PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: CAPABILITIES AND CULPABILITIES

Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams
Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities

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and
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Eric G. Berman joined the United Nations in 1990 in the Department for Disarmament Affairs and subsequently served as the Assistant Spokesman for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the Special Assistant to the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, and the Political Affairs Officer for the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda). He was also Executive Director of United Nations Watch, a non-governmental organization based in Geneva. Mr. Berman undertook the work for this book as a Visiting Researcher at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). He received a Master’s degree in International Relations from Yale University and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

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PREFACE

This study on peacekeeping in Africa is an important undertaking. At a time when African States are taking on a greater degree of responsibility for promoting peace and security on their continent, the authors have provided a detailed and insightful chronicle of the efforts of African States to shoulder these burdens and of Western programmes aimed at enhancing their ability to do so.

Stemming the tide of deadly conflict in Africa has been one of my main priorities not only as Secretary-General but even before then, during the years I was head of United Nations peacekeeping. In a report to the Security Council in April 1998, I set out my thoughts and concerns about the causes of conflict in Africa and how the international community might support Africa’s efforts to find the path of durable peace and sustainable development. The Security Council and General Assembly, other United Nations organs and bodies, and the wider international community have exhibited great interest in the report and its follow-up. The Council in particular has taken significant decisions in line with the report’s recommendations. For example, since July 1999—the month after the research for this book was completed—the Council has authorized a large peacekeeping operation to replace the small observer force in Sierra Leone, and has also authorized the deployment of a multi-disciplinary mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and military liaison officers in the region.

Despite these positive developments, the study’s sobering conclusion is that present-day policies and programmes are insufficient to respond meaningfully to current and emerging threats to African peace and security. As the authors stress, African States have often contributed to United Nations peacekeeping operations and to multinational forces in Africa and abroad, but frequently lack the ability to deploy and sustain sizeable forces without significant outside assistance. In the authors’ view, the capacity-building programmes of non-African countries are welcome initiatives but do not go far enough; moreover, they write, although donor countries sometimes provide African peacekeepers with financial aid and substantial equipment, such support is frequently belated and inadequate.
The authors, Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, have carried out an exhaustive review that draws on an array of expertise from throughout the United Nations Secretariat and United Nations system as well as from dozens of United Nations Member States. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, in cooperation with the South African Institute for Security Studies, has produced a contribution of clear value to policymakers, practitioners and researchers. It is my hope that this study will help Africans and non-Africans alike form closer and more effective partnerships that will help us reach our shared goal of ushering in, at long last, an era of peace and prosperity throughout Africa.

Kofi A. Annan
Secretary-General
January 2000
DIRECTORS’ NOTE

In their book, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams review the effects of the increasing tendency by the international community to rely on regional and subregional organizations as well as ad hoc arrangements in the promotion of peace and security in Africa. The book analyses, in some detail, both indigenous and external efforts to develop African countries’ individual and collective capacities to undertake peacekeeping operations. Amidst the various alarm bells that are rung, the authors provide clear and succinct recommendations for ways to improve on current practices which are insufficient to cope with the growing challenges facing the continent.

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has been providing the international community with detailed independent studies on problems relating to peace and security for two decades. While traditional arms control and disarmament issues remain a core concern for the Institute, matters pertaining to the resolution of conflicts in Africa have assumed an ever greater focus. Recent examples include the widely-acclaimed book *A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking* (1998 and 1999), and the UNIDIR project on the control of small arms in West Africa, which is an in-depth, forward-looking research project on disarmament policies and challenges in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and other West African States.

Since its establishment some ten years ago the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa has become a leading independent think tank on African affairs. The ISS seeks to conceptualise the debate on human security in Africa and conducts research projects across the African continent in such areas as corruption and governance, crime, policing, arms management, early warning, peacekeeping, regional security, defence, justice, and civil-military relations. As part of its activities the ISS conducts research and publishes books on subjects such as the privatisation of security in Africa (*Peace, Profit or Plunder?* (1999) From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies (1999)), a bi-monthly journal (the *African Security Review*), a series of monographs, papers, newsletters and a variety of occasional publications.
We would like to express our appreciation to Eric Berman and Katie Sams, who initiated the project and doggedly researched a comprehensive and exhaustive study, under difficult circumstances. In addition, we wish to acknowledge the Governments of Switzerland and the United Kingdom as well as the Geneva Foundation to Protect health in War, and the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, which provided generous support for this research.

This undertaking also shows how the United Nations and civil society can collaborate in an effective partnership. UNIDIR and ISS look forward to building upon this initiative and collaborating on future projects designed to foster informed debate and promote international peace and security.

Patricia Lewis  
Director  
UNIDIR  
Geneva  
January 2000

Jakkie Cilliers  
Executive Director  
ISS  
Pretoria
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This book represents the culmination of two years of directed research. During that time, we conducted fieldwork in some 20 countries and interviewed more than 200 policy makers, practitioners, and members of civil society. We have many people to thank.

While it was not possible for us to visit all of the African (sub)regional organizations highlighted in this book, each one assisted us greatly by answering our questions and providing documentation. We are particularly indebted to Chris Bakwesegha, the former Head of the Conflict Management Division of the Organization of African Unity, and his successor, S. Bassey Ibok, both of whom were especially generous with their time. The same is true of Halima Ahmed, Adrienne Diop, and Roger Laloupo of the Economic Community of West African States, Amb. Nelson Cosme of the Economic Community of Central African States, and R-Adm. Alexandre Diam, the Secretary-General of the Treaty on Non-Aggression, Assistance, and Mutual Defence.

We were also unable to visit all of the other multilateral organizations that we focus on in this book, but many gave us critical feedback. Peter Craig-McQuaide of the European Commission and Sandra Pepera of the Commonwealth Secretariat provided valuable documents and texts. Rafael Branco of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) was particularly candid in his comments. As for the United Nations, we wish to broadly thank the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs within the Secretariat, as well as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States were all extremely open in discussing their respective African capacity-building and military assistance programmes. Amb. Gabriel de Bellescize, the Ambassador for France’s Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix and his Military Adviser, Lt-Col. Eric Bonnemaison, were very helpful, as was Emmanuel Lenain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As concerns the United Kingdom, we appreciate the assistance that British Military Advisory and Training Teams in West Africa and Southern Africa afforded us during our visits to Accra and Harare. Gill Coglin, the Deputy
Head of the Peacekeeping Section in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s United Nations Department, took a keen interest in our work from the outset of the project and was always eager to be of help. Amb. Marshall McCallie, the Special Coordinator of the US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) Interagency Working Group, readily answered our questions. He also facilitated our interviews with members of his staff—a practice that his successor, Amb. Aubrey Hooks, continued. ACRI’s Scott Fisher was particularly detailed and expansive in his remarks, and Philip Egger provided timely and thorough responses to our queries. David Hamon at the Department of Defense was instrumental in putting us in touch with colleagues both within and outside the US Government.

Beyond these organizations and individuals, we were privileged to interview a number of people who by virtue of their experiences were in a position to provide us with unique insights into the issues we studied. They include: Amb. Herman Cohen, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; Lt-Gen. Emmanuel Erskine, former Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, and former Force Commander, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon; Peter Fitzgerald, former Commissioner, United Nations International Police Task Force; Amb. George Moose, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; Amb. Robert Oakley, former US Special Envoy to Somalia; Lt-Gen. Arnold Quainoo, former Force Commander, Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group; Maj-Gen. Klaas Roos, former Police Commissioner, United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC); Gen. (Rtd) John Sanderson, former Force Commander, UNTAC; Amb. Jackie Selebi, Director-General, South African Department of Foreign Affairs; and Gen. Amadou Toumani Touré, former President of Mali and former Chairman of the International Monitoring Committee to Supervise the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements and the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements. We appreciate the time they gave us.

We conducted most of our interviews in person, a task made infinitely easier because of the assistance we received from many individuals, institutions, and Governments. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS)—and in particular Mark Malan—helped us greatly in arranging meetings in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The central offices of the United Nations Development Programme in Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo ensured that
our visits to those four countries were as productive as possible. Ivor Fung’s generous offer to put the United Nations Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Lomé, Togo, at our disposal was much appreciated. The Governments of Benin (for scheduling a full itinerary for us, including a trip to Porto Novo to meet with the Gendarmerie), France (for travel within Senegal during Exercise Guidimakha), and Mozambique (for facilitating meetings with CPLP officials in Lisbon) also merit special mention. We are grateful to Bassey Ate of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs for putting together a roundtable of experts and giving us the opportunity to share our preliminary findings with him and his colleagues.

The assistance we received in creating the maps and compiling the data in the numerous charts and annexes has also greatly enriched our book. Robert McKay of the Cartographic Section of the United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI) generously agreed to design the maps, and we are also thankful to Miklos Pinther, the Section’s Chief. DPI’s Kevin S. Kennedy and Fred Schottler answered many questions concerning facts and figures that appear in the various tables. Mohammed Alhassan and Lt-Col. Carlos Alonso Ausin of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations also helped to ensure that the data was as accurate as possible. The staff of the United Nations library in Geneva was very helpful. Of the dozens of United Nations Member States’ Permanent Missions that we contacted, the contributions of Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, and Nigeria, were of particular importance in verifying statistical data concerning their countries’ participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Col. Oduro Apenteng of the Ghanaian Ministry of Defence was also instrumental in this regard. We appreciate the willingness of Kevin O’Prey and DFI International to allow us to include their study for ACRI as an annex to our book.

We also benefited from having numerous people read and provide substantive comments on various chapters, including: Clement Adibe, Roland Adjovi, Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Anatole Ayissi, Christophe Carle, Gill Coglin, Christopher Coleman, Comfort Ero, Andrew Grene, Dylan Hendrickson, Dan Henk, João Honwana, Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou, Sally Morphet, Laurie Nathan, ‘Funmi Olonisakin, Michael Pugh, Erwin Schmidl, Jessica Wattman, Maj-Gen. (Rtd) Ishola Williams, and Michael Wolfers. We are particularly indebted to Robin Poulton, whose wit, wisdom, and red pen significantly strengthened the final text. Jakkie Cilliers’ critique was both extensive and much appreciated. We also wish to acknowledge the
substantial editing assistance we received from Claire Berman, Noel Berman, Elizabeth Eyster, Matthew Johnson, Sylvie van Lammeren, Betsy Sams, David Sams, and Elizabeth Umlas.

This book would not have been possible if not for the financial and institutional support of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Patricia Lewis gave us complete freedom to develop this project and took the initiative to support a valuable research trip to Mali. Anita Blétry was extremely understanding and meticulous in typesetting the manuscript. Isabelle Roger was a particularly good friend to us. Emmanuelle Tuerlings and Renata Zaleski assisted us in our research.

In addition, the Geneva Foundation to Protect Health in War gave us significant financial—as well as moral—support. We especially appreciate the interest Luc Paunier and Elisabeth Nyffenegger showed in our work. We are also grateful to ISS and the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre for their generous research grants.

Finally, we would like to thank our families and friends for their support and encouragement—and for putting up with us during what were sometimes tense times. Eric wishes to pay special tribute to his wife, Elizabeth Umlas, whose understanding was boundless.

Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams
December 1999
# Glossary of Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAFC</td>
<td>Allied Armed Forces of the Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRF</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACSS</td>
<td>African Center for Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSTRAG</td>
<td>African Strategic and Peace Research Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAD</td>
<td>Accord de non-aggression et d’assistance en matière de défense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>All People’s Congress Party of Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAS</td>
<td>Association of Southern African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTBAT</td>
<td>Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDF</td>
<td>Botswana Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British Military Advisory and Training Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMLO</td>
<td>British Military Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAE</td>
<td>Central African Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>confidence-building measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAO</td>
<td>Communauté économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEAC</td>
<td>Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique centrale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Communauté financière africaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMAG</td>
<td>Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Conflict Management Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMD</td>
<td>Conflict Management Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>Commonwealth Monitoring Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMSA</td>
<td>Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPAX</td>
<td>Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPLP</td>
<td>Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSLG</td>
<td>Civilian Security Liaison Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Combined Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDA</td>
<td>Department for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIILS</td>
<td>Defense Institute of International Legal Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>demilitarized zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOMREP</td>
<td>Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOPHA</td>
<td>Department of Operations, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPAS</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPI</td>
<td>Department of Public Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>daily subsistence allowance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>E-IMET</td>
<td>Expanded IMET</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>FDD</td>
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<td>FROLINAT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>FT</td>
<td>Follow-on Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTX</td>
<td>field training exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>GAFSCC</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
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<td>GRIP</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUNT</td>
<td>Gouvernement d’union nationale transitoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICI</td>
<td>International Charter Incorporated</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
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<td>International Commission of Inquiry</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally-displaced person</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IGADD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGNU</td>
<td>Interim Government of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INMARSAT</td>
<td>International Maritime Satellite Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>INPFL</td>
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<td>IPF</td>
<td>IGAD Partners Forum</td>
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<td>IPTF</td>
<td>International Police Task Force</td>
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<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Network</td>
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<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Inter-State Defence and Security Committee</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IWG</td>
<td>Interagency Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCEP</td>
<td>Joint/Combined Exchange Training</td>
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<td>LCD</td>
<td>Liberal Congress for Democracy</td>
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<td>MET</td>
<td>Mobile Education Team</td>
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<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>UN Verification Mission in Guatemala</td>
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<td>UN Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<td>MIFONUH</td>
<td>UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MISAB</td>
<td>Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui</td>
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</table>
MLC  Mouvement pour la libération du Congo
MONUA  UN Observer Mission in Angola
MOT  Military Observer Team
MOU  memorandum of understanding
MPLA  Movimiento Popular de Libertaçao de Angola
MPRI  Military Professional Resources Incorporated
MSA  mission subsistence allowance
MTAP  Military Training Assistance Programme
NACC  North Atlantic Co-operation Council
NAM  Non-Aligned Movement
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO  non-commissioned officer
NGO  non-governmental organization
NMOG  Neutral Military Observer Group
NOREPS  Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System
NPFL  National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPP  National Patriotic Party
OAU  Organization of African Unity
OIF  Organisation internationale de la Francophonie
OMC  Observation Monitoring Center
OMIB  Observer Mission in Burundi
OMIC  Observer Mission in the Comoros
ONUC  UN Operation in the Congo
ONUCA  UN Observer Group in Central America
ONUMOZ  UN Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL  UN Observer Mission in El Salvador
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAC  Pan-Africanist Congress
PAE  Pacific Architects and Engineers
PCASED  Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development
PDD  Presidential Decision Directive
PKO  peacekeeping operation
PSO  peace support operation
PVO  private voluntary organization
RCD  Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie
RECAMP  Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix
RENAOMO  Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
<table>
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<td>status of forces agreement</td>
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<td>standard operating procedure</td>
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<td>Sustainment Training</td>
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<td>Short-Term Training Team</td>
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<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organization</td>
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<td>Swedish Armed Forces International Centre</td>
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<td>TfP</td>
<td>Training for Peace in Southern Africa Project</td>
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<td>United Arab Republic</td>
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<td>UDEAC</td>
<td>Union douanière et économique des États de l’Afrique centrale</td>
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<td>Union économique monétaire de l’Afrique de l'Ouest</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>ULIMO</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement of Liberians for Democracy</td>
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<td>UMA</td>
<td>Union du Maghreb arabe</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>UN Mission in East Timor</td>
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<td>UN Advance Mission in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNASOG</td>
<td>UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group</td>
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<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>UN Angola Verification Mission</td>
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</table>
UNCRO  UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
UNDOF  UN Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP  UN Development Programme
UNEF  UN Emergency Force
UNEP  UN Environment Programme
UNFICYP  UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGOAMAP  UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCR  UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIC  UN Information Centre
UNIFIL  UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIMOG  UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNIKOM  UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNIPOM  UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission
UNITA  União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola
UNITAF  United Task Force
UNMAS  UN Peacekeeping Senior Management Seminar
UNMIBH  UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH  UN Mission in Haiti
UNMIK  UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMOGIP  UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOP  UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
UNMOT  UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOGBIS  UN Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNOIL  UN Observer Group in Lebanon
UNOMIG  UN Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL  UN Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL  UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMUR  UN Observer Mission in Uganda-Rwanda
UNOSOM  UN Operation in Somalia
UNPREDEP  UN Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR  UN Protection Force
UNPSG  UN Civilian Police Support Group
UNSF  UN Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)
UNSMIH  UN Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC  UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES  UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAG  UN Transition Assistance Group
UNTAT  UN Training Assistance Team
<table>
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<th>Description</th>
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<td>UN Transition Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>Western European Union</td>
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<td>Zairean Camp Security Operation</td>
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The founders of the United Nations, in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, envisaged an important role for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is increasingly apparent that the United Nations cannot address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world. Regional or subregional organizations sometimes have a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and to assist the United Nations in containing them.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1 November 1995 from *Improving preparedness for conflict prevention and peace-keeping in Africa*.

Within the context of the United Nations primary responsibility for matters of international peace and security, providing support for regional and subregional initiatives in Africa is both necessary and desirable. Such support is necessary because the United Nations lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa. It is desirable because wherever possible the international community should strive to complement rather than supplant African efforts to resolve Africa’s problems.

Kofi Annan, 13 April 1998 from *The causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa*.

African regional and subregional organizations have an important role to play in the promotion of peace and security on their continent. The United Nations Security Council has relied on them excessively, however, in large part because it has been reluctant to authorize United Nations peacekeeping operations. Although there is merit to strengthening indigenous capabilities, the issue of whether Africans are prepared for the challenge of assuming primary responsibility for responding to conflicts is another matter. What can African States and organizations do to enhance their peacekeeping

---


peacekeeping operations on the continent in 1993, in June 1999 there were three. (See Map 0.1.)

African States have recognized the grave threats to their security and are well aware of the Security Council’s reluctance to become meaningfully involved in conflicts on their continent. Consequently, they are striving to become more self-reliant in responding to armed conflict and complex humanitarian emergencies in their midst. Towards this end, they have shown a greater willingness to prepare for and undertake diplomatic and military actions jointly with other African States.

A number of African political and economic organizations have been expanded to include security dimensions and have developed—or are developing—conflict prevention, management, and resolution frameworks. In 1993, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) created a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Three years later, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) adopted an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) supported the creation of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1998. Most recently, in 1999, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) established a similar mechanism known as the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX). The East African Co-operation (EAC) is actively discussing the possibility of concluding a defence treaty that would provide for regional peacekeeping operations.

African States—through recognized organizations as well as ad hoc coalitions—also have undertaken peacekeeping operations. Even prior to the creation of its Mechanism, the OAU deployed military observers in Rwanda—a move that was especially noteworthy considering the difficulties the Organization had encountered during its only previous foray, a decade earlier, in Chad. Subsequent to the establishment of its Mechanism, the OAU fielded observer missions in Burundi and the Comoros. Of the subregional organizations, ECOWAS and SADC have been most active in deploying multinational forces. Since 1990 when it formed the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in response to the civil war in Liberia, ECOWAS has also authorized missions in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. SADC members have undertaken military operations in DRC and in
Lesotho. Concurrent with these efforts, African countries have continued to form inter-African forces outside of formal organizations. The Six-State operation in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 1997 is the most recent example.

African peacekeeping capabilities, however, have lagged behind their willingness to intervene. The various peacekeeping initiatives have suffered from political, financial, administrative, logistical, as well as command and control problems. Several have failed to attain their objectives, and some have arguably exacerbated or widened the very conflicts they were meant to resolve.

Aware of the problems but nonetheless unwilling to intervene militarily themselves, a number of Western countries have designed programmes to develop African peacekeeping capabilities. The initiatives vary considerably in terms of their levels of financial and political commitment as well as their primary emphases. Nevertheless, most provide training, equipment, or financing to African countries, either directly or through African regional organizations.

Among the capacity-building initiatives, American, British, and French programmes are the most substantial and well developed. The US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) provides peacekeeping training and related non-lethal equipment to African countries on a bilateral basis. France conducts subregional peacekeeping training exercises, provides classroom instruction, and pre-positions heavy equipment in designated locations in Africa through its Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix (RECAMP). The UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme focuses primarily on education and training.

Largely in response to criticisms from African States, Western countries have begun to coordinate their capacity-building programmes. In May 1997, France, the UK, and the US announced their “P-3 Initiative,” which sought to begin a dialogue with African countries as to how to best promote peace and security on the continent. An added goal was to foster and harmonize donor countries’ assistance in this effort. In December 1997, a meeting was held at United Nations Headquarters in New York to discuss the individual programmes of the P-3 as well as those of other countries and to listen to African concerns. At this meeting, the P-3 Initiative gave way to a larger
group of interested States, which has convened on subsequent occasions to share information and coordinate activities.

Taken as a whole, this flurry of diplomatic and military activity by African and Western States and organizations appears more significant than it actually is. There is a great disparity between the needs of African actors, on the one hand, and the predispositions of Western actors, on the other. Both groups bear responsibility for the present situation. Granted, the challenges to African peace and security defy simple solutions. Yet current approaches have been oversold. They are at best a partial response.

* * *

Part I of this book describes challenges to African peace and security and discusses the reasons why the United Nations Security Council has changed its peacekeeping policy. Chapter 1 reviews the broad effects of colonialism and the cold war on African polities. Factors responsible for the recent rise in intra-state conflicts are highlighted. The proclivity for civil wars to assume regional dimensions is also addressed. Chapter 2 reviews the evolving role of peacekeeping. The section outlines the early years of peacekeeping and chronicles how it flourished after the end of the cold war. Special attention is paid to United Nations’ activities in Somalia because of the profound impact this mission had on subsequent policy. The chapter also documents the Council’s increasing tendency to defer to regional and subregional peacekeeping initiatives.

Part II examines African attempts to manage and resolve conflicts on their continent. The responses of the OAU are analysed in Chapter 3. The significance of its experience in Chad is discussed. The chapter also reviews the creation and functioning of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and describes the OAU observer missions in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Comoros. Chapter 4 examines the role of ECOWAS in the promotion of subregional peace and security. It traces the organization’s evolution and chronicles its interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. The chapter also presents the proposed structure of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. Chapter 5 studies the creation and evolution of SADC. The organization’s efforts to develop a security framework, which culminated in the 1996 establishment of the Organ for Politics, Defence and
Security, are presented. The chapter describes various capacity-building initiatives of the organization and its members. It also examines the political and military involvement of SADC member States in Lesotho in 1994 and 1998, and in DRC in 1998. Chapter 6 looks at five other subregional organizations that are often mentioned as having potentially significant roles to play in the promotion of peace and security in Africa—the Arab Maghreb Union (known by its French acronym, UMA, for Union du Maghreb arabe), EAC, ECCAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defence (known by its French acronym, ANAD, for Accord de non-aggression et d’assistance en matière de défense). Ad hoc African initiatives are discussed in Chapter 7. The chapter reviews the examples of the two Moroccan-led forces in Zaire, the Nigerian operation in Chad, and the military involvement of several Southern African countries in Mozambique. It places particular emphasis on the recent inter-African force that deployed in the Central African Republic. The proposed peacekeeping operation in Congo (Brazzaville) is also discussed.

Part III reviews African peacekeeping experience outside of African regional, subregional, and ad hoc initiatives. Chapter 8 chronicles the participation of African countries in United Nations peacekeeping operations and non-African-led multinational forces over the past 50 years. It examines African contributions in terms of troops, military observers, and civilian police. Chapter 9 analyses the relevance of such involvement in determining African countries’ capacities to undertake peacekeeping operations on their own. It highlights the characteristics of United Nations and non-African-led undertakings that differentiate them from the African initiatives reviewed in Part II. The link between the capabilities of African militaries and their ability to contribute to peacekeeping is also discussed.

Part IV describes and analyses efforts made by non-African States to address the deficit. The undertakings of the US, France, and the UK are reviewed in Chapters 10, 11, and 12, respectively. The origins and components of each country’s central capacity-building programmes—ACRI, RECAMP, and the African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme—are discussed in detail. In the case of the US, other assistance programmes that include relevant peacekeeping field training or classroom education are reviewed. In the case of the UK, the new Security Sector Reform Programme of the Department for International Development (DFID) is introduced. The
operational support that the US, France, and the UK have provided for peacekeeping missions is also described in these chapters. Chapter 13 presents other countries’ bilateral programmes to develop African peacekeeping capabilities and describes operational assistance that has been provided in the field. The initiatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden are highlighted. Chapter 14 surveys multilateral capacity-building initiatives. It discusses the relevant programmes of the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU). It also reviews the efforts of three cultural and linguistic groupings: the Commonwealth, the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (known by its Portuguese acronym, CPLP, for Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa), and La Francophonie. In addition, three less formal cooperative arrangements—between France and the United Kingdom, through Franco-African Summits, and among Nordic countries—are also described.

The study concludes with a series of recommendations on how to make current approaches more effective. It provides concrete suggestions for strengthening African regional and subregional efforts and for improving Western capacity-building programmes. It also emphasizes that the United Nations must assume a greater role in both promoting and undertaking peacekeeping on the African continent.
Part I

Setting the Stage
CHAPTER 1

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

ENDURING LEGACIES OF COLONIALISM AND THE COLD WAR

Colonialism stunted Africa’s political, economic, and social development. During the nineteenth century’s “scramble for Africa,” European powers partitioned the continent into arbitrary territorial units. The colonies that emerged often lacked internal cohesiveness, and differences and antagonisms among various indigenous groups were frequently exploited and exacerbated. Africans were given virtually no voice in political affairs. Designed to support the needs of the colonial powers, colonial economies required largely unskilled labour, and education was neglected. Generally, colonial powers did not prepare African countries for statehood, which most achieved during the 1960s. (See Table 1.1 for years when African States became United Nations Members.)

Not surprisingly, therefore, decolonization created a new set of challenges which the first generation of African statesmen were ill-equipped to handle. Transitions to independence were frequently bloody affairs. Despite the pragmatic decision of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to accept colonial borders under the doctrine of uti possidetis 1 (“as you hold possession by right”), the existence of poorly defined and controversial borders throughout the continent has contributed to conflicts and will likely

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Member State</th>
<th>Year of Admission</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, South Africa*</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan Arab Jamahiriya</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Zaire</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania, Sierra Leone, United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi, Zambia</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Swaziland</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde, Comoros, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola, Seychelles</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Founding Members of the United Nations.
pose greater problems as resources become increasingly scarce.\(^2\) In light of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity within those preordained borders, individual African States have found it difficult to build “national” identities.

The cold war had a profound effect on African Governments and security. Both the Soviet Union and the United States courted newly-independent African States (as well as liberation movements) in an effort to win converts to their respective causes. As a result, they often supported authoritarian, corrupt, and oppressive Governments. While Moscow and Washington helped fuel several conflicts on the continent by supplying significant armaments to States and rebel groups, they also kept some conflicts from erupting.\(^3\)

With the end of the superpower rivalry, many African leaders could not continue to rely on the accustomed backing of an outside power to lend much-needed political legitimacy and financial and military support to their regimes. The US no longer needed to coddle African leaders in exchange for their allegiance. Russia no longer had the means to provide assistance, and Cuba, the former Soviet Union’s surrogate in Africa, agreed to withdraw its troops serving on the continent. Several colonial powers that had maintained

\(^2\) While African countries have largely accepted the status quo for fear of opening a Pandora’s Box, the doctrine of *uti possidetis* will increasingly come under attack. See I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Updated Edition)*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 15.

\(^3\) Stephanie Neuman argues that although both superpowers used military assistance to compete for influence, they exercised restraint, especially during periods of heightened tension. During the early stages of the war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977, for example, Moscow and Washington initially were reluctant to provide the level of support requested. The Soviet Union did not begin to provide the large-scale shipments of *matériel* to the new Government in Addis Ababa until after the US had clearly indicated it was distancing itself from the conflict. See Stephanie Neuman, *Military Assistance in Recent Wars: The Dominance of the Superpowers*, New York: Praeger, 1986, pp. 31-32.
an elevated interest in their old colonies also began to reduce their exposure and commitments. As a result, African leaders could no longer depend upon the political and economic support of an outside power to lend much-needed political legitimacy and financial and military support to their regimes. Disgruntled and oppressed groups began to more openly and forcefully challenge the legitimacy of these leaders, and their weakened regimes were increasingly susceptible to domestic unrest and violence.

**DECLINE OF THE STATE**

African leaders themselves helped create many of today’s crises. The style of Government pervasive on the African continent has not been conducive to development, democracy, and peace. Many leaders of the newly-independent African countries tried to impose national unity by consolidating political and economic power in the State. Governments became bloated, inefficient bureaucracies and corruption was often rampant and tolerated. As United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has written:

> It is frequently the case that political victory assumes a ‘winner-takes-all’ form with respect to wealth and resources, patronage, and the prestige and prerogatives of office. ... Where there is insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, political control becomes excessively important, and the stakes become dangerously high. This situation is exacerbated when, as is often the case in Africa, the State is the major provider of employment and political parties are largely either regionally or ethnically based.5

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4 France’s preservationist instinct was the strongest, and it committed itself to a proactive and interventionist policy throughout independent francophone Africa. Other former colonial powers also attempted to protect their legacies in their former territorial possessions, albeit generally with less resolve and success.

Many African States’ economic and fiscal policies have failed, and largely Western-imposed “solutions” have created new problems. After the prices for many of their exports slumped in the 1970s, African States borrowed heavily to maintain Government expenditures. Initially, Western States and institutions readily lent them money on the shared and erroneous expectation that commodity prices would recover. By and large, African countries did not invest the borrowed funds prudently and their debts mounted. Waste and corruption exacerbated the situation. International financial institutions subsequently restricted access to international loans. The long-term results of the policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are controversial.6 There is general agreement, however, on the short-term results: the economies and social structures of many African countries have experienced great stress. Servicing their debts has become the chief financial preoccupation for many African States.

Social responsibilities that were once the purview of the State have increasingly been substantially ignored or subcontracted to others with varying degrees of success. International private voluntary organizations (PVOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and numerous United Nations bodies have become even more involved in the development, education, and health sectors. Yet even with outside assistance the State is finding it difficult to cope. For example, the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) pandemic has had a devastating impact on the continent. Eighty-three per cent of all AIDS-related deaths have been recorded in sub-Saharan Africa, and seven out of 10 people infected with the virus in 1998 live there.7

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6 Some question the efficacy of the reforms, for example, charging that the political élite have managed to retain their influence and have continued to enrich themselves at the expense of the general populace notwithstanding the measures imposed. They argue that the stated ends will not be realized regardless of the means employed. See, for example, Peter Lock, “Africa, Military Downsizing and the Growth in the Security Industry,” in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds), Peace, Profit or Plunder?: The Privitization of Security in War-Torn African Societies, Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies, 1999, pp. 17-19.

States are also finding it difficult to provide for their own security. Many African military do not possess the human and material resources or the discipline and inclination to defend the State. Indeed, in the extreme case of Sierra Leone, Government soldiers are not simply unmotivated and corrupt, they are subversive. To establish and maintain order, African States have called upon private security firms (or “corporate mercenaries”). Some see these firms as providing useful services to the State—as long as their bills are paid. Others are far less sanguine. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the question of the use of mercenaries, Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, has called private security companies “the biggest and most sophisticated threat to the peace, sovereignty and self-determination of the peoples of many countries.”

Indeed, political, economic, social, and military challenges to the State have been so great that some have ceased to function and the international

7 ...continued) disaster,” The Economist, 2 January 1999, pp. 40-42.
9 For example, many Sierra Leoneans and foreign diplomats credited the firm Executive Outcomes (EO) with restoring some semblance of order to the country in 1996 so elections could be held. (Elizabeth Rubin, “An Army of One’s Own,” Harper’s Magazine, February 1997, pp. 48-49.) Such companies are typically well-equipped to deal with low-intensity, high casualty civil wars. (David Shearer, “Outsourcing War,” Foreign Policy, Fall 1998, p. 70.) Moreover, they are willing to take casualties, fire decisively, and use overwhelming force. Elizabeth Rubin, “Saving Sierra Leone, At a Price,” The New York Times, 4 February 1999.
10 William Reno stresses that although EO was effective, they departed as soon as the Government no longer paid them, at the expense of the people they were charged to protect. William Reno, “Privatizing the War in Sierra Leone,” Current History, May 1997, p. 229.
community’s attempts to reverse this trend have failed. Following the particularly devastating civil wars in Liberia and Somalia, and in the immediate wake of the genocide in Rwanda, the renowned African scholar Ali Mazrui actually proposed that parts of Africa be re-colonized for humanitarian purposes until such time when the State would be prepared to govern effectively and humanely. 12 Although his radical proposal for the establishment of a neo-UN trusteeship system is as unlikely today as it was then, the concerns Mazrui raised in 1994 are still valid.

**REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICT**

The inability of States to put their own houses in order is not simply an internal matter. The proliferation of rebel movements, small arms, and refugees all adversely affect a State’s ability to govern, and they threaten regional security. Intra-State conflicts are spilling over national borders with greater frequency and assuming regional dimensions.

Whereas States have historically supported—or denied support for—insurgencies in other countries as a means of retaining or gaining influence, their abilities to control rebel movements have diminished. Some of these groups are sufficiently independent that they have themselves reportedly contracted mercenaries.13 They are often able to finance their activities by exploiting natural resources such as diamonds and timber in areas under their control. One-fifth of the global diamond market is reportedly supplied by African rebel groups. 14 The United Nations International Commission of Inquiry (ICOI) for Rwanda in its November 1998 report stressed that several of the more than 20 rebel groups active in the

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Great Lakes region of Africa collaborate with one another,\textsuperscript{15} many independent of State patrons. The \textit{Interahamwe} militia together with members of the former army of the Government of Rwanda, which continue to wage a war against Kigali, have assisted rebel groups fighting the Governments of Burundi and Uganda.\textsuperscript{16}

Vast quantities of weapons, especially small arms, used to fight wars of independence, civil wars, and insurgencies remain in circulation and help fuel present conflicts. Many African Governments simply cannot monitor the movement of small arms within their countries or across their borders—although some are endeavouring to develop such a capacity.\textsuperscript{17} Other African Governments lack the political will to do so. Despite some highly publicized African initiatives to destroy small arms and ammunition,\textsuperscript{18} light weapons will continue to be cheap, accessible, and available in great quantities. National and international laws and regulations to counter this illicit trade are frequently circumvented and haphazardly enforced. Even if embargoes were respected, the huge stockpiles of weapons on the continent would continue to circulate from one conflict to another. Surplus small arms in Eastern Europe will continue to find their way onto the continent.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item For example, on 31 October 1998, the Heads of State and Government of the 16-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) pledged to cease producing, importing, and exporting small arms and ammunition for an initial three-year period. A framework to operationalize the political agreement is to be constructed, known as the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED). See UN Document A/53/763 - S/1998/1194, Annex, \textit{Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa}, 18 December 1998. The ECOWAS Secretariat is to play an active role in PCASED, which will be developed under the aegis of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Moreover, in 1998 African countries imported large weapons systems at an increasing rate. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in 1998 the regional arms market in sub-Saharan Africa grew by more than 50 per cent from the previous year.19

Like arms flows, movements of people will continue to have profound repercussions on African security. As of January 1999, there were 6.5 million “people of concern” to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Africa, which included refugees, internally-displaced persons (IDPs), and recent returnees.20 The problem is much greater, however, than even this large number suggests, as UNHCR handles only a relatively small percentage of the continent’s IDPs. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, the number of IDPs in Africa surpassed 8 million in 1998. Sixteen African States produced newly uprooted populations in 1998.21 Countries often have insufficient infrastructures to deal with the influx and migrations of people, and conflicts over scarce resources frequently arise. Moreover, rebels sometimes use refugee camps to regroup and as bases from which to launch attacks. (The fact that many refugee camps are situated near borders facilitates such activities.)

* * *

The challenges to African peace and security defy easy solutions. Many conflicts are multifaceted and deeply entrenched. They require sustained diplomatic and military engagement to move towards resolving them. Peacekeeping forces have a potentially significant role to play in this process.


20 The figure included 3.3 million refugees, 2.1 million internally-displaced persons (IDPs), and 1.1 million recent returnees. “UNHCR Country Updates - Africa Fact Sheet,” UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2 June 1999, available on the Internet at <http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int>.

CHAPTER 2

EVOLVING ROLE OF “PEACEKEEPING”

The concept of contemporary “peacekeeping” is replete with doctrinal ambiguities and defies a straightforward definition. The term has become synonymous with any number of international activities designed to resolve or attenuate a conflict. Since the end of the cold war, the tenets of traditional peacekeeping have been eroded and the scope of its activities has expanded significantly. In practice, the temporal boundaries between peacekeeping and the related notions of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-building are not always apparent. The once-clear distinction between peacekeeping operations and enforcement actions has also become blurred. Moreover, the United Nations is no longer the only actor performing peacekeeping duties; regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions have in fact become the primary peacekeepers.

Efforts to clarify the terminology have not kept up with the rapid pace of developments on the ground. In an early attempt to make sense of the changing security environment, the then United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali provided definitions for the “integrally related” concepts of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building. He also spoke about the possible creation of peace enforcement...
“units.” While Boutros-Ghali’s definitions initially gained wide currency, their value has declined over time. With the expansion of peacekeeping following the end of the cold war, commentators began to speak of successive “generations” of United Nations operations. In some circles, the terms “peace operations” and “peace support operations” are now used interchangeably with the term “peacekeeping operations” to encompass a broad spectrum of conflict management and resolution techniques. A new vocabulary of related concepts has emerged. The South African Department of Defence, for example, recently identified and defined nine overlapping terms: [1] peace missions; [2] peace support operations; [3] preventive diplomacy; [4] peacemaking; [5] peacekeeping operations; [6] peace enforcement; [7] peace-building; [8] humanitarian assistance; and

(...continued)

“action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.” According to the Report, peacekeeping is “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.” Peace-building is “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” Ibid., paras. 20-21.

According to Boutros-Ghali, such peace enforcement units “would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service. They would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces.” Ibid., para. 44.

Classical missions have commonly been termed “first generation” operations. The expansive UN missions of the immediate post-cold war period have been widely labelled “second generation” operations. Some commentators have also spoken of the more robust operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia as “third generation” missions. Others have even attempted to delineate a possible “fourth generation” of operations. See, for example, Mark Malan, “Peacekeeping in the New Millennium: towards ‘Fourth Generation’ Peace Operations?,” African Security Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1998, pp. 13-20.
To further complicate matters, different countries and organizations ascribe different meanings to the same terms.

Without minimizing these doctrinal inconsistencies, this book does not elaborate them. The study focuses on conflict management and resolution activities, rather than on conflict prevention per se. The term “peacekeeping” is used broadly to denote a military or a police force deployed at the request of a Government or a representative group of political and military actors that enjoys wide international recognition. This presence will usually be multinational in composition and receive its authority from the United Nations or a regional organization. Peacekeeping encompasses a variety of interventions on the continuum of peace to war that may include aspects of peace enforcement—i.e., when the use of force other than in self-defence is authorized to achieve limited goals. Peacekeeping operations place much greater constraints on the use of force than do pure enforcement actions.

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6Thus, Angola’s decisive and unilateral military support for Denis Sassou-Nguesso in 1997 during the Congolese civil war cannot be seen as a peacekeeping operation.

7The peacekeeping interventions of Nigeria and Congo (Brazzaville) in Chad in 1979 and 1980, respectively, are notable exceptions.

8Sometimes this authorization is not explicit, but must be inferred from a tacit or implicit acceptance; other times this authorization comes retroactively.

9Examples might include helping ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid or defending clearly-defined safe havens.

10The US-led Operation Desert Storm in 1991 is an example of a pure enforcement action and is not a peacekeeping or a peace enforcement mission.
ORIGINS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

Not specifically envisaged in the United Nations Charter, peacekeeping developed as an impromptu reaction to the political constraints of the bipolar world. The Charter’s designs to establish a standing United Nations army that would be “on call” and at the Security Council’s disposal became unrealistic with the onset of the cold war. The five permanent members of the Council were unable to agree upon a collective security regime. The concept of peacekeeping thus emerged as a workable alternative. As of 30 June 1999, the United Nations had established 50 peacekeeping operations (see Table 2.1).

The classical peacekeeping model that took shape was thus moulded by the political realities of the cold war period. The scope of United Nations peacekeeping operations was rather limited. They generally fulfilled a conflict management role and were established sparingly. In 1987, for example, there were only five, in which about 10,000 troops from 23 troop-contributing States were deployed. The supplemental peacekeeping budget was less than US$ 250 million.

The specific contours of the classical peacekeeping model derive from the first United Nations peacekeeping force—the United Nations Emergency

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11Article 43, UN Charter. Anticipating that the World Organization would be summoned to confront forces on the same size and scale as World War II, the drafters of the Charter provided for the creation of a standing UN army composed of contingents from the armed forces of Member States.

12In deference to Indonesia, the UN does not consider the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), established in June 1999 (UN Document S/RES/1246 (1999), 11 June 1999), as a peacekeeping mission.

13These operations, all of which continue to the present day, were: [1] UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO); [2] UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP); [3] UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); [4] UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF); and [5] UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

14This sum only covered the costs of UNFICYP, UNDOF, and UNIFIL, as UNTSO and UNMOGIP have been financed from the UN’s regular budget since their inception.
Table 2.1

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1 of 2)
(as of 30 June 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 UNTSO</td>
<td>UN Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>06/48 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 UNMOGIP</td>
<td>UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
<td>01/49 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 UNEF I</td>
<td>UN Emergency Force I</td>
<td>11/56 - 06/67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 UNOGIL</td>
<td>UN Observation Group in Lebanon</td>
<td>06/58 - 12/58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 ONUC</td>
<td>UN Operation in the Congo</td>
<td>07/60 - 06/64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 UNSF</td>
<td>UN Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)</td>
<td>10/62 - 04/63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 UNYOM</td>
<td>UN Yemen Observation Mission</td>
<td>07/63 - 09/64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08 UNFICYP</td>
<td>UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
<td>03/64 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 DOMREP</td>
<td>Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic</td>
<td>05/65 - 10/66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 UNIPOM</td>
<td>UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission</td>
<td>09/65 - 03/66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 UNEF II</td>
<td>UN Emergency Force II</td>
<td>10/73 - 07/79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 UNDOF</td>
<td>UN Disengagement Observer Force</td>
<td>06/74 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 UNIFIL</td>
<td>UN Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
<td>03/78 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 UNGOMAP</td>
<td>UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
<td>04/88 - 03/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 UNIMOG</td>
<td>UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group</td>
<td>08/88 - 02/91</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 UNAVEM I</td>
<td>UN Angola Verification Mission I</td>
<td>01/89 - 05/91</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 UNTAG</td>
<td>UN Transitional Assistance Group</td>
<td>04/89 - 03/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 ONUCA</td>
<td>UN Observer Group in Central America</td>
<td>11/89 - 01/92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 UNIKOM</td>
<td>UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission</td>
<td>04/91 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 MINURSO</td>
<td>UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
<td>04/91 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 UNAVEM II</td>
<td>UN Angola Verification Mission II</td>
<td>05/91 - 02/95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 ONUSAL</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
<td>07/91 - 04/95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 UNAMIC</td>
<td>UN Advance Mission in Cambodia</td>
<td>10/91 - 03/92</td>
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<td>24 UNPROFOR</td>
<td>UN Protection Force</td>
<td>02/92 - 12/95</td>
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<td>25 UNTAC</td>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
<td>02/92 - 09/93</td>
</tr>
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## Table 2.1

### United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2 of 2)

(as of 30 June 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>26 UNOSOM I</td>
<td>UN Operation in Somalia I</td>
<td>04/92 - 03/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 ONUMOZ</td>
<td>UN Operation in Mozambique</td>
<td>12/92 - 12/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 UNOSOM II</td>
<td>UN Operation in Somalia II</td>
<td>03/93 - 03/95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 UNOMUR</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda</td>
<td>06/93 - 09/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 UNOMIG</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
<td>08/93 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 UNOMIL</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
<td>09/93 - 09/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 UNMIH</td>
<td>UN Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>09/93 - 06/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 UNAMIR</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
<td>10/93 - 03/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 UNASOG</td>
<td>UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group</td>
<td>05/94 - 06/94</td>
</tr>
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<td>35 UNMOT</td>
<td>UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan</td>
<td>12/94 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 UNAVEM III</td>
<td>UN Angola Verification Mission III</td>
<td>02/95 - 06/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 UNCR0</td>
<td>UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia</td>
<td>03/95 - 01/96</td>
</tr>
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<td>38 UNPREDEP</td>
<td>UN Preventive Deployment Force</td>
<td>03/95 - 02/99</td>
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<tr>
<td>39 UNMIBH</td>
<td>UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>12/95 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 UNTAES</td>
<td>UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium</td>
<td>01/96 - 01/98</td>
</tr>
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<td>41 UNMOP</td>
<td>UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka</td>
<td>01/96 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 UNSMIH</td>
<td>UN Support Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>07/96 - 06/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 MINUGUA</td>
<td>UN Verification Mission in Guatemala</td>
<td>01/97 - 05/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 MONUA</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Angola</td>
<td>07/97 - 02/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 UNTMIH</td>
<td>UN Transition Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>08/97 - 11/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 MIPONUH</td>
<td>UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>12/97 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47 UNPSG</td>
<td>UN Civilian Police Support Group</td>
<td>01/98 - 10/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48 MINURCA</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
<td>04/98 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49 UNOMSIL</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>07/98 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 UNMIK</td>
<td>UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
<td>06/99 to date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although the UN had previously deployed two observer missions—UNTSO and UNMOGIP—UNEF I was the first UN peacekeeping operation to have troop contingents.


Chapter VII describes the enforcement tools at the Security Council’s disposal. Article 40 authorizes the Council to call upon the parties to a dispute to comply with “such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.” Article 41 identifies “measures not involving the use of armed force” available to the Council, including “complete or partial interruption of economic sanctions and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic provisions.” Article 42 provides that if Article 41 sanctions are or would be inadequate, the Council “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Articles 40, 41, and 42, UN Charter.

The Council has not established all UN peacekeeping operations. UNEF I was created by the General Assembly. After France and the UK had vetoed US- and Soviet-sponsored Security Council resolutions, the matter was

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(continued...)

Traditional peacekeeping operations are thus neither pure Chapter VII enforcement actions nor pure Chapter VI means of pacific dispute settlement. On the one hand, such classical missions employ more moderate measures than the enforcement provisions contained in Chapter VII. Moreover, Security Council resolutions establishing these operations
generally do not mention the buzzwords triggering Chapter VII’s application: “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” On the other hand, traditional peacekeeping operations are more intrusive than the peaceful means of dispute settlement outlined in Chapter VI. To highlight the in-between character of such operations, former United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld referred to them as belonging to “Chapter Six and a Half.”

**POST-COLD WAR PEACE OPERATIONS**

**Initial Expansion**

The end of the cold war altered the international peace and security landscape significantly. With the easing of East-West tensions, cooperation in the Security Council has been enhanced, presenting new opportunities to resolve certain conflicts. Yet the post-cold war era has also been characterized by the proliferation of other conflicts. Complex and violent intra-State wars—often with regional dimensions—have erupted worldwide.

In response to these new political realities, the international community turned to peacekeeping, which expanded in size and scope. From 1991 through 1994, at the height of United Nations peacekeeping, the Council established 17 operations. As of December 1994, 77,783 United Nations Blue Helmets from 76 troop-contributing countries were deployed, and

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18(...continued)


19Article 39, UN Charter.

20Chapter VI identifies “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” as appropriate pacific dispute settlement options. Article 33, UN Charter.
annual expenditures had risen to US$ 3.6 billion. 21 As the international community became increasingly willing to dispatch United Nations peacekeepers to deal with more complex scenarios, a “second generation” of peacekeeping operations—with economic, humanitarian, political, and social components—emerged.22 Rather than simply preserving the status quo, such missions were intended to build a firm and sustainable peace.23 Because these operations developed in the post-cold war era, they were able to transcend the conflict management role that the cold war ultimately relegated to first generation operations and encompass peacemaking as well as peace-building.24

A by-product of the expansion of peacekeeping was the obscuring of its definition. New operations challenged and eroded the established pillars of

22Missions such as UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and the third UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) fall into this category of peacekeeping operations.
traditional peacekeeping. The principles of consent, impartiality, and defensive force were no longer the hallmarks of United Nations operations; missions were established where consent was forfeited, impartiality was foregone, and force was used other than in self-defence. As a result, the distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement action became blurred.

**Experience of Somalia**

Too much was expected of the United Nations in the aftermath of the cold war, and it proved unable to meet those expectations. As the current United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted recently, “the United Nations’ peacekeeping mechanism for a time became the international community’s emergency services, fire brigade, gendarmerie, and military deterrent, even in instances where there was no peace to be kept.” The United Nations became overstretched and many of its Member States disillusioned.

The turning point was Somalia. Conceptualized by the then US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, as “an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations,” the international community’s efforts in Somalia fell far short of that mark. A United Nations-authorized multinational force managed briefly to distribute crucial humanitarian aid, but the two United Nations peacekeeping operations proved ill-equipped and unable to help restore the Government and bring peace to Somalia. After considerable loss of life and little progress, the United Nations peacekeepers withdrew in March 1995. The United Nations’ “failure” in Somalia precipitated a rapid and decisive retreat from United Nations peacekeeping worldwide. In the wake of the debacle, the five permanent members of the Council—led by the United States—became increasingly reluctant to commit their troops or their money to United Nations peacekeeping efforts. As a result, the international community’s peacekeeping goals became decidedly more modest.

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The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I)—ostensibly a traditional peacekeeping mission—demonstrated the limitations of classical peacekeeping in a hostile environment. Securing the consent of the parties proved time-consuming and tedious. Although the Council established the operation in April 1992,\(^\text{27}\) agreement on the deployment of a 500-strong infantry force was not reached until mid-August.\(^\text{28}\) Without consulting the parties to the conflict, the Council authorized the expansion of UNOSOM to 3,500 in late August\(^\text{29}\) and then to 4,219 troops in early September.\(^\text{30}\) These actions antagonized the parties and jeopardized the initial agreement reached.\(^\text{31}\) At its height, UNOSOM comprised only 54 military observers and 893 troops\(^\text{32}\) and the force never managed to deploy beyond the airport of Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu.\(^\text{33}\) There was little the mission could do given that the country’s Government had collapsed and that the warring factions routinely attacked United Nations peacekeepers. As the humanitarian crisis


\(^{30}\)See UN Document S/24480/Add.1, Addendum to The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-General, 28 August 1992, (proposing the additional deployment of three specialized units comprising up to 719 personnel); UN Document S/24531, Letter dated 1 September 1992 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 8 September 1992 (reiterating the proposal for the deployment of three logistic units); and UN Document S/24532, Letter dated 8 September 1992 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, 8 September 1992 (informing the Secretary-General of the Council’s agreement with the proposed deployment of three logistic units).


\(^{32}\)UN Peacekeeping: 50 Years, New York, UN Department of Public Information, October 1998, p. 28.

\(^{33}\)Chopra, Eknes, and Nordbø, p. 36.
worsened, the peacekeeping force was unable to fulfil its mandate of monitoring the cease-fire, protecting United Nations personnel, and safeguarding its relief assistance activities.  

Although the United Task Force (UNITAF), the US-led multinational coalition authorized to work alongside UNOSOM, may have accomplished its humanitarian mission, it was ultimately not sustainable. In the face of the deteriorating humanitarian situation, in December 1992, the Security Council authorized Member States to “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia under Chapter VII of the Charter.” The 36,000-strong multinational force, codenamed Operation Restore Hope, improved humanitarian conditions. Little progress was made, however, on restoring law and order or disarming the Somali factions. A controversy between the US and the United Nations over the scope of disarmament arose; the US was not prepared to undertake the complete disarmament that the United Nations envisaged. Concerns about “mission creep” led the US to push for the United Nations to essentially take over the operation, almost from the outset. By late February 1993, the US had already reduced its presence from some 26,000 to 16,000.

The final phase of operations—the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)—was a failure both conceptually and operationally. UNOSOM II was established to take over from UNITAF in March 1993.

36Chopra, Eknes, and Nordbø, p. 42.
37Ibid., p. 47.
Although officially termed a peacekeeping operation, UNOSOM II actually constituted the United Nations’ first so-called “peace enforcement” mission.\(^39\) The 30,000-strong operation prioritized military tasks at the expense of political reconstruction,\(^40\) but ultimately it failed in both domains. After 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed and more than 50 wounded in a series of ambushes and attacks by fighters loyal to Somali warlord Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed,\(^41\) UNOSOM II undertook a number of actions to restore law and order and disarm the factions.\(^42\) The botched 3 October raid by US Rangers intended to capture a number of Aideed’s key aides—which resulted in the deaths of 18 US soldiers—effectively ended American involvement in Somalia. Four days later, on 7 October, President Bill Clinton announced that

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\(^39\)Boutros-Ghali initially indicated that the operation would differ from the peacekeeping model and would constitute “the first peace-enforcement operation to be carried out under United Nations command.” (See UN Document S/24992, Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992), 19 December 1992, para. 43.) However, he ultimately recommended enlarging UNOSOM and redefining its mandate to include operations under Chapter VII. UN Document S/25354, paras. 56-88. See also Serge Lalande, “Somalia: Major Issues for Future UN Peacekeeping,” in Warner (ed.), New Dimensions of Peacekeeping, pp. 77-78.

\(^40\)Chopra, Eknes, and Nordbø, p. 57.


\(^42\)See ibid., paras. 17-32.
the US would withdraw its combat forces and the bulk of its logistics units by 31 March 1994. In February 1994, the Security Council revised UNOSOM’s mandate to exclude the use of coercive methods. The mission was withdrawn in March 1995.

Subsequent Reduction

The US experience in Somalia prompted it to re-evaluate and redefine its peacekeeping policy, which in turn has influenced other countries’ approaches. In May 1994, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, the unclassified version of which is entitled *The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*. Early drafts of PDD-25 had actually envisioned a growing US commitment to multilateral peace operations and advocated the expansion of United Nations peacekeeping. However, the document ultimately issued in May 1994 bore witness to a profound transformation in the Clinton Administration’s policy. PDD-25 established strict conditions for US participation in United Nations and other peace operations and indicated that the United States would reduce its United Nations peacekeeping assessment from some 31 per cent to 25 per cent. PDD-25 also indicated that the US would wield its power on the Security Council to prevent the

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establishment of what it considered to be ill-defined and imprudent missions.48 The other four permanent members of the Security Council have largely taken their cues from the United States.

The direct ramifications of the international community’s retreat from peacekeeping were most pronounced in Rwanda. Unable to summon the necessary political will or the financial and human resources, the international community failed to intervene to prevent the genocide there. In fact, the Security Council initially responded to the spiralling violence by reducing the authorized strength of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) by almost 90 per cent—from 2,548 to a mere 270.49 Although the Council subsequently authorized the augmentation of UNAMIR to 5,500 troops in May 1994,50 less than 10 per cent of the force had been fielded by the end of July.51 Operation Turquoise, the French-led multinational force that served alongside UNAMIR from 22 June to 21 August 1994, is credited with saving thousands of lives, but it created certain problems as well.52

48“The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations.”


51See UN Document S/1994/923, Letter dated 1 August 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 3 August 1994 (reporting his urgent request to Governments to provide the reinforcements and equipment necessary to bring UNAMIR to the strength authorized by the Council in Resolution 918 (1994)).

52Allegations persist that France rearmed remnants of the former Rwandan Government’s armed forces during Operation Turquoise. (See, for example, “Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity,” Human Rights Watch Arms Project Vol. 7, No. 4, May 1995, pp. 6-9.) According to former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, however, such accusations are “nonsense” and “totally unjustified.” Cohen states that “Operation Turquoise saved tens of thousands of Tutsis, and the French were the only ones to do anything about the genocide (except for the Ghanaian (continued...
Although Rwanda may be the most glaring casualty of the international community’s revised approach to peacekeeping, it is far from the only one. In general, the Security Council has scaled down United Nations peacekeeping in both size and scope. Although the Council established 15 operations from 1995 to mid-1999, only four of those represented interventions in new conflicts. As of 30 June 1999, fewer than 12,000 Blue Helmets from 73 troop-contributing States were deployed worldwide, in 15 operations. The largest mission as of that date, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), comprised only 4,500 troops—which itself represented a reduction of more than 10 per cent since 1993. The annual supplemental budget assessment for United Nations peacekeeping operations has again fallen below the US$ 1 billion mark. The mandates of United Nations missions have also been reduced. The Security Council has become reluctant or unwilling to authorize large-scale, multi-functional peacekeeping operations.

Instead, the Security Council has established military observer and civilian police missions with increasing frequency. As of 30 June 1999, only five of the 15 ongoing missions were composed of formed units of national

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52(...continued)

general who saved a few thousand in a Kigali stadium). The Rwandan propaganda machine has been determined to make the French their scapegoat for the genocide and they have succeeded.” Written correspondence with Amb. Herman J. Cohen, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, US Department of State, 27 February 1999.

53Eleven of them were authorized to succeed or supplement ongoing operations in Angola, Haiti, and former Yugoslavia. The 1997 peacekeeping operation in Guatemala represented a new Security Council initiative, but it constituted a small and short-lived addition to a civilian operation authorized by the General Assembly in 1994. New missions were also established in the Central African Republic (in 1998), Sierra Leone (1998), and Kosovo (1999).

54As of 31 May 1993, 5,280 troops served in UNIFIL. The force’s authorized strength was 7,000. United Nations Peace-keeping, New York: UN Department of Public Information, August 1993, p. 19.
contingents and just one of those five was created after October 1993. Seven were primarily military observer missions, most comprising relatively small numbers of unarmed military officers charged with tasks including monitoring cease-fires, verifying troop withdrawals, patrolling borders or demilitarized zones, and monitoring the performance of larger regional forces. Three were primarily staffed by civilian police, which have assumed an increasingly important role in United Nations operations. Five other operations also had civilian police components as of that date. Tasks of such missions range from performing law enforcement duties to reorganizing, rebuilding, training, and monitoring national police forces.

**INCREASING RELIANCE ON BURDEN-SHARING**

Although the Security Council has proven increasingly reluctant to authorize United Nations peacekeeping operations, it appears increasingly willing to allow regional, subregional, and ad hoc initiatives in their stead.

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There are a number of recent examples of this “burden-sharing” trend. Such regional, subregional and ad hoc undertakings have varied significantly in terms of their size and effectiveness.

There is nothing inherently wrong with utilizing the peacekeeping services of others. Indeed, Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter recognizes a subsidiary but integral role for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 52 empowers regional organizations to deal with those matters that are appropriate for regional action and encourages them to undertake the pacific settlement of local disputes before referring them to the Security Council. Article 53 permits regional organizations to undertake enforcement actions, provided the Council gives its approval. Article 54 requires any regional organization to inform the Council of activities it is contemplating for the maintenance of international peace and security.59

However, the five permanent members of the Security Council have embraced Chapter VIII disingenuously, to lend both respectability and legitimacy to some of their selfish desires. Among the Permanent Five, the concerns of the United States—saving its money and the lives of its citizens—clearly predominate. The objectives of the four other permanent members of the Council are not adverse to the US-led changes. China, for example, while never enthusiastic about inter-State peacekeeping in the first place, is decidedly less enthusiastic about intra-State peacekeeping. China has also sought to scale down peacekeeping operations as a means to settle political scores. Although Russia complains that it would prefer the United Nations to play a greater role in peacekeeping operations where the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is active, Moscow has benefited from the respectability that Chapter VIII bestows upon its peacekeeping activities in the region.60

59See Articles 52-54, UN Charter. Beyond the broad requirements of Chapter VIII, however, the Charter does not prescribe a precise division of labour between the UN and regional organizations in security-related matters. This ambiguity has permitted an ad hoc and crisis-driven division of competencies.

60For a fuller description of the various motives behind burden-sharing see (continued...)
Outside of Africa, the Council’s reliance on regional organizations has had some success. In Kosovo, the ability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deploy a peacekeeping force in the tens of thousands is not in doubt. In Bosnia, NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have managed to assume responsibilities previously carried out by the United Nations, although initially with some difficulty. China’s February 1999 veto of an extension of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)—in retaliation for that country’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan—has had no adverse effect. Western countries simply took over the United Nations’ responsibilities.

In contrast, African political and security organizations, which have relatively few resources, have encountered greater obstacles in filling the void created by Security Council inaction. Partly in response to perceived Western indifference, African States have begun to exhibit a growing willingness to intervene in African conflicts. Several political and economic alliances on the continent have been expanded to include military dimensions. While it is important that Africans have recognized the need to take primary responsibility for responding to crises and armed conflict, their political will far surpasses their peacekeeping capabilities.

\(\text{...continued}\)

Part II

African Organizations
and Ad Hoc Initiatives
CHAPTER 3
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

A LEGACY OF NON-INTERVENTION

When the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created in 1963, its members1 sought to protect their independence not only from the West, but from one another as well. The “Purposes,” and “Principles” enumerated in Articles II and III of the OAU Charter place a premium on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in member States’ internal affairs.2 The Charter does not provide for collective security. The powers and resources of the Organization’s Administrative Secretary General were purposely limited.3

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1At the OAU’s inception, its Charter was signed by 30 out of the 32 independent African countries (with one country absent and one abstaining). Togo, which was not represented because of a recent coup, signed two months later in July 1963. Morocco, which originally abstained (because of the independence of Mauritania), subsequently signed in September 1963. (Written correspondence with Michael Wolfers, author, 30 June 1999.) It now has 53 member States. Among the internationally-recognized States of the continent, only Morocco is not presently a member of the Organization. Rabat formally withdrew in 1985, after the OAU bestowed membership on the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) of Western Sahara in 1984. SADR has not become a UN member, however, pending results of the long-awaited referendum to decide whether the people of Western Sahara choose independence or a federated union with Morocco.


3The designation “Administrative” was dropped in 1979. (Michael Wolfers, “The Institutional Evolution of the OAU,” in Yassin El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman (eds), The OAU After Twenty Years, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984, p. 89.) The powers and resources of the Secretary-General have grown somewhat with the passage of time but are still limited, for primarily political reasons.
OAU member States’ lack of enthusiasm for intervention in conflicts is clearly seen in the Organization’s dispute resolution structures, which have been largely undeveloped and unused. The OAU Charter provides for a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. Under the terms of the protocol elaborating the Commission, it was to consist of 21 elected individuals. Even though the Commission was envisaged as one of the Organization’s four principal organs, it never became operational. The places were filled at the 1968 OAU Summit in Algiers, but its permanent status was revoked two years later at the Summit in Addis Ababa, and it has since fallen into disuse. The 1977 Ad Hoc Committee on Inter-African Disputes, which despite its name was intended as a permanent body, shared a similar fate. Instead, the OAU has relied on ad hoc committees of member States and eminent personalities to mediate disputes.

The fact that member States have not embraced OAU initiatives to manage and resolve conflicts and have looked elsewhere for security assurances highlights the weaknesses of the OAU’s ad hoc approach. The OAU decision in October 1963 to send military officers to supervise a cease-fire, the withdrawal of troops, and the creation of a demilitarized zone (DMZ) as a means to settle a disagreement between Algeria and Morocco was never acted upon; moreover, subsequent initiatives by the OAU to resolve the dispute over the next two years proved equally ineffective. In the end, the matter was settled bilaterally, without the OAU’s active intervention. The OAU was similarly sidelined the following year in attempting to address the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia as

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6The other three principal institutions are the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, and the General Secretariat.
8Written correspondence with S. Bassey Ibok, Head, Conflict Management Division, OAU Secretariat, 3 May 1999.
well as the continuing civil unrest in the Congo. After the OAU failed to intervene meaningfully in the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), African countries largely eschewed the Organization’s involvement in attempting to resolve their differences and increasingly turned to countries outside the continent for their security needs.

**Neutral Force in Chad**

The OAU Neutral Force in Chad of 1981-1982—the only instance when the OAU undertook a large-scale multinational operation—was an aberration. (See Annex A for a listing of all OAU peacekeeping operations.) Although the Chadian civil war had begun in the 1960s, the OAU’s first diplomatic overture to help resolve the conflict did not occur until 1977 when the Assembly of Heads of State and Government created an ad hoc committee on Chad. The 1979 Nigerian peacekeeping operation in Chad received diplomatic support from the OAU retroactively, but was not an OAU force per se. The peacekeeping force from Congo (Brazzaville) that was deployed briefly in Chad in 1980 was essentially an OAU operation even though the OAU Secretariat does not claim “credit” for it. The OAU’s largely laissez faire attitude towards the conflict only changed in the wake of the announced union of Chad and Libya in January 1981, some two weeks after several thousand Libyan troops had entered the Chadian capital, Ndjamena. An inter-African force, which the OAU does consider its own, was deployed later that year. The OAU’s lack of enthusiasm for the venture was matched by its difficulty in fielding an effective force. While the 1981-1982 OAU force did not achieve its stated aims and suffered from many operational shortcomings, its very feebleness ironically succeeded in hastening the end of the civil war.

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Background

The first peacekeeping force to deploy in Chad was Nigerian. The fall of the southern Sara-dominated Government of Félix Malloum in February 1979 provided a new impetus for a diplomatic solution to try to end the civil war. The coalition of northern groups that at one point had coalesced as the Front de libération nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT) had long since split into several acrimonious political and military factions. Thus, despite the north’s success in finally taking control of N’djamena, there was no consensus among the “victors” on a clear successor to govern the country. Nigeria, a member of both the 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 OAU committees on Chad, hosted a conference in Kano in March 1979 that several of the Chadian warring parties attended. A peace accord was reached that called for Nigeria to send a peacekeeping force to N’djamena to supervise a cease-fire. French troops stationed in the country as a result of a security pact with the previous Chadian Government were still present but remained on the sidelines.

In the wake of the failed bid by Nigeria to bring about a political settlement to the Chadian civil war, an agreement was reached whereby an inter-African force would undertake a similar mission. Lagos withdrew its troops but remained engaged diplomatically in attempting to resolve the conflict. Nigeria, which secured OAU support for its initiative retroactively at the July 1979 OAU Summit in Monrovia, convened a subsequent peace conference in August 1979 in Lagos (also known as “Lagos II”). All 11

12 For a succinct review of FROLINAT’s creation and disintegration, see Dean Pittman, “The OAU and Chad,” in El-Ayouty and Zartman (eds), The OAU After Twenty Years, pp. 299-301.

13 The OAU Libreville Summit of July 1977 appointed Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Senegal to comprise the ad hoc committee on Chad. A year later at the Khartoum Summit, the committee’s membership was reconfigured and included Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan. Samuel G. Amoo and I. William Zartman, “Mediation by Regional Organizations: The Organization for African Unity (OAU) in Chad,” in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992, pp. 139-40.

14 Lagos was Nigeria’s capital from independence until December 1991, when the seat of the Federal Government was officially transferred to Abuja.
Chadian factions were represented. Several important agreements were reached in Lagos, including the creation of a transitional Government of unity to be known as the Gouvernement d’union nationale transitoire (GUNT) as well as another peacekeeping operation. Whereas Nigeria alone had fielded the initial force, this second mission would be comprised of three States, none of which were to border Chad. It was agreed that the three countries would be Benin, Congo (Brazzaville), and Guinea.

For all intents and purposes, the second peacekeeping force was an OAU undertaking—even though the OAU does not claim ownership. Whereas the OAU Secretary General was kept informed of developments in negotiations leading up to the 1979 initiative headed by Nigeria, in the discussions for the 1980 force he had agreed to assume a much more active, if largely ceremonial, role. The Secretary General was to replace Nigeria as head of the monitoring commission to ensure that the various factions faithfully implemented the agreement. Thus, while the Heads of State and Government did not decide or resolve to officially sanction the inter-African force as an “OAU” operation, the actions of the Secretary General made it so. Moreover, as Roy May and Simon Massey point out, “Although deriving its mandate from Lagos II, rather than directly from the OAU, the troops that eventually arrived in January 1980 were recognized as the OAU Neutral Force.”

From the difficulties encountered in deploying and in light of subsequent events, it is clear that this second peacekeeping force was not prepared for the challenge. OAU member States proved reluctant to fund the operation. Two of the three countries selected to send troops—Benin and Guinea—begged off, claiming that they did not possess the necessary

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17Pelcovits writes that only five countries—Cameroon, Liberia, Libya, Niger, and the Sudan—paid the US$ 50,000 that the OAU requested each member State to contribute to a special fund to support the mission. (Pelcovits, “Peacekeeping: The African Experience,” p. 277.) Legum reports that the OAU managed to raise just 10 per cent of its promised contribution of US$ 6 million. (Legum, “The Crisis Over Chad: Colonel Gaddafi’s Sahelian Dream,” pp. A37-38.) Whatever the amount provided, it was insufficient.
funds to undertake the operation. The third, Congo (Brazzaville), did contribute an infantry battalion with the aid of Algeria, which provided the necessary airlift, but not until January 1980. The Congolese troops were led by Cmdr. Dawit Gebre Igzabhier of Ethiopia. Apart from Congolese officers residing in a N’djamena hotel, the force was largely confined to the local police barracks. The peacekeepers did not intervene when the Chadian war was reignited in March. Instead, they were promptly flown home by France, which still had armed forces in the country.

While the peacekeeping operation did not accomplish its objectives, it is impossible to blame the failed mission solely on the force’s own shortcomings. Even if all three countries had sent troops as proposed and the sought-after money had been raised, the success of the operation would have been questionable. Nathan Pelcovits stresses the numerous problems the peacekeeping force had faced in securing a mandate, which were never adequately resolved:

Because of factional division in the Chad Government, no consensus could be reached on the command structure or functions of the peacekeeping group, the status of the force, whether it could interpose to separate warring factions, where it could be deployed, how it might

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18Pittman, “The OAU and Chad,” p. 309. Pelcovits, however, reports that Guinea failed to deploy for logistical (and not financial) reasons. Nigeria, which was to ferry Guinean troops, refused to do so until France withdrew its military forces from Chad. Pelcovits, “Peacekeeping: The African Experience,” p. 277.

19The size of the force is variously listed as between 500-600 men.


21According to the OAU, the Congolese contingent “... eventually turned up in Chad on January 8 1980.” Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options, OAU Information Services Publication - Series (II), 1993, p. 38, para. 113.

22The Head of the OAU Conflict Management Division, S. Bassey Ibok, points out that Igzabhier was a naval officer. Written correspondence with Ibok, 3 May 1999. Most commentators incorrectly list him as a “General.”


24Ibid.
supervise and police the cease-fire, or what law-and-order it would exercise.25

Africa Contemporary Record highlights the chaotic political environment in Chad at the time of the proposed mission:

[The GUNT] reflected the remarkable unanimity attained at... Lagos... a unanimity that could not long endure, given the Chadians centrifugal regional and ethnic tendencies, intensified by their leaders’ personal ambitions, the competitive foreign sponsorship, and their pervasive mistrust of any centralized authority. By the end of 1979, none of the key provisions of the Lagos agreements had been carried out... 26

The “OAU” Intervention (1981-1982)

The OAU Freetown Summit of July 1980 called for another peacekeeping operation in Chad. However, the OAU made little tangible progress towards this end for the remainder of the year. Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadéma’s mediation efforts produced a truce, which lasted for only two days.27 At an OAU subcommittee meeting on Chad held in November, Goukouni Weddeye, the titular head of the GUNT, agreed to a cease-fire and a neutral peacekeeping force to be comprised of Benin, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, and Togo.28 However, Hissène Habré, who had been dismissed from the GUNT in April 1980 and had gone on to challenge Weddeye for control of the country, did not attend the November meeting. He only signed the cease-fire on 16 December—the day after his Forces armées du nord (FAN) had been routed and forced to seek refuge in neighbouring Cameroon.29

Western prodding and largesse along with Libya’s actions ultimately provided the impetus for the OAU to establish what it viewed as its own

25i bid., pp. 277-78.
peacekeeping force. In December 1980, Libya sent thousands of troops to Ndjamena in support of Weddeye, which explains Habré’s difficulties. Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi’s explanation that his actions were based on a mutual defence treaty concluded in June 1980 was not universally accepted. Subsequently, in January 1981, Chad and Libya announced plans to unify their countries, \(^{30}\) heightening concerns in many Western and African capitals. In response to these events, France, which had previously supported an African peacekeeping force in Chad politically, made it known that it would now support an OAU peacekeeping force in Chad financially. \(^{31}\) Qaddafi’s decision to abruptly withdraw his troops from Ndjamena in October 1981 and the fear that this would lead to greater instability brought matters quickly to a head.

