Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

UNITED NATIONS
NATIONS UNIES

UNIDIR
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Institut des Nations Unies pour la recherche sur le désarmement
Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

Paper: Clement Adibe
Questionnaire Analysis: LTCOL J.W. Potgieter,
Military Expert DCR Project

Project funded by: the Ford Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, The Winston Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; and the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, Finland, France, Austria, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Argentina, and the Republic of South Africa.

UNITED NATIONS
NOTE

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

* *

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Secretariat.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface - Sverre Lodgaard</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Introduction - Virginia Gamba</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Part I: Case Study

### Chapter 1: Introduction

1. Background: The People, Government and Politics of Somalia ............ 4
2. The Origins and Character of Somalia's Political Crisis ............... 5
3. From Crisis to Conflict: The Principal Actors in the Struggle for Power 10

### Chapter 2: The Evolution of International Responses to the Somali Conflict: Regional and International Dimensions

1. The Emergence of a Consensus on an International Emergency Relief Plan for Somalia 25

### Chapter 3: The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

2. Phase II: "Option 4", The United States, Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and "Operation Restore Hope" in Somalia 48
The Problem of Transition from UNITAF: Differing Perspectives from the UN Secretariat and the United States Government ................ 60

3.3 Phase III: The Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) ....................... 61

Chapter 4: The Task of Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia .......................... 69

4.1 Disarmament as a Mission Task in Somalia ............... 70
4.2 The Evolution of an Overall Concept and Plan of Disarmament in Somalia ....................... 72
4.3 The New Four-Stage Concept of Disarmament .......... 88
4.4 The Consequences of Implementing the New Cost Saving Concept of Disarmament in Conditions of Anarchy ..................... 91
4.5 The 5 June 1993 Attack on UNOSOM II Inventory Team ........................................... 93
4.6 The 3 October 1993 Attack on UNOSOM II and its Aftermath ........................................... 98

Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusion .............................. 101

Biographical Note .................................................. 111

Part II Bibliography .................................................. 113

Part III Questionnaire Analysis ................................. 133

Analysis Report: Somalia ........................................... 135
List of Tables

1.1 The Military Capability of Somalia, 1990 ...................... 7
1.2 Principal Actors and Their Role in the Current
   Somali Conflict .................................. 10
3.1 UN Intervention in Somalia: A Chronology of Major Events,
   1991-95 ......................................... 31
3.2 Composition of UNITAF as at 7 January 1993 ............... 56
3.3 Composition of UNOSOM II as at 30 April 1993 .......... 65
3.4 Composition of UNOSOM II as at November 1993 .......... 67
4.1 Comparative Statistics of Arms Deliveries to the States
   of the Horn and Three Leading Arms Importers
   in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1972-1990 (in US $) ............... 71
4.2 The Rules of Engagement for US-UNITAF .................. 75
4.3 The Rules of Engagement for UNOSOM II ................. 84

List of Maps

Somalia ............................................. 129
UNOSOM II Deployment as of September 1993 ............. 130
UNOSOM II Deployment as of September 1994 ............ 131
Preface

Under the headline of Collective Security, UNIDIR is conducting a major project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR). The project examines the utility and modalities of disarming warring parties as an element of efforts to resolve intra-state conflicts. It collects field experiences regarding the demobilization and disarmament of warring factions; reviews 11 collective security actions where disarmament has been attempted; and examines the role that disarmament of belligerents can play in the management and resolution of internal conflicts. The 11 cases are UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia), UNOSOM and UNITAF (Somalia), UNAVEM (Angola), UNTAC (Cambodia), ONUSAL (Salvador), ONUCA (Central America), UNTAG (Namibia), UNOMOZ (Mozambique), Liberia, Haiti and the 1979 Commonwealth operation in Rhodesia.

Being an autonomous institute charged with the task of undertaking independent, applied research, UNIDIR keeps a certain distance from political actors of all kinds. The impact of our publications is predicated on the independence with which we are seen to conduct our research. At the same time, being a research institute within the framework of the United Nations, UNIDIR naturally relates its work to the needs of the Organization. Inspired by the Secretary General's report on "New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era",1 the DCR Project also relates to a great many governments involved in peace operations through the UN or under regional auspices. Last not least, comprehensive networks of communication and cooperation have been developed with UN personnel having field experience.

