Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts
Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts

Swadesh Rana*

* Swadesh Rana, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Centre for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations
NOTE

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

* *

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Secretariat.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop Participants</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Small Arms: Characteristics and Trends</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Intra-State Conflicts: A Global Profile</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Findings and Conclusions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex I: Characteristics of Small Arms</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex II: World-Wide List of Active Small Arms</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturers and Manufacturers of Related Equipment and Accessories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex III: Small Arms Manufacturers</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex IV: Armed Conflicts in the World, 1989-93</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

In his Position Paper on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, supplementing *An Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary General highlighted the problems posed by small arms. Small or light arms may be defined as arms that are man-portable or transportable by light vehicles and which do not require much by way of logistics or maintenance. For the time being, these are the weapons that kill, accounting for some 90 per cent of the deaths and injuries in many armed conflicts.

An early attempt to understand these problems was made by the Secretary General’s Advisory Mission to Mali. In October 1993, the President of Mali requested the Secretary General to provide assistance in the collection of illicit small arms proliferating in the country. The Advisory Mission tried to determine the scope of the problem and the types of assistance the United Nations might provide. In the beginning of 1995, a follow-up Mission set out to address the same issues in a regional West African context.

In cooperation with Swadesh Rana at the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York, a small workshop was convened at UNIDIR, Geneva, in November 1994. The aim was to take stock of ongoing research on security and small arms, and to discuss ways and means of reducing and controlling the flow of such weapons. To date, these efforts have been feeble. It will take a long time to find good solutions. However, as the Secretary General emphasizes in his Position Paper, the search should begin now.

This UNIDIR Paper was written by Mrs Rana in the aftermath of the workshop. I am grateful to her and to the Centre for Disarmament Affairs for smooth and rewarding cooperation. It will be followed up by other UNIDIR publications.

The United Nations has a unique role to play by demobilizing and disarming warring factions in the framework of broader peace operations. UNIDIR is currently undertaking a review of 10 collective security actions where demobilization/disarmament has been attempted, analysing the conditions under which it can contribute to conflict resolution and how it can be made more effective. Further UNIDIR studies on small arms will be made in the framework of this project.

This assessment of "Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts" appears in the series of *UNIDIR Papers*. In publishing this series, UNIDIR wishes to make
available, both to the international diplomatic and scientific community, analyses prepared by the staff of the Institute or by collaborating experts. UNIDIR takes no position on the views and conclusions expressed in these papers, but recommends them to the attention of its readers.

Sverre Lodgaard
Director, UNIDIR
Workshop Participants

Lora LUMPE, Director, Arms Sales Monitoring Project, Federation of American Scientists, Washington DC, USA

Stephania NEUMAN, Director, Comparative Defense Studies Program, Columbia University, New York, USA

Joachim SCHULZE, First Secretary, Permanent Representation of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland

John SIMPSON, Director, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Department of Politics, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom

Stephen John STEDMAN, Associate Professor African Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, The John Hopkins University, Washington DC, USA

Workshop Director:

Swadesh RANA, Centre for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York, USA

Alice WEBER, Assistant to Workshop Director

UNIDIR:

Sverre LODGAARD, Director
Virginia GAMBA, Senior Research Associate
I. Introduction

1. Although small arms have existed as long as humanity and armed conflicts predate the evolution of State, the use of small arms in intra-state conflicts has been more frequent in the last five years than at any other period since World War I. In fact, all the 90 armed conflicts in 1993, accounting each for at least 25 to over 1,000 deaths a year, were within States. More than 90% of deaths and injuries in these conflicts were the result of direct fire from small arms and light weapons. In some cases, over 20 people were displaced or uprooted for every person directly hit.

2. For the United Nations, the direct and indirect consequences of the use of small arms in intra-state conflicts present a two-fold dilemma. The traditional paradigms of arms control within the United Nations’ framework do not lend themselves effectively to deal with small arms and light weapons. Article 2, para. 7 of the United Nations Charter restrains the United Nation’s authority to intervene in the internal affairs of its Member States.

3. An international organisation of 185 Member States, based upon the principle of renunciation of the use of force in international relations, does not easily arrive at a consensus to use overwhelming military force for imposing peace on warring factions within a State. And yet, the United Nations’ growing mandates to provide humanitarian assistance to victims of intra-state conflicts are running up against increasing resistance by individuals and groups armed with light weapons. Not much is known about the source of these weapons or their users except that they seem to be turning up with greater frequency and causing heavier damage.

4. In light of above considerations, this paper draws a rough sketch of the characteristics of small arms and identifies major trends in their manufacture, acquisition, and trade. It also provides a global profile of armed conflicts occurring within States. After looking at the instances of linkage and coincidence between small arms and intra-state conflicts, concluding observations are made with a view to assist in policy formulation.
II. Small Arms: Characteristics and Trends

5. Small arms are essentially any means of lethality other than the sheer use of physical force. In this sense, small arms need not be manufactured and may not even be seen as weapons until so used e.g. sticks, stones, fire, water.

6. Manufactured small arms, also described as light weapons, are all conventional weapons that can be carried by an individual combatant or by a light vehicle. These are weapons which do not require an extensive logistical and maintenance capability. As compared to major conventional weapons, which could be operated from land, air or sea, small arms are weapons operated from land.

7. Like other conventional weapons, small arms also aim at two types of targets: point target weapons like revolvers, rifles and machine guns for human hits; and area weapons like grenades, flame throwers, and mortars for both human and material targets.

Characteristics

8. What distinguishes one category of small arms from another is one or more of the following characteristics:1

- Weight/portability;
- Explosive yield/size of the projectile;
- Mode of operation;
- Maintenance and logistic requirements;
- Rate of fire and calibre.

9. Based upon their performance characteristics, small arms fall into the following major categories:2

- Revolvers and self-loading pistols are among the lightest weapons weighing about 1 kg, most with an effective range up to 50 m though some are of much greater range.

---

1 See Annex I.
2 Based upon the contribution made by Joachim Schulze.
- Sub-machine guns, assault rifles and rifles weigh from 3 to 5 kg and have an effective range of 200 to 300 m.
- Machine guns have higher calibre, rate of fire and weight and can shoot more rounds.
- Grenades can be thrown or fired in a ballistic trajectory by hand, by a rifle or by a mortar according to the intended distance to a target which may be behind some kind of barrier. These area weapons are explosive devices mainly consisting of an explosive, a fuse and a metal containment. Several grenades are non-metallic.
- Machine guns have higher calibre, rate of fire and weight and can shoot more rounds.
- Grenades can be thrown or fired in a ballistic trajectory by hand, by a rifle or by a mortar according to the intended distance to a target which may be behind some kind of barrier. These area weapons are explosive devices mainly consisting of an explosive, a fuse and a metal containment. Several grenades are non-metallic.
- Fuel air explosives are mixtures of vaporized fuel and air and are activated by detonation.
- Mines, often referred to as poor man's weapon, are deposited to hamper the movement of combatants by maiming or killing people and/or destroying or damaging vehicles. They can be laid down by hand, vehicle, artillery, helicopter, or aircraft. Simple forms of mines can be produced in a small workshop because they consist of explosive and fuse only.
- Anti-tank weapons are recoilless weapons firing hollow charge ammunition meant to defeat armoured vehicles. They also can be used against buildings or fortification.
- Anti-aircraft weapons are more sophisticated machine guns or shoulder fired missiles with either unguided or guided warheads.