Western support for, and interest in, the OAU peacekeeping operation can be seen in the fact that the agreement to deploy the force was concluded in France. Weddeye and OAU Secretary General Edem Kodjo met in Paris on 14 November 1981 and agreed to terms for sending an OAU peacekeeping force to Chad. The subsequent meeting between Weddeye and Kodjo in Nairobi was convened for largely symbolic reasons at the behest of the OAU Chairman, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi. According to Amadu Sesay, “many African States felt sufficiently concerned and embarrassed [about the lead role France had assumed] to convince the OAU Chairman ... to get Weddeye and the Organization to sign another agreement in Nairobi...” \(^{32}\)

The mission was fraught with problems from the outset. The planned force of 5,000 men, \(^{33}\) although substantially smaller than the numbers that

\(^{30}\) According to Colin Legum, Weddeye let it be known to Nigeria and others that he acceded to Qaddafi’s merger proposal under extreme duress. See Legum, “The Crisis Over Chad: Colonel Gaddafi’s Sahelian Dream,” pp. A40-41.

\(^{31}\) Pittman, “The OAU and Chad,” p. 315.


\(^{33}\) Nigeria was to provide the bulk of the force, with the other five contributors supplying 600 troops each. Ibid.
According to an Africa Research Bulletin report, initially Nigeria was to provide 8,000 troops, Senegal 2,000 and Côte d’Ivoire 1,500. Ibid. See Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options, p. 39, para. 116.

The OAU’s annual budget in 1980 was US$ 17.6 million—of which the Organization, according to its Secretary General, had only received US$ 9 million. Sesay, Ojo, and Fasehun, The OAU After Twenty Years, p. 39.

There is some confusion as to how many countries had pledged to provide troops. Most accounts mention Benin, Guinea, and Togo in addition to the three that eventually deployed. (See, for example, Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 101.) However, Gabon has been listed as a seventh country to have pledged troops. See Wiseman, “The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution,” p. 133.

According to the OAU, Nigeria provided 2,000 troops, Zaire, 700, and Senegal, 600. See Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options, p. 39, para. 117.


The commander of the Nigerian contingent in Chad during 1981-1982, Col. Rufus Kupolati, makes reference to the “excellent relationship” he had with observer groups from Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, and Zambia. Force Commander Ejiga mentions (continued...)
remained hamstrung in part because the OAU did not know what to do with it, as the Organization’s initial plan for the force to deploy in six sectors was clearly not going to materialize.  

Besides financial difficulties that limited the size of the force, the operation suffered from logistical shortcomings and an unclear mandate. Logistical constraints delayed the force’s deployment and undermined its ability to function smoothly once in the field. The OAU’s material contribution to the mission was largely limited to supplying green berets and badges towards the end of the operation. The inhospitable terrain and the inability to purchase spare parts and fuel on the local market further complicated matters. The mission’s mandate was muddled and its intentions were unclear. According to May and Massey:

With a piece of characteristic circumlocution, the OAU appeared to both support the GUNT and maintain a neutral stance, while equivocating as to whether the [inter-African force] would act as a standard Chapter VI peacekeeping force or employ enforcement tactics to ‘ensure the defence and security of the country.’

41[...continued]

that those four countries, as well as Congo (Brazzaville) and Gabon, were to provide observers to the mission. Written correspondence with Maj-Gen. (Rtd) Romeo Ola Ishola Williams, former Chief of Defence, Operations, Training and Plans, Nigerian Ministry of Defence, current Acting President, African Strategic and Peace Research Group (AFSTRAG), 6 August, and 7 October 1999.


44Ibid.

45See May and Massey, “The OAU Interventions in Chad: Mission Impossible or Mission Evaded?,” pp. 52-53.

46Ibid., p. 52.
Communication and command problems were never satisfactorily
addressed. Force Commander Ejiga never exercised control. The fact that
participants were beholden to their Western benefactors 47 rather than the
OAU itself complicated his task. Inadequate communication with the OAU
Secretary General and the Secretariat in Addis Ababa compounded his
difficulties. The Secretary General’s Special Representative, Gebre
Igazabier (the Force Commander of the 1980 mission), was unable to
properly inform the Secretariat of developments or to receive instructions
on how best to proceed. Secretary General Kodjo did not make himself
accessible. He visited the mission only once, for a period of three days. 48
Instead of going through Addis Ababa, Ejiga communicated with OAU
Chairman Moi in Nairobi, whose military observers on the ground served
as the Chairman’s “eyes and ears” 49 since he could not rely on the OAU
Secretariat for information either.

Besides biting off more than it could chew operationally, the OAU
clearly had little political appetite for the mission. Many
countries—including several that pledged troops—were sympathetic to, if
not outright supportive of, Habré. 50 The sudden withdrawal of Libyan
soldiers created a vacuum that Habré correctly believed he could fill. The
timely deployment of a peacekeeping force capable of interposing itself
between the FAN and Weddeye’s troops would have impeded Habré from
seizing control of the country. The OAU’s unrealistic timetable for elections
(to be held in February 1982) and its firm deadline for the force to be
withdrawn by the end of June underscored the Organization’s lack of
enthusiasm for the venture. Ejiga could not even count on the continuing
support of his own country, which began to withdraw its contingent before
the end of the mission was announced. When Habré’s FAN wrested
control of Ndjamena from Weddeye on 7 June, OAU Chairman Moi
immediately called for the operation’s termination and the return of all

47 Senegal and Zaire received substantial assistance from France. The US provided
significant support to Nigeria. See Pittman, “The OAU and Chad,” p. 316.
48 Written correspondence with Williams, 6 August 1999.
49 Ibid.
50 According to Dean Pittman, Egypt, Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, Senegal, the Sudan,
Togo, Zaire, and to a lesser extent Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, were generally
troops by month’s end. Habré’s appeal that the peacekeeping force remain deployed was not seriously considered. 51

END OF THE COLD WAR: A NEW BEGINNING?

The end of the cold war provided the impetus for the OAU and many of its member States to attempt to redress the failings of the peacekeeping force in Chad and to develop the OAU’s conflict resolution machinery. A growing awareness was already taking hold that Africa would become further marginalized once the victorious West no longer had to compete for friends and influence against the vanquished East. Weak regimes could no longer be assured of receiving the critical financial and military aid they once enjoyed from their foreign supporters. African leaders believed that this disengagement would have a negative impact on African security and result in several upheavals of various magnitudes. 52 Many were also annoyed that the West, besides reducing its assistance, was increasingly adding political conditions upon which such aid would be disbursed.

African leaders recognized that a business-as-usual approach to governance and inter-State relations on the continent could not continue without exacerbating negative socio-economic trends. These concerns were expressed in a Declaration by the Heads of State and Government at the July 1990 OAU Summit in Addis Ababa, which stated in part:

We are fully aware that in order to facilitate this process of socio-economic transformation and integration, it is necessary to promote popular participation of our peoples in the processes of Government and development. A political environment which guarantees human rights and the observance of the rule of law, would assure high standards of probity and accountability particularly on the part of those who hold public office. ... We accordingly recommit ourselves to the further

51 Given that Habré had paid the OAU peacekeeping force little heed during his advance on the capital, it is understandable that the OAU did not greet his proposal enthusiastically.

52 Interview with Chris J. Bakweseenha, former Head, Conflict Management Division, OAU Secretariat current Deputy Permanent Observer, OAU Permanent Observer Mission to the UN in New York, 13 March 1998, New York.
They also took note—if only obliquely—of the rise of intra-State conflicts and their potential to destabilize and harm other States:

We realize at the same time that the possibilities of achieving the objectives we have set will be constrained as long as an atmosphere of lasting peace and stability does not prevail in Africa. We therefore renew our determination to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all the conflicts on our Continent. 54

While African leaders did not openly challenge the OAU’s cherished principles of sovereignty and non-interference, they did indicate a willingness to become somewhat more transparent. The former Head of the OAU Conflict Management Division (CMD), Chris Bakwesegha, has written that, “It must be emphasized that prior to 1990, nobody ever imagined that any member State of the OAU would ever invite the OAU Secretary General to send a team of people to observe elections in a sovereign State.” 55 The OAU has since been invited to monitor and supervise elections and referenda with increasing frequency among a growing number of OAU member States. According to Bakwesegha’s successor, S. Bassey Ibok, the Declaration is tantamount to the Heads of State and Government saying that, “… non-interference should not mean indifference.” 56

54 Ibid., para. 11.

The OAU’s decision in 1990 to send a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda illustrated this changing mind-set. The OAU Secretary General seized upon the rebellion by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as an important test case by which to gauge the preparedness of the Organization to embark on a new, more interventionist, path. Within weeks of the RPF incursion, the Secretary General, in consultation with the OAU Chairman, had already met with regional leaders and representatives of the rebels and the Government of Rwanda to conclude an agreement whereby a group of military observers would help promote reconciliation and put an end to hostilities. 57 Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire agreed to take part in this undertaking, known as the Military Observer Team (MOT). 58

The OAU quickly realized that MOT would not be effective and sought another solution. It soon became clear that the selection of the three countries to participate in the force was problematic. 59 The countries either had vested interests that compromised their effectiveness or their troops were ill-disciplined and were a liability rather than an asset. Therefore, even before MOT first was deployed in April 1991 after months of delay, an agreement had been concluded in March 1991 in N’sele, Zaire, providing for the deployment of another team of military observers, to be known as the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) to replace MOT. 60

Although NMOG’s size and costs were modest, the OAU still had a difficult time fielding the force. The problems stemmed in part from the failure of the RPF and the Government of Rwanda to respect numerous cease-fires, as well as from the lack of clear demarcation lines. This

57 Interview with Bakwesegha, 18 June 1999, New York.
58 Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.
complicated the deployment, which should have been relatively easy. Force projection, logistics, and command and control should not have been obstacles. NMOG was to comprise a total of 50 military observers from Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zimbabwe. By September 1991, however, only 15 OAU military observers were in the country. By the mission’s end in July 1992 (when it was to be replaced by another OAU operation), 40 military observers from Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zimbabwe had been deployed.

Despite the difficulties encountered in fielding and sustaining NMOG, the OAU Council of Ministers agreed in June 1992 to create an enlarged follow-on operation. OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim indicated that NMOG II was intended to total 240 all ranks. He acknowledged that the OAU could not support a larger force and would have to rely on outside assistance to deploy even one company. According to Col. Gustave Zoula of the CMD, the OAU believed a force of at least 1,200 men would be required to effectively patrol the DMZ. In the end, the OAU was able to field most of the observers it sought, but only two infantry platoons. NMOG II, which became operational in August 1992, comprised 70 military officers from Congo (Brazzaville), Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.
as well as 62 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) from Tunisia. The Force Commander was Maj-Gen. Ekundayo Opaleye of Nigeria. The Government of Rwanda and the RPF each provided five liaison officers to the force as a confidence-building measure (CBM). 68

Notwithstanding the problems NMOG II encountered operationally in Rwanda, it achieved its political objectives in New York. From the time NMOG was created, the OAU had been trying to prod the Security Council into sending a United Nations peacekeeping force to Rwanda. 69 The Council dragged its feet. In March 1993, it passed a resolution inviting United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to consult the OAU on the ways in which the United Nations might contribute to the Rwandan peace process. 70 Three months later, the Council approved a small peacekeeping operation comprising 81 military observers to deploy in Uganda along the Rwandan border. 71 Finally, on 5 October, the Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), 72 a comparatively robust peacekeeping force of 2,217 troops and staff officers, 331 military observers, and 60 civilian police. 73 NMOG II was

68 Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999 and 3 May 1999.
73 See S/26488, paras. 31-38, 41, and 47.
integrated into UNAMIR on 1 November 1993, the day after its mandate expired.

**Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution**

The creation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution underscores that the OAU’s new determination to take a more pro-active stance in both inter- and intra-State conflicts on the continent had not been universally embraced. According to Said Djinnit, OAU Secretary General Salim’s Director of Cabinet, during negotiations at the Dakar Summit in July 1992, “... a clear consensus emerged against the involvement of the OAU in peacekeeping.” The Secretariat’s proposal that the OAU Defence Commission be tasked with performing an advisory function within the Mechanism to strengthen and harmonize member countries’ peacekeeping policies received little support. According to the OAU, the proposal received “scant reference in both the debate and the written responses, and even in the consultations...”

When the Mechanism was formally adopted at the OAU Summit in Cairo in June 1993, the focus was firmly on conflict prevention rather than conflict management or resolution. This emphasis is clearly spelled out in the Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government establishing the Mechanism, which states:

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75UN Document S/26488, para. 15.


77The Defence Commission, one of five Specialized Commissions established in the OAU Charter, survived where others did not but fell largely into disuse. See Michael Wolfers, *Politics in the Organization of African Unity*, London: Methuen, 1976, pp. 91-97.

The Mechanism will have as a primary objective, the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it will be its responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts. In this respect, civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration may be mounted and deployed. In setting these objectives, we are fully convinced that prompt and decisive action in these spheres will, in the first instance, prevent the emergence of conflicts, and where they do inevitably occur, stop them from degenerating into intense or generalized conflicts. Emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures, and concerted action in peace-making and peace-building will obviate the need to resort to the complex and resource-demanding peace-keeping operations, which our countries will find difficult to finance. 79

Given many African rulers’ tenuous grip on power, this outcome is not surprising. Governments rarely endorse policies or enact laws likely to result in their ouster. Makumi Mwagiru, questioning the effect the Mechanism would have on changing the conservative nature of the OAU and its resistance towards change, has written, “[a]fter all, the Mechanism was given the green light by the very Heads of State in whose countries internal conflicts abound.” 80

Nevertheless, the Mechanism is a significant divergence from, and improvement on, previous practice and structures. It provides for a new decision-making body called the Central Organ. More importantly, the Mechanism creates a separate source of financing called the Peace Fund. The establishment of the Peace Fund has had a positive effect on developing the human and material assets of the Conflict Management Division, which should strengthen the position of the Secretary General. It has also provided a means for the West to influence the OAU’s agenda and to support OAU peacekeeping initiatives.

Central Organ

OAU member States chose to model the Central Organ on the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (the Bureau). The Bureau comprises 15 countries elected annually on the basis of geographical representation to consider issues before the OAU and to assist the Chairman. It is not a formally-constituted body and does not appear in the OAU Charter, but rather an ad hoc arrangement that over time has assumed some degree of permanence. This option won out over another recommendation to establish a new special committee whose members would be elected solely for the purpose of trying to resolve conflicts. Advocates for the special committee argued that many States that otherwise might be actively engaged in the decision-making process cannot participate because of geographical restrictions. The proposals by the OAU Secretary General to create an African Security Council based on the United Nations model, or to revive and revise the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, were not seriously considered.

81 For a discussion of the various proposals put forth and the reasons behind the eventual consensual decision to opt for a Central Organ based on the Bureau, see Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options, pp. 44-48, paras. 135-149.

82 OAU member States have devised five African subregions: Central (with 11 countries), Eastern (12), Northern (5), Southern (9), and Western (16). Membership of each region is as follows: Central (11) - Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe; Eastern (12) - the Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Somalia, the Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda; Northern (5) - Algeria, Egypt, Libya, SADR, and Tunisia; Southern (9) - Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; and Western (16) - Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. (“Africa’s Five Regions,” Organization of African Unity, courtesy of OAU Permanent Delegation to the UN in Geneva.) The Bureau is comprised of three States each from the Central, Eastern, and Southern groups, two from the Northern, and four from the Western. Written correspondence with Ibok, 15 June 1999.

83 Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options, pp. 45-46, paras. 139-40.
Although the decision to create the Central Organ based on the Bureau indicates some member States’ lack of enthusiasm for the Mechanism, it is not necessarily troublesome. There is no reason to believe that if a separate committee had been established, it would have been any more effective than the current structure. OAU member States that do not support an interventionist agenda would likely have placed like-minded countries on the committee. Assuming the committee worked by consensus—the guiding principle of OAU and African diplomacy—the concerns of these committee members still would have had to be taken into account. The agreement to model the Central Organ on the Bureau helps ensure that the decisions the Central Organ makes will enjoy the full support of the Organization’s members. It may also be seen as an intelligent cost-saving measure, and was argued as such by some of those who favoured it, as it only required “institutionalizing” a pre-existing structure.84

The Central Organ differs from the Bureau in significant ways. Unlike the Bureau, the Organ meets regularly on three levels: annually, at the Heads of State and Government level; bi-annually, at the Ministers of Foreign Affairs level; and monthly, at the level of Ambassadors accredited to the OAU. It can, and has, met extraordinarily as the need arises. More importantly, the Organ can make binding decisions—even at the Ambassadorial level. The Central Organ also differs from the Bureau in its composition. In the interest of continuity it was decided that the country chairing the previous Summit would retain its membership on the Central Organ even if that country would no longer be a member of the Bureau. Similarly, the Organ will include the country designated to be the incoming Chair, if known beforehand. Thus, the Central Organ’s size will vary from 15 to 17 members, with 15 mirroring those serving on the Bureau.85

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84Ibid., p. 45, para. 138.
85The Central Organ’s membership for 1998-1999 was 16: Algeria (Incoming Chair), Burkina Faso (Chair), Burundi, Chad, Egypt, Ghana, Madagascar, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, the Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Outgoing Chair). Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.
Peace Fund

The Peace Fund provides an important source of financing for a cash-strapped Organization. According to an OAU report issued prior to the June 1998 Summit in Ouagadougou, the Organization was owed more than US$ 48 million in arrears, with only 20 of the 53 members paid in full. Given the financial difficulties the OAU encountered in fielding the observer force in Rwanda, a source of independent funding for OAU peace and security initiatives was regarded as important. According to the OAU, the cost of that small mission “proved staggering.” The Fund is designed specifically to support initiatives of the Central Organ, and more generally, to develop the Conflict Management Division. It is divided into two parts: a General Peace Fund and Special Contributions. The fund is not used for salaries and allowances of OAU staff members (although it can be, and has been, used to pay for consultants) or to cover normal operational costs of the Political Department.

The Fund has significantly augmented the OAU’s coffers. As of 31 December 1998, the Peace Fund had received almost US$ 28 million since its creation on 1 June 1993. The percentage of the OAU regular budget earmarked for the Peace Fund was raised from five to six per cent beginning in the 1998-1999 fiscal year. Yet the failure of OAU member States to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time means that considerably less than the expected contribution of some US$ 2 million per year is actually received. African countries’ voluntary contributions to the Peace Fund have “been rather modest,” in the words of Secretary General

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87 Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options, p. 56, para. 175.

88 Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.

89 Ibid.

90 The 1997-1998 annual budget of the OAU was US$ 31,199,000. Gaye, “OAU Owed 48 Million By Member States.” Six per cent of US$ 32 million is US$ 1.92 million.
Salim. In the first five years, only nine African countries had made voluntary contributions to the Peace Fund, for a total of US$ 1.4 million.  

Most of the money has come from Western countries and has been earmarked for special projects. Non-African countries have provided more than US$ 18.2 million—roughly two out of every three dollars that the Fund has received. All but two of these contributions have come from Western Governments. More than 90 per cent of the money has been deposited into the Special Contributions section of the Peace Fund. The OAU does not have the power to dispense these funds as it pleases, unlike its discretionary use of the General Peace Fund. (The Central Organ can, of course, always choose to decline an offer, but never has.)

Most of the money spent has gone to support OAU peacekeeping operations. Of the US$ 19.9 million disbursed as of March 1998, US$ 10.1 million went to the mission in Burundi (discussed below). An additional US$ 2.9 million was used to procure logistical support for a projected 100-strong OAU observer force. The OAU mission in the Comoros (also discussed below) received US$ 1.1 million.

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92 The nine countries were: Algeria (US$ 210,000), Burkina Faso (US$ 14,572), Egypt (US$ 100,000), Ethiopia (US$ 10,000), Lesotho (US$ 15,000), Mauritius (US$ 52,000), Namibia (US$ 250,000), South Africa (US$ 715,680), and Tunisia (US$ 5,136). All of these contributions were made to the General Fund. Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.

93 Korea and Indonesia provided US$ 50,000 and US$ 15,000, respectively, to the General Peace Fund. Ibid.

94 Written correspondence with Ibok, 3 May 1999.

95 Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.

96 Written correspondence with Ibok, 3 May 1999.
Conflict Management Division

The Peace Fund also supports the work of the OAU Conflict Management Division. Created in March 1992, the CMD has four units: Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution, Field Operations, and Project Formulation. More than US$ 1 million has gone to constructing and equipping the Conflict Management Centre (CMC) and training its staff. The CMC includes the Situation Room, Peace Library and Documentation Center. The Situation Room has been outfitted with computers, maps and communication equipment, and is intended to serve as the basis for an Early Warning System (EWS). It is envisaged that the EWS will benefit from inputs supplied by OAU member States, African subregional organizations, the United Nations System and civil society, including academia, research institutes, the media, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The Conflict Management Division has made important strides since it was created, but is still far from meeting the weighty demands that have been thrust upon it. The completion of the Situation Room represents an important development. An exercise undertaken in March 1998 showed its potential. The basis now exists for CMD’s staff to provide useful analysis to support OAU decision-making. Yet while the collection of data is crucial, making sense of that data is extremely time-consuming. At present, the CMD simply does not possess the personnel to take full advantage of its new capabilities. The entire Division consists of 15 full-time OAU staff members—including the secretaries, a receptionist, and a messenger.

98 The Situation Room is also known as the Crisis Management Room.
99 The EWS is also referred to as the Early Warning Network. The OAU itself uses the two terms interchangeably.
100 Ibok, “The Dynamics of Conflicts in Africa: Evaluating OAU’s Past and Present approaches for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and Future Prospects,” p. 73.
101 Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999. At the time, there were also three consultants on short-term contracts. Ibid.
MECHANISM’S EFFECT ON OAU PEACEKEEPING POLICY AND CAPACITY

Although the focus of the Mechanism is on conflict prevention, the Central Organ has approved two small peacekeeping operations. While both initiatives have encountered operational shortcomings, they may have served useful political functions. Less controversial accomplishment are the growing administrative know-how, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and rules of engagement (ROEs) that have resulted from these missions, which ought to facilitate future OAU peacekeeping operations.


Once NMOG II was subsumed into UNAMIR, the OAU believed a useful precedent had been established and sought to replicate it elsewhere. Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Zaire, to differing degrees, were all seen as potential candidates. The murder of Burundi’s President, Melchio Ndadaye, on 21 October 1993 in a military coup, brought a sense of urgency to the decision-making process. The OAU henceforth focused its energies on Burundi. Bakwesegha described the OAU as being “flush with success” from its initiative in Rwanda and noted that it saw Burundi as an opportunity to strengthen the peace process and improve on its performance in Rwanda.102

Financial and operational considerations did not weigh heavily in the OAU’s decision to send a peacekeeping mission to Burundi. According to Bakwesegha, there was a general expectation within the OAU that if an agreement was reached with Bujumbura, financing would not be a factor. The OAU strongly believed that certain foreign countries would likely contribute to an OAU peacekeeping initiative. The issue of finding a sufficient number of qualified African military observers was never seriously debated.103

102Interview with Bakwesegha, 30 November 1998, New York.
103Ibid.
Rather, the problem lay in convincing the Government of Burundi to accept an OAU mission. Initially, discussions between the OAU and Bujumbura centred around a proposal to send 180 observers as part of an “International Mission of Observation and Protection for the Restoration of Confidence.” 104 This number was eventually reduced to 47 because of the Burundian military’s strong opposition to the intervention. During negotiations, the possible OAU mission was spoken of as a “preventive diplomacy” force and not as a “peacekeeping” force, to further assuage certain Burundian sensitivities. 105 Importantly, several of the military observers were also medical doctors who assisted civilians to the extent possible.

Deployment of even this smaller force was significantly delayed. The mission’s civilian component was deployed by mid-December 1993, 106 a month after the Central Organ had established the OAU Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB). The first military observers did not arrive in Bujumbura until February 1994. 107 As of September 1994, 33 of the 47 observers had been dispatched to Burundi 108 Thirteen more deployed the following month. 109 The six-nation OAU force (comprised of observers from Burkina

104 The peacekeeping operation was to also include 20 civilians. See Chris J. Bakwesegha, “The Role of the Organization of African Unity in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,” International Journal of Refugee Law, Special Issue, July 1995, p. 213.
105 Interview with Bakwesegha, 30 November 1998, New York.
106 Written correspondence with IBOK, 3 May 1999.
107 Ibid.
109 The initial 47-strong OMIB force never reached full strength. An observer from Niger, killed during the mission, was not replaced. Written correspondence with IBOK, 3 May 1999.
Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia) was under Tunisian command.\footnote{Although OMIB did not serve as a catalyst to Security Council action, the force cannot be judged a complete failure. Tensions were extremely high between the minority Tutsi-led Government and Hutu civilians (who make up the vast majority of the population), and military action by both the Government and rebels was commonplace. According to Col. Djibril Sangaré, a military observer serving in OMIB who headed the team of medical officers, the OAU observers, although few in number, served as useful intermediaries between the military authorities and civilian leaders and managed to defuse numerous explosive situations. Furthermore, the provision of medical care was not seen as a threat by the Burundian army, and it helped reassure a wary populace. The decision to augment OMIB by an additional 20 military observers in March 1995 suggests that Bujumbura, the OAU, and foreign donors viewed the mission as a valuable undertaking. The military component was withdrawn shortly after the coup of 25 July 1996. The civilian component continues with a small number of political officers.}{111}

Observer Mission in the Comoros (1997-1999)

Following the withdrawal of the OAU military observers in Burundi, a full year passed before the Central Organ agreed to deploy another peacekeeping mission, this time in the Comoros. The decision to authorize the OAU Observer Mission in the Comoros (OMIC) was taken by the

\footnote{ Cameroon had initially committed 10 observers. In the end, however, only one deployed—briefly. He fell ill shortly after arriving, and returned home. Ibid.}{110}

\footnote{ The first Commander, Lt-Col. Ben Younnes Abdeljilil was replaced by his compatriot, Lt-Col. Mabrouk Boujemma. Written correspondence with Ibok, 3 May 1999.}{111}

\footnote{ Interview with Col. Djibril Sangaré, former Head, Medical Officers, OMIB, current Security Officer, OMIB, 17 September 1998, Bujumbura.}{112}
Organ at Ambassadorial level in August 1997, after the island of Anjouan (one of three islands that comprise the country) unilaterally declared itself independent from the Comoros that July. The Central Organ authorized OMIC’s strength at 27 military observers, which were provided by Egypt, Niger, Senegal, and Tunisia.

If ever there were an instance when the OAU could agree to act with unanimity and alacrity, one would be hard-pressed to find a better example. Anjouan’s decision to break from the islands of Grande Comoros and Mohéli to join the archipelago’s fourth island, Mayotte, as a French territory could simply not be countenanced by any of the 53 OAU members.

OMIC had mixed success. Only 20 observers deployed, as it proved impossible to reach agreement with Anjouan concerning the intended seven-member observer team to be stationed there. Despite the OAU’s presence and repeated stern warnings to reunite, Anjouan is instead preparing to celebrate its second year of independence. On the other hand, as the OAU has stressed, the observers fulfilled on occasion a useful mediation role among the factions and provided humanitarian assistance when violent clashes broke out. Moreover, Ibok suggested there were signs that the hardline taken by the Anjouanese was softening—although he was uncertain what effect the 30 April 1999 coup would have on the

114Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.
115Mayotte was alone among the four islands to forego independence in favor of departmental status within France in a December 1974 referendum. In a 1996 vote, more than 99 per cent of Mayotte’s residents casting ballots voted to continue its status. See Cornwell, “Africa Watch, Anjouan: A Spat in the Indian Ocean,” pp. 51-54.
116France too responded unenthusiastically to Anjouan’s declaration.
117Written correspondence with Ibok, 3 May 1999.
118Ibid.
peace process. He also emphasized the differences between a large peacekeeping operation and a small observer mission, such as OMIC. The fact that the peace process has been lengthy with few noticeable achievements, together with the coup and its uncertain aftermath, does not mean that OMIC was a failure. The OAU announced the withdrawal of its observers from the Comoros on 10 May 1999.

Achievements

Although the Central Organ has approved only two peacekeeping operations, an important base exists upon which to build. Administrative, financial, institutional, and operational structures have been established to serve as benchmarks and guidelines for future missions. For example, ROEs now exist for OAU military observers. They may use deadly force in self-defence when an OAU military observer’s life is in imminent danger. (Unlike their United Nations counterparts, OAU military observers carry side arms.) They are also authorized to search, detain, and disarm paramilitary personnel when acting in self-defence. The OAU has also devised a standard life insurance for mission participants.

The OAU is now better able to provide basic tools of the trade. During NMOG, the OAU was forced to seek from donors such items as flashlights, boots, and canteens. It is now able to routinely provide flak jackets, helmets, raincoats, “OAU” armbands and berets, binoculars, compasses, and somewhat rudimentary communication equipment. The provision of weapons and uniforms remains the responsibility of the country contributing military personnel.

Ibid. Acting on behalf of the army, Col. Azali Assoumani seized power in a bloodless coup from President Tadjidine Ben Said Massonde.

Ibid.


Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.

Zoula, “OAU Peacekeeping Operations: Past Experience and the Challenges of New Perspective.”

Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.
Precedents have now been set for the relative reimbursement levels for the commanding officer, contingent commanders, military observers, and NCOs. While the OAU has paid different allowances for lodging, food, and incidentals for those serving in NMOG, OMIB, and OMIC, this is not surprising and is the same for United Nations operations.

Limitations

At the same time, a sense of realism is needed with regard to what the OAU can and cannot accomplish. Bakwesegha has admitted that the Mechanism has its flaws. In 1997 he wrote, “The Organization cannot assume that it has achieved much in its efforts to operationalize the Mechanism since its adoption [in 1993], nor can one assume that the Mechanism as it is today is without its shortcomings.” 125 Bakwesegha, however, highlighted election monitoring as an area where the Mechanism had scored highly. Two years later, while some progress towards managing and resolving conflicts has been made, preventive diplomacy continues to be, and will remain, the chief preoccupation of the Mechanism.

OAU plans to field large and multifaceted peacekeeping operations and to establish a standby African peacekeeping force are simply out of the question for the foreseeable future. Ibok believes a standby force is still three to five years away from becoming operational. 126 Even this seems to be an overly optimistic assessment, given the lukewarm response of OAU member States. The aspirations of senior African military and diplomatic officials to a continent-wide African standby peacekeeping force are likely to remain just that. In October 1997, the OAU Chiefs of Defence Staff recommended that the OAU earmark a brigade-sized contribution to standby arrangements from each of the five African subregions. They also suggested that each subregion identify 100 military and civilian observers.


126 Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.
as a starting point. In March 1998, the OAU Council of Ministers agreed that an eventual African peacekeeping force should be made up of subregional brigades under the OAU’s command and control, within the framework of the OAU Central Organ. Yet no further action was taken at the 1998 Summit in Ouagadougou. The Council of Ministers simply requested the OAU Secretariat to look into the possibility of adopting the United Nations Training Doctrine. As of early 1999, no member State had begun to identify military or civilian observers in a coordinated manner to comply with the OAU’s previous decisions.

Even if the various OAU standby initiatives should eventually become operational, their impact is likely to be quite limited. The Central Organ’s decisions to create only two observer missions (of 67 and 27 personnel) reflect deeply-entrenched conservative political sensibilities, rather than an appreciation of the OAU’s limited resources. The OAU is quick to distinguish between “peacekeeping operations” and “observer missions” and claims that it has been successful in undertaking the latter. The Organization’s evident failure to predict—let alone prevent—the recent coup in the Comoros calls into question the achievements of its observer missions. A more fundamental issue, however, is the OAU’s reluctance to field peacekeeping missions of even a modest size and complexity. As for more robust undertakings, the OAU is still years away from possessing even the capability, much less the inclination. It is the willingness to undertake peacekeeping operations that gives some of Africa’s subregional organizations a decided advantage.

129 Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.
CHAPTER 4

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

In the West Africa subregion, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has taken the lead—both diplomatically and militarily—in responding to crises. Implicit in this development is the recognition that neither the Organization of African Unity (OAU) nor the wider international community can summon the political will to respond meaningfully to armed conflict in West Africa. Seeking to fill in the void, ECOWAS has deployed three sizeable peace missions—first in Liberia, then in Sierra Leone, and most recently in Guinea-Bissau (see Annex B). In the process of fulfilling its new responsibilities, ECOWAS has undergone a significant transformation. In terms of its activities, goals, and priorities, ECOWAS today is a very different organization than the one that was established in 1975 with primarily economic functions.

Within ECOWAS, subregional rivalries have always threatened to undermine the organization’s potential. Of the 16 ECOWAS member States (see Map 4.1), five are anglophone, nine are francophone, and two are lusophone (see Table 4.1). With some 90 per cent of the subregion’s population and a significant market share, Nigeria leads the anglophone bloc. Among the anglophone ECOWAS members, Ghana also vies for a leadership position. The francophone States—led by Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal—have long been suspicious of Nigeria’s intentions. They have sought to frustrate Abuja’s hegemonic ambitions by withholding support for certain Nigerian-led “ECOWAS” initiatives. In addition, the francophone States have created rival economic organizations such as the now-defunct Communauté économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO), and its successor, the Union économique monétaire de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UEMOA), as well as a defence and security-oriented organization known as the Accord de non-agression et d’assistance en matière de défense (ANAD).
Map 4.1

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

Members
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cape Verde
Côte d'Ivoire
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo

The information and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion or any official endorsement or any other by the United Nations.
Table 4.1

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* Mauritania’s official language is Arabic. French is widely used in government circles, however.
Notwithstanding the divisive subregional politics, ECOWAS has managed to deploy three ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peace operations since 1990. Rather than building consensus and strengthening solidarity among ECOWAS member States, these missions have underscored and exacerbated subregional tensions. Moreover, ECOMOG initiatives have suffered from financial, institutional, and operational shortcomings. The intervention in Liberia was fraught with well-documented difficulties. Some implications of ECOMOG’s unenviable undertaking in Sierra Leone are similarly troubling. Although aspects of its mission in Guinea-Bissau are also problematic, others illustrate the significant institutional strides that ECOWAS has made.

Attempting to redress past criticisms of ECOMOG operations, ECOWAS has recently taken steps to establish a permanent peace and security mechanism. In October 1998, the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government (the Authority) endorsed a draft framework for a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. The proposed mechanism is designed to standardize ECOWAS involvement in peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This is a potentially significant development, as ECOWAS has never had a functioning security framework.

**INITIAL EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A SECURITY FRAMEWORK**

**Economic Integration: a Useful Confidence-Building Measure**

The impetus behind the creation of ECOWAS was the desire to develop an economic cooperation and integration scheme within West Africa. In April 1972, Nigeria and Togo agreed to form the nucleus of an all West African Economic Community (WAEC), which would remain open to other States of the subregion. The two countries were ultimately able to

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1 Nigeria had first begun to advocate subregional economic integration in the early 1960s but recognized that the political atmosphere within the subregion was not then conducive to such a course of action. Francophone States in particular were wary of Nigerian domination and were therefore opposed to any all-West African economic (continued...)
convince the other West African States to support an all-West African economic community, but only after francophone countries completed their plans for the CEAO. In December 1973, a ministerial conference on ECOWAS was held in Lomé, and a Summit of Heads of State and Government adopted a draft treaty on ECOWAS on 28 May 1975 in Lagos. The Community aimed:

- to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity ... and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and of con-tributing to the progress and development of the African continent.

Although economic considerations provided the unifying force behind the establishment of ECOWAS, security concerns weighed heavily in some countries’ considerations. Nigeria, for example, had begun to view economic cooperation as a means to ensure its internal security in light of

1 (...continued) integration plan. In the early 1970s, most of the francophone States within the subregion affirmed their commitment to form the CEAO. Thus, Nigeria set about driving a wedge between its francophone neighbours and the other members of the proposed CEAO. Not surprisingly, in view of its April 1972 agreement with Nigeria to form a WAEC, Togo refused to sign the CEAO preliminary agreement in June 1972. See Olatunde J.B. Ojo, “Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS,” International Organization, Vol. 34, No. 4, Autumn 1980, pp. 572-97.

2 The fifteen signatories to the Treaty of Lagos were: Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey (now Benin), the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso). Cape Verde joined ECOWAS in 1977.


4 For a contrasting view, see, for example, Olu Adeniji, “Mechanisms for Conflict Management in West Africa: Politics of Harmonization,” ACCORD Occasional Paper 1/97, reprinted in Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 15 October 1997, available on the Internet at <http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a258.htm>, para. 10. According to Adeniji, when ECOWAS was created, economic development and state security were viewed as two distinct and unrelated domains. He claims that the issue of regional security was not considered relevant to the ECOWAS project. Ibid.
the destabilizing role some West African States had played in the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970).\(^5\) By reducing its neighbours’ dependency on Europe and increasing subregional economic ties, Nigeria hoped to insulate itself against external aggression.\(^6\)

Yet the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty did not include any security-related provisions, as political and ideological issues were still considered too divisive. Instead, economic issues were prioritized as a means of developing cooperative ties. According to Yakubu Gowon, then Nigeria’s military ruler, the founders of ECOWAS “played down the political aspect when ECOWAS was formed” and instead endeavoured to build “a bridge of cooperation” by encouraging economic links.\(^7\)

**1978 and 1981 Protocols**

The adoption of a Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978 marked the first stage in the establishment of an ECOWAS security framework. The Protocol on Non-Aggression explicitly recognizes that ECOWAS “cannot attain its objectives save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among the Member States of the Community.”\(^8\) Accordingly, it obligates member States to “refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression ... against the territorial integrity or political independence of other Member States”\(^9\) and to “refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial
By adopting the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (Defence Protocol) in 1981, ECOWAS leaders sought to address many of the limitations inherent in the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression. Unlike the initial Protocol, it applies not only to conflicts between ECOWAS member States, but also to internal conflicts engineered and supported from outside and to aggressions perpetrated against an ECOWAS member State by non-ECOWAS countries. The Defence Protocol envisages an elaborate security framework.

The enforcement arm of the Mutual Assistance on Defence framework is the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC), a standby force comprised of national units earmarked from ECOWAS member States and available in case of “any armed aggression.” The Protocol provides that the ECOWAS Authority would appoint a force commander to head the AAFC. In the situation where an external armed threat or aggression is directed against an ECOWAS member, the written request of the besieged

10 Ibid., Article 2.
14 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, 29 May 1981, Article 13, courtesy of ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja. The Protocol defines aggression as “the use of armed force by any State against the sovereignty and territorial integrity or political independence of another State or by any other manner incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and OAU.” Ibid., Article 1.
15 Ibid., Article 14.
state triggers AAFC action. 16 In the case of a conflict between ECOWAS member States, the AAFC may be authorized to serve as an interposition force. 17 Although the AAFC is forbidden to intervene in a “purely internal” conflict, it is authorized to respond “where an internal conflict in a Member State of the Community is actively maintained and sustained from the outside.” 18

The envisaged Mutual Assistance on Defence framework also includes decision-making and administrative structures. The Defence Protocol provides for the creation of a ministerial-level Defence Council, tasked with completing the preparatory work on defence matters for Authority meetings, examining emergency situations, supervising the activities of the AAFC Force Commander, and submitting a report to the Authority at the end of any AAFC operation. 19 The Protocol also envisions the establishment of a Defence Commission to deal with technical defence issues, comprised of Chiefs of Staff from each ECOWAS member State. 20 In addition, the Protocol foresees the appointment of a Deputy Executive Secretary (Military) at the ECOWAS Secretariat to support and oversee defence activities. 21

Yet none of the structures described in the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence has become fully operational. Member States have never earmarked units of their national armed forces for participation in the AAFC. Neither the Defence Council nor the Defence Commission has been established. 22 Moreover, a Deputy Executive Secretary (Military) has never been appointed at the ECOWAS Secretariat. Indeed, the Defence Protocol was regarded with considerable suspicion for a number of

16 Ibid., Article 16.
17 Ibid., Article 17.
18 Ibid., Article 18.
19 Ibid., Articles 7-10.
20 Ibid., Article 11.
21 Ibid., Article 12.
reasons23 and had not been invoked—until 1990 with the advent of the Liberian civil war.

CREATION OF ECOMOG: AN IMPROVISED RESPONSE

The lack of a functioning security apparatus combined with a determination among a small group of ECOWAS States to intervene militarily in support of a fellow member provided the impetus for the creation of a new structure called ECOMOG. While the Defence Protocol remains in effect and is still cited as the textual authority for many ECOWAS initiatives, its security framework has been largely superseded. Despite the neutral and pacific connotations of its name, ECOMOG was, in effect, an intervention force in Liberia from the outset and it quickly assumed the task of peace enforcement. Although the name ECOMOG has been retained for the subsequent missions in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, the circumstances surrounding the authorization and deployment of each of these forces have been drastically different. As of June 1999, ECOMOG had not been in accordance with a specific procedure.

Civil War in Liberia

Since Samuel Doe led a bloody military coup in 1980 to become Liberia’s President, his rule had been increasingly oppressive and unpopular. Because of a widespread dislike for the minority Americo-Liberian elite that ruled the country since independence in 1847, Doe, though only a sergeant at the time, was welcomed warmly by a large segment of the Liberian population when he came to power. However, his support for his Krahn tribesmen at the expense of other, more sizeable indigenous ethnic groups in Liberia, his ruthlessness, and his incompetence made him increasingly feared and reviled. He did succeed, however, in

23 These include a fear of Nigerian domination (particularly among the francophone States), a belief that the Defence Protocol encroaches upon a state’s sovereign right to conclude defence agreements, and a concern about operational and logistical aspects of force deployment. See Adeniji, “Mechanisms for Conflict Management in West Africa: Politics of Harmonization,” para. 4; see also Okolo, “Securing West Africa: the ECOWAS defence pact,” pp. 181-84.
cultivating some loyal allies among regional Governments—especially Nigeria.

Although Doe had successfully scuttled numerous attempted coups during his rule, the rebellion launched in December 1989 by Charles Taylor appeared ready to succeed. Taylor, though an Americo-Liberian, counted significant numbers of Gio and Mano among his supporters. Doe’s Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) responded to the rebellion with characteristic brutality. Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) swelled in size, gaining new recruits in the wake of the AFL’s heavy-handed tactics and benefiting from Doe’s unpopularity with the populace. Whereas Taylor began his putsch reportedly with fewer than 100 men, his NPFL soon numbered several thousand. Although the NPFL splintered when Prince Johnson, an NPFL commander, formed the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), Taylor controlled over 90 per cent of the country within months. By April 1990, the NPFL had captured Buchanan, Liberia’s second largest city, and Taylor was positioning his troops to lay siege to the capital, Monrovia. The AFL was no longer a unified force, and Doe had essentially barricaded himself in his Executive Mansion.

Standing Mediation Committee

It is against this backdrop that a desperate Doe turned to Nigeria’s President Ibrahim Babangida to help him find a diplomatic—or barring that, a military—solution to save his Government. Babangida then attempted to enlist the support of ECOWAS member States to come to Doe’s aid. The humanitarian imperative and concerns about the war’s destabilizing effects on their own countries as well as regional security prompted several other ECOWAS member States to consider military intervention.

At Babangida’s request, the ECOWAS Authority established the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) at the May 1990 ECOWAS Summit

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in Banjul. The Decision to create the Committee provides that “[w]here there is a dispute, the Chairman of the Authority shall convene the other members of the Committee as early as practicable and inform the member States involved in the dispute or conflict of the preparedness of the Committee to initiate mediation procedures.” 26 Although the Decision establishing the SMC makes no reference to a particular conflict, it is clear that the Committee was created to address the Liberian civil war. The SMC’s initial membership comprised the Gambia (as Chairman of the Authority), Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo. 27

The Standing Mediation Committee, in turn, established ECOMOG. After the May 1990 Summit, ECOWAS Executive Secretary Abass Bundu consulted with the parties to the Liberian conflict as well as the members of the SMC. A ministerial-level meeting of the SMC was then held in July, at which a Sub-Committee on Defence Matters was established to address military issues relating to a proposed military force. 28 The next month, the SMC Heads of State decided that:

ECOWAS shall establish, under the authority of the Chairman of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS and under the command of an ECOWAS Member State, a Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to be composed of military contingents drawn from the

27 ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, Extract from the Final Communiqué, Establishment of a Standing Mediation Committee, Banjul, 30 May 1990, reprinted in ibid., p. 40. The Decision establishing the SMC specifies that the Committee comprises the current Chairman of the Authority and four ECOWAS member States, whose membership is reviewed every three years. Decision A/DEC.9/5/90, Article 1, reprinted in ibid., p. 39.
Member States of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee as well as from Guinea and Sierra Leone.  

The Standing Mediation Committee’s reference to the 1981 Defence Protocol in its decision to create ECOMOG was a formulaic nicety rather than a deference to legal precedent. Even if the Mutual Assistance on Defence framework had been operational, it is questionable whether the Liberian civil war should have triggered its application. Some commentators argue that under the terms of the Defence Protocol, an ECOWAS intervention was not justified because the Liberian conflict was “purely internal.” 30 Others take exception, maintaining that the Defence Protocol justified a military response because the conflict, though internal, was “engineered and supported actively from the outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire Community.” 31

Regardless of the Defence Protocol’s applicability, it is clear that the proper procedure for invoking it was not followed. According to the Protocol, “the Authority shall appreciate and decide” whether a given internal conflict is actively supported from outside and likely to endanger peace and security in the subregion—and thus qualifies for an armed response by the Community.32 In this instance, however, there was no such


32 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense, Article 4(b).
concerted determination by the Authority.  

Even at the time, several ECOWAS member States claimed that the appropriate decision-making channels had not been followed. It is also unclear whether Doe sent the requisite “written request for assistance” to the ECOWAS Chairman, with copies to other members. Some commentators claim that Doe initially requested assistance from President Babangida, who in turn brought the issue before ECOWAS. In July 1990, Doe did write to the Chairman and members of the newly-constituted Standing Mediation Committee—rather than ECOWAS Heads of State—requesting the deployment of an ECOWAS peacekeeping force. By that point, however, it was arguable whether he still exercised sufficient control over the country to entitle him, as “President,” to make such a request. (Doe was President in name only at the time he wrote the letter; a few weeks later his title was formally taken from him when an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was created with Amos Sawyer as President.)

34 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense, Article 16.
36 In the letter, Doe stated that “it would seem most expedient at this time to introduce an ECOWAS Peace-Keeping Force into Liberia to forestall increasing terror and tension and to assure a peaceful transitional environment.” “Letter addressed by President Samuel K. Doe to the Chairman and Members of the Ministerial Meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee,” reprinted in Weller (ed.), Regional Peace-Keeping and International Enforcement: the Liberian Crisis, p. 61.
The establishment of ECOMOG was thus an improvised response to the Liberian conflict. As Clement Adibe has observed, “the [May 1990] Banjul Summit basically handed over the issue of the Liberian conflict to the SMC rather than institute the mechanism for collective security as provided for by the Defence Protocol.” 39 Capitalizing on the lack of a functioning security framework, Nigeria pushed through the creation of an entirely new structure—one that would better serve its purposes. The Authority’s decision to establish the SMC with a very broad mandate, and to make Nigeria a member of that body provided Lagos with an opportunity to influence ECOWAS policy on Liberia, which Nigeria fully exploited.

ECOMOG IN LIBERIA (1990 TO DATE)

Anglophone-Francophone Divide and Fears of Nigerian Domination

The decision to establish ECOMOG and the manner in which that decision was taken exacerbated long-standing tensions between anglophone and francophone States. Several francophone States, particularly Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, strongly objected to the deployment. 40 The leaders of these two countries supported Charles Taylor and the NPFL in their bid to oust President Doe. 41 When Doe had seized power in 1980, he killed then President William Tolbert and imprisoned Tolbert’s eldest son, Adolphus, who died in custody. This incensed Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny who had been a close friend of


40 For example, Burkina Faso’s President, Blaise Compaoré, stated: “We learnt from the international media, the momentous decision by some member States of ECOWAS to send a supposedly reconciliatory force to Liberia, without first fully briefing other countries on the exact assignment of the force. As far as we are concerned, the Mediation Committee of ECOWAS is not competent to intervene in a member State’s internal conflict.” Newswatch, 27 August 1990, p. 16, cited in Adisa, “The Politics of Regional Military Cooperation: The Case of ECOMOG,” pp. 214-15.

President Tolbert and the father-in-law of Adolphus. Houphouët-Boigny’s same daughter subsequently married Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré. Beyond fulfilling personal vendettas, francophone States more generally viewed Taylor’s ascension to power as a means of checking Nigeria’s hegemonic designs.  

The deployment of an ECOMOG force comprised almost entirely of anglophone member States underscored the political division within ECOWAS. In light of the opposition to ECOMOG, both francophone members of the Standing Mediation Committee—Mali and Togo—rescinded their initial offers to contribute troops. All four of Liberia’s anglophone counterparts in ECOWAS participated: the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The sole francophone participant, Guinea, had experienced a massive influx of refugees since the outbreak of the civil war. The anglophone countries were concerned about the possible implications of Taylor’s ascension to power on their own futures. Moreover, each initial troop-contributing country was governed by an authoritarian leader concerned with maintaining his own power at home. For them, President Doe was thus in some sense a kindred spirit. Like Doe, Nigerian President Babangida, Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings, and

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45 Within two months of the rebellion’s launch, more than 80,000 Liberian refugees had crossed into Guinea. (See “Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), No. 2, 1990, p. 35.) While some 60,000 Liberian refugees had crossed into Côte d’Ivoire (see ibid.), the refugees posed a greater security threat to Guinea than they did to Côte d’Ivoire, as Guinea’s territory and population were considerably smaller than those of Côte d’Ivoire.

46 Dissidents from the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone had reportedly trained with Taylor’s NPFL, with the understanding that Taylor would support them if he was successful. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, “Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia,” pp. 272-73.
Guinean President Lansana Conté, had all seized power through military coups. Sierra Leonean President Joseph Momoh had been hand-picked by his predecessor to rule Sierra Leone’s one-party-State, and Gambian President Dauda Jawara had governed his country since its independence in 1965. Of all of them, Babangida was particularly interested in preserving Doe’s presidency.

Yet even the anglophone countries participating in the force were wary of Nigeria at the outset, as evidenced by disagreements with Nigeria over the nature of ECOMOG’s mission. According to ECOMOG’s first Force Commander, Lt-Gen. Arnold Quainoo of Ghana, Accra viewed the mission as an “interposition” force, intended to deploy in Monrovia and preserve the status quo. Quainoo saw his task as keeping the belligerents where they were and restoring law and order. The force did not intend to support one faction over another or to carry out attacks. Nigeria saw the force differently. In its view, ECOMOG was a vehicle by which to save Doe and block Taylor’s ascension to power. Initially, an interposition force would serve that purpose. After President Doe was captured—ironically at ECOMOG headquarters—and subsequently killed, Nigeria’s anti-Taylor policy became increasingly evident.

Nigeria did try to camouflage its dominant role in the force by consenting to a non-Nigerian force commander. As negotiations concerning the composition of an eventual force continued, Quainoo visited the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone (at the request of President

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48 Presidents Babangida and Doe had a close personal relationship. Babangida, like Doe, had overthrown a civilian Government and had managed to consolidate power. At that point, Nigeria was already under increasing international pressure to transfer power back to a democratically-elected Government. The military Government in Nigeria therefore saw value in having Doe remain in power—and indebted to Nigeria. Interview with Kayode Samuel, former Special Assistant to the Nigerian Head of State (1993-1995), current Programme Coordinator of Democracy-in-Peace Initiative, African Refugee Foundation, 13 March 1999, Lagos.

49 Interview with Lt-Gen. (Rtd) Arnold Quainoo, former Force Commander of ECOMOG in Liberia, current Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, 17 March 1999, Accra.
Rawlings). According to Quainoo, President Babangida explained that Nigeria could not take the lead role in a peacekeeping initiative because it would look like Nigeria was supporting Doe. Babangida indicated that Doe had recently appealed to Lagos for help and that Nigeria was “only waiting for an excuse to go” and had earmarked troops for an eventual force. In view of its impressive United Nations peacekeeping experience, Ghana was the obvious other choice to lead the force. Guinea would have been the ideal country to command the force given anglophone-francophone tensions, but no suitable candidate was identified. Similarly, there were no appropriate Gambian or Sierra Leonean candidates for force commander. Quainoo was the personal choice of Rawlings. Under ECOMOG’s initial command structure, the Deputy Force Commander was Guinean and the Chief of Staff was Nigerian.

ECOMOG’s Deployment

Despite the initial opposition to ECOMOG within ECOWAS, plans for deployment proceeded. Each troop-contributor pledged to provide at least one infantry battalion (roughly 700-750 men). Ghana and Nigeria also provided air force personnel and some fixed-wing aircraft that would be stationed at Sierra Leone’s Lungi airport. Each country was to take responsibility for ferrying its troops and equipment to the Sierra Leonean capital, Freetown, by a certain date.

ECOMOG troop-contributors did not coordinate their logistical needs and capabilities prior to deployment. In this context, Quainoo described

50 Ibid.
52 Interview with Quainoo, 17 March 1999, Accra.
54 Interview with Quainoo, 17 March 1999, Accra.
ECOMOG’s response as, “ad hoc more than anything else.” Participants did not indicate what equipment they intended to bring or what equipment they lacked. According to Quainoo, each country simply “did what it could.” The contingents were expected to assemble in Freetown and travel from there to Monrovia by sea. Quainoo indicated that the mission planners did not make sophisticated logistical calculations prior to deployment. The numerous logistical and transportation problems delayed the force’s arrival in the mission area.

Moreover, ECOMOG’s concept of operations was not determined in advance of deployment. According to Quainoo, the force’s rapid deployment was the main consideration, and staff duties and planning were secondary. ECOMOG’s initial aim was limited to simply reaching Monrovia. Once deployed, the force would then concern itself with becoming familiar with the terrain and the locations of the warring parties. While still in Freetown, however, they had decided that each participating battalion would deploy in a designated “sector,” except for the Gambian battalion, which was tasked with securing ECOMOG headquarters.

When the ECOMOG force deployed on 24 August 1990, it had to contend not only with these logistical and operational uncertainties but with a hostile landing. Charles Taylor understood correctly that ECOMOG, whatever its stated intentions, would complicate his efforts to take control of the country. Even an interposition force as described by Quainoo that simply sought to preserve the status quo and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief to a besieged country was anathema to Taylor, who saw

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55 Ibid.
57 Interview with Quainoo, 17 March 1999, Accra.
58 See Aderiye, “ECOMOG Landing,” pp. 99-100. Some blamed the delay on Taylor’s resistance and the uncertain security situation in Monrovia. Ibid.
59 Interview with Quainoo, 17 March 1999, Accra. The Gambian army was less experienced than the other participating armies, being only a few years old at that point. Ibid.
victory at hand. 60 On the eve of ECOMOG’s arrival in Liberia, Taylor called the “peacekeeping” force a “flagrant act of aggression.” 61 The next day, the NPFL shelled the port and the beaches, as well as sent troops out on motorboats to intercept and harass the approaching landing craft ferrying the peacekeeping troops. With the assistance of the INPFL, ECOMOG fought back the NPFL and managed to set up camps in Monrovia as planned. 62

From “Interposition” Force to Intervention Force

Nigeria largely abandoned its efforts to disguise its dominant role in ECOMOG in the wake of Doe’s murder in September 1990. The Nigerian Government blamed Quainoo for Doe’s capture, which was carried out by Johnson and his INPFL in the ECOMOG compound on 9 September. 63

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60 While Taylor may have been confident that the AFL and INPFL were no match for his NPFL, others paint a different picture. Lt-Col. George Aryiku, who commanded the initial Ghanaian battalion serving in ECOMOG, indicated that three battalions of the AFL were still under unified command and that the INPFL was getting stronger every day, benefiting from defections from the NPFL. Furthermore, Doe’s alliance with Johnson, made prior to ECOMOG’s arrival, was a serious setback for Taylor.


62 Interview with Quainoo, 17 March 1999, Accra.

63 Quainoo insists that he had not been aware of Doe’s visit, which had been arranged by his Guinean deputy, and had not assured Doe of any protection. He further believes that Doe went to ECOMOG’s headquarters because Doe thought that some arrangement had been made for him as a result of Guinea’s intervention.

(Ibid.) Others maintain, however, that ECOMOG miscalculated its security precautions (see Sesay, “Collective Security or Collective Disaster: Regional Peace-Keeping in West Africa,” p. 213), that Quainoo was incapable (Herbert Howe, “Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 155, 161), or that Quainoo was an accomplice (Adisa, “ECOMOG Force Commanders,” pp. 247-48). Mark Huband posits that Doe’s demise was primarily attributable to Johnson’s cunning. According to Huband, Johnson had lulled Doe into a false sense of security by forging an (continued...)
Accordingly, Nigeria pushed to assume a greater role in commanding the force. Quainoo’s Guinean deputy was replaced by a Nigerian, who was given the title of Field Commander, and Nigeria retained the Chief of Staff position. Quainoo himself was dispatched to Freetown and instructed to carry out his duties from there while the Nigerian Field Commander assumed responsibility for the day-to-day actions of the force. A Nigerian has commanded ECOMOG ever since (see Table 4.2). Yet the ostensible retention of Quainoo as Force Commander was designed to be only a short-lived, face-saving measure for Ghana. The Nigerian Field Commander, Maj-Gen. Joshua Dogonyaro, took over the direction of ECOMOG’s military operations immediately and launched a “limited offensive” against Taylor’s NPFL.

The strategy pursued by Dogonyaro further antagonized Taylor and failed to secure a political environment conducive to finding a diplomatic solution. In November 1990, at the first Extraordinary Summit of Heads of

63 (...continued)

64 Interview with Quainoo, 17 March 1999, Accra. Quainoo refused to continue working based in Sierra Leone and returned to Ghana. Ibid.


66 See Adibe, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Liberia, p. 34.
Table 4.2

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
<td>07/90 - 09/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj-Gen. Joshua N. Dogonyaro</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Field Commander</td>
<td>09/90 - 02/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj-Gen. Rufus M. Kupolati</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Field Commander</td>
<td>02/91 - 09/91</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Field Commander</td>
<td>09/91 - 10/92</td>
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<td>Field Commander</td>
<td>10/92 - 10/93</td>
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<td>10/93 - 12/93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maj-Gen. John Mark Inienger</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Field Commander</td>
<td>12/93 - 08/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj-Gen. Timothy M. Shelpidi</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
<td>01/98 - 03/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj-Gen. Felix Mujakperuo</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
<td>03/99 - present</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* “Force Commander” was the designation given to ECOMOG’s first commander, Lt-Gen. Arnold Quainoo. In the wake of President Samuel K. Doe’s capture and murder, however, the ECOMOG command was reshuffled. A Nigerian was given the title “Field commander,” and Quainoo subsequently stepped down. The term “Field Commander” was then used to designate the individual with overall responsibility for the force until the end of Maj-Gen. Samuel Victor L. Malu’s tenure, after which the term “Force Commander” was reinstated.
State and Government in Bamako, 67 ECOWAS Heads of State endorsed an ECOWAS Peace Plan. 68 The Summit also secured a cease-fire agreement between the warring parties. In December 1990, Côte d’Ivoire as well as representatives from the warring factions attended a ministerial meeting of the Standing Mediation Committee. 69 In the meantime, Taylor was becoming increasingly incensed by Nigerian activities. On the eve of a February 1991 Standing Mediation Committee Summit meeting, Taylor reportedly called for Nigeria’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Liberia. 70 The Committee’s Summit meeting exacerbated tensions, rather than eased them. 71 As fears of renewed violence increased, Dogonyaro was suddenly recalled to Nigeria. 72 Although Dogonyaro had brought ECOMOG closer to achieving its military aims of defeating Taylor, his strategy had diminished prospects for a negotiated political settlement. 73

ECOWAS member States continued to pursue uncoordinated and competing strategies. In mid-1991, the francophone countries took the

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67 Houphouët-Boigny had endeavoured to convene an ECOWAS Summit the previous month in Yamoussoukro. Several anglophone member States had refused to attend, however, and the Summit was cancelled. Osisioma B.C. Nwolise, “The Internalization of the Liberian Crisis and Its Effects on West Africa,” in Vogt (ed.), The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace Keeping, p. 69.

68 The Summit was attended by 13 of the 16 ECOWAS member States; Guinea, Liberia, and Mauritania were absent. Nnamdi Obasi, “The Negotiation Process,” in Vogt (ed.), The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt At Regional Peace Keeping, p. 185.


71 See Adibe, Hegemony, Security and West African Integration: Nigeria, Ghana and the Transformation of ECOWAS, pp. 232-34. Prior to the meeting, a rapprochement between Taylor and Johnson to challenge Amos Sawyer’s presidency had created a troubling new dynamic and had put the Bamako cease-fire on shaky ground. The meeting failed to address a number of the warring parties’ concerns. Ibid.

72 For an explanation of the possible reasons for Dogonyaro’s unexpected withdrawal, see Adisa, “ECOMOG Force Commanders,” pp. 252-55.

lead in mediating the conflict while the Nigerian-led ECOMOG still sought a military solution. A francophone-dominated Committee of Five (comprised of Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Togo) was established in June 1991. It was hoped that this group, chaired by Ivorian President Houphouët-Boigny, would have more influence with the warring parties. Yet in the end, the meetings held under the auspices of the Committee of Five were no more successful than the Standing Mediation Committee meetings had been. In an effort to harmonize ECOWAS policy, Joint Meetings of the Standing Mediation Committee and the Committee of Five were held in October and November 1992, but they failed to achieve their objective. Moreover, ECOWAS member States continued to support and create different Liberian factions. Burkinabé and Ivorian support for Taylor continued throughout the war. Guinea and Sierra Leone assisted the United Liberation Movement of Liberians for Democracy (ULIMO).

Taylor’s relations with the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG remained tense and conflict-ridden throughout the war. Taylor responded to the provocations of Nigeria and ECOMOG by launching a major offensive code-named Operation Octopus in October 1992 to seize Monrovia. He almost succeeded. Prince Johnson managed to survive the offensive, but

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75 Ofuaty-Kodjoe, “Regional Organizations and the Resolution of International Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia,” p. 285. The Committee of Five held four meetings during 1991 in Yamoussoukro (in June, July, September, and October) and one the following year in Geneva (in April).

76 Ibid.

77 ULIMO would eventually split into two factions: ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K under the leadership of Roosevelt Johnson and Alhaji Kromah, respectively. The split occurred in 1994 along ethnic lines: Johnson is a Krahn (and of no relation to Prince Johnson, a Gio), and Kromah, a Mandingo.
his INPFL was routed and he soon left the country. ECOMOG suffered significant casualties, but ultimately managed to defend itself and the capital. In response, Nigeria reinforced its troops and ECOMOG undertook a full-scale offensive against the NPFL, often fighting alongside ULIMO soldiers and the AFL. ECOMOG occasionally provided intelligence, transportation, and weapons to various factions opposing the NPFL throughout the conflict. Notwithstanding the ever-growing concern about ECOMOG’s actions and Nigerian heavy-handedness, Abuja continued its military campaign.

Security Council’s Initial “Hands Off” Approach and Subsequent Efforts to Make ECOMOG More Credible and Effective

The international community’s response to ECOMOG’s foray into Liberia was largely one of “wait and see.” In June 1990, the US, with UK
support, sent warships to Liberia’s coast in the event that an evacuation of their citizens and foreign diplomats and their families became necessary. Washington, however, had no intention of intervening either to support Doe or to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating situation. When ECOMOG was deployed, the United Nations Security Council neither approved the undertaking nor made formal reference to it. It remained silent even after Doe was murdered. The Council’s first reference to ECOWAS’s efforts and the Liberian civil war was only in January 1991, at which point the President of the Council merely “commended” the efforts of ECOWAS and called upon the parties to the conflict to respect the cease-fire agreement. Significantly, the Council did not refer to ECOMOG by name. Sixteen months passed before the Council again formally addressed the conflict, commending ECOWAS’s efforts in another Presidential Statement. The first Security Council resolution did not materialize until November 1992, when the Council imposed an embargo on all deliveries of weapons and equipment to Liberia, except for those destined for ECOMOG’s use.

African countries from the subregion and beyond supported such a hands-off approach and were instrumental in shaping the Council’s laissez faire attitude towards the deteriorating situation in Liberia. Granted, they were pushing against an open door, but it would be wrong to criticize the West’s and the Council’s failure to become meaningfully engaged in the conflict without appreciating African sensitivities and policies. Nigeria, for example, was reportedly determined to keep the Liberian issue out of the Security Council, so that it could have more control over the ECOMOG

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83 (...continued)
intervention. 88 Côte d’Ivoire, a member of the Council during 1990-1991, reportedly frustrated early attempts to get the Council to consider the Liberian crisis. 89 Ethiopia and Zaire, the two other African members on the Council in 1990, were also opposed to the Council dealing with the issue, succumbing to Nigerian pressure and fearful of establishing a precedent that could be applied to them. 90 African countries and the OAU have a long-standing policy of trying to keep African issues out of the Council—except for large-scale humanitarian disasters that are simply beyond the scope of the continent’s leaders and regional organizations to cope with on their own. The OAU supported ECOWAS efforts to promote peace in West Africa in line with this policy, and in deference to subregional initiatives, as an appropriate first line of action.

The US, however, did provide financial and logistical support for Senegal to join ECOMOG in 1991 in an effort to strengthen the force and address complaints of Nigerian domination, 91 but the initiative did not succeed militarily or politically. With US assistance, Senegal agreed to contribute troops in September 1991. 92 While the first contingent arrived in Monrovia in October 1991, the full battalion did not deploy to the interior of Liberia until April 1992. After the NPFL killed six Senegalese soldiers in May 1992, the battalion was transferred to Monrovia. In light of the escalating violence, Senegalese President Abdou Diouf announced in

91 The decision by Mali to contribute six soldiers to ECOMOG in early 1991 (Adibe, Hegemony, Security and West African Integration: Nigeria, Ghana and the Transformation of ECOWAS, p. 234) was a symbolic measure that, not surprisingly, did not allay Taylor’s concerns.
January 1993 that Dakar would withdraw its peacekeepers from ECOMOG.93

The Security Council’s policy towards the Liberian civil war changed after the signing of the Cotonou Peace Agreement on 25 July 1993. Previous peace agreements, such as those concluded in Yamoussoukro, had elicited little adherence among the signatories and only passing reference by the Council.94 There was a growing appreciation that years of imperceptible progress had given way to a situation that had clearly worsened and showed little sign of improving in the wake of Operation Octopus and the ECOMOG counter-offensive. The Cotonou Agreement called for the creation of a United Nations Observer Mission to supervise and monitor its implementation95 as well as for African troops from outside West Africa to participate in ECOMOG.96 The Council formally established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in September 199397—more than three years after ECOMOG had become involved in Liberia.

The introduction of contingents from African countries outside the subregion to democratize and professionalize ECOMOG was a short-lived initiative that failed to achieve its objective. Subsequent to the Cotonou Agreement, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe agreed to contribute a battalion each.98 Prior to deploying, however, Zimbabwe withdrew its pledge.99 In January 1994, some 1,500 troops from Tanzania and Uganda

93 See ibid., pp. 299-302.
96 Ibid., Article 3.2
99 Numerous reasons have been proffered for Zimbabwe’s ultimate decision not to provide troops. According to one Zimbabwean Government official, financial considerations were the root cause. (Interview with Amb. Eliot Manyika, Deputy Secretary, Zimbabwean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 January 1998, Harare.)
arrived in Monrovia. Although the inclusion of these East African peacekeepers into ECOMOG reduced Nigeria’s domination, it created other difficulties. There were complaints that Tanzania and Uganda performed inadequately on those infrequent occasions when they actually saw combat and that they were not committed to ECOMOG’s mission. The veteran ECOMOG peacekeepers also resented the fact that the East African contingents had better equipment and more secure financing. According to the Chief of the Tanzania People’s Defence Force, however, sometimes the financial and material support that Tanzania was promised did not materialize in time. In early 1995, Tanzania announced the withdrawal of its contingent, citing the financial burden and the lack of progress in the peace process, and Uganda followed suit.

99 (...continued)
Zimbabwe was also concerned about certain political and military aspects of the mission, such as the force’s exit strategy and mandate. (Interview with Maj-Gen. Edzai Absolom Chanyuka Chimonyo, Chief of Staff (Operations and Plans), Zimbabwean Ministry of Defence, 27 January 1998, Harare.) Zimbabwe’s relationship with Nigeria may also have influenced its decision not to deploy; Zimbabwe would not have been keen to serve under Nigerian command. Interview with Zimbabwean Government official, 26 January 1998, Harare.


101 Howe, “Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping,” p. 169. In one instance when part of the Tanzanian contingent was confronted by NPFL forces, they reportedly surrendered their equipment rather than fight. Ibid.

102 R.P. Momba, “The Role of Regional Bodies in Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping,” in Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (eds), Peacekeeping in Africa (Volume II), Halfway House: Institute for Defence Policy, 1996, p. 116. Momba indicated that Zimbabwe had incorrectly believed that all necessary arrangements for financial and material support had been made prior to deployment. Ibid.


UNOMIL had a potentially important role to play, but was never able to function as intended. An “honest broker” was of critical importance, given the enmity that existed between Taylor and ECOMOG. This was especially so because a replacement for Nigeria, which provided the bulk of the force and much of the logistical infrastructure, was not likely to materialize (even if Nigeria were willing to disengage). The Security Council agreed to United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s request for a force of 303 observers and support personnel. While UNOMIL reached full strength in February 1994, the observers were not able to be deployed as planned. In November 1995, as a result of continued fighting throughout Liberia, the Council amended UNOMIL’s mandate and reduced the authorized strength to 160 observers. The number of United Nations observers actually deployed was much less than the number authorized. For half of 1996, UNOMIL’s “strength” ranged from five to 10 observers. In October 1996, the Secretary-General estimated that the need for military observers would not exceed 92—an

105 See UN Document S/26422, Report of the Secretary-General on Liberia, 9 September 1993, paras. 12-24, which sets out the Secretary-General’s suggestions for the force. The Secretary-General proposed 303 military observers, a military medical unit of some 20 staff, and 45 military engineers. (See ibid, paras. 18-20.) The Council accepted his proposals. UN Document S/RES/866.


In the month prior to the July 1997 elections, 86 military observers were deployed. 109

**Persistent Operational Difficulties**

Given Taylor’s antipathy towards ECOMOG, and ECOWAS member States’ competing objectives, it is no surprise that these various efforts failed to make ECOMOG more effective—especially in light of the force’s formidable operational shortcomings. ECOMOG was continually beset with financial difficulties for the duration of its mission in Liberia. In 1990, the Standing Mediation Committee created a Special Emergency Fund 111 and determined that all of the expenses relating to ECOMOG operations would be drawn from that fund. 112 The Special Emergency Fund was to be endowed with an initial amount of US$ 50 million, derived from voluntary contributions by ECOWAS member States and donor Governments and institutions. 113 Yet the Fund received no contributions. 114 Each troop-contributing country thus bore the financial burden for its contingent. Western assistance was slow in coming. Even after the United Nations established a Trust Fund for Liberia in September 1993 and convened a Conference on Assistance to Liberia in October 1995, ECOMOG remained

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112 ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, Article 3.

113 ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee Decision A/DEC.3/8/90, Articles 1-3.

