and maintenance of that infrastructure.

The need for structured engagement between the public and private sectors

These observations ultimately attest to two realities.
The foremost of these is that risk assessments and mitigation measures for both the public and the private sectors will inevitably evolve from traditional structures. While the destruction of military factories is far from being a novel strategy, the increased reliance on dual-use digital infrastructures such as data centres further emphasizes the need for both States and technology suppliers to re-evaluate their risk assessments.

The large prime contractors in the defence industry may already have established structures and processes for such risk assessments. To the extent that their facilities may be military objectives, technology companies should follow suit if they are to supply, even remotely, capabilities to the military. To this end, States and the private sector should clarify expectations with respect to the distribution of roles and responsibilities, including in the context of risk assessments and mitigation.

The other, equally significant, reality is that the need for structured engagement between the public and the private sectors is now more evident than ever. Beyond risks assessments and clarity on the distribution of roles and responsibilities, establishing shared expectations could ultimately foster predictability, mutual trust and accountability and could contribute positively to international peace and security. States and non-state actors (including industry) have engaged extensively since 2018 on information and communications technologies (ICTs) in the context of international security as part of two United Nations open-ended working groups. The upcoming Global Mechanism on ICT in the context of international security subsequently provides an opportunity to deepen the multi-stakeholder dialogue on, among other things, voluntary norms and international law, particularly the protection of dual-use infrastructure and data.

Specifically on AI, UNIDIR in partnership with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights launched an initiative dedicated to the development of a Framework of Responsible Industry Behaviour for AI in the Military Domain. The framework seeks to provide a practical and actionable set of voluntary guidelines firmly grounded in international law and norms, to be co-developed in collaboration with industry actors and governments.

As the boundary between commercial cloud computing and the military domain continues to blur, the strikes on the data centres in the Gulf confirm that digital infrastructure is not only the backbone of our society, but that it also lies on the frontline of modern conflict. The engagement of the international, multi-stakeholder community with governance processes, including within the United Nations, is now more critical than ever to ensure that current and future infrastructure fosters international peace and security, and does not become the catalyst for escalation and conflict.

The post Clouds of war: The implications of targeting data centres first appeared on UNIDIR.

Every year, on 23 April, the UN celebrates International Girls in ICT Day. This year’s theme “AI for Development: Girls Shaping the Digital Future” draws attention to the digital gender divide: How can we ensure that AI benefits everyone when 90% of adolescent girls and young women in low-income countries are offline? If not developed responsibly, AI technology risks perpetuating and reinforcing gendered inequalities through unequal access, biased algorithms and new forms of AI-enabled digital harm.

An important step for addressing these issues is to ensure that women diplomats, who remain under-represented in multilateral cyber governance forums, have a seat at the decision-making table. Every year, UNIDIR organizes the Women in AI Fellowship and the Women in Cyber Fellowship, bringing together women diplomats from across the world working on AI and cybersecurity for week-long trainings. The fellowships are part of UNIDIR’s broader effort to contribute to women’s meaningful participation in international security.

Q: How does your work relate to AI and/or cybersecurity? And how do you see your role as a diplomat in shaping the digital future?  

A: My work sits at the intersection of technology, security and global governance. As a diplomat, I contribute to building international consensus on how artificial intelligence and digital technologies should be developed and used in a responsible, ethical and secure manner.  

I see my role as that of a translator between different worlds: the technical, the political, and the human.

Ultimately, the digital future is not defined only by what technology can do, but by what we decide as societies it should do. From Chile, I seek to bring a perspective that places people, their rights and their dignity at the centre, ensuring that digital transformation becomes a tool to reduce inequalities rather than deepen them. 

Q: What aspects of the UNIDIR Women in AI Fellowship and/or Women in Cyber Fellowship have been most helpful to you and how?

A: One of the most transformative aspects of these fellowships has been the opportunity to connect with amazing women from different regions and professional backgrounds, all sharing a common conviction: that we can and want to actively shape more inclusive technological futures.

Beyond technical knowledge, I particularly value the space to question assumptions and enrich discussions through interdisciplinary perspectives. For example, through the fellowships I was able to more effectively integrate ethical and gender considerations into discussions on security and emerging technologies, strengthening my ability to contribute more holistically in multilateral settings.

Q: Which emerging challenge related to AI or cybersecurity concerns you the most – and why?

A: I am deeply concerned about the pace at which these technologies are advancing compared to our collective ability to govern them. In particular, the risk that artificial intelligence may reproduce or amplify existing inequalities, often in ways that are not immediately visible.

I have worked in regulating tech my entire professional career and as regulators, we are always lagging behind. AI is a whole new challenge as it revolutionizes multiple sectors at the same time, making it very hard for current governing structures and institutions to follow up.

I am also concerned about the increasing autonomy of certain systems in sensitive contexts, such as security and defence. This raises fundamental questions:

Where do we draw the line? How do we ensure accountability? And, above all, how do we guarantee that these technologies remain in service of people?

Perhaps even more fundamentally, I often ask myself whether we will be able to collectively prioritize what truly matters. In an international context that frequently incentivizes competition – technological, economic and strategic – the real challenge lies in achieving the agreements needed to establish shared principles and limits. The question is not only what we can do with these technologies, but whether we will have the collective will to ensure that their development serves the common good, rather than narrow interests.

Q: What do you think are the biggest barriers to women and girls’ meaningful participation in the digital space?

A: The barriers are not only about access, but also about perception and confidence. Many girls and young women grow up without seeing themselves reflected in these spaces, or they grow up feeling that they do not belong.

These challenges are compounded by structural inequalities in education, opportunities and access to digital tools, as well as online environments that are not always safe or welcoming. Addressing these barriers requires not only public policy, but also deeper cultural change. And most of all, it requires strong networks of professionals inspiring and supporting each other.

Q: What advice would you share with girls and young women aspiring to contribute to AI and cybersecurity governance?

A: I would tell them that curiosity is a form of courage. Asking questions, exploring, making mistakes, and trying again are all essential parts of the journey.

But above all, I would remind them of something they should never lose sight of: technology is not an end in itself. Any innovation that truly matters must be, at its core, by and for people. It should improve lives, expand opportunities, and protect what makes us human.