10. Some of the most commonly known small arms are:

- Assault rifles: Infantry rifles that automatically load and fire a burst of bullets (supplies from a detachable magazine) when the trigger is pulled. Examples include the Soviet AK-47 and its successor, the AKM; the U.S. M-16; the German G-3; the Belgian FAL and FNC; the Chinese copy of the AK-47 (Type-56); and the Israeli AK-47 copy (the Galil).
- Machine guns: These are rapid fire guns that discharge a steady stream of bullets as long as the finger is on the trigger. These guns are belt fed/magazine fed and can be mounted on a bipod/tripod or affixed to a tank or vehicle. Examples include the U.S. M-2 and M-60; The German MG3, the Soviet PKS and the Belgian MAG.
- Light anti-tank weapons (and Bazookas): Various light infantry weapons used against tanks, vehicles and fortified positions, including grenade...
launchers, recoilless rifles, rockets and anti-tank missiles. Examples include Soviet RPG-2 and RPG-7 portable rocket launchers (and Chinese variants, Type 56 and 69); the U.S. M20 and M72 rocket launchers and Dragon and TOW anti-tank missiles; and the Franco-German MILAN anti-tank missile.

- **Shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles**: Self-guided missiles that manoeuvre in flight to strike low-flying aircraft and helicopters. Examples include: the U.S. Stinger, the British Blowpipe, the Soviet SAM-7 and the Swedish RBS-70.

- **Anti-personnel landmines**: Small explosive devices placed in the ground that are triggered when stepped on by weight or tripwire either remotely or by seismic shift. Examples include the U.S. M18A1 Claymore; the Chinese Type 72A and PMN, and the Belgian PRB 409.

**Manufacture, Acquisition and Trade in Small Arms**

11. At present, nearly 300 companies in over 50 countries worldwide are actively manufacturing small arms, equipment and accessories.\(^4\) This represents a twenty-five percent increase in the known number of manufacturing countries as compared to ten years earlier. Some of the erstwhile importers of small arms have started domestic production through reverse engineering, licences for co-production with suppliers, and turn-key production arrangements between sellers and clients. China, with at least 16 factories manufacturing small arms, is believed to currently possess the world’s largest industrial capacity for producing infantry weapons.

12. Unlike the production of major weapon systems, most small arms do not require complex materials and sophisticated technology for manufacturing. The end of World War II was followed by a marked shift in the manufacturing technology for rifles and machine guns from shaping different components to metal sheet pressing which allows for mass production of precision spares. The technology for cold press of steel sheets, a major breakthrough in its time, is standard knowledge today. There are, thus, little chances of controlling a further proliferation of small arms manufacture through supplier controls over transfer of technology.

---

\(^4\) See Annexes II and III.
13. A striking feature in the manufacturing of small arms is the home-made guns. Many are comprised of nothing more than a nail which is attached to a spring, to strips of a car's inner tube or to a water piping. Homemade firearms are being manufactured virtually in the backyards and huts of South Africa and in South West Asia.

14. The world market is now glutted with small arms that are easily available at very low prices. Many of the small arms used in Rwanda were reported to be shipped in from Uganda where an AK-47 could be obtained for the price of a chicken. In Swaziland, the same weapon was known to be available for a mere $6. In Johannesburg and other urban centres in Africa and South Asia, it seems possible to hire automatic weapons by the hour. In Puerto Rico, there were instances of small arms being bought through regular mail. In Mozambique, rifles were traded for a box or two of maize.

15. As compared to the international trade in major conventional weapons, the world market in small arms has at least four distinguishing features:

- Unlike major weapons which can be acquired only through manufacture or trade, small arms can simply be stolen from the police and defence forces within the country, brought from private individuals, smuggled from across the borders, or obtained in skirmishes between small groups of hostile criminal factions. Attacks on security forces, police and militia are much more common than is publicly admitted. One of the relatively rare disclosures in this regard was the Annual Report of the Commissioner of the South African Police in 1992 which registered a 10 to 14% increase in the number of firearms stolen from the national security armoury.

- Both in terms of their cost and bulk, it has usually been more difficult, though not always impossible, to completely hide the transactions in major weapons. Small arms, on the other hand, are low value, light weight items which can move across the borders, and exchange hands within countries, with relative ease. Some of the most rudimentary small arms such as machetes, bows, arrows, and knives are nearly impossible to detect until they actually are used as weapons.

- The supplier-client-user relationship is far clearer in the case of major weapons than for the small arms. Clandestine deals and third party sales are applicable to both. But most of the trade in major weapons is either conducted as a government-to-government transaction or requires government approval. A sizeable share of small arms deals are increasingly
between private individuals, sub-national groups or non-state actors who also act as conduits for actual users. The Northwest Frontier Provinces near Afghanistan are reported to be full of miscellaneous small arms which apparently arrived through most circuitous and unpredictable routes from as far as Vietnam or the Middle East. The markings on the weapons sometimes indicate their original manufacturer but that provides no real clue of its supplier.

- There is no phenomenon in international trade in major weapons that can be compared to the leaking, rupturing and continuing pipelines of small arms. These pipelines are highly concentrated channels for movement of small arms in various regions of the world which were of some strategic significance to the major military powers during the Cold War. The pipelines have remained open even after the Cold War has ended. In Africa, there is a deeply defined channel down the eastern seaboard: approximately 1.5 million AK-47’s are believed to be unaccounted for in Mozambique alone. In South Asia, the Afghan pipeline is estimated to harbour at least 700 Stinger surface-to-surface missiles besides an assorted array of millions of rifles, machine guns and artillery rockets.

16. Until recently, small arms were considered somewhat marginal to the international arms trade. Now, it is being increasingly recognized by some major military manufacturers that small arms may well be the weapons faced worldwide in actual situations of combat into the late 1990’s and the early 21st century. The United States is believed to have made the maximum investment in research and development on small arms. Among the considerations determining the production and design of the small arms of the future are the following:

- most combat shooting in small arms is done at a distance of less than 300 meters;
- stress of combat and movement of target and shooter make it increasingly difficult to aim accurately at closer ranges;
- terrain features such as vegetation, man-made structures and lay of the land seriously affect target acquisition up to ranges in excess of 200-300 meters;

——

5 Based upon the contribution made by Stephen John Stedman.
to get optimum combat results, firepower and shooting skills may need to be combined but in some cases e.g. rifle fire, higher rates of fire may be more effective than the precision of its aiming quality.

17. Military planners expect the small arms of the future to have capabilities such as:

- light weight and compactness that would permit the soldier so armed to have "hands-free" concentration on his primary task;
- rapid and uncomplicated target acquisition, combined with low recoil, to help assure a high hit probability;
- high rate of fire, to give the user the edge in short, sharp, close-range encounters;
- improved ballistic and terminal effects of projectiles;
- ammunition that provides the highest probability of incapacitation against an adversary, even when protected by body armour, out to a range of at least 150m;
- affordability, simplicity and ruggedness;
- interchangeability, with modular construction and reduced maintenance.

III. Intra-State Conflicts: A Global Profile

18. With two exceptions i.e. Iraq-Kuwait and Ecuador-Peru, every other armed conflict in the nineties, resulting in 25 or more deaths in a year, took place within the territorial province of an internationally recognized sovereign State.