114 Interview with Roger Laloupo, Director, Legal Affairs, ECOWAS Secretariat, 11 March 1999.
in a precarious financial state. Troop-contributing countries repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the force due to financial difficulties.


\begin{quote}
While reports have been received that some individual ECOMOG soldiers may have been involved in looting or may have provided arms to fighters, such actions were neither systematic nor a matter of policy. If they did occur, they may reflect the chronic lack of resources suffered by the force, all the way down to the foot soldier, who is expected to operate in a hostile environment without proper equipment and sometimes without having been paid for weeks. \footnote{UN Document S/1996/362, para. 23.}
\end{quote}

The problem of graft was so bad that ECOMOG was seen by many to stand for “Every Car or Moveable Object Gone.” \footnote{Comfort Ero, “The Future of ECOMOG in West Africa,” in Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (eds), From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1999, p. 61.}

Logistical problems also hindered ECOMOG operations. Financial constraints reportedly prevented the ECOWAS Secretariat from providing logistical support to ECOMOG troops. ECOWAS initially had agreed that each troop-contributing country would be self-sufficient for the first 30 days, after which the ECOWAS Secretariat would take over. ECOWAS was
unable to fulfill its commitment, however, and troop-contributing countries had to continue to resupply their own troops.\footnote{Olonisakin, “African ‘Home-made’ Peacekeeping Initiatives,” pp. 363-64.} There was also an absence of centralized logistic distribution, which showed the gap between the logistical capabilities of the different contingents.\footnote{Ibid., p. 364.} ECOMOG participants suffered shortfalls in lift and other logistical capabilities, and most of them relied heavily upon Nigeria.\footnote{Jennifer Morrison Taw and Andrew Grant-Thomas, “U.S. Support for Regional Complex Contingency Operations: Lessons from ECOMOG,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 22, p. 67.}

Sometimes ECOMOG troops did not possess the necessary equipment to perform their duties. In addition to maintaining its own contingent, Nigeria also provided most of the heavy weapons, military aircraft and naval vessels, as well as the oil products for the entire operation.\footnote{Sesay, “Collective Security or Collective Disaster? Regional Peace-keeping in West Africa,” p. 217.} The force was not equipped to conduct counter-insurgency operations. In mid-1995, ECOMOG reportedly had only one functioning helicopter—designated for the Force Commander’s personal use.\footnote{Howe, “Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping,” p. 167.} Inadequate maintenance of equipment was also a problem.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 167-68.} Most troop-contributing countries had very old equipment that was frequently in need of repair. Guinea, Mali, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania, for example, used primarily Chinese and Soviet equipment, and it proved difficult for them to secure spare parts and repair supplies.\footnote{Taw and Grant-Thomas, “U.S. Support for Regional Complex Contingency Operations: Lessons from ECOMOG,” p. 67.}

Particularly during its first several years, ECOMOG experienced numerous command and control problems. From the beginning, the force had difficulty harmonizing tactics.\footnote{Alao, “Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Liberian Civil War,” p. 343.}
Unit reportedly contained no logistics officers. Training and doctrine posed problems as well. Most ECOMOG troop contributors had little doctrine to guide military activities, let alone peace operations. Anglophone and francophone participants had distinct traditions, as did individual armies. The various contingents also had differing military capabilities. Particularly at the beginning of the operation, communication between ECOMOG contributors and even within national units were difficult owing to incompatible equipment and a lack of radios. According to Quainoo, the fact that countries taking part in ECOMOG spoke different languages was an obstacle.

**Lack of Accountability and Unclear Legal Status**

ECOMOG was only nominally accountable to ECOWAS, which exercised little oversight and provided minimal political and economic guidance. This became increasingly true during the later part of the ECOMOG operation. ECOWAS member States failed to energetically support the ECOWAS Special Representative, Joshua Iroha of Nigeria, and he was withdrawn after roughly two years. Moreover, political and legal advisory positions in ECOMOG were not filled due to financial difficulties. As a result, the ECOMOG Force Commander was often called upon to perform a political as well as a military role. As Liberian Interim President Amos Sawyer observed in 1994:

> One weakness of ECOMOG is that there is no political office side by side. ... The political dimension has been missing here. ... The Force Commander is saddled with an enormous responsibility. The ECOWAS

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131 Interview with Quainoo, 17 March 1999, Accra.
Executive Secretary has made infrequent visits to Liberia. He is hardly ever seen on the ground.\textsuperscript{134}

Moreover, the legal status of ECOMOG was unclear throughout the Liberian civil war. A status of forces agreement (SOFA) was finally signed between the ECOWAS Secretariat and the Government of Liberia on 5 June 1998\textsuperscript{135}—almost eight years after ECOMOG’s initial intervention. Roger Laloupo, the Director of Legal Affairs at the ECOWAS Secretariat, acknowledged that this document “was supposed to be signed a long time ago.”\textsuperscript{136} The agreement sets out the privileges and immunities of ECOMOG and other pertinent regulations.

\textbf{“Successful” Elections to End the War: Hold the Applause}

A new force commander, an influx of Western military assistance and West African troops, as well as a growing war-weariness later all combined to enhance ECOMOG’s effectiveness. During Maj-Gen. Victor Malu’s tenure as ECOMOG Force Commander, the Liberian civil war was brought to a close. Malu is largely credited with transforming ECOMOG into a credible force. As the elections approached, some ECOWAS members that had initially refused to contribute personnel to ECOMOG did so. Contingents from Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Niger were deployed to Liberia during the first half of 1997.\textsuperscript{137} In addition, Western countries began to increase their support for ECOMOG operations. In February 1997, for example, the United States transported 1,200 West African troops and their equipment to Liberia.\textsuperscript{138} Many of the warring

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{136} Interview with Laloupo, 11 March 1999, Abuja.


\textsuperscript{138} The US initially reported that it would airlift 1,200 troops from Mali. (“DoD to Airlift ECOMOG Peacekeepers to Liberia from Mali,” United States Information (continued...)}
factions—or their supporters—grew increasingly tired of the fighting. Troop-contributing countries also began to face increasing domestic opposition to ECOMOG, due to its high costs and high casualty rates, and threatened withdrawal.  

Although ECOMOG did ultimately supervise the implementation of the final cease-fire and oversee the July 1997 legislative and presidential elections, these achievements do not counterbalance its previous track record. ECOMOG is largely credited with creating an environment in which substantially free and fair elections could be held. Charles Taylor won the presidential race handily, with over 75 per cent of the vote; the closest contender received only 9.5 per cent. When assessing ECOMOG’s performance, however, the entire period of its involvement in Liberia must be reviewed, not only the later events. Quainoo acknowledges that ECOMOG is commendable as an expression of political will but stresses that it is not something to emulate, in terms of logistics, administration, force composition, or (lack of) mandate.  

A small contingent of ECOMOG troops was still present in Liberia as of mid-1999. After the July 1997 elections, ECOWAS extended the tenure

138 (...continued)

139 After seven years in Liberia, Nigeria had reportedly spent US$ 3 billion. “Nigeria spent three billion dollars on peacekeeping in Liberia,” Agence France-Presse, 2 August 1998.


141 Adrienne Yandé Diop, “19th July enters into History,” The West Africa Bulletin, No. 5, November 1997, p. 16. Taylor’s party, the National Patriotic Party (NPP), also won 21 out of 26 seats in the Senate and 49 out of 64 seats in the House of Representatives. Ibid.

142 Interview with Quainoo, 17 March 1999, Accra.
of the subregional force in Liberia in order to consolidate the peace. 143 In response to Liberia’s request for ECOMOG’s continued presence, the ECOWAS Authority instructed the Liberian Government and the ECOWAS Secretariat to draft a mandate for the operation. 144 The ECOWAS Secretariat subsequently tasked the Government of Liberia with drafting a proposal for a new ECOMOG mandate centred around capacity-building. However, Liberia had yet to submit a text as of March 1999.145 At the time, 54 Ghanaians and 112 Nigerians comprised ECOMOG’s Liberian operation.146

Relations between ECOMOG and Taylor’s Government seem permanently strained, and it is unlikely that the force will remain in Liberia for much longer. Although the Liberian Government formally requested ECOMOG’s continuing presence in the country, it did so unenthusiastically. Taylor has periodically called for the force’s reduction of withdrawal. There has been confusion about the force’s mandate as well. The already tense situation deteriorated further in the wake of the January 1999 rebel advance in neighbouring Sierra Leone. ECOMOG claimed that Taylor supported the rebel movement there, and Taylor accused ECOMOG of training men to overthrow him.

145 Interview with Adrienne Diop, Director, Public Information, ECOWAS Secretariat, 11 March 1999, Abuja.
146 Interview with Laloupo, 22 March 1999, Bamako.
ECOMOG IN SIERRA LEONE (1997 TO DATE)

Background to the ECOMOG Intervention

Beyond exacerbating the Liberian conflict, ECOMOG’s involvement there contributed to the civil war in neighbouring Sierra Leone. Charles Taylor assisted Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the main rebel force that began fighting the Sierra Leonean Government in early 1991. With Taylor’s backing, a small band of RUF rebels invaded eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia in March 1991 and launched a campaign to overthrow the All People’s Congress Party of Sierra Leone (APC), which had ruled the country for 24 years. By supporting the RUF, Taylor was able both to undermine the Sierra Leonean Government’s commitment to ECOMOG in Liberia and to distract the ECOMOG force.

The rebels did not succeed in gaining power until 1997, after six years of civil war and three military coups. President Joseph Momoh’s response to the initial insurgency was both ineffective and unpopular with the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). In May 1992, a group of junior SLA officers overthrew Momoh’s Government, and 28-year-old Capt. Valentine Strasser assumed the presidency. Unable to quell the rebellion, Strasser turned to others for security assistance, including Nigeria as well as the Kamajors, a Sierra Leonean militia. Yet it is the private security company Executive Outcomes (EO) that is generally credited with substantially strengthening the

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149 By late 1991, the Momoh Government was in complete disarray. To counter the growing rebel threat, Momoh more than quadrupled the army’s strength, but without an ability to finance the expansion. This further demoralized the SLA, and some of its members reportedly began to collude with the rebels. See William Reno, “Privatizing the War in Sierra Leone,” *Current History*, May 1997, p. 228.
Government’s position vis-à-vis the rebels. 150 EO did not protect Strasser from his own men, however, and in January 1996 his Chief of Defence Staff, Brig-Gen. Julius Maada Bio, overthrew him. Elections were nevertheless held as scheduled in February 1996, and Bio stood down after Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected to the presidency. Although Kabbah may have had democratic legitimacy, 151 he had little power. His position was further weakened after EO withdrew in January 1997 according to the terms of a November 1996 peace accord. 152 On 25 May 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) overthrew Kabbah. Sankoh ordered his RUF forces to support the AFRC and its leader, Maj. Johnny Paul Koroma. An alliance between the AFRC and the RUF was formed, and RUF members were appointed to senior positions in the new Government. 153

Nigeria intervened quickly in support of the Kabbah Government but proved unable to topple the junta. Sierra Leone had concluded a bilateral defence agreement with Nigeria in March 1997, which called on Abuja to provide training to Sierra Leone’s army and presidential guard. Prior to the coup, some 900 Nigerian troops were present in Sierra Leone 154—a military

150 “Chronology of Sierra Leone: How diamonds fuelled the conflict,” Africa Confidential, available on the Internet at <<http://www.africa-confidential.com/sandline.htm>>. In February 1995, Strasser hired a small group of former British Army Gurkhas, the Gurkha Security Group, which proved ineffective and withdrew after its commander’s death. Strasser then hired EO to train the SLA as well as local militias and self-defence units. EO was also tasked with securing the Government’s access to Sierra Leone’s diamond mines. Ibid.

151 Kabbah’s democratic credentials were undercut somewhat by the fact that a majority of the population did not have the opportunity to cast a ballot. According to The Economist, less than 25 per cent of the population had voted, as no one in disputed or rebel-held areas could vote. “The darkest corner of Africa,” The Economist, 9 January 1999, p. 37.

152 “Chronology of Sierra Leone: How diamonds fuelled the conflict.”

153 Sankoh, who had been under house arrest since March 1997, nevertheless was named as Koroma’s deputy. As of mid-1999, Sankoh remained in protective custody.

training team and a battalion attached to ECOMOG.\textsuperscript{155} They responded in an effort to try to restore order and reinstate Kabbah, and Abuja rapidly moved to reinforce its positions.\textsuperscript{156} Smaller contingents from Ghana and Guinea were also called upon to make the force look more multinational.\textsuperscript{157} Yet the force’s aerial and naval bombardments failed to oust the AFRC and the RUF from Freetown and control of the Government. Indeed, Nigerian troops suffered casualties and many were captured during the first few weeks, forestalling further military action until Abuja won their release.

Nigeria’s mandate for intervening in Sierra Leone was questionable. No agreement explicitly authorized those Nigerian troops present in Freetown prior to the coup to respond militarily in support of the deposed Government.\textsuperscript{158} President Kabbah also reportedly asked for Nigerian military assistance in the wake of the coup,\textsuperscript{159} but the legality of such a request is suspect. Nigeria then tried to characterize its intervention as an

\textsuperscript{155} At the time of the coup, a Nigerian ECOMOG battalion happened to be transiting through Lungi airport (the main hub for transportation and re-supply to and from Liberia). Interview with West African Government official, 1999.

\textsuperscript{156} As of 6 June 1997, Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone were estimated to number 3,500-4,000. See IRIN-West Africa Sierra Leone - Special Internal Briefing No. 2, 9 June 1997, available on the Internet at \textless http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int\textgreater .

\textsuperscript{157} “Nigeria imperatrix,” p. 50. Guinea dispatched several hundred troops to Sierra Leone in accordance with a long-standing bilateral defence agreement between Conakry and Freetown. (Interview with West African Government official, 1999.) A small number of Ghanaian technicians stationed at Lungi airport also joined the effort. Interview with Col. Oduro Apenteng, Director of International Peacekeeping Operations, Ghanaian Ministry of Defence, 18 March 1999, Accra.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid. Nigeria claimed that its bilateral defence agreement with Sierra Leone authorized the intervention, yet there has been some disagreement over the terms and the applicability of the agreement. (For opposing views, see Yusuf Bangura, “Security in ECOWAS,” West Africa, 30 June-6 July 1997, p. 1039; and Bundu, “The case against intervention,” p. 1041.) There were subsequent claims that the agreement had not received the requisite Parliamentary approval. See Terence Terry, “Is history repeating itself?,” New African, April 1998, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{159} “ECOWAS intervenes to restore democracy,” Africa Today, July/August 1997, p. 24.
ECOMOG initiative. However, ECOWAS had not authorized the military action.

When seeking to designate its intervention an “ECOMOG” action, Nigeria took advantage of the fact that ECOWAS still lacked a formal security framework. No institutionalized mechanism had been established during the course of the Liberian conflict. Thus, in response to the crisis in Sierra Leone, Nigeria simply pursued another ad hoc approach. Whereas in Liberia, Nigeria had sought some form of ECOWAS authorization prior to intervening, in Sierra Leone, Nigeria responded militarily first and sought ECOWAS approval only after it had intervened.

**ECOWAS Approval and Subregional Dynamics**

Formal ECOWAS authorization was not granted until three months after Nigeria intervened. On 26 June 1997, ECOWAS Foreign Ministers met in Conakry to review the situation in Sierra Leone. Although they identified “the use of force” as an appropriate means to restore Kabbah’s defence and referred to “acts of atrocities against ... ECOMOG personnel,” they did not establish an ECOMOG force. The ministers created a Committee

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160 final Communiqué, Extraordinary Meeting of the ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the Situation in Sierra Leone, Conakry, 26 June 1997, para. 9.iii, courtesy of ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja.

161 Ibid., para. 10.
The Committee of Four became the Committee of Five with the addition of Liberia in August 1997. (UN Document S/1997/695, Annex I, Final Communiqué of the Summit of ECOWAS, 8 September 1997, para. 26.) The Committee was again enlarged in December 1998, becoming the Committee of Six with the addition of Togo, as the current Chair of ECOWAS, in December 1998. (Extraordinary Meeting of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, Abidjan, 28 December 1998, courtesy of ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja.) The Committee ceased to convene after Kabbah was restored in early 1998 but resumed its meetings in late 1998 following the rebel offensive. Interview with Halima Ahmed, Deputy Director, Legal Affairs, ECOWAS Secretariat, 2 September 1999, by telephone.

The establishment of the Committee was seen as a means of getting around the apparent divisions within ECOWAS over the appropriate course of action to pursue. (Paul Ejime, “Sierra Leone, Financial Crisis to Dominate ECOWAS Summit Agenda,” Panafrican News Agency, 18 August 1997, available on the Internet at <<http://www.africanews.org>>.) Ghana, Guinea, and Nigeria were involved militarily in Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire had played an active diplomatic role in the conflict since 1996. See “How the West won in Sierra Leone,” New African, April 1998, p. 14.

ECOWAS Chiefs of Staff and Foreign Ministers then held successive meetings in August 1997. The Foreign Ministers “agreed to recommend the establishment of an ECOWAS cease-fire monitoring group in Sierra Leone to be known as ECOMOG II.” On 29 August, the ECOWAS Authority extended the scope of ECOMOG’s activity to Sierra Leone, “to

162 The Committee of Four became the Committee of Five with the addition of Liberia in August 1997. (UN Document S/1997/695, Annex I, Final Communiqué of the Summit of ECOWAS, 8 September 1997, para. 26.) The Committee was again enlarged in December 1998, becoming the Committee of Six with the addition of Togo, as the current Chair of ECOWAS, in December 1998. (Extraordinary Meeting of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, Abidjan, 28 December 1998, courtesy of ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja.) The Committee ceased to convene after Kabbah was restored in early 1998 but resumed its meetings in late 1998 following the rebel offensive. Interview with Halima Ahmed, Deputy Director, Legal Affairs, ECOWAS Secretariat, 2 September 1999, by telephone.


164 Concluding Statement, Meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Four on Sierra Leone, Abidjan, 18 July 1997, courtesy of ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja; see also, ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, Decision A/DEC.7/8/97, Extending the Scope of Activity and Mandate of ECOMOG to Cover Sierra Leone, “20th Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government,” 29 August 1997, courtesy of ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja.

165 See Final Communiqué, Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of ECOWAS, Abuja, 28 August 1997, para. 5, courtesy of ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja.

166 Ibid., para. 7.
assist in creating the conducive atmosphere that would ensure the early reinstatement of the legitimate Government of Sierra Leon."  

Notwithstanding their formal approval of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention, ECOWAS member States were troubled by its implications and were wary of Nigerian intentions. Countries such as Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana were reluctant to become involved in another expensive ECOMOG mission. Given that Burkina Faso and Liberia had allegedly assisted the RUF rebels, their support for ECOMOG was suspect. Anglophone-francophone tensions had eased somewhat after the death of Ivorian President Hophouët-Boigny in 1993 but were still an issue. Of greater concern initially, however, was the fear that Nigeria had hijacked ECOMOG and that the force had become an instrument of Nigerian domination. Several ECOWAS member States were wary of creating a deleterious precedent.

Moreover, the ECOWAS “approval” given did not authorize the full-scale military intervention that Nigeria had sought. Indeed, ECOWAS member States viewed their authorization as an effort to limit Nigeria’s activities. Some commentators saw the decision extending ECOMOG activities to Sierra Leone as a defeat for Nigeria. Rather than approving an all-out military offensive as Nigeria had hoped, the Authority imposed an embargo on all supplies of petroleum products, arms and military equipment to Sierra Leone and authorized “[t]he subregional forces” to use “all necessary means” to enforce it. The decision authorizing ECOMOG...
to operate in Sierra Leone was seen as a compromise between Nigeria and those States in the subregion opposed to armed intervention.

Skepticism of Nigerian motives was, in part, well-founded. Granted, altruistic impulses played a role in Abuja’s decision to intervene in Sierra Leone. The RUF had committed numerous well-publicized atrocities. Nigeria played up the humanitarian rationale and stressed that it was endeavouring to restore democracy in a neighbouring country. Nigeria was also eager to prevent the chaos from spreading any further. Nigeria may have wanted to prove its worthiness for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council as well. In addition, Nigeria’s military ruler, Sani Abacha, may have wanted to keep his troops far away from home, where their dissatisfaction may have created domestic security concerns. Financial gain was likely another factor prompting Abuja’s intervention. When Kabbah had first come to power, Abacha had reportedly approached the Sierra Leonean authorities for mineral concessions.

The efforts of ECOWAS States to rein in Nigeria were unsuccessful. Nigeria determined its own military strategy and did not consult other ECOWAS members concerning its planned activities. By late 1997, Nigeria had apparently lost faith in the Six-Month Peace Plan for Sierra Leone that the AFRC had signed in October 1997 and opted to pursue a military solution instead. In doing so, Nigeria brushed aside the preference of

171 (...continued)


172 As Former ECOMOG Chief of Staff and Nigerian Contingent Commander Brig. Gen. A-One Mohammed observed, “We had to put off this fire in order to prevent it from extending to our own houses.” A-One Mohammed, “The ECOMOG Story: Our Mission and Success,” ECOWAS Now, November-December 1998, p. 44.


some other States in the subregion for continued diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. By late 1997, however, there was a growing appreciation among several ECOWAS members that the rebels were not negotiating in good faith. A Nigerian-led military response was therefore justified. Nigeria launched an offensive to recapture Freetown from the rebels and restore Kabbah’s Government in February 1998.

Abuja was able to do its own bidding in part because the force remained Nigerian-stacked and Nigerian-led. Even after ECOMOG had received ECOWAS approval, Abuja continued to provide the bulk of the troops and to finance much of the operation’s costs. The initial Ghanaian contingent comprised only 20 personnel. Aside from this small contribution, Ghana was reluctant to become involved militarily in the conflict. During the first year of operations, Guinea provided an infantry battalion, which served alternatively within Sierra Leone and inside its own territory along the border.

**ECOMOG’s Pyrrhic Victory**

ECOMOG, with substantial external assistance, quickly ousted the rebels from Freetown. The British company Sandline International, which

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174 (...continued)


176 As a Nigerian Government official pointedly observed, while other countries in the subregion have complained about Nigerian domination, they are not offering their troops or their money. Interview with Nigerian Government official, Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 1999, Abuja.

177 Interview with Apenteng, 18 March 1999, Accra.
had been contracted in July 1997 to assist Kabbah, provided Nigeria with military equipment from small arms to helicopters as well as highly-skilled personnel. Kabbah was re-installed within weeks of ECOMOG’s February 1998 offensive, and the RUF and AFRC retreated into the bush.

However, ECOMOG proved unable to solidly defeat the rebels and secure the surrounding countryside. The rebels stepped up their campaign of terror, destroying entire villages and mutilating and murdering civilians in the thousands. Both the type of terrain and the rebels’ better knowledge of it hampered ECOMOG’s efforts to gain control of the hinterland. ECOMOG’s superior firepower was not effective against the rebels’ guerrilla tactics, to which the densely-forested region in the northeastern part of the country lends itself. Significantly, the rebels continued to control several diamond mines and use the proceeds to fund their activities.

In addition to the inherent difficulties a conventional force faces when fighting a guerrilla war on foreign territory, ECOMOG has experienced operational shortcomings of its own making. For example, the ECOMOG force has lacked the requisite equipment and logistical support to accomplish its objectives. A shortage of trucks and helicopters as well as weapons and ammunition has restricted its activities and limited its effectiveness. Former ECOMOG Force Commander Timothy Shelpidi acknowledged that his force did not have sufficient numbers of helicopters. He claimed that ECOMOG could have defeated the rebels if it had possessed appropriate counter-insurgency military equipment, such as the MI-24 helicopter gunship.

Troop-contributing countries have added to their woes by failing to coordinate their actions. ECOMOG national contingents have not worked together at an operational level. According to the former Defence Adviser

178 Cilliers and Mills (eds), From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa, p. 64.
Interview with Col. Peter Norman, former Defence Adviser, UK High Commission to Sierra Leone, current Defence Adviser, UK High Commission to Nigeria, 8 March 1999, Lagos. 


Interview with Samuel, 13 March 1999, Lagos.


Corruption, ill-discipline, and lack of *esprit de corps* have all figured heavily in ECOMOG’s problems. Significant numbers of the officer corps have reportedly been in Sierra Leone for personal profit. Because of the lucrative trade in diamonds and the possibility to engage in other business ventures, a Nigerian officer’s loyalty to Abuja’s military regime has been seen as more important than competence or conduct. ECOMOG forces have been accused of selling some of the logistical support that has been provided to them. Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and foot soldiers have also become entrepreneurs, albeit on a smaller scale. According to a Western military source, ECOMOG soldiers have often been “too busy doing other things” to perform their assigned duties; patrolling is often lax and cursory. Many Nigerian soldiers have not been home for several years (having come directly from serving in Liberia) and have not been regularly paid. They have grown dispirited and poorly motivated. ECOMOG soldiers have also allegedly collaborated with the rebels, although there is no evidence that this is systematic.

Financial constraints have also posed severe limitations. ECOWAS spoke of establishing a trust fund, but had not done so as of mid-1999. Nigeria, which according to Sierra Leone’s Finance Minister had spent US$ 568.5 million in Sierra Leone—roughly one million per day—as of

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1 Interview with Col. Peter Norman, former Defence Adviser, UK High Commission to Sierra Leone, current Defence Adviser, UK High Commission to Nigeria, 8 March 1999, Lagos.


3 Interview with Samuel, 13 March 1999, Lagos.

January 1999, \(^{185}\) said it could not continue to fund the mission at such levels. Indeed, in December 1998, the Nigerian Government had announced that it would be unable to pay civil servants the salaries agreed in a new pay structure. \(^{186}\)

ECOWAS member States initially proved largely unwilling, or unable, to come to Kabbah’s and Nigeria’s aid. In May 1998, Ghana announced that it was prepared to contribute troops to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone but only after certain concerns had been addressed. \(^{187}\) In late 1998, Accra had only 200 soldiers participating in ECOMOG. The Guinean battalion withdrew for a time to provide security for its December 1998 presidential elections, but it was redeployed after the elections had taken place. \(^{188}\) At the October 1998 Abuja Summit, the Authority called upon those that had pledged to commit troops—Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Mali, and Niger—to do so. \(^{189}\) By the end of the year, however, none had.

ECOMOG’s operations in Sierra Leone have been made more difficult by largely unforeseen factors beyond its control. The RUF has received significant levels of support. Despite the repeated and vociferous denials of Presidents Compaoré and Taylor, Ghana and Nigeria, in particular, have continued to accuse Burkina Faso and Liberia of arming and training the

\(^{185}\) “Nigeria Spends $1 m Daily on ECOMOG,” Xinhua, 22 January 1999.

\(^{186}\) IRIN-West Africa Update 369, 29 December 1998, available on the Internet at \(<\text{http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int}>\).

\(^{187}\) The Ghanaian Minister of Foreign Affairs indicated that ECOMOG’s status, objectives, rules of engagement, strength, and required resources needed to be defined. (“Ghana Urges Clarification of ECOMOG’s Mandate in Freetown,” Panafriican News Agency, 4 May 1998, available on the Internet at \(<\text{http://www.africanews.org}>\). Meeting with the British High Com-missioner to Ghana, Ian Mackley, Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings expressed reservations about committing Ghanaian troops. The UK offered US$ 165,000 of logistical support to assist the possible deployment of Ghanaian troops, but Rawlings declined it. He explained that the sum was insufficient to cover the costs of keeping troops in the theatre. Interview with Amb. Ian Mackley, High Commissioner, UK High Commission to Ghana, 18 March 1999, Accra.

\(^{188}\) See IRIN-West Africa Update 369, 29 December 1998, available on the Internet at \(<\text{http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int}>\).

\(^{189}\) Twenty-first Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, para. 23.
rebels. ECOMOG Force Commander Maj-Gen. Felix Mujakperuo threatened Burkina Faso and Liberia militarily, saying that ECOMOG “will no longer watch this mischief by supposed leaders ... in view of the danger it poses to us and the whole subregion ... We shall proceed to strike at all channels involved in this movement of heavy arms and ammunition to the rebels by land and sea and air.”

The actions of President Kabbah have also undermined ECOMOG’s efforts. Rather than using the occasion of his reinstatement to reach out to the RUF and AFRC and seek political compromise, Kabbah instead sought retribution. Notwithstanding international criticism, he summarily executed 24 alleged coup leaders. Some believe that this action together with his initial failure to hold out the possibility of establishing a political dialogue have spurred the rebels to carry out further gross human rights violations. One commentator from the region likened each amputation to a telephone call to Kabbah and the international community demanding that the rebels’ grievances be addressed.

The international community’s response to ECOMOG’s difficulties was significantly below that which the situation demanded. The Security Council took many actions, but none that responded meaningfully to the severity of the crisis. Initially, in October 1997, the Council imposed an embargo on the sale or supply of petroleum or petroleum products and arms as well as related matériel to Sierra Leone and authorized ECOWAS to ensure its implementation. Pursuant to the Council’s request, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan did establish a Trust Fund for

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Sierra Leone in March 1998, but contributions have been negligible. Annan also created a small United Nations liaison office in Sierra Leone, but the Council authorized the deployment of no more than 10 military liaison and security personnel in April 1998 to staff it. When the Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) in June 1998, it limited the operation’s size to only 70 military observers.

Seizing upon ECOMOG’s shortcomings, appreciative of the international community’s demonstrated lack of commitment to Kabbah, and buoyed by the significant external support they had received, the rebels gathered strength and made their way back to Freetown. The junta had reportedly begun its advance as early as September 1998. It appears that the rebels began to infiltrate the Freetown peninsula in September in small numbers. ECOMOG failed to distinguish them from civilian refugees. One informed source claims that rebels entered the peninsula in significant numbers of formed units in mid-December. The Sierra Leonean Government’s decision, which Nigeria supported, to enlist “former” RUF rebels and AFRC soldiers in the new Sierra Leone Army to serve alongside ECOMOG troops was, in retrospect, a poor one. Many of these recruits, who numbered in the thousands, remained loyal to the forces fighting Kabbah. They colluded with the RUF and AFRC and in a few strategic places turned on ECOMOG troops. ECOMOG’s effectiveness was significantly compromised as a result.

The January rebel offensive failed to capture the capital but succeeded in wreaking havoc. The rebels seized State House and burned the police headquarters as well as the Nigerian embassy. They also overran the prison

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199 Interview with a Western military source, March 1999, West Africa.
200 Interview with a knowledgeable source, 1999.
and released detained RUF and AFRC members. 201 During the fighting, some 3,000 people were reportedly killed and more than 50,000 fled their homes. Bodies were decaying on the streets of Freetown, the hospital was overwhelmed with amputees, and thousands of people faced starvation.

Nigerian troops also suffered significant casualties during the January 1999 rebel offensive. 202 As of mid-1999, the Government had not released a definitive number of Nigerian fatalities that resulted from the siege, partly because doing so would acknowledge a staggering figure and partly because the actual figure may not be known. 203 In January 1999, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook indicated that some 700 Nigerians had been killed during the course of ECOMOG’s involvement in Sierra Leone. 204 A well-placed source familiar with the situation believed this figure to be exaggerated, but acknowledged that Nigeria by January 1999 had suffered in excess of 500 fatalities—some 10 per cent of which occurred during the January offensive. 205 A Nigerian Government official allowed that his country lost, “God knows how many” troops in Sierra Leone. 206 Nigeria reportedly has resorted to burying soldiers outside of their units in an effort to cover up the actual figures. 207
Salvaging the Situation?

Frustrated by the brutality of the war and the difficulties they had encountered, ECOMOG forces retaliated, staging a brutal counter-offensive. At the end of January, certain ECOMOG troops allegedly began to defend themselves in a “fortnight of retribution,” committing revenge killings. ECOMOG’s counter-offensive was code-named “Death Before Dishonor,” to raise the flagging morale of Nigeria’s troops. A confidential United Nations human rights report accused ECOMOG soldiers of summarily executing suspected rebels. Some 100 soldiers were subsequently arrested for questioning in connection with reported excesses.

In the wake of these damaging and damning incidents, Abuja announced it would withdraw its troops from Sierra Leone. The decisive military victory that Nigeria sought had become increasingly illusive. Although ECOMOG had never been popular with the Nigerian people, domestic opposition to the initiative peaked in early 1999. Nigerian President Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar indicated that the Nigerian forces would be recalled before the country’s May 1999 transfer to civilian rule. He reasoned that a civilian Government would not accept the operation’s high costs and expected casualties.

Western countries stepped up their support for ECOMOG considerably in response to Nigeria’s threats to withdraw. In January 1999, the UK pledged an additional US$ 1.65 million, followed by a US$ 16.5

208 Interview with Norman, 8 March 1999, Lagos.
million matching grant in March.\textsuperscript{214} As of mid-1999, US$ 7 million of those sums had been used to provide logistical support for ECOMOG\textsuperscript{215} Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States are among the other Western countries to have increased their assistance. As in Liberia, the United Nations responded to the flare-up of hostilities by withdrawing its peacekeepers rather than by augmenting its presence. UNOMSIL was reduced to a mere nine military observers following the January rebel advance.\textsuperscript{216} By early June 1999, UNOMSIL’s strength was only 24.\textsuperscript{217}

African countries—aided by the influx of Western support—responded to Nigeria’s announcement by providing more troops. After the January 1999 rebel offensive, Ghana sent 500 soldiers.\textsuperscript{218} During the first week of February, Ghana reportedly contributed another 1,000 men.\textsuperscript{219} A 488-man Malian battalion was deployed in February 1999. Mali, which had previously lacked the necessary funds to undertake the mission,\textsuperscript{220} received financial assistance from the Netherlands and the UK to enable it to participate.\textsuperscript{221}

Nigeria subsequently retracted its stated intention to withdraw unilaterally and hastily. Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s newly-inaugurated
civilian president, reaffirmed Nigeria’s commitment to the mission in Sierra Leone. Indeed, withdrawing the Nigerian forces would not be an easy decision. Regional security concerns would not disappear. Moreover, there would be a reckoning of Nigerian casualties as the Government would have to account for the Nigerians who failed to return home. In addition, the Government would have to host thousands of enlisted men—and perhaps more importantly, hundreds of officers—some of whom might be bitter from the experience and pose potential security threats.

Abuja has also taken steps to address and rectify shortcomings. Having come under increasing criticism following the events of early 1999, the ECOMOG command was restructured in March. ECOMOG Force Commander Shelpidi was replaced by Mujakperuo. Brig-Gen. Amu Ahmadu, the ECOMOG Task Force Commander in Sierra Leone was also replaced, as was ECOMOG Chief of Staff and Nigerian Contingent Commander Brig-Gen. Gabriel Kpambe. Maxwell Khobe, the Nigerian Chief of Staff of the Sierra Leonian Army, blamed the rebel advances on a “command structure problem.” Confused lines of communication among senior officers may have also played a role in the reorganization.

While ECOMOG did manage to regain control of Freetown, five months later, in June 1999, the question of how long the war will continue loomed large. It is clear that a military solution is untenable. Whereas diplomacy was not pursued energetically at first, President Kabbah and Sankoh have made what appears to be progress. The 18 May 1999 ceasefire seems to be generally holding. As the negotiations proceeded in Togo, however, Mujakperuo was still seeking to defeat the rebels on the battlefield and had requested an additional 5,000 troops.

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ECOMOG IN GUINEA-BISSAU (1998-1999)

Background to the ECOMOG Intervention

The dismissal of Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ansumane Mane precipitated an uprising by army officers on 7 June 1998. Earlier that year, in January, Guinea-Bissau’s president, João Bernardo Vieira, had suspended Mane following allegations that Mane had been involved in supplying arms to the Casamance separatists in neighbouring Senegal. Mane maintained his innocence, and a parliamentary inquiry into the incident was begun. Before the results of the inquiry were announced, Vieira replaced Mane with Brig-Gen. Humberto Gomes in June 1998. Vieira’s plans to arrest Mane failed, however, and the army staged a coup d’état in retaliation. Mane claimed that he had no long-term political ambitions and announced that he intended to set the stage for democratic elections.

Immediately following the coup, Guinea and Senegal intervened militarily in support of Guinea-Bissau’s President. Both countries explained their actions as in line with bilateral defence accords they had previously concluded with the Bissau Government. The Casamance issue apparently prompted Senegal’s intervention. Guinean President Lansana Conté and President Vieira are close friends. Conakry’s concerns about an influx of refugees from Guinea-Bissau was also a factor in its decision.

As with the ECOMOG force in Sierra Leone, there was initially some confusion as to when and how the force present in Guinea-Bissau actually became an “ECOMOG” operation. Vieira wrote to Abubakar, the then

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226 Vieira had seized power in 1980, and he was elected to the presidency in 1994. Vieira’s popularity waned after Guinea-Bissau entered the Communauté financière africaine (CFA) Franc Zone in May 1997 and buying power was drastically reduced.

ECOWAS Chairman, requesting that ECOMOG deploy in Guinea-Bissau. Meeting to consider this request on 3 July, ECOWAS Foreign and Defence Ministers condemned the rebellion and reaffirmed their support for Vieira’s democratically-elected Government. They also “recommended that the sphere of activities and mandate of ECOMOG should be broadened to include Guinea-Bissau” and “expressed their support for Guinea and Senegal’s rapid intervention.” To implement their recommendations, the Ministers set up a Committee of Seven. At their first meeting on 4 August, the Foreign Ministers of the Committee of Seven “reaffirmed their support for Guinea and Senegal.”

Thus, at the outset, it appeared that Guinean and Senegalese troops were to form the backbone of the ECOMOG force. This raised the concern that any country willing and able—not only Nigeria—could hijack ECOMOG for its own purposes. There is also some confusion as to the weight of ministerial recommendations. According to Laloupo, however, an ECOMOG force can be constituted “after the Ministers have met,” there

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229 This meeting was preceded by a fact-finding mission by the ECOWAS Secretariat to the Gambia, Guinea, and Senegal as well as an ECOWAS Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting. UN Document S/1998/638, para. 4.

230 Ibid., paras. 8 and 10.

231 Ibid., paras. 13 and 16.

232 The Committee comprised: Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Senegal. (Ibid., para. 14.) In October 1998, at the twenty-first session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Committee was enlarged to a Committee of Nine, to include Cape Verde and Togo.

233 Final Communiqué of the First Meeting of ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Seven on Guinea-Bissau, 4 August 1998, para. 15, courtesy of ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja.
is no need to await approval by the Authority of Heads of State and Government.234

During the course of subsequent meetings, it became increasingly clear that the Guinean and Senegalese troops would not be welcome in the eventual peacekeeping force. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) that the parties signed on 26 July, following consultations with the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (known by its Portuguese acronym, CPLP, for Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa), referred to the “deployment of a military observer or an interpositional force, preferably from Portuguese-speaking countries.”235 Under the joint aegis of ECOWAS and CPLP, a cease-fire agreement was subsequently concluded on 26 August. Although the agreement spoke of the deployment of “observation and interposition forces,” it failed to define them.236 Similarly, the Final Communiqué of the joint ECOWAS/CPLP meeting indicated that “the composition and all other aspects relative to the deployment of the interposition forces” would be subsequently determined.237 The Second Joint Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the ECOWAS Committee of Seven and CPLP established the modalities for implementing the cease-fire, as it related to the deployment of an ECOWAS/CPLP observer mission.238 In the November 1998 Abuja Accord, Vieira and Mane agreed to “the total withdrawal from Guinea-Bissau of all foreign troops.”239 The agreement also stipulated that “[t]his withdrawal shall be done simultaneously with the

deployment of an ECOWAS Military Observer Group interposition force, which will take over from the withdrawn force.” 240

The departure of the Guinean and Senegalese forces from Guinea-Bissau was not immediate. Although troops reportedly began leaving the country in January 1999,241 their withdrawal was phased. The continuing presence of Senegalese troops (coupled with the delay in ECOMOG’s deployment) prompted the junta to renew calls for an alternative CPLP force in January 1999.242 The Prime Minister-designate appointed to head the transitional Government of national unity also reportedly claimed that the continued presence of Guinean and Senegalese troops endangered the fragile peace. He further threatened that his Government would not take office before the foreign troops had departed.243 Renewed fighting in early February further prolonged their stay. Indeed, the complete withdrawal of Guinean and Senegalese troops was only accomplished at the end of March 1999.244

Difficulties in Fielding the ECOMOG Force

The belated withdrawal of Guinean and Senegalese troops was in part due to delays surrounding the deployment of the ECOMOG replacement force. Togo dispatched an advance detachment of some 110 military personnel in December 1998,245 but no other country was able to deploy

240 Ibid.
244 UN Document S/1999/432, Annex, Report on the situation in Guinea-Bissau prepared by the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, 16 April 1999, para. 8.
245 Interview with Abou Yacoubou, Plenipotentiary Minister, Political and Judicial Affairs Directorate, Togolese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 16 March (continued...).
until early February 1999. By 12 February, a 600-strong battalion, comprised of equal numbers of troops from Benin, the Gambia, Niger, and Togo was also in place in Guinea-Bissau.

The 712-strong ECOMOG force that ultimately deployed was much smaller than initially envisaged. In November 1998, the ECOMOG Force Commander had carried out a needs assessment to determine an appropriate size for the eventual force. He recommended a three-phased deployment: [1] an advance team of roughly 100 troops; [2] a force of 2,000 to replace the Senegalese and Guinean troops; and [3] a force of 5,000 during the election period. The ECOWAS Secretariat then asked ECOWAS member States to contribute troops on the basis of these requirements. The number of troops pledged was substantially lower than the desired figures. Togo and Niger offered 500 each, Benin 300, and the Gambia 150. Thus, when the ECOWAS Secretariat negotiated the Agreement Defining the Operations, Composition, and Status of ECOMOG on the Territory of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, the “requirements” were reduced to reflect the pledges that had been received: [1] an advance team of 112 Togolese troops; [2] a force of 600 to replace the Senegalese and Guinean troops; and [3] a force of up to 1,450 during the election period.246 ECOWAS subsequently indicated that an additional battalion of

245 (...continued)
1999, Lomé.
246 Interview with Laloupo, 11 March 1999, Abuja; see also UN Document S/1999/445, Agreement Defining the Operations, Composition and Status of ECOMOG on the Territory of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau dated 22 March 1999, 20 April 1999, Article V. After the revised figures were made public, the ECOWAS Secretariat denied reports that a troop level of 5,000 had initially been solicited and stated that a 1,450-strong force would suffice. See IRIN-West Africa Update 384, 20 January 1999, and IRIN-West Africa Update 385, 21 January 1999, available on the Internet at <http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int>.
850 was expected to be deployed. Beyond the initial commitments, Mali offered to provide a 125-strong contingent.

Without substantial French assistance, ECOWAS would have been hard-pressed to field even this smaller ECOMOG force on its own. Attempting to explain the time lapse prior to the force’s arrival, ECOMOG Force Commander Shelpidi lamented in November 1998, “We are not like the US who can deploy troops in 24 hours.” In December 1998, ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyaté stated that until sufficient financial assistance and logistical support were secured, it would be impossible to predict when the ECOMOG force could be deployed. France then offered to help deploy the battalion and backstop the operation. The troops were transported to Bissau aboard a French naval
vessel, and France supplied a number of military trucks. France also provided *per diem* to participating troops.\footnote{See “ECOMOG troops disembark in Guinea-Bissau,” *Agence France-Presse*, 4 February 1999, available on the Internet at <http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/>; see also, “African Troops Land to Police Bissau Truce,” *Reuters*, 6 February 1999.}

Despite the considerable French assistance, logistical problems nevertheless hampered the effectiveness of the force. As United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed, “[o]wing to the lack of adequate communication equipment, troops operating in other parts of the country generally return on the same day to Bissau to reduce the risk of being cut off from contact with the force headquarters.”\footnote{UN Document S/1999/432, Annex, para. 4.} He also noted that “[t]o enhance its patrol and reconnaissance activities in Bissau and elsewhere in the country, ECOMOG has indicated a need, in particular, for four-wheel drive vehicles, International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) and mobile radio communication equipment.”\footnote{UN Document S/1999/294, para. 13.} In fact, when hostilities flared up on 6 May 1999, ECOMOG experienced a communication breakdown, and it was impossible to establish contact with the ECOMOG High Command.\footnote{Ibid.}

The small size of the operation also compromised its ability to carry out its duties. As the ECOWAS Executive Secretary indicated in his *Report on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau*, “[t]he limited troop strength and scant resources of the ECOMOG force currently operating in Guinea-Bissau are in fact delaying or reducing some of its activities. According to ECOMOG, insufficient numbers prevented it from deploying along the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal border, as called for in the November 1998 Abuja
When the junta ousted President Vieira on 7 May 1999, ECOMOG soldiers were in no position to prevent the renewed fighting.

**Coup d’État Threatens Coup d’Éclat**

The May 1999 coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau was a significant setback for ECOWAS. On 10 May, Benin announced that it would withdraw its contingent. On 25 May, ECOWAS Foreign Ministers determined that the entire ECOMOG operation should be withdrawn, citing financial difficulties as well as developments on the ground. Subject to the availability of the French naval vessel designated to ferry the troops back to their respective countries, the force was expected to begin pulling out during the first week of June. The early withdrawal of ECOMOG is not entirely attributable to the failings the force or of ECOWAS more generally. Although the force that ultimately deployed was smaller than originally foreseen, the parties’ lack of resolve to implement and respect the cease-fire agreement should not be blamed on ECOMOG or ECOWAS. Nevertheless, the peacekeeping mission was supposed to actively assist the parties in implementing a political solution and not simply passively observe one of the parties imposing a military solution.

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257 UN Document S/1999/294, para. 15. The failure of ECOMOG to deploy along the northern border was also reportedly due to the fact that the military junta had not authorized this action. See Humanitarian Situation Report Guinea-Bissau: 27 March–13 April 1999, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 14 April 1999, available on the Internet at <http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int>.


In spite of its difficulties, the ECOMOG force in Guinea-Bissau signalled a welcome and significant departure from previous initiatives. The charge that ECOMOG is simply a Nigerian tool is no longer persuasive. Nigeria, the bulwark of previous ECOMOG operations, was absent from this mission. The force was comprised of one anglophone and three francophone countries. Two ECOWAS member States—Guinea and Senegal—were expressly forbidden from participating in the force because the military junta objected to their presence. This was the first time in ECOMOG’s history that a party’s demands regarding force composition were heeded.

ECOMOG also operated in accordance with a clearly-defined mandate. A comprehensive agreement, dated 22 March 1999 and signed between ECOWAS and representatives from the two parties to the conflict, put in place a legal framework for ECOMOG’s presence on the ground. The text defined ECOMOG’s mandate as monitoring the cease-fire and thereby facilitating the holding of elections. It also described ECOMOG’s mission. In addition, the document specified the privileges and immunities that devolved to ECOMOG as an entity, to contingents participating in the force, and to individuals and included other regulations.

262 Margaret Vogt asserts that ECOMOG’s mandate, however well defined, was not sufficiently robust. The force relied too much on the good faith of the belligerents. Interview with Margaret A. Vogt, former Senior Associate, International Peace Academy, current Special Assistant to the Assistant-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, UN Department of Political Affairs, 22 June 1999, New York.


concerning the various rights and responsibilities of ECOMOG and ECOMOG personnel.\textsuperscript{265}

In a noteworthy departure from past practices, ECOWAS also began submitting periodic reports to the United Nations Security Council concerning its activities in Guinea-Bissau. Security Council Resolution 1216 requested ECOWAS to provide reports to the Council “at least every month,” beginning one month after the deployment of troops.\textsuperscript{266} Although its first report was a few months late, ECOWAS eventually provided a comprehensive description of the situation on the ground, covering ECOMOG’s deployment, the implementation of the Abuja Accord, political issues, military issues, social and humanitarian issues, current or potential problems, and other observations.\textsuperscript{267}

Because ECOWAS withdrew before the United Nations peace-building operation was deployed, the cooperative relationship foreseen never materialized. In February 1998, the United Nations Secretary-General indicated his intention to establish a United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS).\textsuperscript{268} The small unit was to comprise a director, several political affairs and human rights officers, an electoral officer, a military adviser, and support staff. As originally envisaged, its mandate covered four areas: [1] creating an environment conducive to consolidating peace and organizing democratic elections; [2] working, with the Government, ECOWAS, and others, to facilitate the implementation of the Abuja Agreement; [3] seeking the parties’ commitment to adopt a voluntary programme of arms collection, disposal, and destruction; and [4] harmonizing United Nations activities in the country.\textsuperscript{269} The coup calls into question the relevance of the mandate. It is

\textsuperscript{265} Ibid., Articles VI-XIV.
\textsuperscript{267} UN Document S/1999/432, Annex.
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid. The Security Council subsequently expressed its support for the Secretary-General’s decision to establish UNOGBIS. UN Document S/RES/1233 (1999), 6 April 1999, para. 7; see also UN Document S/1999/233, Letter dated 3 March 1999 from (continued...)
therefore impossible to know if any lessons have been learned from the difficulties encountered between the United Nations and ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT, AND RESOLUTION, PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY

Path Towards the Mechanism

ECOMOG’s experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone prompted discussions among ECOWAS member States to develop an institutionalized mechanism for crisis prevention, management, and resolution. Such a mechanism would address many long-standing shortcomings concerning ECOMOG’s mode of deployment, force composition, operational command and control, and the lack of involvement of ECOWAS member States and the ECOWAS Secretariat in the management of its operations. In the nine years since the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia began, various steps towards the establishment of a new framework have been achieved.

As early as 1993, with the adoption of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, the intention to elaborate a new security framework was apparent. Attesting to the expanded focus of ECOWAS, the Revised Treaty includes an article entitled Regional Security, which provides that ECOWAS member States “undertake to cooperate with the Community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra- and inter-State conflicts.”270 The relevant provision also refers to the need to “establish a regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces where appropriate.”271 The article does not expand upon the structure of the
envisaged framework, however, stating instead that those details should be elaborated in additional protocols. 272

Yet the issue was not addressed at the level of the ECOWAS Authority until more than four years later. In the interim, a number of initiatives concerning the creation of peace and security mechanisms were taken outside of the ECOWAS framework. Although ECOWAS member States spearheaded some of these initiatives, ECOWAS itself was neither directly implicated nor involved. 273 In December 1997, the decision was finally taken to move forward with the creation of a permanent peace and security mechanism within ECOWAS.

The process was jump-started at the Fourth Extraordinary Summit of the ECOWAS Authority, convened at Togo's behest in December 1997. At this meeting, ECOWAS Heads of State agreed in principle to set up a formal mechanism to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict as well as to supervise peacekeeping in the subregion. The Authority also resolved to implement the Regional Security provision of the 1993 Revised Treaty as well as existing protocols. 274

Since the December 1997 Summit, the form of the mechanism has begun to take shape. In March 1998, ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs, and Security met in Yamoussoukro to establish

272 Ibid., Article 58.3, p. 688.
273 At the June 1994 OAU Heads of State and Government Summit in Tunis, Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadéma proposed the creation of an African peacekeeping force. At the 18th France-Africa Summit in Biarritz in November 1994, President Eyadéma was tasked with creating a blueprint for this force. A study was then circulated at the 19th Franco-African Summit in Ouagadougou in December 1996, setting out the modalities of this proposed initiative. See “Communication du Président de la République Togolaise Son Excellence Gnassingbé Eyadéma au 20ème Sommet France-Afrique,” 26-28 November 1998, pp. 20-26, courtesy of Togolese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lomé. In April 1997, another subregional body, ANAD, began to investigate the modalities for a subregional peacekeeping force in West Africa.

guidelines for its structure. Debate centred around whether ECOMOG should be transformed into a permanent force or whether another peace force should be constituted. The ministers eventually decided that ECOMOG would serve as the basis for the future peacekeeping structure. ECOWAS Chiefs of Defence Staff then met in May 1998 to further discuss subregional security. In July 1998, a group of independent “resource persons” prepared a draft framework for the mechanism at the ECOWAS Secretariat’s request, and a group of “governmental experts” then met to study the draft. On 23 July, ECOWAS Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs, and Security endorsed the proposed framework, as did ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 26 October. On 31 October, the Authority also endorsed the draft mechanism and tasked the Executive Secretariat with elaborating appropriate protocols and instruments for the effective application of the Mechanism.

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275 Vogt termed this meeting “the fiasco in Yamoussoukro,” because a number of different initiatives from different camps were presented and the ECOWAS Secretariat had not come up with a template. Interview with Vogt, 22 June 1999, New York.


278 Vogt, then with the International Peace Academy, led this six-person group. Interview with Laloupo, 11 March 1999, Abuja.

279 Each ECOWAS member State was represented by three experts from the foreign affairs, defence, and security divisions of their respective Governments. Ibid.

280 Ibid.

Structure of the Proposed Mechanism

The principal decision-making body of the proposed mechanism is a Mediation and Security Council. The Council will consist of nine member States, elected for a two-year period. Membership on the Council will be extended automatically to the serving ECOWAS Chair as well as to its immediate predecessor. All of the Council’s decisions will require a two-thirds majority. The Council will convene “as often as necessary,” either at the ECOWAS Secretariat or in any of its members. ECOWAS will establish a separate Secretariat to service the Council. As envisaged, the Council will have five primary functions: [1] authorizing political as well as military interventions; [2] determining mandates and terms of reference for such interventions; [3] reviewing such mandates and terms of reference periodically; [4] appointing actors such as the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary and the Force Commander, upon the Executive Secretary’s recommendation; and [5] informing the United Nations and OAU of its decisions.

In carrying out its functions, the Mediation and Security Council will operate at three levels. A Committee of Ambassadors accredited to both Nigeria (as the seat of the ECOWAS Secretariat) and ECOWAS will meet once a month as a matter of course, but more frequently as the need arises. Their reports on regional peace and security issues will be forwarded to all Council members as well as to any affected States. A Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs, and Security, will meet quarterly, or more frequently as the need arises, to discuss the general political and security situation in the subregion. Their reports will be forwarded to the Council’s third level, the

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284 Ibid., p. 6, para. 20.
285 Ibid., p. 5, para. 18.
Heads of State. The nine Heads of State will meet at least twice a year and will make the final decisions on any measures to be taken.  

A Defence and Security Commission will serve as a technical advisory body to the Mediation and Security Council. The Commission will be comprised of Chiefs of Staff, Police Chiefs, Experts from Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and representatives from Immigration and Customs Services, Border Guards, and Narcotic Agencies. The Commission will instruct the Mediation and Security Council on the formulation of mandates and terms of reference for various missions and on the appointment of force commanders. As a part of its duties, the Commission will keep track of the administrative and logistical requirements for peacekeeping operations.

An ad hoc Council of Elders is also to play an important role in arbitration, conciliation, and mediation. The Council will be made up of eminent persons from the subregion, the African continent, and beyond. The Executive Secretary and the current ECOWAS Chair will identify competent individuals to serve in this capacity, and their names will be entered into a database, which will be reviewed annually. Whenever the need arises, the Executive Secretary will appoint a Council, subject to the approval of the parties to the dispute. The mandate and composition of the Council will vary, based upon the nature of its particular mission.

Under the proposed mechanism, the Executive Secretary will have an enhanced role in conflict prevention and management. The Executive Secretary will be responsible for administrative, operational, and political aspects of ECOWAS field missions. The Executive Secretary will also recommend individuals to serve as Special Representatives, as Force Commanders, and as eminent persons on the Council of Elders. On his or her own initiative, the Executive Secretary can also deploy fact-finding and mediation missions. The Executive Secretary will also organize and participate in meetings of the Mediation and Security Council. Finally, the Executive Secretary will submit reports to the Mediation and Security Council.

286 Ibid., pp. 5-6, para. 19.
287 Ibid., p. 6, paras. 21-23.
288 Ibid., p. 7, paras. 24-27.
Council and to ECOWAS member States on the activities of the mechanism. 289

To manage and oversee ECOWAS field activities, a new branch—the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence, and Security—will be established within the ECOWAS Secretariat. 290 This Office will consist of a Department of Operations, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs (DOPHA), a Department of Political Affairs and Security (DPAS), and an Observation Monitoring Center (OMC). The DOPHA will formulate and implement policy in all ECOWAS military, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations, focusing on such issues as planning, administering, and monitoring operations, as well as training. The DPAS will deal with political activities relating to conflict prevention, management, and resolution. It will formulate and implement policy on cross-border crime, light weapons flows, drug controls, and peace restoration measures. 291

To enhance its capacity for both “early warning” and “early action,” ECOWAS is establishing a Subregional Security and Peace Observation System. 292 This network will analyse factors that potentially affect regional peace and security, disseminating information on a day-to-day basis. Economic, environmental, political, security, and social indicators will be assessed. The ultimate aim of the Security and Peace Observation System is to enhance the ability of ECOWAS to prevent situations from degenerating into violent crises. To facilitate data collection and processing, ECOWAS will develop an Observation and Monitoring System, consisting of a network of member States, grouped into zones. 293 The subregion will be divided into four Observation Monitoring Zones, possibly

289 Ibid., pp. 7-8, para. 28.
290 As mentioned above, the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, mentioned in the 1993 Revised Treaty, was never established.
292 The Observation System was put forward and supported by francophone States. Interview with Vogt, 22 June 1999, New York.
headquartered in Banjul, Ouagadougou, Monrovia, and Cotonou. 294 The field offices will submit reports to the Observation and Monitoring Center at the ECOWAS Secretariat, which in turn will analyse and collate the information. 295

To remedy many of the structural and operational problems of past ECOMOG forces, ECOWAS is setting up a permanent peacekeeping force. This new structure will provide ECOWAS with the capacity to serve as the command and control centre and to provide institutional support in future peace operations. The military arm of the peacekeeping structure will be a composite brigade-sized standby force, called ECOMOG. 296 This force will be comprised of national contingents from each ECOWAS member State that are earmarked, trained, equipped and organized for deployment on short notice. 297 For each mission, the strength, standard operating procedures, and rules of engagement will vary according to that force’s mandate. Under the new mechanism, ECOMOG’s deployment will be systematic. The Observation Monitoring System will issue a report to the Executive Secretary, who in turn will inform the Mediation and Security Council. The Mediation and Security will then decide upon appropriate form of intervention, issue a mandate, define terms of reference, and appoint the principal officers. 298 The ECOMOG Force Commander 299 will

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294 Zone 1 will consist of Cape Verde, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Senegal. Zone 2 will consist of Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Niger. Zone 3 will consist of Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Zone 4 will consist of Benin, Nigeria, and Togo. Ibid., p. 12, paras. 36-37.

295 Ibid., pp. 12-13, paras. 38-42.

296 Ibid., pp. 13-14, paras. 43-45. In addition to peacekeeping operations, ECOMOG may undertake smaller observation and monitoring missions, humanitarian missions, preventive deployment actions, peace-building operations, and policing activities. Ibid., p. 16, para. 52.


298 Ibid., p. 15, para. 50.

299 The Force Commander’s functions will include: ensuring the administrative, logistical, and operational effectiveness of the mission; giving operational instructions to contingent and unit commanders; and providing security for humanitarian organizations operating in the mission area. Ibid., pp. 17-18, para. 60.
The functions of the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary will include:

serving as Chief of Mission, responsible for the political direction of the mission;
spearheading peacemaking activities; providing political guidance to the Force Commander;
briefing ECOWAS member States on mission operations; coordinating activities with other international organizations operating in the mission area; and
keeping the Executive Secretary apprised of any and all developments. Ibid., p. 17, para. 59.

Laloupo predicts that the levy will be in place before the end of 1999. Interview with Laloupo, 11 March 1999, Abuja.


The new mechanism also seeks to redress the funding problems that have plagued past ECOMOG peace operations. Recognizing that the current system of assessed contributions to the annual ECOWAS budget is not working, ECOWAS is in the process of instituting a community levy to fund the Secretariat’s activities. Under the new system, ECOWAS member States will be taxed 0.5 per cent on their imports from outside the subregion. A percentage of this levy will be earmarked for funding the mechanism. Beyond this, funds within the Executive Secretariat’s annual budget will be earmarked for peace and security activities. A Special Peace Fund will also be established for voluntary contributions. Under the new system, troop-contributing countries should not have to bear the full financial burden of their military involvement; rather ECOWAS intends to take financial responsibility after the first three months of a given operation. ECOWAS also intends to fund the acquisition of logistics.

ECOWAS PEACEKEEPING PROSPECTS: THE MECHANISM AND BEYOND

The advent of the mechanism represents an important turning point for ECOWAS. The organization has decided to abandon its ad hoc peacekeeping approach in favour of a formal peace and security structure.

300 The functions of the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary will include: serving as Chief of Mission, responsible for the political direction of the mission; spearheading peacemaking activities; providing political guidance to the Force Commander; briefing ECOWAS member States on mission operations; coordinating activities with other international organizations operating in the mission area; and keeping the Executive Secretary apprised of any and all developments. Ibid., p. 17, para. 59.

301 Laloupo predicts that the levy will be in place before the end of 1999. Interview with Laloupo, 11 March 1999, Abuja.

Yet it remains to be seen whether it will be able to exclude those aspects of ECOMOG that have made it a liability, while preserving those aspects of ECOMOG that have made it a success.

A lack of adequate financial resources threatens to undermine the organization’s grandiose future plans before they can be implemented. ECOWAS’s annual budget is US$ 10 million, and it is currently owed more than US$ 40 million in arrears. The Secretariat’s formal move from Lagos to Abuja in 1998 was delayed for seven years in part because it lacked the necessary funds. The organization cannot presently pay its staff, let alone finance new peace and security initiatives. Notwithstanding all of the suggested means of acquiring funds under the new mechanism, it is doubtful whether ECOWAS will be able to secure adequate resources for the proposed initiatives. The Community levy was first “instituted” in the 1993 ECOWAS Revised Treaty. More than six years later, it still has not entered into force. Thus, earmarking a percentage of the levy for the mechanism’s activities is a long-range plan, at best. Moreover, unless the Secretariat’s annual budget is increased substantially, funds earmarked from it for the mechanism’s activities will not be terribly significant. Although international support for ECOMOG initiatives has grown, ECOWAS should not rely too heavily upon voluntary contributions. Executive Secretary Kouyaté has cautioned, “If we depend 100 per cent on donors, all the good ideas mentioned may never be realized.” These financial uncertainties (and the exorbitant costs of past ECOMOG missions) also cast doubts upon the Secretariat’s stated intention of assuming financial responsibility for ECOMOG peacekeeping operations after three months.

303 Interview with Ahmed, 11 March 1999, Abuja. The headquarters was constructed and fully furnished by 1991. Ibid.


305 ECOWAS 1993 Revised Treaty, Article 72.

A related concern is the ability of the ECOWAS Secretariat to assume the responsibilities envisaged for it in the realm of peace and security. Although the Secretariat’s staff is dedicated and efficient, there are real limits as to what they can accomplish given their small numbers, the ever-increasing demands placed upon them, and the scant resources at their disposal. The Secretariat has not grown commensurately with the expanding role of ECOWAS, either numerically or conceptually. As a result, the two-person Legal Affairs Division has become saddled with much of the organization’s peace and security work. The Information Division has also assumed a number of related responsibilities. The proposed restructuring seeks to reorder the Secretariat’s organizational morass, with the creation of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence, and Security. This should also ease the workload of other divisions. Yet it will take some time before this Office is established and fully-staffed—much less functioning efficiently.

Moreover, some aspects of the proposed mechanism appear far-fetched in view of present and foreseeable realities. The Subregional Security and Peace Observation System, for example, seems well beyond the organization’s current capabilities. It is difficult to see how the Secretariat plans to create, finance, and staff four Observation Monitoring Zone field offices. Vogt concedes that the Observation System is “ambitious,” but stresses that it is a “tremendous political coup” that member States have agreed to allow field offices on their territory. Similarly, plans for a standing peacekeeping force—regardless of the size—appear unrealistic.

There is also the possibility that institutionalizing ECOMOG could prove its demise. Potential participants might find it less attractive to contribute to an ECOMOG force if some of their autonomy were taken away. A country might opt not to deploy at all if its participation in a given operation were subject to too many controls. It is conceivable that in redressing criticisms of prior ECOMOG deployments, those elements that

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308 Interview with Vogt, 22 June 1999, New York. Vogt also stresses that the “end goal” need not be the starting point; ECOWAS could begin by appointing a desk officer for each zone within the Secretariat. Ibid.
actually made ECOMOG work will be removed. As Kayode Samuel, former Special Assistant to the Nigerian Head of State, observed, “Some of the ECOMOG officers I met in Sierra Leone were of the view that the success of ECOMOG is in large part due to the fact that there was a ‘preponderant power’ driving the process, i.e., Nigeria. Interestingly, this is a position shared by non-Nigerian ECOMOG officers.”

ECOWAS member States have distinguished themselves by their willingness to assume primary responsibility for promoting peace and security in the subregion. It is encouraging that ECOWAS countries have begun to stage multinational field training exercises and prioritize peacekeeping training. Eight ECOWAS States took part in Exercise Guidimakha, which Senegal hosted in February 1998. Two months later, nine ECOWAS members attended Exercise Cohésion Kompienga in Togo. Beyond this, a number of ECOWAS States now offer peacekeeping courses at their national staff colleges and have opened participation to other countries from the subregion. Moreover, in three instances, they have deployed sizeable military forces. ECOMOG intervened when no other organization would, and it has stayed the course. As former ECOMOG Force Commander Victor Malu observed concerning Liberia, “Regional peacekeeping I think is much more effective than the United Nations peacekeeping, in terms of the casualties that have occurred within the seven years of operations here. If the United Nations had got one-tenth of that, they would have abandoned this place over how many years back.”

Yet this willingness has sometimes undermined peace and security. ECOMOG has inflicted casualties as well as incurred them—at levels that

309 Written correspondence with Samuel, 20 April 1999.
310 Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal were represented at battalion strength, while Cape Verde, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau provided platoons. Guidimakha 98, Paris: EMA-EMIA, Sirpa/Bureau édition, May 1998, courtesy of French Ministry of Defence.
call into question the wisdom of its actions. Its neutrality has often been called into question, which has limited its effectiveness. Sometimes a lack of resources has forced contributing countries to develop creative financing schemes or prevented them from paying their soldiers. Such policies have engendered corruption and ill-discipline among participating officers and troops. The Mechanism should address these shortcomings as a matter of priority.
CHAPTER 5

SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

States from the southern African subregion have also increasingly begun to take the lead in the promotion of peace and security. Prior to the end of apartheid in 1994, many of the subregion’s countries were preoccupied with their own security situations and with countering the machinations of South Africa to destabilize its neighbours as well as to subjugate the majority of its own population. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), which was established in 1992 and now counts South Africa as a member, has exhibited a growing interest in conflict prevention and resolution. Since its creation, the organization has endeavoured to develop a formal framework for addressing peace and security issues. Disagreements over the proposed mechanism’s structure and leadership as well as personal feuds among the subregion’s heads of State have thwarted progress towards this end. Nevertheless, even without a functioning peace and security mechanism, SADC countries have undertaken important peacekeeping training and other capacity-building initiatives. Yet although SADC members have fielded two multinational operations since the organization’s creation, the peacekeeping capabilities of SADC—as an organization—have never truly been tested.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

Front-line States

The Front-line States (FLS) was established in the mid-1970s to coordinate support for those still fighting for independence in Southern Africa. The Presidents of Botswana, Tanzania, and Zambia, along with the
President-elect of Mozambique met in 1974 ¹ to discuss concrete ways to implement the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto.² The leaders initially tried to unify the various Rhodesian liberation movements. Over time, both the focus and membership of the group, which became known as the Front-line States in early 1976, expanded. In addition to assisting in Zimbabwe’s struggle for independence, the FLS concerned itself with Namibia’s liberation, the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, and the campaign for economic sanctions against South Africa.³ Angola joined in September 1976. Zimbabwe and Namibia became members of the organization upon achieving independence in 1980 and 1990, respectively. Majority-ruled South Africa became an FLS member in 1994.⁴


Our objectives in Southern Africa stem from our commitment to [the] principle of human equality. We are not hostile to the Administrations of these States because they are manned and controlled by White people. We are hostile to them because they are systems of minority control which exist as a result of, and in the pursuance of, doctrines of human inequality. What we are working for is the right of self-determination for the people of those territories. We are working for a rule in those countries which is based on the will of all the people and an acceptance of the equality of every citizen.”

The group convened informally on an ad hoc basis to exchange views and coordinate activities. At times, the FLS Heads of State met frequently, almost on a monthly basis. Bilateral and trilateral meetings were often held on the side, as were other meetings at the functional level. Other States were sometimes invited to attend FLS meetings, and liberation movements such as South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and Namibia’s South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) routinely participated. The FLS’s loose structure was one of the keys to its success. According to Thomas Ohlson, “[t]his way, each national leader can pursue the foreign policy of his country, while the summitry format allows for flexibility, pragmatism, and rapid, collective responses to questions of vital importance to the common goals.” Although FLS members disagreed on certain key issues, their disputes did not threaten to break up the alliance. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere served as the organization’s first Chair until 1985. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, who succeeded Nyerere, headed the group until 1991. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe chaired the FLS until it disbanded in July 1994.

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9 The longest-serving head of State generally served as the FLS Chair. According to this practice, Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos should have assumed the position after Kaunda. Dos Santos declined, however, due to instability in Angola. See Horace Campbell, “SADC Heads at loggerheads?,” *SAPEM*, 15 September-15 October 1997, p. 6.
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference

In 1980, the then nine majority-ruled States in Southern Africa formed the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). The FLS, led by Botswanan President Seretse Khama, convened a preparatory conference in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 1979. Wishing to coordinate their assistance to the FLS’s struggle against Pretoria, the United Kingdom and its European Economic Community (EEC) partners were also instrumental in the organization’s creation. SADCC was formally established in April 1980 at a regional economic conference in Lusaka. The organization’s strategy was outlined in the Lusaka Declaration, entitled “Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation.” In it, the signatories identified “the reduction of economic dependence particularly, but not only, on South Africa” as one of their principal objectives and determined priorities and strategies for achieving that goal. A programme of action allocating...
specific studies and tasks to member Governments was also approved in Lusaka.\textsuperscript{14}

SADCC was essentially a loose cooperative framework rather than a formal supranational entity. There was no treaty establishing the organization or governing the activities of its members.\textsuperscript{15} No SADCC institution was authorized to make binding decisions on behalf of individual members or the subregion. Rather, each member State was responsible for a particular aspect of SADCC’s programme.\textsuperscript{16} Meetings were held at both the ministerial and heads of State levels on an ad hoc basis. The rationale underlying this informal arrangement was that it did not encroach upon member States’ sovereignty and thus endeavoured to facilitate cooperation among countries with different ideologies and development priorities.\textsuperscript{17} Given the diverse political ideologies of SADCC members, political cooperation was limited. Moreover, the organization was not very visible on a day-to-day basis.\textsuperscript{18} There was no Secretariat to administer its programmes or coordinate its activities.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{13} (...continued)

Lusaka Declaration identified three other development objectives: forging links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration; mobilizing resources; and acting in concert to secure international cooperation within the framework of SADCC’s economic liberation strategy. Ibid.


\textsuperscript{19} Written correspondence with Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies, 18 November 1999.
Although SADCC did achieve some measure of success, it failed to reduce the subregion’s economic dependence on South Africa. The organization served to build solidarity among its members, and it also mobilized significant international donor support for its projects. However, SADCC’s ties to the EEC prompted charges of “neocolonialism.” Sanford J. Ungar, *Africa: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent (Revised and Updated Edition)*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986, p. 337.

**Dismantling of Apartheid and Other Notable Developments**

SADCC’s lack of progress coupled with significant regional and wider international developments prompted the decision to revamp the organization. The end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union had a pronounced impact on subregional dynamics. The dismantling of apartheid in South Africa and the unbanning of majority-led South African organizations such as the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) led SADCC to rethink its anti-South Africa stance. Members began to consider the possibility of an economically-strong, democratic South Africa joining the organization. In Angola, there was a rapprochement between the União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). In Mozambique, peace talks were being brokered between the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) and Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO). Other states in the subregion were moving towards more democratic forms of government.

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21 “Southern African Development Community—SADC,” p. 133.