Weapons-wise, the disarmament of warring parties is mostly a matter of light weapons. These weapons account for as much as 90% of the casualties in many armed conflicts. UNIDIR recently published a paper on this subject (Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts, UNIDIR Paper No 34, 1995). The Secretary General's appeal for stronger efforts to control small arms - to promote "micro disarmament"2 - is one which UNIDIR will continue to attend to in the framework of the DCR Project. To examine the peace operations where disarmament has been attempted, we invited scholars from the regions of conflict. This Report on the peace operations

---

in Somalia (UNOSOM, UNITAF) was written by Dr. Clement Adibe while staying at UNIDIR in the winter/spring of 1995. It has been reviewed by Astrid Arland (the Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs, Oslo), Steven John Stedman (Johns Hopkins University, Washington) and by the project staff. It is the first in a series of UNIDIR Reports on the disarmament dimension of peace operations. There will be a Report on all of the cases mentioned above.

The authors of the case studies have drawn on the professional advice and assistance of military officers intimately acquainted with peace operations. They were Col. Roberto Bendini (Argentina), Lt. Col. Ilkka Tiihonen (Finland) and Lt. Col. Jakkie Potgieter (South Africa). This Report also benefitted from a number of briefings by military officers who worked in Somalia, among them Col. Cecil Bailey (USA) and Gen. Bruno Loi (Italy). UNIDIR is grateful to all of them for their invaluable contributions to clarifying and solving the multitude of questions and problems we put before them.

Since October 1994, the DCR Project has developed under the guidance of Virginia Gamba. Under her able leadership, the project has not only become the largest in UNIDIR history: its evolution has been a source of inspiration for the entire Institute.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views or conclusions expressed in the Report. They are Dr Adibe’s. My final word of thanks goes to him: UNIDIR has been happy to have such a resourceful and dedicated collaborator.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views and conclusions expressed in these papers which are those of their authors. Nevertheless, UNIDIR considers that such papers merit publication and recommends them to the attention of its readers.

Sverre Lodgaard
Director, UNIDIR
Acknowledgements

UNIDIR takes this opportunity to thank the many Foundations and Governments who have supported the DCR Project. Among our contributors, the following deserve a special mention and our deep appreciation: the Ford Foundation; the United States Institute of Peace; the Winston Foundation; the Ploughshares Fund; the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; and the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, Finland, France, Austria, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Argentina, and the Republic of South Africa.
Project Introduction

Disarmament and Conflict Resolution

The global arena's main preoccupation during the Cold War centred on the maintenance of international peace and stability between states. The vast network of alliances, obligations and agreements which bound nuclear superpowers to the global system, and the memory of the rapid internationalization of disputes into world wars, favored the formulation of national and multinational deterrent policies designed to maintain a stability which was often confused with immobility. In these circumstances, the ability of groups within states to engage in protest and to challenge recognized authority was limited.

The end of the Cold War in 1989, however, led to a relaxing of this pattern, generating profound mobility within the global system. The ensuing break-up of alliances, partnerships, and regional support systems brought new and often weak states into the international arena. Since weak states are susceptible to ethnic tensions, secession, and outright criminality, many regions are now afflicted by situations of violent intra-state conflicts.

Intra-state conflict occurs at immense humanitarian cost. The massive movement of people, their desperate condition, and the direct and indirect tolls on human life have, in turn, generated pressure for international action.

Before and since the Cold War, the main objective of the international community when taking action has been the maintenance and/or recovery of stability. The main difference between then and now, however, is that then, the main objective of global action was to maintain stability in the international arena, whereas now it is to stabilize domestic situations. The international community assists in stabilizing domestic situations in five different ways: by facilitating dialogue between warring parties, by preventing a renewal of internal armed conflict, by strengthening infrastructure, by improving local security, and by facilitating an electoral process intended to lead to political stability3.

The United Nations is by no means the only organization that has been requested by governments to undertake these tasks. However, the reputation of the United Nations as being representative of all states and thus as being objective and

---

trustworthy has been especially valued, as indicated by the greater amount of peace operations in which it is currently engaged. Before 1991, the UN peace operations presence enhanced not only peace but also the strengthening of democratic processes, conciliation among population groups, the encouragement of respect for human rights, and the alleviation of humanitarian problems. These achievements are exemplified by the role of the UN in Congo, southern Lebanon, Nicaragua, Namibia, Salvador, and to a lesser extent in Haiti.