They do not need to fit into a predefined mold to contribute to this field. Their perspectives, experiences, and questions are exactly what is needed to build a more just digital future. I would encourage them to step forward, to make their voices heard, and to imagine different kinds of technologies: more inclusive, more ethical, and more human-centred. Technology that reflects and supports their needs and dreams.

Q: Any final thoughts on girls’ and women’s empowerment in the digital space?

A: Digital empowerment is not only about access, but also about agency… the ability to influence, decide and transform. It is not just about increasing the number of women in technology, but about ensuring that they can shape how these technologies are designed, implemented and governed.

If we truly integrate diverse perspectives, we will not only close gaps, but we will also build better technologies. Because a more inclusive digital future is not only fairer; it is also more innovative and sustainable.

The post Women shaping our digital future first appeared on UNIDIR.

This marked the first time UNIDIR was invited to present its work as a cooperation partner of SOMTC-Cambodia during the open session of the Working Group on Arms Smuggling. The Institute delivered the presentation to delegations from ASEAN Member States and representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat.

UNIDIR highlighted two areas for potential cooperation:

1. It presented outcomes from the capacity-building on reporting under international instruments on conventional arms and ammunition control, held in Phnom Penh.
2. It highlighted policy-relevant research on emerging production methods and knowledge transfers related to improvised weapons, including collaborations with organizations and experts in Southeast Asia.

This event was a landmark for deepening cooperation between UNIDIR and its partners across the region, particularly with Cambodia as the SOMTC voluntary lead shepherd for the arms smuggling priority area. UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme reiterated its commitment to supporting the efforts of SOMTC-Cambodia and the SOMTC Working Group on Arms Smuggling to curb the illicit smuggling of firearms and its ammunition.

ASEAN’s approach to preventing arms smuggling

The ASEAN Declaration on Combating Arms Smuggling was adopted on 21 August 2023 in Labuan Bajo, Indonesia. The declaration recognizes the pervasive threats of arms smuggling in Southeast Asia and the challenges in preventing and curbing cross-border illicit trade and smuggling of firearms and its ammunition.

The ASEAN SOMTC Working Group on Arms Smuggling meets annually and serves as a dedicated platform for Member States to exchange views on challenges, share best practices, and identify practical solutions related to arms smuggling. The Working Group plays a central role in supporting the implementation of the declaration. It is also a forum for ASEAN Member States and invited dialogue partners to seize opportunities for collaboration on capacity-building, training and information-sharing to enhance regional responses to arms smuggling.

The post Advancing cooperation against arms smuggling in Southeast Asia first appeared on UNIDIR.

Organized by UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme, the training sought to strengthen Malaysia’s cyber resilience by promoting greater alignment and cooperation among key national actors. It also advanced efforts to operationalize the UN cyber norms and address the growing need for demand-driven and responsive capacity-building, as highlighted by the UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICT Security. 

Ranging from the rapid growth of ransomware to supply-chain compromises and AI-enabled disinformation, the training addressed the evolving cyber threat landscape and the practical challenges of responding to high-impact ICT incidents. Participants gained a comprehensive picture of how cyber threats can disrupt critical infrastructure and services through scenario-based and multi-stage table-top exercises by applying UNIDIR Taxonomy of Malicious ICT Incidents. The dedicated policy briefings highlighted how recent advancements and trends in quantum computing and artificial intelligence are expected to reshape cybersecurity and broader security dynamics.

Aligning national capabilities with UN frameworks

By featuring extensive discussions on the role of UN voluntary cyber norms and developing a national position on the interpretation of international law, the training helped advance Malaysia’s long-term cyber resilience.

In addition to the UNIDIR’s Foundational Cyber Capabilities Framework, the programme introduced strategic approaches that decision-makers may consider for responding to malicious ICT incidents and de-escalating tensions with potentially significant impacts on regional security and stability. These included:

• diplomatic engagement,
• acts of retorsion,
• countermeasures, and
• the activation of confidence-building measures.

An interactive session led by the International Telecommunication Union complemented these discussions, sharing good practices and practical tools for integrating the UN framework in the development of the national cybersecurity strategies.

Towards stronger regional cyber resilience

This training forms part of a growing regional series of bilateral trainings – also held in Pakistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Lao PDR, and Thailand – aimed at reinforcing national and regional cybersecurity capacities. UNIDIR remains committed to supporting governments with tailored tools and training, enabling them to respond effectively to rapidly evolving threats in the ICT environment. 

To learn more about UNIDIR’s research-driven training and capacity-building programmes, visit the UNIDIR Academy. 

This project is funded by Global Affairs Canada under its Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The post UNIDIR builds national cyber resilience in Malaysia first appeared on UNIDIR.

The workshop was designed to increase the awareness among national authorities on international conventional weapons instruments, strengthen their capacity to fulfill reporting commitments under them, and identify priority areas for enhanced international cooperation and assistance. It brought together some 40 government officials from Cambodia’s capital and border provinces involved in conventional arms and ammunition control and counter-trafficking efforts.

The workshop opened with a high-level address from H.E. Police General Por Phak, Secretary of State and Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) Cambodia Leader at the Ministry of Interior. He emphasized Cambodia’s commitment to strengthening national control systems and adapting to evolving global standards:

This [event] reflects our determination to fulfill our obligation and strengthen [our] national control system. At the same time, we are taking steps to align [with] emerging framework[s], including the Global Framework on Through-Life Conventional Ammunition Management, which require enhanced technical capacity and coordination. This workshop provides a timely opportunity to advance these efforts.

H.E. Pol. Gen. Por Phak, Secretary of State and SOMTC-Cambodia Leader, Ministry of Interior, Kingdom of Cambodia

Strengthening national reporting processes

The training focused on the institutionalization of effective inter-agency cooperation to collect and share the information needed for national reports on:

• The implementation of the UN Programme on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)
• The implementation of the Global Framework on Through-Life Conventional Ammunition Management (GFA)
• International arms transfers for the UN Register on Conventional Weapons

UNIDIR experts Dr Paul Holtom, Head of Programme, and Joshua Angelo Bata, Associate Researcher, both with UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme, delivered presentations and facilitated group exercises. A highlight of the training was the process of drafting a “national procedures document” to support the institutionalization of reporting in Cambodia. This exercise entailed identifying “what” data and information is needed, “who” holds it, and “when” to collect, share, and prepare reports for each instrument.  