19. Over one-third of the UN Member States have been the scene of one or more armed conflicts since 1989. At least 175 sub-national groups and organizations are known to have resorted to acts of violence ranging from random incidence of criminality to full-blown insurgency. Although the State has been a party to each conflict, not every conflict was actually aimed at undermining the institution of State. The political context in which these armed conflicts have occurred broadly falls into four categories:

---

6 See Annex IV.
random acts of violence by individuals or groups having no aspiration to the status of State e.g. criminality among rival gangs or organized criminal acts against persons in positions of authority such as judges and police officers;
- sporadic incidence of violence by organized groups seeking greater political participation, cultural autonomy and economic benefits within the existing State structure;
- sustained resort to violence over long periods of time by organizations and movements with intent to supplant the existing governmental authority of the State over all or part of its territory;
- intense acts of extreme violence by groups operating within the context of the breakdown of the State in all or parts of its territory.7

20. Although armed conflicts have been a part of the international landscape, rather than aberrations in history, the present day intra-state conflicts are different in several respects from inter-state wars in the past and not so long ago:

- More than in the wars fought by the regular armed forces of hostile States, the maximum human casualties of intra-state conflicts are unarmed civilians many of whom may neither understand nor want to participate in the violence. Close to 90 percent of the deaths in intra-state conflicts of the 1990s have been those of non-participating civilians.
- Unlike in inter-state conflicts where the militarily more powerful combatant still has some chance of ending the war through victory, this is unlikely in most intra-state conflicts. Indeed, in a number of internal conflicts in Africa, the better supplied and more heavily armed faction did not win a victory as was the case in Ethiopia and Rwanda.
- Like inter-state conflicts, intra-state conflicts too can be for control of government or territory. But mostly, these are recurrent clashes of interest over values, relationships and identities. Often conflicts resulting from one set of goals lead to another and separate conflicts within a State get enlarged to create a general situation of anarchy. In Liberia, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia, protracted conflicts resulted in a splintering of the contending factions. What started as an internal war between 2 or 3
identifiable factions led to general fighting among multiple contending groups.

- Irrespective of their historical origins, most intra-state conflicts today carry the potential of territorial or political escalation largely due to mass demographic upheavals and transboundary migration by people fleeing from violence. Massive intrusion by unarmed civilians seeking succour and relief has made internationally recognized frontiers highly porous.

- Whereas inter-state armed conflicts are more prone to outside involvement on behalf of one of the warring parties, intra-state conflicts tend to spread across wider areas particularly among neighbouring States with shared ethnic and religious affinities.

- In inter-state armed conflicts, territorial adjustment through political negotiations or military victory usually leads to a lasting settlement. In intra-state conflicts, attainment of territorial autonomy by one or more warring factions tends to set in motion a process of fragmentation which is easier to start than to stop.

21. By 1994, the number of active armed conflicts had dropped from 90 to 47, all of them intra-state. The process of conflict termination was somewhat abrupt in cases where a change of regime brought about a sharp fall in violence e.g. Ethiopia, Panama and Sri Lanka. It was more gradual where negotiated agreements were reached among conflicting groups with or without third party good offices or mediation e.g. Lebanon, Mali, Morocco/Western Sahara, Mozambique, El Salvador, Liberia, Cambodia, Haiti. A simple lull in armed activity was noticed in some conflicts e.g. the Kurds and in East Timor. Then there were instances of inter-state conflicts where the withdrawal of long-standing support from outside powers changed the intensity of strife more than the fact of its incidence e.g. Angola, Afghanistan.

22. Europe as a region had a uniform increase in the number of armed conflicts, totalling twelve active conflicts in 1994. Of the 18 conflicts in Europe 1989-93, 15 were fought on the territory of what was previously the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The Americas showed the reverse pattern, with three conflicts recorded in 1993 compared to eight in 1989. Asia had the most variation with a large reduction in 1991, an upsurge in 1992 and again a reduction in 1993. The latter was in particular associated with the ending of conflicts in Myanmar/Burma. Notwithstanding the general image, conflicts in Africa continued to decline in numbers as well as in intensity: five in 1993 compared to nine in 1991.
23. In more than half of the cases of conflict termination or abatement between 1989 to 1994, the United Nations was directly or indirectly involved: through quiet diplomacy of the Secretary-General or his special representatives; through political persuasion in cooperation with regional organizations; through monitoring and observation of cease-fire agreements; through dispatch of good will and fact-finding missions; through provision of emergency and humanitarian assistance; through supervision of electoral processes; through logistical and operational support for signing of peace accords; through application of economic sanctions; and through deployment of UN personnel in the field. In 1994 UN personnel were deployed in 25 locations around the world with mandates ranging from active monitoring of cease-fire agreements to a staging of international presence.

24. The most difficult operations undertaken by the United Nations today are internal conflicts occurring within a weak State. States are weak where they are built upon fragile societies still in search of a national identity, where the institutional structures are undeveloped, and where problems of poverty and economic adjustment exacerbate political tensions. The absence of recognized avenues for redressing the discontent arising from these weaknesses leads to breakdowns of law and order, to secessionist movements, to outright civil war. The most susceptible States combine structural weaknesses with a regime which is divisive and does not represent all parts of the community.

25. Besides the internal dynamics of institution-building which put pressure especially on new States, the weak States of today are also vulnerable to a fast changing external political environment. Relieved of any pressing strategic and ideological concerns, the leading international actors now have greater political energies to pursue causes which were earlier considered secondary to maintaining global balance of power and political stability. The old international order put a premium on rights of the State including inviolability of its territorial frontiers against external aggression and non-interference in its internal affairs. The new order elevates the rights of minorities and individuals to the centre of the global political agenda. Among the minorities most prominently in conflict with the existing States are those with an ethnic affinity e.g. in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda.

26. Ethnic tensions are almost as old as ethnicity which is older than the institution of statehood. The current wave of ethnic unrest, as in the past, is also essentially about competing claims for access to resources, e.g. land, water, minerals. What distinguishes the present from the past is the relationship between ethnicity and statehood.
27. Virtually every modern State is multi-ethnic. Multi-ethnic States are living in relative harmony where a sense of common national identity has been forged through political pluralism, equality of economic opportunity and respect for cultural distinctness. Conflicts among different ethnic groups, and between the State and one or more ethnic groups, have erupted where symbols of statehood are perceived to be unfairly distributed.

28. What the world is witnessing today is ethnic unrest not only in several continents but also across the centuries. It is as if different profiles of ethnic conflicts were peering out simultaneously from several time periods. Ethnic conflicts in Europe are mostly related to the abrupt end of ideology, a 20th century phenomenon. Hitherto held together by a tight ideological grip, some of the ethnic groups are seeking territorial autonomy and separate statehood. In parts of Africa, there is a certain timelessness about the present ethnic tensions. They are still caused by competing claims to resources. Statehood is hardly an issue except to the extent that its symbols are unevenly spread among different ethnic groups. Elsewhere, ethnic identities representing a tribe or clan as the basis unit of social cohesion have come to clash with a belated exposure to democratic institutions representing a majority rule based upon one person, one vote. Here too, the ethnic search is mostly for greater autonomy within existing state structure: a parallel apparatus rather than a separate identity. The simultaneous occurrence of ethnic unrest aimed at different goals vis-a-vis the state structure carries a risk of political contagion. If self-determination outside the present State structure is the professed goal of some groups, then others too may seek it even when they started by looking for something less.

29. There are at least 5,000 distinct ethnic groups known to be living among the 185 Member States of the United Nations. Even if a small fraction of them were to resort to violence against each other or the State structures surrounding them, the international system will be faced with a continuum of intra-state conflicts.

IV. Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts

30. A majority of ongoing intra-state conflicts involve close range combat, irregular fighting, lack of clearly defined military objectives and a pre-set time frame for accomplishment. Not requiring much logistical support, training or maintenance, small arms are the weapons of choice for internal conflicts where the average age of the fighter is getting younger.
31. In Rwanda and Somalia, roadblocks consisting of nothing more than sticks and stones were put up by fighters, aged between 8 to 17 years, and wielding AK-47s or handmade guns.