Nevertheless, since 1991 the United Nations has been engaged in a number of simultaneous, larger, and more ambitious peace operations such as those in Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, Mozambique and Somalia. It has also been increasingly pressured to act on quick-flaring and horrendously costly explosions of violence, such as the one in Rwanda in 1995. The financial, personnel, and timing pressure on the United Nations to undertake these massive short-term stabilizing actions has seriously impaired the UN's ability to ensure long-term national and regional stability. The UN has necessarily shifted its focus from a supporting role, in which it could ensure long-term national and international stability, to a role which involves obtaining quick peace and easing humanitarian pressures immediately. But without a focus on peace defined in terms of longer-term stability, the overall success of efforts to mediate and resolve intra-state conflict will remain in question.

This problem is beginning to be recognized and acted upon by the international community. More and more organizations and governments are linking success to the ability to offer non-violent alternatives to a post-conflict society. These alternatives are mostly of a socio-political-economic nature, and are national rather than regional in character. As important as these linkages are to the final resolution of conflict, they tend to overlook a major source of instability: the existence of vast amounts of weapons widely distributed among combatant and non-combatant elements in societies which are emerging from long periods of internal conflict. The reason why weapons themselves are not the primary focus of attention in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies is because they are viewed from a political perspective. Action which does not award importance to disarmament processes is justified by invoking the political value of a weapon as well as the way the weapon is used by a warring party, rather than its mere existence and availability. For proponents of this action, peace takes away the reason for using the weapon and, therefore, renders it harmless for the post-conflict reconstruction process. And yet, easy availability of weapons can, and does, militarize societies in general. It also destabilizes regions that are affected by unrestricted trade of light weapons between borders.
There are two problems, therefore, with the international community's approach to post-conflict reconstruction processes: on the one hand, the international community, under pressure to react to increasingly violent internal conflict, has put a higher value on peace in the short-term than on development and stability in the long-term; and, on the other hand, those who do focus on long-term stability have put a higher value on the societal and economic elements of development than on the management of the primary tools of violence, i.e., weapons.

**UNIDIR's DCR Project and the Control of Arms during Peace Processes (CAPP)**

The DCR Project aims to explore the predicament posed by UN peace operations which have recently focused on short-term needs rather than long-term stability. The Project is based on the premise that the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations can be a tool for ensuring stability. Perhaps more than ever before, the effective control of weapons has the capacity to influence far-reaching events in national and international activities. In this light, the management and control of arms could become an important component for the settlement of conflicts, a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and deflation of conflict, and a critical component of the reconstruction process in post-conflict societies.

Various instruments can be used to implement weapons control. For example, instruments which may be used to support preventive diplomacy in times of crisis include confidence-building measures, weapons control agreements, and the control of illegal weapons transfers across borders. Likewise, during conflict situations, and particularly in the early phases of a peace operation, negotiations conducive to lasting peace can be brought about by effective monitoring and the establishment of safe havens, humanitarian corridors, and disengagement sectors. Finally, after the termination of armed conflict, a situation of stability is required for post-conflict reconstruction processes to be successful. Such stability can be facilitated by troop withdrawals, the demilitarization of border zones, and effective disarmament, demobilization and demining.

---

4 Fred Tanner, "Arms Control in Times of Conflict", Project on Rethinking Arms Control, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, PRAC Paper 7, October 1993.
Nevertheless, problems within the process of controlling weapons have cropped up at every stage of peace operations, for a variety of reasons. In most cases, initial control of arms upon the commencement of peace operations has not generally been achieved. This may be due to the fact that political negotiations necessary to generate mandates and missions permitting international action are often not specific enough on their disarmament implementation component. It could also be that the various actors involved interpret mandates in totally different ways. Conversely, in the specific cases where peace operations have attained positive political outcomes, initial efforts to reduce weapons to manageable levels - even if achieved - tend to be soon devalued, since most of the ensuing activities centre on the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. This shift in priorities from conflict resolution to reconstruction makes for sloppy follow-up of arms management operations. Follow-up problems, in turn, can result in future threats to internal stability. They also have the potential to destabilize neighboring states due to the uncontrolled and unaccounted-for mass movement of weapons that are no longer of political or military value to the former warring parties.

The combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of light weapons has marked peace operations since 1990. This combination poses new challenges to the international community and highlights the fact that a lack of consistent strategies for the control of arms during peace processes (CAPP) reduces the effectiveness of ongoing missions and diminishes the chances of long-term national and regional stability once peace is agreed upon.

The case studies undertaken by the DCR Project highlight a number of recurrent problems that have impinged on the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations. Foremost among these are problems associated with the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment early in the mission, and problems concerned with the lack of co-ordination of efforts among the various groups involved in the mission. Many secondary complications would be alleviated if these two problems areas were understood differently. The establishment of a secure environment, for example, would make the warring parties more likely to agree on consensual disarmament initiatives. Likewise, a concerted effort at weapons control early in the mission would demonstrate the international community's determination to hold the parties to their original peace agreements and cease fire arrangements. Such a demonstration of resolve would make it more difficult for these agreements to be broken once the peace operation was underway.
The co-ordination problem applies both to international interactions and to the components of the peace operation. A peace process will be more likely to succeed if there is co-operation and co-ordination between the international effort and the nations which immediately neighbor the striken country. But co-ordination must not simply be present at the international level; it must permeate the entire peace operation as well. To obtain maximum effect, relations must be co-ordinated among and within the civil affairs, military, and humanitarian groups which comprise a peace operation. A minimum of co-ordination must also be achieved between intra- and inter-state mission commands, the civil and military components at strategic, operational and tactical levels, and the humanitarian aid organizations working in the field; these components must co-operate with each other if the mission is to reach its desired outcome. If problems with mission co-ordination are overcome, many secondary difficulties could also be avoided, including lack of joint management, lack of unity of effort, and lack of mission and population protection mechanisms.

Given these considerations, the Project believes that the way to implement peace, defined in terms of long-term stability, is to focus not just on the sources of violence (such as social and political development issues) but also on the material vehicles for violence (such as weapons and munitions). Likewise, the implementation of peace must take into account both the future needs of a society and the elimination of its excess weapons, and also the broader international and regional context in which the society is situated. In this sense, weapons that are not managed and controlled in the field will invariably flow over into neighboring countries, becoming a problem in themselves. Thus, the establishment of viable stability requires that three primary aspects be included in every approach to intra-state conflict resolution: (1) the implementation of a comprehensive, systematic disarmament programme as soon as a peace operation is set-up; (2) the establishment of an arms management programme that continues into national post-conflict reconstruction processes; and (3) the encouragement of close cooperation on weapons control and management programmes between countries in the region where the peace operation is being implemented.

In order to fulfill its research mission, the DCR Project has been divided into four phases. These are as follows: (1) the development, distribution, and interpretation of a Practitioners’ Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations; (2) the development and publication of case studies on peace operations in which disarmament tasks constituted an important aspect of the wider mission; (3) the organization of a series of workshops on policy issues; and (4) the publication of
policy papers on substantive issues related to the linkages between the control of arms during peace processes (CAPP) and the settlement of conflict.

Between September 1995 and March 1996, the Project foresees four sets of publications. The first of these will involve eleven case studies, covering UN peace operations in Somalia, Rhodesia (1979), Bosnia/Croatia, Central America (ONUCA and ONUSAL), Cambodia, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Liberia and Haiti. The second set of publications will include nine policy papers, addressing topics such as Security Council Procedures, Mandate Specificity, Doctrine, Rules of Engagement, Coercive versus Consensual Arms Control and Demobilization Processes, Consensus, Intelligence and Media, and Training. A third set of publications will involve three papers on the relationship between arms and conflict in the region of Southern Africa. The last of the Project's published works will be an overarching policy paper summarizing the conclusions of the research and delineating recommendations based on the Project's findings.

Taking into account the existing material on some of the case studies, the DCR project has purposefully concentrated on providing more information on the disarmament and arms control components of the relevant international peace operations than on providing a comprehensive political and diplomatic account of each case.