22 South Africa’s President F.W. de Klerk unbanned opposition parties on 2 February 1990 and released Nelson Mandela from prison the following week.
These developments contributed to a positive view of economic integration.23

Creation of a “Community”

SADC was established in 1992, putting in place a more formalized structure with an altered focus. A January 1992 SADCC Council of Ministers meeting approved proposals to transform the organization into a fully integrated economic community. On 17 August 1992, the 10 SADCC members signed a treaty establishing SADC.24 South Africa subsequently joined the organization in August 1994, followed by Mauritius in August 1995, as well as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Seychelles in September 1997. (See Map 5.1.)

The SADC treaty provides for the creation of a number of formal institutions. The Summit of Heads of State or Government, the organization’s chief policy-making body, meets at least once per year.25 The Summit elects a Chair and Vice-Chair from among its members to serve “for an agreed period.”26 The Council, comprising one minister from each member State, oversees the development and functioning of SADC.27 It currently meets at least twice per year. The SADC treaty states that

26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., Article 11, p. 126.
Commissions will be constituted in designated sectoral areas. Since the organization’s creation, 18 Sector Coordinating Units have been established in member States. The Standing Committee of Officials acts as a technical advisory body to the Council and meets at least once per year. The Gaborone-based Secretariat, currently headed by Kaire Mbuende of Namibia, is responsible for strategic planning and management of SADC programmes. The SADC Treaty designates the Tribunal as the organization’s dispute-settlement body, but it had not been established as of mid-1999. The Treaty also provides for the establishment of other institutions “as necessary.”

**EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A SECURITY FRAMEWORK**

Although economic independence was the primary aim behind the creation of SADC, peace and security concerns were nevertheless evident. The Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of Southern African States that accompanied the SADC Treaty—“Towards the Southern African Development Community, available on the Internet at <http://www.sadc.int/sector.htm>.

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28 Ibid., Article 12, p. 127.
31 Ibid., Articles 14 and 15, pp. 127-28.
32 Ibid., Article 16, p. 129.
Development Community”—addresses the issue of a more formal security structure. It provides:

Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, and peace and mutual security, are critical components of the total environment for regional cooperation and integration. The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security.  

The SADC Treaty anticipates the creation of a security framework. Article 4 identifies “solidarity, peace and security” as one of the principles that should guide the actions of SADC members. Article 5 provides that one of the objectives of SADC is to “promote and defend peace and security.” Article 21 obligates member States to cooperate in the area of “politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security.” Yet beyond these broad provisions, the treaty does not flesh out the details of a peace and security mechanism. Indeed, Article 22 instructs that members will conclude the necessary protocols in such areas of cooperation.

**Inter-State Defence and Security Committee**

Prior to the creation of SADC, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), a substructure of the FLS, dealt with various individual and collective defence and security issues in the subregion. The organization was established in 1975 as a forum for sharing and coordinating defence and security strategies. The ISDSC initially comprised three members:


37. Ibid., Article 5, p. 124.

38. Ibid., Article 21, p. 130.

39. Ibid., Article 22.

40. The ISDSC’s early work included coordinating training assistance and venues for freedom fighters within Africa and abroad. Written correspondence with Maj-Gen. (Rtd) Daan Hamman, former de facto Secretary, Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, 6 November 1999.
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. Angola, Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe joined the organization during the FLS era. The remaining SADC members joined after the FLS had disbanded: Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, and Swaziland in 1994; Mauritius in 1995; and DRC and the Seychelles in 1997.

The ISDSC was created as an informal body. It had no charter or other governing text. Moreover, it had neither a Secretariat nor an institutional headquarters. Meetings were held on an ad hoc basis, but at least once per year, at both the ministerial and official levels. Three subcommittees—Defence, Public Security, and State Security—were set up to facilitate the organization’s work, but they were not formal structures.

**Proposal for an Association of Southern African States**

In 1994, SADC member States took the first concrete steps to move beyond the ISDSC and create a new security framework. In July 1994, SADC convened a ministerial-level Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security in Windhoek. The conference recommended the establishment of a sector devoted to conflict resolution and political cooperation, with

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42 Ibid.

43 Written correspondence with Hamman, 6 November 1999.


45 SADC’s 1993 Programme of Action had recommended a strategy for advancing subregional security that included adopting a wider definition of security, establishing a forum for mediation and arbitration, and reducing military expenditures. Zacarias, “SADC: From a system to a community of security?,” p. 48 (citing SADC, “Southern Africa: A framework and strategy for building the community, SADC Secretariat, pp. 24-25).
responsibility allocated to a SADC member State. This proposal was referred to the next SADC Council of Ministers meeting in Gaborone, where it was decided to establish a conflict mediation and prevention “wing,” rather than a “sector.” On 30 July 1994, the FLS decided to dissolve and proposed to become SADC’s political and security arm.

The first formal proposal called for the creation of the Association of Southern African States (ASAS). In March 1995, SADC Foreign Ministers, meeting in Harare, recommended replacing the FLS cooperative framework with a more formal peace and security mechanism. They suggested that this new structure, called the ASAS, would function independently of the SADC Secretariat and would report directly to SADC Heads of State and Government. They also envisaged that the ASAS would incorporate two specialized SADC sectors—one dealing with military security and one dealing with political affairs.

SADC Heads of State and Government ultimately rejected the ASAS proposal. The recommendations were first considered at the August 1995 SADC Summit in Johannesburg. However, some of the countries were still uncomfortable with the idea that such sensitive sectors as military security and political affairs would be allocated to individual member States. Moreover, the proposal for the creation of the ASAS had not been reviewed by the various ministers of defence and police or the intelligence community. SADC members also disagreed over how the Association’s chair should be designated. Namibia’s idea for a two-year revolving chairmanship was ultimately accepted, but Mugabe, who had headed the FLS when it was disbanded, continued to insist that the longest-serving SADC

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49 Ibid., p. 13.
Head of State—Mugabe himself in this instance—should serve as the ASAS chair. ⁵⁰ The Summit deferred the decision to establish a formal political and security framework. The Communiqué provided:

The Summit considered and granted the request of the Foreign Ministers of SADC, that the allocation of the sector to any Member State be deferred and that they be given more time for consultations among themselves and with Ministers responsible for Defence and Security and SADC Matters, on the structures, terms of reference, and operational procedures, for the sector.⁵¹

**Organ for Politics, Defence and Security**

The Organ for Politics, Defence and Security was proposed and accepted in place of ASAS. SADC Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security recommended its creation on 18 January 1996.⁵² In May 1996, President Ketumile Masire of Botswana, as Chair of SADC, wrote to the SADC Heads of State declaring the Organ officially established and indicating that Mugabe would serve as its interim until the next SADC Summit.⁵³ The 28 June 1996 SADC Summit in Gaborone accepted the Organ concept. The Summit’s Communiqué defined 16 objectives to be pursued through the new body. It also provided that the Organ would function at the Summit level, operating independently of other SADC structures, as well as at the ministerial and technical levels. Its Chair would rotate among a troika on an annual basis. The ISDSC would become an institution of the Organ, and the

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⁵¹ SADC Summit Communiqué, Johannesburg, 28 August 1995, courtesy of SADC Secretariat, Gaborone.
⁵³ Documentation provided by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria.
Organ could establish other structures as well. The summit meeting elected Mugabe as the Organ’s first Chair.

A fissure within SADC regarding the relative autonomy of the Organ soon became apparent. South Africa, on the one hand, maintained that the body should be a SADC sub-structure and should report directly to the SADC Summit. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, asserted that the Organ should function under a separate Chair, as essentially a parallel structure to SADC. Tensions came to a head at the August 1997 SADC Summit in Blantyre, Malawi, and the Summit failed to adopt the draft protocol as planned. The Summit Communiqué simply “noted the ongoing efforts to finalize a protocol

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54 SADC Summit Communiqué, Gaborone, 28 June 1996, courtesy of SADC Secretariat, Gaborone.

55 Zambian President Frederick Chiluba did not attend the Summit, reportedly because his Government feared that the Organ would be empowered to interfere in a country’s internal affairs. “Southern African Development Community—SADC,” p. 133.


57 Zimbabwe was of the view that the Gaborone Summit created a separate summit for the Organ, based on FLS principles. (Brammer, “In search of an effective regional security mechanism for southern Africa.”) In reaching this conclusion, Harare drew upon the Gaborone Summit’s Communiqué, which provides that “The SADC organ on Politics, Defence and Security shall operate at the Summit Level, and shall function independently of other SADC structures.” SADC Summit Communiqué, Gaborone, 28 June 1996; see also Cilliers, “Building Security in Southern Africa—An Update on the Evolving Architecture.”

that will establish the institutional structures and operational procedures for the organ.\textsuperscript{59}

Hopes that the matter could be resolved quickly proved unrealistic. The issue of the Organ’s structure was deferred until a meeting of Heads of State and Government that was scheduled to be held in Luanda in September 1997. The Angolan Government cancelled the Summit, however, fearful that a controversy-filled meeting might upset the Angolan peace process.\textsuperscript{60} The matter was raised during an extraordinary meeting of SADC Heads of State in Maputo in March 1998, but no decision was made. At the meeting, Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano, the Deputy Chair of SADC, announced that he, together with the Presidents of Malawi, and Namibia, would form a working group to study and help resolve the issue. The three Presidents, in turn, delegated the task to their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In May 1998, Mozambique convened a SADC Organ ministerial meeting to enable the three ministers to make their recommendations on the proposed form and structure of the Organ.\textsuperscript{61}

The compromise solution presented at the May 1998 meeting was not enthusiastically embraced. According to Mark Malan, the recommendations “amount to a ham-fisted effort at steering a middle road between the positions of South Africa and Zimbabwe.”\textsuperscript{62} The ministers suggested that the SADC Organ should be created as a Committee comprising five SADC member States. They further stated that this Committee would be given a mandate to intervene in all conflicts arising within the subregion. The idea behind this structure was that its small size would render it flexible and better ensure the confidentiality of information. Moreover, Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs and Security should continue to operate as the ISDSC, and the Committee may ask the Foreign Affairs Ministers to assist in its activities. According to the proposal, the SADC Summit could modify decisions of the

\textsuperscript{59} SADC Summit Communiqué, Blantyre, 8 August 1997, courtesy of SADC Secretariat, Gaborone.
\textsuperscript{60} Malan, “SADC and Sub-Regional Security: Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?,” p. 16.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., p. 5.
Committee. The envisaged Organ would have no permanent Secretariat, and would meet on an ad hoc basis. 63

As of mid-1999, the controversy continued unabated. It is unclear whether the Malawian, Mozambican, and Namibian presidents had approved the recommendations of their foreign ministers and were prepared to propose them at the next summit. In any event, this question became moot. The matter of the Organ’s form and structure was removed from the agenda of the September 1998 SADC Summit in Mauritius. SADC members had not formally met to address the issue as of June 1999. 64

SADC CAPACITY-BUILDING EFFORTS

ISDSC Initiatives

Notwithstanding the non-functioning of the Organ, SADC members have undertaken some important capacity-building initiatives, primarily through the ISDSC. After the dissolution of the FLS, the ISDSC continued to exist in anticipation of its (yet undefined) role as an institution of the SADC Organ. 65 In the interim, its three Sub-Committees have taken on new responsibilities—some in the domain of capacity-building.

Recognizing the importance of a secure and reliable communication network, the ISDSC has established a satellite communication system linking the various SADC Governments. This “high-level hotline” was installed and became operational in early 1999. Each member State has been given two terminals, which they will place as they see fit with one likely dedicated to

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63 Ibid.
64 Interview with Horst Brammer, Deputy Director, SADC Political Affairs, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 27 August 1999, by telephone.
65 Until the controversy over the SADC Organ is resolved, the ISDSC will remain a “floating structure” completely detached from other subregional structures. Ibid.
the office of each nation’s Defence Minister. The idea is that the terminals should be supervised 24 hours per day. 66

Under the ISDSC’s supervision, the SADC subregion has committed itself to creating a standby brigade. Each country will earmark formed units as well as headquarters staff. This arrangement was supposed to be operational by the end of 1998, but due to the impasse concerning the Organ, little progress has been made. According to Maj-Gen Daan Hamman, former de facto Secretary of the ISDSC, the SADC Organ must initiate a number of the actions to be taken, such as determining the procedure to be followed in the case of a conflict alert in order to deploy peacekeepers in the region. The civilian structures to manage the peacekeeping operation must also be decided upon and established. 67

The ISDSC has been involved in important training and other preparatory initiatives as well. For example, the Defence Sub-Committee has solved a number of technical problems associated with disaster relief support operations. It has also approved a training syllabus for peace support training, based on the United Nations training syllabus, which SADC defence forces will use. It is working to develop operational procedures and ensure that standing operational orders are in place as well. Moreover, the ISDSC requested that the Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC), through its Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC), coordinate and harmonize peacekeeping education training in the SADC subregion. 68

Peacekeeping-Related Instruction

The Zimbabwe Staff College has endeavoured to market itself as the subregion’s peacekeeping training center. With advisory and financial assistance from both Denmark and the United Kingdom, the ZSC has improved its training facilities and expanded its peacekeeping course


67 Ibid.

68 Written correspondence with Hamman, 7 July 1999.
offerings. The RPTC was inaugurated in November 1995. Since then, it has conducted an annual, two-week peacekeeping course for commanders, which is geared towards officers designated to participate in peacekeeping operations as sector commanders, battalion commanders, or chiefs of staff. The course draws both instructors and participants from throughout the subregion. The RPTC has conducted other training programmes in addition to the annual course. In June 1998, for example, it held a three-week regional military observer course. Vacancies in regional courses are allocated to each country in the subregion according to the size of its population, the size of its military, and its past and present involvement in United Nations operations. With Danish support, the RPTC is currently developing a "clearing house" that will, among other things, monitor peacekeeping training activities, identify new regional training requirements, and keep a record of trained peacekeeping practitioners and instructors in the subregion and beyond. The clearing house will also establish direct links between the various SADC countries at the defence force level.

Rather than relying exclusively on the RPTC, other SADC members have begun to offer peacekeeping-related training to other countries in the subregion. With British support, Malawi hosted a four-week regional command and staff course in October 1998 and an eight-month regional...
training course for junior officers in January 1999. South Africa has suggested that individual SADC countries should provide peacekeeping training in a particular “specialty,” under the rationale that no single country can possibly have a center of excellence that covers all of the components of peacekeeping.

**Regional Peacekeeping Training Exercises**

*Blue Hungwe*

The subregion has also initiated regional peacekeeping training exercises, the first of which was held in April 1997. Some 1,500 troops from 10 SADC countries participated in exercise Blue Hungwe, which Zimbabwe hosted and organized with British assistance. Blue Hungwe aimed “to enhance regional African liaison, cooperation, military skills and interoperability by means of a multinational joint field training exercise in the tactics and techniques of international peacekeeping.” The exercise included three phases of substantive training. At the outset, participants received five days of low-level instruction, including weapons handling, medical assistance, road blocks, and convoys. Commanders and officers were then brought to the ZSC for tactical training. Troops subsequently were deployed to the exercise area and played out a number of scenarios.

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77 Interview with R.M. “Rocky” Williams, Director, Defence Policy Department, South African Department of Defence Secretariat, 23 January 1998, Halfway House.
78 The UK Government spent over US$ 500,000 for Blue Hungwe and its British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) Southern Africa served as the exercise’s “umpire.” Interview with Brig. Adrian Naughten, Commander, BMATT Southern Africa, 26 January 1998, Harare.
80 Interview with Naughten, 26 January 1998, Harare.
Blue Hungwe proved to be a useful initiative and was instrumental in highlighting areas where progress still needed to be made. Brig. Adrian Naughten, Commander of the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) Southern Africa, acknowledged that certain contingents lacked an adequate appreciation of who does what in a multinational integrated headquarters. However, he stressed that given the lack of expertise and the varied military standards among the participating States, Exercise Blue Hungwe was a resounding success and “a major achievement in both military and political terms.”

Other observers praised the exercise’s straightforward format as well as its comprehensiveness. Zimbabwe Defence Force Chief of Staff (Administration and Quartermaster Staff) MajGen. Michael Nyambuya noted that Zimbabwe had found it difficult to work with certain contingents with different training standards and doctrine, and emphasized the need for the subregion to conduct standardized pre-deployment training and to develop standard operating procedures (SOPs). There was also a clear need to enhance the compatibility of communication equipment and procedures for effective command and control.

Blue Crane

South Africa subsequently hosted the brigade-level Blue Crane under the auspices of the ISDSC. The exercise was originally scheduled for November 1998 but was postponed until April 1999. Blue Crane, which cost some US$ 3.3 million to stage, brought together 4,965 troops from 13 SADC countries. It was designed to simulate a UN-led multinational operation deployed in a classic inter-positional role between two warring factions on

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81 Ibid.
82 Interviews with military observers that attended Blue Hungwe, 26 February 1998, Bakel.
84 Both subregional instability and budgetary pressures on the South African Department of Defence have been cited as reasons for the delay. The training for commanders at the ZSC and the training of civilians and civilian police took place as originally planned in late 1998.
a fictional island in the Indian Ocean. The exercise had both land and naval components. The field dimension covered military tasks such as disarming and separating combatants, patrolling, and manning checkpoints, as well as humanitarian and media relations skills. It included a significant role for civilians. The naval dimension reviewed tasks such as enforcing a naval embargo and handling refugees at sea.

Blue Crane can be termed a success for a number of reasons. Although South Africa received significant financial and logistical contributions from donor countries, it essentially organized the exercise on its own. Blue Crane was also the first brigade-level undertaking held in Southern Africa. The exercise proved timely in view of the tensions in the subregion, giving participants a much-needed opportunity to train together. Beyond that, it developed SOPs that SADC can use in future peacekeeping missions. Also, as Cedric de Coning, a Controller of the civilian component of the exercise noted, “for the first time civilian organizations took part, not in an isolated one-on-one basis with the military in a peace exercise, but as a central part of the organization and planning of the scenarios.”

Yet there were also some criticisms of Blue Crane, and a number of lessons learned have been identified. Some viewed the exercise’s emphasis on the civilian component of peacekeeping as too ambitious or unrealistic. Military participants and observers in particular complained about the heightened participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Exercise planners were not wholly successful in integrating the civilian and humanitarian dimensions into the exercise, according to one observer. The organizers of the civilian activities have concluded that there should be more

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87 See de Coning, “Exercise Blue Crane: A unifying moment for SADC.”
89 Interview with South African Government official, August 1999, by telephone.
opportunities for joint civil-military training. The structure of some of the battalions was also criticized as impractical. For example, one of the battalions comprised a headquarters staffed jointly by South Africa and Tanzania, motorized infantry companies from Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania, as well as South African support elements. Some observers claimed that deploying such small national contingents would be unworkable in an actual operation.

Tulipe

Most recently, eight SADC members participated in a subregional peacekeeping training exercise in Madagascar in May 1999. Madagascar, which has expressed an interest in becoming a SADC member, organized Exercise Tulipe with French assistance. Some 1,700 troops from France and 10 African countries—Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe—participated. This exercise provided another important opportunity for the subregion’s armed forces to train together.

(PROPOSED) MILITARY INTERVENTIONS OF SADC MEMBER STATES

SADC member States have considered undertaking concerted military actions on three separate occasions. In 1998, inter-African forces comprising SADC countries were deployed in DRC as well as Lesotho. These interventions were essentially ad hoc initiatives by willing coalitions of African States that just happened to be SADC members, although both ultimately received some form of SADC “approval.” In 1994, three Southern African

90 “Lessons Learned from the Civilian Participation in Exercise Blue Crane,” The African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), courtesy of ACCORD.
92 See “Madagascar: SADC’s Trojan Horse,” The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 3 April 1999.
countries contemplated intervening in Lesotho, but a force was never actually fielded. This example is nevertheless important because it was the first and last time the FLS met to discuss an internal crisis in a majority-ruled state and because it was majority-ruled South Africa’s first attempt to resolve a conflict within the subregion.

Lesotho (1994): the Intervention that Never Was

In 1994, countries from the Southern Africa subregion undertook diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis in Lesotho. Tensions between the democratically-elected Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle and the Kingdom’s monarch, King Letsie III, had been steadily rising since 1993. In January 1994, Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe formed a task force to find a peaceful solution to the dispute.94 This attempt at mediation began as an FLS initiative95 but included South Africa, which was not yet a FLS member (or a member of SADC). Despite their efforts, the situation did not improve. On 17 August, following Mokhehle’s announcement that he would establish a commission of inquiry into the future of monarchy, Letsie suspended the constitution and dissolved Mokhehle’s administration. The task force held an emergency meeting in Gaborone on 23 August and condemned the “royal coup.” On 25 August, the warring factions were assembled in Pretoria and given one week to resolve their differences.96 On 2 September, one day after their deadline had expired, Letsie and Mokhehle agreed in principle to restore constitutional order and determined that Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe would act as guarantors to their agreement.97 In the following days, however, it became clear that King Letsie had placed certain

97 See Evans, “Preventive Diplomacy in Lesotho and Mozambique,” p. 189.
Ultimately, a “show of force” by South Africa proved sufficient to seal the agreement. On 9 September 1994, three South African Impala jets performed manoeuvres and paratroopers staged a mass drop near the Lesotho border. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) described the military activity as “exercises” designed to “stabilize certain aspects of its contingency planning” and confirmed that the unrest in Lesotho’s capital, Maseru, was the issue at hand. According to Brendan Seery, “it was clear that the SANDF deployment was the stick to the carrots being proffered in diplomatic shuttling behind the scenes by South Africa and some of its neighbours.”99 South Africa terminated the exercises on 11 September,100 and within 48 hours, Letsie had agreed to restore Mokhehle’s Government and to abdicate in favour of his father, Moshoeshoe II.101

Had Letsie not backed down, it is unlikely that an inter-African force—either under SADC auspices or as an ad hoc undertaking—would have been deployed. Meeting in July 1994, SADC Foreign Ministers had determined that any military intervention in a SADC member State would only be sanctioned as a last resort.102 Presidents Masire and Mugabe may have wanted to send a tough message—to their own restive armies as much

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99 Ibid., p. 87.  
100 Ibid.  
101 Moshoeshoe II had been Lesotho’s king from the country’s independence in 1965 until he was deposed by the military Government in 1990. Lesotho’s principal chiefs then elected Moshoeshoe’s eldest son as his successor, and his son assumed the throne as Letsie III. When he returned to the throne, Moshoeshoe pledged not to involve the monarchy in any aspect of political life. Richard Brown, “Lesotho: Recent History,” in Africa South of the Sahara 1999 (28th Edition), pp. 596-99.  
as Lesotho’s—that military coups in the subregion would not be tolerated.103 Yet neither of their countries could undertake an operation in Lesotho on its own—although Zimbabwe was willing to command an intervention force.104 South African military support for such a mission was therefore required, but it was questionable if it would be forthcoming.105 Although the SANDF had begun making contingency plans for a possible intervention, political approval for an intervention was never given, and the South African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) was not significantly involved in the matter.106 Pretoria was in the process of integrating members of former liberation armies and homeland defence units into a new national defence force. With drastic budget cuts, the Department of Defence was preoccupied with downsizing and creating a new unified military structure. Thus, the SANDF showed little enthusiasm for undertaking a costly and potentially lengthy peacekeeping operation.107

Democratic Republic of the Congo (1998 to date)

On 2 August 1998, a new rebellion broke out in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and soon posed a serious threat to the Government of President Laurent Désiré Kabila. The Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) enjoyed the active support of Rwanda and Uganda108—which hitherto had been Kabila’s principal benefactors.

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104 Indeed, a Zimbabwean Force Commander had been identified and appointed. Written correspondence with Cilliers, 13 November 1999.

105 Jakkie Cilliers believes that South Africa would not have stopped Zimbabwe from taking military action and would have joined the operation. Ibid.


108 Initially, both Rwanda and Uganda publicly distanced themselves from the RCD, denying any support. Their involvement in the conflict on the side of the rebels was an open secret, however, and both countries subsequently acknowledged that they (continued...)
Kabila’s Forces armées congolaises (FAC) proved ineffective, and the RCD quickly made inroads. Within days, the rebellion had spread from the populous but strategically insignificant town of Goma on the western shore of Lake Kivu to an important military base at Kitona, located clear across the vast country, near the Atlantic ocean. Within two weeks, the RCD had seized the Inga hydro-electric dam that supplied electricity to the capital and had advanced to the outskirts of Kinshasa. Kabila, who had made a similar trek westward two years earlier in his successful bid to unseat President Mobutu Sese Seko—but at a much slower pace—knew that his FAC could offer no serious defence and that he and his Government were extremely vulnerable.

Kabila Secures “SADC” Support

Kabila secured the diplomatic and military support he desperately needed from SADC countries spearheaded by Zimbabwe. Within 72 hours after the outbreak of the rebellion, Mugabe mentioned his intention to host a summit of regional leaders in an effort to resolve the conflict. On 8 August, in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, the first meeting of regional Heads of State and Government was held to address the war. Those in attendance included the leaders of Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Mugabe announced at the meeting that a four-nation committee of representatives from Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and

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108 (...continued)

had troops in DRC fighting alongside the RCD.

109 James Kabarere, the FAC Chief of Staff until 13 July when Kabila summarily dismissed him, commandeered three aircraft and flew from Goma with 400 rebels to Kitona to tap into popular discontentment among the FAC, thousands of whom were stationed at the airbase there. See “Congo in Crisis,” New African, October 1998, available on the Internet at <<http://www.africalynx.com>>.


Zimbabwe would be created and charged with helping secure a cease-fire. Upon receiving the recommendations of this task force, Mugabe forwarded the proposals to an ISDSC meeting in Harare on 18 August. Speaking on state television, Mugabe declared that SADC had unanimously agreed to Kabila’s request for assistance. The following day, the Defence Ministers of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe declared that their three countries would come to the assistance of fellow SADC member DRC’s.

Mugabe’s claim of “unanimous” support within SADC for his decision to intervene on behalf of Kabila was disingenuous. Opposition to Zimbabwe’s desire to rally behind Kinshasa militarily was strongest in—but not limited to—South Africa. Mandela, the SADC Chairman, challenged Mugabe’s authority to send troops on behalf of SADC and continued to champion a diplomatic solution as the only viable route towards resolving the crisis. On 23 August he convened an extraordinary SADC Summit in Pretoria, to which he also invited the Presidents of Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda, as well as the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Mugabe, who declined to meet with Mandela in a pre-Summit consultation on 22 August, did not attend the Summit, sending his High Commissioner to South Africa to represent him. Angolan President José Eduardo Dos Santos was in telephone contact.

The justifications that the three troop-contributing countries offered for their actions are unfounded. They initially explained that their intervention had been based on an Organ decision. The Organ, however, was not

115 Mary Braid, “Congo war threatens to draw in rival states,” The Independent, 23 August 1998. Kabila also refused to meet with Mandela, sending his Foreign Minister in his stead. Ibid.
116 Interview with Brammer, 27 August 1999, by telephone.
operational and was not involved in the peace negotiations. Still, Mugabe as the Chair of the Organ believed he could take the decision on the Organ’s behalf. The intervening countries alternatively claimed that an ISDSC decision authorized their intervention. Yet the ISDSC does not have a mandate to take decisions. Moreover, there were only four ministers present at the August 1998 ISDSC meeting from which they claimed the authority derived.117 Mandela’s spokesman Parks Mankahlana put it bluntly, “There is no way that the people who met at Victoria Falls and Harare can have met under the auspices of the SADC.”118

Tensions between Mandela and Mugabe on SADC’s position grew, and the prospects for SADC to play an effective role in resolving the conflict diminished. Both men exchanged thinly-veiled insults. For example, Mugabe lectured Mandela, “No SADC country is compelled to help [a brother country]. But those who don’t want to help should keep quiet about those who want to do so.”119 Mugabe concluded that, “We must now enlist the OAU which has an organ for conflict resolution. It is not possible for us to resolve it as SADC because we are divided.”120

At an unscheduled meeting of SADC Heads of State on 2 September, Mandela unexpectedly121 toned down his strong rhetoric against Mugabe and announced that SADC unanimously supported the three SADC countries’ military intervention in DRC. The meeting was held in Durban during the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit. Eleven of the 14 SADC countries were present—nine at the Head of State level. 122 Kabila, Mugabe, and

117 Ibid.
121 Mandela’s about-face vis-à-vis the appropriateness of Mugabe’s response to the rebellion in DRC took officials in DFA by surprise. Written correspondence with Cilliers, 18 November 1999.
122 The Seychelles and Zambia were represented at the foreign ministerial and vice-presidential levels, respectively. “SADC Summit Supports Intervention in Congo,” (continued...)
Namibian President Sam Nujoma did not attend and were not represented. Mandela said, “It is quite reasonable when a legitimate leader says ‘I have been invaded’ and asks for support and it is quite reasonable for countries to respond to that.”  

Mandela’s acquiescence to Mugabe’s actions did not signify his approval. Mandela simply no longer took to jousting with Mugabe verbally in public. Indeed, the South African president continued to champion a negotiated settlement. According to Horst Brammer, the Deputy Director of SADC Political Affairs in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Mandela’s announcement was purely an attempt to reflect some form of unity in SADC. South Africa did not diverge from its position that a standstill, cease-fire, and elections were necessary for a true resolution to the conflict.

Mandela’s efforts to resolve the conflict through diplomacy were not just undermined by the split within SADC, but by the active involvement of several actors outside of SADC supporting Kabila and the rebels. For example, a coalition of largely francophone Central African States backed Kabila. On 24 September, Gabon hosted a meeting of regional countries united in their support for Kinshasa. Kabila had already secured support for his cause earlier that month. Gabonese President El Hadj Omar Bongo had proposed to hold a regional summit during a meeting with Kabila on 12 September, and agreement with Chad had been reached prior to the summit.

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122 (...continued)


123 Ibid.

124 Interview with Brammer, 27 August 1999, by telephone.

125 Besides Gabon, the Heads of State of CAR, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), and Equatorial Guinea also attended the meeting, as did the Prime Minister of Cameroon, among other countries’ representatives. See IRIN-CEA, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Chadian involvement detailed,” 24 September 1998, available on the Internet at <http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int>.

126 Ibid.
SADC member States’ attempts to establish an uneasy compromise between Mugabe and Mandela were apparent in the carefully-worded communiqué issued at the SADC Summit in Mauritius. The text welcomed the initiatives of SADC and its member States to restore peace and security to DRC and diplomatically mentioned both the Victoria Falls and Pretoria meetings. SADC Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and commended the Governments of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe for providing troops in a timely manner.127 Zambia’s President, Frederick Chiluba, was given the unenviable task of developing a programme of action to promote a peace process.

**SADC Coalition’s Operational Successes and Limitations**

Troops from Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe arrived in DRC within days of the 18 August meeting that Mugabe hosted. According to eye-witness accounts, some 2,500 Angolan troops together with their equipment crossed from the Cabinda enclave over the lema bridge into DRC over a three-day period from 22 to 24 August.128 Zimbabwe deployed a similar number of troops in the first week of operations, frequently recorded to be 2,800.129 Namibia’s relatively modest contribution was widely reported to number 200-300.130

The coalition was placed under the operational command of Zimbabwe. Air Marshal Perence Shiri served as the first head of the joint force, followed by Maj-Gen. Michael Nyambuya, (a former Deputy Force Commander in the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Angola), and later Maj-Gen.

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Amoth Chingombe. The Deputy Force Commander has always been a Namibian, and Zimbabwe has always provided the Chief of Staff. The forces of Chad and the Sudan operated independently of those from Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. (In February 1999, however, an Angolan detachment was assigned to the Chadian-Sudanese sector to serve as reinforcements.)

Luanda provided the bulk of the logistical support required to deploy the three-nation inter-African force. Besides airlifting its own troops, the Angolan air force transported Namibian and Zimbabwean soldiers to DRC as well as Zimbabwean tanks and armoured vehicles. It also ferried FAC contingents within the country. Harare provided Alouette helicopters and Casa light transport aircraft.

Initially, the coalition forces enjoyed military success. The RCD’s gains in western DRC began to be reversed within days of the arrival of foreign troops from the three Southern African States. They soon successfully repulsed the rebel offensive on the capital. By the end of August, Angolan troops had retaken the port city of Matadi and the Inga dam.

Contrary to the heady pronouncements by Kabila and Mugabe that the rebels would soon be defeated, the war dragged on. While the coalition forces were reclaiming rebel-held positions in the west of the country, the RCD was advancing virtually unchecked through much of the rest of the country. Kisangani, the country’s second largest city, and the port towns of

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131 Interview with Francis N.F. Mutisi, Military Adviser, Zimbabwean Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 28 October 1999, by telephone.
133 Interview with Jakkie Potgieter, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies, 14 October 1999, by telephone.
134 Written correspondence with Adonia Ayebare, Analyst, International Crisis Group, 3 November 1999. A battalion of former Forces armées rwandaises (ex-FAR) was also assigned to the sector. Ibid.
135 “More deployed as casualties rise.”
137 “More deployed as casualties rise.”
Kalemie and Moba on Lake Tanganyika fell to the RCD. The infusion of troops from Chad and the Sudan in September 1998 bolstered Kabila’s position and allowed Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe to better concentrate their limited resources. Nevertheless, the country was simply too vast, the roads too dilapidated or poorly developed, and the rebels too numerous, organized, and well armed for Kabila and his SADC backers to defend or retake many remote positions.

**Military Stalemate and Political Fallout**

Despite sporadic heavy fighting and the infusion of additional troops on both sides of the war, a stalemate has been effectively in place since late 1998. After having concluded arrangements with Angola, Chad, Namibia, the Sudan, and Zimbabwe for formed units of troops, Kabila turned to various non-state actors to augment the FAC. Numerous rebel groups fighting other countries in the region joined Kabila’s cause, including the elements of the former *Forces armées rwandaises* (ex-FAR) and the Interahamwe militia fighting Kigali, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and other rebel groups fighting Kampala, and the *Front pour la défense de la démocratie* (FDD) fighting Bujumbura. As for the States supporting DRC, Zimbabwe supplemented its initial presence with the deployment of additional brigades over the course of the war. In June 1999, it was reported that the 8,000 Zimbabwean troops serving in DRC would be further reinforced, with some analysts predicting the force would soon total 11,000 men. Angola is believed to have deployed as many as 7,100 troops during the early stages of the war, but its subsequent commitment has been closer to 1,600.

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138 See, for example, IRIN-CEA, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Chadian involvement detailed.” Khartoum persistently denied sending its own troops to DRC, but diplomats and seasoned observers of the region do not find its denials credible.


Bujumbura has forcefully denied its involvement in the conflict, claiming to be neutral. However, remaining “uninvolved” and “neutral” does not preclude having deployed its forces on DRC territory. It is understood that several hundred Burundian troops were deployed across Lake Tanganyika in South Kivu in an effort to contain Burundian rebel activity. Given that the RCD controls the territory in which Burundian troops have been stationed, it is fair to say that Burundi provides de facto support to the forces fighting Kabila.

Remnants of the former Forces armées zaïroises (ex-FAZ) are reported to have joined both sides of the conflict. The infusion of additional troops (and weapons) has not resulted in a significant change in the territory the two sides control. The country effectively remains split in two.

The split within the RCD—which more significantly indicates a further breakdown in relations between Rwanda and Uganda—does not bode well for any attempt to resolve the conflict. In May 1999, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba was effectively ousted from the RCD’s leadership and replaced by Emile Illunga. Wamba dia Wamba subsequently set up a new headquarters in Kisangani. Thus, there are now in effect two RCDs—one headquartered in Kisangani and led by Wamba dia Wamba, which enjoys Ugandan support, and another headquartered in Goma and led by Illunga, which enjoys Rwandan support. This further complicates any eventual negotiation with the rebels, which had already been made more difficult by the creation of the Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC) led by Jean-Pierre Bemba and headquartered in Gbadolite. An attempt by Tanzania to create some semblance of a unified front among the two RCDs and the MLC in June 1999 was unsuccessful as the RCD-Goma faction failed to attend the meeting.

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143 See “The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and the Prospects for Peace.”
Lesotho (1998-1999)

Escalating unrest and violence in Lesotho following May 1998 parliamentary elections prompted the September 1998 military intervention of Botswana and South Africa. In response to the posted results, which awarded 79 of the 80 seats to the ruling Liberal Congress for Democracy (LCD) party of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, opposition parties claimed that the elections were rigged. In August 1998, SADC established a committee of experts to investigate the allegations of fraud in an effort to stem the growing political crisis. The Langa Commission ultimately found that there had been irregularities in the voting and counting processes but determined that they did not nullify the elections. Fearing a further breakdown of law and order, Mosisili requested SADC member States to intervene militarily in support of his Government. The situation further deteriorated on 11 September when junior officers of the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF) placed the Prime Minister under house arrest and effectively removed senior military officers thought to be loyal to the LCD. By the time the Langa Report was made public on 17 September, Botswana and South Africa had already established a joint force in

144 The LCD achieved this landslide despite claiming to have received (only) 60 per cent of the vote. “Lesotho: sad aftermath,” The Economist, 10 October 1998, p. 47.
145 The SADC committee of experts was chaired by South African judge Pius Langa.
146 William Boot claims the Langa Commission’s final report was redrafted for political reasons and “… sections which questioned the legitimacy of the LCD Government and called for re-elections under an interim Government of national unity [were] excised.” See William Boot, “SA’s crippling arrogance,” Weekly Mail & Guardian, 9 October 1998, available on the Internet at <<http://www.m&g.co.za>>.
147 In addition to Botswana and South Africa, the Prime Minister also reportedly invited Mozambique and Zimbabwe to intervene. Malan, “Regional Power Politics Under Cover of SADC—Running Amok with a Mythical Organ,” p. 7.
preparation for a possible military operation.\textsuperscript{149} South African troops crossed into Lesotho in the early morning hours of 22 September, followed later that day by those from Botswana.

\textit{A Rash Decision to Intervene Made Outside of SADC}

The decision to respond militarily was made without explicit SADC authorization. From the outset, the SANDF claimed that the intervention took place under “SADC auspices” in accordance with “SADC agreements.”\textsuperscript{150} At a 21 September 1998 meeting, the South African Minister of Safety and Security and representatives from Botswana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe reportedly confirmed that SADC had authorized a possible military intervention in the event of a coup in Lesotho.\textsuperscript{151} In fact, the organization had taken no such action. At the SADC Summit in Grand Baie the week before, SADC Heads of State had merely “expressed concern at the civil disturbances and loss of life following the recent elections” and “welcomed the mediation initiative led by the South African Government.”\textsuperscript{152} According to Malan, “[i]t is hard to imagine how this was translated into a SADC mandate for a peace operation that resembled a military invasion and occupation of the Kingdom of Lesotho.”\textsuperscript{153} Moreover, doubt has been cast on the legality of Lesotho’s request for assistance in the first place. Although Mosisili, as Head of Government, appealed for States to intervene, King Letsie III, Lesotho’s


\textsuperscript{151} Malan, “Regional Power Politics Under Cover of SADC—Running Amok with a Mythical Organ,” p. 7.


\textsuperscript{153} Malan, “Regional Power Politics Under Cover of SADC—Running Amok with a Mythical Organ,” p. 8.
nominal Head of State, had not been consulted as required by the Constitution and had opposed such an action.

Combined Task Force (CTF) Boleas, as the intervention was known, was essentially a South African undertaking that enjoyed the political support of a few countries from the subregion. Botswana’s initial contribution to Operation Boleas was limited to a motorized infantry company (130 personnel) and a battalion command element (15). South Africa, by contrast, initially sent roughly 500 troops to Lesotho and also provided air and medical support. The CTF was placed under the command of Col. Robbie Hartslief of the SANDF. Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which together with Botswana and South Africa were “guarantors” to the previously-mentioned 1994 agreement, supported the intervention.

Ironically, the South African-led intervention received little domestic support. Within the South African Foreign and Defence Departments, there was a complete breakdown in communication and planning. South African foreign affairs officials criticized the intervention and claimed they did not participate in the policy-making process and only learned about the decision after the fact and through the media. According to Brammer, only the DFA

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154 Upon the death of King Moshoeshoe II in January 1996, Letsie returned to the throne in accordance with a 1994 law passed in conjunction with his abdication. Like his father, Letsie vowed not to intervene in the country’s political affairs. Brown, “Lesotho: Recent History,” p. 599.
155 Howard Barrell, “We have some serious explaining to do,” Weekly Mail & Guardian, 25 September 1998, available on the Internet at: <http://www.m&g.co.za>. The Prime Minister does not have to secure the King’s acquiescence, however. Ibid.
158 Maputo became involved when it assumed the Vice Chairmanship of SADC. Interview with Brammer, 27 August 1999, by telephone.
Director-General was involved.\textsuperscript{159} Policy was formulated and implemented at the Department of Defence in a similar fashion. Although the Chief of the SANDF, Siphiwe Nyanda, had been consulted, Defence Secretary Pierre Steyn was kept in the dark. The SANDF later complained that it had 48 hours to plan and execute the operation.\textsuperscript{160} The intervention also contravened several of the criteria identified in the \textit{White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions}, which had been finalized but had not yet been tabled in Parliament when the operation was launched.\textsuperscript{161}

\textit{The Force Encounters Unexpected Difficulties}

The operation was expected to be both quick and easy. South Africa fully anticipated that the troops it sent would be sufficient to resolve the situation peacefully. The “plan” was for the show of force to convince the mutinous soldiers that had rallied behind the King in opposition to the Prime Minister to return to their barracks. As with its 1994 involvement in Lesotho, the SANDF did not expect to engage in offensive military operations. This time, however, the SANDF crossed the border and entered Lesotho. According to Amb. Jackie Selebi, Director-General of South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs, the idea was that “maximum visibility but minimum force” would suffice. Indeed, the South African armoured vehicles sent to Lesotho were not heavily armed. For example, blank cartridges were fired to make its presence felt while limiting the potential for bloodshed and property damage.\textsuperscript{162}

Events did not transpire as South Africa had anticipated, however. The SANDF encountered stiff resistance from the outset. Selebi believes that the

\textsuperscript{159} Interview with Brammer, 27 August 1999, by telephone.

\textsuperscript{160} Written correspondence with Cilliers, 13 November 1999.

\textsuperscript{161} For example, the White Paper provides that Parliament must give prior approval before South African military forces can be sent as part of a peace mission. The mission must also have an appropriate international mandate or UN approval. See \textit{White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions}, approved by Cabinet on 21 October 1998, courtesy of South African Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva.

\textsuperscript{162} Interview with Amb. Jackie Selebi, Director-General, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 26 March 1999, Geneva.
rebellious soldiers must have quickly become wise to the fact that the South African troops were not prepared to fight, which emboldened them.\footnote{Ibid.} In the ensuing mayhem, eight South African soldiers\footnote{“Bulletin No. 61/98,” South African Department of Defence, 25 September 1998, available on the Internet at <<http://www.mil.za/SANDF/>>. The Department of Defence also announced that 17 SANDF troops had been wounded. “Bulletin No. 60/98,” South African Department of Defence, 23 September 1998, available on the Internet at <<http://www.mil.za/SANDF/>>. Media reports at the time suggested the number of CTF casualties was significantly higher.}—and many more Lesothans\footnote{President Mandela regretted that 58 Lesothan soldiers had lost their lives as a result of the intervention. “Verbatim,” Weekly Mail & Guardian, 25 September 1999, available on the Internet at <<http://www.m&g.co.za>>.}—lost their lives. Rioters took to the streets and destroyed property and looted businesses. Much of the capital, Maseru, was torched and laid to ruins. Thousands of people were uprooted from their homes.

The SANDF was ill-prepared to respond to the unexpected developments. The initial mission was much smaller than what was needed to put down the unrest. (The force would eventually grow to more than 3,000 troops.) The new SANDF did not possess the discipline and abilities of its predecessor, the South African Defence Force (SADF).\footnote{“Lesotho: Pretoria Under Fire for Messy Intervention,” p. 13239.} The SANDF claimed that the Government did not have a clear national security policy and admitted that the units involved were not combat-ready. Brig.Gen. Borries Bornmann, Chief of South Africa’s Special Forces, said, “[t]he wrong people were sent in and there was a lack of intelligence. Our troops could not adapt to the terrain.”\footnote{Howard Barrell, “Defence force reputation in tatters,” Weekly Mail & Guardian, 2 October 1998, available on the Internet at <<http://www.m&g.co.za>>. South Africa’s intelligence operatives failed to identify 53 truck loads of heavy weapons that were moved to a military base. (Lawrence Whelan, “Questions raised by Lesotho intervention,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1999, p. 44.)} SANDF Lt-Gen. Deon Ferreira stated that there were limited reserves of ration packs and spare parts due to cuts in
defence spending. He also acknowledged that no scenario planning was done because there were no aerial photographs.\textsuperscript{168}

\textit{Salvaging a Bungled Operation?}

Operation Boleas eventually restored a semblance of calm, and a negotiated settlement was reached between Prime Minister Mosisili and the aggrieved opposition parties. In October 1998, they agreed to establish a Transitional Committee responsible for organizing new elections within 18 months.\textsuperscript{169} Troops from the CTF began to withdraw in significant numbers in December 1998.\textsuperscript{170} Operation Boleas was concluded on 15 May 1999.\textsuperscript{171}

The botched intervention raised doubts internationally about South Africa’s diplomatic and military competence. The military response was arguably not justified by the circumstances. Leaving aside whether further diplomatic initiatives might have succeeded in resolving the crisis, coercive measures short of military force, such as the imposition of economic sanctions, were never fully explored. According to Richard Cornwell, “Lesotho was a prime candidate for negotiated settlement. Besides, in these situations, you do not just march in. You mass troops at the border, make threatening noises or drop a few paratroopers and flyers.”\textsuperscript{172} The intervention was also inconsistent with South Africa’s own policy of non-military intervention in DRC. Beyond that, it challenged expectations that South Africa will serve a constructive role in the subregion. Moreover, it raised the concern that if South Africa cannot handle a relatively small problem, like Lesotho, it cannot well serve as the subregion’s policeman.


\textsuperscript{170} “Bulletin No. 96/98.”


\textsuperscript{172} “Lesotho: Pretoria Under Fire for Messy Intervention,” p. 13240.
SADC PEACEKEEPING PROSPECTS: THE ORGAN AND BEYOND

It is inaccurate to term the military responses of SADC members in DRC and Lesotho “SADC” interventions. The Organ for Politics, Defence, and Security, which should be the SADC body that sanctions such military actions on behalf of the organization, is not yet operational. In both cases, no other SADC structure followed the proper procedure for approving the interventions. The SADC Treaty provides that for all meetings of SADC institutions, two-thirds of the organization’s membership constitutes a quorum and all decisions are taken by consensus. Moreover, the SADC Secretariat has been substantially divorced from the decision-making process in both instances and has not played a very visible or transparent role. The Secretariat has not exercised any operational oversight into either intervention.

The interventions in DRC and Lesotho have exacerbated pre-existing tensions among SADC countries and have created new ones. The announcement in April 1998 that Angola, DRC, Namibia, and Zimbabwe had concluded a mutual defence pact does much more than simply reinforce the four countries’ relationship vis-à-vis the conflict in DRC. It is a harbinger that the split within SADC may yet become more pronounced. Luanda’s war with UNITA shows no signs of abating, let alone concluding, and there are clear indications that SADC countries are split in their approach to the conflict—with some favouring military force against the rebels while others support negotiations and a political solution to that conflict. Even before the defence pact had been concluded, Mugabe had let it be known publicly that he favoured supporting Angola militarily. The agreement will likely embolden Luanda to increase its sabre rattling against Zambia, which it has accused of aiding UNITA. The prospect for some form of Angolan intervention in Zambia—ostensibly in “hot pursuit” of UNITA rebels—has

173 Articles 18 and 19, Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, p. 129.
increased, and the existence of the Defence Protocol threatens to draw other countries into the fray.\textsuperscript{175}

The fact that SADC member States continue to discuss ways to make the Organ effective suggests, however, that political will does exist to address previous shortcomings. Exercise Blue Crane underscores this point. During a time of heightened political tensions among many countries from the subregion, adversaries managed to put aside their differences to work towards developing a military capability to jointly undertake peacekeeping operations. SADC countries’ present and foreseeable inability to field and sustain a brigade-sized force as envisioned in Blue Crane must be borne in mind, but perhaps is of less significance.

\textsuperscript{175} Windhoek, which accuses Lusaka of encouraging successionist activity within the Caprivi Strip, would likely support an Angolan intervention in Zambia.
CHAPTER 6

OTHER AFRICAN SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Although the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have fielded the most significant multinational forces, five other subregional organizations are often mentioned as potentially playing a similar role in the promotion of peace and security. The five are the Arab Maghreb Union (known by its French acronym, UMA, for Union du Maghreb arabe), the East African Co-operation (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defence (known by its French acronym, ANAD, for Accord de non-agression et d’assistance en matière de défense). The least-known of the five, ANAD, is the only one that has actually undertaken a peacekeeping mission of its own. The other four differ from the security-oriented ANAD in that they were primarily created to promote economic development. Like the OAU, ECOWAS, and SADC, however, they all have moved towards establishing mandates and mechanisms to deal with conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

ARAB MAGHREB UNION

The very creation of the Arab Maghreb Union in February 1989 represented a notable accomplishment, given the level of distrust among some of its member States. Previously, the organization’s five members—Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia (see Map 6.1)—had concentrated their energies on concluding bilateral and trilateral

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1 Egypt’s application in 1994 to be accorded “Observer” status had yet to be acted on as of mid-1999. Written correspondence with Kemal Mohamedou, Political Affairs and Information Officer, UMA Secretariat, 7 June 1999.
political agreements with one another. The outbreak of the war in Western Sahara in November 1975 had effectively put on hold any plans for greater regional cooperation. Agreements concluded after that date were spawned in large part by Algerian-Moroccan posturing for political support from the other countries of the region.

Continuing tensions among UMA member States have kept the organization from functioning as envisioned. The Presidential Council (also known as the Summit), comprised of the five members’ Heads of State and Government was convened six times, but has not been assembled since its meeting in Tunis in 1994. Morocco, in a show of displeasure with Algeria over the Western Sahara issue, asked in 1995 that the activities of UMA be effectively frozen—but stopped short of withdrawing from the Organization. Some meetings at the ministerial level have since been held, and member States have not withheld their dues. The Rabat-based Secretariat, comprising 15 officials, has continued to function relatively smoothly, however, and operates on a budget of US$ 1.9 million.

UMA has no working defence or conflict resolution structures. Article 14 of its Treaty addresses peace and security matters, stating that, “any act of aggression against one of the Member countries will be considered as an act of aggression against the other Member countries.” The Treaty does not define what constitutes “aggression” or what the response to such an occurrence would be. Comparatively greater emphasis is placed on

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3 Diplomatic efforts by the three other UMA members proved insufficient to break the deadlock. See ibid, pp. 18-19.

4 Written correspondence with Kemal Mohamedou, 25 August 1999.

5 Ibid.

proscribing the actions of member States against one another. Article 15 provides:

The Member countries undertake not to allow on their respective territories any activity or organization which might prove harmful to the security, territorial integrity or political system of any Member country. They also undertake to take part in no military or political pact or alliance which may be directed against the political independence or territorial unity of the other Member countries.7

Yet there is no clear recourse if a member should violate this provision. The Council of Common Defence, established at the Tunis Summit in January 1990,8 was to be an informal body comprising Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence. As of mid-1999, the Council had never been convened.9

UMA member States have, however, come to one another’s aid in response to natural disasters. Morocco and Tunisia provided military assistance to Algeria in 1980 after an earthquake, and in 1988 Algeria and Morocco contributed equipment and personnel to help Tunisia, which was suffering from floods.10 While both interventions occurred before UMA was created, they nevertheless are potentially important precedents upon which to base future cooperation in response to complex humanitarian emergencies.

Despite its lackluster history, there are signs that UMA may become reinvigorated. The April 1999 presidential election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika in Algeria presents the possibility that Algerian-Moroccan relations may thaw considerably. Bouteflika, a former Foreign Minister, is generally considered to have established a good rapport with Morocco.11 Second, the United Nations Security Council’s decision in April 1999 to lift the embargo against

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7 Written correspondence with Kemal Mohamedou, 7 June 1999.
Libya,\textsuperscript{12} which included economic sanctions, represents another significant political change. That same month, UMA Secretary-General Mohamed Amamou\textsuperscript{13} (from Tunisia) announced that plans were under way for the Presidential Council to meet before year’s end.\textsuperscript{14}

Nevertheless, economic concerns will remain the principal focus of UMA. Contributions to peacekeeping initiatives, either in the subregion or elsewhere in Africa, have never been broached. There is no reason to believe that the understanding among UMA member States that the Western Sahara issue is strictly off-limits will be revisited, let alone revised. The matter has never been an agenda item or even mentioned at any of UMA’s six Summits or more numerous ministerial-level meetings.\textsuperscript{15} As for the crisis in Algeria, the UMA considers it an internal affair.


\textsuperscript{13} Amamou has been the Secretary-General since UMA’s founding.

\textsuperscript{14} “Algeria to Host Maghreb Summit,” Panafrican News Agency, 22 April 1999, available on the Internet at \texttt{<http://www.africanews.org>}

\textsuperscript{15} Written correspondence with Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou, 26 January 1999. According to Mohamedou, the conflict has only been referred to twice in an UMA context: “by the Moroccan Foreign Affairs Minister who cited it as the reason his country was asking to freeze UMA activities, [and]… by Secretary-General Amamou in a press interview saying that, ‘L’affaire du Sahara n’a jamais été sur l’agenda de l’UMA.’” Ibid.
**EAST AFRICAN CO-OPERATION**

The East African Co-operation was relaunched in March 1996, but its membership and acronym date back some 30 years. The three members—Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (see Map 6.2)—initially came together to form the East African Community in 1967. That organization effectively folded in 1977, a year before Tanzania and Uganda went to war with one another. New Governments in those two countries that bore little resemblance to their predecessors and an appreciation that beneficial economic zones were being formed in other parts of the world contributed to the decision to create a new organization. The EAC Secretariat is based in Arusha, Tanzania, and its Executive Secretary, Amb. Francis Muthaura, is from Kenya. In October 1999, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda plan to sign a treaty establishing a new East African Community, retaining once again the EAC acronym, but substantially enhancing the subregional organization’s role.

While the current EAC also has a clear economic agenda, it differs significantly from its predecessor in devoting considerable attention to security-related matters. In November 1997 and January 1998, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda held high-level meetings to discuss possible cooperation for undertaking peace support operations. In April 1998, the three countries’ armed forces signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on defence matters. According to military leaders, the MOU addresses a wide range of issues. The chief of the Ugandan army has said it includes the mutual use of communication facilities, sharing of intelligence,

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16 The EAC was officially disbanded in 1984. Written correspondence with Magaga Alot, Information and Public Relations Officer, EAC Secretariat, 7 September 1999.
17 Ibid.
and potentially, joint operations. According to the Tanzanian Defence Minister, the MOU covers confidence-building measures (CBMs) including training and joint exercises, the coordination of facilities and systems, military research, and production measures. The intention is to eventually conclude a defence pact.

The decision to enlarge the organization’s membership is motivated more by the desire to address regional security concerns than to capture an increased market share. At a Summit of Heads of State held in Arusha in January 1999, the three EAC Presidents agreed to consider Rwanda’s application for membership after the signing of the EAC Treaty. They also suggested that an application by Burundi would be similarly considered at the appropriate time. Burundi and Rwanda are small States with relatively tiny populations compared to Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Both countries have experienced much bloodshed in recent years and are better known for exporting refugees than products. The decision, therefore, is a calculated gamble that moving to integrate the two countries economically and politically will help provide a basis for stability.

This budding interest in cooperating in security matters was evident in the decision to hold a joint peacekeeping exercise, Natural Fire, in June 1998. It was the first time all three regional countries’ militaries worked alongside one another. Host country Kenya provided the bulk of the force, which also included a contingent from the US. The month-long exercise

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22 EAC Executive Secretary Muthaura announced that he had been instructed “by the Heads of State to make a positive communication to Rwanda today . . . In principle, yes, they will be admitted [to the EAC]—but after the treaty [is signed].” “EA Summit: Rwanda Promised Admission, Burundi’s Position Favourable,” Africa News Service, 22 January 1999, taken from the Internet.
23 Ibid.
24 According to one account, Kenya provided 1,365 soldiers, Tanzania 256, Uganda 210, and the US 375. See Willy Faria, “Ministers Hail Joint Military Operations,” (continued...)
assumed the force was operating in a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Participants were to create conditions for negotiating a cease-fire, assist refugees, facilitate humanitarian relief, and hold free and fair elections. Although the US had to provide a communication team for each unit in the field to ensure effective command and control, the three EAC countries did assemble a brigade-sized headquarters that worked well together.25

This initial exercise was conceived as a springboard for further cooperation in peacekeeping activities and complex emergency operations. According to the Commander of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces, Natural Fire was not designed to form a standing peacekeeping force but rather to develop a capacity to assemble such a force, should the need arise. He stressed that the applicability of peacekeeping skills was not confined to military operations, but also to respond to catastrophes and natural disasters. In such cases a peacekeeping force could escort relief convoys, provide medical treatment, and otherwise assist civilians.26 Plans are under way for a follow-up exercise to Natural Fire with the same participants in 2000.27

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES

The Economic Community of Central African States has been largely moribund since its creation in 1981. Members of the Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique centrale (CECAC) (Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire) and the Union douanière et économique de l’Afrique centrale (UDEAC) (Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), and Gabon) established ECCAS not to supplant their organizations, but to create a larger economic trading bloc. Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe were also founding members of the organization. Angola has always participated in ECCAS, first as an observer and, since January 1999, as a full

24 (...continued)
member. Subsequent to ECCAS’s creation, several of its members have been beset by rebellions, civil wars, military invasions, and coup d’états. Expending resources and exerting political will to develop the Libreville-based body, which is currently headed by Secretary General Gen. Louis Sylvain Goma of Congo (Brazzaville), has only recently become a priority.

Given the limitations of ECCAS and the enormity of the problems facing the region, the United Nations was engaged to help ECCAS States address political and security concerns, which resulted in the creation of a complementary mechanism. In 1986, the then ECCAS Chairman Cameroonian President Paul Biya asked the United Nations to support a programme to identify and implement CBMs to promote development and security in the subregion. Towards this end, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa held a workshop in February 1988, in which ECCAS members participated. In May 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali established the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (the Committee) in response to a General Assembly resolution. A Trust Fund

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Map 6.3

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES

Members
Angola
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Congo
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Rwanda
São Tomé and Príncipe

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.
was subsequently created to support the Committee’s work. All ECCAS member and observer States were part of the Committee.

Through the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee, ECCAS States have undertaken a number of ambitious initiatives to promote regional peace and security. In July 1996, at the Committee’s first Summit of Heads of State and Government, a Non-Aggression Pact was concluded. As of 30 June 1999, nine members had signed the pact, but none had ratified it. Seven must ratify the Pact for it to enter into force. A Training Seminar on Peace Operations was held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, in September 1996. A conference entitled, “Democratic Institutions and Peace in Central Africa,” originally scheduled for April 1997 in Brazzaville, was postponed and subsequently held in Bata, Equatorial Guinea, in May 1998. In February 1999, ECCAS Heads of State and Government decided to create a mechanism to promote, maintain, and consolidate peace and security in the region to be known as the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX). An Early Warning Mechanism was as well approved.


34 Eight countries signed at the Summit ceremony, and CAR signed the pact on 24 September 1996. (United Nations Concern for Peace and Security in Central Africa: Reference Document, p. 85.) Angola and Rwanda have not signed as of mid-1999.


Heads of State have also expressed a desire to undertake joint military and peacekeeping exercises provided appropriate funding can be secured.\textsuperscript{38} 

The manner in which COPAX was “created” strongly suggests, however, that the substance behind these initiatives is often minimal. The agreement on COPAX of 25 February 1999 consisted of just three Articles. The first two Articles, each a single sentence, say essentially the same thing.\textsuperscript{39} Article 3 states in full:

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Defence/Armed Forces will meet in Yaoundé as soon as possible in order to draw up the draft terms of reference for the mechanism referred to in article 1 and propose them to the heads of State and Government of Central Africa during the summit meeting of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to be held in Equatorial Guinea in April 1999. Cameroon will convene this ministerial meeting.

The idea that less than two months should be sufficient to develop terms of reference for such a mechanism is not so much a sign of hubris as a calling into question of ECCAS member States’ seriousness of purpose. ECCAS ministers did meet as planned in March, but the April 1999 Summit was postponed until June for logistical reasons. According to the June Summit’s Final Communiqué, the Heads of State simply decided (again) to integrate

\textsuperscript{36}(...continued)

\textsuperscript{37} Written correspondence with Cosme, 30 September 1999.


\textsuperscript{39} Article 1 states, [ECCAS Decides] “To create a mechanism for the promotion, maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Central Africa, to be known as the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX).” Article 2 adds, “The aim of COPAX is the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts in Central Africa, together with activities to promote, maintain and consolidate peace and security in the subregion.” UN Document A/53/868 - S/1999/303, Annex I.
COPAX into the ECCAS structure.\textsuperscript{40} The money provided to support this flurry of activity seems a very small price to pay for the remote possibility that one of these CBMs will succeed—even partially. More than concluding another agreement, however, follow-through on that which has already been concluded would be a truer indication that progress was indeed being made, and the money well spent. Anatole Ayissi believes that limited resources are being squandered as ECCAS fora are long on form and short on substance.\textsuperscript{41}

Some progress has been made, however, as a result of the Committee’s and ECCAS member States’ efforts. There is now a willingness to discuss issues and a structure for them to be addressed. The former Secretary of the Committee, Sammy Kum Buo, stresses that COPAX at the very least provides a “blueprint” for future action. He acknowledges that progress has been slow but believes that achievements, however limited, should not be casually dismissed given the level of distrust that exists among several ECCAS member States and the subregion’s instability.\textsuperscript{42} In January 1999, a new post, at the level of Deputy Secretary General, was created within the Secretariat to liaise with the Committee, among other responsibilities.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Final Communiqué, Ninth Ordinary Session of the Conference of ECCAS Heads of State and Government, 24 June 1999, courtesy of ECCAS Secretariat.}

\textsuperscript{41} Written correspondence with Anatole Ayissi, Associate Director, Peace and Disarmament Education Programme, International Relations Institute of Cameroon, and Visiting Scholar, Centre for Defence Studies, Royal Military Academy of Belgium, 26 August 1999.

\textsuperscript{42} Interview with Sammy Kum Buo, former Secretary, Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, UN Department of Political Affairs, current Deputy Director, Africa II Division, UN Department of Political Affairs, 10 September 1999, by telephone.

\textsuperscript{43} Two other Deputy Secretary General posts were established—for Administration and Finance, and for Physical and Economic Integration—but neither had been filled as of 30 June 1999. Written correspondence with Cosme, 7 October 1999.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT

The origins of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development differ from most other African subregional organizations in the emphasis placed on humanitarian concerns. With the active encouragement of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), six countries in East Africa and the Horn of Africa—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, and Uganda—formed the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in January 1986. Working together they hoped to improve their own and the international community’s responses to natural disasters that were wreaking havoc on their region. Eritrea joined IGADD in September 1993. (See Map 6.4.) The organization changed its name to IGAD in 1996.

As with other subregional organizations in Africa, IGAD has subsequently turned its attention to peace and security issues. IGAD began its mediation efforts to end the Somali conflict in 1991. In 1993 it mandated Ethiopia to take the lead on behalf of IGAD members to follow developments and help find a diplomatic solution. IGAD has since convened numerous meetings to try and resolve the conflict, often in association with the United Nations and the OAU. It has played a similar role in trying to help negotiate a settlement to the civil war in the Sudan. A Committee, established in 1993 comprising the Presidents of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya (as Chair), and Uganda, was entrusted with this task. The international donor community created the Friends of IGAD in 1996 to assist both of these efforts. In January 1997, this body was replaced with the more robust IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) to better generate and channel

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45 Written correspondence with Juliet Bateyo Kamara, Chief, Documentation and Information Section, IGAD Secretariat, 24 August 1999.
46 Ibid.
much needed funding and international political support for the peace processes.47

The name change from IGADD to IGAD in March 1996 was not merely cosmetic and has had a bearing on the Secretariat’s ability to promote peace and security more directly. IGAD Heads of State and Government adopted a revised charter and resolved to strengthen and restructure the Secretariat.48 The Djibouti-based Secretariat, headed by Executive Secretary Tekeste Ghebray (from Eritrea), has grown significantly since the reorganization—from 11 full-time staff to 19, with provision made for three more. (The number of consultants has remained constant at eight.) Its budget has grown to US$ 2.27 million. 49 The Division of Political and Humanitarian Affairs was created, which includes a Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution section. IGAD has also developed a five-element “Programme on Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management”: [1] developing capacity-building for conflict prevention; [2] documenting demobilization and post-conflict peace-building experience; [3] elaborating a culture of peace and tolerance; [4] developing a conflict early warning mechanism; and [5] creating an emergency relief fund. These five projects were discussed at IPF Technical Experts Meeting in April 1998, and plans have been drawn for developing each of the five “outputs” at a cost of just under US$ 1 million.50

IGAD’s potential to contribute to regional peacekeeping is negligible. For the foreseeable future its efforts to resolve and manage conflict will be confined to the realm of diplomacy. The conflicts in Somalia and the Sudan defy easy solutions, and member States are economically strapped. Although

47 Written correspondence with Kamara, 29 September 1999.
49 Written correspondence with Kamara, 24 August 1999 and 29 September 1999.
IGAD did initiate high-level talks with leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia following the outbreak of hostilities in May 1998,\(^{51}\) it was in no position to intervene meaningfully—even if the combatants had sought its services, which they did not.\(^{52}\) IGAD member States seem more willing to devote significant scarce resources to actively undermine their neighbours than to help bring about a sustainable peace.\(^{53}\) Several members possess militaries, gendarmes, or police as well as the experience to undertake a peacekeeping mission in the region. What is missing is the political will.\(^{54}\) As an IGAD official stated matter-of-factly, IGAD was not foreseen, and it is not expected, to have a peacekeeping army or police force.\(^{55}\)

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**THE TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION, ASSISTANCE AND MUTUAL DEFENCE**

The Treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance, and Mutual Defence underscores the division that continues to exist between francophone and anglophone countries in West Africa. ANAD was created in 1977 by six francophone members of the *Communauté économique de l’Afrique de l'Ouest* (CEAO). The treaty has the dual purpose of promoting cooperation and preventing conflict between member states. It establishes principles of non-aggression, assistance, and mutual defence, aiming to foster regional stability and economic development.

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51 “IGAD Sparing No Efforts to Prevent a Full-Scale Conflict Between Ethiopia and Eritrea,” *IGAD Secretariat Press Release*, available on the Internet at &lt;http://www.igad.org/press05.htm&gt;.

52 The war flared up again in February 1999 after a lull in the fighting of several months. By April, it was widely reported to have claimed as many as 50,000 lives, “because the combatants use the weapons of the Korean war, the tactics of the first world war and the medical treatments of the 19th century.” See “Africa’s forgotten war,” *The Economist*, 8 May 1999, pp. 45-47.

53 Several countries support insurgencies in neighbouring countries to varying degrees.

54 A January 1999 US Institute of Peace (USIP) colloquium on the Sudanese peace process and the role of IGAD concluded that although IGAD should remain the primary actor to conduct the negotiations, it was vital that outside actors assume a greater role in helping set the agenda and pushing things forward. See *A New Approach to Peace in Sudan: Report on a USIP Consultation*, 25 February 1999, available on the Internet at &lt;http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990225/sr990225.html&gt;.

55 Written correspondence with Kamara, 24 August 1999.
l’Ouest (CEAO)\textsuperscript{56}—Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso)—and Togo, which was not a CEAO member. Francophone States Benin and Guinea have observer status.\textsuperscript{57} (See Map 6.5.) The Secretariat, established in 1981, consists of some 30 individuals and is headquartered in Abidjan.\textsuperscript{58} The current Secretary-General, R-Adm. Alexandre Diam, is from Senegal.

The ANAD Treaty provides for conflict management and collective defence mechanisms. A commission consisting of two representatives from each member country is responsible for settling disputes through mediation, arbitration, or conciliation. Should preventive diplomacy fail, it is foreseen that the deployment of an inter-positional peacekeeping force may be appropriate. Provision is made for diplomatic initiatives, including coercive measures short of military force, as well as military actions.\textsuperscript{59} Between 1981 and 1984, during a period of heightened activity, members of ANAD adopted more than a dozen protocols and statutes concerning security issues and the functioning of the Secretariat.\textsuperscript{60}

Although ANAD members have authorized an observer mission on one occasion, it was quite limited in size and scope. Four days after a war broke

\textsuperscript{56} CEAO was founded in 1973, and continued after ECOWAS had been created in 1975.

\textsuperscript{57} Benin has completed the legal procedures to become a full member of ANAD. It is now a matter of formalities. Written correspondence with R-Adm. Alexandre Diam, Secretary-General, ANAD Secretariat, 12 April 1999.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.


out between ANAD members Burkina Faso and Mali in December 1985.\footnote{Burkina Faso and Mali had gone to war once before in 1974. This was partly responsible for ANAD’s creation as it showed that despite links with France, regional wars were still a serious threat. Olu Adeniji, “Mechanisms for Conflict Management in West Africa: Politics of Harmonization,” *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 15 October 1997, available on the Internet at <http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/>.} ANAD Council of Ministers convoked the organization’s first extraordinary meeting. A cease-fire was successfully negotiated, and a 16-member Commission of Observers was agreed upon. Each of the seven members provided two military officers, as did Benin.\footnote{“L’ANAD a 10 ans: 1977-1987,” pp. 29-30.} In addition, the Ivorian Government provided air support for the operation\footnote{An Ivorian Alouette helicopter attached to the Commission crashed on 12 January 1986, and four Ivorian crew members were killed. Ibid, p. 30.} as well as significant financial assistance.\footnote{Written correspondence with Diam, 12 April 1999.} The observers withdrew at the end of January 1986, after tensions eased.\footnote{“L’ANAD a 10 Ans: 1977-1987,” p. 30.}

Surprisingly, at a time when ECOWAS member States are attempting to strengthen that organization’s peacekeeping capacities, ANAD is showing signs of reasserting itself after many years of inactivity. Despite the successful management and resolution of the conflict between Burkina Faso and Mali, there has not been another instance when ANAD authorized or deployed a peacekeeping force—even though opportunities to do so have subsequently arisen. At a meeting of defence ministers held in April 1999 in Senegal, an agreement was reached on a proposal to form a peacekeeping force to respond to defence, security, and humanitarian activities. The decision to create such a body had been made several years earlier.\footnote{A study for the OAU on African peacekeeping training reported that as of October 1996, ANAD Heads of State and Government had tasked the Chiefs of Defence Staffs of ANAD member states to develop recommendations for establishing a subregional peacekeeping force. Mark Malan, William Nhara, and Pol Bergevin, *African Capabilities for Training for Peace Operations*, Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies, 1997, p. 75.} The US$ 290,000 initiative, to be funded over a three-year period, is to be submitted to ANAD.
Heads of State for approval.

Nevertheless, the future effectiveness of ANAD remains questionable. The organization is not on secure financial footing. As of April 1999 it was owed US$ 884,000 in membership arrears. In this light, the hoped-for sum of US$ 290,000 seems rather optimistic. Moreover, such a figure would be insignificant compared to the actual cost of staging an operation of any meaningful size and complexity. It is difficult to envision a conflict in West Africa in which another month-long 16-member military observer team might prove a viable solution.