32. Anti-personnel mines are currently responsible for the maiming of thousands of civilians in past and present zones of conflict such as Cambodia and Mozambique. Simple mortars have been used to devastating effect against crowded groups of civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Stinger surface-to-air missiles are capable of bringing down a Boeing 747 at both take-off and landing at least - at least a dozen were seen to be in possession of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. By definition, technological advances in light weapons are designed to make a system less difficult to use or more devastating in its impact. If weapons are easy to use and durable, they quickly work themselves down the 'conflict chain' - providing ammunition is available. Spare parts are seldom important, as they are in conflicts involving major weapons systems.

33. For a sub-national group looking for weapons, large quantities of small arms are easily available from a wide variety of sources. Infantry weapons of World War II vintage continue to surface in internal conflicts around the globe in perfect operational condition partly because military establishments tend to stock rather than destroy their systems equipment. Whether sold or donated by governments, these second-hand weapons find their way to sub-national groups either through black market or simple theft.

34. Somewhat paradoxically, unusually large volumes of light weapons have been released into the small arms market as an unintended fallout of recent progress in three of the most welcome political trends in the post-Cold War world: i.e. disarmament, demilitarization and negotiated conclusion of some long-standing intra-state conflicts.

- With agreements for elimination and reduction of nuclear weapon arsenals and weapons of mass destruction, the accompanying base closures and downsizing of supporting establishments, major military manufacturers are facing tough decisions on finding alternative avenues for gainful employment of military personnel and infrastructure. Taking into account the limited levels of demand for non-military products in some countries, and the costs of conversion from military to civilian products in others, several manufacturers of military hardware are promoting arms exports, including a whole range of small weapons. Bargain-basement sales of small arms have been made recently by both the former members of the USSR, and the Eastern European states.
As compared to the early 1990s, when at least one third of the new States were either military regimes or controlled by the military, there is now a definite trend towards the emergence of civilian rule in several parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The integration of military into civilian society has been far from easy in conditions of general lack of economic opportunity and gainful employment. In some cases, parts of the large pool of defense personnel have turned their energies into production and sale of small weapons.

In conclusion of peace agreements among warring factions, arms and equipment are expected to be either handed over to a third party or destroyed. In many cases, weapons and equipment were held back for a variety of purposes: self-defense, future income from trafficking and a political bargaining chip. The weapons handed over by the Contras to the ONUCA (United Nations Observer Group in Central America) were believed to be a fraction of their total arsenal, part of which resurfaced in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America. According to some reports, the demobilized Contras sold significant quantities of weapons to the Salvadorean FMLN (Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation). These were shipped in small and difficult to detect quantities across Honduran territory possibly with the collusion of some elements in the Honduran armed forces which were, along with the Contras, involved in drug trafficking.

35. The coincidence between drug trafficking, illicit trade in small arms and intra-state violence is by now recurrent in Southern Africa, South West Asia and Central America. The coincidence is heaviest where the terrain defies easy monitoring, where the inter-state borders are porous, and where the population separated by national frontiers shares largely similar physical traits e.g. Afghanistan/Pakistan, Nicaragua/Honduras, Angola/Mozambique.

36. There is a constant change of hands in the market for small arms as one intra-state conflict is finished and another starts looking for guns. The sale of weapons spells cash to buy transportation, food, shelter and medical equipment for those who have left war behind. Easy access to weapons is a disincentive for relying on other than violent means to those who feel underprivileged and want a change in the existing State structures.
37. In most cases of intra-state conflicts, the indirect consequences of the use of small arms tend to outweigh the direct casualties.\(^8\) Out of nearly 20 million refugees under United Nations care in 1994, one fifth had fled from Afghanistan alone and another one-fourth from African countries ravaged by a mutually reinforcing circle of prolonged fighting destroying crops and devastating agricultural lands into ecological waste. Two-thirds of the population in Somalia became dependent upon food aid after the widespread socio-economic disruption starting in one small part of the country constituting less than 2 percent of its entire territory i.e. Baidoa. In Nicaragua, where an estimated 22,000 people were killed during the Contra war, another 250,000 were displaced and nearly $2.5 billion worth of war damage was caused. The consequences of the Contra war extended beyond the Nicaraguan frontier with Honduras and Costa Rica, neither faced with an internal conflict, becoming vulnerable to refugee outflows from neighbours and economic decay of the region. By 1987, when a peace process was set in motion, up to 18 percent of Central America’s population had been displaced within their own countries or forced to flee into exile and more than one third of the regional labour force was unemployed. There was a general economic decay in the region, with the prices of regional exports declining and the deterioration of regional trade to a level approximately one third of its 1980 level.

\(^8\) Based upon the contribution made by Virginia Gamba.
V. Findings and Conclusions

38. The political fallout of small arms used in intra-state conflicts is generally larger than the actual military and operational value of these weapons. This consideration by itself is strong enough to make small arms the weapons of choice for sub-national groups seeking wider recognition of the causes for which they want to challenge the authority of the State over a part or all of its territory. Even when considered inconsequential to determine the military outcome of an armed conflict, the AK-47’s, the grenade launchers, the Stinger surface-to-surface missiles and the mortar are mostly seen as the weapons of war for the remainder of this century rather than the ICBM’s, the F-16’s and T-72’s.

39. The States most susceptible to the violence resulting from the use of small arms by sub-national groups are those who do not have a monopoly over the use of coercion to uphold the rule of law and order in a society at war with itself. To earn that monopoly the State must enjoy broad-based political support which legitimizes its authority within its territorial frontiers. The prolongation of intra-state conflicts and continuation of violence is most likely where a State neither has the monopoly to use coercion nor the authority to exercise it legitimately.

40. Although more people have been killed by small arms than major weapons since World War II, none of the measures traditionally associated with arms control can be expected to work effectively in dealing with light weapons. Unlike chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction, their production cannot be banned because most of the very small arms which become tools of combat for sub-national groups also provide the national security forces with means of law enforcement against criminals in otherwise peaceful societies. Unlike nuclear weapons, where non-proliferation was attempted while the number of nuclear powers was known, the proliferation of small arms has already occurred among both the known producers manufacturing them and the underground movements using them. Unlike in the missile technology control regime where a small group of suppliers agreed to restrict transfer of technology to would-be manufacturers, small arms are relatively independent and rudimentary technological packages which can be manufactured almost in a backyard. Unlike major weapon systems, which cannot be produced, transported or stored for long without detection, small arms easily elude monitoring. But above all, the existing paradigms of arms control apply essentially to actions of recognized governments representing sovereign States whereas the use of small arms in intra-state conflicts consists of actions by sub-national groups either aspiring to form a government or representing a State without actually being either.
41. Time is politically ripe now to simultaneously address both ends of the spectrum resulting from a recurring coincidence between the use of small arms and the outbreak of intra-state conflicts. Among the major military powers, there is a marked disinclination towards getting involved in civil strife among irregular forces in strategically marginal lands over causes which are often distinguished more by their bitterness than any clearly defined objectives. There is also a distinct war-weariness among the countries geographically close to the areas of internal conflict particularly where it results in mass exodus of refugees and a general economic disruption in the region. Even for the public at large there is a rising sense of outrage at the grim pictures of death and destitution caused by a number of small wars during a period of peace.

42. While internal conflicts were traditionally outside the UN's jurisdiction, and small arms are not covered by the existing paradigms of arms control, some useful precedents have been established in recent years.

- Mandates for UN involvement in intra-state conflicts have arisen from inter-state agreements. In March 1989, for example, the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was requested to verify the commitments made by Central American States in the Esquipulas Agreement of August 1987. Section 6 of that Agreement, also known as the Guatemala Procedure, reads as follows:
  "... to prevent the use of their own territory by persons, organizations or groups seeking to destabilize the Governments of Central American countries and to refuse to provide them with or allow them to receive military and logistical support."