This volume of the DCR series introduces the first of the Project's case studies, focusing on Somalia. The case study is divided into three sections. The first section analyzes the way in which three international peace processes (UNOSOM, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II) struggled with the issue of controlling and managing light weapons in Somalia so as to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance to a famished and lawless population. The second section presents a full bibliography of secondary and primary material used in the making of this study. Finally, the third section provides an analysis of the responses on Somalia which were obtained through the Project's own Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations.

Virginia Gamba
Project Director
Geneva, August 1995
Part I:

Case Study
Chapter 1
Introduction

The collapse of the Somali state and the subsequent degeneration of the society into anarchy in 1991 contrast sharply with the country's reputation among the ancient Egyptians as the "Land of Punt, ... a fabled source of wealth and luxury far beyond the upper reaches of the Nile..."1 According to Stephen Riley, Somalia in the late twentieth century has become a byword for clan politics... and a symbol of the hollow promises and contradictions of the "New World Order" in the 1990s.2 How did this largely homogeneous and otherwise resourceful society become an icon of failed states3 after barely three decades of independence? The purpose of this study is to examine in some depth the role of arms in explaining the current Somali conflict and the difficulties of multinational intervention in resolving this African tragedy.

This study is presented in five chapters. Chapter 1 briefly discusses the Somali society and politics and provides the background to the conflict that ensued in 1991. Chapter 2 examines the regional and international contexts of the conflict, focusing particularly on early efforts to bring the conflict to the attention of the international community. Chapter 3 traces the involvement of the international community and the United Nations through various phases. Chapter 4 focuses on the evolution and implementation of the disarmament concept in Somalia. Chapter 5 discusses the lessons of the Somali experience for future UN involvement in disarmament and conflict resolution.

---

2 Ibid.
1.1 Background: The People, Government and Politics of Somalia

The state of Somalia is the result of the amalgamation of two separately administered colonies: British Somaliland in the north and Italian Somaliland in the south. The two colonies were inhabited by ethnic Somalis who may also be found in Djibouti (French Somaliland), Kenya’s Northern Frontier District (NFD) and in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The majority of Somalis are Sunni Muslims, but a small proportion are Christians. Unlike many African countries, Somalis are united by one common language: Somali. In addition to the national language, other languages widely spoken by segments of the population include Arabic, English and Italian.

For a brief period during World War II, the “Somali people enjoyed a temporary and partial ‘reunification’” following Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia’s Ogaden region and Italian Somaliland (i.e. Rome’s Africa Orientale Italiana) in addition to British Somaliland in August 1940.4 The enforced reunification of Somalia was subsequently reversed in March 1941 when Britain defeated Italy in the Horn. With the signing of the Paris peace treaty between Italy and the Allied Powers in 1947, Italy formally renounced title to its African colonies, including Italian Somaliland. However, in 1949, the United Nations General Assembly, by Resolution 289, decided to place Italian Somaliland “under the International trusteeship system with Italy as the Administering Authority.”5 In 1950 Italy formally began to administer its former colony, now known as the United Nations Trust Territory of Somalia (hereafter referred to as the Trust Territory), for a transitional period of ten years. As part of measures towards Somali independence before the expiration of that mandate, Italy organised general elections in the Trust Territory in 1959. That election was won by the Somali Youth League (SYL), whose leader, Seyyid Abdullah Issa, emerged as the Prime Minister. On 1 July 1960, the Trust Territory joined British Somaliland, which attained its independence on 26 June 1960, and the Republic of Somalia was formed. At unification, the parallel institutions of government were merged, with Mr. Aden Abdullah Osman (formerly president of the Legislative Assembly of British Somaliland) as president and Seyyid Issa of SYL as Prime Minister. Following his

---

5 Ibid., p.4.
early resignation, Seyidd Issa was replaced as Prime Minister by Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke (also of SYL).\textsuperscript{6}

The signs of the problems that would seriously impact on the stability of the new republic were present from the start. According to Nii Wallace-Bruce,\textsuperscript{7}

\begin{quote}
The new Republic could not disguise the stark bi-reality. It had "two different judicial systems; different currencies; different organization and conditions for service for the army, the police and civil servants... The governmental institutions, both at the central and local level, were differently organized and had different powers; the systems and rates of taxation and customs were different, and so were the educational systems."\textsuperscript{7}
\end{quote}