Enhancing the quality and use of reports

This training is timely as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs has requested Member States to submit their national report on the implementation of the UN PoA and ITI in advance of the 2026 Biennial Meeting of States. In parallel, Member States are also requested to voluntarily submit their initial overview of the GFA implementation in 2026.

The two-day event, while national in scope, also included regional and global considerations.  Workshop participants not only explored how to ensure high-quality national reports but also identified issues on which Cambodia could share effective practices in implementing these instruments, as well as international cooperation and assistance needs.

Reporting on the implementation of conventional arms and ammunition control instruments helps to build confidence between States, reduce tensions relating to authorized and illicit arms flows, and support efforts to foster peace, security, stability and sustainable development.

Dr Paul Holtom, Head of UNIDIR’s Conventional Arms Programme

Supporting Cambodia’s regional leadership

The training also supports Cambodia in its role as the voluntary lead shepherd of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) SOMTC Working Group on Arms Smuggling. The workshop helped to show how preparing national reports for the PoA and GFA helps to review national legal frameworks related to manufacturing, trafficking and use of arms, as well as for data collection regarding illicit arms manufacturing and trafficking, in accordance with the ASEAN Declaration on Combating Arms Smuggling.

Experts from Non-Violence International Southeast Asia, Mitzi Austero and Dr Fred Lubang also contributed to the training by sharing the national experiences of ASEAN Member States regarding inter-agency cooperation.

The workshop forms part of UNIDIR’s broader efforts to support States in strengthening national systems and processes for reporting on international conventional weapons instruments. Through its Conventional Arms Programme, UNIDIR continues to deliver tailored advice and training to help States build sustainable, nationally owned capacities for effective and transparent reporting.

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The discussions have confirmed an emerging international consensus that the UN system should address this agenda more systematically and strategically. Maritime security is increasingly understood as a global responsibility to protect the sea; ensure freedom of navigation and safe passage for international trade; fight blue crimes, such as piracy; and safeguard marine ecosystems.

Achieving these objectives requires a comprehensive, multi-level approach spanning national, regional, and global frameworks. The effectiveness of the UN system — its coordination with regional actors, its support to Member States, and its capacity to respond to maritime emergencies — remains critical.

But how can the UN system be further strengthened to address both traditional and emerging maritime security challenges? Closing persistent gaps will be essential to ensure strategic coherence, long-term sustainability, and greater foresight.

This leads to concrete reform proposals which are modest in ambition, but significant in impact. The UN’s approach would be stronger through a thematic Security Council resolution, a Secretary General report, deeper in-house expertise, and mainstreaming the maritime security agenda.

Too many agencies, too little coordination

A significant number of UN agencies have developed programmes on maritime security since the early 2000s. A large and still-growing number of agencies, programmes and bodies — each with their own mandate, funding stream, and reporting line — deals with aspects of maritime security. Yet, none have a comprehensive mandate.

A first attempt to map the responsible agencies by UNIDIR has identified five agencies with large scale maritime security programmes (the Big Five), 19 other relevant agencies, and nine international organizations not formally part of the UN system. In addition, many formal and informal regional organizations work in the field.

While this breadth reflects the cross-cutting nature of maritime threats, it generates significant risks of overlap, duplication and governance gaps. There is no single entity with the mandate, authority or capacity to coordinate these activities at the global level, presenting a risk of competitive fragmentation rather than complementary specialization.

Capacity building gaps: Who trains whom in what?

Weak national and regional capacities in maritime security governance continue to be a substantial problem. This is a major challenge not only for countries recovering from armed conflict or grappling with development challenges, but also for small island states.

Major international investments in maritime security capacity building, technical assistance, and security sector reform have been made since the early 2000s. Much of this work is concentrated and run by the “Big Five” group of agencies. Yet, attempts to coordinate their delivery work remain limited in scope.

This may lead to programming that reflects the strategic priorities of providers rather than the needs of recipients, alongside risks of overlap and duplication, gaps in coverage, insufficient attention to long-term requirements and emerging challenges, and limited evaluation of effectiveness — including instances where “zombie projects” continue to absorb resources without delivering commensurate impact.

Data gaps: Towards a global picture of the maritime domain

This points to another important gap: the absence of an authoritative global dataset on maritime security threats and incidents to identify problems, assess responses, and guide priorities.

Reporting mechanisms by the “Big Five” are mandate-specific, fragmented across agencies, and heavily dependent on voluntary member-state submissions. Interpol and Interport Police facilitate operational exchanges, and regional Maritime Domain Awareness initiatives now provide near-comprehensive coverage of most ocean basins — with a persistent South Atlantic gap.

A growing share of maritime data infrastructure — satellites, sensors and data platforms — is commercially owned, improving access for some but raising concerns about affordability, equity and whether such data should be treated as a global public good rather than a commodity.

The UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime’s Global Maritime Crime Programme has begun to facilitate dialogue between different platforms and actors. However, there are yet no agreed international standards and mechanisms for international data exchange and fusion. This limits the ability of the international community to identify patterns, assess trends, and allocate resources rationally.

Making sense of data

Even where data exists, the UN system does not have an institutional home for the kind of expertise and strategic analysis needed to translate information into policy priorities.

Regional analytical centres exist — often focused on specific issue areas such as narcotics or sanctioned shipping — and ad hoc reports are produced by UNODC, UNIDIR, and academic institutions.

But these are insufficient substitutes for a standing analytical capacity with a global mandate. The absence of such a capacity means that international responses to maritime security threats remain reactive rather than anticipatory.

The strategic and foresight gap

Since 2000, the maritime security threat landscape has evolved through four overlapping phases, each introducing new actors and challenges:

• Early 2000s: an early focus on counter-terrorism 
• Late 2000s: counter-piracy
• Early 2010s: increasing attention to blue crimes like smuggling and illegal fishing
• Present: a dominant focus on grey-zone threats

This current phase is marked by deliberate ambiguity, with state-sponsored or tolerated actors operating below the threshold of armed conflict and exploiting legal gaps, as seen in activities such as GNSS spoofing and jamming, maritime cyber attacks, and potential sabotage of critical infrastructure like undersea cables and pipelines.

