

The Treaty of Pelindaba: towards the full implementation of the African NWFZ Treaty

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The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, commonly known as the Treaty of Pelindaba, declares that the “African nuclear-weapon-free zone will constitute an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, promoting general and complete disarmament and enhancing regional and international peace and security”.¹ This article provides a brief historical background to the treaty and an update of developments in its implementation since its entry into force, including the First Conference of State Parties, in November 2010.

Developing a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Africa has been a long process. Back in July 1964 the then Organization of African Unity (OAU)² adopted the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.³ The 1960s was a very different Africa from today. Apartheid was firmly entrenched in South Africa and was characterized by racial oppression, segregation and a sense—on the part of the ruling National Party—that it was facing a “total onslaught” from Soviet-inspired enemies, which required a “total strategy” response, including an eventual nuclear deterrent.

It was also an Africa where France was conducting atmospheric and underground nuclear tests in the Sahara desert. It was only in June 1995, after the end of apartheid and the dismantlement of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme, when the final text of the African NWFZ Treaty was agreed to by African heads of state and governments. The treaty opened for signature on 11 April 1996, and thirteen years later the Treaty of Pelindaba entered into force when Burundi deposited its ratification instrument on 15 July 2009, becoming the twenty-eighth African state to do so.⁴ As of 1 March 2011 all 53 members of the African Union (AU) are signatories to the treaty (including the territory known as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic), and 31 states have deposited their instruments of ratification with the AU Commission (the Treaty Depository)—the latest being Cameroon, on 28 September 2010.⁵ Although Morocco left the OAU in 1984—and is not a member of the AU—it signed the treaty on 11 April 1996.

Through the treaty, African states seek to ensure that nuclear weapons are not developed, produced, tested, or otherwise acquired or stationed in any of the countries on the continent or associated islands.⁶ As an important step towards strengthening the global non-proliferation regime, it provides for the promotion of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, requires complete nuclear disarmament by African states, and enhances both regional and

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global peace and security. According to the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra, the treaty is part of a wider strategy to implement the Common African Defence and Security Policy.⁷ As such, it is a key component of the overall peace and security architecture of the AU.⁸

Provisions of the treaty

Under the terms of the treaty, African states pledge the following:

- renunciation of nuclear explosive devices
- prevention of the stationing of nuclear explosive devices
- prohibition of the testing of nuclear explosive devices
- declaration, dismantling, destruction or conversion of nuclear explosive devices and the facilities for their manufacture
- prohibition of the dumping of radioactive waste
- promotion of peaceful nuclear activities and verification of their peaceful uses
- physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities and the prohibition of armed attacks on nuclear installations
- establishment of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy as a mechanism for compliance
- reporting and exchange of information on nuclear activities

The treaty is of unlimited duration and withdrawal requires 12 months prior notification. It prohibits research on nuclear explosive devices by any means, and includes acquiring, manufacturing, testing or developing nuclear weapons. It also requires the destruction of any nuclear explosive device a state party might possess. However, the transport of nuclear weapons through ports, airfields and territorial waters within the zone is the independent decision of each state party.

However, the treaty supports the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes. Each state party is to conduct all activities regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy under strict non-proliferation measures. These include providing assurance of exclusively peaceful use and comprehensive safeguards in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the purpose of verifying compliance.

The treaty strengthens the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is often regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. In line with the provisions and three pillars in the NPT, the Treaty of Pelindaba not only commits African states not to manufacture, acquire, test or possess nuclear weapons but also facilitates the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes on the continent. Like other NWFZ treaties, the Treaty of Pelindaba includes a protocol for the five

nuclear-weapon states⁹ (NWSs) to sign and ratify—and therefore respect—the status of the zone by providing negative security assurances.

However, according to Hans Blix, the then IAEA Director General, speaking at the Conference for the Signing of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty:

The Pelindaba Treaty, however, goes further than the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Unlike the NPT, it prohibits the stationing and testing of any nuclear explosive device in the territories of its parties; it also commits its parties to apply the highest standards of security and physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment to prevent theft and unauthorized use; it prohibits armed attack against nuclear installations in the zone; and it prohibits the dumping of any radioactive waste. These are important undertakings supplementary to those already assumed by the parties under the NPT. They will help to advance the cause of horizontal and vertical non-proliferation and to prevent illegal trafficking in or other unauthorized uses of nuclear material. They will help to shield nuclear facilities from possible armed attacks and consequent radiological releases during conflicts; and they will require management of radioactive waste to be in accordance with accepted international safety standards.¹⁰