In addition, while British Somaliland had been conditioned by the colonial government to political representation "on the basis of clans," the Trust Territory was not.\textsuperscript{8} However, these differences notwithstanding, the Somali political elite was united in their quest for the unification of all Somalis under one state.\textsuperscript{9}

1.2 The Origins and Character of Somalia's Political Crisis

Not unlike many immediate post-colonial African governments, the first republican government of Somalia ran into severe obstacles soon after independence because of an intense power struggle among the political elites.\textsuperscript{10} In Somalia, however, the intensity of the political struggle took on an added dimension as a result of the nationalist and irredentist policies of the post-colonial government. Upon unification, the Shermarke government made strong territorial

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{9} This included Somalis in Djibouti, Kenya's NFD and Ethiopia's Ogaden region. The quest for the reunification of all Somalis would later lead to the militarization of the region and two major inter-state wars between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1964 and 1977/78.
\end{flushleft}
claims on its neighbours, especially Kenya and Ethiopia. British and Western
governments' opposition to such blatant irredentism may have encouraged the
Shermarke government to seek the support of the Soviet Union. In the context of
the Cold War, Moscow seized on the opportunity to establish a politico-military
foothold in the strategic Horn of Africa.

Thus began the progressive expansion of the Somali armed forces through the
massive importation of Soviet arms and equipment. Between 1964-1969 the
national security apparatus grew from 5,000 police personnel to a standing army
of 12,000 persons. In 1964, fighting broke out between Somalia and Ethiopia
over the Ogaden district, while tension characterised Somalia's relations with its
other neighbours, Kenya and Djibouti. By 1977, when Somalia initiated the
Ogaden War with Ethiopia, the strength of the Somali national armed forces had
increased markedly to 37,000, equipped with sophisticated Soviet land, aerial and
naval conventional weapons systems. Thereafter (until the conflict of 1992), the
Somali Armed Forces grew to become a comparatively modern fighting force with
a wide range of basic and advanced weapons systems (see Table 1.1).

University Press, 1972; A.I. Asiwaju (ed.), *Partitioned Africans*, 1985; and Ioan M. Lewis, *A
12 "International Implications of the Somali Crisis," n.n., n.d., p.3.
13 Ibid. See also Bereket Habte Selassie, *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa*,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Numerical Strength</th>
<th>Number and Description of Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>290 main battle tanks; 20 light tanks; 85 reconnaissance vehicles; 484 armoured personnel carriers; 296 towed artillery pieces; 370 mortars (comprising 81, 82 and 120mm); 100 Milan anti-tank guided weapons; 300 89-mm rocket launchers; 60 106-mm recoilless launchers; 258 air defence guns (various sizes); and 71 surface-to-air missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>8 patrol and coastal combat craft, including 2 missile fast patrol craft (PFMs) and 2 torpedo fast patrol craft (PFTs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>56 combat aircraft (incl. MIG-17/21 series).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paramilitary:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Data not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Police</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Border Guards</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) People's Militia</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition Forces:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Data not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Somali National Movement (Isaaq)</td>
<td>10,000 (about 5,000 armed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- United Somali Congress (Hawiyeh)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Somali Patriotic Movement (Ogaden)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 15 October 1969, President Shermarke was assassinated in a military coup d'état. One week later, Major-General Mohammed Siad Barre, the Commander of the national armed forces, assumed absolute power. Consistent with the tradition of military regimes, General Barre decreed the suspension of the Somali constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, and in its place established an all-military council known as the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). In 1970, General Barre formally declared Somalia a "socialist state." In 1976, he dissolved the SRC and replaced it with the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) as the sole political party in the country and the vanguard of the "people's revolution." The members of the SRC became the politburo of the SRSP, with General Barre as the Secretary-General. Backed by Moscow, President Barre sought to replicate the Soviet model and its entrenched patronage system of *nomenklatura* in Mogadishu. According to one study, Barre adapted the Soviet model to suit his interests and the special conditions prevalent in Somalia. Thus, for instance, in place of the *nomenklatura*, General Barre established "a *clanklatura* system whereby clan relatives and other political loyalists" were appointed "into positions of leadership, authority and power within the civil service, armed forces, academies and institutes and social or civic associations."
In the absence of major ethnic or religious cleavages in Somalia, Barre resorted to manipulating the clan system as part of his overall strategy to maintain political power despite his regime's deepening crisis of legitimation. As challenges to his dictatorship grew stronger, especially after Somalia's defeat by Ethiopia in 1978, General Barre resorted to a "divide and rule" strategy which, by the late 1980s, had resulted in several state-orchestrated mass murders of elites belonging to opposing clans. In one such incident involving the massacre of Isaaq professionals in Jasiira Beach in 1989, Khalif Galaydh recounts that "at least forty-seven individuals, taken out of their homes in the middle of the night, [were] confirmed to have been shot in cold blood and put in a mass grave." According to Jeffrey Clark, many more thousand Isaaqs who were fleeing the government crack-down were strafed by Siad Barre's air force. This heightened level of violence was caused by an attempted coup d'état staged in 1978 against the Barre regime by elements of the Somali military belonging to the Isaaq clan. Following a government reprisal, the leaders of the failed coup fled initially to Ethiopia and then to England where, in 1981, they formed a resistance movement, the Somali National Movement (SNM), aimed at toppling the Barre dictatorship.
### 1.3 From Crisis to Conflict: The Principal Actors in the Struggle for Power