None of these five subregional organizations is ready to undertake multifaceted peacekeeping operations. With the election of Algerian President Bouteflika, UMA appears poised to pick up where it left off in 1994 when the last Summit was convened. However, the tacit agreement among UMA member States not to intervene even diplomatically, on “domestic” issues such as the Algerian civil war and the conflict in Western Sahara is not likely to soon be revisited. EAC, on the other hand, has undertaken a joint military exercise and its recent defence agreements and plans for future operations suggest that it could undertake a peacekeeping or complex emergency operation in the near future. Barring an infusion of financial and material resources from other countries, however, any such initiative will be quite limited in both scope and duration. Still, the apparent political willingness of the three member States and their individual and joint military experience distinguish EAC from its peers. ECCAS cannot be expected to respond in any meaningful way to crises within and among its members, the

creation of COPAX notwithstanding, IGAD has shown itself willing to become engaged in conflict prevention, management, and resolution in its subregion, but its efforts will continue to be limited to mediation and negotiation. ANAD’s 1986 observer mission succeeded largely because the combatants wanted it to succeed. Financial limitations alone suggest that ANAD’s 1999 decision to form a standby peacekeeping force is not likely to materialize.
CHAPTER 7

AFRICAN AD HOC INITIATIVES

African countries have also undertaken a number of military interventions on the continent outside of regional and subregional organizations. Those resulting from purely bilateral arrangements are not considered in this chapter, except for the 1979 deployment of Nigerian troops in Chad. Military invasions, no matter how well intentioned, are not included. While few of the interventions reviewed were instrumental in bringing about a negotiated settlement, all are noteworthy for the political will exhibited in deploying troops abroad and in accepting foreign troops on one’s own territory.

ZAIRE (1977-1979)

The first African-led multinational force was not established through a regional organization. In April 1977, a force principally comprised of Moroccan troops was deployed to Zaire to put down an incursion from Angola into the mineral-rich mining province of Shaba. The Forces armées zaïroises (FAZ) had proved to be ineffective in countering the rebels, who had commenced their attack the previous month. The intervention received significant international support and included military personnel from other countries. Egypt, which provided some pilots and aviation technicians, and France, which contributed military advisers, assisted the 1,300-strong...
Moroccan force. Belgium also supplied personnel. The provision of military units from other countries is less clearly documented.

Morocco received considerable assistance from Western countries in mounting the operation. France contributed 11 aircraft to transport Moroccan troops. Approximately 80 flights were required to deploy the requisite food, fuel, ammunition, and equipment. The US helped plan and execute the Moroccan contingent’s deployment. Washington also provided “non-lethal” equipment and supplies worth US$ 15 million, which included rations and parachutes. Belgium sped up the delivery of military equipment already on order. The Moroccans departed by June, after order had been restored—at least temporarily.

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3 (...) continued

4 Written correspondence with Raja Ghannam, Counsellor, Moroccan Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 3 April 1999. The figure most often cited in academic literature is 1,500.


6 For example, Africa Contemporary Record mentions only that the Sudan provided military support and that Uganda volunteered to send a “suicide squad.” Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 10, 1977-78, p. B594.


9 Ibid.


11 Ibid.
A year later, Moroccan troops returned to Zaire—this time to lead an inter-African force. In May 1978, a much larger group of Zairean rebels invaded Shaba. Again, the FAZ proved incapable of containing the insurgency. On this occasion, Belgium and France dispatched significant numbers of their own forces to the region. The African force was assembled following discussions between French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and various African leaders at the 22-23 May 1978 Franco-African Summit that, as it happened, was being held during the time of the rebellion and just a few days after Belgian and French troops arrived in Shaba. Support for a Moroccan-led mission was quickly secured, although the proposal had its dissenters. By the month’s end, Morocco replaced the French troops—the Belgians having departed a week earlier. Contingents from the other countries participating in the operation began to arrive in June. According to I. William Zartman, Morocco provided 1,500 troops, Senegal 600, Central African Empire (CAE) 390, Côte d’Ivoire 110, and Gabon and Togo “token”

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12 George E. Moose, “French Military Policy in Africa,” in William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen (eds), Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa’s International Relations, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 71-72. Gabonese President El Hadj Omar Bongo championed the idea of sending an Organization of African Unity (OAU) force to Shaba, but it was not seriously considered as support for the proposal was half-hearted even among its advocates. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Updated Edition), p. 162.


15 The President of the Central African Republic (CAR), Jean-Bédel Bokassa, declared his country an “Empire” in 1976 and renamed CAR accordingly. Bokassa held his coronation the following year at which point he became Emperor. In 1979, Bokassa was overthrown, and his successor, David Dacko, returned the country to a Republic.
numbers.16 Egypt, which reportedly offered to provide military personnel,17 ultimately did not send a contingent.

All six African countries that participated in the operation received assistance from Belgium, France, or the United States. The US airlifted the various African contingents to the mission area,18 and Belgium and France joined the US in providing logistical support to maintain the force.19 The mission successfully fulfilled its tasks before withdrawing some 15 months later.

**CHAD (1979)**

The Nigerian undertaking in Chad differs from other bilateral initiatives in that it enjoyed international support and resulted from a multi-party agreement concluded in an effort to end the civil war there. As discussed in Chapter 3, the factious Chadian polity was not yet ready to conclude a workable peace agreement. From subsequent events, however, it is clear that Lagos could not have fielded a force of sufficient size and staying power to implement an accord on its own. The Nigerian force, known as Harmony II,20

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20 Despite the name of the operation, the intervention had little in common with Harmony I, Nigeria’s 1964 mission to assist the Government of Tanzania in restoring order on the island of Zanzibar where mutinous troops opposed the island’s political union with mainland Tanganyika.
was deployed in March 1979 with only 150 men and was later reinforced to 800.\textsuperscript{21}

Nigeria was ill-prepared to undertake the mission and withdrew its peacekeepers in June 1979, after only three months. Neither the Nigerians nor the Chadians were properly briefed on what was expected of them. The concept of “neutrality” was not universally appreciated and the legal status of the peacekeepers was unclear. Anglophone Nigerians and francophone Chadians found it difficult to communicate with one another, which aggravated the situation.\textsuperscript{22}

**MOZAMBIQUE (1986-1992)**

The military intervention by regional countries in support of Maputo in Mozambique’s civil war represents the largest African-led ad hoc undertaking. Concerned about recent advances the rebel movement Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) had made, in 1986 the Mozambican Government asked the Front-line States (FLS) for military assistance. Tanzania and Zimbabwe agreed to deploy troops inside Mozambique to help counter the threat RENAMO posed. Zambia pledged to establish joint patrols with Mozambique along their shared border but would keep its army on its own territory.\textsuperscript{23} Malawi, which was not a FLS member, also sent troops to Mozambique under a separate agreement. The Zimbabwean contingent of 10,000 troops\textsuperscript{24} was by far the largest foreign

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\textsuperscript{22} Wiseman, “The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution,” p. 131. As a result of its difficulties, Nigeria resolved never again to undertake peacekeeping operations wholly on its own. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{23} Interview with João Honwana, former Chief, Mozambican Air Force, current Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, 21 September 1999, Montreal.

\textsuperscript{24} Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, “Mozambique: Victims of Apartheid,” in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds), *Frontline Southern Africa: Destructive* (continued...)
presence, but Malawi and Tanzania together also contributed several thousand personnel.

The inter-African force in Mozambique later distinguished itself by the limited degree to which it relied on Western countries. In addition to Tanzanian and Zimbabwean contributions of troops, the three other FLS States assisted Maputo materially. Angola donated oil and uniforms, Botswana supplied rations, and Zambia contributed communication equipment. Mozambique also secured much-needed logistical and medical assistance from Algeria, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia. France agreed to sell Mozambique helicopters and offered other assistance. The foreign troops operated independently from one another and withdrew at separate and uncoordinated times over the next several years. Zimbabwean troops remained in Mozambique until 1992, when Maputo and RENAMO concluded a peace agreement.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (1997-1998)

The African multinational force that deployed in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 1997 is widely hailed as model of cooperation between Africa and the West. During 1996, the political situation in the country had rapidly deteriorated. By December, CAR's capital, Bangui, was divided: one part held by the mutinous army and elements of the gendarmerie, and the other by the presidential guard, which remained loyal to President Ange-Félix

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24 (...continued)

25 Interview with Honwana, 21 September 1999, Montreal.

26 Johnson and Martin, “Mozambique: Victims of Apartheid,” p. 43.


28 Army officers had mutinied three times in a period of eight months. Much of the population shared the officers’ discontent with the Government’s economic and social policies and performance.
Patassé. French troops based in CAR served as a buffer. The potential for the State to collapse was great, and there was considerable fear that such an event would exacerbate regional conflicts. With French support, African countries undertook the Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (known by its French acronym, MISAB, for Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui).

**Political and Legal Framework**

African efforts to resolve the conflict date from the December 1996 Franco-African Summit in Ouagadougou. At the meeting, President Patassé, through his Minister of Foreign Affairs, requested the assistance of those in attendance to negotiate a peace accord. In response, the Heads of State present designated Gabonese President El Hadj Omar Bongo to chair a four-nation International Mediation Committee, which included the presidents of Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali. These four leaders, in turn, established the International Monitoring Committee, to which each country designated a representative. Former Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré chaired this body, which was charged with assessing the situation and recommending how the conflict might best be resolved. Touré proposed to Bongo that “military structures” be put in place. Bongo agreed and spoke to France about providing logistical support for the force. With the agreement of the Conference on Consensus-Building and Dialogue, held from 11 to 16 January 1997, the International Mediation Committee decided to dispatch an inter-African force.

The force deployed with neither a clear mandate nor a status of forces agreement (SOFA). Touré explained that MISAB “drew up [its] own

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mandate,” which he described as “very clear and simple.” It was signed by
President Bongo on 6 March 1997 for an initial period of three months. The
mandate provided that “the objective of MISAB is to help restore peace and
security by monitoring the implementation of the agreements signed on
25 January 1997 in Bangui.” Beyond that, the text simply stated that “MISAB
shall conduct operations to disarm the ex-rebels, the militia and all other
unlawfully armed individuals.” The SOFA, which outlined the relationship
between MISAB troop-contributing countries and Bangui, was signed
later.

Composition and Command

MISAB comprised contingents from the four countries on the
International Monitoring Committee as well as two others—Senegal and
Togo. Although Senegal and Togo were not represented on the Committee,
they were present on the ground from the beginning of the operation. Each
troop-contributing country provided an infantry company of roughly the
same size: Burkina Faso (114 troops), Chad (147), Gabon (149), Mali (113),
Senegal (153), and Togo (120). According to the International Monitoring
Committee, the strengths of the contingents remained substantially constant
throughout the mission.

Touré continued to chair the International Monitoring Committee and
was given political authority over MISAB. All six troop-contributing countries

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32 Interview with Touré, 25 March 1999, Bamako.
33 UN Document S/1997/561, Appendix I, Mandate of the Inter-African Force to
Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements, 22 July 1997, Articles 2
and 3.
34 Ibid. Appendix II, Status of the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the
36 Ibid.
38 See, for example, UN Document S/1997/759, Annex, Fourth report to the
Security Council pursuant to resolution 1125 (1997) concerning the situation in
the Central African Republic, 30 September 1997, para. 46.
were represented at the senior-staff level at headquarters. Brig-Gen. Dejo Edouard Nkili of Gabon served as MISAB’s first Force Commander. He was replaced in August 1997 by his compatriot, Gen. Augustin Mombo Moukangi. Moukangi died of a heart attack in October 1997, and MISAB’s Chief of Staff, Col. Talla Nyang of Senegal, was appointed Acting Force Commander.

Performance in the Field

MISAB succeeded on numerous accounts. According to Touré, the troop-contributing countries generally provided competent men who possessed the necessary expertise. The force essentially brought the rebellion to a stop and recovered 96 per cent of the heavy weapons and 60 per cent of the light weapons. A United Nations official following developments in CAR enthused that MISAB did a “good job” and commended Touré and the International Monitoring Committee for getting Patassé to go to the negotiating table. Nyang cited the unity of language and military culture of MISAB troop-contributors as one of the reasons for its
impressive performance. Touré identifies four “keys” to MISAB’s success: (1) A group of Heads of State was intent on devising a workable solution to the situation in CAR and provided the necessary international political support for the peace process; (2) Touré was a “free agent” who largely took his own initiatives and made his own decisions in an impartial manner; (3) Western embassies in Bangui lent crucial support to the mission; and (4) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided important financial support and played a coordinating role.

### Dependence on External Support

MISAB’s achievements must not obscure a fundamental weakness: the force was wholly reliant on French largesse. Paris transported all six contingents to the field within days of the signing of the Bangui Agreements. The force also required French logistical and tactical support on the ground. Although each participating State provided its troops with their regular pay and supplied them with weapons, France paid their total food and daily subsistence allowances at rates then applicable to Central African military personnel. Enlisted men received US$ 167 per month, non-commissioned officers US$ 334, and officers US$ 668. France also provided personal equipment for the troops, including clothing. In addition, it supplied, provided fuel for, and maintained tactical and support vehicles, paid rents for buildings used by MISAB command and military personnel, and donated office equipment. The International Monitoring Committee estimated France’s support at US$ 600,000 per month. From among its 1,300 troops stationed in CAR in accordance with a bilateral defence accord, France made available to MISAB a logistical support command unit of 88 personnel and a 39-strong liaison and assistance detachment. French tactical support was

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46 Interview with Touré, 25 March 1999, Bamako.


48 Interview with Touré, 25 March 1999, Bamako.


Transition to a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation

French threats to withdraw placed the mission in jeopardy. France had grown tired of supporting Patassé and had decided to close its military bases in CAR. When no other Western countries stepped in to help alleviate its financial burden, Paris became increasingly vocal about its dissatisfaction with the MISAB arrangement. The Security Council, which had waited until August 1997 to give its political support for MISAB, proved even more reluctant to give its financial support. The Council eventually decided to authorize the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) to replace MISAB in March 1998.

50 (...continued)

African Republic, 4 September 1997, para. 27.


54 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council “authorized the Member States participating in MISAB and those States providing logistical support to ensure the security and freedom of movement of their personnel.” UN Document S/RES/1125 (1997), 6 August 1997.

The creation of the United Nations mission responded to French concerns, but it created new problems. The Council’s decision to place the operation on a shoestring budget contributed to numerous and largely preventable delays. The lack of adequate air craft and logistics personnel severely restricted the United Nations force’s ability to provide necessary security and support. Due in part to the insufficient number of troops, the legislative elections initially scheduled for September 1998 were postponed until November 1998. Ultimately, Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) troops were recruited to serve alongside MINURCA during the elections and provide the necessary manpower that the United Nations force lacked.

PROPOSED OPERATION IN CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) (1997)

The contemplated peacekeeping operation in Congo (Brazzaville) similarly illustrates the growing willingness of African States to intervene militarily. Fighting erupted in Congo in June 1997 between forces of the democratically-elected President, Pascal Lissouba, and the militia of former military ruler, Gen. Denis Sassou-Nguesso. In light of the deteriorating security situation, several of the subregion’s leaders established a mediation committee chaired by President Bongo to bring about a peaceful resolution of the crisis. After securing a temporary cease-fire in mid-June, the committee requested the Security Council to authorize the rapid deployment of an inter-African force to Brazzaville. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan suggested two possible force options: either a UN-authorized multinational force or a United Nations peacekeeping operation composed mainly of


57 The failure to agree on a mandate for MINURCA regarding running the elections also caused numerous delays in concluding necessary contracts to help plan the elections (such as in contracting helicopters and planes to monitor the country for potential sites). Moreover, the UN’s piecemeal approach created a negative image of the UN and reduced the mission’s credibility with the local people, the Government, and the opposition. Interview with Carlos Valenzuela, former Chief Electoral Officer, UN Mission in the Central African Republic, 9 March 1999, Lagos.
African contingents. Annan recommended that the force should initially comprise 1,600 to 1,800 troops, support units numbering 400 to 800, and United Nations military observers. A number of African States reportedly indicated their willingness to participate. Senegal offered to lead and contribute a battalion to the eventual force. In early July, it designated Brig.-Gen. Charles Nelson as commander of the proposed force and pledged to provide some 520 troops. Chad, Mali, and Niger also reportedly expressed their tentative interest in participating in the force, as did Botswana, Namibia, and Togo.

The mission did not deploy as planned, however, in part due to circumstances beyond the control of those African countries that had volunteered to participate in the force. The Security Council set three preconditions for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation that were never met. They were: [1] complete adherence to an agreed and viable cease-fire; [2] agreement to the international control of Brazzaville airport; [3] a clear commitment to a negotiated settlement covering all political and military aspects of the crisis. In October 1997, rebel forces—with Angolan assistance—gained full control of Brazzaville. In the wake of Sassou-Nguesso’s military victory, Western countries were accused of turning a blind eye to and even complicity in the situation. France reportedly had supported Sassou-Nguesso both militarily and politically. While France was expressing

60 Interview with Lt-Col. Mamadou Dione, Commanding Officer, Senegalese Army Military Academy (Thiès), 25 February 1998, Dakar.
63 UN Document S/PRST/43, 13 August 1997. The Secretary-General had first identified these conditions for the deployment of an international force in June. UN Document S/1997/484.
its tentative support before the Security Council for a UN-authorized intervention, President Jacques Chirac allegedly concluded a deal with Sassou-Nguesso on behalf of French business interests.64

The logistical and financial constraints of those African countries that had volunteered to participate in the operation were an equally critical factor in its failure to materialize. The proposed Senegalese-led force simply could not deploy without outside assistance. As Secretary-General Annan observed in his 21 October 1997 Report to the Security Council: “No country emerged that was able and willing to assure the command, control and communications capacity, the rapid deployment capability or the ability to generate the necessary financing that would be required to assume the leadership of a multinational force.”65 The financial impediments to constituting the proposed force are also telling. According to Annan, “[m]ost potential troop contributors specified that the force should be a United Nations peacekeeping operation rather than a multinational force.”66 This is instructive because it highlights a reality that is often unstated: financial—not political—concerns are frequently paramount when African countries speak of seeking United Nations authorization.

* * *

The examples of the two Moroccan-led forces in Zaire, the Nigerian operation in Chad, the military involvement of Southern African countries in Mozambique, MISAB in CAR, and the proposed mission in Congo (Brazzaville) underscore the political willingness of African countries to intervene militarily on the continent. The ad hoc approach characteristic of these initiatives shows that much can be achieved outside of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or one of the several African subregional organizations. Even as these bodies have begun to develop peacekeeping mechanisms, the practice of constituting ad hoc forces has persisted. As MISAB attests, a coalition of States with common interests but

66 Ibid.
no common membership in a subregional organization can make a positive contribution to regional peace and security by deploying peacekeepers.

These five examples also highlight the limitations of African countries. With the exception of the initiative in Mozambique, each case shows that participation in an ad hoc military intervention is contingent upon substantial Western assistance. If substantial Western financial and logistical support is not given, as in the case of Congo (Brazzaville), or is withdrawn, as in the case of MISAB, then African countries are extremely hard-pressed to go it alone.
Part III

Understanding
African Peacekeeping Abilities
and Limitations
CHAPTER 8
FROM KOREA TO KOSOVO: 50 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE

The problems African organizations and coalitions have encountered in fielding their own multinational forces should come as no surprise. Statistics on African countries' participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations are routinely offered as proof of their readiness to take on new responsibilities. While such figures do help inform, they can also obfuscate the true significance of African contributions.

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

As of mid-1999, 33 of the 53 African United Nations Member States had contributed military personnel or civilian police to United Nations peacekeeping operations.\(^1\) (See Annex E.) They had participated in 40 of the 50 United Nations missions. These numbers are especially impressive considering that most African countries did not gain independence until the early 1960s and, therefore, did not have an opportunity to contribute troops to the initial peacekeeping operations. Moreover, 10 African countries have only achieved independence and joined the United Nations since 1974.

\(^1\) Soldiers from Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)) and the Central African Republic (CAR) have served alongside UN peacekeeping forces in the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) but cannot be considered UN Blue Helmets. From February 1963 until June 1964, a battalion of the Congolese National Army served within ONUC. (The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peacekeeping (Third Edition), New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 710.) A contingent of 150 “carefully selected” soldiers from the restructured Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) served under the operational control of MINURCA to assist in providing security during the elections. UN Document S/1998/1203, Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, 18 December 1998, para. 10.
Most of this experience has been gained during the past decade, reflecting the growing political will in Africa to participate in peacekeeping activities. Before 1989, only 14 African countries had contributed Blue Helmets to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Eight of these countries’ participation had been limited to the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which concluded in 1964. While the number of opportunities to contribute to United Nations peacekeeping operations has grown since 1989, this fact alone does not explain the trend. Even after United Nations peacekeeping had been scaled back, African participation continued to increase. Twenty-two African countries contributed troops, observers, or police to United Nations operations between January 1997 and June 1999.

African participation has been concentrated among a small group of countries. Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia have been the most active and the largest contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations. As of 30 June 1999, Nigeria had provided Blue Helmets to 24 United Nations peacekeeping operations—the most of any African country. Ghana had contributed military personnel or civilian police to 23 operations, Egypt to 21,2 Senegal to 20,3 Kenya to 19, and Tunisia to 16. No other African country had participated in more than 10 missions. Nearly one-third

2 Egypt provided troops to ONUC as part of the United Arab Republic (UAR), a political union with Syria proclaimed in February 1958. (It ended in September 1961 when Syria declared itself independent from Egypt. Egypt, however, retained the name UAR for another 10 years.) The UN records Egypt as having provided troops, observers and police to a twenty-second operation, UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), (see, for example, The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition), p. 754) but according to Cairo, Egypt did not participate in that operation. Written correspondence with Hossam Zaki, First Secretary, Egyptian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 3 May 1999.

3 Senegal, together with Mali, comprised the Mali Federation, which contributed troops to ONUC. Shortly after the decision to contribute troops, the Mali Federation disbanded in August 1960. The contingent remained under the command of a Senegalese officer. Interview with Alioune Diagne, Minister Counsellor, Senegalese Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 14 April 1999, by telephone.
Seven countries have contributed to a single UN peacekeeping operation: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, the Gambia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Cameroon and Malawi would join this list if not for contributions of two civilian police to MINURCA, and one military observer to the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), respectively, in 1999.

The exact size and composition of each of these four categories will differ according to the individual army and the nature of the force being assembled. Generally, a battalion serving in a UN peacekeeping operation will include a minimum of 500 troops, a company 100, and a platoon 30.

Thus, Egypt is credited with providing a “battalion” to UNPROFOR even though it consisted of only 410 men. Written correspondence with Zaki, 3 May 1999.


The Ghanaian and Nigerian contingents, which numbered roughly 2,000 and 2,600, respectively, included large numbers of civilian police. Ibid.

Written correspondence with Zaki, 3 May 1999.
Table 8.1

African Countries Providing Formed Units of Infantry Troops to UN Peacekeeping Operations (as of 30 June 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Strength (number of operations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BRIGADE 3 Battalions ~1,500-3,000+ men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Botswana</td>
<td>X (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Burkina Faso</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 Chad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 Djibouti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 Egypt</td>
<td>X (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08 Ethiopia</td>
<td>X (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 Gabon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Ghana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Guinea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Kenya</td>
<td>X (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Liberia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Malawi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Mali</td>
<td>X (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Morocco</td>
<td>X (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Namibia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Niger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Nigeria</td>
<td>X (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 Senegal</td>
<td>X (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Sudan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24 Togo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Tunisia</td>
<td>X (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Zambia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 (4)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10 Infantry battalions have been supplied by: Botswana, to UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ); Egypt, to ONUC (as part of UAR), UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and UNOSOM II; Ethiopia, to ONUC and UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR); Ghana, to ONUC, Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II), UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and UNAMIR; Guinea, to ONUC; Kenya, to UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), UNPROFOR, and UNCR; Mali (as part of the Mali Federation) to ONUC; Morocco, to ONUC and UNOSOM II; Nigeria, to ONUC, UNIFIL, UNOSOM II, and UNPROFOR; Senegal, to ONUC, UNEF II, and UNIFIL; the Sudan, to ONUC; Tunisia, to ONUC, UNTAC, and UNAMIR; Zambia, to ONUMOZ, UNAMIR, and the third UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III); and Zimbabwe, to UNOSOM II and UNAVEM III.

11 The six countries are Botswana, Egypt, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. They have each contributed at least 100 infantry to the following missions: UNOSOM II (Botswana and Tunisia); UNAMIR (Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal); and MINURCA (Egypt, Mali, and Senegal).


13 The 10 are: Burkina Faso (in MINURCA); Chad (UNAMIR and MINURCA); Côte d’Ivoire (MINURCA); Djibouti, (UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)); Gabon (MINURCA); Liberia (ONUC); Malawi (UNAMIR); Namibia (UNAVEM III and UN Mission in Angola (MONUA)); Sierra Leone (ONUC); and Togo (MINURCA).

14 Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea-Bissau, and Niger provided roughly 40 troops each to UNAMIR. Namibia also provided a convoy escort element containing a slightly higher number of infantry to UNTAC towards the end of the mission, just before elections.
protection in a hostile environment. Namibia provided mine-resistant vehicles to assist in convoy escort duties in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and operations in Angola. The Nigerian battalion serving in UNOSOM II deployed with sufficient armoured vehicles to fulfil a reconnaissance role. A small unit from Ghana took part in an “integrated headquarters camp command” that constituted a rapid response capability in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Similarly, African States have provided specialized units to United Nations peacekeeping operations infrequently. During ONUC, Liberia deployed a movement control contingent, Ghana contributed two medical units, and Ethiopia sent an air unit and ground support personnel. A Zimbabwean communication company served in UNOSOM II. Morocco ran a forward field hospital in UNOSOM II. Ghana provided an engineering company to UNIFIL. Most recently, Egypt sent logistics and medical units to replace French contingents serving in the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA).

African countries have been much more likely to provide military observers or civilian police than to contribute troops. As of mid-1999, they had supplied observers and police 126 and 122 times, respectively, whereas

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18 Ibid., pp. 709-10.
19 UN Document, S/26738, para. 47.
20 Written correspondence with Raja Ghannam, Counsellor, Moroccan Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 3 April 1999.
22 Written correspondence with Zaki, 3 May 1999.
they had furnished troops in 66 instances. Twenty-two African countries had contributed military observers, and 23 had provided civilian police—of which 16 had given both. (See Table 8.2.) In keeping with the greater role civilian police are being asked to assume in United Nations peacekeeping, African countries have increasingly made civilian police available.

On average, African States are likely to provide relatively fewer observers and more police to a particular peacekeeping operation. Broadly speaking, the numbers of military observers and civilian police that African countries contribute to a United Nations peacekeeping operation tend to range from 1-10 and 10-40, respectively. There have been some notable exceptions. Several African countries sent many more military observers to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) than is customary: Kenya, for example, gave 47. Ghana, which furnished more than 55 observers to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), stands out among African States as having provided the largest contingent of military observers at one time to a single United Nations peacekeeping operation.

Concerning the provision of civilian police, African countries have contributed sizeable contingents on numerous occasions. Ghana and Nigeria have distinguished themselves as having made available particularly large forces in several instances. Nigeria’s 400-man unit in ONUC represents the single largest contribution of police by any country in any United Nations peacekeeping operation. Nigeria also provided units of 163

23 Besides the 59 occasions when African countries have contributed formed units (which may also include staff officers), there have been seven instances when African countries have only provided small numbers of staff officers or military experts (such as de-miners): Egypt (UNAVEM III and MONUA); Ghana (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)), Kenya (UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and MONUA); Zambia (MONUA); and Zimbabwe (MONUA).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military Observers</th>
<th>Civilian Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 Algeria</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Benin</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 Botswana</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 Cameroon</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 Cape Verde</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 Chad</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08 Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 Djibouti</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Egypt</td>
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**TOTALS** 22 23

*Table 8.2: African Countries Providing Military Observers and/or Civilian Police to UN Peacekeeping Operations (as of 30 June 1999)*
police to UNTAG,\textsuperscript{26} 150 to UNTAC,\textsuperscript{27} 55 to the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 74 to UNPROFOR, and 68 to the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO).\textsuperscript{28} Ghana supplied units of at least 100 police to four operations: ONUC,\textsuperscript{29} UNTAG (129), UNTAC (283), and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) (100)\textsuperscript{30} as part of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). Egypt and Kenya both contributed units of more than 50 police to three separate peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{31} Algeria, Cameroon, and Morocco also provided contingents of 75 or more to UNTAC\textsuperscript{32} and Guinea-Bissau and Zambia provided contingents of at least 50 police to ONUMOZ.\textsuperscript{33} Mali

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 90.


\textsuperscript{28} Based on a compilation of “UN Monthly Summaries of Troop Contributing Countries to Peacekeeping Operations” by Erwin Schmidl. Written correspondence with Erwin A. Schmidl, Head of Research, Bureau of Military Scientific Studies, Austrian Ministry of Defence, 18 May 1999. Nigeria’s contributions to UNPROFOR and UNCRO were not concurrent.

\textsuperscript{29} Erwin Schmidl, who has published widely on the history of civilian police in UN peacekeeping operations, surmises that based on his archival research of UN documents, Ghana provided between 150-300 police to ONUC. Written correspondence with Schmidl, 18 May 1999.

\textsuperscript{30} Written correspondence with Mohammed Alhassan, Assistant Commissioner, Civilian Police Unit, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 21 September 1999.

\textsuperscript{31} Egypt provided contingents of 70 civilian police to ONUMOZ, 85 to UNPROFOR, and 100 to UNTAC. Kenya provided 50 to UNPROFOR, 100 to UNTAC, and 50 to UNTAES.

\textsuperscript{32} The individual countries’ contributions were: Algeria, 157; Cameroon, 75; and Morocco, 100. See, for example, The United Nations and Cambodia: 1991-1995, p. 23. The table provides the numbers of police for each contributing country when the mission’s police force was at peak strength—which was not necessarily the case for each individual contingent. Cameroon and Morocco, for example, had provided 75 and 100 police, respectively and not 73 and 98 as listed.

provided a 48-man unit to the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), and Senegal sent a 53-man unit to IPTF.34

NON-AFRICAN-LED MULTINATIONAL FORCES

Kenya’s participation in the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) of 1979-1980 represented the first instance when an African country participated in a non-African-led multinational force in Africa. (See Annex F for a list of African participation in all such operations both on the continent and elsewhere.) The Lancaster House Conference in England established CMF to oversee Rhodesia’s transition from minority rule to form the new State of Zimbabwe and thus end that country’s civil war. The fact that Kenya, which provided 51 military observers,35 was the only African country to take part in the mission had little to do with African countries’ peacekeeping capacities or political will. Rather, the sensitivities and sensibilities of the United Kingdom were of paramount importance. The UK, which provided the financial, political, and military backing for the 1,300-strong force,36 wanted to keep CMF small and to limit the number of participating countries.37 It was not interested, therefore, in taking advantage of the services of several African States that were part of the Commonwealth and possessed extensive peacekeeping experience.38

34 Based on a compilation of “UN Monthly Summaries of Troop Contributing Countries to Peacekeeping Operations” by Erwin Schmidl. Written correspondence with Schmidl, 18 May 1999.
37 The UK provided the bulk of the five-nation force. The four other Commonwealth countries accounted for fewer than one in four members of the 1,319-man force: Australia (159), Fiji (24), Kenya (51), and New Zealand (75). Ginifer, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Zimbabwe, p. 5.
38 For example, London rejected possible Ghanaian and Nigerian participation. The two rebel groups that had coalesced into a united Patriotic Front had demanded a more diverse CMF and had mentioned those two (and several other) countries by name as possible candidates for inclusion in the force. Ibid.
African participation was significantly greater in the United Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia in 1992-1993. The Security Council, recognizing that the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) could not cope with the enormity of the growing humanitarian catastrophe, authorized the United States on 3 December 1992 to lead an international force that would help ensure that the relief effort reached its intended beneficiaries. Botswana, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe all contributed at least a company of infantry (with the Moroccan contingent considerably larger) to the 24-nation, 37,000-strong force. All six African participants remained in the mission area, joining UNOSOM II, upon the completion of UNITAF’s mandate in May 1993.

Seven African countries took part in Operation Turquoise, a much smaller and shorter French-led force that deployed in Rwanda in response to the genocide. As with UNITAF, the Council authorized the operation for humanitarian purposes and in light of an existing United Nations peacekeeping operation’s limitations. The roughly 3,100-strong eight-nation multinational force lasted two months, from 22 June until 21 August 1994. France provided the requisite operational support for its own troops as well as those of the other participating nations. Chad and Senegal both provided contingents of at least company-strength. Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea-Bissau,


40 Exact numbers are difficult to obtain. As of 7 January 1993, the US reported that Botswana had 303 troops serving in UNITAF, Egypt 270, Morocco 1,356, and Nigeria, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe had “advance parties” in the country. See UN Document S/25126, Annex, Report dated 16 January 1993 by the United States of America pursuant to Security Council resolution 794 (1992), 19 January 1993.

41 The transfer of military command from UNITAF to UNOSOM II occurred on 4 May 1993. (See UN Document S/26317, Further Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraph 18 of resolution 814 (1993), 17 August 1993, para. 4.)


and Niger provided platoon-strength detachments. The combined strength of the Egyptian and Mauritanian units was 17 men.\textsuperscript{44}

A fourth relevant operation in Africa in which regional countries participated was a small observer group in 1995-1996 in Eastern Zaire. A proposed United Nations peacekeeping operation in response to security concerns at refugee camps along the Zaire/Rwanda border was not supported by United Nations Member States\textsuperscript{5} in a four-day period following the fall of the Rwandan Government in July 1994, more than one million Rwandans, almost all Hutu—tens of thousands of whom had actively taken part in the genocide—streamed across the border and into Zaire. \textsuperscript{46} The decision by the head of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to take advantage of Kinshasa’s offer to provide security for the camps was one of desperation. The Zairean Camp Security Operation (ZCSO) was created in January 1995. It comprised a Zairean Camp Security Contingent (ZCSC) of 1,500 members of the Presidential Guard, and a Civilian Security Liaison Group (CSLG) of some 35 non-Zairean security advisers, with police or military backgrounds. CSLG was initially under the command of a Canadian General and subsequently headed by a Norwegian. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Guinea (along with the Netherlands and Switzerland) provided “Liaison Officers.” All members of CSLG received their salaries from their respective Governments, but the African officers also

\textsuperscript{44} UN Document S/1994/933, Annex, \textit{Operation Turquoise: developments from 10 to 25 July 1994, 4 August 1994}. The numbers were Chad (130), Congo (Brazzaville) (45), Egypt (7), Guinea-Bissau (35), Mauritania (10), Niger (43), and Senegal (243). (Ibid.) Note that despite the report’s title, a significant number of these troops arrived after 25 July. Note also that these numbers do not tally exactly with the number of African troops (508) mentioned in the \textit{Final Report}.

\textsuperscript{45} Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had proposed the creation of a UN peacekeeping operation composed of troops, civilian police, or military observers. See UN Document S/1995/65, \textit{Second Report of the Secretary-General on Security in the Rwandese Refugee Camps}, 25 January 1995, paras. 21-34.

\textsuperscript{46} The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated 850,000 Rwandans fled to the areas surrounding Goma in the north, and another 370,000 crossed into the Bukavu area in the south. UN Document S/1994/1308, \textit{Report of the Secretary-General on Security in the Rwandese Refugee Camps}, 18 November 1994, para. 6.
received a daily subsistence allowance (DSA) from UNHCR at the same rate as United Nations staff. CSLG, which became operational along with ZCSC in February 1995, continued through mid-1996. By that time, ethnic violence and the nascent rebellion headed by Laurent Kabila made it impossible to continue.

Numerous African countries were prepared to commit troops to the proposed Canadian-led multinational force for Eastern Zaire. The ZCSC, which had proven surprisingly professional, showed little interest in defending the camps against the rebels. The situation in the region was becoming increasingly tense as refugees were displaced in the fighting and interested parties sought to settle old scores. A multinational force was proposed that would provide security for a humanitarian corridor to be established in Eastern Zaire in an attempt to restore some semblance of order. There was no shortage of African countries willing to participate.

According to the US, which was to provide significant financial and logistical support to the operation, at least 13 African countries were likely to contribute troops—although the actual number of countries to take part

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47 Interview with Kimberley Roberson, former Desk Officer for Zaire, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 4 June 1999, Geneva.

48 The rebellion began in response to the increased persecution of the Banyamulenge by Kinshasa and Rwandan *Interahamwe* militia. The Banyamulenge were Zaireans who had lived in Eastern Zaire since the eighteenth century but were nevertheless targeted because of their perceived ethnic ties to Tutsis. See Simon Massey, “Operation Assurance: The Greatest Intervention that Never Happened,” *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 15 February 1998, available on the Internet at <<http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk>>.


51 Many have questioned US resolve for undertaking the mission. Washington appeared hesitant to become involved from the beginning.

52 The 13 countries mentioned by name were Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe. See Jacqueline S. Porth, “Final Decision on US Troops for Zaire Not Yet Made,” *US Information Agency*, 14 November 1996, and Judy (continued...)
African countries’ willingness to join Western-led multinational forces is not limited to operations in Africa. Ethiopia and South Africa contributed troops to the US-led force in Korea from 1950-1953. Egypt, Morocco, Niger, Senegal,56 and Sierra Leone57 took part in the US-led force to liberate Kuwait, known as Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991. In the US-led operation in

52 (...continued)

53 Simon Massey mentions only six African countries (Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, and Senegal) as having offered to provide troops and questions the extent to which they could have contributed given financial concerns. See Massey, “Operation Assurance: The Greatest Intervention that Never Happened.”


55 Concurrent with the Council’s decision to authorize the multinational force, hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees began crossing the border back to Rwanda as a result of the rebels’ advance. (See, for example, Gérard Prunier, “The Geopolitical Situation in the Great Lakes Area in Light of the Kivu Crisis,” Writenet Country Papers, February 1997, available on the Internet at <<http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/writenet/wridrc.htm>>.) According to Prunier, the mass exodus, which began the day before the Council voted, was “completely unforeseen.” The uncertain fate of several hundred thousand of the estimated 1.3 million refugees in Eastern Zaire as of September 1996, that fled westward into Zaire was deemed troublesome, but not significantly so to warrant the force’s deployment. (Ibid.) It is believed that significant numbers of this group—which included Interahamwe and members of the armed forces of the former Government of Rwanda—were killed.


Haiti in 1994-1995,58 Benin provided 34 gendarmes.59 Egypt and Morocco60 participated in both the Implementation Force (IFOR)61 undertaken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995-1996 as well as the NATO-led follow-on mission known as the Stabilization Force (SFOR).62 Most recently, in June 1999, five African countries—Egypt, Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, and Zimbabwe—were among the 28 Member States63 that Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed to comprise the 280-authorized police contingent 64 of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET),65 which despite its name is not a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

58 The Security Council established the force in July 1994 to create the necessary conditions for the military regime in Haiti to return the country to democratic rule. (UN Document S/RES/940 (1994), 31 July 1994.) The force deployed in September and continued until the end of March 1995, when its authority was transferred to UNMIH.

59 Interview with Col. Jean N’Dah, Director-General, Beninois National Gendarmerie, 15 March 1999, Porto Novo.


CHAPTER 9
MEANS, MOTIVES, AND MILITARIES

ENABLING CHARACTERISTICS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND WESTERN-LED MISSIONS

Any evaluation of African countries’ participation in United Nations peacekeeping and Western-led multinational forces must acknowledge several characteristics of these missions that often affect a country’s ability to take part. The structure and benefits associated with these operations make it easier and more attractive for many African States to participate. Without such frameworks, several African countries’ limitations would be exposed and their willingness to participate would be greatly reduced.

Countries participating in these undertakings are routinely assisted in deploying to the mission area. This was true, for example, in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), the first United Nations peacekeeping operation in which African countries participated, and continues. During ONUC, the US airlifted Ghanaian, Guinean, Moroccan, and Tunisian troops.1 The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) airlifted the Ghanaian and Senegalese battalions serving in the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II).2 The US did the same for Senegal in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).3 Most recently, in the United

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1 The UK also assisted with the airlift of the Ghanaian contingent. The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition), New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 710.
2 Ibid., p. 695.
3 Ibid., p. 700.
Deploying without appropriate resources is not limited to major military items, and even the inability to provide basic provisions can have adverse effects. Such was the case with the Ghanaian civilian police contingent serving in the International Police Task Force (IPTF) of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). Former IPTF Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald observed:

I have seen colleagues from Ghana, most honourable people, spend most of their energy trying to keep warm in sub-zero temperatures of Bosnia. They had not been supplied with winter clothing and indeed many of

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5 Written correspondence with Hocine Medili, Director, Field Administration and Logistics Division, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 10 March 1999.
6 Money provided to the UN Trust Fund for Rwanda (which may have been used to procure equipment or help defray other costs to troop-contributing African countries) is not included. The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition), p. 731.
them finished working in Irish ‘Garda’ uniforms that we had spare. It is very difficult to expect personnel to perform effectively under such conditions.7

For many countries, there are financial incentives for participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations. The United Nations reimburses countries directly for most of their military personnel that serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations.8 The basic United Nations rate for a soldier serving within a formed military unit is fixed at US$ 1,058 per month.9 Provision is also made to pay each troop-contributing country an additional allowance of US$ 291 per month for 10 per cent of an infantry unit or 25 per cent of any speciality contingent.10 Thus, a country providing a 500-strong infantry battalion would be reimbursed US$ 543,550 per month, while a Government contributing a 500-strong engineering battalion would receive US$ 21,825 more.11 (All personnel also receive a direct payment from the United Nations, albeit a nominal one: the United Nations pays them US$ 1.28 per day plus a “recreational leave allowance” of US$ 10.50 per day for no more than one week every six months. 12) For many countries in Africa, outlays are significantly lower than the amount the United

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8 For administrative reasons, the UN pays a mission subsistence allowance (MSA) directly to Blue Helmets not serving in formed units—i.e. military observers, civilian police, and in exceptional cases some troops. The rate of MSA is determined anew for each mission, and is designed to cover accommodation, meals, and incidentals.
10 Ibid., para. 2 (d).
11 The calculations for the infantry and engineer battalions are: US$ 543,550 (500 x 1,058 = 529,000 plus 50 x 291 = 14,550) and US$ 565,375 (500 x 1,058 = 529,000 plus 125 x 291 = 36,375), respectively.
12 UN Document A/51/967, Annex A, para. 3.
If a country’s costs exceed the UN rate of reimbursement, that country bears the shortfall. This is the case with many Western States.

The delayed deployment of the Zimbabwean battalion in Somalia is a concrete example of how monetary considerations may influence a country’s peacekeeping policy. In 1992, Harare agreed to provide an infantry battalion to serve in the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). Subsequent to that decision, but prior to the contingent’s departure, the Security Council established the United Task Force (UNITAF). Countries that had already committed troops to serve in UNOSOM, but had not yet deployed them by December 1992 were invited to serve in UNITAF. As it was not a United Nations operation, participants were expected to pay their own costs. Zimbabwean troops did arrive on 15 January 1993, but only at company strength. The remaining complement of the 939-strong Zimbabwean battalion did not arrive until 26-28 June 1993, after UNITAF’s mandate had expired and it had been replaced by the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). Logistical constraints contributed to the initial delayed and partial deployment. Zimbabwe’s appreciation for the different financial incentives between a multinational force and a United Nations peacekeeping operation, however, also influenced the date its contingent reached full strength. Harare received no

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13 If a country’s costs exceed the UN rate of reimbursement, that country bears the shortfall. This is the case with many Western States.


16 Ibid., pp. 118-19.


18 The United States, which led UNITAF and provided significant financial and logistical support to many of the 23 other countries in the force, did not push Zimbabwe to deploy the remainder of its battalion. (Interview with Amb. Robert Oakley, former US Special Envoy to Somalia, 12 February 1999, by telephone.) Oakley also pointed out that Zimbabwe (along with Botswana) performed especially well among all the countries that took part in UNITAF. Ibid.
assistance to help offset its expenses during UNITAF. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe has emphasized the financial considerations and constraints that his country and others face in deciding whether or not to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Any monetary incentives a United Nations peacekeeping operation may provide are no longer as alluring as they once were. This is not because the terms have changed. Rather, it is because in the current financial crisis troop-contributing countries have been forced to wait years to be reimbursed. The United Nations in effect has borrowed from its supplemental peacekeeping account to cover shortfalls in its regular budget. Many countries, therefore, are still waiting to be paid, and are likely to continue to wait for some time.

African increased participation in non-UN undertakings highlights that financial incentives, while potentially important, are not the main factors in African countries’ decision-making processes. Contributing to a multinational force is generally not remuneratively rewarding. Indeed, most are loss-making ventures. The expected political benefit to be gained from taking part or the moral imperative is often sufficient to convince countries to volunteer military or police forces, regardless of the level of reimbursement.

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20 In his address before the 48th UN General Assembly, President Mugabe stated, “We stand ready to... participate in [UN] peacekeeping operations. ... However, unless all Member States commit themselves to timely payments of their assessed contributions for these efforts, some countries will find continued participation difficult.” UN Document A/48/PV.7, 8 October 1993, p. 4, cited in Angela Kane, “Other New and Emerging Peacekeepers,” in Trevor Findlay (ed.), “Challenges for the New Peacekeepers,” SIPRI Research Report No. 12, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 117.
CAPABILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

Many African countries have acquitted themselves well in carrying out their responsibilities. Eric Falt, the former Spokesperson for the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), singled out the gendarmes from Benin as “outstanding” and among the most effective Blue Helmets serving in that operation. According to Falt, “they did wonders everywhere they were deployed and brought an understanding of sometimes inextricable situations in a way no other national contingent seemed able to match.” Maj-Gen. Klaas Roos, who held senior positions in two United Nations peacekeeping operations, observed that African police developed excellent rapport with the local populace and could have “given lessons” to other peacekeepers. Roos singled out the Ghanaian and Kenyan police contingents as among the most professional of the 32 countries contributing police to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), for which he served as Police Commissioner. The Botswanan contingent serving in UNITAF has received high marks as one of the very best units within the 24-nation force according to US officials familiar with the operation. They were well disciplined, well trained, well versed in the rules of engagement, and professional in carrying out their tasks. While there are cases of ill-discipline and corruption among African contingents serving in United Nations missions, they are isolated instances. Moreover, this problem is certainly not limited to African peacekeepers.
African military and civilian officers as well as diplomats have gained important peacekeeping experience. Battalion commanders often are tasked with overseeing the activities of other contingents and units based in their sectors. Many military observers and headquarters staff have assumed—or may still assume—greater responsibilities in subsequent peacekeeping operations. For example, the Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), Daniel Ishmael Opende of Kenya, subsequently served as the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). (Table 9.1 provides a list of Africans who have commanded United Nations peacekeeping forces or headed civilian police components.) Similarly, many Africans have served as civilian heads of United Nations peacekeeping operations (see Table 9.2) and in senior positions of civilian components. They provide the continent with an important pool of highly knowledgeable and capable diplomats and administrators who can be called upon to help plan and implement multifaceted peacekeeping missions—whether within a United Nations structure or through some other framework.

Generally, exposure to and participation in United Nations and Western-led missions can provide a valuable opportunity to learn and hone peacekeeping skills. Peacekeeping manuals provide important information for the aspiring peacekeeper (and help to develop national training courses). Peacekeeping exercises provide excellent opportunities to practise basic techniques such as staffing checkpoints or observation posts. However, some important peacekeeping skills can best be taught and mastered during actual operations. Learning how to work in a multinational environment, developing good civil-military relations, and practising a restraint in the use of force all take time. Besides possessing general military and certain peacekeeping skills, peacekeepers also must possess a certain attitude.25 The Nordic peacekeeping manual, which is widely used and consulted, stresses that “peace-keeping is an empirical art” and no manual can hope to cover every situation.26

26 Ibid, p. 18.
Table 9.1

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<td>04/96-04/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>Maj-Gen. Philip Valerio Sibanda</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>FC</td>
<td>06/97-04/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj-Gen. Seth Kofi Obeng</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>FC</td>
<td>05/98-02/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCA</td>
<td>Brig-Gen. Barthélémy Ratanga</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>FC</td>
<td>04/98 to date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMO = Chief Military Observer  
FC = Force Commander  
CoS = Chief of Staff  
PC = Police Commissioner  

* Lt-Gen. Erskine began his command of UNIFIL as Interim Commander in March 1978 and was given full command in April.
## African Civilian Heads of UN Peacekeeping Operations
(as of 30 June 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PKO</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Mr. Mekki Abbas</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Acting SRSG</td>
<td>03/61-05/61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Robert K.A. Gardiner</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>OiC</td>
<td>02/62-05/63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>SRSG/CoM</td>
<td>06/93-02/95</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM I</td>
<td>Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>04/92-11/92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Acting SRSG</td>
<td>02/94-06/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. James Victor Gbeho</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>07/94-04/95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>Mr. Anthony B. Nyaki</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>SRSG/CoM</td>
<td>03/94-04/97</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Mr. Tuliameni Kalomoh</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>04/97-09/97</td>
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<tr>
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<td>09/93-03/96</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh Booh</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>SRSG/CoM</td>
<td>11/93-06/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM III</td>
<td>Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>02/95-07/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>SRSG/CoM</td>
<td>07/97-06/98*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brig-Gen. Seth Kofi Obeng</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>OiC</td>
<td>06/98-08/98*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Issa B.Y. Diallo</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>SRSG/CoM</td>
<td>08/98-02/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCA</td>
<td>Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>SRSG/CoM</td>
<td>04/98 to date</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>Mr. Francis G. Okelo</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>SRSG/CoM</td>
<td>07/98 to date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CoM = Chief of Mission  
HoM = Head of Mission  
OiC = Officer-in-Charge  
SRSG = Special Representative of the Secretary-General

* On 26 June 1998, Alioune Blondin Beye was killed in a plane crash along with five MONUA staff members and two pilots. Secretary-General Kofi Annan designated the MONUA Force Commander, Maj-Gen. Seth Kofi Obeng, as Officer-in-Charge of the Mission. On 7 August, Annan informed the Security Council of his intention to appoint Issa B.Y. Diallo as his SRSG for Angola.
Yet sometimes prior experience is of questionable value in either evaluating countries’ capabilities or preparing them to participate in future missions. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan, for example, all provided ground troops to ONUC. However, they are in no position to contribute to international or regional peacekeeping efforts now or for the foreseeable future. Moreover, previous peacekeeping experience can have potential drawbacks. Former UNTAC Force Commander John Sanderson stresses that, “Prior experience is useful for some officers and observers. Often it is counter-productive. People try to do totally irrelevant things they picked up on very different missions. ... Experience will never replace good quality specific to mission training.”

Statistics enumerating a country’s peacekeeping experience often obscure or exaggerate its inclinations or contributions. Agreeing to contribute to an entirely new peacekeeping initiative is more significant than renewing a commitment to have already-deployed troops simply remain in a follow-on mission. On 31 March 1995, those countries with soldiers or police in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia that just happened to be stationed in Croatia or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) got to record another notch in their peacekeeping belts. Similarly, four of the five missions to which Benin has contributed Blue Helmets (always gendarmes serving in a civilian police role) have been cascading United Nations peacekeeping operations (in Haiti).

To a large degree, African countries’ participation in United Nations and Western-led peacekeeping operations is indicative of what they...
can—and cannot—provide. Many countries possess ground troops in excess of what they require for national security purposes. Conversely, the Government might consider it to be in its self-interest to keep some troops and, perhaps more importantly, some officers, away from the country.29

According to Dan Henk and Steven Metz:

Many African militaries are rich in peacekeeping experience and leadership talent. Their senior leaders have studied in western staff or war colleges. Yet African militaries reflect the relative poverty of their States. Budgets rarely are sufficient for adequate living standards for military personnel, to acquire and maintain equipment, or undergo realistic, large-unit training. Militaries in sub-Saharan Africa are particularly weak at maintenance of complex equipment, strategic mobility, advanced command, control, and intelligence, airpower, or naval power.30

Few African countries have specialized units in addition to their basic needs, or with sufficient skills and equipment that make them attractive potential contributors to multinational operations. For example, when Mauritania volunteered to provide troops to the operation in Somalia, its offer was declined as Nouakchott neither possessed the necessary equipment nor the desirable experience.31 DFI International, in a 1997 study conducted

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29 To assuage their well-founded fears of succumbing to a coup d’état, African leaders often send capable, popular, or ambitious military leaders far from home, and develop robust paramilitary groups such as presidential guards or gendarmes as a counterbalance to the armed forces. See Walter L. Barrows, “Changing Military Capabilities in Black Africa,” in William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen (eds), Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa’s International Relations, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 103-07.


for the US Government, reviewed the military capabilities of African countries and concluded that only 11 were capable of deploying a battalion without significant augmentation for a multinational peace or humanitarian operation.\textsuperscript{32} Besides infantry, DFI analysed other units’ capabilities and concluded that “little to no capability exists” among any African country as concerns airlift, logistics, ground transport, naval assets, and medical skills.\textsuperscript{33} (Annex G provides DFI’s 19 country-specific case-studies.)

With few exceptions, African countries do not possess the ability to project force great distances. Henk and Metz mention South Africa, and to a lesser degree, Ghana and Nigeria as possessing military and commercial assets that permit them to deploy troops and equipment substantial distances either by air or by sea.\textsuperscript{34} South Africa has used its air assets to assist United Nations peacekeeping operations in Angola and Mozambique, although unofficially,\textsuperscript{35} and it was considering providing airlift support for the proposed multinational force in Eastern Zaire.\textsuperscript{36} Egypt also possesses substantial heavy airlift capacity as evidenced by its contribution of two full divisions to Operation Desert Storm totalling some 40,000 men—which it transported to

\textsuperscript{31} (...continued)


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{35} For a detailed account of the South African air force’s contributions to the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) and the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), see H.A.P. Potgieter, “South African Assistance in ONUMOZ and UNAVEM,” in Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (eds), Peacekeeping in Africa (Volume 2), Halfway House: Institute for Defense Policy, 1996, pp. 231-39.

\textsuperscript{36} Interview with R.M. “Rocky” Williams, Director, Defence Policy Department, Defence Secretariat, South African Department of Defence, 23 January 1998, Halfway House.
the field on its own.37 Ethiopia, with the aid of civilian aircraft,38 was largely able to deploy an infantry battalion to UNAMIR. 39 Angola rates mention given its relatively significant fleet of transport aircraft.40 Although Luanda will remain preoccupied with its civil war, it has shown itself willing to use some of its assets further afield in Congo (Brazzaville) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The ability to sustain a sizeable force presents a more significant obstacle. Whereas it is possible to utilize civilian assets to assist in the initial transport of troops and some matériel, it is much more difficult to paper over shortcomings in command and control, maintenance, and re-supply. Even deploying with the desired level of self-sufficiency has proven an illusive goal. The problems that this creates concerning these units’ effectiveness have often been offset by the largesse of other countries. This limitation is greater than what can be ascertained from African countries’ participation in multinational operations, however. The country leading the multinational force, after securing the desired international political support, will often limit the number of countries requiring high levels of assistance because of the drain on resources and the strain on military credibility. Thus, the fact that even pre-selected countries should encounter serious problems in this regard underscores this limitation.

38 Ibid.
39 The US provided some assistance and equipment, but it was essentially an Ethiopian undertaking. Interview with Fisher, 24 August 1999, by telephone.
40 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) records Angola as possessing five An-2s, four An-26s, six BN-2s, eight C-212s, four PC-6Bs, two L-100-20s, six C-130s, as well as a large helicopter fleet. The Military Balance 1998/99, London: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 241.
Part IV

Efforts to Develop African Capacities
CHAPTER 10

UNITED STATES

AFRICA: NOT A US “VITAL NATIONAL INTEREST”

Historically, the interest of the United States in Africa has been negligible compared to attention and resources it has paid to other regions.¹ The US was not involved in the “scramble” for Africa and was not a colonizing power there, although it did forge a special relationship with Liberia in the early nineteenth century.² America’s interest in Africa was elevated during the cold war, during which time Washington supported or opposed several African countries, supplying or withholding military equipment and financial aid in line with geopolitical considerations. Much of its involvement has been substantially reduced since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US has no

¹ This lack of interest is exemplified to a certain extent in the travel itineraries of US Presidents. According to National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, President Bill Clinton’s 12-day visit in March and April 1998 to six African countries during which he met with 10 African heads of State was historically significant in that it represented a marked departure from his predecessors’ actions. Berger noted that George Bush had visited US troops serving in Somalia during the final days of his presidency, that Jimmy Carter had spent a few days in Liberia and Nigeria during his term, and that in 1943 Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s plane had touched down in Africa to refuel. See “Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, Administrator of AID Brian Atwood, and Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater,” Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 20 March 1998, available on the Internet at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/Africa/19980320-5382.html>.

² Beginning in the 1820s, freed slaves from the US returned to Africa and settled in what is now Liberia with US assistance. The connection is symbolized in part by the fact that the country’s capital, Monrovia, is named after James Monroe, the US President at the time resettlement activity began, and by the fact that the US dollar is legal currency in Liberia.
sustained military presence in Africa, and its global military structure has contributed to the continent’s marginalization as concerns American policy.3

On a global scale, however, US assistance to Africa is significant. Many Western countries provide aid that is more generous on a per capita basis or as a measure of their gross national products. Nevertheless, few provide the overall amounts of developmental, military, and humanitarian aid that the US contributes. For example, in 1997, the US budgeted US$ 700 million for development projects and provided an additional US$ 600 million in humanitarian relief and disaster assistance to sub-Saharan Africa alone.4

To a large extent, humanitarian concerns rather than strategic or political considerations shape US African policy. As a result, US policy is considerably reactive. The US, for example, lavished hundreds of millions of dollars of aid in response to the mass exodus of refugees from Rwanda to Tanzania and Zaire after the genocide in 1994. Yet it was parsimonious and unenthusiastic towards the possible augmentation of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Rwanda or towards a new operation in the Great Lakes region.5 The Africa

3 The US military is organized into five regional commands. The majority of African States are the operational responsibility of the US European Command (USEUCOM). Eight countries, largely around the Horn and including Egypt, fall under the aegis of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM). In both instances African security matters have traditionally assumed a much lower priority than other concerns of these two military commands: namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Persian Gulf, respectively. See Dan Henk, “Peace and Security in Africa: Contributions by the United States,” ISS Monograph No. 35, Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies: March 1999, pp. 19-20. Similarly, the core focus of the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) does not include the island nations of the Comoros, Madagascar, and Mauritius, which are part of its area of responsibility.

4 These figures were provided by the Administrator of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). See “Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, Administrator of AID Brian Atwood, and Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater.”

5 Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen recounts a powerful and damning anecdote about how US policy in Africa is sometimes made. When Cohen spoke to a congressional staffer about the advisability of taking a proactive stance in the Great Lakes region to possibly avert a (continued...
The 1993 deaths of 18 US servicemen in Somalia continue to undermine a more robust US African policy. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, issued in May 1994, has made it more difficult for the US to intervene in Africa, either directly or indirectly. PDD-25 was formulated at a time when domestic support for American involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations was waning. President Bill Clinton sought to seize the initiative from a hostile Congress and deflect criticism on this aspect of US foreign policy. While the Clinton Administration was justified in calling for US vital interests to be at stake in any decision for the US to intervene militarily, it applied the same criterion to US support for United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of the US level (quite possibly none) of military participation in the undertaking. This has permitted members of Congress with isolationist agendas or simply opposed to multilateral diplomacy to more forcefully and effectively question and withhold support for United Nations peacekeeping operations—especially in Africa where US vital interests are less clear. As former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen has succinctly put it, “with this rigid criterion in PDD-25, the Administration is being hung by its own petard with the Congress.” A senior official in the Clinton Administration has described PDD-25 as too confining

5 humanitarian tragedy, saving both lives and money, his interlocutor conceded matter-of-factly that supporting such a policy might well have had the desired effect. The staffer added that saving lives and money was not the issue, however. He opined that budgetary considerations were of far greater concern. Humanitarian assistance is a different budget line item and does not affect the cost- and image-conscious voting of congresspersons serving on the House International Relations Committee or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Written correspondence with Amb. Herman J. Cohen, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, US Department of State, 27 February 1999.


7 Written correspondence with Cohen, 27 February 1999.
and restrictive, preventing the US from being appropriately creative and engaged in promoting peace and security in Africa.\textsuperscript{8}

This lack of interest to become involved militarily in Africa—be it direct or through the United Nations—explains the causes and contours of many US policies towards Africa. The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) represents the centerpiece of the US peacekeeping policy in Africa. There are several other US undertakings, however, which seek to promote African countries’ abilities to manage and resolve conflicts on their continent. Indeed, several long-standing Department of Defense programs that impart peacekeeping-related skills to African military personnel or provide military equipment for peace support operations, taken together, represent a greater financial commitment than ACRI.

**TRAINING AND LONG-TERM CAPACITY-BUILDING PROGRAMMES**

**African Crisis Response Initiative**

*Plans for an African Crisis Response Force*

The African Crisis Response Initiative has its origins in the Clinton Administration’s ill-conceived and short-lived proposal in 1996 to create an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF). The failure of the US and the international community to respond appropriately to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was still fresh in policy makers’ minds in early 1996 as concern grew in Washington over escalating political tensions in Burundi.\textsuperscript{9} The sense of urgency can be seen from the spate of visits by senior US


\textsuperscript{9} Burundi, like Rwanda, had experienced several instances of mass killings over the previous 30 years.
officials to Burundi during 1996\textsuperscript{10} to gauge the situation and attempt to avert a bloodbath. Congress’s decision to appropriate US$ 20 million to support preventive action in Burundi\textsuperscript{11} is perhaps the clearest indication of the fear in Washington of a possible Rwanda-type genocide in Burundi to which the US might be compelled to send American troops. To make such a scenario less likely, the US hastily proposed to create a standing African peacekeeping force capable of responding to the crisis in Burundi or elsewhere in Africa down the line.\textsuperscript{12}

Fortunately, the crisis in Burundi subsided,\textsuperscript{13} obviating the immediate need for an ACRF (or for an American intervention) and giving the US much-needed time to re-think its policy. The way ACRF had been presented engendered resentment throughout Africa. Kenya’s President Daniel arap Moi, for example, was asked to make a commitment to join the ACRF project during the same brief meeting at which the US first informed Kenya of its proposal. US officials familiar with the incident were embarrassed at the way it was handled and sympathetic to Moi, who, not surprisingly, did not

\begin{enumerate}
\item US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Special Assistant to the President Susan Rice, and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose all travelled to Bujumbura. Interview with Amb. George Moose, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, US Department of State, current Permanent Representative, US Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, 4 March 1998, Geneva.
\item Ibid.
\item The US hoped to establish this force within six months. It would have considered providing aircraft and minimal logistical support including communication equipment to assist such a force if necessary. Interview with Ken Hillas, Deputy Chief, Political Section, US Embassy to South Africa, 20 January 1998, Pretoria. This was an unrealistic timetable, and the amorphous commitment underscores the lack of seriousness with which ACRF was formulated.
\item Maj. Pierre Buyoya’s coup on 25 July 1996 had a calming effect. Buyoya, a Tutsi, had previously stepped down as President in June 1993, when Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, was democratically elected. Many, therefore, viewed Buyoya as a moderate and conciliator. He continues to rule Burundi, which experiences sporadic outbursts of ethnic killings but is no longer considered on the precipice of mass slaughter.
\end{enumerate}
respond favourably. The heavy-handed and non-transparent manner in which the US introduced ACRF also rankled some of America’s European allies.

From Standing Force to Capacity Enhancement

Whereas ACRF proposed to create a force, ACRI seeks to develop a capacity. Under ACRI, national contingents at the battalion-level receive classical peacekeeping training. Instruction for brigade staff headquarters with support staff is also a part of the programme. ACRI training is based on procedures from both national and intergovernmental peacekeeping doctrines. Basic soldiering skills as well as specific peacekeeping functions are taught, such as establishing checkpoints, providing perimeter security, and processing displaced persons. The importance of respecting human rights and developing and maintaining good relations with civil society is also emphasized.

As originally envisaged, ACRI training was to be conducted in recipient countries at six-month intervals over a three-year period and was to be divided into two “phases.” Phase 1 was to last 60 days and culminate in a field training exercise (FTX) that involved humanitarian agencies, the media, and the local population. Phase 2 was to include six Sustainment Training (ST) modules. The first five STs were to last 30 days each. The timing and

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16 ACRI training borrows from US, UK, Nordic, UN, and NATO peacekeeping doctrines.
duration of the last ST, a regional training exercise, was undetermined given the greater number of variables involved.  

Before Phase 1 training begins, each participating African State in ACRI is furnished with approximately US$ 1.2 million worth of related equipment, for the battalion as well as the individual soldier. This equipment is intended for use both in training and in the event of actual deployment. Emphasizing interoperability, the US supplies recipients with equipment that meets United Nations specifications whenever possible, which explains the procurement of significant foreign-manufactured systems. ACRI participants receive standard communication equipment (US radios and repeaters), night vision binoculars (Russian), water-purification equipment (US), generators (US), and mine detectors (Austrian). Provision is made to replace worn parts for most of the major systems over the course of the three-year programme. Given the variety of cars and trucks in use, the limited shelf-life of many spare parts, and the rapidity with which vehicles fall into disrepair, the US decided not to provide vehicles or try to standardize transportation equipment. Except for small arms ammunition for marksmanship training, the ACRI package does not include any lethal equipment. Each trainee is outfitted with a complete uniform, boots, personal gear, and even eyeglasses if necessary.

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19 British repeaters were originally used, but they were replaced with American models because experience showed a more rugged communication set to be preferable. The new systems ensure that interoperability is maintained. Interview with Troy Shirley, Deputy for Budget and Logistics, ACRI Interagency Working Group, US Department of State, 27 July 1999, by telephone.

20 Ibid.


Changes to Phase 1 and Phase 2

ACRI has undergone a metamorphosis since it was unveiled in early 1997 to replace the ACRF concept. Whereas ACRF suffered from a failure to adequately inform or consult with African leaders, let alone consult them, the first Special Coordinator of the ACRI Interagency Working Group (IWG), Marshall McCallie, emphasized from the very beginning the importance of working with America’s “African partners” to design and develop ACRI. McCallie’s openness to innovation combined with the inchoate programme he inherited led to a series of changes that make the 1999 ACRI significantly different from the programme that existed in 1997.

The changes to phase 1 are relatively insignificant. The period of training has been extended to 70 days, as 60 days was deemed too short. A member of the US Special Forces who trained Senegalese troops participating in ACRI in 1997 compared their ability to retain and benefit from the training to “trying to take a sip of water from a fire hose.” There was simply too much material to cover in too short a time period. In another effort to address this concern, the number of Special Forces participating in the training was augmented, although the overall figure will vary slightly with the number of trainees. The level and type of equipment provided for the initial training

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23 In an effort at damage control, the US first began to use the term “partner” when speaking of Africa and the programme’s recipients in late 1996 before the creation of the IWG. See, for example, “U.S. Department of State On-the-Record Briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose on Secretary Christopher’s Trip to Africa,” Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, 3 October 1996, available on the Internet at <http://dosfan.lib.uiuc.edu/ERC/briefing/press_statements/9610/>.

24 Interview with ACRI trainer, Special Forces, US Department of Defense, 28 February 1998, Bakel.

25 The number of Special Forces taking part in Phase 1 training for Malawi, Senegal, and Uganda was 60. This number was later increased to 70. Interview with Naughton, 9 March 1998, Arlington.

26 For example, fewer Special Forces were required to train the Beninois battalion, which was smaller than the other African battalions trained in ACRI. Interview with Amb. Marshall F. McCallie, former Special Coordinator, ACRI Interagency Working Group, US Department of State, current Deputy Commandant for
and the conditions for its use have not changed much,27 nor have the terms under which it may be used outside of ACRI training.

Phase 2, by contrast, has undergone substantial restructuring. According to US Government officials, while the strict six-month interval had made sense because of the need to schedule the Special Forces instructors well in advance and to secure appropriate funding, it did not necessarily correspond with the needs and absorptive capacities of ACRI recipients. Thus, the time-frame was relaxed and the number of ST modules reduced. Phase 2 was amended to encompass up to six shorter ST modules for elements of the selected battalion. Elements of each ACRI-trained battalion would receive four to six STs in one or more of the following areas: [1] logistics and maintenance; [2] battalion headquarters staff operations; [3] operational interaction with international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs); [4] brigade headquarters staff operations; and [5] human rights and “train the trainer” development.28

Sustainment Training has since given way to Follow-on Training (FT) modules. FTs are designed to be more flexible than the revised STs in meeting the different needs of each recipient. Accordingly, while Special Forces still take part in FTs (albeit in smaller numbers), ACRI now makes increasing use of private companies and NGOs, which also possess the requisite expertise but have less rigid schedules, to provide the sought-after training. For example, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) and Logicon provide specialized training to officers, including computer-simulation exercises.29 Instructors from the NGO the US Institute of Peace

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26 (...)continued
27 Changes to the ACRI equipment package include an upgrade to the base communication system and the provision of some additional and upgraded personal gear for the troops. Interview with Shirley, 27 July 1999, by telephone.
28 Written correspondence with Philip Egger, Political Officer, ACRI Interagency Working Group, US Department of State, 27 August 1998.
29 Interview with McCallie, 30 June 1999, by telephone.
(USIP) will train Special Forces on negotiating techniques to better prepare them for the relevant ACRI training segment.30

The Eight Recipients

As of 30 June 1999, eight African countries had concluded agreements with the US, and six of those had begun to receive training. (See Table 10.1.) Ghana, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, and Uganda were identified early on as ACRI recipients.31 Tunisia was also mentioned as a possible candidate, but an agreement was never concluded as Tunisia desired more than the US was willing or able to provide.32 Benin and Côte d’Ivoire have subsequently joined ACRI, concluding agreements in July 1998 and November 1998, respectively. Ethiopia was scheduled to receive Phase 1 training in August 1998, but this was put on hold due to the outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998. ACRI training for Ethiopia is still being re-evaluated. Additional follow-on training for Uganda was suspended because of Kampala’s activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).33


32 Tunisia sought armoured vehicles to be included in the training package, which was not in the offering. Interview with Charles Ikins, Management Associate, Cohen and Woods International, 11 March 1998, Arlington.

33 Interview with Fisher, 2 July 1999, by telephone.
Table 10.1

Recipients of ACRI Training$^a$
(as of 30 June 1999)
dates indicate the month training commenced or was scheduled to begin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2$^b$</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FT 1</td>
<td>FT 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>10.98</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$ Based on interviews and written correspondence with the ACRI Interagency Working Group.

$^b$ Phase 2 includes four to six Follow-on Training (FT) modules of roughly 30-day sessions. FTs were initially called “STs” for “Sustainment Training.” Countries that received Phase 2 training prior to December 1998 did so under “ST 1.”

planned = planned
postponed = postponed
Possible Further Changes

While ACRI still provides bilateral training at battalion-level strength, it is now willing to train smaller infantry as well as specialized units and focuses greater attention on officer training. In March 1998, McCallie spoke of the desirability of training 10-14 battalions and 10-12,000 troops. Initial recipients were each to provide a single battalion with the exception of Ethiopia, which was to provide two battalions and a brigade headquarters. When McCallie left the IWG 13 months later, ACRI had trained some 4,200 African troops, but the total number had assumed less importance. Comparatively greater emphasis is now placed on training officers in general, and on “training the trainer” in particular.

There is continued interest in training a Brigade Staff battalion, but no final decision has been taken on how to proceed. The IWG envisages that instruction will be given to some 60 senior officers and a forward support company with specialized cells that together will likely comprise more than 300 soldiers of various ranks. Pending an eventual decision to move ahead with ACRI training for Ethiopia, the US is evaluating other options. Both Ghana and Senegal have concluded the necessary agreements to make them eligible recipients. Besides determining which country or countries are to receive Brigade Staff training, the US must still identify appropriate instructors and then coordinate their availability with each selected recipient. Special Forces are able to train many of the units within the Brigade Staff battalion’s forward support company, but do not have the organizational competence to provide instruction to the senior staff. This issue has long been appreciated in policy planning circles but has yet to be resolved.

ACRI is now actively considering whether to provide assistance on a subregional basis. The US has shown a particular interest in developing a programme with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The IWG is evaluating the advisability of having a Presidential Decision Directive issued that would allow ECOWAS to receive direct

34 Interview with McCallie, 11 March 1998, Washington, DC.
35 McCallie, Lessons from the African Crisis Response Initiative.
36 Interview with Fisher, 2 July 1999, by telephone.
37 Interview with Fisher, 24 August 1999, by telephone.
assistance at substantial levels. The selection of ACRI recipients demonstrates this interest: five of the eight “partners” are from the West African subregion and are members of ECOWAS. According to ACRI officials, the US would also like to work with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and possibly the East African Co-operation (EAC).