Nuclear installations

Article 11, which prohibits armed attacks on nuclear installations, is distinct in that few of the other NWFZ treaties include such a provision and thus “reassures parties that other parties will neither launch such an attack nor assist others in doing so.”¹¹ This is important given that Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa have operational nuclear research reactors. While South Africa is the only state at present to have nuclear power reactors, a number of African states are in the process of investigating the feasibility of developing nuclear power plants for generating electricity.¹² In addition, the inclusion of substantial definitions of the terms “nuclear explosive device”, “nuclear installation” and “nuclear material” and the fact that the treaty prevents the dumping of waste anywhere in the zone is an improvement upon both the Treaty of Rarotonga and the Treaty of Tlatelolco.¹³

Securing nuclear material and technology

The need to better secure nuclear and other radioactive material and technology has taken on increased significance in recent times. An international nuclear smuggling ring—the A. Q. Khan network¹⁴—was uncovered in 2004, which implicated a number of citizens of various states in the dissemination of sensitive nuclear technology without authorization. There has also been evidence which suggests that Al-Qaida-linked groups may have an interest in acquiring or

developing weapons of mass destruction and in particular a nuclear or radiological explosive or dispersal device.¹⁵ Under Article 10 of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which lays out the necessary physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, states parties undertake to:

maintain the highest standards of security and effective physical protection of nuclear materials, facilities and equipment to prevent theft or unauthorized use and handling. To that end each Party, *inter alia*, undertakes to apply measures of physical protection equivalent to those provided for in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and in recommendations and guidelines developed by IAEA for that purpose.¹⁶

National implementation

None of the early NWFZ treaties require states parties to take the measures necessary to implement the treaty obligations. It is, however, a general duty for states to bring their national law into conformity with their obligations under international law.¹⁷ Although it is not explicitly laid out in the Treaty of Pelindaba, each African state is required to take the appropriate legal and administrative measures to prevent and punish any prohibited activity by either individuals under its jurisdiction or control, or in any territory under its jurisdiction or control. Legal measures include the imposition of penal sanctions. Administrative measures, including changes in military doctrine and operating procedures and the notification of organizations involved in the development, production and transfer of arms, may also be required to ensure that violations do not occur.

Beyond the prevention and punishment of violations, states parties need to consider a range of positive measures to ensure implementation of the treaty. They are required to prohibit the testing of any nuclear explosive devices in their territory (Article 5), draw up and implement plans to destroy any stockpiled nuclear explosive devices (Article 6), and ensure high security standards (Article 10). States parties are also required to observe the measures outlined in the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, with regards to radioactive waste. In addition, reports to the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONe) are to be prepared and submitted.¹⁸

Protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba

Additional to the treaty are protocols for the NWSs and Spain, which are *de jure* or *de facto* in control of territories within the zone. The states are required to sign and ratify the protocols and should take all necessary measures to ensure the speedy application of the treaty to the territories which lie within the limits of the established geographical zone.

Protocol I calls on NWSs not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon against any states parties to the treaty or against any territory within the NWFZ. It has been signed by all the NWSs and ratified by China, France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom.

Protocol II calls on the NWSs not to test, assist or encourage the testing of a nuclear explosive device anywhere within the African NWFZ. It has been signed by all the NWSs and ratified by China, France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom.

Protocol III calls upon states which are de jure or de facto in control of territories within the NWFZ—France and Spain—to apply the principles of the treaty to the territories under their control. France has signed and ratified it. However, Spain, which is a non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS), has yet to do so.

State positions

Spain

According to Spain, three of its territories—the Canary Islands and two coastal cities in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla—are an integral part of the European Union. Therefore, Spain has insisted that these three territories should not be included within the African NWFZ. Spain has also argued that the treaty does not contain any global non-proliferation or disarmament provisions that it has not already signed. Spain also cites its adherence to IAEA and European Atomic Energy Community safeguards—which in its view contain provisions that go considerably beyond those contained in the Treaty of Pelindaba. Spain has renounced production of nuclear weapons. It has militarily denuclearized its whole national territory and has been committed to an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy. The signature, and later ratification of Protocol III, would therefore create a redundant nuclear control regime over those parts of Spanish territory that, according to the treaty, would fall within the geographical area to which the treaty applied.¹⁹

The Russian Federation

The Russian Federation signed Protocols I and II in November 1996—shortly after the treaty opened for signature. On signing the Russian Federation made clear that:

It would not use nuclear weapons against a state party to the treaty, *except* [emphasis added] in the case of invasion or any other armed attack on Russia, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a state towards which it had a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a non-nuclear weapon state party to the treaty, in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state.²⁰

In August 2010 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev submitted Protocols I and II to the lower house of the Duma for ratification. The Duma ratified the protocols in March 2011. However, according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov:

Russia signed the treaty with a number of reservations. They stipulate that we do not assume the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against states that are part of the zone free from nuclear weapons in Africa in situations where they have allied commitments to other nuclear states and may participate in military actions using nuclear weapons against Russia. [...] In signing this treaty the reservation was made it does not apply to the US base of Diego Garcia. [...] This is an important reservation, which allows us to fully maintain our own security in hypothetical situations of the emergence [of] crises or conflicts in which the potential use of nuclear weapons is possible.²¹

The United Kingdom and the United States

In the past both the United Kingdom and the United States have argued that the British Indian Ocean Territory cannot be included in the geographical area of the Treaty of Pelindaba, as it is a UK territory used by the United States as a major military base. On depositing the ratifications:

The UK stated that it did not accept the inclusion of the British Indian Ocean Territory within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone without its consent, and did not accept, by its adherence to Protocols I and II, any legal obligations in respect of that territory.²²

The AU, however, considers the islands to be part of Mauritius, and a map, in Annex 1 of the treaty, explicitly includes the Chagos Archipelago—although with the note “Appears without prejudice to the question of sovereignty” in reference to the long-standing diplomatic dispute between Mauritius and the United Kingdom. While the airstrip on Diego Garcia played a central role in the war against Iraq and Afghanistan from 1991 through 2006, it is not known whether the United States has ever stored nuclear weapons on the Indian Ocean island.

In May 2011 US President Barack Obama jointly submitted Protocols I and II to the Treaty of Pelindaba and Protocols I, II and III to the Treaty of Rarotonga to the US Senate for consent to ratification. In reference to the Treaty of Pelindaba, the president stated:

I am convinced that it is in the best interest of the United States to ratify Protocols I and II to the Treaty. This step will strengthen our relations with our African friends and allies, enhance US security by furthering our global nonproliferation and arms control objectives, demonstrate our commitment to the decisions taken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and contribute

significantly to the realization of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in all its aspects.²³

At the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in 2010, the representative of France, speaking on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, noted that France and the United Kingdom had committed themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any African states parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba. Furthermore, he added that the United States had announced “its intention to start the process of ratifying the protocols annexed to the treaty”.²⁴ India—neither a state party to the NPT nor a recognized NWS—also conveyed its assurance that it would respect the status of the African NWFZ.

The 2010 First Conference of States Parties

Article 14 lays out a “Conference of all Parties to the Treaty”, which should meet “as soon as possible after the entry into force of the Treaty to, *inter alia*, elect members of the Commission [AFCONE] and determine its headquarters”.²⁵ The article continues with the stipulation that conferences should be held as necessary and at least every two years.

The First Conference of States Parties was held in Addis Ababa on 4 November 2010 and was attended by states parties²⁶ to the treaty, states not party²⁷ and the NWSs.²⁸ At the First Conference 12 commissioners were elected, as stipulated in the treaty.²⁹ Participants also endorsed the decision to establish the headquarters of AFCONE in South Africa. On 4 May 2011 the First Ordinary Session (a meeting of the 12 Commissioners) of AFCONE was held to decide on the structure and budget of AFCONE and its rules of procedure, as well as to elect its chairman and vice-chairman and to establish a process to appoint an executive secretary.

At its 2011 Ordinary Session the AU Assembly welcomed the convening of the First Conference.³⁰ The Assembly called upon “the AU Member States that have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba without further delay”, and appealed “to the concerned non-African States to speedily sign and ratify the relevant Protocols to the Pelindaba Treaty and to comply with all the commitments contained therein”.³¹

The African Commission on Nuclear Energy

Under Article 12 states parties are to establish AFCONE in order to ensure that there is compliance to the treaty. AFCONE has to perform certain administrative functions in support of compliance, such as collating reports and the exchange of information and establishing a complaints procedure. State party conferences can be convened, following a simple majority, on any matter arising from the implementation of the treaty. In addition, AFCONE is also responsible for reviewing the application of peaceful nuclear activities,

following IAEA safeguards. Article 12 concludes with a call for encouraging regional and international cooperation initiatives in the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology. Thus AFCONE will need to ensure state party compliance with the basic principles of the treaty and play an instrumental role in facilitating the promotion of peaceful nuclear activities (Article 8), the verification of peaceful uses (Article 9) and the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities (Article 10).