- Among the major manufacturers, suppliers and developers of small arms, there is a manifest willingness to share their expertise in strengthening bureaucratic and border controls to block illicit exports. The United States is currently assisting former Soviet republics and China in developing centralized control over exports. In addition, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms works closely with law enforcement and customs offices in foreign nations to curb the illegal traffic in guns of U.S. origin. It has set up offices in Mexico City and Bogota, Colombia, and conducted a firearms trafficking workshop in Honduras for senior law enforcement officers and military personnel from 13 Central American countries.9

9 Based upon the contribution made by Lora Lumpe.
The United Nations has been approached for assistance in the collection of illicit arms surfacing within States. As a result of a request made by the President of Mali, the Secretary-General established in October 1993 the first ever Advisory Mission to determine the quantity and types of weapons, their origins, their suppliers and their users inside a State. The report of the Mission provided an assessment of regional and subregional linkages between the security environment, political institutions and national legislative measures for controlling the illicit traffic in small arms. Subsequently, similar advisory missions were expected to visit four other countries, i.e. Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad.

Unilateral measures to ban the export of certain types of small arms have been followed by international action. Since 1991, the U.S. Congress has prohibited all U.S. exports of anti-personnel mines. On 16 December 1993, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution calling upon Member States to agree to a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines. Efforts are currently afoot to develop an international protocol on landmines within the framework of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious Or To Have Indiscriminate Effects.

Both among the suppliers of weapons to the pipelines established during the Cold War and the areas where they operate, there are indications of cooperation in retrieving the missing weapons and stemming their flow and proliferation through illicit trade. In September 1991, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. agreed to shut off the flow of arms to both sides in Afghanistan. Since 1993, Afghanistan has sponsored an annual resolution in the General Assembly requesting Member States to submit their ideas on effective ways and means of collecting weapons illicitly transferred as well as concrete proposals to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms.

Regional organizations have demonstrated capabilities for assisting in the demobilization of sub-national groups using small arms. In August 1989, the Secretaries General of the UN and the Organization of American States agreed to establish the International Verification and Follow-up Commission (CIAV) to receive the arms equipment and military supplies of the Nicaraguan Resistance and of other irregular forces who might wish to demobilize voluntarily.
Research institutes and academic bodies have started examining the patterns in which small arms flow to the areas of conflict and put forward proposals to stem or reverse the trend. Among such proposals are those for an international agreement to the effect that the production of small arms should be accompanied by a document of ownership making it illegal to possess a weapon without the original document.

National legislatures are considering tougher measures to guard against acquisition of small arms through theft from private individuals, police and defense forces. The Arms and Ammunition Act in South Africa contains numerous provisions aimed at preventing licensed weapons from being stolen and used by other than its original owner.

43. Each one of the precedents could serve as a basis for a package of workable Measures on Small Arms and Internal Conflicts (MOSAIC).

44. The operational implications of putting these measures in effect could be worked out through one or more of the following procedures:

- an international workshop under the aegis of UNIDIR in cooperation with the Commission on Global Governance.
- an inter-regional working group with participants from regional organizations like the OAU, OAS, and ASEAN.
- a high-level panel of intergovernmental experts nominated by the Secretary-General at his own initiative or in response to a General Assembly resolution.

45. Politically, the critical issue in dealing with the use of small arms in intra-state conflicts is to bring small arms back under the authority of the State functioning through a democratic government which enjoys broad public support. That is a demanding task. Political institutions take time to grow. The quintessential challenge here is to encourage peaceful avenues for the expression of political dissent within States.
Annex I

Characteristics of Small Arms

What distinguishes one category of small arms from another is one or more of the following characteristics:

**Weight/Portability**

- Weapons which are man-portable e.g. pistols, rifles, grenades, automatic weapons, anti-personnel mines, shoulder fired anti-tank/aircraft missiles, small calibre mortars/unguided missiles;

- Weapons which are portable in a jeep/light truck e.g. vehicle mines, anti-aircraft cannon up to 40mm, heavier mortars, light artillery;

- Weapons which are portable in a heavy vehicle e.g. tank guns, large calibre mortars and artillery, medium and long range anti-aircraft missiles, radar guided anti-aircraft artillery, mobile ballistic missiles.

**Explosive Yield/Size of the Projectile**

- Weapons which injure by kinetic energy alone e.g. rifle bullets;

- Weapons which injure through the explosive effects of a small quantity of explosives e.g. cannon shells, anti-personnel mines, mortars;

- Weapons which injure through the explosive effects of a large quantity of explosive e.g. heavy artillery.

**Mode of Operation**

- Direct, line-of-sight flight of the projectile e.g. rifle bullet, bazooka;

- Indirect ballistic trajectory of the projectile e.g. grenade, mortar round;
- Passive, non-mobile operation e.g. landmines;

**Maintenance and Logistic Requirements**

- Minimal logistic and maintenance requirements e.g. rifles, grenades, mines, encapsulated guided-missiles;

- Some logistic and maintenance requirements e.g. all non-man portable weapons, weapons involving guidance radars;

- Major logistic and maintenance requirements e.g. tanks, armoured-personnel carriers, mobile ballistic missiles.

*Source*: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton
Annex II

World-Wide List of Active Small Arms Manufacturers and Manufacturers of Related Equipment and Accessories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-A'C Manufacturing Corp.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAI Corporation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuracy International</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Arms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Corporation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeritalia Sp.A. Avionics Systems &amp; Equipment Group (Italy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aipoint AB (Sweden)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aims Optronics NV (Belgium)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al. Gi. Mec. srt (Italy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliant Technology Systems (Formerly Honeywell)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alsetex Societé d'Armement et d'Etudes (France)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMAC, Inc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Industries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Arms Inc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ares, Inc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arges Armaturen (Austria)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armalon Ltd. (UK)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armiger (Canada)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arminex Ltd. (USA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Ingenuity Co.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armscor - Lyttleton Engineering Works (RSA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Research Associates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astra - Unceta (Spain)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Small Arms Factory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Weaponry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWA Defence Industries Pty. Ltd. (Australia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baird Corporation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barr &amp; Stroud Ltd. (Scotland)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrett Firearms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battelle Memorial Institute</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaver Manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benelli Armi SpA (Italy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beretta, Pietro, SpA (Italy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernadelli, Vincenzo, SpA (Italy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beta Company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMARCO (subsidiary of GLAT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMS Arms (UK)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNJ Industries Ltd (UK)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bofors Aerotronics AB (Sweden)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Manufacturing and Research Co. Ltd. (UK)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunswick Corporation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21
B Square
Buck Chemisch-Technische Werke GmbH (Germany)

C
Calibre International Inc.
Calico Light Weapons Systems
CAMDEC
Canon Delcour
Cape Armoury (RSA)
Cardoen Industries, SA (Chile)
Cation Corporation
Cavim, Division Metalmeccanica (Venezuela)
Ceskoslovensak Zbrojovka NP (Czechoslovakia)
CETME (Spain)
Charter Arms
Chartered Industries (Singapore)
China Light Weapons Research Institute (China)
China North Industries Corp (China)
China Ordnance Society (China)
China: The Small Arms Research Institute of the PLA General Staff (China)
Choate Machine Tool
Cienner, Jonathan Arthur, Inc.
Colt's Manufacturing Company
Combined Service Forces (Taiwan)
Companhia de Explosivos Valparaiaba (Brazil)
Condor SA - Industria Quimica (Brazil)

D
Conjay Firearms & Ammunition Ltd. (UK)
Coonan Arms
Critoan Armetec
Daewoo Precision Industries (Korea)
Dansk Industri Syndikat A/S (DISA) (Denmark)
Dan Wesson Arms
Davin Optical, Ltd. (UK)
Davis Company
Day & Zimmerman
Defense Research Group Two
Ballistic Division (Switzerland)
Diehl GmbH & Co. (Germany)
Diemaco (Canada)
Dowty Armourshield (UK)
Dynamit-Nobel AG (Germany)