Other Programmes that Develop Peacekeeping Capacities

Joint/Combined Exchange Training

In addition to ACRI, the US conducts other military assistance programmes that enhance recipients’ peacekeeping capabilities through field training and group exercises. Unlike ACRI, however, they are not regional in application and peacekeeping is not their primary objective. Indeed, the focus of the largest such programme, Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET), is to improve US military capabilities. JCET familiarizes American troops with different environments and seeks to build long-term military contacts rather than to enhance the skills of the countries hosting the exercises per se. Nevertheless, the adage that a good peacekeeper must first be a good soldier underscores the value of such training to develop the latter’s peacekeeping abilities. JCETs are relatively small month-long exercises. US troops taking part in the exercise will commonly be below platoon strength. Those participating from the host country will be more numerous, typically ranging from platoon to company strength. Many African States have hosted JCET exercises since the programme was instituted in 1991. Between 1996 and 1998, for example, more than 20 took part.

38 Interview with McCallie, 30 June 1999, by telephone.
41 Countries hosting JCET training during that time period included Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, (continued...)
Regional Command Exercises

US regional commands also conduct bilateral exercises abroad in which African countries participate. Like JCETs, their primary purpose is to enhance the effectiveness of US troops. However, these exercises tend to be larger, although not necessarily longer. In 1996, US European Command (USEUCOM) undertook its first bilateral exercise in Africa.42 Lessons learned from that exercise in Mali were applied to the initial design of the FTX in ACRI.43 US Pacific Command (USPACOM) held a similar training exercise in Madagascar early in 1999, and USEUCOM will undertake another in Botswana from July-August 1999.44 Natural Fire, a US Central Command (USCENTCOM) exercise held in Kenya in June 1998, included troops from Tanzania and Uganda—countries outside of USCENTCOM’s area of responsibility.45 The US contributed 400 troops to the 2,100-strong exercise.46 Plans are under way for a follow-up exercise to be held in 2000.47

(...continued)


42 Interview with Grimes, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

43 Interview with Lt-Col. Mike Burke, Central Africa Desk Officer and ACRI Point of Contact, Africa Branch, European Division, Joint Staff, US Department of Defense, 12 March 1998, Arlington.

44 Interview with David Hamon, Regional Director for Plans and Policy, Office of African Affairs, US Department of Defense, 19 August 1999, by telephone.

45 This created budgetary concerns as USCENTCOM only had funds for Kenya, and USEUCOM, which did not initiate the exercise, did not have monies earmarked to cover the costs of Ugandan and Tanzanian participation in the 27-day exercise. Nairobi agreed to reimburse Dar es Salaam and Kampala for the expenses they incurred once in Kenya (other than on spent ammunition). Interview with Col. Ron Roughead, Chief, Kenya-United States Liaison Office, US Embassy to Kenya, 14 July 1999, Nairobi.

46 Kenya provided approximately 1,250 troops, Tanzania 235, and Uganda 210. Ibid.

47 Interview with Hamon, 29 July 1999, by telephone.
International Military Education and Training

Besides providing tactical training, the US offers academic courses, many with peacekeeping dimensions, which are open to African military officers. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme is the largest undertaking of this kind. It received US$ 49.8 million for fiscal year (FY) 1999. IMET was created in the 1950s and was designed to introduce foreign military officials to the United States as well as American values and expertise. Among the courses covered by IMET, those of particular relevance to developing peacekeeping capacities include segments on human rights and civil-military relations. African participation has grown considerably. In FY 1978, for example, US$ 2.65 million was allocated to fund six sub-Saharan African countries selected to benefit from IMET. Between FYs 1994 and 1998, the annual IMET budget for sub-Saharan Africa increased from US$ 4 million to US$ 8 million. Forty of the 48 sub-Saharan countries participated during this time, with 36 receiving funding in FYs 1997 and 1998.

52 Interview with Lazarus, 16 August 1999, by telephone. Sub-Saharan African countries received US$ 8 million again in FY 1999. Ibid.
53 Henk, “Peace and Security in Africa: Contributions by the United States,” p. 37. The eight sub-Saharan African countries that did not receive any IMET funding during this period were Burkina Faso, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia, and the Sudan. Ibid.
Expanded International Military Education and Training

Through the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) programme, foreign civilians are also able to receive defence-related training and attend academic courses. E-IMET is a sub-programme within IMET and was created in 1990 to engage foreign Government officials outside of the military as well as members of civil society, including the media and NGOs. E-IMET focuses on enhancing a recipient country’s commitment to democracy through strengthening its defence resource management, developing its military justice systems and codes of conduct, promoting civilian control of the military, and protecting human rights. E-IMET, like IMET, enables beneficiaries to attend courses in the US, but it provides a greater percentage of its training overseas through Mobile Education Teams (METs). METs allow the US to better tailor its courses to a country’s specific needs and enable a greater number of people to benefit from the programme. The US Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) in Rhode Island, for example, has provided training on disciplined military operations to more than 20 countries throughout Africa since 1996.

Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities

The Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) initiative focuses on developing foreign countries’ peacekeeping doctrines. The motivation behind the programme’s creation in 1996 was to make certain countries more capable of undertaking peacekeeping and in so doing make it less likely that the US would have to intervene. As of 30 June 1999, South

54 See “DSCA Information Paper on IMET.”
56 Written correspondence with Walter Munroe, Academic Director, Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, US Department of Defense, 20 August 1999.
57 Written correspondence with a US Government official familiar with the programme and its genesis.
Africa was the only African country to have received EIPC funding.\textsuperscript{58} The money enabled a team of South African peacekeeping trainers to visit the US for an orientation tour of available peacekeeping-related programmes and equipment. Together with US experts, South Africa is assessing its needs and developing an appropriate peacekeeping programme and curriculum.\textsuperscript{59} A relatively small initiative to begin with, EIPC is likely to become more modest; the programme was allocated US$ 7 million in FYs 1998 and 1999, but only US$ 5 million is being sought for FY 2000.\textsuperscript{60} Congressional support for EIPC is lukewarm, and additional funding for any of the countries that received EIPC support in the programme’s first two years of funding is not assured. As of mid-1999, no commitments had been made to fund any additional countries—in Africa or elsewhere.

\textit{African Center for Strategic Studies}

The \textit{African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS)} \textsuperscript{61} represents the most recent US initiative to engage Africa on issues of peace and security. ACSS was officially established in May 1999 and follows the creation of other regional centres.\textsuperscript{62} It will provide academic seminars and a dynamic forum in Africa to promote civil-military relations, national security strategy, and

\textsuperscript{58} South Africa received US$ 350,000 in FY 1998, and US$ 300,000 in FY 1999. Interview with Smith, 13 August 1999, by telephone.

\textsuperscript{59} Interview with Smith, 17 August 1999, by telephone.

\textsuperscript{60} Interview with Smith, 13 August 1999, by telephone.

\textsuperscript{61} When first unveiled by President Clinton during his 1998 trip to Africa, ACSS stood for the African Center for Security Studies.

defence economics.63 Like E-IMET, ACSS will be open to military officers as well as civilians, but on a grander scale. Instruction will be in English and French with simultaneous translation.64 The initial two-week course is scheduled to begin on 31 October 1999 in Senegal. The location for future seminars as well as the permanent facility has yet to be chosen.65

**Support for Other Countries’ Peacekeeping Training Initiatives**

In addition to these US programmes, Washington has also supported other countries’ peacekeeping training initiatives on an ad hoc basis. In February 1998, an American platoon joined Exercise Guidimakha in Senegal. Washington provided US$ 1 million in airlift to bring troops from regional countries to South Africa to participate in Blue Crane.66 The US plans to participate in Gabon 2000, the follow-up to Guidimakha.67 It has also agreed to pay for 10-12 African participants attending the British-assisted international peace support operation (PSO) course to be held at the Ghanaian Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC) in November 1999.68

63 Ibid.
64 Through an arrangement with Portugal, lusophone participants will also be assisted. Interview with Hamon, 19 August 1999, by telephone.
65 “DoD Launches African Center for Strategic Studies.”
67 Interview with Hamon, 29 July 1999, by telephone.
68 Interview with Gill Coglin, Deputy Head, Peacekeeping Section, United Nations Department, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 25 August 1999, by telephone.
**OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FIELD**

The US has also routinely assisted in the airlift of African troops to multinational operations—both on the continent and abroad. For the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), it transported contingents from Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia (as well as some non-African countries) to the mission area.69 The US supported the French airlift of Moroccan troops to Zaire in 1977.70 In 1978, the US airlifted Senegalese troops to join the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).71 Washington provided airlift services for several countries participating in the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Nambia during 1989 and 1990,72 including Kenya.73 Between 1991 and 1997, the US airlifted Malian, Ghanaian, Senegalese, Tanzanian, and Ugandan troops at various stages of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group’s (ECOMOG’s) operations in Liberia.74

The US has supplied African forces with equipment for use in peacekeeping operations. It is not uncommon for the US to provide non-lethal matériel such as uniforms, tents, rations, spare parts for vehicles, and repair kits for radios. For example, the Tanzanian and Ugandan troops serving in ECOMOG received many of these items. For the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), besides airlifting the Chanaian

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72 Ibid., p. 712.
73 Interview with Fisher, 24 August 1999.
contingent, the US also furnished it with illuminating mortar rounds and armoured personnel carriers with 50-calibre guns for self-protection.75

Washington has also provided services to help sustain African troops already deployed in the field through civilian subcontractors. In Liberia, for example, the American company International Charter Incorporated (ICI) received US funding to provide commercial helicopter lift.76 Similarly, Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) helped procure, maintain, and repair vehicles in Liberia with US money (as well as financing from other countries). The US has also employed civilian subcontractors to provide various non-lethal equipment. Again in Liberia, the US provided funds for generators and communication equipment.77 Washington has funded similar programmes to support United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Rwanda. Other civilian contractors have included Raytheon, Dyncorp, Brown and Root, Lock heed Martin, Bechtel, and MPRI.78

**ASSESSMENT**

Not surprisingly, the US takes offense at the suggestion that it is “disengaging” from Africa. The provision of the airlift, equipment, and subcontracted services for ECOMOG operations in Liberia alone amounted to US$ 80 million.79 A year of ACRI training is budgeted at about US$ 20 million. The various Defense Department programmes in which Africans partake receive significantly more. The cost of this military training and education is often much less than US humanitarian assistance. A common refrain among many US Government officials interviewed for this book was that if the US was truly leaving Africa to its own devices, Washington could do so less expensively.

75 Interview with Fisher, 24 August 1999. It is rare for the US to provide such “lethal” aid in the context of peacekeeping.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., p. 11.
79 See ibid., p. 7.
More telling than the amount of money being spent, is the reactive manner with which it is dispensed. The majority of the funds allotted to support ECOMOG’s efforts in Liberia did not materialize until six years into the conflict. The US allocated roughly US$ 15 million towards the Senegalese contribution to ECOMOG in 1991 and 1992, and another US$ 15 million for Tanzanian and Ugandan participation in 1993 and 1994. Washington came up with US$ 50 million in 1997 and 1998, which together with other factors helped bring an end to the Liberian civil war. Given numerous variables such as the political will of the combatants and other interested political actors in the region, it is not necessarily the case that an influx of funds from Washington earlier in the conflict would have brought an end to the war any sooner. Still, one thing is certain about the “wait and see” attitude that characterized American policy: the situation deteriorated significantly before it improved. The same is true of most US efforts to assist regional—and to a lesser extent international—peacekeeping initiatives.

Those policies designed to be proactive are quite limited. Most Defense Department programmes that develop African military capacities as well as their respect for civilian authority and human rights tend to be small and uncoordinated. While ACRI differs from most other initiatives in its Africa-centric focus, it too represents a relatively minor undertaking compared to what the US is capable of doing. One US Government official lamented that ACRI was “supposed to be a major African policy initiative, but it’s living from hand to mouth.”

Despite talk of working with its “African partners,” US programmes are first and foremost a response to American needs and constraints. The largest Defense Department programmes that provide training and education for African recipients are designed primarily for the benefit of US armed forces. IMET and JCET do not make claims to the contrary. ACRI, however, purports to serve African interests. Yet above all ACRI is a response to domestic priorities and considerations. It reflects the desire of the US not to be drawn into armed conflicts and humanitarian tragedies in Africa.

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Many of these constraints are self-imposed. US Government officials readily concede that ACRI is flawed but stress that it represents the best policy option that can realistically be expected to garner Congressional support.\footnote{Interviews with US Government officials, Winter and Spring 1998, Geneva, Pretoria, and Washington, DC.} Isolationist and anti-UN sentiment in Congress is formidable, but President Clinton emboldened those holding such views and enticed his Administration’s ability to mount a rigorous challenge. During the 1996 national election campaign,\footnote{For a succinct overview of the mood and tenor of the times, see John M. Goshko, “U.N. Becomes Lightning Rod for Rightist Fears: Criticism of World Body Resonates in GOP Themes,” The Washington Post, 23 September 1996, p. A01.} he made the United Nations and then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali scapegoats in an effort to shield himself against potential partisan attacks from accountability for US policy “failures” in Somalia and Yugoslavia. The manner in which PDD-25 was worded and the decision not to make United Nations and peacekeeping priority concerns have resulted in the Clinton Administration’s inability to regain control of this aspect of US foreign policy from a hostile Congress even after Clinton won re-election.

Congressional support for ACRI has been maintained, albeit at a modest level.\footnote{Initially, ACRI received US$ 15 million for FY 1997. Henk and Metz, “The United States and the Transformation of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond,” p. vii. It has received close to US$ 20 million in subsequent fiscal years.} McCallie stresses that no African country has been denied battalion-level training because of budgetary concerns. A few countries that had expressed interest in receiving ACRI training were not viewed favourably because of their human rights records and questionable embrace of democracy, and a few others could not be accommodated because they could not provide units of sufficient size.\footnote{Interview with McCallie, 30 June 1999, by telephone.} (In March 1998, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger mentioned that 15 African countries had expressed an interest in receiving ACRI training, but provided no details.\footnote{“Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, Administrator of AID Brian Atwood, and Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater.”}) Civilian control
over the military and respect for the rule of law and human rights are important considerations for the US. Yet more than eight African countries would be eligible to receive ACRI training under such guidelines if money were not a factor. Additional financing could permit units smaller than battalion-level to benefit from ACRI.

The programme’s long-term prospects remain in doubt. Although ACRI funding is only guaranteed for FY 1999, there initially was a general appreciation that Congress would fund the programme at current levels for the first five years. Discussions have since ensued to extend this informal understanding for an additional two years. Given current commitments and plans to train a brigade staff battalion, it will be difficult for the US to engage additional countries for ACRI training unless Congress appropriates funds well in excess of what has been agreed to date.

The motivation of the African recipients also raises questions as to ACRI’s efficacy. The US, in an effort to appear less paternalistic, has always underscored that African countries receiving ACRI training will decide for themselves whether to take advantage of the skills taught and equipment provided in ACRI to undertake peacekeeping. This uncertainty represented a potentially troubling aspect of the programme: a recipient might choose not to become involved in regional peacekeeping. Washington has stressed that several ACRI recipients have subsequently sent ACRI-trained troops to serve in regional peacekeeping operations, and has taken evident satisfaction in being “vindicated.” Examples include Benin in Guinea-Bissau, Ghana in Sierra Leone, and Mali in CAR. Understandably, the US has not sought to focus attention on the activities of Senegal in Guinea-Bissau and Uganda in DRC, which highlight another aspect of the programme that is potentially troubling: a recipient may select not to honour its commitment to use the equipment as intended. (There is no proof, however, that ACRI equipment has been used in such ventures.)

Moreover, the initial selection process of ACRI recipients did not engender much confidence in the long-term vision of the US and its “African partners.” One US Government official familiar with the origins of ACRF and its transformation into ACRI described the first group of ACRI recipients as
essentially comprising the first countries to raise their hands. The way in which Malawi was selected to receive ACRI training is a case in point. The US had sought to interest several SADC countries—particularly Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe—in ACRI training but settled instead on Malawi. Lilongwe simply asked to participate during a US briefing on ACRI before the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), which Malawi happened to be chairing at the time. The subsequent selection of Benin and Côte d’Ivoire, however, represents a clear policy decision to help create a healthier political and military balance within ECOMOG undertakings.

McCallie’s successor, Aubrey Hooks, will likely oversee an ACRI that will continue to evolve. For example, the interest shown in working directly with ECOWAS represents a step in the right direction. It could permit countries to receive training that otherwise might not have the opportunity. ACRI has not been able to engage some States because they do not have a sufficient capacity to merit selection for battalion-level training. A regional approach might enable smaller national units to train alongside those from another country. It also increases the likelihood that the training provided will be used for the purposes intended. By enhancing the capability of a regional organization with a mandate to undertake peacekeeping, this uncertainty is reduced. Along these same lines, the provision of relevant training and equipment for specialized units, especially signals and logistics, is also made more attractive given that additional oversight will help ensure that equipment will be used as intended.

87 Interview with Fisher, 24 August 1999, by telephone.
88 Hooks became the ACRI Special Coordinator in April 1999.
89 Interview with McCallie, 30 June 1999, by telephone.
CHAPTER 11

FRANCE

FRANCE’S “AFRICA POLICY” IN TRANSITION

In contrast with other colonial powers, France remained militarily engaged in Africa—albeit to varying degrees—following decolonization. Former French colonies and trust territories largely accepted this proactive role. Many of them concluded bilateral defence agreements with Paris, which permitted France to respond militarily upon their request. Some countries also permitted France to maintain a military presence on their soil. France generally honoured its commitments, intervening frequently in the early 1960s to quell uprisings and restore order. However, African and non-aligned States roundly criticized France’s 1964 intervention in Gabon, which was not carried out at the request of the authorities in

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1 Guinea was a notable exception. In 1958, it renounced its ties with France, and France retaliated by cutting off all aid to the country. (Peter J. Schraeder, “France and the Great Game in Africa,” Current History, May 1997, p. 207.) This incident served as a powerful lesson for other francophone African States.


3 French garrisons in Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Senegal succeeded in promoting order by dint of their very existence.
power. This incident gave Paris reason to pause, but it was the hostile reaction of African States regarding France’s support for the Biafran secessionists in Nigeria’s civil war (1967-1970) that brought about a significant change in French policy. As a result, France became increasingly reluctant to intervene. From 1964 to 1974, even though military coups and attempted coups were commonplace on the continent, it conducted only two overt military interventions in support of its bilateral defence agreements: in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 1967 and in Chad from 1968-1971.

Cuban and Soviet gains in Africa during the early 1970s prompted France to reassert itself militarily. The number of Cuban military personnel stationed in Africa, which had been growing steadily, reached more than 20,000 in Angola alone by 1975. Paris was increasingly uncomfortable with having a relatively “small” force on a continent with which it had a special relationship. Renewed fighting in Zaire in 1978 ushered in a second wave of French military activity. By late 1978, France’s military presence in sub-Saharan Africa had been significantly augmented and stood at 13,000

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7 France had responded to Zairean dissidents’ March 1977 incursion into Zaire’s Shaba province (Shaba I) by providing logistical support to the largely Moroccan force that was constituted. When rebels attacked the mining town of Kolwesi in May 1978 (Shaba II), France responded more forcefully, dispatching paratroops.
troops and 1,000 advisers and technicians. France pursued this proactive approach into the 1990s.  

A series of developments beginning in the 1990s led France to re-evaluate and reformulate its policy. France’s experience in Rwanda—more than any other incident—had a profound impact on its approach. The French Government’s close relationship with the Rwandan Government and its alleged continuing support for the Forces armées rwandaises (FAR) even after the genocide prompted outrages both domestically and abroad. The French public also began to increasingly question France’s financial commitment in Africa as well as French support for autocratic African regimes. Policy makers’ attention shifted towards Europe, as they grew preoccupied with the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European integration, and the Balkan conflict. Sub-Saharan Africa appeared more peripheral as a result. The new generation of French Government officials did not have the same ties and commitments to Africa as its predecessors. Moreover, in 1997, the French parliament passed a law ending conscription, which necessitated a

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9. Although President François Mitterand publicly called for democratization in Africa as early as 1990 and intimated that continued French aid would be contingent upon a willingness of recipient African countries to promote appropriate reforms, a change in French policy towards Africa was not frequently apparent. Paris continued to support pro-French regimes that often were dictatorial or undemocratic. (Schraeder, “France and the Great Game in Africa,” p. 207.) This reluctance to make a clean break from past practices was also apparent during the presidency of Jacques Chirac, Mitterand’s successor. Chirac’s decision to appoint Jacques Foccart, a man who epitomized French interventionist policy in Africa since the days of President Charles de Gaulle, as an adviser was taken by many to be a symbol that the old paternalistic policy was still alive. These fears subsided somewhat in 1997, with Foccart’s death. Interview with Robin E. Poulton, Senior Researcher, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 23 July 1999, Geneva.

reduction in the size of its armed forces and militated against an interventionist policy in Africa. This coincided with the arrival of a socialist government led by Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, who had new ideas on French African policy.  

One element of France’s revised Africa policy is the reduction of its military presence on the continent. In 1997, France announced it would reduce the number of its “pre-positioned troops” in Africa by nearly 30 per cent, from 8,100 to fewer than 6,000. The first significant step in this process was the closure of its bases in CAR and its complete withdrawal from the country by April 1998. As of mid-1999, France had 6,300 troops distributed among the five remaining bases. It intends to further reduce its presence to roughly 5,600 by 2002. In 1998, the operational costs for these pre-positioned forces had been reduced to US$ 418 million—down significantly from US$ 550 million the previous year.

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15 Interview with Col. Bruno Dary, Chief, Operational Center, Africa Division, General Staff, French Ministry of Defence, 29 June 1999, Paris. France will scale back its presence in Djibouti to achieve this goal. Ibid.
Another aspect of France’s changing Africa policy is the reduced military cooperation budget destined for Africa in general—and francophone Africa in particular. For 1999, the total military cooperation budget was US$ 142 million, down from US$ 144 million in 1998 and US$ 150 million in 1997. The portion of the military cooperation budget destined for sub-Saharan Africa decreased by four per cent for 1999. Credits destined for francophone African countries have been reduced, while those available for the rest of the world have been increased. The latter category, which received 12 per cent of the military assistance credits in 1998, received 17 per cent in 1999. As a consequence of the diminished military cooperation budget and its changed orientation, France has scaled back the number of its military advisers posted in sub-Saharan Africa to provide technical assistance. From 1996 to 1997, the figure was reduced from 697 to 625 individuals posted in 23 and 21 countries, respectively. For 1998, the figure was further cut to 547, distributed

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Among 19 countries. In 1999, there were 484 advisers serving in 20 African countries. 22

Under France’s new policy towards Africa, non-francophone countries are to be engaged to a greater extent than before. 23 This change was apparent at the most recent Franco-African Summit in November 1998, at which 49 African countries were represented. 24 In previous years, these biannual Summits included only francophone African countries and France. The redirection is also exemplified in part by Guinea-Bissau’s recent membership in the Communauté financière africaine (CFA) Franc Zone. 25 The French Agency for Development has expanded French aid

22 For 1999, the breakdown of French military advisers in sub-Saharan Africa was: Angola (5), Benin (21), Burkina Faso (17), Cameroon (42), CAR (28), Chad (46), the Comoros (11), Côte d’Ivoire (40), Djibouti (32), Equatorial Guinea (4), Ethiopia (2), Gabon, (35), Guinea (23), Madagascar (22), Malawi (1), Mali (20), Mauritania (39), Niger (39), Senegal (30), and Togo (27). (Bouveret, “Coopération militaire française: vers une banalisation?,” p. 61, citing Bernard Cazeneuve, “Avis No. 1114,” Assemblée nationale, 8 October 1998.) France also had 30 defence assistants in Morocco and 12 in Tunisia during 1998-1999. Ibid., p. 62, citing Cazeneuve, “Avis No. 1114.”


RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITÉS AFRICAINES
DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX

In the emerging era of changed Franco-African relations, Paris has embarked on a new security assistance policy to the continent. France initially promoted the concept of a standing African force, first floating the idea at the November 1994 Franco-African Summit in Biarritz, France. Yet it never received broad support from within the French Government, let alone from African countries or the international community. Paris thus

geographically as well. Of the 85 countries it assisted in 1998, 51 are in Africa.26

Linked with France’s decision to expand its focus was the absorption of the Ministry of Cooperation into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Cooperation ran French policy in Africa in support of the “special relationship” but under strict supervision of presidential advisers in the Elysée Palace.27 Francophone countries in other parts of the world had no such special advocacy bodies. According to France, this change will enable Paris to continue to focus on francophone African countries while offering its programme to other countries as well, identifying a “zone of priority solidarity.” Prime Minister Jospin announced the decision to enact this long-debated reform on 4 February 1998, and the task was accomplished by 1 January 1999.

30 In the wake of Operation Turquoise, it was not an opportune time politically to try to sell such a concept. France quickly learned that it would be extremely (continued...)
abandoned the idea and developed the Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix (RECAMP) concept in its stead.

RECAMP is based upon the premise that African States have the political will to participate in peacekeeping operations on their continent, but neither the logistical and financial resources, nor the experience in establishing multinational command and control structures. It therefore aims to provide African States with the tools they need to conduct successful peacekeeping operations. Accordingly, the initiative has three pillars: instruction, subregional peacekeeping training exercises, and pre-positioning equipment in designated locations in Africa. RECAMP is most accurately viewed as a “concept,” not as a programme that can be executed or implemented—or perfectly quantified.

In September 1998, the French Government appointed an Ambassador for RECAMP. The post’s first occupant, Gabriel de Bellescize, is tasked with coordinating the various aspects of France’s capacity-building programme, promoting its initiatives, and forging new partnerships with African and Western countries. In creating an office and naming an Ambassador to service RECAMP, France consciously followed the US’s example of establishing an “Interagency Working Group” and appointing a “Special Coordinator” for its African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) programme.
Because it is a concept and not a programme, RECAMP has no firm annual budget. Indeed, it is difficult to calculate how much money is spent on RECAMP-related programmes each year. In 1998, France came up with the sum of US$ 36 million, in part because the US has a precise figure for its ACRI programme. Paris has since opted against fixing an overall budget for RECAMP, although there is a specific budget for various components of the initiative. 35 RECAMP is funded through both the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In general, the Ministry of Defence funds the pre-positioning and restocking equipment, and most aspects of multinational training exercises. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget covers instruction programmes. 36

Instruction

RECAMP prioritizes the provision of peacekeeping instruction. France is working with African countries to set up schools for both officers and troops on the African continent. Such training centres can be regional institutions, national schools that are open to participants from the region, or purely national schools. As it has done for many years, France still invites African participants to attend courses in France as well, although the number of spots available is diminishing. At the end of 1998, de Bellescize estimated that France provided peacekeeping instruction to 1,500 African military personnel. 37

Zambakro Peacekeeping Training School

Together with Côte d’Ivoire, France has established a peacekeeping training centre in Zambakro, Côte d’Ivoire. The school officially opened on 7 June 1999. It will offer peacekeeping instruction to African officers from

35 Ibid.
36 Interview with de Bellescize, 29 June 1999, Paris.
The school also houses an Ivorian center for training national units. Interview with Bonnemaison, 28 June 1999, Paris.

For the first course of 15 officers, for example, there will be three participants from Côte d’Ivoire, seven from elsewhere in West Africa, and five from outside West Africa. Ibid.

Although France encouraged Côte d’Ivoire to provide the centre’s Commandant from the outset, Côte d’Ivoire declined. Ibid.

A two-week officers’ command post course for the battalion level will follow. 44

France has made a significant financial commitment to the Zambakro facility and its programmes but expects other countries to provide assistance as well. According to Paris, the school’s construction alone cost France nearly US$ 3 million. Beyond that, France anticipates that it will contribute roughly US$ 300,000 per year for the center itself. In addition, France will provide a stipend to both trainers and course participants to cover food and incidentals. For students, this allowance will be roughly US$ 360 per individual, per course. France hopes that the European Union (EU) will make a financial contribution to Zambakro in the future, thereby reducing its financial burden. In addition, other Governments and institutions have expressed an interest in using the center’s facilities. For example, the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre has indicated its intention to hold a peacekeeping training session at Zambakro and would presumably cover related costs. 45

Other Initiatives Devoted to Education

France also provides financial assistance and instructors to a growing number of African national military staff colleges, which have been designated to provide training to other nationals as well. In 1997, there was only one such “national school open to the region:” the military staff college in Mali. By the end of 1999, 13 more national schools in West and Central Africa will be open to participants of other nationalities. 46 Roughly
270 students received instruction through such programmes in 1998, and 550 will be trained during the course of 1999. France hopes that 700 African students per year will attend such courses by 2002. 47

Although all of these schools are devoted to particular aspects of military training, 48 their courses also include peacekeeping modules. The military staff college in Koulikoro, Mali, for example, focuses on humanitarian law issues, relevant international treaties and conventions, and recent African conflicts during its nine-month staff officers course. The programme aims to instil in participants the notion of a “culture of peace.” 49

Each programme is based on bilateral relations between France and the host country but is geared to meet the subregion’s training needs. The curriculum is discussed and restructured according to requirements of the host country as well as the subregion. The partnership agreement signed between France and a country requesting the “regionalization” of one of its schools foresees that France will assist in developing the training doctrine and that the institution will be open to students from neighbouring countries. This concept of “national schools open to the region” responds to two concerns: [1] it makes up for the reduction of places in French military staff colleges commensurate with the reduction in size of the French Army; and [2] it provides instruction adapted to the realities of African armies. 50

46 (...continued)
piloting, and maintaining law and order), one in Senegal (for active officers), and one in Gabon (for general staff). Ibid.


48 The Zambakro center, which qualifies as a national school open to the subregion, is an exception, in that it focuses specifically on peacekeeping training.

49 Information taken from briefing given by the École d’État Major ouest-africaine de Koulikoro during Gaidimakha, 28 February 1998, Bakel.

50 “Dossier de Presse: Séminaire de Libreville.”
Courses conducted at French military staff colleges, some of which have peacekeeping dimensions, are still open to African officers. Recently, for example, France invited African States to participate in a three-week peacekeeping course at its Institut de Hautes Études de Défense Nationale. The course was open to anglophone, francophone, and lusophone countries, and officers from Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Kenya were among the participants.

French military personnel have also been seconded from the army’s Operational Instruction Detachment and the Technical Instruction Detachment to provide specific peacekeeping training. Some 15 personnel from the Operational Instruction Detachment helped to prepare various African contingents for participation in the February 1998 multinational peacekeeping training exercise, Guidimakha. In early 1998, two Operational Instruction Detachment personnel and one individual from the Technical Instruction Detachment provided training to the Ivorian contingent preparing to serve in the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA). One Technical Instruction trainer instructed a Burkinabé company on peacekeeping techniques in early 1999.

Subregional Training Exercises

RECAMP prioritizes training at the subregional level. Through RECAMP, France provides significant support to multinational peacekeeping exercises hosted by different African countries. Some of the participating troops are organized into multinational battalions, giving them an opportunity to work closely together. France intends to support large-scale subregional exercises roughly every two years, in different locations around the continent, although this does not preclude smaller French contributions to other exercises in the interim. Increasingly, France hopes to develop and undertake these exercises in conjunction with African subregional organizations.

The number of African participants has diminished significantly, however, from 1,800 in 1991, to 916 in 1998. Sada, “Le changement à petits pas des relations franco-africaines,” p. 229.


de Bellescize, “Enhancing Africa’s Peacekeeping Capabilities (RECAMP).”
Exercise Guidimakha and “Lessons Learned”

The first RECAMP training programme, Guidimakha, took place in February 1998 in Senegal. The exercise was preceded by a political-military seminar in October 1997. Some 3,600 troops from 11 African and Western countries took part in the 10-day exercise. Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal were represented at battalion strength. Five other African countries provided platoons: Cape Verde, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau. France provided roughly 900 French troops, and the UK and the US contributed small contingents as well.

Guidimakha was designed to prepare troops for a number of contingencies and thus covered a broad range of scenarios. The exercise was divided into four separate phases, in order to approximate an actual operation and facilitate training. First, specialized personnel from participating countries gathered intelligence in the theatre of operations. Next, during the preliminary contingency operations phase, participating troops were tasked with securing key strategic points. The third phase centered around taking control of a particular area as well as securing a humanitarian zone, and included aerial bombardment simulations. The final phase was devoted to providing humanitarian assistance, such as regrouping and protecting refugees and internally-displaced persons (IDPs).

Guidimakha was praised on some accounts and criticized on others. As one observer noted, the exercise was significant in that it brought

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56 Belgium provided a C-130 aircraft but no troops and is not included in this number.
together “new mixes” in terms of participating and donor countries. It also clearly manifested the willingness of African and Western countries to work together. Politically, therefore, Guidimakha was an important undertaking. Yet some military experts in attendance questioned the value of the training given. One observer estimated that the exercise was 90 per cent political and 10 per cent training. Another noted that Guidimakha involved “a little bit of everything,” claiming that the exercise was not straightforward or simple enough to be useful to participants. Many attendees also wondered whether they were witnessing a peacekeeping exercise or a military training drill.

France has attempted to incorporate a number of “lessons learned” from Guidimakha into its plans for subsequent training exercises. For example, future subregional exercises will be preceded by not only a civil-military planning seminar, but a command post exercise. Future exercises will also be better planned, and preparation will be longer term. For Guidimakha, only four months separated the planning seminar and the exercise. Moreover, during the pre-operations phase, military planners will have a good link with non-military organizations such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Future subregional exercises will generally be limited to 1,000 participants, in response to complaints about the unwieldiness of Guidimakha—as well as cost issues. They will also

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58 Interview with Col. Charles Vuckovic, Army Attaché, US Embassy to Senegal, 28 February 1998, Bakel.
59 Interviews with international military officers observing Guidimakha, 22-28 February 1998, Dakar and Bakel.
60 Guidimakha showed the importance of gathering officers from different countries serving within the command post before the exercise—to enable them to get to know one another, to minimize their suspicions, to minimize language barriers, to become familiar with tactical procedures, and to sort out potential rank problems. Interview with Bonnemaison, 28 June 1999, Paris. See also, “Allocution du Général CEMIA: Séminaire Gabon 2000,” courtesy of French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
concentrate more on specific peacekeeping tasks and less on military skills. This will enable countries with fewer capabilities to participate alongside countries that have more advanced capabilities, without either group feeling constrained. 63

**Plans for Gabon 2000**

The next *Guidimakha*-type regional peacekeeping exercise will be held in Gabon in January 2000. The first seminar to begin preparations for the exercise, called Gabon 2000, took place in Libreville, from 16-17 June 1999. Forty-one countries and 11 international organizations were represented. 64 The list of exercise participants is yet to be finalized, but planners are targeting the 11 member States of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). 65 With the exception of Rwanda, 66 all of the ECCAS countries have expressed their interest in attending. A number of countries from outside the subregion—from Africa and beyond—are expected to observe the exercise. 67

Gabon 2000 will be significantly smaller and more humanitarian-focused than *Guidimakha*. Roughly 600 troops will take part in the 10-day exercise. Each participating country will provide several officers to serve within the command post as well as a platoon, for a total of 35 participants.

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62 (...continued)

63 Interview with de Bellescize, 29 June 1999, Paris.

64 Interview with Col. François Dureau, Chief of Staff, Military Adviser’s Office, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 22 June 1999, New York.

65 Those eleven countries are: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe. The exercise is designed to test and strengthen ECCAS peace and security structures. Interview with de Bellescize, 29 June 1999, Paris.

66 Interview with Bonnemaison, 28 June 1999, Paris. Rwanda has not attended recent ECCAS summits, nor did it attend the Gabon 2000 civil-military planning seminar. It has been invited to participate nevertheless. Interview with de Bellescize, 29 June 1999, Paris.

The exercise will be smaller in part because there will be no non-African participants. Also, the planners are not keen to mount a large-scale peacekeeping exercise so close to a war zone. Instead, they are planning a “soft” exercise that stresses the humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping operations such as welcoming and protecting refugees, running an evacuation centre, and constructing and operating a field hospital. In fact, there will be only one “real” military component of the exercise: the actual deployment of the force.  

For Gabon 2000, France will lead a large cast of donor countries, but will have no significant presence on the ground. Besides France, potential donors include Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US. These States have been asked to “sponsor” a participant country. It is envisaged that donor countries will fly participating officers to and from the command post exercise in November 1999, transport the platoon to the field training exercise in January 2000, and feed as well as supply personal equipment for the participants. Some countries may also be asked to provide an aircraft for use during Gabon 2000. France will donate what the other donor countries fail to provide, as well as the equipment that will be used in the exercise.

Support for Other Multinational Exercises

In addition to its biannual support for large-scale, subregional exercises, France makes smaller contributions to other training initiatives. For Cohésion Kompienga, a nine-country exercise that Togo hosted in April 1998, France supplied an aircraft, communication equipment, and a

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70 “Exercice Gabon 2000: Fiche de Présentation.”
planning team. 73 Six officers from the Operational Instruction Detachment also provided technical assistance and training during the exercise. 74 For Blue Crane, France contributed more than US$ 295,000, and French forces stationed in Réunion participated in the naval component of the exercise with one patrol vessel and 37 personnel. 75 Most recently, together with Madagascar, France’s Réunion garrison organized Exercise Tulipe, held in Madagascar in May 1999. 76 France also provided technical support for the exercise. 77

**Equipping**

The provision of peacekeeping-related equipment is the third component of RECAMP. France ultimately plans to pre-position matériel—in conjunction with a subregional training exercise—in five locations in Africa. This equipment is destined for use in the exercise itself as well as in subsequent peacekeeping operations. France used Guidimakha as an occasion to transfer equipment to Dakar in early 1998. Before Gabon 2000, equipment will be delivered to Libreville. In 2000, France intends to pre-position equipment in Djibouti. The last two locations are potentially Réunion and Côte d’Ivoire. According to the Office of the Ambassador for RECAMP, need will ultimately dictate where the equipment is placed. 78

The standard package, which includes vehicles, a field hospital, communication equipment, and weapons, is designed to equip a battalion-
sized contingent. It includes 100 vehicles: nine armoured vehicles, three ambulances, three emergency repair vehicles, 18 jeeps, 35 double-axle trucks, and 32 triple-axle trucks.\textsuperscript{79} For every 100 vehicles provided, 80 are used for transport and 20 are used for their spare parts. Although older model vehicles are a part of the standard equipment package, these are the same vehicles that the French military uses in its field missions in Africa. According to one French Government official, they are simple to use and easy to maintain, which is a large part of their appeal given the climate and general difficulty in obtaining spare parts.\textsuperscript{80} The 100-bed field hospital provided has a dispensary, an emergency medical unit, two pre-/post-surgery sections, one surgical section, laundry facilities, and sterilization equipment. Thirty additional vehicles destined for use in conjunction with the hospital—two emergency repair vehicles, four ambulances, and 24 double-axle trucks—are also supplied.\textsuperscript{81} The standard equipment package includes 96 receiver-transmitters and some 650 individual and collective weapons.\textsuperscript{82}

France finances the equipment itself, as well as its delivery, upkeep, and replenishment. This \textit{matériel} is stored at a central facility and is to remain under French control.\textsuperscript{83} The equipment pre-positioned in Dakar in conjunction with \textit{Guidimakha} was valued at roughly US$ 6.3 million, and France spent an additional US$ 1.8 million to deliver and install it.\textsuperscript{84} When the equipment stocks become depleted, France will supply additional matériel.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{79} Exercise \textit{Guidimakha} Presentation Booklet, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{80} Interview with Bonnemaison, 28 June 1999, Paris.
\textsuperscript{81} Exercise \textit{Guidimakha} Presentation Booklet, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{82} “RECAMP Concept, \textit{Guidimakha} Exercise,” courtesy of French Ministry of Defence. Specifically, 586 individual weapons and 57 crew service weapons are provided. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83} Interview with Emmanuel Lenain, Desk Officer in Charge of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Department, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 June 1998, Paris.
\textsuperscript{84} “Présentation du concept RECAMP,” courtesy of French Ministry of Defence.
\textsuperscript{85} Interview with Dary, 29 June 1999, Paris.
OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FIELD

In two instances, this pre-positioned equipment has been used to support peacekeeping operations on the African continent. Two-thirds of the equipment pre-positioned in Dakar was subsequently transported to the Central African Republic for use in MINURCA. When MINURCA ends, France will assess what remains of the equipment that it provided to the mission. In theory, this matériel should be returned to the storage facility, but it remains to be seen what will happen in practice. Additional matériel was placed at the depot in Dakar, and some of it was then used for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping operation in Guinea-Bissau. For Guinea-Bissau, France supplied 40 vehicles, an emergency medical unit, and communication equipment.

France has also provided financial and further logistical support for African peacekeeping initiatives. MINURCA's predecessor, the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (known by its French acronym, MISAB, for Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui), which was deployed in CAR in February 1997, required the direct assistance of France to be deployed and become operational. For the participating States, France paid the total food and daily subsistence allowances at rates then applicable to Central African military personnel. France also supplied, maintained, and provided fuel for

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86 Interview with de Saqui de Sannes, 28 May 1998, Paris. The equipment pre-positioned in Dakar was not sufficient for the 1,350-strong MINURCA operation. Therefore, the stocks were replenished, and the original equipment was reinforced. Interview with Dary, 29 June 1999, Paris.
87 Interview with de Bellescize, 29 June 1999, Paris.
90 MISAB comprised 800 troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, and Togo.
tactical and support vehicles, paid rents for buildings used by MISAB command and military personnel, and donated office equipment. France estimated the value of its support at US$ 2 million per month.

Beginning in January 1999, France provided similar support for the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops serving in Guinea-Bissau. At the request of Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, France agreed to assist one battalion logistically and financially. First, France flew the contingents from their host countries to Dakar. It then transported the troops and their vehicles to Bissau by boat. Roughly once each week, fuel was brought in from Dakar, and vehicles were taken for maintenance and repairs. France also paid the troops per diems of US$ 18 per day as well as provided personal equipment. At the end of the mission, France transported the contingents home. Paris spent some US$ 7.3 million during the five-month operation.

France has also supplied equipment for use in other multinational operations in Africa. For Operation Turquoise, the French Ministry of Cooperation paid for an African battalion as well as part of the equipment it used. In 1998, France provided more than US$ 250,000 of matériel, including communication assets, automobile and nautical equipment, and two Zodiac patrol craft, to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) observer mission deployed in the Comoros. As part of this assistance package, the French Ministry of Defence “loaned” the mission a number

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91 See, for example, UN Document S/1997/652, Letter dated 20 August 1997 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (Enclosure), containing the International Monitoring Committee’s First Report to the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1125 (1997), 21 August 1997, para. 19.


94 Approximately US$ 5 million of this sum was used for equipment, including trucks, communication equipment, aircraft and boat transportation, and ammunition. The remaining US$ 2.3 million was spent on per diems. Ibid.


96 This sum was part of a pledge of US$ 1.1 million that France made to the OAU in 1998. Interview with Bonnemaison, 28 June 1999, Paris.
of vehicles from its Réunion fleet while the Ministry of Cooperation “gave” a number of others. In May 1999, France provided 40 military transport vehicles to the Guinean contingent serving with ECOMOG in Sierra Leone.

For MISAB, France had a contingent on the ground to provide logistical and, as a last resort, tactical support. There were two types of French units operating alongside the African contingents in MISAB: a command and logistics unit and an operational assistance element. The command and logistics unit, which comprised 2,000 French troops at the outset of the mission, was tasked with supporting MISAB. The operational assistance element, numbering 200 troops, was there to assist MISAB troops militarily in case of need. When there was a difficulty in the field and recourse to force was necessary, the African force was the first to respond and the French operational assistance element provided the requisite back-up. This element was called upon twice during the mission—in March and June 1997.

**ASSESSMENT**

France, like the US, bristles at the suggestion that it is withdrawing from Africa. Paris spent some US$ 36 million on RECAMP initiatives in 1998. The French Ministry of Defence spent more than US$ 400 million that same year to maintain its forces pre-positioned around the African continent. Even when current force reductions are completed, more than 5,000 French troops will still be stationed in five locations in Africa. Beyond

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99 In contrast with its role in MISAB, France did not have a military presence in Guinea-Bissau during the ECOMOG operation. Although France transported the ECOMOG contingents to and from the mission and maintained the equipment, it remained stationed in Dakar. Interview with Bonnemaison, 28 June 1999, Paris.
its capacity-building and military programmes, France also provides significant developmental and humanitarian assistance to Africa.

Although France has remained meaningfully involved in Africa, it has reduced its traditional exposure and expenses on the continent. The absorption of the Ministry of Cooperation into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an indication that Africa’s privileged status in the formulation of French foreign policy is waning. As one French Government official acknowledged, it is difficult to see how France will be able to open up to other countries while remaining faithful to its francophone friends—particularly with a reduced budget. 101 France’s schizophrenic support for the proposed Senegalese-led operation in Congo (Brazzaville)102 and its eagerness to extract itself from MISAB and subsequently MINURCA also suggest that its commitment to strengthening peacekeeping on the continent is less ironclad than its various pronouncements would indicate. RECAMP is billed as a strengthened commitment to African peacekeeping, yet it can best be understood as a cost-cutting measure. Paris is rechannelling some 30 per cent of its military spending destined for Africa into peacekeeping-related activities, but the overall aid figure is significantly reduced in real terms.

RECAMP, like ACRI, is first and foremost a response to domestic interests and limitations. Throughout most of the 1990s, France muddled through crises on the African continent, often pursuing contradictory foreign policy objectives. Because of the questionable alliances it forged—most notably its close relationship with the Government of Rwanda prior to its overthrow in 1994—Paris suffered a series of humiliations and its traditional, proactive Africa policy came under increasing criticism and scrutiny, both internationally and domestically. 103

103 In March 1998, the Commission of National Defence and the Armed Forces established the Commission of Information to review international operations in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994. With regard to French policy, the Commission noted that France had made “errors of appreciation.” However, it did not find France or any French officials responsible for the genocide. See (continued...)
The French public began to criticize France’s business-as-usual relationship with Africa to a greater extent than ever before, and policy makers became increasingly concerned with other issues. This series of developments led France to re-evaluate and reformulate its Africa policy.

The first pillar of RECAMP—the provision of peacekeeping instruction—has value but has been oversold. Both African and Western Government officials believe the newly-created Zambakro Peacekeeping Training School, with its emphasis on peacekeeping and its multilingual and multinational focus, is a worthwhile initiative. The growing body of “national schools open to the region” should also provide important instruction and enable participants from different countries to interact. Importantly, however, these schools focus primarily on military training, not peacekeeping, per se. The fact that French support for these instruction programmes has come at the expense of African participation in courses offered in France is not necessarily problematic, but it underlines Paris’s financial constraints.

Similarly, the subregional training exercise component of RECAMP is meritorious but has yet to achieve its stated goals. France has incorporated a number of “lessons learned” from Guidimakha into its plans for Gabon 2000. Despite its intention to plan more thoroughly in advance of the field exercise, it began its preparations late for Gabon 2000. Training side-by-side in a field exercise can serve as an important confidence-building measure (CBM) for participants. In Exercise Guidimakha, for example, the spectre of Mauritanian and Senegalese troops training together was a poignant symbol in view of recent tensions between the two countries. French claims that such subregional exercises provide equally valuable opportunities to strengthen subregional organizations have yet to be...

103 (...continued)

104 Interview with attendee at civil-military planning seminar for Gabon 2000, June 1999.

105 Indeed, the dispute centred around territory in the very area where the exercise was held.
substantiated. RECAMP training exercises do have a subregional focus in that they bring together neighbouring countries. Regional and subregional organizations were not active planners or participants in *Guidimakha*, however.106 As it prepares for Gabon 2000, France’s initial contact with the ECCAS Secretariat has been minimal.

The third element of RECAMP—the pre-positioning of peacekeeping-related *matériel*—has proven its worth. The equipment that was placed outside Dakar in conjunction with *Guidimakha* has since been used in peacekeeping missions, first in CAR and then in Guinea-Bissau. The fact that Paris has twice permitted this *matériel* to be used in actual operations and restocked the equipment after each usage is an important measure of France’s commitment to enhancing peacekeeping capabilities.

France’s support for ECOMOG troops in Guinea-Bissau underscores what Paris claims is one of RECAMP’s main virtues—its inherent flexibility. The Military Adviser to the Ambassador for RECAMP, Lt-Col. Eric Bonnemaison, acknowledges that while RECAMP faces some constraints, French assistance in Guinea-Bissau exemplifies what can be achieved when a policy is not limited by a budget or restrictive mandate.107 It is conceivable, however, that this freedom could also lead to inaction. Nevertheless, France’s willingness to provide transportation, equipment, and *per diems* to ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau shows that its support for MISAB was not an aberration and bodes well for the future of the “concept.”

106 The OAU and the Treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance, and Mutual Defence (known by its French acronym, ANAD, for *Accord de non-aggression et d’assistance en matière de défense*) sent one observer each. ECOWAS was not represented.

CHAPTER 12

UNITED KINGDOM

FROM DECOLONIZATION TO DEVELOPING AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES

The British post-colonial strategy has differed significantly from the French. Marked by its experience with Indian independence, the UK initially sought to withdraw gracefully but quickly from its African colonies. Its disengagement was both political and military. On the political side, London has increasingly worked through international forums such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth. The British Government has generally shunned direct military interventions in Africa and limited its support to the provision of military assistance, which encompasses training as well as arms sales. Indeed, the UK has only deployed a large force in post-colonial Africa one time; in 1980, it dispatched 1,000 troops as part of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) to oversee Zimbabwean independence.¹

The UK’s formal efforts to develop African peacekeeping capabilities began in late 1994, with a proposal presented to the United Nations General Assembly by then Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. The United Nations was just emerging from the Rwanda debacle, and the proposal was a reaction to the crisis there and the likelihood that problems would continue in the region. The idea was not to establish actual forces but to develop the capacity of Africans to undertake peacekeeping. Suggestions concerned providing peacekeeping training to interested countries, establishing centers

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of excellence on the continent, and enhancing logistical capabilities.\textsuperscript{2} Between November 1994 and January 1995, the UK organized a series of seminars in Accra, Cairo, and Harare, which were attended by various African and donor countries, the United Nations, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Together with Nigeria, the UK also co-chaired a working group that produced a paper entitled \textit{Conflict Prevention and Peace-keeping in Africa}. That report was submitted to the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the OAU in April 1995.\textsuperscript{3} The UK began the more practical phase of its regionally-focused initiatives in early 1996.\textsuperscript{4}

Three branches of the Government—the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence, and, most recently, the Department for International Development (DFID)\textsuperscript{5}—contribute to British capacity-building efforts. Within the Government, the FCO has traditionally funded training activities for foreign armies. The Ministry of Defence has furnished them with equipment and logistical support. In March 1999, DFID announced that it was expanding its focus to provide non-military training and assistance to foreign security forces and relevant civilian bodies, with the goal of increasing effective civilian Government control over the security sector. Although DFID’s Security Sector Reform Programme is not Africa-specific, it could have a significant impact on the African continent. The FCO, Ministry of Defence, and DFID are increasingly endeavouring to coordinate their activities and espouse a consistent security policy.

\textsuperscript{2} Interview with Simon J. Manley, First Secretary, UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 5 May 1997, New York; see also, UN Document, A/49/PV.8, \textit{Intervention by Douglas Hurd before the General Assembly}, 28 September 1994.

\textsuperscript{3} “Conflict Prevention and Peace-keeping in Africa,” 11 April 1995, courtesy of UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New York. In the domain of peacekeeping, the report covered the issues of doctrine, training, preparation of units, equipment and logistics, and planning. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{4} Interview with Manley, 5 May 1997, New York.

\textsuperscript{5} Until 1997, the British Government had no separate development agency, and foreign aid fell under FCO control. Shortly after its election in May 1997, the Labour Government established DFID.
AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING TRAINING SUPPORT PROGRAMME

Unlike US and French capacity-building initiatives, the UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme focuses primarily on training officers. In light of the relatively small size of its initiative, the UK has determined that its comparative advantage lies in “training the trainer.” The rationale underlying this “top down” approach is that the officers receiving training will then impart the lessons they learned to their soldiers. The annual budget for the programme, which is funded by the FCO, has been roughly US$ 4 million since it was introduced in 1996.6

British Military Advisory and Training Teams

A central goal of the British programme is helping to develop national military staff colleges into “centres of excellence” for regional peacekeeping training. Two African-based British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTs)—BMATT Southern Africa (in Zimbabwe) and BMATT West Africa (in Ghana)—provide training and instruction to officers from the host countries as well as from other African States.7 Both BMATT Southern Africa and BMATT West Africa, which are based at the Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC) and the Ghanaian Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC), respectively, are fully integrated into the command structures of their host institutions.8 The UK’s plans to establish a BMATT in Uganda to cover the East Africa subregion were scuttled in light of political unrest in

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6 Interview with Gill Coglin, Deputy Head, Peacekeeping Section, United Nations Department, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 27 August 1999, by telephone.

7 There is another BMATT in Pretoria, which was established in 1994 and provides advice solely to South Africa on restructuring its armed forces and does not give peacekeeping training. This BMATT, which is staffed by 10 officers, has been funded through 2001. Written correspondence with Coglin, 21 October 1998; and interviews with Coglin, 25 August 1999 and 27 August 1999, by telephone.

8 According to Gill Coglin of the British FCO, this is a “unique aspect” of the British programme. In the cases of both BMATT Southern Africa and BMATT West Africa, a BMATT officer serves as the college’s Director of Studies and reports directly to the institution’s Commandant. Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.
Uganda and Kampala’s recent military involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). London now intends to establish a BMATT elsewhere in East Africa. Although the BMATTs are staffed primarily by British military officers, they are administered and funded by the FCO.

BMATT Southern Africa has undergone a significant transformation since its creation, evolving from a nationally-focused to a regionally-focused assistance programme. BMATT’s involvement in Zimbabwe dates back to Zimbabwean independence in 1980. At that time, the new Zimbabwean Government requested the UK to oversee the integration of the Zimbabwean armed forces and to help them become an organized military. The Commandant of BMATT also served as the Commandant of the ZSC until the mid-1980s. At one point there were as many as 80 BMATT personnel at the ZSC. By 1994, however, the team had dwindled to four people. In 1996, the British Government expanded its training initiative to include other countries in the subregion and began offering regional training. As of mid-1999, BMATT Southern Africa comprised 11 British officers.

BMATT West Africa was established much later than BMATT Southern Africa, and consequently, has not undergone a similar transformation. The British Government assisted Ghana with the construction of the staff college in the 1970s, but not under the guise of BMATT. Over time, the British military’s primary tasks there shifted from providing material support to providing instruction and training. BMATT West Africa was established in

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9 Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.
11 Zimbabwe was created in April 1980, after democratic elections brought an end to the civil war and white-ruled Rhodesia. The new national army would comprise elements of the Rhodesian armed forces and the two guerrilla forces of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo.
13 Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.
1996, and it had a subregional focus from the outset. As of mid-1999, the office was staffed by four British officers.15

Both BMATT Southern Africa and BMATT West Africa try to tailor themselves to the specific needs of the host country and the subregion. BMATT Southern Africa conducts bilateral and regional peacekeeping training in Zimbabwe as well as other countries in the subregion. In Harare, the BMATT team works closely with the directing staff of the ZSC to run the annual four-week peacekeeping module in the senior staff course, which is open to participants from the subregion and beyond. Until recently, BMATT taught regional tactical and staff training courses, but the BMATT programme was refocused to concentrate exclusively on peacekeeping training. Outside Zimbabwe, BMATT Southern Africa has run a company commanders course in Swaziland, a disaster management course in Mauritius, and a method of instruction course in Mozambique. Each of these programmes was open to military personnel from the host country only.17 In October 1998, BMATT Southern Africa held a four-week command and staff course in Malawi for officers from Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries.18 It began a subregional course for junior officers in Malawi in January 1999,19 and was scheduled to sponsor a senior officers development course in Namibia in late 1999.20

Unlike BMATT Southern Africa, BMATT West Africa conducts training only within the host country. BMATT West Africa works closely with the

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15 Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.
16 London had already begun to reorient its BMATT Southern Africa towards the provision of peacekeeping training, but Harare’s military involvement in DRC gave a new urgency to this effort. The UK has revamped its BMATT programme and now concentrates exclusively on providing peacekeeping training. Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.
17 Written correspondence with Coglin, 21 October 1998.
18 Ibid.
directing staff of the GAFCSC to run the annual four-week peacekeeping module in the senior command and staff course.\textsuperscript{21} The year-long programme typically has 37 participants: 22 from Ghana and 15 from other countries. In the past, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda have sent officers.\textsuperscript{22} BMATT’s “main effort” during 1999-2000 will be to help reorient and rewrite the curriculum for the senior command and staff course.\textsuperscript{23} In September 1998, BMATT helped organize a three-week, “stand-alone” international peace support operation (PSO) course.\textsuperscript{24} The UK paid the transportation costs, subsistence allowances, and course fees for participants. The next international PSO course is scheduled for November 1999.\textsuperscript{25} BMATT West Africa is also sending an instructor to Zambakro\textsuperscript{26} to provide two-week training segments on an ad hoc basis.\textsuperscript{27}

The UK has improved and helped equip the staff college facilities in both Ghana and Zimbabwe. The British Government has provided funding for the construction of extra classrooms, dining facilities, and dormitories. Most recently, in 1998, it constructed an additional accommodation block at the GAFCSC, which can house some 30 students.\textsuperscript{28} The UK has also agreed to fund a new peacekeeping training library at the GAFCSC, which


\textsuperscript{22} Documentation provided by Diggins, March 1999.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid. Accordingly, the course will not be offered during the 1999-2000 calendar year.

\textsuperscript{24} Thirteen countries sent a total of 43 participants to the course: Cameroon (1), Côte d’Ivoire (2), Egypt (1), Ethiopia (1), Ghana (12), Kenya (1), Malawi (5), Mali (5), Senegal (5), South Africa (2), Tanzania (1), Uganda (5), and Zimbabwe (2). Ibid.

\textsuperscript{25} Documentation provided by Diggins, March 1999.

\textsuperscript{26} Interview with Lt-Col. Joe Gordon, Trainer, BMATT West Africa, 17 March 1999, Accra.

\textsuperscript{27} The UK has also offered to sponsor the participation of Ghanaian instructors. Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

\textsuperscript{28} Letter from Weston to Miyet, 20 February 1998.
will be opened in November 1999. It also offsets the costs of computers and other classroom equipment and routinely supplies books, training materials, and printing assistance.

Other Elements of the Programme

Although the BMATTs are the most formalized component of the British programme, the UK also has smaller-scale training initiatives. Short-Term Training Teams (STTTs) provide specialized training to recipient countries bilaterally, for periods of roughly six weeks. The UK has also conducted map exercises for a wide range of African countries, at the former British Staff College in Camberley and in Addis Ababa. A British Military Liaison Officer (BMLO) is stationed in Addis Ababa and works closely with the Ethiopian military and the OAU.

Building upon the work of the BMLO in Addis Ababa, the British Government has undertaken a wider effort to enhance the capacity of the OAU Conflict Management Center (CMC). In January 1999, the FCO sent a Needs Assessment Team to the CMC, which worked together with the OAU to identify priority areas for donor funding and devise a plan of assistance. The team noted that the CMC’s Situation Center was staffed by a single clerk and determined that three political desk officers were needed. Accordingly, London has agreed to fund three personnel for a three-year period. After these individuals have begun work, the UK will support a command post

29 Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.
30 Documentation provided by Diggins, March 1999.
31 Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.
32 An April 1997 exercise, for example, was attended by diplomats and military officers from 17 African countries. Letter from Weston to Miyet, 20 February 1998.
33 Interview with Coglin, 27 August 1999, by telephone.
34 Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone. This plan of assistance will be presented to potential donor countries in October 1999. Ibid.
exercise (as a follow-up to the US-run exercise of April 1998), scheduled for Spring 2000.35

The UK has aided subregional training initiatives as well. Through BMATT Southern Africa, it supported and helped organize Blue Hungwe, a three-week peacekeeping exercise hosted by Zimbabwe in April 1997. The UK spent over US$ 500,000 for the event,36 in which more than 1,500 troops and observers from 10 SADC member States participated. The Commandant of BMATT Southern Africa, described BMATT's role as the “umpire” of the exercise.37 In February 1998, the UK contributed a C-130 aircraft and a 61-strong contingent to Guidimakha.38 The UK offered to help South Africa plan Blue Crane, but South Africa sought to limit external assistance aside from financial support. Ultimately, the UK sent several members of BMATT Southern Africa to advise the exercise planning coordinators on lessons learned from Blue Hungwe. For the exercise itself, the UK contributed roughly US$ 250,000 in cash and sent six “umpires,” observers, and advisers.39

In the past, African officers received training at various military academies and institutions in the United Kingdom, but the British

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35 The exercise was originally scheduled for March 1999 (written correspondence with Coglin, 21 October 1998), but was postponed due to staffing concerns following the recommendation of the needs assessment team. Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

36 Interview with Alice Walpole, Head, Peacekeeping Section, United Nations Department, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 28 February 1998, Dakar. Much of that sum went to establishing the necessary infrastructure to conduct the exercise. Ibid.

37 Interview with Naughten, 26 January 1998, Harare.

38 Interview with Lt-Col. Robert Bruce, Commander of British Guidimakha Contingent, UK Ministry of Defence, 28 February 1998, Bakel; and interview with Geoff Collier, Third Secretary (Political Affairs), UK Embassy to Senegal, 23 February 1998, Dakar.

39 Written correspondence with Coglin, 21 October 1998; and interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.
Government has curtailed this aspect of its programme.40 Places at Sandhurst and the Royal College of Defense Studies, for example, used to be open to African participants.41 The provision of training in Africa is more cost-effective.42

The UK has supported and initiated several other projects designed to strengthen African peacekeeping. For example, British contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa have financed courses in Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia.43 In an effort to promote anglophone/francophone military cooperation in the field, the UK funded an English/French glossary of peacekeeping terms produced jointly by the Ghanaian and Senegalese armed forces.44

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM PROGRAMME

DFID’s Security Sector Reform Programme also aims to develop indigenous capabilities, with the ultimate goal of enhancing security and reducing poverty. The initiative will support activities such as providing training in human rights, humanitarian law, and democratic accountability to security services, strengthening the capacity of civilian bodies to manage and monitor the security sector, and enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping forces.45 Explaining the rationale behind the new policy, Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short stated, “In the past we said someone should make peace and then we will come in and help. ...That’s
Reforming the security sector is a relatively new domain for development agencies, which have often restricted their support to civilians.

Sierra Leone is the first country to receive assistance under this programme. There DFID is working closely with the UK Ministry of Defence to help Freetown devise a new security sector policy that will distinguish between internal and external security functions and define roles for the army, police, customs and immigration units, and local defence forces. The UK is helping to restructure and train the Sierra Leone army, which will eventually consist of 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers, as well as to reorganize Freetown’s Ministry of Defence to ensure that it is controlled by qualified civilians. At the same time, efforts are being made to address the difficult question of how to find sufficient public funds to embed the structural reforms in the security sector. Although this is a very complex and lengthy process, only a short-term commitment—one year with a possible two-year extension—has so far been made. If the initiative shows promise in Sierra Leone, it will influence DFID’s efforts to develop security sector reform programmes in other countries over the next several years.

**OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FIELD**

The UK also donates peacekeeping-related matériel or funding to purchase equipment on an ad hoc basis. In view of the expense involved in providing equipment, the UK has traditionally felt that offering training and instruction is a better use of its limited resources. Increasingly, however, it has allocated money to buy equipment for use in peacekeeping operations. In 1995, for example, London contributed accommodation equipment for use

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47 Written correspondence with Dylan Hendrickson, Research Fellow, Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College, University of London, 2 November 1999.
48 Written correspondence with Hendrickson, 15 November 1999.
49 Written correspondence with Hendrickson, 2 November 1999.
in the third United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III). In 1996, it contributed more than US$ 160,000 to purchase and dispatch vehicle spare parts for contingents serving in Liberia with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). It also donated generators and provided funding for communication equipment for ECOMOG in Liberia. Following the December 1998 rebel advance on Freetown, the UK provided an additional US$ 1.6 million worth of logistical support for ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, in the form of communication equipment, trucks, and field ambulances. It has also provided personal equipment for the Ghanaian contingent. Some of the US$ 16 million matching grant that the British Treasury designated for Sierra Leone in early 1999 has been used to purchase equipment for ECOMOG.

Beyond equipment, the British Government has provided other logistical support to African contingents. For the ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone, for example, the UK has shared intelligence with ECOMOG commanders on the ground and provided the force with detailed maps of the area. In addition, a British naval vessel has helped repair Nigerian naval ships.

The British Government has also ensured the transportation of African contingents to and from the mission area. In the 1960 United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), for example, the UK funded the airlift of
Ghanaian troops at the beginning of the mission. 56 Much of the more than US$ 3 million that the UK contributed to the United Nations Trust Fund for Sierra Leone was removed from the Fund and then used to finance the transportation of ECOMOG contingents by the US company, Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE). 57 In early 1999, the UK funded the airlift for a Ghanaian battalion deploying to the ECOMOG mission in Sierra Leone out of part of its US$ 16 million contribution. 58

The UK has also provided specialized training to African contingents preparing to deploy to peacekeeping operations on two occasions. STTTs provided mine awareness training to the Zimbabweans before they participated in the third United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III). They also provided more general pre-deployment training to a Ghanaian contingent in January 1996 before it was deployed to Liberia as a part of ECOMOG. 59

ASSESSMENT

Whereas France and the United States have recently been accused of disengaging from Africa, the UK has more routinely been singled out for stepping up its aid and military assistance to the continent. 60 The FCO’s budget for Africa has risen from nine per cent of the total in 1995-1996 to 11

57 After contributing more than US$ 3 million to the UN Trust Fund in Sierra Leone in early 1998, the UK discovered that this was not the most effective means of providing support for ECOMOG. The money was thus withdrawn from the fund in mid-1998 and used to renew a transportation contract that the US had originally had with PAE. Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.
58 Documentation provided by Coglin, February 1999.
59 Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.
60 According to Africa Confidential, for example, with France reducing its involvement in Africa and the US increasingly preoccupied with the 2000 presidential election, the UK is the most likely of the three to put its diplomatic weight behind Africa. “Britain/Africa: Diplomacy with attitude,” Africa Confidential, Vol. 40, No. 9, 30 April 1999, p. 1.
per cent in 1998-1999. That sum for 1998-1999 is US$ 96 million. DFID’s bilateral aid to Africa for 2001-2002 is estimated at US$ 780 million, up from US$ 480 million when the Labour Government took over in 1996-1997. While the budget for the African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme has not grown—and is not likely to grow—appreciably, the Security Sector Reform Programme will significantly augment the resources the Government has available for capacity-building. In addition to these programmes, the UK has provided substantial additional funding on an ad hoc basis—particularly since the “Sandline Affair,” which came to light in May 1998. The 1999 matching grant of US$ 16 million that London made available to support the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG operations there is four times the annual funding for BMATT, for example.

Although the FCO, DFID, and the Ministry of Defence are working to better coordinate their activities, current British capacity-building initiatives do not yet consistently reflect Labour’s new notion of “joined up Government.” Each of the departments is in the process of devising a three-year plan for its activities that will facilitate a rationalization of policies. According to Dylan Hendrickson, all three departments still have an incomplete understanding of the broader environment in which they work. Moreover, communication is often poor, both within and between departments. Finally, the departments still have—and will likely always have—conflicting approaches and interests.

Notwithstanding its relatively small size, the African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme has a number of positive aspects. The “train the trainer” approach is a cost-effective way for the UK to disseminate its instruction to a wide audience. By being permanently present in the country, BMATT officers are necessarily in close contact with their African

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61 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
62 Shortly after ECOMOG retook Freetown from Sierra Leonean rebels in February 1998 and reinstated President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, London was implicated in a scandal concerning a violation of the UN arms embargo against Sierra Leone. The UK company Sandline International acknowledged that Kabbah had contracted it to provide equipment, training, and personnel in support of ECOMOG. Sandline maintained that the FCO was fully aware of its activities, a claim that Foreign Secretary Robin Cook denied.
63 Written correspondence with Hendrickson, 2 November 1999.
counterparts. This should facilitate the development of personal relationships and enable BMATT officers to better assess the needs of recipient countries (although there are some complaints that this has not always been achieved). Recognizing the importance of providing instruction on a subregional basis, both BMATTs have opened their programmes to participants outside their host countries. BMATT Southern Africa’s policy of actually conducting training programmes in various countries throughout the subregion is valuable and should be replicated. Providing specialized training to contingents preparing to deploy to peacekeeping operations, as STTTs have done on two occasions, is a worthwhile initiative and should be further developed.

DFID’s Security Sector Reform programme is more financially significant—although its impact is yet unknown. DFID enjoys much greater funding than the FCO. However, early indications are that it has rushed into this new area of activity without a sufficient understanding of the problems it is trying to address, appropriate policy instruments, or the international capacity to support reforms successfully. Critics of the programme have predicted that it is just a matter of time before an army recently trained by DFID in the niceties of human rights and international law contravenes the standards taught. Yet the failure to provide training also raises moral issues. DFID’s initiatives in Sierra Leone are justifiable given Freetown’s inability to establish law and order and the proven ruthlessness of the rebels.

Recent UK assistance to Sierra Leone represents a marked departure from past practices, but its significance may be limited to that country. London’s generous support and matching grant were instrumental in quickly generating a significant infusion of funds. While African countries may share a similar historical relationship with London, there is no denying that the

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64 Some African recipients have criticized BMATT officials for dictating programmes with a “take it or leave it” attitude, and have accused them of being unresponsive to stated needs. It is clear from speaking to several African military officers familiar with BMATT programmes and officers that a residue of colonial baggage remains. Interviews with African Government and military officials, 1998 and 1999.


embarrassment over the Sandline Affair contributed to the United Kingdom’s generosity, and the alacrity with which it dispensed funds. It is too early to tell whether this response and DFID’s substantial engagement will be limited to Sierra Leone or represent the beginnings of an enhanced commitment to Africa and peacekeeping on the continent.
CHAPTER 13

OTHER BILATERAL INITIATIVES

Other non-African countries besides the “P-3” have formulated general policies and specific programmes to promote peacekeeping in Africa. As of mid-1999, 63 countries outside of Africa had contributed Blue Helmets to United Nations peacekeeping operations on the continent.¹ (See Annex H.) While several of these countries have become more reluctant to send peacekeepers for financial and political reasons, many others have reduced their presence because there are simply fewer opportunities. In addition to or in lieu of their contributions of Blue Helmets, a number of non-African countries have undertaken initiatives to enhance African peacekeeping. The bilateral programmes of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden merit special mention.

BELGIUM

Belgium pursued a different policy after decolonization than both France and the United Kingdom. The chaos and bloodshed following its hasty withdrawal in 1960 from its colony, Congo, eroded domestic and international support for potential high-profile and interventionist policies on the continent. In addition, Brussels had a comparatively small defence budget, more limited air and naval assets, and fewer troops than either

¹ Fourteen of the 63 countries have participated in at least half of the 16 missions: Argentina (in 8 operations), Bangladesh (12), Brazil (9), Canada (10), Hungary (8), India (12), Jordan (9), Malaysia (11), the Netherlands (10), New Zealand (8), Norway (9), Pakistan (11), Slovak Republic (8—including as part of Czechoslovakia), and Sweden (9). Fifteen, have taken part in only one operation: Barbados, Bolivia, Burma (now Myanmar), Colombia, El Salvador, Iran, Jamaica, Japan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Venezuela.
France or the UK. As a result, it pursued few strategic ambitions in Africa. Nevertheless, Belgium did give special attention to its former colony and trust territories, Burundi and Rwanda, in the areas of military assistance and development cooperation. Prior to 1994, Brussels contributed contingents to United Nations peacekeeping operations on the continent more frequently than either London or Paris.