Once AFCONE is operational, African states will have more control over the development of nuclear projects on the continent, which should also ensure increased security of radioactive material. AFCONE could also assist African states with the ratification and implementation of other international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, including the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

In fulfilling its role in facilitating the promotion of peaceful nuclear activities AFCONE will have to work closely with the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA) and the recently created Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA). AFRA is an important IAEA initiative given that it “seeks to maximize the use of the available infrastructure and expertise in Africa and assists countries to move toward regional self-sufficiency using peaceful applications of nuclear techniques”.³² The FNRBA was formed in response to the increasing use of radioactive material in peaceful nuclear applications such as health, agriculture and energy, and 33 African states are currently part of the Forum. According to IAEA Deputy Director General Tomihiro Taniguchi the launching of the FNRBA “is a very positive step in strengthening nuclear safety and security in Africa”.³³ As laid out in its charter, the FNRBA provides a mechanism for the exchange of regulatory experiences and practices among nuclear regulatory bodies in Africa, and importantly, aims “to provide for the enhancement, strengthening and harmonisation of the radiation protection, nuclear safety and security regulatory infrastructure and framework among the members of FNRBA”.³⁴ Working together (and with the IAEA), AFCONE, AFRA and the FNRBA will avoid duplication and close the gaps in strengthening Africa’s nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations while simultaneously providing a balance between Africa’s security and development needs.

AFCONE and states parties will have to consider in the near future how best to approach Article 9, which deals with the verification of peaceful uses. The provision obliges states “not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material”³⁵ for the peaceful purposes of any NNWS unless it complies with IAEA safeguards. Agreements between India and the United States may now conflict with this. On 6 September 2008 the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) agreed to exempt India from its guidelines, which require comprehensive international safeguards as a pre-condition for the trade in nuclear material. India is one of four states which have signed neither the NPT nor the CTBT and continues to produce fissile material as it expands its nuclear arsenal. As a state not party to the NPT

(along with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Israel and Pakistan), India has not made a legally binding commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament. In reference to the NSG decision, Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, remarked that this "severely erodes the credibility of global efforts to ensure that access to nuclear trade and technology is available only to those states that meet global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament standards".³⁶

Conclusion

In many ways nuclear weapons had fallen from the African agenda since the Treaty of Pelindaba was signed, and it took 13 years before the treaty entered into force. African participation in international legal regimes concerning nuclear weapons has often been perceived as marginal over the last 14 years—and this should come as no surprise. The continent faces many security challenges: the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; the alleviation of poverty; and the provision of basic goods and services such as food, housing, educational and health care. However, when the Treaty of Pelindaba entered into force in July 2009, African support for a world without nuclear weapons gained significant momentum—and since then three more African states have ratified: Cameroon, Tunisia and Zambia, with more expected in the near future as AFCONE becomes operational.

Many African states played a significant role at the 2010 NPT Review Conference—both individually and as groups, such as the Africa Group, the Arab Group and the Non-Aligned Movement. Attended by virtually all African states, 22 African states made opening statements. Ambassador Tommo Monthe of Cameroon set the tone of what the continent desired at the review conference—which was for all UN member states "to demonstrate sufficient political goodwill and requisite flexibility and deep understanding with a view to achieving concrete results".³⁷

A vital element in all NWFZ treaties that have been negotiated is they are not something that can be imposed from outside. They must be rooted in the politics and culture of the region, and although they share common elements, each is unique. The Treaty of Pelindaba is thus an important African initiative led by Africans and for Africans. However, it is also important to place NWFZs within a global context and recognize that the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco for Latin America and the Caribbean served as the model for the successive NWFZ treaties: the Treaty of Pelindaba, as well as the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga for the South Pacific, the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok for South-East Asia and the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk for Central Asia.