E
Eagle Military Gear (Israel)
EEV Night Vision Systems (UK)
Eidgenossische Munitionsfabrik (Switzerland)
Eidgenossische Waffenfabrik (Switzerland)
Elbit (Israel)
Electro Criso Metal S.A. (Spain)
Elop (Israel)
Eley, Ltd. (UK)
Eltro GmbH (Germany)
Emerging Technology
ENARM (Brazil)
ENOSA (Spain)
Euroatlas GmbH (Germany)
Eurometaal NV (Netherlands)
Experiencias Industriales (Spain)
(Now INISEL)

F

Fabrica Militar de Armas
Portariles Domingo
Natheu' (Argentina)
Fabricaciones Militares (FAMAE)
(Chile)
Fabrique Nationale Nouvelle
Herstal (Belgium)
F.A.T.S. II
FC Holdings
Feather Inc.
Fegyver-Es Gazkwsulekhyar
(FEG) (Hungary)
Ferranti Electro-Opt
Ferunion Foreign Trading
Company (Hungary)
FFV Ordnance (Sweden)
Fiocchi Munizioni SpA (Italy)
FN Manufacturing, Inc.
Franchi, Luigi (Italy)
Fritz Werner Industrie-
Ausrustungen (Germany)

G

Gabriel & Vojta Sportswaffen
Ges.M.B.H. (Austria)
GEC Sensors, Pullin Controls Div.
(UK)
General Electric Aerospace
Glock GmbH (Austria)

Gonzé Co.
Grendel Inc.
GLAT Industries (France)
GSI Inc.

H

Hall and Watts (UK)
Hawk Engineering Inc.
Heckler und Koch GmbH
(Germany)
Helio (UK)
Hellenic Arms Industry (Greece)
M. Hensoldt und Sohn Optische
Werke AG (Germany)
Hertenberger AG (Austria)
Fa. Hiendlmayer (Germany)
High Standard
Hilton Gun Co. (UK)
HKS Products
Hornady
Howa Machinery Ltd. (Japan)
Hughes Aircraft Company, Electro
Optical and Data Systems Group

I

Imatronic, Ltd. (UK)
Industria de Materiel Belico do
Brazil (IMBEL) (Brazil)
Industrial Technology and
Machines AG (Switzerland)
Industrias Nacionais de Defesa EP
(Portugal)
Inidel (Spain)
Instalaza (Spain)
Institute of Optronics (Pakistan)
Intel Sec Systems
International Technologies (Lasers) (Ltd) (Israel)
Intratec USA Inc.
Israel Military Industries (Israel)
Iver Johnson Arms & Cycle Works

J

Jagd-und Sportwaffen Suhl (Germany)
Johnson Firearms Specialties
Jorgen Andersen Ingeniofirma A/S (Denmark)
JSL Ltd (UK)

K

Karl Kaps & Co.
KBI Inc.
Kern & Co. AG (Switzerland)
Knight's Armament Co.
Korea Explosives Co. Ltd. (Korea)

L

Laboratorio de Pesquisa de Armamento Automatico LTDA (Brazil)
Laser Devices
Laser Photonics, Inc.
Laser Products
Laser Systems Division
Laser Technologies Ltd. (Switzerland)
Ernst Leitz Ltd. (Canada)
Leupold Stevens
Litton Electronic Devices Division

Llama-Gabilondo y Dia SA (Spain)
Losfeld-Industries (France)
Luchaire (France)
Lynn Arms Manufacturing

M

Maadi Company for Military & Civil Engineering (Egypt)
M&D Munitions
Magnavox Electro-Optical Systems
Magnum Research
Makina Ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (Turkey)
Manroy Engineering Ltd. (UK)
Manufacture d'Armes Automatiques Bayonne (MAB) (France)
Marconi Command & Control Systems Ltd. (UK)
Master Cartridge
Matra Manurin Defense (France)
Mauser Werke (Germany)
Mecar SA (Belgium)
Mekanika Industria e Comercio Ltda. (Brazil)
Mendoza SA Productos (Mexico)
Merkuria (Czechoslovakia)
Minebea C., Omori Factory (Japan)
O.F. Mossberg & Sons, Inc.
Muller Group Ltd. (UK)
Musgrave (RSA)
MWG Co., Inc.
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company
McMillan & Company, Inc.

N
National Aerospace
New Detonics Mfg. Co.
Nite Optics, Inc.
Nobel Industries (Germany)
Noptel OY
Norsk Forsvarteknologi A/S (Norway)
NTK Division of Sumitomo Heavy Industries (Japan)

O
Oerlikon-Buhler Machine Tool Works (Switzerland)
Officine Galilea Sp.A. (Italy)
Oip-Instrubel (Belgium)
Oldeft (Netherlands)
Olin Ordnance
Optic-Electronic Corporation
Optronique-Fabricantes de Electronicas Lda. (Portugal)
Ordnance Development & Engineering Co. of Singapore (Pte.) Ltd.

P
Pakistan Institute of Optronics
Pakistan Ordnance Factories
Pancor Corporation
Parker-Hale, Ltd.
PGM Precision SARL

Philips USAF BV (Netherlands)
Phototronics Corporation
Phrobs
Phychem Ltd. (UK)
Pilkington Ptd. Ltd. (UK)
Pindad Pt. (Indonesia)
Poly Technologies Inc. (China)
Poongsan Corporation (Korea)
Pocal

R
Ram-Line Inc.
RAMO Inc.
Raufos Ammunisjonsfabrikker, A/S (Norway)
Remington Arms Inc.
Redick Arms Development Inc.
Reutech (RSA)
Rheinmetall GmbH (Germany)
Ring Sights Ltd. (UK)
R.M. Equipment Inc.
Royal Ordnance (UK)
Royal Ordnance, Guns & Vehicles Division
Ruggieri (France)

S
Saco Defense Inc.
Sako Ltd (Finland)
San Cristobal Arsenal (Dominican Rep.)
J.P. Sauer & Sohn GmbH (Germany)
Saunders-Roe Developments Ltd. (UK)
Schweizerische Industrie-Gesellschaft (SIG) (Switzerland)
Schmidt & Bender GmbH (Germany)
SERAT (France)
Siemens AG (Germany)
Siemens Albis (Switzerland)
Sima-Cefar (Peru)
Simrad Optronics (Norway)
Sirkus Industries Ltd. (Israel)
Sites SpA (Italy)
Small Arms Manufacturing
Smith & Wesson Inc.
Socimi SpA (Italy)
Sopelem (France)
Sphinx Electronics
Springfield Armory Inc.
Standard Armament
Star Bonifacia Echeverria (Spain)
Star-Tron Technology Corp
Sterling Armament Co. Ltd. (UK)
Steyr-Mannlicher AG (Austria)
Sturm, Ruger & Co.
Surveillance Technology Group
SWD Inc.
Swiss Defense Technology & Production Agency (Switzerland)
Swiss Federal Ammunition Factory
Technipol International
Telecommunications
Radioelectriques et Telephoniques (France)
Thermold Design & Development Inc.
Thorn EMI Electronics Ltd. (UK)
TNO Prins Maurets Laboratory (Netherlands)
Tomkins Corporation
Trijicon Inc.
United Industrial Corporation
United Scientific Instruments (UK)
United Telecontrol
US Army Ballistics Research Laboratory Exterior Ballistics
US Army Ballistics Research Laboratory Weapon Dynamics and Accuracy Br
US Army Combat Systems Test Activity
US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center
US Repeating Arms Co.