These activities reveal significant norm deficits — areas where international law is unclear, contested or simply absent. They present unresolved and rapidly changing legal and governance challenges that existing institutions are not well-equipped to address.

The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis is a telling example. While it demands an emergency response, it should also invite strategic thinking on what future options are available to ensure safe passage for civilian vessels in strategic waterways during and after armed conflict. Options for future crises need to be developed, drawing on the lessons from past initiatives.

A concrete path to reform

Addressing the structural deficits identified above requires both immediate steps and longer-term institutional reform. The following measures represent a sequenced and politically feasible path:

Adopt a UN Security Council resolution on maritime security. Building on the current momentum, the Security Council could adopt a comprehensive thematic resolution establishing maritime security as a standing priority and mandating inter-agency coordination. The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis provides a timely catalyst for action, and the elected Council members (E-10) could jointly lead the way.

Publish an annual UN Secretary-General Report. An annual report on maritime security trends, governance gaps, and system-wide activities could provide the analytical foundation for strategic decision-making and increase accountability across the UN system. Debates on the annual report in the Security Council and General Assembly could ensure sustained attention for a comprehensive approach.

Ensure appropriate liaison functions. Representation and liaison of all relevant UN agencies – notably the “Big Five” – in New York is important to enhance coordination and ensure expertise is brought to bear when needed. Remote participation can only partially compensate.

Establish a dedicated maritime security body. A section or division in the General Secretariat with cross-cutting coordination and analysis mandate is essential. Such a body could serve as a clearing house for data, a coordinator for information sharing and best practices on capacity-building, and a provider of strategic assessments to the Security Council and General Assembly. A few (seconded) staff members could make a major difference and enhance resource efficiency.

Create an expert network for maritime security. An expert network or United Nations University Institute could ensure that UN entities, regional organizations, and Member States have access to comprehensive expertise when needed. It would also help enhance analytical capabilities, cross-regional and cross-agency exchange of best practices, global assessments, and strategic foresight.

Mainstream maritime security across the UN System. Maritime security dimensions need to be systematically integrated into the UN Ocean Decade, the World Ocean Assessment, the UN Ocean Conferences, relevant peacebuilding and sustainable development frameworks and human rights work. Treating maritime security as a siloed ‘hard security’ issue disconnected from ocean health and blue economy goals is analytically incoherent and operationally counterproductive.

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In the past, successful Review Conference outcomes – such as an agreement on a final document comprised of some combination of a review of the operation of the treaty, and conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions – have been achieved in difficult circumstances. This commentary provides an overview of the various forms of consensus achieved at past NPT Review Conferences, which can be clustered into comprehensive consensus, partial consensus, and conditional consensus.

2000: Achieving comprehensive consensus

To date, only one of the ten NPT Review Conferences has managed to agree on a final document, based on comprehensive consensus without caveats. The 1995 decision on strengthening the review process established the forward-looking part of the document, in addition to the review of the implementation of the treaty in the preceding five years.

In 2000, the Review Conference was the first and the only one to achieve consensus on both. It is widely considered the most significant substantive success with the adoption of the “13 Practical Steps” for systematic and progressive implementation of Article VI on disarmament, following various concerning international developments in the preceding review cycle. The steps included significant language on:

• nuclear disarmament commitments,
• the principle of irreversibility,     
• the elimination of nuclear arsenals, and
• accelerated efforts toward the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Negotiations were complex and required significant compromise on language related to key issues, leading some to note that consensus was only possible because “deep differences between States on several crucial matters were papered over” and the wording used was “sufficiently ambiguous to enable all sides to claim victory.”

Accordingly, the prospect of implementation of the agreed upon steps was already perceived as “bleak” at the time. Such concerns were later confirmed by the disavowal of the “13 Practical Steps” by several nuclear-weapon States (NWS) at the following Review Conference in 2005, as well as the persistent implementation gaps that continue to impact upon the NPT regime today.

1995 and 2010: Years marked by partial consensus

States Parties have achieved partial consensus twice to date; at the highly consequential 1995 and 2010 Review Conferences, the latter which remains the last one to have adopted a consensus final document. In both cases, comprehensive consensus could not be achieved, but diplomatic skill and procedural openness enabled consensus on key issues.     

The 1995 conference is often considered the most unique and significant in the history of the NPT’s review process. The treaty’s initial 25-year duration was ending, making its extension a priority for many States Parties, who successfully adopted a package of four key decisions. These included:

• the indefinite extension of the NPT,
• the adoption of “principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,”
• the strengthening of the review process, and
• a resolution on the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

The package of decisions was passed without a vote but required careful and clever drafting to ensure that key demands of different groups were satisfied in the bargain. The NWS strong interest in indefinite extension of the treaty gave the non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS), especially the Non-Aligned Movement, a significant bargaining chip, which was used to progress the Middle East Resolution. While a deal was struck for the forward-looking package of decisions, consensus was not achieved on the review part of the document as fundamental disagreements prevailed. These tensions were bypassed by not insisting on a traditional comprehensive consensus final document, allowing the important package of decisions to be passed.

The case of 1995 stands out because of its procedural creativity. Yet, the choice to adopt a package of decisions was less revolutionary at the time than it seems today, as States Parties had submitted draft resolutions, decisions and even protocols to the NPT at previous Review Conferences, showing that States Parties then considered a broader scope of possible outcome formats.

The 2010 Review Conference was the last one to date to adopt a consensus final document, though consensus was achieved only on the forward-looking action plan, while the review instead became a “President’s reflection” without necessarily representing the views of all the States Parties. Nonetheless, the outcome was significant with a 64-point Action Plan covering all three pillars of the NPT and including specific steps for the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, endorsing a 2012 conference.

The 2010 Action Plan also reaffirmed the “13 practical steps” of the 2000 conference, embedding them into a larger, more complex political bargain that went beyond disarmament to also include non-proliferation and peaceful uses.

1975 and 1985: Establishing conditional consensus

The Review Conferences in 1975 and 1985 both managed to achieve consensus on a final document, but introduced notable conditionalities.