#### Table 1.2: Principal Actors and Their Role in the Current Somali Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Role Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Siad Barre</td>
<td>Somali Army General who seized political power through a coup d'état in 1969, and whose rule generated the tensions that led to the implosion of Somalia in 1991. In the summer of 1992, he went into exile in Nigeria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Mohamed Farah Aideed</td>
<td>Former General in the Somali Army who helped defeat General Barre's forces in Mogadishu as the military commander of the United Somali Congress (USC). Following a bitter struggle for power with Mr. Ali Mahdi, his civilian colleague in the USC, General Aideed formed the Somali National Alliance (SNA), which soon became a key player in Somalia's deepening conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Mahdi Mohamed</td>
<td>A cabinet minister in the First Republic and prominent Mogadishu businessman, Mahdi was a central figure in the USC and a key player in Somalia's political tragedy. After the exit of General Barre from Mogadishu, Mahdi was pronounced interim President by the USC on 29 January 1991 - an act that provoked a violent power struggle between Mahdi and General Aideed. Mahdi's faction, the USC Manifesto Group, once exercised unchallenged control over economic activities in Mogadishu harbour and airports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Mohamed Said Hersi</td>
<td>General Barre's son-in-law and a prime beneficiary of the President's patronage, serving as Defence Minister and head of national security. In February 1993, General Morgan captured a substantial part of Kismayu from pro-Aideed forces led by Col. Ahmed Omar Jess. This led to violent pro-Aideed demonstrations in Mogadishu against UNITAF which, because of its neutrality, was alleged to have abetted General Morgan's victory. In the spring of 1993, General Morgan made a bungled last-ditch military effort to return his father-in-law to power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess</td>
<td>A pro-Aideed activist from the Ogaden clan and former leader of the Somali People's Movement, which was expelled from the southern part of Kismayu by rival clans in the Ogaden region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Mohamed Abshir Musa</td>
<td>Former leader of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), an anti-Aideed faction. Educated in the US, Gen. Musa is reputed to have taken sides with UN forces against Aideed, and is regarded to be the favourite of the Americans. His local support base is in the northeast and southern Juba region of Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Abdi Warsame</td>
<td>Leader of the Somali Salvation National Movement (SSNM), Warsame left the Aideed camp after Aideed engaged UN forces in battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Aden Nur Gabiyo</td>
<td>One-time Defence Minister under General Barre, Gabiyo heads a faction of the Somali People's Movement which supports Ali Mahdi. General Gabiyo's forces control Kismayu.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table: Key Figures in Somalia's Conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Ali Hamad</td>
<td>Leader of the Somali Democratic Movement, which draws its support from the Rahanwein sub-clan based in Baidoa, the famine-ravaged city in southern Somalia. Not known for his loyalty to either Aideed or Mahdi, Mohamed Hamad's relative neutrality may have influenced the elders of his sub-clan to choose him as leader of the SDM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Ismail Abdi</td>
<td>An ally of Aideed's, Abdia heads the Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU), a Leelkase Darod-based militia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Ramadan Arbo</td>
<td>Allied with Ali Mahdi's faction of the USC, Mohamed Arbo leads the fragmented bantu farming clans who live along the Shebelle and Juba rivers, long regarded to be Somalia's breadbasket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Omer Haji Maselle</td>
<td>A fellow Marehan-Darod clansman of Barre's and former commander of Somali Armed Forces, General Maselle is a prominent member of the Somali National Front (SNF) - a pro-Barre movement with strong support from Barre's clan. Based in the famine-stricken town of Bardere, General Maselle's SNF has tried but failed in the past to take advantage of the factionalization of the USC to regain political power in Mogadishu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awad Ahmed Hashero</td>
<td>Reputed leader of a militia based in two Darod sub-clans, Dolbahante and Warsengeli.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In a classic statement of this view, Andrew S. Natsios wrote in his "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Intervention and US Policy", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No 1, 1993, p.136, that: "The Somalis are by instinct a remarkably ethnocentric culture..." As evidence, he cites a Somali proverb, suggesting their world view: "Me and Somalia against the world, Me and my clan against Somalia, Me and my family against the clan, and Me against the family." This echoes an earlier description of Somalis by Sir Richard Burton as "a fierce and turbulent race of republicans" (quoted in Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia," p. 207). The problem, however, is that this view of the individual Somali as inherently force-prone, an iconic attribute of the "zone of turmoil" about which relatively little can be done, projects a static view of the Somali state and, as a consequence, is of limited use for purposes of analysis and prescription.