V

OY Vaimenninmetali AB (Finland)
Fabbrica d’Armi Fratelli Tanfoglio SpA (Italy)
TASCO
Taurus International (Brazil)
TD Arms

Vinhoggs Mek. Versted AS (Norway)
W

Carl Walther Waffenfabrik
(Germany)
Weaver Arms Ltd.
J.L. Weibull AB (Sweden)
Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrustungen GmbH (Germany)
H.P. White Laboratory Inc.
Wild Leitz (Switzerland)
Winsloe Arms
Wooden Laboratories

XYZ

10-X Manufacturing
Zavodi Crvene Zastava
(Yugoslavia)
Zavody Presneho Strojirenstvi v
Brod (Czechoslovakia)
Zeiss, Carl (Germany)

Source: *International Small Arms Usage and Research and Development Trends*,
Institute for Research on Small Arms in International Security,
Washington, D.C. May 1993
Annex III

Small Arms Manufacturers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech-Slovak Republic</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic People's Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Republic of South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>USSR (Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex IV

Armed Conflicts in the World, 1989-93

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Sub-national groups/non-state parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government of Armenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Husseinov military faction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina¹</td>
<td>Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbian irregulars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatian irregulars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Serbian irregulars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbian Republic of Krajina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Anti-government alliance²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zviadists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of South Ossetia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Abkhazia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ With the support of the government of Croatia, Croatian irregulars and Muslim irregulars.
² The anti-government alliance in Georgia consists of a faction of the National Guard, the forces of Vazha Adamia and Mkhedrioni.
Moldova  Dniestr Republic

Romania  National Salvation Front/National Armed Forces

Russia  Parliamentary Forces

Soviet Union  Azerbajani Popular Front
               Government of Armenia and ANM (Armenian National Movement)

Spain  ETA (Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna: Basque Nation and Liberty)

United Kingdom  PIRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army)
                INLA (Irish National Liberation Army)

Yugoslavia  Republic of Croatia
            Croatia irregulars
            Republic of Slovenia

Middle East

Egypt  al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Association)
       al-Jihad al-Islamiyy (Islamic Jihad, Holy War)
       Tala 'i al-Fath (Vanguards of Conquest, New Jihad)

Iran  Mujahideen Khalq
       KDPI (Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran)

Iraq  DPK (Al-hizb al Dimuqrati al-kurid: Democratic Party of Kurdistan)

---

3 Some 40 Muslim groups cooperate in Gama’a al-Islamyya.
4 In 1987 an umbrella organization of eight Kurdish groups, the Kurdistan front, was formed, and apart from DPK and PUK other groups within the Front were militarily active during 1991 and 1992.
PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan)
SAIRI (Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq)\textsuperscript{5}

**Iraq-Kuwait**

**Israel**
Groups joined as PLO (Munazamat Tahir Falasatin: Palestine Liberation Organization) or with unclear relations with PLO e.g. UNLU (Unified National Leadership of the Uprising connected to the Intifada)
Other non-PLO groups and/or with unclear level of organization e.g. Hamas and Islamic Jihad

**Lebanon**
Lebanese Army (Aoun)
Lebanese forces
Druze militia (PSP: Progressive Socialist Party)
Amal
Hizbollah
LCP (Lebanese Communist Party)
Groups joined as PLO (Munazamat Tahir Falasatin: Palestine Liberation Organization)
PFLP-GC (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command)
SLA (South Lebanese Army)
Government of Syria
Government of Israel
Government of Iran (Revolutionary guards)
Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party
Lebanese National Resistance Front
Popular Nasserite Organization
Lebanese Baath Party

**Turkey**
PKK (or Apocus: Kurdish Workers Party)

\textsuperscript{5} Unclear number of deaths during 1992, possibly more than 1000. SAIRI is the largest of several Shia rebel groups reportedly active in Southern Iraq.
Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary left)

Asia

Afghanistan
Mujahideen (Afghanistan-based)
Mujahideen (Pakistan-based)
Mujahideen (Iran-based)
Military faction
Hezb-i-Islami
Hezb-i-Wahdat
Jumbush-e Milli

Bangladesh
JSS/SB (Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti: Chittagong Hill Tracts People’s Coordination Association/Shanti Bahini (Peace Force)

Cambodia
KR (Khmers Rouges: Red Khmers)/PDK (Party of Democraticaic Kampuchea)
KPNLF (Khmer People’s National Liberation Front)
FUNCINPEC (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif: United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia)/ANS (Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste: National Sihanoukist Army)

India
Kashmir insurgents
Sikh insurgents

---

6 A large number of groups exist; according to the government, approximately 60 in 1990, 140 in 1991 and 180 in 1992. Some of the most important are the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and the Hizbul Mujahideen.
7 A large number of groups exist, reportedly more than 24 organizations and splinter groups in 1992. Some of the most important are the Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) and the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF).
ABSU (All Bodo Students Union)  
BPAC (Bodo People’s Action Committee)  
ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam)  
BSF (Bodo Security Force)  
ULFA faction  
PLA (People’s Liberation Army)  
NSCN (National Socialist Council of Nagaland)  
ATTTF (All Tripura Tribal Force)  
Jharkand Mukti Morcha  
Naxalites/PWG (People’s War Group)  
MCC (Maoist Communist Centre)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|           | Freti\text{lin} (Frente Revolucionario Timorense de Libertacao e Independencia: Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor)  
|           | Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh)  |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Laos</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ULNLF (United Lao National Liberation Front)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Myanmar</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|        | NMSP (New Mon State Party)  
|        | Arakan insurgents\(^8\)  
|        | KIO/KIA (Kachin Independence Organization/Army)  
|        | KNPP (Karenni National Progressive Party)  
|        | KNU (Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army)\(^9\)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Papua New Guinea</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRA (Bougainville Revolutionary Army)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Philippines</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| NPA (New People’s Army)  
| RAM-SFP (Reform Movement of the Armed Forces - Soldiers of the Filipino People) in  

---

\(^8\) At least 6 groups. Rohingya Solidarity Organization, RSO, is the largest.  
\(^9\) Possibly more than 1000 deaths in 1991.
1991 renamed RAM (Revolutionary Alliances of the Masses)
Military faction

Sri Lanka
LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam)
JVP (Janata Vimukhtti Peramuna: Sinhalese People's Liberation Front)

Tadzhikistan
Popular Democratic Army

Africa

Algeria
FIS (Jibhat al-Inqath; Front Islamique du Salut: Islamic Salvation Front)\(^{10}\)
Expiation and Sin
Exile and Redemption
The Faithful of the Sermon
The Brigades of God
GIA (Groupe islamique armé: Armed Islamic group)

Angola
UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
FNLA (Frente Nacional da Libertacao de Angola: National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
FLEC (Frente da Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda: Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda)

Burundi
Ubmwé
Palipehutu (Parti pour la Libération du peuple Hutu: Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People)

---

\(^{10}\) Several armed Islamic groups are brought together under the command structure of the FIS military wing.
Chad

Military faction, later in 1989 developing into Revolutionary Forces of April 1st

MOSANAT (Mouvement pour la Salvation Nationale Tchadienne: Movement for the National Salvation of Chad)\textsuperscript{11}

Islamic Legion

CSNPD (Conseil de salut national pour la paix et la démocratie: Committee of National Revival for Peace and Democracy)

CNR (Comité national de redressement: National council for recovery)

FNT (Front National Tchadien: Chad National Front)

MDD (FANT) (Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Développement: Movement for Democracy and Development) (Forces Armées Nationales du Tchad: Chad National Armed Forces)

Comoros

Presidential guard

Djibouti

FRUD (Front de Restauration de l'Unité et de la Démocratie: Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy)

Ethiopia

EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front)