The short 1975 Final Declaration (which is under 5000 words) was drafted primarily by the President of the Conference. Consensus was only achieved by attaching various interpretive statements and reservations to the record, reflecting the differing views of delegations. This required flexibility on the part of the delegations, who chose to not block consensus, and of the President, who accepted the inclusion of national and group statements. Because of the caveats attached to the final document, the conference was not necessarily seen as an unequivocal success by all parties at the time.

In 1985, a similar approach was taken, ensuring that a consensus final document could again be adopted despite significant rifts. Explicit disagreement was noted around the lack of progress on a CTBT, in much stronger terms than in the 1975 final document. While formal consensus was thus preserved, the readily apparent lack of unanimity on the CTBT led one scholar to describe this as a “bogus consensus”.

Past pathways to success

A variety of approaches have contributed to meaningful outcomes and final documents at past NPT Review Conferences – yet no single method offers a guaranteed recipe for success. Only one Review Conference (in 2000) produced a fully negotiated, consensus-based and comprehensive final document—suggesting that such an outcome should be regarded as the exception rather than the norm.

Furthermore, the size and scope of Review Conference final documents have varied considerably. While discussions during the conferences may be wide-ranging, the issues explicitly captured in the final documents have, in practice, often been relatively narrow.

Table 1. Inclusion of language related to selected issues in NPT Review Conferences

Lessons for future NPT Review Conferences

Most NPT Review Conferences with successful outcomes were characterized by a degree of flexibility regarding the format of the final document. Examples of this begin with the very first Review Conference in 1975, which produced a final document written primarily by the President and which included the reservations of State Parties to specific statements.

Similarly, the 1985 final document included explicit mentions of disagreement on key issues, allowing formal consensus to be achieved despite intense substantive disagreement. The 1995 Review Conference pushed this further by not adopting a final document at all, instead passing a set of important decisions that continue to define the NPT Review Process today.

The most recent successful outcome at a Review Conference occurred in 2010 and whilst a final document was agreed and the forward-looking conclusions and recommendations achieved consensus, the review segment was not agreed by consensus and instead reflected the President’s views. Even as a President’s document, the review section featured language that qualified the degree of agreement on issues, rather than suggesting consensus.

Taken together, these cases show that successful NPT Review Conference outcome documents vary in terms of length, scope, focus and the type and route to consensus. While the goal of comprehensive consensus has presented a challenge at all Review Conferences, flexibility and procedural creativity have enabled past successes, even in tense international environments.

Nick Arndt was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme. He holds a Master of Philosophy in International Relations with distinction from the University of Oxford and a Bachelor of Arts in History and a minor in International Relations from the University of Groningen, where he graduated cum laude.

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Returning after a successful inaugural edition, Geneva Cyber Week 2026 comes at a time of mounting cyber insecurity, intensifying geopolitical tension, and rapid technological change. Under the theme “Advancing Global Cooperation in Cyberspace”, the week will bring together policymakers, diplomats, technical experts, industry leaders, academics and civil society representatives to discuss cyber stability, resilience, governance, digitalization and the security implications of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence.

Cybersecurity is no longer a niche technical issue; it is a strategic policy challenge with implications for international peace, economic stability and public trust. At a moment of growing fragmentation and accelerating technological change, Geneva Cyber Week brings together the communities that need to be in the room — diplomatic, technical, operational and policy — to move from shared concern to practical cooperation.

— Dr Giacomo Persi Paoli, Head of Security and Technology Programme, UNIDIR

Geneva Cyber Week reflects a commitment to dialogue, trust-building and international cooperation in cyberspace. With nearly 90 events, this year’s programme highlights Geneva’s role as a global centre for cyber diplomacy, international cooperation and digital governance.

The programme will include UNIDIR’s Cyber Stability Conference; Peak Incident Response, organized by the Swiss CSIRT Forum; Digital International Geneva, featuring a strategic fireside chat with the Swiss FDFA State Secretary; the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting on Cybersecurity, as well as the session Steering through Cyber Turbulence; and the Council of Europe session Artificial Intelligence, Cybercrime and Electronic Evidence: Risks, Opportunities, and Global Cooperation.

At a time when digital threats know no borders, fostering inclusive discussions is essential to building trust, advancing common norms, and promoting a secure and open cyberspace for all. International Geneva provides an unparalleled multilateral environment to address these cybersecurity challenges collectively. Geneva Cyber Week’s diverse programme embodies this collaborative spirit.

— Marina Wyss Ross, Deputy Head of International Security Division and Chief of Section for Arms Control, Disarmament and Cybersecurity, Swiss FDFA 

Throughout the week, partner-led panels, workshops, simulations, exhibitions and networking events will further enrich the programme. Geneva will also showcase the week citywide, from flags on the Mont Blanc Bridge to the Jet d’Eau illuminated in Geneva Cyber Week colours on Monday evening.

To learn more, visit the Geneva Cyber Week website. For further information, please contact Claudia Marquina, UNIDIR Head of Communications at claudia.marquina@un.org.

About UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems. For more information, visit unidir.org.

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Describing the report as both “timely and necessary,” Dr Raymond Omollo, Principal Secretary at Kenya’s Ministry Interior and National Administration, emphasized its clear analysis of achievements and remaining gaps. “It provides a clear-eyed view of where we stand and what needs to be done,” he noted during the launch.

Presenting the key findings, Dr Paul Holtom, Head of UNIDIR’s Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, called the study a “milestone for combating the scourge of illicit small arms and light weapons and their misuse in eastern Africa.” He contrasted the region’s nascent national SALW control systems in 2005 with significant progress made by States by 2025.

In his remarks, Douglas Kanja, Inspector General of the Kenya National Police Service and President of the AFRIPOL General Assembly, highlighted the measurable gains in legislative and regulatory frameworks, stockpile management, marking, recordkeeping systems, and inter-agency coordination mechanisms.

Progress by the numbers

In 2005, no State in the region marked their weapons. By 2025, five States could confidently report that they had marked all State-owned SALW, with the remaining seven States assessed in the study making good progress.

We can say with confidence that the RECSA region has made remarkable and measurable progress.