As an NWFZ, Africa has reinforced the commitments of both NNWSs and NWSs to their nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. The treaty and AFCONE could play a galvanizing role towards the rapid entry into force of the CTBT—a pressing international imperative towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The CTBT and the Treaty of Pelindaba are mutually reinforcing. The impact and effects of any test, use or accident involving nuclear

weapons cannot be contained within national boundaries or continents. As stated by Jean du Preez on behalf of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), states parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba “should have no conceivable political and security obstacles to ratifying the CTBT. Under the NPT, they already have a legal obligation not to develop nuclear weapons. The Pelindaba Treaty further binds them legally not to test nuclear weapons or to allow nuclear testing on their territories”.³⁸

Notes

1. General Assembly, *Final text of a treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone*, UN document A/50/426, 13 September 1995, p. 7.
2. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa. Its successor, the African Union (AU), was established on 9 July 2002.
3. OAU, *Resolutions adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Cairo, UAR, from 17 to 21 July 1964*, AHG/Res.11(I), no date.
4. For a comprehensive account of the background to, and negotiating history of, the African NWFZ Treaty, see O. Adeniji, *The Treaty of Pelindaba: On the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone*, UNIDIR, 2002.
5. The 22 AU member states which have yet to ratify the treaty are: Angola, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Namibia, Niger, Republic of the Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, as well as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Morocco is not included here, as it is not an AU member because of its opposition to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic's AU membership.
6. The NWFZ covers the entire African mainland as well as the following islands: Agalega Islands, Bassas da India, British Indian Ocean Territory (commonly referred to as the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia), Canary Islands, Cape Verde, Cardagos Carajos Shoals, Comoros, Europa Island, Juan de Nova, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mayotte, Prince Edward and Marion Islands, Réunion, Rodrigues Island, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Tromelin Island and the Zanzibar Archipelago.
7. AU, *Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy*, Second Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Head of States and Government, held in Sirte, 28 February 2004.
8. Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, Opening address to the First Conference of States Parties to the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), Addis Ababa, 4 November 2010.
9. The five states are China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.
10. H. Blix, “Conference for the Signing of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty)”, Cairo, 11 April 1996.
11. P. Savita, “Treaty of Pelindaba: How Different?”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 547–59.
12. These include: Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia.
13. The Treaty of Rarotonga is also known as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.
14. Abdul Qadeer Khan, referred to as the father of the Pakistan nuclear weapon programme, provided the government of Pakistan with centrifuge designs and sold nuclear technology to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.
15. For further information see R. Mowatt-Larssen, *Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2010.

16. General Assembly, *Final text of a treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone*, UN document A/50/426, 13 September 1995, p. 12.
17. For further information see L. Tabassi, "Strengthening the NWFZs: National Legislation Enabling Enforcement of the Norms", *NPT News in Review*, no. 9, 2009, pp. 2–3.
18. It should be noted that recent AU documents, for example those emanating from the First Conference of Parties, use the abbreviation ACNE and not AFCONE—whereas the treaty itself refers to the African Commission on Nuclear Energy.
19. General Assembly, *Action on all draft resolutions under all disarmament and international security agenda items*, UN document A/C.1/60/PV.20, 26 October 2005.
20. B. Gill et al., *SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010, p. 501.
21. Global Security Newswire, "Russia Ratifies African Nuke-Free Zone Pact", 14 March 2011.
22. B. Gill et al., *SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010, pp. 500–1.
23. The White House, *Press release from the Office of the Press Secretary*, 2 May 2011.
24. General Assembly, *Action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items*, UN document A/C.1/65/PV.20, 27 October 2010, p. 16.
25. General Assembly, *Final text of a treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone*, UN document A/50/426, 13 September 1995, p. 13.
26. Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
27. Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, Namibia, the Republic of the Congo, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sudan and Uganda.
28. For further information see First Conference of State Parties to the African-Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), *Conclusions*, 4 November 2010.
29. The commissioners elected are from: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, Togo and Tunisia.
30. Assembly of the Union, "Sixteenth Ordinary Session", Addis Ababa, 30–31 January 2011.
31. Assembly of the Union, *Decision on the report of the Peace and Security Council on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa*, AU document Assembly/AU/Dec.338(XVI), no date, p. 6.
32. M. Edwerd, "Development of a Continent", *IAEA Bulletin*, vol. 51, no. 1, 2009, pp. 53–56.
33. IAEA, "Africa Takes Nuclear Safety Stage", IAEA Staff Report, 17 December 2009.
34. FNRBA, *Charter of the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa*, Article 2, 2 October 2008.
35. General Assembly, *Final text of a treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone*, UN document A/50/426, 13 September 1995, p. 12.
36. D. Kimball, "Unfinished Business for the NSG", MIT Workshop on Internationalizing Uranium Enrichment Facilities, Cambridge, 6 October 2008.
37. Statement by H.E. Tommo Monthe, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cameroon to the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 5 May 2010.
38. Statement by Jean du Preez, Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO, to the First Conference of State Parties of the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, Addis Ababa, 4 November 2010.