Belgium’s experience in the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) effectively ended its direct participation in peacekeeping operations on the African continent. On 7 April 1994, 10 Belgian members of UNAMIR were murdered by Hutu extremists, and Belgium unilaterally decided to withdraw its troops from the mission. The episode had a profound effect on Belgian society and Government policy. In 1997, the Belgian Senate established a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to investigate Belgium’s role in the events leading up to the Rwandan genocide.

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3 For example, Belgium conducted military assistance programmes with Congo/Zaire and Rwanda, maintaining roughly 100 military advisers on the ground. Ibid.

4 The event that sparked the Rwandan genocide, the downing of the plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana, had taken place the previous night.

Brussels is not yet ready to again commit its own troops to serve in Africa.

Since its experience in Rwanda, however, Belgium has participated in and observed several training exercises on the African continent as a way of becoming re-engaged in African peacekeeping issues. In February 1998, it provided a C-130 aircraft for Exercise Guidimakha. In April 1998, 12 Belgian trainers and a medical team took part in the first phase of the US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) training in Ghana. Prior to that, Brussels had sent an officer to observe ACRI training in both Malawi (for four weeks) and Uganda (for two weeks).

Belgium has continued to voluntarily support peacekeeping efforts on the continent. For UNAMIR, Brussels contributed equipment and logistical assistance including vehicles, ambulances, a field kitchen, radios, spare parts, various equipment for the use of an infantry company, transportation, and training. Much of this support aided a Malawian company participating in the mission. In 1995, it provided equipment and other logistical support for

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6 The Commission was preceded by an ad hoc working group, which released a report in January 1997 accusing Belgium and the international community of ignoring the events taking place in Rwanda. A Special Commission on Rwanda was then established to assign responsibilities and to identify possible lessons learned from the experience. In April 1997, the Special Commission was transformed into a Commission of Inquiry—with an investigative role, Jean-Claude Willame, Les Belges au Rwanda: le parcours de la honte, Brussels: GRIP, 1997, pp. 7-9.


10 See UN Document A/49/PV.18, Address of Bakili Muluzi, President of the Republic of Malawi, Forty-Ninth Session, General Assembly, 18th Meeting, 5 October 1994; see also “Initiatives and Support from Belgium.”
Organization of African Unity (OAU) military observers in Burundi. 11 The Belgian Government also contributed US$ 1.5 million in 1997 to equip a Burkinabé battalion participating in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) mission in Liberia.12

CANADA

Canada, which has long identified participation in peacekeeping as a cornerstone of its foreign and defence policies, 13 remains committed to promoting peace and security in Africa by deploying its own troops in UN-authorized operations on the continent. This commitment has withstood adversity and embarrassment. Like Belgium, Canada’s experience in a United Nations mission in Africa stands out as a defining moment in its peacekeeping history. On 4 March 1993, Canadian troops serving in the United Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia shot at Somali intruders who had entered their compound, wounding one and killing another, and then tortured and killed a Somali teenager in their custody.14 Unlike Belgium, however, Canada has not subsequently shied away from peacekeeping commitments in Africa (or elsewhere) as a result.15 The 1994 Canadian White


12 “Initiatives and Support from Belgium.”


14 Ottawa established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the matter. Subsequently, the Government sought to curtail the inquiry, but its attempt was ruled unlawful. The Government refused to grant the Commission’s request for a six-month extension. The Commission issued its report, maintaining that it had been unable to complete its work. See “Executive Summary, Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry,” Canadian Department of National Defence, available on the Internet at <<http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol/v0sle.htm>>.

15 Ottawa provided additional troops to serve in the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in 1996. Canadian assistance was needed because China, in retaliation for (continued...)
Paper on Defence reaffirmed the country’s commitment to participating in multilateral peace operations. Ottawa provided a contingent comprising communication, logistics, and medical units as well as the Force Commander to UNAMIR. In 1996, it offered to lead the proposed multinational force for the humanitarian operation in Eastern Zaire. With France’s withdrawal from the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), Canada is the only non-African country to have formed units of Blue Helmets serving in that mission.

Beyond contributing contingents to United Nations operations in Africa, Ottawa also offers peacekeeping training to African countries in Canada, albeit on a small scale. Most of this training is funded through the Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP). MTAP has enabled several African countries to send officers to the Canadian military’s United Nations Logistics Course as well as its Observer Training Course. About 10 African officers have attended the two-week logistics course in each of the past two years. African participation in the military observer course varies, as it only convenes prior to the deployment of Canadian forces in peacekeeping

(...continued)

Haiti’s support for Taiwan, had threatened to veto a resolution extending the mission unless it was scaled down. The Security Council acceded to China’s request. An additional Canadian battalion was deployed to support the work of the UN peacekeeping operation—at considerable cost to Canada. Eric G. Berman, “The Security Council’s Increasing Reliance on Burden-Sharing: Collaboration or Abrogation?,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 6-7.


18 Although the force never became operational due to circumstances outside of Canada’s control, some 550 Canadian military personnel had been deployed in the field in preparation for the mission. “Canadian and Multilateral Operations in Support of Peace and Stability,” Canadian Department of National Defence, available on the Internet at <http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive>.
operations. The Canadian Government also funds courses offered at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, which are open to African officers. The MTAP initiative has grown considerably since it was transferred from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) to the Department of National Defence (DND) in 1991.

Canadian peacekeeping training on the African continent is a less developed aspect of its capacity-building programme, but there is interest in enhancing it. In the past, Canada has seconded an officer to the Zambian Staff College and has given presentations on peacekeeping at the Egyptian Institute of Foreign Affairs. In addition, several Canadian logistics officers have trained Kenyan forces for peacekeeping as part of the United Nations Training Assistance Team (UNTAT) programme. Ottawa is interested in developing a version of its United Nations Logistics Course in both English and French, which it would offer to African countries and teach on the continent.

21 Interview with Canadian Government official, 1999. The annual budget for MTAP has increased from around US$ 700,000 per year to more than US$ 10 million—although the greatest share of those funds goes to supporting countries participating in the Partnership for Peace programme of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Ibid.
23 Interview with Moquin, 18 November 1999, New York.
Canada has also supported regional organizations as well as subregional training initiatives on the continent. As of 31 December 1998, Ottawa had contributed US$ 194,180 to the OAU Peace Fund. For Blue Crane, Canada gave some US$ 35,000. It plans to provide money and instructors to a United Nations peacekeeping workshop for civilian police to be held in Ghana in late 1999.

Canadian direct support for African peacekeeping efforts on the continent is a relatively insignificant element of its overall policy. For the 1960 United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), it did airlift food supplies at the beginning of the mission. Most recently, Canada provided some US$ 700,000 in non-lethal matériel, including rations and medical supplies, to Ghanaian and Nigerian troops serving with ECOMOG in Sierra Leone.

DENMARK

Denmark’s programme to develop African peacekeeping capabilities has its origins with the end of the cold war and focuses on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) subregion in general and Zimbabwe in particular. After assuming office in January 1993, Danish Defence Minister Hans Haekkerup sought to use the capacity of the armed forces to promote global security—and thus forestall likely cuts in the defence budget. In 1995, Denmark undertook an assessment of the existing capacity of the Southern Africa region and identified the need for a regional centre and a clearing house for peacekeeping training. As an interim step, the Danish Government funded and provided several instructors for a regional peacekeeping course held at the Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC) in October
1996. This involvement led to discussions about how Copenhagen could help in a more comprehensive way. In January 1997, Denmark and Zimbabwe signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to formalize their cooperation in the field of subregional peacekeeping training. The budget for the initial three-year programme was some US$ 2.7 million.

The Danish programme is centred around the development of a Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) at the Zimbabwe Staff College. In accordance with the January 1997 MOU, Denmark has begun to construct and equip peacekeeping training facilities at the ZSC. The same agreement calls for Denmark to organize and largely finance 10 peacekeeping courses at the ZSC over a three-year period and to provide both short- and long-term technical advisers. Accordingly, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has seconded a Danish officer to the ZSC. Denmark is also supporting the creation of a clearing house at the ZSC that will monitor peacekeeping training activities, identify new regional training requirements, keep a record of trained peacekeeping practitioners and

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30 Interview with Danish Government official, 1998. Prior to the end of apartheid, Denmark had financed courses in South Africa that promoted civil-military relations. When apartheid was dismantled in 1994, Denmark undertook a new “development paradigm,” in which peacekeeping was a component. Interview with Peter Lysholt Hansen, Head, Department for Southern Africa, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 February 1998, Copenhagen.

31 “Memorandum of Understanding Between Zimbabwe and Denmark,” 31 January 1997, courtesy of Danish Embassy to Zimbabwe. This figure does not include costs associated with the provision of short- and long-term technical experts, which Denmark also covers. Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 The appointment of a military officer to serve as the point person for Denmark’s efforts at the ZSC is significant, as it is the first time the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has paid for a Ministry of Defence official to conduct what is billed as a “development project.” Interview with Maj. Michael Lollesgaard, Department of International Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence, 18 February 1998, Copenhagen.
instructors in the subregion and beyond, establish a library, and publish a quarterly magazine.34

Another component of the Danish programme involves providing the means for participants from the SADC subregion to attend Nordic peacekeeping courses. In 1997, Denmark financed the participation of two officers from the SADC subregion in the Nordic United Nations Peacekeeping Senior Management Seminar (UNMAS). For each year of its three-year programme, Denmark also committed to funding two participants in both the Nordic United Nations Military Police Officers Course in Denmark and the Finnish-hosted Nordic United Nations Military Observers Course.35

As a part of its programme, Denmark has also given SADC officials an opportunity to learn first-hand about the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT)36 with the intention of helping SADC member States develop

34 Kurt Mosgaard, “Training Co-ordination: the NACC Clearing House Concept,” in Malan (ed.), “Resolute Partners: Building Peacekeeping Capacity in Southern Africa,” p. 88. In 1993, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) appointed Denmark to be the lead nation for peacekeeping training and education. One of its responsibilities was to establish a clearing house for the exchange of information and to identify new training requirements and available resources. The NACC Clearing House for Peacekeeping Training has developed a pamphlet entitled “Standardization of Peacekeeping Training and Education and a Peacekeeping Course Handbook,” which is updated and distributed annually. Denmark’s current initiative in Southern Africa is modelled after the NACC Clearing House. Ibid., p. 84.


36 The three Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—have agreed to contribute troops for a joint battalion earmarked for international peacekeeping duties. Denmark, together with Norway and Sweden, has taken the lead in providing peacekeeping training to these countries. According to a Danish Government official, a “SADCBAT” might have several advantages over its Baltic counterpart: [1] SADC countries do not have to erase Soviet-style thinking; [2] most SADC countries share a common language; [3] within SADC, there is a potential lead country that possesses substantial military hardware and abilities; [4] many SADC member States have retained a useful residue of colonial
similar capabilities. The Danish Government organized a visit for SADC Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence to Denmark and to Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 1998 and underwrote the costs of the trip. 37

Denmark also organized a second trip in May 1998 for senior SADC military officers to observe the joint Danish-Polish brigade participating in the multinational force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which included a Lithuanian company serving with the Danish battalion.38

Other Danish initiatives designed to enhance the peacekeeping capabilities of African States also focus on the SADC subregion. Copenhagen, for example, has funded a defence management course at a South African university for mid-level officers and civilians from SADC countries and has supported an effort to develop indigenous conflict resolution strategies. 39 Although these initiatives are somewhat tangential to peacekeeping, they provide the basis for important confidence-building measures that contribute to peacekeeping. Denmark has also contributed some US$ 35,000 to Blue Crane.40

Danish support for capacity-building in the SADC subregion has not come at the exclusion of assistance to peacekeeping efforts there and elsewhere on the continent. Denmark has made voluntary financial contributions to a number of United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa, including the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ),

36 (...continued)
training; and [5] there is a clear dominant power in the subregion. Interview with Julian Elgaard Brett, Head of Section, Office Eight, Danish Ministry of Defence, 18 February 1998, Copenhagen.
37 Eleven of 14 SADC members sent representatives, although not all at the ministerial level. Interview with Hansen, 17 February 1998, Copenhagen.
38 Ibid.
UNAMIR, the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), and MINURCA. For example, a Danish contribution permitted MINURCA to air radio broadcasts 24 hours per day. Denmark also contributed financially to UNITAF in Somalia. In 1996 and 1997, Denmark provided some US$ 2 million to Benin, Burkina Faso, and Ghana, in recognition of their efforts and the costs they incurred in taking part in ECOMOG in Liberia. (Benin, Burkina Faso, and Ghana were the only three ECOWAS countries eligible for assistance due to their “privileged partner” status.) While it was clearly understood that Danish largesse was to cover peacekeeping costs, the transfer “officially” was not made for “operational costs” but rather for “balance of payments support.” The Director of the Africa and Middle East Department at the Beninois Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation described the aid as “budgetary support,” in which the money was given to Benin with the understanding that it would allow the Government to deploy troops, as it had indicated it wished to do. According to the Chief of Staff of Benin’s Armed Forces, the Danish “contribution” was used for logistical support including per diems, hazard pay, food, medical supplies, and

45 Interview with Danish Government official, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 February 1998, Copenhagen.
46 Interview with Francis Loko, Director, Africa and the Middle East Department, Beninois Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 15 March 1999, Cotonou; interview with Amb. Edmond Cakpo-Tozo, Secretary-General, Beninois Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 15 March 1999, Cotonou.
transportation. 47 Denmark had also contributed US$ 299,980 to the OAU Peace Fund as of 31 December 1998. 48

GERMANY

Germany has become an increasingly important provider and supporter of peacekeeping education and training to African countries. Berlin’s Support Aid Programme includes the provision of military advisory groups to 10 African countries from all of the continent’s subregions. 49 This four-year, US$ 23 million initiative includes training and materials for civilian police. Germany also makes available peacekeeping training to African officers at the battalion and company commander levels in Germany. Officers from Burkina Faso, Egypt, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe have availed themselves of this opportunity. In Zimbabwe, Germany has equipped the Zimbabwe Staff College with computers. In addition, Berlin was by far the largest contributor to Blue Crane, 50 providing more than US$ 493,000, a C-160 aircraft, and 28 satellite phones. 51

Germany is also seeking to influence the international agenda as concerns peacekeeping-related policy. In 1996, it introduced a draft resolution to the General Assembly First Committee on “consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures,” which the Assembly adopted without a vote. Follow-up resolutions were adopted in 1997 and 1998, at subsequent General Assembly sessions. In March 1998, a Group of Interested States was established under German chairmanship. Among other

47 Interview with Col. Felicien Antoine Dos Santos, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Beninois Ministry of National Defence, 15 March 1999, Cotonou.
48 Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.
50 Interview with Betsie Smith, Deputy Director, OAU Politics and Security, and Peacekeeping, South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 August 1999, by telephone.

Germany has provided operational assistance to United Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa as well. In January 1974, the then Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) airlifted Ghanaian and Senegalese troops serving in the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). For the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, the FRG contributed light vehicles, minibuses, mobile workshops, ambulances, and spare parts. It voluntarily furnished vehicles, field kitchens, and a repair workshop for UNAMIR. For the third United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Germany also gave equipment. In late 1998, Germany funded the transportation of 150 Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) troops who served under the operational control of MINURCA during the period of the legislative elections, spending US$ 100,000.

In addition, Germany has supported African regional and subregional peacekeeping initiatives. In the context of the OAU, Berlin contributed money, flak jackets, helmets, and binoculars for OAU missions, valued at

53 Documentation provided by the German Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, August 1999.
55 Ibid., p. 712.
56 Ibid., p. 731.
57 Ibid., p. 717.
more than US$ 260,000 during 1996-1997.\textsuperscript{59} In 1996, it donated more than US$ 35,000 worth of medical supplies for the OAU Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB).\textsuperscript{60} In 1998, Germany provided two contributions of some US$ 30,000 each to support the OAU Mission in the Comoros (OMIC) and OAU mediation efforts to end the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{61} Regarding subregional operations, Germany donated 35 trucks for ECOMOG contingents serving in Liberia in late 1996.\textsuperscript{62} The next year, it provided 27 jeeps and some medical equipment to participating countries. In 1998, Berlin supplied 5,000 uniforms for ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, valued at US$ 163,000, and it donated US$ 337,000 worth of communication equipment to the Ghanaian contingent in 1999.\textsuperscript{63} For the ECOMOG mission in Guinea-Bissau, it provided US$ 40,000 worth of medicines and medical supplies. It was in the process of fulfilling a request for some US$ 100,000 worth of office and basic communication equipment at the time of the May 1999 coup in Guinea-Bissau. At that point, the German Embassy in Dakar had procured roughly half of the items, which included computers, a fax machine, furniture, and safes. This equipment was then transferred to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. Germany had also planned to finance the participation of a Malian contingent in Guinea-Bissau and had earmarked US$ 139,000 for that purpose, but the mission was withdrawn before the troops had been deployed.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{59} Documentation provided by the German Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, August 1999.
\textsuperscript{60} Written correspondence with German Government official, German Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 31 August 1999.
\textsuperscript{61} Documentation provided by the German Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, August 1999.
\textsuperscript{63} Documentation provided by the German Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, August 1999.
\textsuperscript{64} Interview with German Government official, 18 August 1999, by telephone.
ITALY

In recent years, Italy has increasingly sought to develop African peacekeeping capabilities through bilateral assistance programmes. It has agreed to undertake a peacekeeping training initiative with Ethiopia, which will include establishing an Ethiopian brigade for peacekeeping activities. Although some minor elements of this initiative have been implemented, it has essentially been suspended pending the cessation of hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia.\(^{65}\) Rome had also planned to establish a “technical assistance” mission in Eritrea, but that too has been put on hold. According to the Italian Government, these two initiatives will cost some US$ 20 million.\(^{66}\) Italy has established a technical and military assistance mission in Morocco, which provides training to the Moroccan armed forces at a cost of US$ 250,000 per year. It also finances the participation of African officers in peacekeeping seminars and courses at the United Nations Staff College in Turin and at national police officer training courses.\(^{67}\) On average, 30-35 African officers receive training at Italian military institutes each year. The Italian Government forecasts that it will spend US$ 700,000 on preventing and managing conflicts in Africa during the course of 1999.\(^{68}\)

Italy has also provided voluntary in-kind support and financial assistance for both United Nations and subregional peacekeeping operations in Africa. For ONUMOZ, it supplied an air component comprising eight helicopters, three fixed wing aircraft, and some 110 personnel.\(^{69}\) It also made available police training as a part of the second United Nations Operation in Somalia

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\(^{65}\) “Initiatives and Support from Italy;” and interview with Gianfranco Incarnato, Counsellor, Italian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 18 August 1999, by telephone.

\(^{66}\) Written correspondence with Incarnato, 19 August 1999.

\(^{67}\) See “Initiatives and Support from Italy;” and Interview with Incarnato, 18 August 1999, by telephone.

\(^{68}\) Written correspondence with Incarnato, 19 August 1999.

(UNOSOM II). More recently, Italy offered a C-130 aircraft to transport participating contingents for ECOMOG missions in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. ECOMOG accepted, but the offer had not been acted upon by mid-1999. The ECOMOG mission in Guinea-Bissau was withdrawn before the Italian offer could be implemented.

JAPAN

Japan has recently organized a number of conferences and symposia that address the issue of developing African peacekeeping capabilities. In October 1993, it hosted the first Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development (TICAD I). Drawing upon the Conference’s conclusion that “stability and security are prerequisites to sustainable development,” the Japanese Government held a High-Level Symposium on Peace and Development: Problems of Conflict in Africa in October 1995. The meeting brought together 21 prominent persons from African States, donor countries, and international organizations. This was followed by a High-Level Symposium on Conflicts in Africa: Road to Nation-Building in the Post-Conflict Period in September 1996. In January 1998, Tokyo sponsored an International Conference on Preventive Strategy, which placed particular emphasis on the African continent. It hosted TICAD II in October 1998, which addressed the themes of conflict prevention and post-conflict
development. Among other commitments made at TICAD II, the Asian “Development Partners” agreed: to support capacity-building for police and internal security forces; to continue strengthening the conflict prevention, management, and resolution capacities of the OAU and subregional organizations; to continue assisting African centres for training in conflict prevention and peacekeeping; and to support OAU efforts to improve its early warning capabilities.\footnote{76}

Japan has also made significant financial contributions to other Africa-oriented programmes and projects, both through the United Nations and African regional organizations. Tokyo has contributed US$ 600,000 to the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa Trust Fund.\footnote{77} Part of this sum was used to finance a training seminar on peacekeeping operations in Cameroon for high-level civilian and military officers from the subregion in September 1996. Of the US$ 950,000 that Japan had given to the OAU Peace Fund as of 31 December 1998,\footnote{78} some US$ 203,000 went to establishing the Early Warning System (EWS).\footnote{80}

In addition, Japan has occasionally made voluntary financial contributions for peace operations in Africa and has supported mediation efforts on the continent. For example, it contributed to UNTAG and to UNITAF.\footnote{81} Tokyo has also established a trust fund with the United Nations

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\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{77}{“Initiatives and Support from Japan;” see also United Nations Concern for Peace and Security in Central Africa: Reference Document, New York: United Nations, 1997, p. 56.}
\item \footnote{78}{United Nations Concern for Peace and Security in Central Africa: Reference Document, p. 12.}
\item \footnote{79}{Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.}
\item \footnote{80}{Written correspondence with Yuki Kitagawa, First Secretary, Japanese Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 27 October 1999.}
\item \footnote{81}{The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition), pp. 712, and 724. Tokyo’s US$ 100 million contribution to UNITAF is particularly (continued...)}
\end{itemize}
}
called “the Sub-account for the Trust Fund in support of Special Mission and other activities related to Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking.” As of mid-1999, it had contributed US$ 200,000 to the fund—US$ 150,000 of that to resolve African conflicts.82

NETHERLANDS

Dutch efforts to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities are a component of its bilateral development assistance programmes as well as its military cooperation initiatives. For 1999, the Netherlands is concentrating its bilateral structural aid on 19 developing countries, 10 of which are in Africa.83 Funds from the Ministry for Development Cooperation can now be used for activities that were once the exclusive responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. In general, the Ministry of Defence still furnishes all peacekeeping-related equipment and funds some training initiatives, while the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation finance other aspects of Dutch capacity-building initiatives.84

The Netherlands has supported efforts to provide peacekeeping-related training to Africans. The Ministry of Defence routinely invites and covers the expenses of African officers to attend courses at Dutch military institutes,
some of which have a peacekeeping component and are taught in English.\textsuperscript{85} In April 1999, the Netherlands contributed more than US$ 249,000 to exercise Blue Crane.\textsuperscript{86} The Hague has also indicated its willingness to support Gabon 2000, tentatively agreeing to install and service a water purification system for the exercise.\textsuperscript{87}

The Netherlands has also supported—both financially and logistically—UN and subregional peacekeeping efforts on the African continent. The Dutch Government was the largest voluntary contributor to UNAMIR, supplying nearly US$ 5.5 million and another US$ 3 million worth of equipment including vehicles, generators, kitchen trailers, ambulances, and mine detectors.\textsuperscript{88} The Dutch donation substantially enabled a Zambian battalion to participate in the operation.\textsuperscript{89} The Netherlands has also given voluntary contributions to UNOSOM II, ONUMOZ, and UNOMIL.\textsuperscript{90} The Dutch Government made available 84 trucks for ECOMOG contingents serving in Liberia in the period leading up to the July 1997 presidential elections.\textsuperscript{91} In addition, the Hague provided “balance of payments support” to ECOMOG contributors with the understanding that recipient countries would then use their own funds to deploy and sustain their contingents in Liberia.\textsuperscript{92} More recently, the Netherlands helped underwrite Mali’s

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{87} Interview with Roos, 31 August 1999, New York.

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)}, p. 731.

\textsuperscript{89} Interview with Roos, 31 August 1999, New York.

\textsuperscript{90} \textit{The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)}, pp. 724, 727, and 733.


participation in the ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone. The money was used to transport a Malian battalion to the mission area, and the Hague has indicated that it will finance the contingent’s transportation home at the end of the operation. As of mid-1999, the Netherlands had contributed some US$ 8 million to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone and was considering providing an additional US$ 3-5 million.

NORWAY

Like Denmark, Norway’s efforts to develop African peacekeeping capabilities focus on the SADC subregion. The Norwegian Government is financing an ambitious US$ 2.5 million five-year Training for Peace in Southern Africa Project (TfP) that aims to build capacity for conflict management and peacekeeping. Two South African non-governmental organizations have helped develop the curricula, which covers the civilian and political aspects of peacekeeping and civil-military relations, and provide the training. More than 250 Government officials, representatives of defence and police forces, and members of civil society including the media and NGOs have attended TfP workshops throughout 11 of the 14 SADC countries. Since 1998, specialized training for civilian police has become a feature of the project. TfP will be extended for at least one year. Beyond this programme, each year Oslo covers all expenses for six officers from the SADC region to participate in its courses in logistics, commanding officer appointments, and civilian police duties. It similarly sponsors two individuals

94 Interview with Roos, 31 August 1999, New York.
Oslo also supports various initiatives to promote peace and security elsewhere on the continent. Norway is playing a leading role in a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project to review the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. In addition, as of 31 December 1998, it had donated US$ 517,192 to the OAU Peace Fund. In 1999, Oslo pledged more than US$ 1 million in support of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED), which is to oversee the implementation of the ECOWAS moratorium on the production, import, and export of small arms and light weapons. It has financed both bilateral and multilateral mediation efforts to end the conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, and the Sudan. Norwegian military officers have provided peacekeeping instruction at various African institutions on an ad hoc basis. Oslo has also provided more than US$ 2 million in voluntary funds to support UNOSOM II, ONUMOZ, UNAMIR, and UNOMIL.

The Norwegian Government has also developed several emergency relief systems active on the African continent that could have a potential role to play in aiding African initiatives. Although the Norwegian Emergency

98 Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.
99 Documentation provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 1999.
Preparedness System (NOREPS), for example, is designed to support disaster relief rather than peacekeeping per se, its pre-positioning of humanitarian-related equipment could be used effectively in a peacekeeping operation. Under NOREPS, Oslo has stocked non-lethal items such as communication equipment, medical supplies, tentage, and rations in four locations in Africa: Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.103

**SWEDEN**

Swedish capacity-building efforts include support for African organizations. Stockholm contributed US$ 136,877 to the OAU Peace Fund104 in 1998 and has budgeted the same amount for 1999.105 In addition, it has invited the OAU to send three participants to attend courses on the United Nations at the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT).106 It has also given US$ 100,000 to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In 1999, Stockholm gave US$ 300,000 in support PCASED—the first installment of its US$ 1 million pledge.107

Stockholm has also supported peacekeeping education and training through both bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Each year SWEDINT invites two participants from SADC member States to attend its courses for junior officers, police officers, and staff officers, and covers course fees and accommodation. It has provided instructors and funding for courses at the RPTC in Zimbabwe.108 Swedish support for field exercises includes a

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104 Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.
105 Interview with Col. Kent Edberg, Military Adviser, Swedish Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 3 December 1999, by telephone.
107 Interview with Edberg, 3 December 1999, by telephone.
108 “Initiatives and Support from Sweden.”
 donation of roughly US$ 125,000 to Exercise Blue Crane \(^{109}\) and a commitment to send a military instructor to Gabon 2000.\(^{110}\)

Apart from its assistance to African organizations and individual States, Sweden has also funded African civil society projects and United Nations undertakings. For example, it financed a three-year, US$ 348,000 project to enable a South African NGO to develop a system to monitor and obtain information on impending crises in Africa with a goal of helping to prevent conflicts from arising or escalating further.\(^{111}\) Besides providing Blue Helmets, Sweden has also made voluntary financial contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations on the continent. Stockholm gave more than US$ 2 million to UNOSOM II and ONUMOZ.\(^{112}\)

**Other Non-African Countries**

Other non-African countries have programmes or initiatives to develop indigenous capabilities. Finland contributed some US$ 200,000 to the OAU Peace Fund in 1997.\(^{113}\) It also provides a yearly donation of US$ 100,000 to the OAU/International Peace Academy Joint Task Force on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in Africa. Helsinki invites two officers from SADC member States to participate in its military observer course as well.\(^{114}\) For Blue Crane, it provided one military observer and one civilian police


\(^{110}\) Interview with Edberg, 3 December 1999, by telephone.

\(^{111}\) “Initiatives and Support from Sweden.”


\(^{113}\) This money was allocated for “Conflict Prevention through the Fund,” and the Finnish Government specified that “the funds should not be used for supporting the OAU Conflict Management Center.” Written correspondence with Lt-Col. Markku Nikkila, Military Adviser, Finnish Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 13 September 1999.

Ireland has assisted the Zambia Staff College in developing its peacekeeping training curriculum.\textsuperscript{115} It has also trained African officers from Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, Tanzania, and Zambia at its United Nations Training School.\textsuperscript{116} Portugal, for its part, will assist with translations for lusophone participants at seminars sponsored by the US African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), as well as with some conference documentation.\textsuperscript{117} Switzerland has also initiated programmes to strengthen African capabilities, including the secondment of a Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs official to a South African non-governmental organization.\textsuperscript{118} For exercise Blue Crane, Austria gave US$ 50,000, India provided an aircraft, and China contributed some 20,000 uniforms.\textsuperscript{119}

Other non-African States have also made important voluntary contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations on the African continent. The Soviet Union airlifted food at the beginning of ONUC.\textsuperscript{120} For UNTAG, Greece supplied logistics equipment.\textsuperscript{121} Australia provided communication equipment to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).\textsuperscript{122} Switzerland made available air ambulance services for the second United Nations Angola Verification

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{115} Written correspondence with Nikkila, 10 September 1999.
\bibitem{116} Ireland has a long-standing relationship with the Zambian army dating back almost to the time of Zambia’s independence. This is the one bilateral relationship with an African country that Ireland has cultivated. Interview with John Deady, First Secretary, Irish Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 31 August 1999, by telephone.
\bibitem{117} “Initiatives and Support from Ireland,” \textit{UN Database on Peacekeeping Training and Initiatives in Africa}, available on the Internet at \texttt{<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/ext11.htm>>}.
\bibitem{118} Interview with David Hamon, Regional Director for Plans and Policy, Office of African Affairs, US Department of Defense, 19 August 1999, by telephone.
\bibitem{119} Written correspondence with Swiss Government official, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 29 August 1999.
\bibitem{122} Ibid., p. 712.
\bibitem{123} Ibid., p. 720.
\end{thebibliography}
Mission (UNAVEM II).\textsuperscript{124} For UNAMIR, the Republic of Korea provided vehicles and containers valued at roughly US$ 530,000.\textsuperscript{125}

**ASSESSMENT**

Despite their relatively small size, the capacity-building programmes of these other countries share much in common with those of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They too vary considerably in terms of their level of financial and political commitment as well as their primary emphasis. Domestic considerations similarly motivate and constrain many of these smaller initiatives. For example, the desire of Denmark’s Minister for Defence to carve out a high-profile role for himself helps to explain the surprisingly large scope of the Danish programme. More broadly, Denmark was eager to differentiate itself from its Nordic partners and has taken obvious pride in being mentioned as one of the “big players.” Japan’s increased involvement in African peace and security issues has been linked to its goal of gaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Some posit that Japan’s new approach is a short-term attempt to curry favor with African States, which comprise the largest bloc of nations in the United Nations General Assembly.\textsuperscript{126} (This charge could of course be made against any donor country assisting Africa with an interest in claiming a permanent seat on an expanded Council.) Ottawa’s interest in supporting peacekeeping and related initiatives in francophone Africa can be in part explained by its sensitivity to the Québec issue.

Although some of these programmes are extremely small or are tangential to capacity-building, several have had a significant impact on African peacekeeping capabilities and potentially merit emulation. Africans have warmly welcomed these low-profile approaches to developing their peacekeeping capabilities. Germany, in particular, has been praised for providing significant assistance with little fanfare. Although their programmes are relatively small compared to those of the P-3, countries such as Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands have provided timely and meaningful support to African troops participating in actual peacekeeping operations. Denmark’s creative use of balance-of-payments support and development aid is noteworthy. Copenhagen’s initiative to introduce SADC countries to the possible benefits of instituting the BALTBAT concept in the subregion also deserves additional attention. The pre-positioning of non-lethal equipment in Africa under NOREPS could complement France’s decision to pre-position matériel, and its potential should be explored.
CHAPTER 14
MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES

Multilateral initiatives to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities—both through existing organizations and informal cooperation networks—are becoming increasingly important. The European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU)—both individually and collaboratively—have expanded their efforts to respond to crises in Africa and to develop African peacekeeping capabilities. The Commonwealth has proven more willing to review and criticize political developments in its member States. The Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (known by its Portuguese acronym, CPLP, for Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa) mediated the conflict in Guinea-Bissau and contemplated deploying a military observer force. The International Organization of the Francophonie (known by its French acronym, OIF, for Organisation internationale de la Francophonie) has transformed itself from a cultural association into a political organization and has become more involved in trying to resolve crises in Africa. On the informal level, cooperation between France and the United Kingdom has intensified, and the two countries have announced that they are harmonizing their policies towards Africa. The Franco-African Summit, long an important forum for addressing threats to African peace, has made security the central theme of two of its last three meetings. The Nordic countries have begun to work together to develop peacekeeping training in Africa.
ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT AFRICAN MEMBERS

European Union

Since 1995, the 15-member European Union1 has consistently noted its support for developing African preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping capabilities. In December 1995, the Council of the European Union stated that the EU was “ready to support African efforts in the field of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, where necessary via the WEU.” It stressed, however, that “[i]t is essential for there to be an African lead in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in Africa.”2 In June 1997, the Council reiterated its willingness to assist. Its Common Position and Council Conclusions on “Conflict prevention and resolution in Africa” provided that the EU will “actively support efforts in favour of the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa.”3 It also averred that “[t]he Union is ready to assist in building the capacities for conflict prevention and resolution in Africa on the basis of concrete project proposals, in particular through the [Organization of African Unity] OAU and African subregional organizations.”4

In line with these policy goals, the EU has funded both regional and subregional African capacity-building initiatives. As of 31 December 1998, it had contributed more than US$ 1 million to the OAU Peace Fund.5 The

1 EU members include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
4 Ibid., Article 7.1.
5 Written correspondence with S. Bassey Ibok, Head, Conflict Management Division, OAU Secretariat, 26 January 1999.
organization has focused on improving the OAU’s telecommunications, with an emphasis on the OAU’s field offices and missions. It has procured equipment such as satellite telephone sets (with encryption features), laptop computers, and portable printers.6 In addition, on 15 June 1999, the EU agreed to provide financial support for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.7

The EU has also helped underwrite various peace processes on the continent. It has, for example, contributed financially to regional efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Burundi. Following a meeting of the European Development Fund on 16 June 1999, the EU decided to allocate more than US$ 2.5 million via the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in support of the Lusaka Peace Process to end the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).8

In addition, the EU has established a Special Envoy for the African Great Lakes Region to support conflict resolution efforts there and report on developments. Amb. Aldo Ajello of Italy, who had previously been the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Mozambique and had headed the United Nations peacekeeping operation there, has served in the post since its creation in March 1996. The Special Envoy assists national, regional, and international initiatives to find a lasting solution to the economic, humanitarian, and political problems facing the region. Among other tasks, Ajello is charged with supporting “the preparation for the holding of a Conference on Peace, Security, and Stability in the Great Lakes Region.”9 The Brussels-based team, which has grown as the Special Envoy’s mandate has been expanded, has traveled extensively throughout Africa and

6 Written correspondence with Peter Craig-McQuaide, Principal Administrator, European Correspondent’s Unit, Directorate General for External Relations, European Commission, 30 November 1999.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
the West to encourage the pacific settlement of disputes in the Great Lakes region and to generate and coordinate diplomatic and financial support.\textsuperscript{10} On 28 June 1999, the EU extended the Special Envoy’s mandate until 31 July 2000.\textsuperscript{11}

While the EU has concentrated its resources on developing African capabilities in the areas of early warning and preventive diplomacy, it has also supported African peacekeeping forces—albeit it to a much smaller extent. From 1994 to 1997, the European Commission provided vehicles to the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and coordinated its development assistance (such as infrastructure repairs) to aid ECOMOG operations when possible.\textsuperscript{12} Although the EU pledged to provide funds to African countries that might contribute troops to the proposed Canadian-led multinational force for Eastern Zaire, this support should not be taken at face value. By the time EU development ministers agreed on an aid package for the Great Lakes region as well as funds for African contingents,\textsuperscript{13} it should have been clear that the mission was not likely to go forward. Indeed, the multinational force never was deployed (see Chapter 8).

\textsuperscript{10} Written correspondence with Craig-McQuaide, 8 December 1999.
\textsuperscript{12} Interview with Craig-McQuaide, 7 December 1999, by telephone.
Western European Union

Like the EU, the 10-nation WEU\(^{14}\) has stated its desire to enhance and support African peacekeeping capacities. In November 1995, the WEU Council indicated that it was studying the possibility of supporting African peacekeeping initiatives. In May 1996, the Council instructed the Permanent Council to pursue this objective, in accordance with a request by the EU. The Permanent Council subsequently decided to send a fact-finding mission to Africa, and the Ministers endorsed this decision in May 1996. In August 1996, the WEU fact-finding mission visited the OAU and several African countries.\(^{15}\) The mission recommended: [1] creating a link between the WEU and the OAU; [2] establishing contacts with subregional organizations; [3] developing ideas for supporting African organizations and States with communications, logistics, and training; and [4] enlisting the WEU’s Military Staff to coordinate support provided by individual WEU member States.\(^{16}\) The WEU Planning Cell has since established a database that records the peacekeeping training that European countries offer to African States.\(^{17}\) In addition, the organization has sent representatives to training exercises as well as attended and hosted various seminars with peacekeeping themes and an African focus.\(^{18}\)

The WEU has devoted substantial resources to monitoring and analysing threats to peace and security on the African continent. The WEU Satellite Centre, for example, has been focusing on African peace and security issues since shortly after its creation in 1993. In 1994, the Centre analysed

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\(^{14}\) WEU members include: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The five EU countries that are not members of WEU (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) enjoy “observer” status within WEU.


\(^{17}\) “WEU’s contribution to reinforcing peace in central Africa,” p. 31.

\(^{18}\) “Statement by, José Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU,” p. 57.
infrastructure and military installations in Burundi and Zaire and created overview maps of large areas of those countries. In 1995, it studied Angolan airfields and produced a number of reports on Rwanda. During 1996–1997, the Satellite Centre performed a number of tasks associated with the crisis in the Great Lakes region, which included detecting and analysing refugee camps and associated lines of communication as well as identifying airfields and access routes. As of September 1998, it had produced over 100 reports analysing 280 different locations in Africa with some 175 satellite images.\(^{19}\)

This information has been made available to WEU members and “associate members”\(^{20}\) but not to African States or organizations.\(^{21}\)

WEU support for peacekeeping in Africa—either direct or indirect—has yet to materialize. Members were split on whether to intervene directly in support of the Canadian-led multinational force in Eastern Zaire.\(^{22}\) This lack of unity was reflected in the reactive manner in which the organization approached the conflict. On 15 November 1996—the day the United Nations Security Council authorized the multinational force in Eastern Zaire—the WEU Permanent Council asked the Planning Cell to examine the possibilities for WEU involvement. The next day, the Planning Cell presented its advice on four possible options, determining that: [1] the WEU could not make a meaningful contribution in coordinating transportation for the multinational force; [2] the WEU could coordinate transport for the humanitarian aid operation being prepared by the EU; [3] although it was too late to coordinate training for the first units of African participants in the multinational force, the WEU could provide training for units being prepared for rotation; [4] further WEU support and logistics for the multinational force would not be useful, but it could be important for the humanitarian

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20 WEU associate members include the six European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that are neither WEU members nor observers—Iceland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, Poland, and Turkey.
21 Interview with Frank Asbeck, Deputy Director, Satellite Centre, WEU Secretariat, 9 December 1999, by telephone.
22 Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain supported an intervention, whereas the Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK did not. Olsen, “Western Europe’s Relations with Africa Since the End of the Cold War,” p. 316.
Ultimately, the Permanent Council could only agree to make a vague commitment to provide training and logistical support for African troops participating. On 2 December, the Planning Cell indicated to the Permanent Council that the WEU could provide transport aircraft for the civil humanitarian operations, assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid with military transport, and conduct training. In the end, none of this support was given as the force did not materialize. Since then, the organization has neither offered to provide similar assistance, nor considered fielding a peacekeeping force in Africa.

**ORGANIZATIONS WITH AFRICAN MEMBERS**

**The Commonwealth**

Besides establishing common ideals, the Commonwealth has increasingly criticized members that fail to uphold them. The Commonwealth, created in 1949, is a voluntary association of States linked by their past relationship as a colony, protectorate, or trust territory of another Commonwealth country. The organization now has 54 members—19 of which are African States—and is headed by Chief Emeka

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24 Ibid., p. 41.

25 From its creation until the late 1950s, the Commonwealth was a small, British-run “club” with fewer than 10 members. Membership expanded rapidly with decolonization in Africa and Asia, however, and had grown to 21 by the time the Secretariat was established in 1965. Ron Gerver, “Guide to the Commonwealth,” BBC News, 11 November 1999, available on the Internet at <http://www.bbc.co.uk>.

26 Mozambique, which became a Commonwealth member in 1995, is the sole exception. Maputo was admitted in recognition of its unique historical relationship with the organization in the struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa. *The Commonwealth*, available on the Internet at <http://www.thecommonwealth.org>.

27 African membership in the organization includes: Botswana, Cameroon, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, (continued...)
Anyauku of Nigeria. The Commonwealth has no written charter, but its members have subscribed to a number of written statements and a body of “Commonwealth principles” has emerged. The association has increasingly focused on promoting good governance and democracy, sustainable economic and social development, and respect for the rule of law, human rights, and gender equality. In November 1995, Commonwealth Heads of Government created the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) to recommend actions to be taken against members that persistently violate the organization’s principles. During its first four years, CMAG has focused on political developments within the Gambia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone—all three of which were under military rule when selected for scrutiny.

Although the Commonwealth has deployed an observer group on the African continent, this initiative is not likely to be repeated despite its success. The Commonwealth, which was actively involved in efforts to liberate the subregion from minority rule, played a central role in shepherding Zimbabwe’s transition to independence during 1979-1980. Several of its members took part in the 1,300-strong Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) (see Chapter 8), and the Secretariat observed the February 1980 elections. In the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which oversaw the elections that led to Namibian independence, 17 Commonwealth members contributed either Blue Helmets or electoral supervisors. In 1992, the multidisciplinary civilian Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa (COMSA) was created to assist South Africa in

27 (...continued)
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.


stemming the escalating political violence that threatened to derail the process towards ending apartheid rule. COMSA continued through the April 1994 elections and concluded its operations in May 1994. In addition, a 33-strong Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group, comprised of military and police officers from nine member countries, helped train the South African National Peacekeeping Force constituted to provide security during the elections. 32 While the association will continue to examine the political situations and human rights abuses in member countries and to field election observation missions,33 it is not likely to undertake another peacekeeping operation—either in Africa or elsewhere.

The Commonwealth Secretariat has, however, facilitated and coordinated peacekeeping assistance from its members to an African State or regional organization. In 1998, the Secretariat recruited and administered a six-person Commonwealth Police Development Task Force to serve with and help train Sierra Leonean police. 34 In 1999, Canada arranged through the Secretariat to procure and transport non-lethal aid35 to the Ghanaian and Nigerian contingents serving with ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. Ottawa initiated this novel approach because it judged that it could procure more supplies and ensure that they reached their intended recipients in a shorter time if it bought and sent the items from Europe. Canada was pleased with the results of this initiative but has no plans to repeat it.36

32 The Commonwealth in Action: South Africa., p. 5, courtesy of Commonwealth Secretariat.
34 The UK provided the bulk of the operation’s funding as well as three police officers, and Canada, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe contributed one officer each. Interview with Sandra Pepera, Chief Programme Officer, Political Affairs Division, Commonwealth Secretariat, 6 December 1999, by telephone.
35 Medical supplies, food, and generators were among the items purchased. Written correspondence with Pepera, 6 December 1999.
36 Interview with Canadian Government official, 1999.
Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries

CPLP has evolved significantly since it was established in 1996 and has begun to concentrate on peace and security issues. When Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and Sao Tome and Principe initially discussed creating an organization, the proposed mandate was rather narrow, focusing on the promotion of Portuguese culture and language. After several years of false starts, the proposed mandate was expanded. At the time of CPLP’s creation in July 1996, plans for a common Parliamentary Assembly and a common University were underway. These ideas proved overly ambitious and have not been implemented. Initially, the CPLP Secretariat comprised only Executive Secretary Marcolino Moro of Angola, his deputy, and a secretary—all of whom shared a one-room office. Moreover, the organization had no budget.37 Despite these constraints, in September 1997, experts from CPLP member States met to prepare a conference of defence ministers and discussed the topic of CPLP participation in peacekeeping forces.38 In July 1998, Defence Ministers from CPLP member States approved an initiative to train and prepare military units for humanitarian and peace missions. They also announced that a Center for Strategic Analysis would be established in Maputo.39

CPLP’s active involvement in conflict resolution on the African continent crystallized with the crisis in Guinea-Bissau. In July 1998, at the second Conference of Heads of State and Government in Praia, Cape Verde, the seven CPLP Heads of State condemned the rebellion in Guinea-Bissau and called for the re-establishment of democratic order. They also agreed to establish a Contact Group at the foreign minister level to explore appropriate diplomatic means to end the conflict.40 The CPLP Contact Group, under the leadership of Cape Verde’s Foreign Minister, is credited with negotiating the

37 Interview with Rafael Branco, Deputy Executive Secretary, CPLP Secretariat, 1 March 1999, Lisbon.
truce of 26 July 1998.\textsuperscript{41} In the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Government of Guinea-Bissau and the military junta, the parties agreed upon the “[d]eployment of a military observer or an interpositional force, preferably from Portuguese-speaking countries.”\textsuperscript{42} On 26 August, a meeting was held under the joint chairmanship of CPLP and ECOWAS, at which the parties transformed the truce into a cease-fire.\textsuperscript{43} In mid-September, CPLP and ECOWAS convened another joint meeting and addressed the size and composition of the eventual peacekeeping force. The Ministers referred to the deployment of an ECOWAS/CPLP observer mission.\textsuperscript{44} CPLP advocated the deployment of a military observer force of around 150 officers, while ECOWAS proposed a regional intervention force of some 5,000 troops.\textsuperscript{45} ECOWAS orchestrated the November 1998 Abuja Accord and thereafter took the lead in overseeing the peace process. That agreement provided for the deployment of an ECOMOG intervention force, but indicated that ECOWAS and CPLP would both send observers to the scheduled elections—\textsuperscript{46}—which the May 1999 coup d’état made moot.

CPLP member States still envisage a future peacekeeping role for the organization but have yet to address its financial and organizational

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item Interview with Branco, 1 March 1999, Lisbon.
\item See UN Document S/1998/825, Annex I, 26 August 1998 \textit{Cease-fire Agreement in Guinea-Bissau}, 1 September 1998. This meeting was billed as a joint mediation effort, but there was initially some disagreement over which organization would have the principal role. “Guinea Bissau: Cease-fire Agreement,” \textit{Africa Research Bulletin}, Vol. 35, No. 8, 1-31 August 1998, p. 13225.
\item Interview with José Duarte, Politico-Diplomatic Adviser, CPLP Secretariat, 1 March 1999, Lisbon.
\end{thebibliography}
constraints, suggesting that such plans will not soon materialize. On 25 May 1999, CPLP Defence Ministers agreed in Praia to create a CPLP peacekeeping force to participate in humanitarian operations.\textsuperscript{47} Concerning the CPLP force discussed for Guinea-Bissau, it was never clear which countries would provide observers or how the mission would be financed. CPLP did not expect that its members alone would comprise or underwrite the relatively small observer mission it had proposed.\textsuperscript{48} The organization’s annual budget is just US$ 600,000-800,000 (US$ 210,000 of which is assessed), and almost half of its small staff is seconded from member Governments. Moreover, according to Rafael Branco, CPLP’s Deputy Executive Secretary, member States’ priorities are very different and it has thus been difficult to formulate a common strategy.\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{International Organization of the Francophonie}

OIF, also known as the Francophonie, has undergone a significant transformation since its creation as a cultural and linguistic association designed to promote cooperation throughout the French-speaking world.\textsuperscript{50} At the November 1997 Summit of Heads of State and Government in Hanoi, the Francophonie took on a political dimension and assumed the status of an international organization. The Summit adopted a charter outlining the organization’s revised objectives and structure.\textsuperscript{51} In addition, the Secretariat

\textsuperscript{47} See “Defense: Lusophone Countries,” \textit{Africa Research Bulletin}, Vol. 36, No. 5, 1-31 May 1999, p. 13560. The five-point document that the Defence Ministers approved also addressed technical-military cooperation and sought to develop the seven CPLP members’ defence industries. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{48} Interview with Duarte, 1 March 1999, Lisbon.

\textsuperscript{49} Interview with Branco, 1 March 1999, Lisbon.

\textsuperscript{50} The first intergovernmental organ, the Cultural and Technical Cooperation Agency, was established in March 1970; the first Francophonie Summit followed 16 years later, in 1986. “L’histoire de la Francophonie: Les grandes dates de la Francophonie,” \textit{La Francophonie}, available on the Internet at <http://www.francophonie.org/oif/francophonie>.

\textsuperscript{51} The new structure comprises three organs: the Summit of Heads of State and Government, which meets biannually, the Ministerial Conference, which convenes at least once each year, and the Permanent Council, which meets at least two times per year. Articles 3, 4, and 5, and Annexes 3, 4, and 5, “La (continued...)
was established and Boutros Boutros-Ghali was elected as OIF’s first Secretary-General. Building upon the work he began as United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali convened a meeting of 16 regional organizations in March 1998. Of the 49 members of the organization, 29 are African States—not all of them French-speaking. Indeed, French is not widely spoken in many OIF member countries.

With its expanded focus, the Francophonie has become increasingly involved diplomatically in conflict prevention, management, and resolution on the African continent. Since 1998, the organization has dispatched four “conciliation missions” to Africa: to Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), DRC, and Togo. OIF has undertaken other political activities in Africa. As part of its preventive diplomacy efforts, it has fielded numerous election monitoring teams. Conflict management and resolution initiatives have included mediation attempts in the Comoros and Guinea-Bissau. OIF has not, however, considered deploying a peacekeeping force or supporting African peacekeeping endeavours financially or materially.

51 (...continued)
Charte de la Francophonie,” 15 November 1997, La Francophonie.
53 The 29 African members are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, the Seychelles, Togo, and Tunisia.
“Données sur les États participant au Sommet francophone,” La Francophonie.
54 “Rapport du Secrétaire général de la Francophonie: de Hanoi à Moncton,” La Francophonie.
INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS

France and the United Kingdom

Particularly since December 1998, France and the United Kingdom have increased their cooperation with regard to Africa. At a bilateral summit in St. Malo, France, they announced that they would harmonize their policies towards Africa and pursue Anglo-French cooperation on the continent itself. In a joint declaration, the two countries pledged to intensify their exchange of information on developments in Africa, to explore the possibility of sharing embassy premises, to organize Anglo/French-Africa Heads of Mission conferences at the subregional level, and to prepare meetings between their respective ministers and joint visits by their Foreign Ministers to Africa.

According to Ian Mackley, the British High Commissioner to Ghana, the new Franco-British approach to African security is ultimately designed to be “joint” in the domain of conflict prevention, rather than conflict resolution. In March 1999, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine and British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook together visited Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana to formally inaugurate the new cooperation programme. In Abidjan, they chaired a conference of British and French ambassadors and high commissioners serving in a number of African countries to devise ways to implement these policy goals. The group discussed sharing embassies and functions and determined that information-sharing, even on matters as sensitive as security, will be prioritized. In this spirit, France and the UK jointly signed MOUs.

56 Besides working together in several multilateral organizations, they have undertaken joint operations to evacuate their nationals from various conflict zones. Interview with Lt-Col. Simon Diggins, Trainer, BMATT West Africa, 17 March 1999, Accra.


58 Interview with Ian Mackley, High Commissioner, UK High Commission to Ghana, 18 March 1999, Accra.

Franco-African Summits

Franco-African Summits have long been an important forum for addressing African peace and security issues. The first such meeting, which convened in 1974, was attended by 10 francophone countries—six at the Head of State level. These Summits were held annually until 1988, when a biannual time-frame was instituted. In 1996, the meeting expanded to include non-francophone African countries. At the most recent Summit, held in Paris in November 1998, 49 African States were represented. Meetings are now thematic, although not to the exclusion of other business. Over the years, a number of concrete proposals for resolving African conflicts and developing peacekeeping capabilities have originated or been cemented at Franco-African Summits. At the May 1978 Summit, for example, France secured the agreement of five African countries to provide contingents for an inter-African force to deploy in Zaire's Shaba province. The last three Franco-African Summits have addressed the issue of the appropriate structure with the United Nations regarding their standby capabilities in June 1999, becoming the first permanent members of the Security Council to do so.


for an African peacekeeping force. Moreover, African efforts to resolve the recent crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) date from the December 1996 Franco-African Summit. Indeed, the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (known by its French acronym, MISAB, for Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui) was an outgrowth of the November 1996 Summit.

Nordic Countries

Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have begun to orient their long-standing cooperation in the domain of peacekeeping training towards African countries. They first agreed to work together on United Nations peacekeeping training in 1964, and joint training courses are now held in each of the countries according to a division of labour scheme. In addition, they initiated a training course for senior United Nations personnel, known as the Nordic United Nations Peacekeeping Senior Management Seminar (UNMAS). The Nordic countries routinely sponsor African participants to

64 France’s 1994 proposal for a standing African peacekeeping force was not supported by African States. Instead, the Summit tasked Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadéma to study the issue and devise an appropriate structure. Togo distributed a document entitled “Standby Force Modules” at the December 1996 Summit. Discussions over the issue continued at the November 1998 Summit. See “Communication du President de la Republique Togolaise, Son Excellence Gnassingbé Eyadema au 20ème Sommet France-Afrique,” courtesy of Togolese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lomé.


67 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The Danish Approach to UN Peace Operations after the Cold War: A New Model in the Making?,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 5, No. 3, Autumn 1998, p. 116. This annual two-week course is designed for potential force commanders, special representatives of the Secretary-General, (continued...)
attend these courses. They have also adopted a joint approach to peacekeeping in Africa. In November 1997, they met to discuss their assistance to the continent\(^{66}\) and sent a fact-finding mission.\(^{69}\) The idea behind these initiatives was to extend their cooperation to Africa. Nordic countries have focused particularly on Southern Africa in terms of devising and articulating a common capacity-building strategy for the region. Indeed, they have proposed the “Nordic Model” of peacekeeping training for the Southern African region.\(^{70}\)

**ASSESSMENT**

These multilateral initiatives focus primarily on conflict prevention, and their capacity-building aspects tend to support structures and processes rather than operations. The EU and the WEU both stress their commitment to developing African peacekeeping capabilities, yet the emphasis and scope of their initiatives belies their resolve. The EU has only provided operational support to an African peacekeeping undertaking on one occasion. None of the WEU’s initiatives constitute capacity-building. Moreover, despite pronouncements to the contrary, the EU and WEU too often work independently of one another. The Commonwealth has distinguished itself by deploying a sizeable multinational force in Africa, but such an initiative is not likely to be repeated. Although the political forces and personalities behind the Francophonie’s recent expansion suggest that it will assume a more important role in resolving crises in Africa, its engagement will likely remain political rather than operational. CPLP has expressed its willingness to deploy a peacekeeping force and to develop African peacekeeping

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67 (...)continued


68 Interview with Danish Government official, 1998.

69 Hernes, “Nordic Perspectives on Capacity-Building,” p. 62.

70 Interview with Lt-Col. Erik Berg, Deputy Military Adviser, Swedish Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 26 February 1998, Bakel.
capacities, but it has neither the resources nor the experience to contribute in a significant way.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The various African and Western undertakings to develop African peacekeeping capacities raise important questions about the efficacy of current approaches. There remains a significant disparity between Africa’s inabilities and needs, on the one hand, and the West’s abilities and predispositions on the other. Although some progress has been made, the international community is still not prepared to respond meaningfully to crises in Africa. African countries largely possess the troops and the will to intervene, but not the means. Western countries, for their part, are still pursuing policies that primarily reflect their own needs and are reluctant to devote the requisite resources with the speed the situation demands, if at all. Five years after the failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda, insufficient progress has been made to respond appropriately, let alone to prevent, a similar catastrophe.

Peacekeeping in Africa: the Growing Demand and Dwindling United Nations Supply

The prospects for African peace and security are disheartening. African States still suffer from the enduring legacy of colonialism. The end of the cold war has created a power vacuum conducive to the rise and spread of internal violence. African leaders have also contributed to the problems facing their nations. It is proving increasingly difficult for the State to respond to economic, social, and security challenges. Some States have “failed” and others are in steep decline. The proliferation of weapons, especially small arms, as well as the migration and displacement of large numbers of people have all contributed to the spread of armed conflict. In several instances, conflicts that started on a national level have spilled over into neighbouring countries or have assumed regional dimensions.

Ironically, at a time when the demand for peacekeepers is growing, the supply of United Nations Blue Helmets has shrunk drastically. In the early 1990s, United Nations peacekeeping expanded exponentially in both size and scope. In addition to serving as a buffer between warring factions, the new operations assumed such diverse responsibilities as disarming combatants, repatriating refugees, instilling a respect for human rights, holding elections, and even nation-building. Some of these tasks proved exceedingly difficult and controversial. The missions also became much more
costly on both human and financial scales. For mostly political reasons, the accomplishments of United Nations peacekeeping operations were minimized and their shortcomings emphasized. In Africa and elsewhere, the United Nations Security Council has substantially scaled back the numbers of operations and Blue Helmets and has increasingly turned to others to take the lead in responding to crises in their midst.

**African Efforts to Promote Peace and Security: Numerous but Limited**

African regional and subregional organizations have made noticeable strides over the past decade in assuming primary responsibility for promoting peace and security. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has created new institutions and provided for greater financial resources to address armed conflict on the continent. The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, established in 1993, institutionalized an informal structure and gave a smaller body of member States a mandate to make decisions that previously could only be taken by consensus among all 53 members. The decision to deploy the OAU Observer Mission in the Comoros (OMIC), taken at the ambassadorial level of the Central Organ, represents an important achievement. The newly-created OAU Peace Fund has succeeded in securing crucial funding for various peace and security initiatives. The OAU Secretariat’s Conflict Management Division is slowly acquiring the skills and equipment necessary to support OAU peacekeeping initiatives.

Members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have played a pivotal peacekeeping role in the subregion through the Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Since its creation in 1990, ECOMOG has intervened militarily in three subregional conflicts—first in Liberia, then Sierra Leone, and most recently in Guinea-Bissau. In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOMOG responded when no other body was willing and proved committed to remaining engaged. Although ECOMOG did not achieve its objectives in Guinea-Bissau, it is nevertheless illustrative of the institutional progress that ECOWAS has made. Importantly, the agenda in that mission was not dictated by a single member State. The composition of the force and its adherence to a mandate are significant advances that bode well for ECOMOG’s future. Similarly, ECOWAS member States’ decision to establish the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,
and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security confirms their intention to abandon their ad hoc peacekeeping approach.

Southern African Development Community (SADC) member States have also exhibited a growing interest in responding to conflicts in their subregion. In 1996, they established a formal framework for addressing peace and security issues known as the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. Since then they have continued their efforts to resolve the impasse over the Organ’s structure and functioning. Even without a working mechanism for addressing peace and security issues, SADC members have undertaken important peacekeeping training and other capacity-building initiatives. In addition, SADC member States have fielded multinational operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Lesotho.

Several other African subregional groupings have moved towards establishing peace and security frameworks. The Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) created an informal body called the Council of Common Defence in 1990. East African Co-operation (EAC) members undertook a successful joint peacekeeping exercise in 1998 and are presently considering a draft treaty to set up the East African Community, which provides a possible basis for joint military operations. In 1999, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) established a mechanism to promote, maintain, and consolidate peace and security in their subregion known as the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX). The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has played a mediation role in Somalia and the Sudan since the early 1990s, and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) has generated financial and international political support for these efforts since its creation in 1997. The Treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defence (ANAD) has decided to form a subregional peacekeeping force.

To date, however, these African regional and subregional responses have achieved only limited success. The OAU remains saddled by its legacy of non-intervention. The Mechanism has succeeded, therefore, in ensuring that the OAU deploys peacekeepers in very few instances, and then only on a very modest scale. The financial and operational shortcomings that plagued the OAU peacekeeping initiative in Chad twenty years ago have not been overcome. Conflict prevention—rather than its management or resolution—will continue to represent the area in which consensus has the greatest chance of being attained. Election monitoring missions will continue
to be the most prevalent OAU field undertaking. Thus, even if the Conflict Management Division’s Early Warning System were to become operational, it would not likely have a profound effect on the OAU’s operational performance. Timely and appropriate decision-making is—and will remain—a much more pressing problem for the Organization to address than early warning.

Of the African subregional organizations, ECOWAS has made the most progress in fielding a credible peacekeeping force, but each of its interventions has had troubling aspects and implications. ECOMOG exacerbated the civil war in Liberia, and its involvement there contributed to the civil war in Sierra Leone. The force’s limitations in Sierra Leone have also prolonged that conflict. ECOMOG’s inability to deploy a sizeable force in a timely manner in Guinea-Bissau set the stage for the subsequent coup. In addition, a lack of adequate financial and human resources casts doubt upon the organization’s ability to fund and oversee a framework as ambitious as the proposed Mechanism. Beyond these concerns, potential troop contributors might find it less attractive to participate in an ECOMOG force that was subject to strict controls.

Although SADC members have cooperated in peacekeeping training and other capacity-building endeavours, the organization itself has been effectively sidelined in the domain of peace and security due to the non-functioning of the Organ and broader subregional tensions. Until the conflict over the Organ is conclusively resolved, subregional peacekeeping initiatives will be largely divorced from SADC. Moreover, the recent interventions of SADC members in DRC and Lesotho have exacerbated existing subregional tensions and created new ones. The military capabilities of SADC members and the political standing of South Africa on the continent make SADC potentially very significant in the domain of peace and security, but current divisions are forestalling this eventuality.

No other African subregional organization is prepared to undertake large-scale multifaceted peacekeeping operations. UMA’s Council of Common Defence has never convened, and its members have tacitly agreed not to intervene diplomatically, let alone militarily, on divisive “domestic” issues in member States. Although EAC members could conceivably field a peacekeeping operation in the near future, any such initiative would be quite limited in both scope and duration. ECCAS cannot be expected to respond
in any meaningful way to crises within and among its members. IGAD’s efforts will remain limited to mediation and negotiation. ANAD’s plans for a standby peacekeeping force are not likely to materialize in view of financial limitations and other subregional peacekeeping developments.

Recognizing that working through a regional or subregional organization is not always feasible or practical, African States have continued to intervene militarily on the continent outside of formal organizations. Like regional and subregional efforts, such interventions highlight the growing political willingness of African countries to undertake peacekeeping operations. The historical examples of the two Moroccan-led forces in Zaire, the Nigerian operation in Chad, and the military involvement of Southern African countries in Mozambique, as well as the more recent examples of the Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) in the Central African Republic (CAR) and the proposed mission in Congo (Brazzaville) show that much has and can be achieved outside of African regional and subregional organizations. As MISAB attests, an ad hoc coalition of States can make a positive contribution to regional peace and security by deploying peacekeepers.

Yet these examples of ad hoc initiatives also underscore African limitations in undertaking peacekeeping operations. In order to participate in ad hoc peacekeeping operations, African countries have typically required substantial Western assistance. When the necessary financial and logistical support is provided, African peacekeepers are largely successful. If that assistance is not given, as in the case of Congo (Brazzaville), or is withdrawn, as in the case of MISAB, African countries have not managed to assume such responsibilities themselves.

**African Peacekeeping Experience and Military Capabilities Explain Predicament**

African experience in various United Nations peacekeeping operations and Western-led multinational forces, while vast, underscores the problems they have encountered when undertaking missions on their own. African countries contributing formed units to these missions have tended to provide infantry battalions with modest assets. More often than not, they have deployed with and remained operational as a result of outside assistance. Very few African countries have provided specialized units to such
undertakings. Although African countries do not take part in United Nations peacekeeping operations for the monetary benefits—evident from their willingness to deploy troops in numerous non-UN operations—the absence of financial support severely undermines their ability to function effectively.

It follows then that many of the difficulties that African organizations and ad hoc coalitions have encountered when fielding their own forces are related to the military capabilities of participating States. Few African countries are capable of deploying a battalion for a peacekeeping operation or multinational force without significant assistance. In addition, most do not possess specialized units with sufficient equipment or expertise to provide such necessary services as engineering, communications, medical, or movement control. African countries whose militaries do possess some of these skills are hard-pressed to make them available for extended periods of time. With few exceptions, African countries cannot project force great distances. The ability to sustain a sizeable force presents a more significant obstacle. Whereas it is possible to utilize civilian assets to assist in the initial transport of troops and some matériel, it is much more difficult to redress shortcomings in command and control, logistics, and resupply. It has even proven difficult for African countries to deploy with the desired level of self-sufficiency.

Western Programmes to Develop African Capacities: A Partial Answer

The P-3 Initiative, which has since been broadened to include any interested States and brought within the United Nations framework, has fulfilled some of its objectives. A number of Western countries have begun to develop programmes to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities and to provide logistical assistance to African peacekeeping contingents. A crucial dialogue has begun between potential donor and recipient countries and organizations. Both African and non-African countries are more aware of what is needed and what is being offered. The greater degree to which this information is being made available has led to increased transparency and cooperation.

However, the desired and necessary “partnership” between Western and African countries has yet to be established. Many African States remain sceptical of Western capacity-building initiatives. The fact that the United Nations Working Group for Enhancing Peacekeeping Training Capacity in
Africa had not become operational one year after it was proposed shows Africa’s apprehension. The initial planning meeting in January 1999 reached no agreement on a mandate or terms of reference for the proposed Working Group. Subsequent meetings scheduled for May and June 1999 were postponed. The inability to designate a focal point within the United Nations has complicated matters but does not explain the failure of the Group to convene. Rather, African countries have stalled because they do not want their participation to be misinterpreted as unqualified approval for Western policies.

African countries’ concerns are understandable. The reality underlying many capacity-building initiatives is that Western countries, by and large, are unwilling to become involved militarily in African conflicts. By providing African countries with peacekeeping-related training, instruction, and equipment, Western States hope to obviate their need to intervene directly in Africa.

In order to truly make Africans more self-sufficient, the provision of peacekeeping-related equipment and logistical assistance in the field is crucial, yet these are the least developed aspects of current Western initiatives. Supplying the type and amount of military equipment as well as the level of logistical support that might enable African peacekeepers to respond effectively to crises on their continent is neither financially nor politically feasible at this time; providing low-level training and instruction is. France’s Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix (RECAMP) concept is exceptional among the most sizeable Western capacity-building initiatives in that it includes the pre-positioning of significant peacekeeping-related matériel in various locations on the African continent. The equipment that was placed outside Dakar in conjunction with Guidimakha has since been used in two peacekeeping missions. By contrast, the US furnishes only a small amount of non-lethal equipment to African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) participants and the UK provides no equipment through its Peacekeeping Training Support Programme. Many other Western capacity-building programmes also focus primarily on providing training to African troops rather than equipment.

When matériel and logistical support are forthcoming, they usually arrive only after the African force has suffered a significant setback. For example, most of the US’s support for ECOMOG’s efforts in Liberia materialized six
years into the conflict. The 1999 matching grant of US$ 16 million that the
UK made available to support Sierra Leone and ECOMOG operations was
offered after ECOMOG had suffered numerous casualties and had
threatened to withdraw.

Although the needs of African countries are well known, bilateral
Western capacity-building initiatives respond principally to domestic political
concerns, not African limitations. ACRI originated as the African Crisis
Response Force (ACRF) to permit the US to work towards resolving African
conflicts without having to commit its own troops. The largest US Defence
Department programs that provide training and education for African
recipients are designed primarily for the benefit of US armed forces. RECAMP
owes its origins in large part to France’s intention to withdraw many of its
troops stationed in Africa and achieve a cost savings while trying to retain its
influence. Financial limitations have as much to do with the Peacekeeping
Training Support Programme’s emphasis on “training the trainer” as does
coherent policy. The desire of Denmark’s Minister for Defence to carve out
a high-profile role for himself helps to explain the surprisingly large scope of
the Danish programme. Canadian support for the International Organization
of the Francophonie (OIF) and the Zambakro Peacekeeping Training School
in Côte d’Ivoire is in part based on the Québec issue. Domestic considerations
also motivate and constrain other countries actively involved in developing
African peacekeeping capabilities.

Similarly, the African capacity-building and military assistance
programmes of the multilateral organizations generally reflect the interests
and concerns of their members. Reluctant to become actively involved in
African conflicts, organizations such as the European Union (EU), the
Western European Union (WEU), the Commonwealth, and OIF have focused
their attentions on conflict prevention. They have made little concrete
progress in the way of developing African peacekeeping capabilities. Both the
EU and the WEU spoke of fielding a peacekeeping operation of their own or
providing logistical support to an African force for Eastern Zaire in late 1996,
but those plans were unrealistic given some of their members’ concerns. The
Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) contemplated
deploying a force in Guinea-Bissau, but that proposal was not viable in view
of the financial and military limitations of its members.
The implications and origins of Western policies should not detract from their merits. Indeed, current programmes have many positive aspects. Western countries have displayed a renewed (if revised) interest in Africa, and the resources they are channelling into Africa should not be dismissed. The various initiatives also impart valuable practical and theoretical skills to participants. Moreover, Western countries have proven willing to alter their programmes in response to perceived shortcomings and criticisms. Importantly, Western and African States have begun to cooperate between and among themselves on peace and security issues.

**Short- and Medium-Term Approaches Needed**

Room for improvement exists, however, and there is much that Western and African countries can do—both unilaterally and collectively—to build upon this cooperation. While Western programmes’ current emphasis on capacity-building is not without value, they represent a long-term approach at best. Col. François Dureau, the Chief of Staff of the Military Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General, supports capacity-building programmes’ goals in general but warns that too much should not be expected of them in the short term. He stresses that the time-frame for African countries and regional organizations to capably assume responsibility for peacekeeping operations on their continent is not “2, 3 or 5 years, but rather 20, 30 or 50 years.”

Recommendations for what can be done in the short and medium terms follow.

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1 Interview with Col. François Dureau, Chief of Staff, Military Adviser’s Office, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 22 June 1999, New York.
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Concerning Actions to be Taken by African States and Organizations

➢ **African States must place a greater emphasis on staffing their organizations with sufficient personnel to assume new responsibilities.**

Subregional organizations are creating mechanisms with inadequate regard for the ability to run them. In the ECOWAS Secretariat, for example, the “Department” of Legal Affairs, which has also been responsible for supporting ECOWAS peace and security initiatives, consists only of a Director and a Deputy Director. Similarly, staff of the OAU’s Conflict Management Division has not grown commensurately with the new demands it has been asked to meet. Fifteen people, including both professional and support staff, are insufficient to run the Conflict Management Centre’s 24-hour Situation Room, let alone the entire Division. African organizations must recruit and train adequate qualified personnel to handle the greater demands being placed on their secretariats.