Jean Pierre Betindji, RECSA’s Executive Secretary

Table: Progress made in marking and recordkeeping for SALW, 2005-2025

Despite the notable progress, persistent challenges remain. Dr Omollo cautioned that “the study equally and clearly captures persistent gaps.” Dr Holtom also highlighted continued challenges in implementing the Nairobi Protocol – especially concerning the mobilization of adequate resources, the operationalization of tracing mechanisms, border controls, law enforcement cooperation, and regional information exchange.

The proliferation of SALW in the region continues to fuel conflicts, to undermine development, and to threaten safety and security of our communities.

Felix Namurahonye, Inspector General of Police in Rwanda and Chair of RECSA’s Technical Advisory Committee

A roadmap for renewal

The report launch represents an important opportunity for States and key stakeholders to renew their commitment to addressing the illicit SALW trade in the region. It provides recommendations to revise the Nairobi Protocol’s provisions to:

• strengthen cross-border cooperation or national coordination mechanisms;
• align the protocol with relevant international and regional arms control frameworks; and
• take into account emerging weapon technologies posing a threat to peace and security in the region, including improvised explosive devices and armed uncrewed aerial vehicles.

RECSA has incorporated the report’s recommendations into its next five-year plan (2026-2031). It will present proposals to update the Nairobi Protocol and its best-practice guidelines to the Technical Advisory Committee, which will meet in Kigali, Rwanda next June. This represents an important first step toward translating the report’s findings into practical measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing, trafficking, possession and use of SALW in the region.

Revitalizing partnerships

Looking ahead, Dr Ivor Fung of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and Francis Wairagu of the Small Arms Survey both highlighted that to realize the new vision for the protocol, cooperation with international and regional organizations, civil society, academia and industry will need to be revitalized and enhanced. In this regard, Nerys Smith of the United Kingdom’s High Commission to Kenya expressed encouragement for these renewed efforts, stating: “We have a shared commitment to reduce human suffering and build a safer future in the region and the continent.”

The report on the Nairobi Protocol on SAWL at 20 is the final output of the joint UNIDIR-RECSA project, funded by the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. The report is intended to support RECSA Member States and Secretariat in responding to the call of RECSA’s 11^th Council of Ministers Meeting to review the Nairobi Protocol.

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This experience captures something essential about space security. We depend on space infrastructure in our daily lives, yet we rarely think about it. When these systems function correctly, they become invisible. But when something goes wrong, the impact ripples across economies and societies.

Storytelling can be used as both a communication tool and a governance mechanism for space security. When we make space threats tangible and perceptible, we show stakeholders like farmers and entrepreneurs the importance of orbital stability and create the foundation for enforcement mechanisms and safeguards. A major theme discussed at OS25 was the excellent work that the space security community has done in identifying threats and proposing frameworks. What we need now is to make those frameworks real for the billions of people who depend on them, and to put the requisite safeguards in place.

Why space security matters now

Space infrastructure drives modern life in ways most people never recognize. Satellites enable navigation, financial transactions, weather forecasting and countless other global needs. In my home country of Nigeria, a small tailoring business owner uses her mobile phone for financial transactions, tracking deliveries and navigating the congested Lagos traffic using apps enabled by Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). She might have never thought of herself as a space technology user, but she absolutely is. If GNSS signals were disrupted, her business would grind to a halt. She would not receive payments nor be able to plan deliveries and navigate efficiently. The satellite systems enabling her livelihood feel distant and abstract, yet they are as essential as the electricity powering her sewing machine.

One key lesson I took from the technology demonstration at OS25 were the words of Dr Peter Martinez who highlighted the growing population of active satellites in space as a challenge. His perspective was supported by other speakers who shared their concerns about orbital debris, dual-use technologies and the increasing complexity of managing a domain that was once scarcely occupied but now hosts a fleet of commercial space actors. As Kees van Der Pols emphasized at the conference, space sustainability is something we need to work on right now, not as a future concern, but as an immediate priority. If we continue taking the orbital environment for granted today, it could become unusable tomorrow unless positive action is not taken.

Addressing the communication gap

During my lightning talk at OS25, I stated that when people think about space in Nigeria, they often think about astronauts and aliens or movies like Star Wars and Interstellar. Dr Melissa de Zwart raised an important question during Panel VI that piqued my interest: Does the farmer who uses space technology consider himself to be part of the space industry? In her response, she stated that they might not consider themselves to be, but they are. That observation showcases a fundamental problem. Space security discussions happen in conference rooms in Geneva, but the real stakeholders are everywhere else.

The essence of this gap is that governance requires legitimacy, and legitimacy requires understanding. When the vast majority of space users do not understand their dependence on orbital infrastructure, they cannot participate meaningfully in the decisions that affect them. Without this understanding, space security frameworks risk becoming disconnected from the people they are meant to protect, undermining both public support and effective implementation.

This gap persists partly because of how people experience space technology. During Panel I, Dr Laetitia Cesari noted that technology is not only an opportunity but it also exposes us to challenges. The opportunity and convenience are what most people experience without understanding the vulnerabilities. People are not aware of what could go wrong, so they do not engage with conversations on how to protect these systems that significantly impact them.

Making governance real through stories

Storytelling plays a critical role in governance as the narratives we share, shape what people perceive as urgent, what they believe is solvable, and what they are willing to support politically. Research in science communication shows that narratives have a “privileged status” in human cognition because they are processed more efficiently than logical-scientific formats, recalled more accurately and are intrinsically persuasive. When complex scientific issues are translated into relatable narratives, public understanding improves and political will strengthens. For space security, this means technical expertise alone cannot drive public engagement or policy support. Narratives become not only appropriate, but essential.

In  2023, I coordinated the largest campus cleanup in University of Benin history, gathering over 400 volunteers and raising more than ₦1,000,000 in sponsorships. That was not achieved by lecturing people about waste management policy alone. We used visual storytelling to show them what our campus could look like, connecting abstract environmental goals to the pride of being part of something transformative. This made the problem visible and the solution achievable.

For space security, storytelling can serve three essential functions:

1. Making threats understandable

During Panel II at OS25, Dr Guoyu Wang highlighted three fundamental elements for defining space threats. These include:

(1) intent, referring to deliberate acts;

(2) behavior, encompassing both actions and inactions;

(3) adverse impact, meaning any form or potential of harm such as material or non-material damage.