ALF (Afar Liberation Front)

TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front)

EPDM (Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement) forming EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front)

Military faction

EPRP (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party)

OLF (Oromo Liberation Front)

\textsuperscript{11} The military faction and MOSANAT joined in an alliance, which in 1990 was named MPS (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut: Patriotic Salvation Movement) and led by Deby. Deby overthrew the president in December 1990 and thereafter formed the government.
Liberia  NPFL (National Patriotic Forces of Liberia)\textsuperscript{12}  
Burkina Faso government  
INPLF (Independent NPFL)

Mali  MPA (Mouvement Populaire de l'Azaouad: Azawad People's Movement)

Morocco/Western Sahara  Frente Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro, or Polisario Front)

Mozambique  RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Mocambicana: Mozambican National Resistance, MNR)

Niger  FLAA (Front de Libération de l'Air et l'Azaouad: Air and Azawad Liberation Front)

Rwanda  FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais: Rwandan Patriotic Front)

Senegal  MFDC (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance: Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance)

Sierra Leone  RUF (Revolutionary United Front)

Somalia  SNM (Somali National Movement)  
Military faction, developing into SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement)  
SSDF (Somali Salvation Democratic Front)  
USC (United Somali Congress) (led by Madhi)  
USC (United Somali Congress) (led by Aidhi)/SNA (Somali National Alliance)

South Africa  ANC (African National Congress)

\textsuperscript{12} Possibly more than 1000 deaths during 1993.
PAC (Pan Africanist Congress)
Azapo (Azanian People's Organization)
FA (Freedom Alliance)\(^\text{13}\)

**Sudan**

SPLA/SPLM (Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement)
Faction of SPLA/SPLM\(^\text{14}\)

**Togo**

Military faction

**Uganda**

Faction of UPDA (Uganda People's Democratic Army)
UPA (Uganda People's Army)
HSM (Holy Spirit Movement), in 1990 renamed UDCM (United Democratic Christian Movement) and in 1991 renamed UPDCA (Uganda People's Christian Democratic Army)

---

\(^\text{13}\) Freedom Alliance: Conservative Party, Inkatha Freedom Party, Afrikaaner VolksFront and the leaders of the homeland governments of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei.

\(^\text{14}\) No exact death figures exist for 1993. However, all sources point clearly to that the fighting caused more than 1000 deaths.
Central and South America

Colombia

FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional: National Liberation Army)
Faction of FARC
Faction of ELN
MAO (Movimiento de Autodefensa Obrera: Workers' Self-Defence Movement)
Quintin Lame

El Salvador

FMLN (Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberation Nacional: Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation)
Gerado Barrios Civic Front

Guatemala

URNG (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca: Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity)

Haiti

Tonton Macoute
Military faction

Nicaragua

FDN (Fuerzas Democraticas Nicaraguenses: Nicaraguan Democratic Forces) or Contras

---

15 FMLN consists of ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo: People's Revolutionary Army), FAL (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion: Armed Liberation Forces), FARN (Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional: Armed Forces of National Resistance), FPL (Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion Farabundo Marti: Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces) and PRTC (Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos: Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers).

16 UNRG consists of EGP (Ejército Guerrilleros de los Pobres: Guerrilla Army of the Poor), PGT (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo: Guatemalan Workers Party), FAR (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes: Rebel Armed Forces) and ORPA (Organizacion del Pueblo en Armas: Organization of Armed People).
Panama  Military faction
Paraguay  Military faction
Peru  Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)
       MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru: Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement)
Trinidad and Tobago  Jamaat al-Muslimeen (Society of Moslems)
Venezuela  Military faction (Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement)

Source: States in Armed Conflict 1993, Report No 38, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, 1994
UNIDIR Publications

The publications produced by UNIDIR are intended for publication and wide dissemination through free distribution to diplomatic missions, as well as research institutes, experts, academics and sales through the United Nations Sales Section and other outlets.

Under an arrangement concluded with the Dartmouth Publishing Company (UK), selected UNIDIR Research Reports are published by Dartmouth and are distributed through their sales network (books indicated by ●; see also at the end of the list How to Obtain UNIDIR Publications).

Research Reports / Rapports de recherche


Disarmament Research: Agenda for the 1990's / La recherche sur le désarmement: programme pour les années 90, Proceedings of the Sochi Conference, 22-24 March

**Conventional Disarmament in Europe**, by André Brie (IIB), Andrzej Karkoszka (PISM), Manfred Müller (IIB), Helga Schirmeister (IIB), 1988, 66p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.88.0.6.


Aerial Reconnaissance for Verification of Arms Limitation Agreements - An Introduction, by Allan V. Banner, Keith W. Hall and Andrew J. Young, D.C.L., 1990, 166p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.90.0.11.


* Existe également en français: Obligations en matière de désarmement: problèmes de respect et mesures d'imposition, sous la direction de Serge Sur, 1994, publication des Nations Unies (à paraître)


Research Papers / Travaux de recherche

No. 1 - Une approche juridique de la vérification en matière de désarmement ou de limitation des armements, par Serge Sur, septembre 1988, 70p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.88.0.5.
* Also available in English: A Legal Approach to Verification in Disarmament or Arms Limitation, 1988, 72p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.88.0.5.


No. 4 - The Prevention of the Geographical Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear-Free Zones and Zones of Peace in the Southern Hemisphere, by Edmundo Fujita, April 1989, 52p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E. 89.0.8.


No. 8 - Esquisse pour un nouveau paysage européen, par Eric Remacle, octobre 1990, 178p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.91.0.2.


No. 30 - *The CTBT and Beyond*, by Herbert F. York, 1994, 21p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.94.0.27.

No. 31 - *Halting the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons*, by Thérèse Delpech, Lewis A. Dunn, David Fischer and Rakesh Sood, 1994, 70p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.94.0.29.


No. 33 - *Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Northeast Asia*, by Yong-Sup Han, 1995, 83p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.95.0.3.

No. 34 - *Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts*, by Swadesh Rana, 1995, 52p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.95.0.7.

No. 35 - *Military Brain-Drain from the Former Soviet Union*, by Dorothy Zinberg, 1995, United Nations publication (forthcoming)

**UNIDIR Newsletter / Lettre de l’UNIDIR**

(quarterly / trimestrielle)

No. 2, June/Juin 1989, Research in Latin America and the Caribbean/La recherche en Amérique latine et dans les Caraïbes, 32p.

No. 3, September/Septembre 1990, Nuclear Non-Proliferation/La non-prolifération nucléaire, 43p.
No. 4, December/Décembre 1990, Research in Western and Northern Europe (I)/La recherche en Europe de l'Ouest et en Europe du Nord (I), 72p.


Vol. 6, No. 21, March/Mars 1993, Research in the Middle East/La recherche au Moyen et Proche Orient, 70p.

How to Obtain UNIDIR Publications

1. UNIDIR publications followed by a United Nations Sales Number (GV.E... or GV.F...) can be obtained from UNIDIR or from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to United Nations, Sales Section, Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland, Phone (41.22) 917.26.12, Fax (41.22) 740.09.31, or United Nations, Sales Section, UN Headquarters, New York, New York 10017, USA. The UNIDIR Newsletter is available at a voluntary subscription price of US $ 25 a year.

2. UNIDIR publications published by Dartmouth can be obtained through Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Gower House, Croft Road, Aldershot, Hampshire, GU11 3HR, England, Phone (0252) 33.15.51, Fax (0252) 34.44.05.

3. UNIDIR publications published by Taylor and Francis can be obtained through Taylor and Francis Ltd, Rankine Road, Basingstoke, Hants RG24 8PR, England, Phone (0256) 84.03.66, Fax (0256) 47.94.38.