➢ **African States need to concentrate on making incremental progress and resist the temptation to jump from one ambitious plan to another without effect.**

African regional and subregional organizations should be more pragmatic about what they can and cannot accomplish in the short and medium terms. Overly-ambitious plans divert scarce resources from more realistic projects. For example, ECCAS has created overlapping and ill-defined peace and security structures with insufficient regard for how they will operate and how its Secretariat will service them. Rather than creating new mechanisms, ECCAS members should now concentrate on making existing ones operational. In the short term, efforts to secure funding for joint peacekeeping training exercises or to establish an Early Warning Mechanism should be abandoned; member States should focus instead on developing COPAX and strengthening the ECCAS Secretariat. ECOWAS has also initiated several projects that appear far-fetched in view of present and foreseeable limitations. Its sub-Regional Security and Peace Observation System, which is to comprise four Observation Monitoring Zone field offices, seems well beyond the organization’s current capabilities, as does a standing
peacekeeping force. ECOWAS members would be better served to put such plans on hold and first concentrate on developing other aspects of the Mechanism, particularly the proposed Mediation and Security Council and numerous reforms to strengthen the Secretariat.

> **African multilateral military interventions need to be placed firmly under civilian control.**

In the past, the OAU and African subregional organizations failed to adequately supervise the military activities of member States that were ostensibly acting in their name. Designating a civilian official to oversee the mission is a possible means of addressing this deficiency. Although the OAU and ECOWAS have both assigned Special Representatives for some of their operations, they have not always been effective. Financial and other organizational constraints make it difficult to provide these officials with appropriate staff. As President Amadou Toumani Touré proved in MISAB, however, a strong-willed, active, and respected individual with an appropriate mandate can achieve much with minimal support. Ensuring that consistent communication channels are established between the Secretariat and the field—a recurring problem for the OAU and ECOWAS—could also minimize misunderstandings and promote civilian control.

> **African countries should embrace the United Nations Working Group for Enhancing Peacekeeping Training Capacity in Africa rather than find reasons to forestall it.**

Some African countries have expressed concern that the continent will be further marginalized if donor countries begin to cooperate. They reason that competition for influence makes donor countries more generous. This dynamic, which characterized many donor-recipient relationships during the cold war, is much less pronounced today. Several United Nations Member States would be willing to provide additional assistance to African countries on either a regional or a bilateral basis to develop their peacekeeping capabilities if they could target specific needs. The United Nations Working Group for Enhancing Peacekeeping Training Capacity in Africa would provide a useful forum for this dialogue to take place.
The OAU Conflict Management Division should serve as a clearing house for continental peacekeeping-related data that cannot be easily retrieved elsewhere.

Wherever possible, the Conflict Management Division should take advantage of services provided by others. For example, African military staff colleges and other institutions that provide peacekeeping training to nationals from other countries should ensure that their information is entered in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ database. The Division could provide a useful service by entering the names of personnel who successfully complete these courses into a database of potential staff for future OAU, subregional, or ad hoc operations.

The OAU should forego its stated intention to develop a standby peacekeeping force in favour of creating a standby observer group.

Given that the Central Organ is not likely to authorize a large, multidimensional peacekeeping force and that the Conflict Management Division is not appropriately staffed to support such an operation, tasking OAU members to earmark troops to form five regional brigade-sized contingents is overly ambitious. Obtaining commitments from OAU members to identify a small number of military officers who could participate in an OAU observer mission is a more realistic undertaking. Ideally, these pre-selected officers would already possess peacekeeping experience. At a minimum, all should have studied peacekeeping doctrine.

ECOWAS should create a standardized pay scale for officers, observers, formed units, and civilian police, as well as a means by which to collect and distribute funds directly to member States contributing personnel to peacekeeping operations.

The current reliance on countries contributing troops to ECOMOG operations to self-finance their participation is problematic. It has skewed the force’s composition towards wealthier countries, those that have secured bilateral aid, or those that can undertake a loss-making venture. It also encourages creative financing schemes to partially offset the force’s costs, which often adversely affect troop discipline and performance. The OAU has developed a differentiated pay scale for military observers, and MISAB employed a remuneration package that also covered formed units. These agreed-upon levels of reimbursement, which are considerably lower than
United Nations rates, could serve as useful benchmarks. Donor countries, many of which are legally prohibited from funding foreign armies or are simply disinclined to do so, might be able or willing to provide such support through a subregional organization. ECOWAS could earmark a percentage of monies received from donor countries to carry out the necessary administrative functions.

- **The SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security should function similarly to the OAU Central Organ and should be based at, and serviced by, the SADC Secretariat.**

  Resolving the long-standing impasse over the structure and functioning of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security should be SADC members’ top priority. The Organ must be made accountable to SADC and not subject to the whims of a single country. The SADC body could more closely resemble the OAU Central Organ. The SADC Summit could elect a smaller group—perhaps seven States—to serve on the organ for one-year renewable terms. Membership on the Organ should be extended automatically to the serving SADC Chair as well. It would meet at least annually at the Heads of State level, biannually at the ministerial level, and monthly at the ambassadorial level. The “Presidency” of the Organ could rotate monthly. Any decision to intervene militarily or to implement coercive means such as the imposition of sanctions would require a two-thirds majority. The Organ’s decisions on such matters should then be brought before the full membership at the SADC Summit level, but no country should be able to exercise a veto. The Summit should provide the necessary mandate and, ideally, the means for the operation. The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) should provide relevant information and expertise to the Organ and eventually be integrated into its structure.

- **In the domain of peacekeeping training, SADC member States should continue to explore the possibility of instituting a division of labour scheme in accordance with the “Nordic Model.”**

  Even without a functioning security mechanism, SADC member States have undertaken important peacekeeping training initiatives, many under the umbrella of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee. Zimbabwe initially took the lead in this regard. Since 1995, the Zimbabwe Staff College’s Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) has opened
selected courses to participants from the subregion. Other SADC members have also begun to offer peacekeeping-related training to other countries in the subregion, through their military staff colleges as well as other institutions. Given that several SADC countries have highly professional militaries and impressive United Nations peacekeeping experience, the "Nordic model" of peacekeeping training, where each country develops a particular area of peacekeeping training expertise and offers courses in that domain, is an attractive option. Because the ISDSC has requested the RPTC to coordinate and harmonize peacekeeping education and training in the SADC subregion, Zimbabwe is well placed to initiate this process.

- **ANAD member States should focus their energies on making ECOWAS more democratic and effective rather than creating autonomous mechanisms.**

The long-standing anglophone-francophone divide in West Africa is increasingly anachronistic. ECOMOG, which initially served as a tool for Nigerian foreign policy aims, has shown itself capable of being transformed into a truly regional mechanism for responding to threats to peace and security. In light of Anglo-French intentions to develop a cooperative policy towards the continent, the time has arrived for anglophone-francophone distrust among ECOMOG member States to be reduced and bridged. Given the scarcity of resources, ECOWAS, rather than ANAD, should be strengthened and reinforced as a matter of priority.

**Concerning Actions to be Taken by Non-African Countries and Organizations**

- **In the absence of a meaningful dialogue between donor and recipient countries, those providing assistance to develop African peacekeeping capacities should meet among themselves as an interim measure.**

If donor countries are better informed about their respective programmes, they are likely to use their limited funds more intelligently rather than reduce their aid. Western countries have successfully teamed up on several occasions to provide peacekeeping training. Both African and Western countries have benefited from this cooperation. The United
Kingdom is sponsoring African participants at the French-supported peacekeeping training centre in Zambakro and is also providing BMATT instructors for its courses. The United States has agreed to cover the costs for several Africans to attend the British-assisted international peace support operation (PSO) course to be held at the Ghanaian Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC) in the second half of 1999. Portugal will assist with translations for lusophone participants at seminars sponsored by the US African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), as well as with some conference documentation. Because African fears of being further marginalized should not be dismissed, however, Western countries need to be transparent in their collaboration.

- **Non-African capacity-building programmes need to more generously support the hiring and training of additional qualified personnel within African regional and subregional organizations.**

Although some non-African countries and organizations have financed additional posts within African organizations and helped train their staff, such assistance is rare and is conducted on a relatively small scale. The UK has recently agreed to fund three political desk officers at the OAU Conflict Management Centre’s Situation Centre for a three-year period. The European Union has underwritten the employment of short-term staff to assist the OAU Conflict Management Division. The United States has supported an exercise designed to test preparedness of the OAU Crisis Management Centre. Such initiatives should be expanded in order to enhance the operational capabilities of African regional and subregional organizations.

- **Donor countries should provide funding for conflict resolution efforts first and “early warning systems” second.**

At present, the greatest challenge in promoting African peace and security is to find a meaningful response to existing conflicts and working to contain them. Broadly speaking, preventive diplomacy is a worthwhile and intelligent policy option. Several programmes billed as “preventive,” however, have been oversold—particularly “early warning systems.” Yet many donor countries and organizations devote significant scarce resources to these initiatives—often at the expense of more pressing and deserving conflict resolution efforts. Providing funding for peacekeeping missions to
manage and resolve ongoing conflicts should take priority over providing funding for elaborate and expensive initiatives to collect and analyse data.

- **Western States and organizations should more freely share their data and analyses on African conflict areas with the United Nations or African regional organizations.**

Many Western States and organizations have devoted substantial resources to monitoring and analysing threats to peace and security on the African continent. Individual Western countries have shared their findings with African States and organizations—albeit rarely. This type of assistance can be extremely helpful to regional peacekeeping initiatives in Africa as evidenced in Sierra Leone, where the UK has shared intelligence with ECOMOG commanders on the ground and provided the force with detailed maps of the area. It is understandable that much of this information cannot be shared given its sensitivity and the need to protect sources. However, there is much useful information gathered that is not of a sensitive nature that nevertheless is not divulged. This describes, for example, much of the reporting and imagery on African conflicts and crises that the Western European Union Satellite Centre has produced. The WEU should consider making some of this information available to either African States and organizations or to the United Nations.

- **ACRI should engage subregional organizations directly and not limit its support to individual States on a bilateral basis.**

Working directly with subregional organizations has numerous benefits. It strengthens the role of the organizations’ secretariats, which is important given the additional responsibilities the United Nations Security Council is asking those bodies to play in the promotion of peace and security. A subregional approach could also enable countries with small military forces to receive training that might not otherwise be possible. Smaller national units could train alongside contingents from other countries. These joint units could also serve as the basis for confidence-building measures among countries that have a history of distrust.
The Brigade Staff battalion to be trained under ACRI should comprise a coalition of countries from within a region rather than a single country as initially foreseen.

The initial decision to train a Brigade Staff battalion from Ethiopia as part of ACRI was put on hold because of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war. Subsequently, both Ghana and Senegal concluded the necessary agreements to make them eligible recipients. No decision has yet been made, however, on which country is to receive such training and when the training would commence. Rather than limit its selection to a single country, the US should work towards creating a coalition of States to provide the 60 or so senior officers as well as the 300-plus strong forward support company. Countries with specialized skills, such as Namibia (deminers), but which would not be likely candidates for ACRI battalion training, could contribute cells as part of the forward support company. Ideally, the US would fund two Brigade Staff battalions: one drawing on participation from ECOWAS members, the other concentrating on the SADC subregion.

France’s programme of pre-positioning matériel in Africa to support regional peacekeeping operations should be expanded.

From its stocks in Senegal, France has provided vehicles and medical equipment to African peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic and in Guinea-Bissau. RECAMP’s long-term plans include establishing four more depots for such pre-positioned matériel—in Gabon, Djibouti, and tentatively Côte d’Ivoire and Réunion. Ideally, the depots should be spread out around the continent to better ensure the equipment’s rapid availability. It may not prove practical to pre-position equipment on Réunion, for example, given its location. If France were to develop this aspect of RECAMP in closer collaboration with African regional or subregional organizations, that might encourage other donor nations to contribute matériel to supplement France’s own supplies. The standard equipment package could also be enlarged to include greater numbers of vehicles and spare parts. Additional non-lethal supplies such as communication equipment, generators, tentage, and rations could be provided as well.
The UK’s decision to use development funds for non-military training and assistance to foreign security forces and relevant civilian bodies is a worthwhile initiative that merits replication by other countries.

The Security Sector Reform Programme of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is a bold experiment with potentially significant results for African countries. Reforming the security sector is a new domain for development agencies, which have often restricted their support to non-military undertakings. Through the DFID initiative, substantial development aid will be used to train foreign security forces with the goal of rendering them accountable to civilian democratic authorities. Although it is still too early to know whether the Security Sector Reform Programme will make a notable impact, the effort provides adequate financial means for serious programmes to be undertaken.

Concerning Actions to be Taken by the United Nations

The Security Council must provide greater oversight and guidance to regional arrangements that intervene militarily in the promotion of peace.

While it may not always be practical or possible for the Security Council to give prior authorization for a regional organization or ad hoc initiative to deploy troops, the Council should require all such undertakings to provide it with timely and relevant information on their activities and the situation on the ground. Reporting requirements should be reasonable and clearly stated. Regional forces must be better sensitized to the needs and activities of international humanitarian relief organizations that work alongside them.

The Security Council should review its practice of authorizing small military observer missions to serve alongside regional peacekeeping forces.

The deployment of United Nations military observers to complement non-UN peacekeeping forces is more likely to create new tensions than to serve as either a useful check and balance or a confidence-building measure. The regional force feels that it is being unfairly scrutinized. If the United Nations observer mission is critical in its reporting, tensions will increase.
Because the small observer mission is sometimes dependent on the larger regional mission for security, there is a tendency to withhold criticism to maintain good relations. When security is not or cannot be provided, United Nations observer missions withdraw—at great financial and political cost. Another problem of this approach is that such small, largely ineffective observer forces provide the Council with a pretext that it is meaningfully engaged in trying to resolve a conflict when it is not.

**The Security Council should authorize specialized United Nations contingents to serve within regional peacekeeping forces.**

Ask an African regional organization or a coalition of ad hoc States what kinds of United Nations assistance would best support their peacekeeping initiatives, and they are not likely to answer “military observers.” Yet that is exactly what the Council offers. Military observers respond to the Council’s concerns, not those of the regional force. What African countries lack are specialized units with sophisticated or expensive matériel, such as aircraft, communication or engineering equipment. A well-equipped and trained signals unit would be an especially welcome addition to African operations, given that such initiatives often lack reliable communication links between headquarters and contingent or sector commands. Similarly, a well-equipped logistics unit would also be helpful in light of the operational shortcomings African operations face. The command structure of the force would potentially be a delicate issue, which should be addressed prior to the force’s deployment. Under such a scenario, the Council would be making a much better investment as formed units cost the United Nations much less than similar numbers of military observers. In addition, the Council would create a more symbiotic relationship between the United Nations and the regional or ad hoc force.

**The United Nations Training Unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should be expanded to serve as a focal point to promote dialogue and transparency in the development of African peacekeeping capacities—but only if donor countries show a greater willingness to exploit it.**

The Training Unit’s emasculation (due to the departure of gratis military personnel) has hindered its ability to serve a meaningful function as a clearing house in the dissemination of peacekeeping training information. The Unit
has created a potentially useful Database of Peacekeeping Training and Initiatives in Africa but has been unable to maintain it. In addition, much of the information provided for inclusion in the Database has been of questionable utility. Courses not open to other nationals, for example, should not be listed. It is the responsibility of the country furnishing the data to include relevant information only.

**PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: CAPABILITIES AND CULPABILITIES**

In summary, the recent enthusiasm for deferring to African States and organizations to promote peace and security on their continent is misguided. While former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali accurately asserted that the United Nations “*cannot* address every potential and actual conflict [emphasis added],” it is important to stress that the Security Council *no longer tries* to address many potential and actual conflicts. The Council’s reliance on burden-sharing is particularly troubling as concerns Africa, where the demand for peacekeepers is arguably the greatest and the indigenous supply faces the most obstacles. Secretary-General Kofi Annan was correct to point out that the United Nations “lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa.” Yet the same might be said—only more so—of its new African “partners.” African organizations and ad hoc undertakings face many of the same challenges as United Nations peacekeeping operations plus numerous additional obstacles. African and Western efforts to develop African peacekeeping capabilities provide a basis upon which to build, but the United Nations Security Council must also reassert itself in peacekeeping on the continent.
# Annex A

## African Participation in OAU Operations

(as of 30 June 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Chad</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
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<td>1981-1982</td>
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<td>Zaire (now DRC)</td>
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**The OAU does not consider the 1980 African peacekeeping force in Chad to be an "OAU" operation.**

**OMIB’s military observers left the mission by August 1996. The mission continues with a few civilian political officers.**
Annex B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country*</th>
<th>Liberia 1990 to date</th>
<th>Sierra Leone 1997 to date</th>
<th>Guinea-Bissau 1998 - 1999</th>
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<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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* All 16 ECOWAS member States are listed—even though four of them have never contributed troops—along with Tanzania and Uganda, which supplied formed units to ECOMOG in Liberia.

** Senegal and Guinea, which had sent troops in support of the Government of Guinea-Bissau in response to the attempted coup in June 1998, were forbidden to take part in the ECOMOG peacekeeping force under the terms of the November 1998 Abuja Accord.
Annex C

AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN SADC OPERATIONS
(as of 30 June 1999)

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* All 14 SADC member States are listed—even though nine of them have never contributed troops—along with Chad and the Sudan, which supplied formed units in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on the side of the pro-government SADC multinational force.
### Annex D

**AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN OTHER AFRICAN-LED OPERATIONS**

(as of 30 June 1999)

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AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (1 OF 5)
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* Mali and Senegal were part of the Mali Federation during ONUC.
## Annex E

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**AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (3 OF 5)**

(as of 30 June 1999)

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AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (4 OF 5)
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Total: 4 4 0 11 6 6 4 11 4 3

* See next page.
The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) received Security Council authorization on 10 June 1999. (UN Document S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999.) As of 1 August 1999, military observers from Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia had arrived in Kosovo as part of UNMIK. (Written correspondence with Lt-Col. Carlos Alonso Ausin, Military Adviser’s Office, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 30 August 1999.) Information as of 30 June was not available.
Annex F

AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN NON-AFRICAN-LED MULTINATIONAL FORCES
(as of 30 June 1999)

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* In June 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed that these five African countries would be among 28 States to comprise the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), which is not a UN peacekeeping operation technically-speaking. It was not possible to ascertain if the police officers had arrived by 30 June.
The following study was conducted by DFI International for the US Department of Defense as part of the latter's efforts to develop the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The report, which has not been widely disseminated, is therefore of particular relevance to this book. For the purposes of information and debate, UNIDIR thought it would be useful to provide the 19 country-specific case studies that DFI included in their briefing. UNIDIR appreciates DFI's willingness to share its research, which was completed in October 1997. The contents of the studies are the sole responsibility of DFI, and they should not be taken to reflect the views of the authors, UNIDIR, or the United Nations.
African Capabilities for Peace Operations:
An Assessment in Support of the African
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)

DFI International
for
OSD/ISA/Africa Region

17 October 1997

Required Disclaimer
The views, opinions, and findings contained in this briefing are those of the authors and
should not be construed as an official Department of Defense position, policy, or
decision, unless so designated by other documentation.
**KEY**

- ✓ = Can Contribute in the Short Term
- + = Threshold Capability (Requires Augmentation)
- ■ = Weak Capability
- ? = Unclear Capability
Glossary

AIDS    Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
AIFV   armored infantry fighting vehicle
APC    armored personnel carrier
BAe    British Aerospace
BDF    Botswana Defense Force
BDU    battle dress uniform
C2     command and control
CA     civil affairs
CAR    Central African Republic
CO     Commanding Officer
COIN   counter-insurgency
CPX    command post exercise
DHC    de Havilland Aircraft of Canada
E-1    (a US rating for enlisted men)
E-2    (a US rating for enlisted men)
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group
EDA    Excess Defense Articles
FM     frequency modulation
FN     Fabrique Nationale
helo   helicopter
HET    Heavy Equipment Transporter
HF     high frequency
HIV    Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HMMWV  Highly-Mobile Multiple-Wheeled Vehicle
HQ     headquarters
IAI    Israeli Aircraft Industries
incl.  including
IFOR   Implementation Force
IMET   International Military Education and Training
ISA    International Security Affairs
JCET   Joint/Combined Exchange Training
MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MISAB  Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements
mm     millimeter
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>military police</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NB</td>
<td>Nota Bene</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>non-commissioned officer</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>Non-combatant Evacuation Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>UN Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>peacekeeping operation</td>
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<td>PLAN</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army of Namibia</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<td>PsyOps</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
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<td>recce</td>
<td>reconnaissance</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>rocket-propelled grenade</td>
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<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South Africa National Defense Force</td>
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<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People's Organization</td>
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<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>UN Angola Verification Mission</td>
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<td>UN Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>UN Protection Force</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>UN Transitional Authority for Cambodia</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded ordnance</td>
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<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>very high frequency</td>
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<td>VIP</td>
<td>very important person</td>
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### Criteria Used in State-Level Analyses

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Criteria Used in State-Level Analyses</th>
<th>INFANTRY</th>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES</th>
<th>SIGNALS</th>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ</th>
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</table>
| Personnel Performance                | • Professionalism, integrity, and initiative of officer corps.  
• Unit cohesion, professionalism, and discipline of infantry forces.  
• Ability to perform basic infantry tasks and operate in a coordinated manner at the battalion level. | Basic Equipment | • Availability of soldier kit, other personal weapons, and support equipment (tentage, ammunition, etc.). | Size of Force | • Ability to provide sizeable infantry contribution without detrimental effects to national security. |
| Basic Equipment                      | • Availability of soldier kit, other personal weapons, and support equipment (tentage, ammunition, etc.). | GROUND TRANSPORT | • Ability to provide personnel and equipment (trucks, jeeps, etc.) to serve as the transport contingent for a sustained peace or humanitarian operation. | AIR SERVICES | • Ability to provide sustained transportation of personnel and equipment (fixed wing and helo) to a peace or humanitarian operation.  
• NB: no more than 2 African countries can provide sustained airlift to an African peace operation. |
| Engineer Services                    | • Demining: operational experience and availability of demining equipment.  
• Other: ability to perform other engineer tasks such as construction, bridging, and water provision. | ENGINEER SERVICES | SIGNALS | • Ability to provide command and control for a brigade-sized element while interfacing with other forces in a multinational operation. | LOGISTICS | • Ability to sustain forces during foreign deployments. |
| Logistics                            | MISSION/FORCE HQ |  • Ability to deploy equipment and staff for a mission headquarters (brigade-level and above) for a multinational operation. |  |  |  |  |  |
Botswana

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<th>INFANTRY</th>
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**Personnel Performance**

- Generally a highly professional, well-trained military.
  - Good unit cohesion. No problems with corruption.
  - Follows ROE precisely.
  - Decent performance in UNOSOM II, ONUMOZ.
- US, UK, Dutch, German, and Indian training both in-country and abroad.
- Reportedly have experience with COIN operations, VIP protection, patrolling, and operating with police.
  - Professional handling of civil disobedience/crowd control observed.
- Renowned tracking skills
- Relatively good health; soldiers and junior officers must meet minimum fitness standards modelled on SANDF requirements. Government health programs in evidence.

**Basic Equipment**

- Basic soldier kit is relatively complete.
- Basic equipment and personal weapons are ten to fifteen years old. Weapons, however, are well maintained.
- Units are relatively well equipped to function in the field.
  - Tentage and other basic support equipment are readily available.
  - Mobile mess facilities and power generators are issued at the battalion level.
- Availability of unit support assets such as freezing facilities, ration storage vehicles, and mobile shower units is considered poor.
- Military is equipped with stun grenades, CS canisters, and other materials for crowd control.

**Officers**

- Education: ten years of formal education is the norm.
  - Although there is no formal military academy, many officers attend US or other foreign staff colleges.
- English skills are high among both officers and NCOs.
- CPX are conducted at the battalion level and below.
- Highly centralized decision-making structure limits NCO initiative:
  - Cleavages between officers and enlisted corps. NCOs generally control; they do not lead.
  - Some privates display better leadership than NCOs.
- Education: ten years of formal education is the norm.
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  - Some privates display better leadership than NCOs.

**Size of Force**

- Active Army: 7,000
  - 2 brigades
  - In addition: commando squadron, presidential guard, and SSG (paramilitary).
- Active Air Force: 500
- Police Mobile Unit: 1,000
Botswana (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Relatively well-equipped, but small, pool of trucks and APCs.</td>
<td>• Small air force, but improving. Some US pilot training.</td>
<td>• Demining: little experience or capabilities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Good maintenance system. Serviceability of equipment ranges form 50-70%.</td>
<td>• Possess French-built, modern, well-equipped airfield.</td>
<td>• Engineering company attached to each brigade; limited to supporting combat forces in the field.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• New procurements include pick-up trucks and 5-ton trucks.</td>
<td>• 2 US-supplied C-130s, one is in disrepair.</td>
<td>• Some bridging, road construction, and water purification capability.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Self-deployed 2 battalions internally to Namibian border as a show of force.</td>
<td>• Self-deployed by air to ONUMOZ. However, longer distance deployments would be a problem.</td>
<td>• Little camp construction capability/equipment.</td>
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<td>• Rely on contractors.</td>
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<td>• NCO-level demolitions experience.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS</th>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Some C² capability for battalion-size units while interfacing in brigade-size operations.</td>
<td>• Logistics network designed to support companies in the field within Botswana.</td>
<td>• Operational HQs are deployed in each military district within Botswana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The BDF required support for higher level signals in UNOSOM II and ONUMOZ.</td>
<td>• – Heavy reliance on contractors.</td>
<td>• Could deploy a HQ unit abroad, albeit in piecemeal manner.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• FM radios down to the company level.</td>
<td>• Capacity to support operations outside of country is doubtful.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Some burst transmissions capability.</td>
<td>• UN provided BDF logistics during ONUMOZ.</td>
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*DFI International-For Circulation*
Egypt

**INFANTRY**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Personnel Performance</strong></th>
<th><strong>Basic Equipment</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>- Well-trained and well-supplied professional force that can execute corps level operations in a coordinated manner.</td>
<td>- Basic kit is complete and includes uniform, load bearing equipment, AK-47 and ammunition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Military is experienced with a wide range of operations, including multinational peace operations: – Participated in UNOSOM II, MINURSO, ONUMOZ, UNPROFOR, and UNAMIR under the UN; contributed two heavy divisions to Operation Desert Storm. – Questionable performance of some units in UNPROFOR.</td>
<td>- Egypt produces and co-produces weapons systems as well as spare parts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The military is attempting to increase interoperability with NATO forces.</td>
<td>- Wide variety of Eastern and Western equipment in use in the military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Have night operations capability and equipment.</td>
<td>- Full interoperability with US and NATO equipment does not exist yet, but is improving markedly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Health of the force is very good.</td>
<td>- Older Russian and Eastern Bloc equipment is not well maintained due to a lack of spare parts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Officers**

- Decision-making is highly concentrated within the senior officer corps. Junior officers either do not, or are not permitted to, display much initiative.
- Most officers have at least two years of advanced professional training or education.
- Many officers have received additional foreign training through IMET.
- NCOs receive specialized and command school training, but do not have a leadership or decision-making role. Most NCOs are given very rigid and specialized tasks.

**Size of Force**

- Active Army: 310,000
  - 4 armoured divisions
  - 7 mechanized infantry divisions
  - 1 infantry division
- Active Air Force: 30,000
- National Guard: 60,000
Egypt (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT (✔)</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES (✔)</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES (✔/✔)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Large number and wide array of trucks from both Eastern and Western sources. The Army has recently acquired US trucks.</td>
<td>• Air force is equipped for a wide range of missions and has an aerial refuelling capability.</td>
<td>• Have experience with demining both inside and outside of Egypt. Possess necessary equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have numerous APCs, including US-made M113A2s, Russian BTR-50s and OT-62s, as well as Egyptian-made Fahds.</td>
<td>• Large inventory of transport aircraft and modern airfields. Most aircraft are Western in origin.</td>
<td>• Capable engineer corps that can perform a wide range of services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Very large tank fleet includes US M60A3s and over 1,600 Russian T-54s, T-55s, and T-62s.</td>
<td>• Successfully deployed forces to Operation Desert Storm using its own air transport assets.</td>
<td>• Have both road and refugee camp construction capabilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS (✔)</th>
<th>LOGISTICS (✔)</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ (✔)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Capability to provide C^2 for a brigade-size contingent while interfacing with other forces in a multinational operation.</td>
<td>• Limited, but adequate, logistics capabilities.</td>
<td>• 3 Army Headquarters Units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have fixed signals network which is mobile inside Egypt but not deployable outside of the country.</td>
<td>• Logistics poses a problem in terms of planning and rationing necessary supplies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Eritrea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Performance</th>
<th>Basic Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Former guerrilla force in the process of becoming more regular and professional.  
  - Efficient and disciplined forces, although they have received little formal training. Leadership positions attained through experience.  
  - Personnel demonstrate a high degree of initiative in combat.  
  - Some women remain in combat positions.  
  - No peace operations experience to date.  
  - Interoperability with Ethiopia, from which it seceded in 1993, is high. Relations are surprisingly positive.  
  - Two-year military service is required. Most soldiers perform non-military tasks.  
  - Strong CA/PsyOps capabilities exist. | Basic soldier kit is not very advanced.  
  - Well-equipped with personal weapons and ammunition, but all other types and levels of equipment are uneven.  
  - On average, soldiers have several AK-47s each.  
  - Almost every soldier has at least one uniform; some may have more.  
  - Very few tents (about 500 provided from US drawdown equipment).  
  - Overall maintenance capabilities are excellent. |
| Officers | Size of Force |
| No staff colleges or other learning institutions currently exist. Six to eight IMET students are instructed each year.  
  - Among the officer corps, English language skills are good; they are fair to moderate among the lower ranks.  
  - No developed NCO corps exists yet. | Active Army: 60,000  
  - 30,000 to 40,000 core combat troops  
  - Although order of battle data are limited, there are at least three divisions  
  - Remaining troops are conscripts engaged in nation-building activities | Active Navy: small, probably fewer than 1,000 officers and men.  
  - Active Air Force: small, probably fewer than several hundred. |
**Eritrea (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Unable to deploy by land or contribute ground transport. Regiments lack motorized transport.</td>
<td>• No real transport or self-deployment capability. One major airbase; no civilian air transport.</td>
<td>• One demining company (of three) and one training cadre are fully operational. More than 10,000 UXOs demined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• US provided 120 vehicles for demining, many of which have been commandeered for other uses.</td>
<td>• Limited air assets: 4 Harbin Y-12 transports; 1 IAI 1125 Astra VIP; 2 ex-Ethiopian Navy helicopters; light utility aircraft.</td>
<td>• Very well supplied with European and US equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Older Soviet tanks and armoured vehicles are not well maintained due to a lack of spare parts.</td>
<td>• Ongoing pilot training in Ethiopia, but little experience.</td>
<td>• Otherwise rudimentary engineering skills only; some construction experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civilian trucking capability does exist, but most likely would not be available for external use.</td>
<td>• 1996 contract with an Italian firm for 6 MB-339 FD trainers; delivery expected in 1997.</td>
<td>• Widespread lack of equipment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS</th>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• High priority placed on upgrading and standardizing communication capabilities.</td>
<td>• No real logistics capability. Non-conventional (inventive) means of supplying troops in past military operations.</td>
<td>• Good leadership with experienced combat commanders. However, formal organization into deployable units seems limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limited battalion-level capability.</td>
<td>• Former Soviet, Eastern Bloc, PRC, and US-supplied equipment is often in disrepair.</td>
<td>• No experience dealing with civilians or NGOs, except for the demining team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• US provided 220 FM and 22 HF radios.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ethiopia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFANTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel Performance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Extensive combat experience from recent civil wars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Military integration of former rebels and government factions continues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Some prejudice against Soviet-trained officers may exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Very good performance in UNAMIR, with UN logistical support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Average soldier’s performance is equivalent to US E-1 or E-2. Motivation is very high, despite poor salaries. Most seek continued training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Forces train regularly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Limited night operations capability; no equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Health: generally a problem (e.g. TB).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Officers**

- Education: formerly possessed extensive network of academies and training schools; current status is uncertain.  
  - Very high willingness to learn, but poor conceptual skills.  
  - Most officers do not speak English.  
  - Strong instructor skills.  
- Rank system is still undergoing change.  
- Former government soldiers accustomed to Soviet-style decision-making.  
  - Hesitant NCO corps defers decisions to officers and exhibits minimal initiative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Limited supply in certain basic equipment areas, e.g.:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Shortages of basic uniforms and boots are apparent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Uneven kit provided to soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No generators or field equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Well-equipped with ageing infantry weapons and ammunition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Running out of Soviet-supplied equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Maintenance is limited by lack of spare parts, supplies, and available technicians. There is no accountability system for most equipment and supplies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Size of Force**

- Active Army: 120,000 (estimated, 1993)  
  - 6-14 infantry divisions with 4 brigades  
  - 7 para-commando battalions  
- Air Force: 5,000-6,000 (estimated)
Ethiopia (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT (👁)</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES (👁)</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES (👁👁)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Despite large fleet, most ground transport assets are Soviet-made and in disrepair. Others are French, Japanese, Italian, and US in origin.  
• Lack of spare parts and trained maintenance personnel are big problems.  
• Receiving 100 US vehicles in 1997 through EDA. | • Most military aircraft are inoperable due to shortages in supplies, spare parts, and qualified maintenance crews.  
• In-country training for MiG pilots.  
• Self-deployed to UNAMIR with aid of civilian airline; may not be willing to rely on that again.  
• Some well-trained pilots with night flight capabilities.  
• Have air assault capabilities. | • Demining: possess decent equipment and experience in demining operations. Have not sustained training absent US personnel.  
• One unit, without much heavy equipment.  
• Demonstrated capability to construct refugee camps and bridges.  
• Commercial water purification capabilities.  
• NCO-level demolitions experience.  
• Often contract construction to competent civilians. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS (👁)</th>
<th>LOGISTICS (👁)</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ (👁)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Capability to execute C² functions for a battalion-size unit while interfacing with other battalions in a brigade-size operation.  
• Units independently communicated with Addis Ababa during UNAMIR, but very poorly.  
• Equipment includes PRC-77s, FM radios down to company level, but no batteries. | • Capability to sustain forces above the company level is marginal.  
• Distribution problems hinder in-country operations and training.  
• Highly bureaucratic system slows response time. | • Unclear capability. However, the Ethiopian military has conducted very large combined-arms operations on its own territory. |

*DFI International-For Circulation*
**Gabon**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFANTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel Performance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Somewhat professional force with extremely limited resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limited peacekeeping experience. Currently contributing well-regarded observer contingent, including CO to MISAB (CAR).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• French influence remains strong; command and rank structure (and uniforms) follow the French model, – France maintains its own 600-man force in Libreville to help maintain stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The 600-man Presidential Guard is a well-trained, well-armed regiment with some experience guarding VIPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Officers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Senior officers are well regarded. Many attend French-run staff colleges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• French is widely used. English is limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No IMET or other US security assistance programs at present, but French presence is widespread.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Women serve as junior officers and NCOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Some reports of corporal punishment against junior enlisted officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Equipment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Basic soldier kit is comprised of French hand-me-downs, although it is often incomplete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• France equipped observer contingent in MISAB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Weapons are dated and often inoperable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Active Army: 3,000-4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 1 Presidential Guard battalion (incl. 1 recce/armor company, 3 infantry companies, artillery and anti-air companies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 8 infantry companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 1 paratroop/commando company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 1 artillery battery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 1 engineer company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 1 signals company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 1 army aviation squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– logistic group in Libreville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Active Air Force: 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Active Navy: 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gendarmerie: 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUND TRANSPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • Equipped with French-built recce vehicles, APCs, AIFVs. | • Air Force has one fighter squadron with 2 Mirage 5G; 4 Glls and 3 Mirage 5DG trainers. Also, 1 EMB-111 in a maritime reconnaissance role. | • Have reportedly purchased anti-personnel mines.  
– However, demining experience and capabilities appear limited. |
|                   | • Some heavy and light transport aircraft and helicopters: 3 C-130s (2 operational), 4-5 Gazelles, 3-4 Alouettes, 2 Pumas.  
• Presidential Guard aircraft includes transports and helicopters.  
• Maintenance is good. Pilots are well trained. | • Possess designated engineer company.  
• Some construction capabilities. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS</th>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Capability unclear. | • Apparently, very limited capabilities.  
• Rely on France for logistics support in MISAB.  
• Possess one logistics group. | • Extremely limited capability.  
• Personnel currently operating in MISAB HQ on French guidance. |
Ghana

### INFANTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Performance</th>
<th>Basic Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The Ghanaian Army is widely respected as very professional and disciplined.  
Army physical endurance standards are high.  
Extensive experience in UN and multinational peacekeeping operations, including ECOMOG, MINURSO, UNOSOM II, and ONUMOZ. Almost one-third of its troops are engaged in peace operations at any given time.  
- Performance under fire in ECOMOG was poor. | The basic kit is relatively complete.  
Personal weapons are mainly Western origin.  
Units are supplied with tentage and packs, but power generators are in limited supply. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Size of Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Officers are promoted on a merit-based system and are considered to be a very professional corps.  
The military operates a staff college that is highly regarded. Many officers attend US and UK training institutions.  
NCO performance is strong. NCOs train with officers and are well regarded by their troops. | Active Army: 5,000-6,000  
- 2 infantry brigades  
- 1 artillery regiment  
- 1 field engineer regiment  
- 1 airborne force  
- 1 reconnaissance regiment  
Active Air Force: 1,000  
People’s Militia: 5,000 |
Ghana (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Limited ground transportation assets are further constrained by the army’s difficulty in gaining gasoline supplies.</td>
<td>• Some ability to deploy forces at moderate distances.</td>
<td>• No demining capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civilian trucks and buses are used by the military when necessary.</td>
<td>• Limited military air assets consist of 4 Skyvan SC-7s, 2 Islander BN-2A9s, and 5 Fokker F-27s.</td>
<td>• Engineering personnel lack basic math skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Self-deployed to ECOMOG and had reliable land transportation assets.</td>
<td>• Ghana Airways has an inventory of large commercial planes that helped deploy their forces in Liberia.</td>
<td>• Possess water purification and bridging equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Capable of road and camp construction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS</th>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Capability to execute C² for a battalion-size unit while interfacing with other battalions in a brigade-size operation.</td>
<td>• Sustained a brigade-sized force during ECOMOG, which included 2 battalions plus a battalion equivalent of artillery and armor.</td>
<td>• Many officers have foreign training and/or extensive experience in PKO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Equipment is reliable and deployable.</td>
<td>• Serious lack of spare parts, fuel and other supplies has caused soldiers to buy from the local economy.</td>
<td>• Experience as headquarters unit in ECOMOG.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*DFI International-For Circulation*
Kenya

**Personnel Performance**

- Very professional, disciplined army despite tribal cleavages.
  - However, excessive bureaucracy limits efficacy.
- Experienced with multinational peacekeeping operations, including UNTAC, IFOR, UNPROFOR, the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe (1980), and the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad in 1981-1982.
  - However, performance in UNPROFOR was poorly regarded.
- Some past experience with a large combined-arms combat operation integrated with air power on its Somali border.
- Capabilities for night operations exist, but not the will to use them.
- Health: extremely high HIV rate.

**Officers**

- Quality of Kenyan military staff college is high. Lieutenants' and captains' courses, and a commissioning course.
- Nascent National Defense College facilities currently unoccupied.
- High level of IMET participation, and UK-sponsored training.
- NCOs are considered very capable, but there is significant reliance on officers.

**Basic Equipment**

- The basic kit is relatively complete and includes load-bearing equipment, personal rifle, complete uniform, and canteen. However, supplies are limited.
- Most weapons are from NATO suppliers and are interoperable with US and NATO standard equipment.
- Have power generation equipment, but is poorly maintained.
- Personal weapons maintenance capabilities are fair.

**Size of Force**

- Active Army: 20,500
  - 1 armored brigade
  - 2 infantry brigades
  - 1 engineer brigade
  - 1 airborne battalion
  - 3 independent air cavalry battalions (with 36-38 helos total)
- Active Air Force: 4,000
- Police General Service Unit: 5,000
Kenya (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT (✔)</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES (gradable)</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES (gradable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - Transport corps with distinct school of transport.  
- Transport battalion with 400+ vehicles.  
  - Includes 30-50 heavy equipment transporters (HETs).  
  - Mercedes 2.5-, 5-, and 10-ton trucks.  
  - Other assets: Land Rovers, Toyotas, Jeeps.  
- Kenya has prioritized procuring more APCs, which will likely occur within the next few years.  
- Lack of spare parts, especially batteries and tires. | - Military air assets include 3 DHC-8s, 9 DHC-5D Buffaloes, and Dornier D0-27 Skyservant.  
- Air assets are not well maintained and only a limited support infrastructure exists. Shortages of fuel limit airborne operations.  
- Kenya Airways has a small fleet of commercial aircraft, including: 3 A-310s, 2 B-737s and 3 Fokker 50s.  
- 3 independent air cavalry battalions (with 36-38 helos total). | - Demining: rudimentary capability. Demining is taught at Engineer Schools.  
- Dedicated engineer brigade with 3 battalions (2 operable) and a water-drilling squadron.  
- Military operates an engineering school.  
- Skilled at refugee camp construction due to experience gained from Somali, Sudanese, and Ugandan refugee flows into Kenya.  
- Military has bridging and water purification capabilities. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS (gradable)</th>
<th>LOGISTICS (gradable)</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ (gradable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - Limited capability to execute C^2 for battalion-sized units while interfacing with other battalions in a brigade-size operation. Limited in-country communications architecture.  
- Outdated HF equipment of European origin. | - Follow UK planning guidelines.  
- Extremely limited ability to sustain forces outside of its borders.  
- Unit-level logistics only. | - Deployed 1,100-troop task force to Yugoslavia for limited mission.  
  - Performed combat intelligence well.  
- Rudimentary coordination between air and ground assets in combat operations. |
### Malawi

#### INFANTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Performance</th>
<th>Basic Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Professional and disciplined military force which is not paid on a regular basis.</td>
<td>- Basic equipment is often in short supply. Most soldiers have uniforms, although they do not necessarily match.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Military has received peace operations training from US JCET program and has operational experience in UNAMIR and UNAVEM.</td>
<td>- Little interoperability with Western forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Defense budget cuts have resulted in a suspension of training, which could result in the erosion of the military's capabilities.</td>
<td>- Mix of dated and new weaponry. Ammunition is scarce.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Current UK training in MP operations.</td>
<td>- Tentage and power generation equipment is procured from the West, but is in short supply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Substantial health problems (especially AIDS), although a PT standard exists for elite forces.</td>
<td>- Although it lacks spare parts and supplies, the military can perform on-site maintenance when necessary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Officers**

- Officers are required to have 8 years of formal education and attend a commissioning course. There is an in-country staff college, though reportedly in name only.
- A significant percentage of the officers received US, UK, or German training.
- Corruption is found at the higher levels of the officer corps.
- NCOs generally have poor leadership skills. Some are US-trained.
- English skills are high among officer and NCO corps, but vary within the ranks.
- Ethnic cleavages may affect decision-making processes and C3.

#### Size of Force

- Active Army: 8,000
  - 3 infantry battalions
  - 1 airborne battalion
- Army air wing of 200 troops, but no separate Air Force
- Mobile Police Force: 1,500
## Malawi (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - Small pool of Land Rovers and older trucks.  
- No operable APCs. Spare parts are in short supply and maintenance is a problem.  
- During the Mozambique civil war, the Malawi Army deployed 1,200 troops to Mozambique to guard the rail lines.  
- Very small pool of qualified mechanics. | - Small force that suffers from numerous maintenance problems and is not capable of troop transport or logistic support.  
- Helo force includes several Pumas.  
- Airborne units received extensive training from the US, UK and RSA.  
- Small national airline with few planes. | - Demining: have crude demining techniques.  
- Rudimentary engineering skills in light construction.  
- Lack bridging capability and heavy equipment. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS</th>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - Battalion-level internal communication.  
- Have FM, HF, fax and land lines for communication. Can maintain 24-hour links, but not encryption.  
- Signals equipment is Western origin.  
- New PRC-77 radios down to the platoon level | - Poor logistics and force sustainment capabilities. | - Minimal to no capability for deployable headquarters. |
## Mali

### INFANTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Performance</th>
<th>Basic Equipment</th>
<th>Size of Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• It does not appear that the military trains on a regular basis. In general, troops appear to be poorly organized and lethargic.</td>
<td>• Uniforms, boots, and personal kits are in short supply. No soldier has more than one uniform. Canteens are particularly scarce. Holland and Germany financed Malian participation in ECOMOG.</td>
<td>• Active Army: 5,200-7,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• All units believed to be understrength, operating at 50-70%. – Program under way to integrate Tuareg officers, but some cleavages still exist.</td>
<td>• Ammunition is not available due to the destruction of in-country stores.</td>
<td>– 3-4 infantry battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Para-commando battalion is well-regarded, but unlikely to be contributed.</td>
<td>• Personal weapons (AK-47s, RPKs, PKMs) are dated, magazines are extremely limited. Cleaning kits are non-existent.</td>
<td>– 1 special forces battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contributed troops to UNAMIR, MISAB (CAR), and UNAVEM. Ad hoc combined battalion of more than 600 infantry, medical, communications, and maintenance troops contributed to ECOMOG in 1997.</td>
<td></td>
<td>– 2 armored battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• English and French language skills are very limited at soldier level.</td>
<td></td>
<td>– 1 tank battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reluctant to conduct night operations.</td>
<td></td>
<td>– 1-2 artillery battalions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Officers

- High degree of respect for civil authority. Leadership skills are mixed.
- An officers’ training school exists in Koti and an academy at Bamako. Six years of education is required for officers in theory, but not always in practice.
- Significant bureaucracy impedes C2 and limits initiative. Some rivalry exists between officer and NCO corps. NCOs lack training.
- Mixture of Soviet, French, and US training limits coherence of doctrine.
- English skills are limited among both officers and NCOs.
Mali (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Vehicles include old Soviet tanks, BRDMs, APCs, Land Cruisers, Toyota pick-up trucks, and Chinese-made transport trucks in varied states of repair.</td>
<td>• Has not self-deployed for PKO.</td>
<td>• No demining capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Vehicle operability rates are extremely low.</td>
<td>• Major airport split between military and civilian usage.</td>
<td>• Capabilities limited. Evidently rely on civil contractors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Possess several MiGs, helos and (1 DC-3) transport planes, but many are poorly serviced.</td>
<td>• Possess one engineer company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 3 O-2 surveillance aircraft used for biodiversity projects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Recently procured several C-47s for evacuation and disaster response.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS</th>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Battalion-level capability.</td>
<td>• Poor logistics capabilities.</td>
<td>• Officers evidently have limited experience in organizing into functional staff roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Some platoons are equipped with PRC-77s, but there are few batteries.</td>
<td>• Relied on other forces to supply food and water in ECOMOG.</td>
<td>– Decision-making by committee is typical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• French radio equipment exists down to squad level.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Some HF capabilities at commander level.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DFI International-For Circulation
**Morocco**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Performance</th>
<th>Basic Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Highly trained, professional military force with very good unit cohesion.</td>
<td>• Force is well-equipped with basic equipment and personal weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Experience in peace operations including UNOSOM II, UNAVEM, UNTAC, and IFOR.</td>
<td>• Moroccans brought their own equipment to UNOSOM II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Extensive experience with COIN operations and operations against the Polisario in Western Sahara.</td>
<td>• Maintenance capabilities are very good.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Participated in Operation Desert Storm.</td>
<td>• Personal weapons are primarily Western in origin, but include domestically produced 9mm pistols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Armed forces are reluctant to perform night operations, although they possess the necessary equipment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Officers**

• Highly educated and professional officer corps.
• Officers receive extensive training at specialized academies, training facilities, the staff college, and at foreign institutions.
• The military is integrating US methods of training into the curriculum.
• NCOs receive technical training but are not given leadership or decision-making roles.

**Size of Force**

- Active Army: 175,000
  - 3 mechanized infantry brigades
  - 2 parachute brigades
  - 12 independent artillery battalions
  - 7 independent engineer battalions
  - 37 independent infantry battalions
  - 10 independent armoured battalions
  - 1 independent air defense group
- Active Air Force: 13,500
- Gendarmerie: 12,000
Morocco (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles are well maintained and there is no problem with spare parts for the Western equipment.</td>
<td>Aircraft are mainly procured from the West and include many modern fixed-wing and helicopters. The inventory is well maintained and interoperable with Western equipment. Several Moroccan airfields have been refurbished to accommodate large transport aircraft.</td>
<td>Extensive mine experience in the Western Sahara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks are procured from a variety of sources, but are mainly Western in origin. Numerous wheeled- and tracked-APCs are also primarily of Western origin.</td>
<td>Have a capable engineer corps which can perform a wide range of combat support operations. Army has 7 well-equipped engineer battalions. Capabilities include water purification, bridging, and road and refugee camp construction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS</th>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capability to provide C² for a brigade-size contingent while interfacing with other forces in a multinational operation. Use HF radios of Western origin.</td>
<td>Have a dedicated logistics battalion which can sustain deployed forces. Operational experience sustaining forces in the Western Sahara. Moroccan logistics in UNOSOM II were provided by the UN.</td>
<td>Capabilities unclear.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Namibia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFINITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel Performance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Somewhat professional force that is paid, fed, and clothed, but basic skills are limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Some ethnic divisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Current military is a combination of former adversaries (SWATF and PLAN), although there is still some reliance on the former guerrilla structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Performed well in UNAVEM and UNTAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Significant experience in domestic police security operations. Undertake patrols with police counterparts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Extensive deficiencies in training and education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No staff colleges/academies. Limited training from the US, UK, and Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- English language skills are mediocre at all levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Troops suffer from a range of chronic ailments including AIDS, malaria, and river blindness (some of which were contracted during the guerrilla era).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Alcoholism is a growing problem among the ranks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Officers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Recent officer turnover (retirement, etc.) may lead to more effective leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Relations between officer and enlisted corps are good, although officers sometimes feel threatened by progressive NCOs. Socialization between ranks, however, is extremely limited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Basic soldier kit is relatively complete, with a mixture of US and former Soviet supplies. |
* Relatively new uniforms. |
* Personal weapons and crew-served weapons are surplus SWAPO or UK-supplied (BDUs, AK-47s, TT 33 pistols, RPGs). |
* All 60 of the troops that participated in UNTAC were fully equipped. |

**Size of Force**
* Active Army: 8,000 |
  - 1 elite presidential guard battalion |
  - 4 motorized infantry battalions (questionable capability) |
  - 1 combat support battalion/brigade |
  - 1 logistic support brigade |
  - anti-tank, field artillery, reconnaissance, engineering and air defense elements at company strength |
* Active Air Force: strength unknown
**Namibia (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>GROUND TRANSPORT</strong></th>
<th><strong>AIR SERVICES</strong></th>
<th><strong>ENGINEER SERVICES</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle maintenance is a low priority. Budgeting generally does not include set-asides for replacement parts.</td>
<td>No ability to deploy by air.</td>
<td>Demining capability and experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several hundred South African-built APCs.</td>
<td>Two major airfields.</td>
<td>Trained engineer company exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some South African, German, and British trucks, Range Rovers, T-34s and T-54/55s of dubious serviceability.</td>
<td>Two presidential aircraft of limited use. 6 Cessnas, 3 helos.</td>
<td>US-supplied hand tools and equipment (shovels, etc.) in questionable state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-over UN Land Cruisers.</td>
<td>Air Namibia is not financially sound enough to be used for non-commercial transport.</td>
<td>No nation-building/engineering skills have been developed to date.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SIGNALS</strong></th>
<th><strong>LOGISTICS</strong></th>
<th><strong>MISSION/FORCE HQ</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited tactical communication within battalions; very little strategic capability.</td>
<td>No logistics capabilities. Relied upon outside forces (former Soviet, Cuban, or South African) to provide logistics in the past. Bureaucratic strangleholds hinder in-country logistics.</td>
<td>Doubtful ability to maintain equipment or staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment is of South African, former Soviet bloc, Cuban, and US origin.</td>
<td>US HF/VHF equipment provided for demining teams.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US HF/VHF equipment provided for demining teams.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*DFI International-For Circulation*
Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFANTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel Performance</strong> (✦)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Overall, a very capable military, but corruption is a major problem. Poor leadership has occasionally led to poor performance and corruption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Extensive, although varied, experience in multinational peace operations, including: UNOSOM II (positive), ECOMOG (poor), UNAVEM (positive), UNPROFOR (positive), MINURSO, ONUMOZ, UNAMIR, and the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad in 1981-1982. Cooperated with US troops in Sierra Leone NEO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nigeria often becomes engaged in human rights violations and crime during multinational peace operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Possess some night operations equipment, but operations capability of force is limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Very little English is spoken among enlisted troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Officers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Good staff college and war college.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Corruption is rampant in the officer corps, and among NCOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Few opportunities for NCO leadership.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Basic Equipment (✓) |
| • Generally well equipped in terms of basic support equipment, although maintenance is poor. Provided equipment for UNOSOM and ECOMOG. |
| • Availability and currency of most equipment is poor due to a lack of planning and inadequate supplies of spare parts. |
| • Nigeria procures equipment from many different sources, which has resulted in interoperability problems within the force. |
| • Nigeria produces FN FAL rifles domestically. |

| Size of Force |
| • Active Army: 62,000 |
| • 1 armored division (2 armored brigades) |
| • 2 composite divisions (1 motorized infantry, 1 amphibious brigade, and 1 airborne battalion) |
| • 2 mechanized divisions (each with 1 mechanized brigade and 1 motor infantry brigade) |
| • Active Air Force: 9,500 |
Nigeria (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT (✔)</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES (✔)</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES (✔/✔)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Quantity of ground transport is fairly high. However, the lack of spare parts and maintenance problems limit availability.</td>
<td>• The Nigerian Air Force has a large inventory of aircraft from Eastern and Western suppliers. Most aircraft are not in good condition due to maintenance problems and a lack of spare parts.</td>
<td>• Limited demining capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Interoperability within the Nigerian motor pool is a problem. For example, several different types of APCs are in the inventory.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Nigeria has a dedicated engineer corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Have water purification capability and bridging equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Have ability to construct roads, base camps, and refugee camps.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS (✔)</th>
<th>LOGISTICS (✔)</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ (✔)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Have limited signals and encryption equipment, which they employed during ECOMOG in a command role.</td>
<td>• Have logistics capability and were able to sustain forces in the field during ECOMOG.</td>
<td>• Deployed headquarters unit to coordinate ECOMOG, with mixed reviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maintained communication between HQ and operational elements in Sierra Leone.</td>
<td>• However, during UNOSOM II, the UN provided logistics services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Senegal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFANTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel Performance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Considered a highly professional, motivated, and reliable force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Senegalese Army has extensive experience in multinational peace operations including UNAMIR, UNAVEM, MISAB and the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad in 1981-1982.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- JCET participants demonstrate good retention of training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Military units undertake continuous operations in the Casamance region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Limited night operations capability, although forces currently patrol nightly in the CAR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Level of education is relatively high.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Health of the army is relatively good, but uncorrected vision problems are common.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Officers**

- The officer corps consists of professional, well-trained, and motivated individuals.
- Most battalion officers have received training in the US and are skilled in planning/coordination.
- High-quality basic officer course located in Senegal.
- NCOs are not given leadership training, but initiative is high.

**Size of Force**

- Active Army: 12,000
  - 1 armored battalion
  - 6 infantry battalions
  - 1 artillery battalion
  - 1 engineering battalion
  - 1 airborne battalion
- Active Air Force: 650
- Gendarmerie: 4,000
Senegal (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Limited land transportation is available, which the army can augment by requisitioning civilian vehicles.</td>
<td>• Air transport capability is limited, due to the size and capability of aircraft.</td>
<td>• Demining: unclear capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ground transportation assets are improving through US EDA acquisitions.</td>
<td>• Air Force cannot transport the Army outside the country.</td>
<td>• Engineering units are well trained and have very capable personnel, but lack adequate supplies to perform complex engineering tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Most APCs are outdated.</td>
<td>• Air Senegal operates a small commercial air service consisting of 2 BAE 748s and 2 DHC-6 Twin Otter 300s.</td>
<td>• Have water purification and bridging capabilities (using US ribbon bridges).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limited ability to sustain vehicle pool due to a lack of resources and poor maintenance.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Have light construction and road building capabilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS</th>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Capability to execute C³ functions for a battalion-size unit while interfacing with other battalions in a brigade-size operation.</td>
<td>• Senegal was able to support two battalions in Liberia.</td>
<td>• Headquarters elements have performed well in multinational exercises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Most signals equipment is Western in origin.</td>
<td>• Have capability to provide logistics for company-level operations in the field.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFANTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel Performance (✔)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Highly professional force which is well equipped and trained to perform a wide range of operations; comparable to a Western military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The military is currently strengthening the core capabilities of its newly integrated military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The South African National Defense Force (SANDF) has extensive operational experience in combat and has recently undertaken peace operation exercises with subregional partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Forces are capable of performing all infantry tasks, all aspects of urban and COIN operations, and law and order operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• All units meet SANDF PT standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Capable of, and generally equipped for, conducting night operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Officers** |
| • Extremely professional and relatively apolitical officers corps. |
| • Officers have 12 years of formal education and a university degree. |
| • PKO training is received at the staff college level. |
| • NCOs receive extensive technical training and usually have strong operational experience. |

| **Basic Equipment (✔)** |
| • Forces are equipped with a full kit including multiple uniforms, boots, shoes, combat vest, radios, ammunition, and gear for different weather and operating conditions. In-country production capabilities exist. |
| • Equipment is in good condition and substantial reserves exist. |
| • Equipment is fully interoperable within the SANDF and interoperable with NATO standard equipment. |
| • Mobile mess facilities are available, which include kitchens, freezing facilities, and ration storage vehicles. |
| • Power generation, mobile shower units, and mobile medical facilities also exist. |
| • Excellent maintenance capability. |

| **Size of Force** |
| • Active Army: 60,000+ |
| • Active Air Force: 9,000 |
| • Police Service: 140,000 |
South Africa (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT (✓)</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES (✓)</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES (✓/✓)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Very large inventory consists primarily of South African-produced trucks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mine resistant versions of most trucks are in service, and produced in-country.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Several different types of APCs are in service.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Parts for both mine-resistant and thin-skinned vehicles are interchangeable.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military air transport assets could probably deploy two battalions within the subregion, but not beyond.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have over 600 military aircraft in service, most of which are in fair condition.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Most South African aircraft are interoperable with Western equipment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transport aircraft include 12 C-130s and squadrons of outdated DC-3 Dakotas.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Excellent demining capability including extensive inventory of demining vehicles.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Engineer Corps is divided into three branches: Field Engineering Units, which provide support to forces in the field; Support Units; and Construction Regiments, which perform base construction and maintenance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have water purification and bridging equipment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS (✓)</th>
<th>LOGISTICS (✓)</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ (✓)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Capability to provide command and control for a brigade-size contingent while interfacing with other forces in a multinational operation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Signals units are fully deployable and can provide radio, telex, and telephone to HQs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The SANDF has a very well developed tactical logistics system which allows supplies to be delivered by road or by air.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The logistics supply system is able to sustain combat forces in the field and is tested during yearly exercises.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The SANDF maintains two HQs on 72-hour standby at the division and battalion level.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Headquarters are fully equipped and can deploy to any location within South Africa for 21 days of operation without resupply.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DFI International-For Circulation
Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Performance</th>
<th>Basic Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Military has a solid human rights record and respect for positive civil-military relations.</td>
<td>• Basic kit is limited and its composition varies. However, they were able to scrape together enough basic kits for their contingent in ECOMOG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military has good training establishment and some multinational peace operations experience in ECOMOG.</td>
<td>• Personal weapons are usually Eastern in origin and include Chinese and Russian machine-guns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Budget problems severely limit military pay. Personnel seek other employment in order to earn extra money. Corruption is another by-product of low pay.</td>
<td>• Interoperability is likely to be a problem given the small amount of Western equipment available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Condition of equipment is very poor, which limits training opportunities.</td>
<td>• Have Canadian and French tentage, but limited power generation equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Health problems exist throughout the ranks.</td>
<td>• No night vision equipment is available.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Well-trained and educated officer corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military training facilities, including the staff college, are good.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NCOs lack decision-making and leadership role.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Active Army: 30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 5 infantry brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2 artillery battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1 engineering battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Active Air Force: 3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Citizens Militia: 80,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tanzania (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Have limited ground transport vehicles. Most are Russian or Chinese in origin and lack spare parts.</td>
<td>• Air assets are limited, poorly maintained, and likely not operable.</td>
<td>• Demining: unclear capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Interoperability within the army is a problem.</td>
<td>• Air Tanzania has four large passenger aircraft.</td>
<td>• Military has a dedicated engineer battalion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The US provided 14 HMMWVs and 11 Bedford trucks for use during ECOMOG.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>• No water purification capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>• Possess light construction and refugee camp construction capability, as demonstrated during the Rwanda crisis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS</th>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Battalion-level capability limited to internal communication.</td>
<td>• Limited logistics capability due to poor transportation assets.</td>
<td>• No known deployable headquarters capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limited signals capability using a mixture of European, Chinese, and Russian equipment.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have some HF equipment.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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## Tunisia

### INFANTRY

#### Personnel Performance
- Professional military with strong unit cohesion.
- Extensive experience in multinational peace operations, including UNOSOM II, MINURSO, and UNAMIR.
  - Discipline and fire control problems were evident during UNOSOM II.
- Forces train regularly with the US military and are considered to be approaching Western European standards.
- Have night operations capability and Western equipment.

#### Basic Equipment
- Complete basic kit includes US-origin equipment such as tentage.
- Strong maintenance capability.
- Possess NATO-standard equipment.
- Some personal weapons are produced in Tunisia with technical assistance from Belgium, but most weapons are procured from Western sources.

#### Officers
- Officers attend service-specific academies and staff college.
- The NCO corps is very professional. NCOs receive technical training at various specialized academies.

#### Size of Force
- Active Army: 27,000
- Active Air Force: 3,500
- National Guard: 10,000
**Tunisia (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT (✔)</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES (†)</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES (✔/✔)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Numerous US and other Western-origin trucks, including 210 US HMMWVs.</td>
<td>• Small Air Force composed primarily of Western aircraft that are interoperable with NATO.</td>
<td>• Have demining capability and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Older APCs include 11 VXB-170s, 106 Fiat 6614, Cadillac V-150 Commandos, and 100 M-113 tracked-APCs.</td>
<td>• Air fleet includes 8 C-130s, UH-1 and HH3 helicopters, and F-5 fighters.</td>
<td>• Have water purification and bridging capability.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Maintenance of air assets is very good.</td>
<td>• Have road and camp construction capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Capability to deploy forces in subregion, but ability to sustain them or transport others is questionable.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS (†)</th>
<th>LOGISTICS (†)</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ (?)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Capability to execute C² functions for a battalion-size unit while interfacing with other battalions in a brigade-size operation.</td>
<td>• Good capability, but problems with sustainment.</td>
<td>• Capabilities unclear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have HF and VHF capability. Most signals equipment is US-origin. German, French and Italian equipment is also in use.</td>
<td>• Logistics were provided by the UN in UNOSOM II.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*DFI International-For Circulation*
Uganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Performance</th>
<th>Basic Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionalism is improving as indicated by the restraint the military has shown during recent civil disturbances.</td>
<td>No basic kit is available. Soldiers have various types of uniforms and often lack boots and steel helmets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly motivated force with some class and caste tensions. Troops respond eagerly to foreign training.</td>
<td>Most personal weapons are Western in origin, but basic equipment is of Soviet or East European origin (AK-47s, PKs, RPDs, RPGs, SGMs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant ongoing experience with counter-insurgency operations.</td>
<td>Maintenance capabilities are fair, but spare parts and related supplies are insufficient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited peace operations experience. Uganda provided civilian police to MINURSO, and a battalion to ECOMOG.</td>
<td>An ammunition plant exists in country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English skills are mixed; higher among younger soldiers.</td>
<td>Overall health of the force is poor: many soldiers are HIV-positive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall health of the force is poor: many soldiers are HIV-positive.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Officers**
- President micro-manages many military decisions.
- There is a cadet or basic course, but no staff college. Some officers attend programs in Tanzania or Kenya.
- Officers are required to have the equivalent of a high school education.
- NCOs lack leadership and decision-making skills.
- Respectful relations between officers and enlisted.

**Size of Force**
- Active Army: 50,000
  - 4 divisions
- Active air wing of 800 personnel
- Readiness and deployability of force are questionable
- Ongoing insurgency limits availability of forces
- Border Defence Unit: 600
Uganda (continued)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited ground transport assets were augmented by a US donation of 14 HMMWVs and 11 Bedford Trucks for use in ECOMOG.</td>
<td>No real airlift capability. Minimal number of military air assets. 1 C-130, some Bell Rangers, and some Soviet helicopters. But the lack of spare parts and petroleum products limits availability. Aircraft maintenance is questionable.</td>
<td>Demining: no real experience, although they have expressed a desire for training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have at least one mine-protected vehicle in their inventory.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Some capabilities for light construction and camp construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military lacks funding to procure spare parts and supplies. Maintenance is generally poor.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Some road construction capability.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited medical capabilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS</th>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalion-level capability, limited to internal communication. Have limited number of PRC-77 radios, and hand-held Motorola radios, but batteries are in short supply. No secure communication capability.</td>
<td>No apparent logistics or sustainment capabilities. Forces typically live off the land.</td>
<td>Little or no deployable headquarters capability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DFI International-For Circulation
### Zambia

#### INFANTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Performance</th>
<th>Basic Equipment</th>
<th>Size of Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Unit cohesion is strong, but corruption is a problem at all levels of the military.</td>
<td>• Basic kit is limited. Soldiers have their own ammunition, boots, and running shoes.</td>
<td>• Active Army: 17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Experience in multinational peace operations under the UN including UNAMIR, ONUMOZ and UNAVEM III. In addition, Zambia participated in the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad in 1981-1982.</td>
<td>• Prior to ONUMOZ, the UN supplied US$ 5 million worth of equipment, including uniforms and boots for the Zambians.</td>
<td>– 6 infantry battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military also has experience with COIN operations and force protection tasks.</td>
<td>• Power generation equipment is available at the battalion level.</td>
<td>– 1 armored regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have the ability to perform guard duties, foot patrols, mobile patrols, and man observation posts.</td>
<td>• Little interoperability with other militaries.</td>
<td>– 1 artillery regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Capabilities for night operations are limited.</td>
<td>• Poor maintenance and repair capability.</td>
<td>– 1 engineer battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Health of the army is poor. AIDS is a major problem.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Active Air Force: 1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Officers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Police Mobile and Paramilitary Units: 1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Training for officers is of low quality, but some attend staff colleges in other African countries and the US.</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Basic Equipment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Officers have a minimum of two years of college education.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Basic kit is limited. Soldiers have their own ammunition, boots, and running shoes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NCO training is technical in nature and lacks a focus on leadership and independent decision-making.</td>
<td>• Prior to ONUMOZ, the UN supplied US$ 5 million worth of equipment, including uniforms and boots for the Zambians.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Basic Equipment

- Basic kit is limited. Soldiers have their own ammunition, boots, and running shoes.
- Prior to ONUMOZ, the UN supplied US$ 5 million worth of equipment, including uniforms and boots for the Zambians.
- Power generation equipment is available at the battalion level.
- Little interoperability with other militaries.
- Poor maintenance and repair capability.
Zambia (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Have small pool of operable vehicles, many of which are from Eastern Bloc countries.</td>
<td>• Most aircraft are old and in poor condition.</td>
<td>• Engineers receive some mine laying and demining training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Procured some South African trucks for use during ONUMOZ.</td>
<td>• Zambia possesses airfields capable of accommodating large transport aircraft.</td>
<td>• Have one dedicated engineering battalion with basic engineering skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military maintains 10 BTR-60 APCs, Mercedes and Chinese 5-ton trucks, and Land Rovers in an unknown state of repair.</td>
<td>• No maintenance facilities exist.</td>
<td>• Have limited light construction capability, which includes the ability to lay out, design and build simple refugee camps.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• No maintenance facilities exist.</td>
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<tr>
<th>SIGNALS</th>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Battalion-level capability.</td>
<td>• The logistics system is designed and partially equipped to support one brigade in the field within Zambia.</td>
<td>• Capability for deployable headquarters at company level, but not above battalion level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• During ONUMOZ, the UN provided the signals network for communications with the headquarters.</td>
<td>• No capability to sustain forces outside of Zambia.</td>
<td>• Zambian military headquarters deployed in the field tend to be static in nature.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>• Field rations are not provided.</td>
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DFI International-For Circulation
Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFANTRY</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel Performance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Considered one of the best disciplined forces in Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Soldiers are trained in basic infantry skills and are capable of marching in formation and performing basic infantry tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Most of the infantry forces have peacekeeping experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have experience with COIN operations and law and order operations. But, very limited ability and no desire to conduct night operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Overall health of the ranks is poor, with an estimated 50% AIDS infection rate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High turnover rate for younger soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Officers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Senior officers attend staff colleges in the US, UK, and former Eastern bloc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Officers are generally committed to the objectives of the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Officers have the ability to function within a main or tactical headquarters, but extensive bureaucracy slows decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Potential exists for cleavages in the officer corps based on tribal loyalties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• English skills are good among officers, mixed among NCOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NCOs are generally well trained and educated and have extensive operational experience. NCO decision-making is hesitant, but implementation is effective.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Size of Force**

- **Active Army**: 41,000, downsizing under way
  - 26 infantry battalions, not at full strength
  - 7 brigades
  - 1 engineer regiment
  - 1 field artillery regiment
  - 1 air defense regiment
- **Active Air Force**: 4,000
- **Police (incl. Support Unit)**: 21,800

---
Zimbabwe (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND TRANSPORT</th>
<th>AIR SERVICES</th>
<th>ENGINEER SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Have significant numbers of transport vehicles, including several new 2.5-ton trucks.</td>
<td>- Have small, well-maintained air force consisting of refurbished DC-3s and C-47s.</td>
<td>- Well-developed mine-laying and demining capability, but equipment is in questionable condition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Interoperability is a problem.</td>
<td>- Well-trained pilots.</td>
<td>- Have moderate capability in most engineering tasks, but are limited by lack of training and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Vehicle maintenance is poor. Most vehicles are in disrepair and lack spare parts.</td>
<td>- Possess runways capable of handling large transport aircraft.</td>
<td>- Basic camp and light construction capability exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Self-deployed to Mozambique during the civil war, but had problems resupplying.</td>
<td>- Air Zimbabwe has a limited troop transport capability; it provided lift for a small number of troops deploying to Rwanda.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNALS</th>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
<th>MISSION/FORCE HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Capability to execute C^3 functions for a battalion-size unit while interfacing with other battalions in a brigade-size operation.</td>
<td>- Elite units have functioning logistics systems.</td>
<td>- Have deployable headquarters unit, which has been used both inside and outside Zimbabwe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reported capability to maintain extensive communications links in the field, but communication is sporadic and inconsistent.</td>
<td>- Actual planning capabilities are constrained by inadequate transportation and slow decision-making processes.</td>
<td>- Deployed battalion-sized headquarters element to Mozambique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Recent operations have relied on outside logistics support from the SANDF.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Annex H

NON-AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA
(as of 30 June 1999)

"x" = Troops, Military Observers, or Civilian Police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>ONUC</th>
<th>UNAMIR</th>
<th>MINURSO</th>
<th>ONUF</th>
<th>UNOMOZ</th>
<th>UNOSOM I</th>
<th>MINURSO</th>
<th>ONUMOZ</th>
<th>UNOSOM II</th>
<th>UNOMIL</th>
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[a] Includes operations in which Czechoslovakia contributed Blue Helmets.
[b] Both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic contributed Blue Helmets to UNTAG.
### Annex H

**NON-AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA**  
(2 of 3)  
(as of 30 June 1999)

"x" = Troops, Military Observers, or Civilian Police

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### Annex H

#### NON-AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

(as of 30 June 1999)

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[c] Includes the short-lived contribution of the Soviet Union to MINURSO.
[d] Includes operations in which Czechoslovakia contributed Blue Helmets.
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