However, to communicate these effectively to non-technical stakeholders, we must ask what adverse impact from intentional behavior in space actually means for someone in Lagos or Nairobi? It could mean an ATM stops working because the satellites enabling financial transactions are jammed. It could mean an Uber driver cannot find its client because GNSS signals are disrupted. It could also mean flights are grounded because air traffic control loses satellite navigation, or that farmers cannot optimize irrigation because precision agriculture data disappears.

Stories highlight that these threats were real all along, even when space security oftentimes seems far away and disconnected from our daily activities. Stories connect abstract policy debates to lived experience.

2. Broadening the stakeholder map

The farmer in Dr de Zwart’s example exposes another challenge where most space users are invisible to themselves. Many everyday stakeholders of space technologies do not follow multilateral discussions or UN forums on space security.

For effective communication to work, we must present the full complexity of these issues honestly. We cannot simply scare people with worst-case scenarios, as doing so risks breeding apathy rather than action, or worse, driving responses that create security dilemmas rather than solving them. We also cannot pretend that the status quo is adequate, as this risks fostering complacency and undermining the urgency for collective action. This is why intentional and honest storytelling is needed, because it provides a balance by showing real users navigating real risks and contributing to real solutions.

3. Building political will through layered governance

During Panel III, Clive Hughes outlined a possible path forward observing that legally binding and non-legally binding instruments must work in tandem. I believe it was a recognition that enforcement does not mean only hard law but also creating multiple, mutually reinforcing accountability mechanisms that work together.

Here, storytelling plays a crucial role by enabling layered governance through the building of public demand for both formal rules and informal norms. When people understand what is at stake, they support legislation. When they see themselves as stakeholders, they adopt responsible practices. When people recognize their collective dependence on space infrastructure for daily life, national security and economic stability, they participate in building collective security.

In the course of Panel V, Sarah Erickson warned that if we allow nuclear challenges to dominate the space security conversation, we risk sidelining other important issues like sustainability. Her concern reflects a real danger that discussions can become too abstract or too dominated by high politics that they lose connection to the everyday stakes that motivate broader engagement. Storytelling can rebalance priorities by showing that sustainability, debris mitigation, traffic management and peaceful uses of space are not separate from security.

Shifting from narrative to action

My analysis of the sector reveals four key recommendations that the space security community, governments, international organizations, civil society and industry can adopt to strengthen public engagement in space security governance.

1. Invest in accessible narratives: the space security community, including governmental agencies, academic institutions and civil society organizations, can create short documentaries, social media campaigns and educational materials that showcase how everyday users depend on space technology. These narratives should demonstrate real dependencies and real vulnerabilities without resorting to fear tactics.
2. Develop layered communication strategies: when briefing legislators or engaging civil society, it is beneficial to present not only threat assessments and policy options but also demonstrate who is affected, how they are affected and why action matters now. Policy documents could include case studies and testimonials from actual users. Technical reports might open with concrete scenarios that illustrate the real-world consequences of the issues being discussed.
3. Pilot local outreach projects: it would be beneficial for the technical community to work with agricultural cooperatives, transportation networks, educational institutions and small businesses to demonstrate their connection to space systems and invite their participation in governance discussions. These pilots should not be one-way information sessions but genuine dialogues where stakeholders can voice concerns, ask questions and contribute perspectives that policy experts might miss. The goal is to expand the circle of people who feel ownership over space security outcomes.
4. Support creative media initiatives: governments and civil society organizations can fund filmmakers, journalists, podcasters and digital creators who can reach audiences outside the conventional reach of the policy sphere. Trusting creative professionals to translate technical complexity into compelling narrative might mean documentaries that follow satellite operators through a day of work, podcasts that interview space technology users, or social media campaigns that visualize the consequences of satellite system failures. Creative storytelling should not replace technical communication, but complement it by reaching different audiences through different channels.

Storytelling is how we build that foundation. It should be done alongside technical expertise, not instead of it; in support of diplomatic negotiations, not instead of them; enabling law and policy, instead of replacing them. Storytelling transforms space security from an abstract policy concern into a tangible reality that affects everyday lives. When stakeholders see themselves in the narrative, they move from passive beneficiaries to active participants in building the governance frameworks necessary to protect our shared orbital infrastructure.

Adeboye Malumi is a legal graduate and media strategist who has developed storytelling for social impact, translating international policy into accessible media and cinematic narratives. He is the founder of Photo Logic and his work focuses on the intersection of international law, global governance and digital advocacy through media and film for emerging regions.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, Adeboye Malumi selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2025 Youth Campaign. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors. 

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My contribution to this issue was a speculative scenario that imagined how our choices could shape the future. The scenario I created, “Dispatch from 2050”, explored how African-led institutions, youth-driven innovation and ethical AI could play a critical role in maintaining orbital safety. At the heart of these issues lies a fundamental question: how do we ensure that the tools we build to safeguard space do not become sources of division or conflict? This question inspired the creative exercise that follows.

_{In the “Dispatch from 2050” scenario, a critical incident unfolded when a privately operated constellation and a State-led constellation entered conflict over contested frequency bands. Their automated systems, designed to respond independently to perceived threats, initiated a series of uncoordinated manoeuvres. These movements placed both networks on a trajectory that could have resulted in a catastrophic chain reaction of collisions.}

_{To address these mounting risks, African institutions had helped establish the Lusaka Protocol code 101e in 2047, a multilateral agreement aimed at regulating AI assisted decision making in orbit. The Lusaka Protocol code 101e emerged from years of growing concern that existing space governance instruments were ill equipped to manage the rise of autonomous decision making in orbit.}

_{During the crisis, a youth-developed AI system at the Lusaka Orbital Institute detected irregular movement patterns earlier than any human operator could. It predicted the likelihood of a collision and triggered an alert under the Lusaka Protocol code 101e. In response, an Emergency Orbital Hold was activated, freezing high-risk trajectories long enough to prevent immediate impact.}

This scenario, though speculative, reflects trends that are already emerging today. Research shows a rapid expansion of mega-constellations and increasing congestion in low Earth orbit (LEO), raising concerns about collision risks and frequency interference. Participating in the discussion around space policy and security initiatives firsthand has shown me that managing space security challenges requires more than advanced technology. It demands foresight, coordination, and inclusive governance frameworks that allow countries, private operators, and even youth to collaborate rather than compete in ways that could escalate into crises.

Ethical AI and governance in Earth’s orbit

The proliferation of satellites has transformed LEO into one of the busiest environments managed by humankind. Mega constellations, numbering in the thousands of satellites, are redefining connectivity, but also magnifying risks. Frequency interference, orbital crowding, and cascading collision hazards now pose systemic challenges.

Artificial intelligence is increasingly deployed to monitor orbital traffic without continuous human intervention, predict collisions, and optimize frequencies. AI-driven conjunction assessment systems can generate earlier and more precise collision warnings, allowing operators to plan avoidance manoeuvres with reduced fuel costs and minimal disruption to satellite services.

For instance, private companies like Leo Labs use AI-powered radar systems to track thousands of objects in LEO, enabling rapid detection of potential collisions. Intergovernmental and national space agencies, such as the European Space Operations Centre and NASA, also employ AI algorithms to optimize satellite constellation management and reduce congestion risks. These innovations illustrate thatfaster, more accurate monitoring can be an opportunity to prevent accidents, maintain the reliability of satellite services, and support global connectivity. However, risks arise when different operators’ AI systems act independently, potentially leading to uncoordinated manoeuvres. 

The autonomy of these systems also raises new dilemmas. Automated collision avoidance systems operating without shared coordination frameworks may respond to the same perceived challenge in conflicting ways, increasing the chances of secondary conjunctions. Another thing to consider is that private algorithms might determine orbital priorities without human oversight, creating opaque decision making that could undermine coordination and safety.

Current legal and normative frameworks, such as the Outer Space Treaty, provide broad principles of peaceful use but do not explicitly address AI-driven decision making. As autonomous systems, including AI-enabled ones, take on operational control in orbit, new governance tools will be needed. The imagined Lusaka Protocol code 101e offers one such conceptual solution, anchoring decision making in ethical AI design, transparency and inclusive diplomacy.

African institutions are beginning to explore solutions in this space. For example, the South African National Space Agency is developing AI- and data-driven tools for space situational awareness, including monitoring orbital debris and supporting national and regional satellite operations. In academia, the University of Cape Town is conducting research into AI applications for satellite traffic management, while private startups in Nigeria and Kenya are exploring small satellite constellations with integrated AI for improved frequency coordination and orbital safety. These initiatives demonstrate the potential for African-led contributions to global space governance. This fills an important knowledge gap and ensures that African perspectives are represented in emerging norms and standards.

Taken together, these examples reveal that the challenge posed by AI in orbital management is not just technological capacity but governance alignment. While AI systems can significantly enhance safety, efficiency and sustainability, their benefits depend on coordination, transparency and shared rules of engagement among operators. Without common standards for data sharing, decision-making logic, and human oversight, autonomous systems risk reproducing fragmentation in orbit. This dynamic is particularly consequential for emerging space actors, as unequal access to data, infrastructure and governance forums may reinforce existing power asymmetries.

International dialogue is evolving to address these issues. For example, the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs has begun exploring the responsible use of emerging technologies such as AI in relation to space. The 2023 REAIM Call to Action, which received wide international support, underscores the global commitment to responsible AI use in the military domain. Furthermore, the OECD Recommendations on AI  provide guidance on how to improve trustworthiness in AI systems. They offer a useful framework for assessing future AI-enabled orbital management systems, particularly in relation to the transparency of automated decisions, accountability for harm, and preservation of human control over safety in critical domains.

In the African context, scholars are beginning to explore how indigenous ethical systems, such as Ubuntu, could influence AI ethics by emphasizing communality, interconnectedness and shared responsibility. Such contributions show the need to define and operationalize African perspectives within AI policy frameworks.

Building the future we imagine

The imagined orbital crisis of 2050 might seem distant, but the seeds of prevention must be planted now. Governance of AI-driven decision-making systems in space remains underdeveloped. Recent research highlights how governance of AI-enabled space technologies is often reactive, with policy frameworks emerging only after risks or crises materialize. These frameworks should instead employ foresight, human oversight, and accountability at the design stage. This would ensure that systems managing space assets reflect collective human values.

In my “Dispatch from 2050” fictional scenario, the Lusaka Protocol code 101e was not written by domain experts alone, but together with storytellers, elders, scientists, and youth from Lusaka. The future of space governance must be inclusive. Historically, decisions about space exploration have been concentrated among a few nations. The UN Space 2030 Agenda and the African Union’s Space Policy and Strategy demonstrate growing recognition of the Global South’s role in shaping the future of space.

Africa, in particular, has shown leadership through data-driven projects in Earth observation, climate monitoring, and satellite innovation. Zambia’s increasing participation in technology innovation highlights the transformative power of youth-led research and policy development. Ethical AI systems developed by African institutions can ensure that space technologies serve developmental goals improving agriculture, education and disaster response while aligning with local values and human rights.

Internationally, instruments like the envisioned Lusaka Protocol code 101e could formalize ethical obligations, much as the Paris Agreement did for climate. At UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025,  Zhanna Malekos Smith emphasized how data ethics underpins responsible governance in emerging technologies, providing a concrete example of how ethical practices in AI and data management can strengthen trust and accountability in space operations. Just as physical debris threatens satellites, ethical neglect threatens the stability of governance.

The 2050 vision where inclusively constructed AI systems protect Earth’s orbit may seem aspirational, yet it is built on principles we can adopt today. The fictional Lusaka Protocol code 101e reflects the real potential of collaborative, human-centred innovation. If we succeed, the Lusaka Protocol code 101e of tomorrow will not be fictional, but a living embodiment of a world that chooses dialogue over dominance, inclusion over isolation, and ethics over expediency. In the end, space security is not about protecting satellites, it is about protecting our shared future.

Kondwani Mbale is an Artificial Intelligence student at the Specialized Institute of Applied Technology — City of Trades and Skills. His work focuses on computer vision, data analysis and intelligent systems. He has participated in international initiatives, including the ICANN80 NextGen programme and the FIRST Global Challenges, and is a laureate of the International Youth Competition of Scientific and Sci-Fi Works.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, Kondwani Mbale, was selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2025 Youth Campaign. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors. 

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