---

**Umar Arteh Ghalib**

A former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ghalib was invited by interim President Ali Mahdi to form a provisional government that would prepare the country for a return to democracy after the fall of Barre's government. Ghalib accepted the offer and formed a government on 2 February 1991. His government was instantly denounced by General Aideed and many international observers as an attempt to dominate post-Barre Somali politics.

**Ibrahim Egal**

Elected President of the Republic of Somaliland, formerly British Somaliland in the north, which unilaterally declared its independence from Somalia on 17 May 1991. However, the Republic of Somaliland has yet to achieve diplomatic recognition from any member of the United Nations.

---

24 In a classic statement of this view, Andrew S. Natsios wrote in his "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Intervention and US Policy", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No 1, 1993, p.136, that: "The Somalis are by instinct a remarkably ethnocentric culture..." As evidence, he cites a Somali proverb, suggesting their world view: "Me and Somalia against the world, Me and my clan against Somalia, Me and my family against the clan, and Me against the family." This echoes an earlier description of Somalis by Sir Richard Burton as "a fierce and turbulent race of republicans" (quoted in Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia," p. 207). The problem, however, is that this view of the individual Somali as inherently force-prone, an iconic attribute of the "zone of turmoil" about which relatively little can be done, projects a static view of the Somali state and, as a consequence, is of limited use for purposes of analysis and prescription.
this case the inherent anarchical tendency of Barre's authoritarian regime.25 This explanation is supported by the accounts of Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun, the former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG) in Somalia, which demonstrate that the disintegration of Somalia resulted from uprisings which were:

fuelled both by clan-based rivalries and by wider political and economic considerations. The northern part of Somalia, home of a large clan, the Isaaq, as well as other smaller tribes, came to resent the leadership of the southern tribal groups, whom they consider to have monopolised political power since Siad Barré took over in a coup in 1969. The inhabitants of the northern regions perceived themselves to be wronged and without the possibility of democratic redress. Their revolt was led by the Somali National Movement (SNM). Government forces, unable to prevent the uprising, unleashed a bloody repression against the civilian population, using aircraft and heavy weapons.26

The government's brutality was responded to in kind by the SNM and other organised resistance movements based mainly in northern Somalia. Guerrilla activities against government facilities intensified and so did Barre's repression, thus institutionalising a cycle of violence in Somalia.27 However, the government's campaign of terror against the uprising in the north revealed the weakness of Barre's army and served to encourage organised southern opposition groups to take up arms against the regime. In 1989, southern opposition groups came together under one politico-military umbrella, the United Somali Congress (USC).


By mid-1990, the political and territorial gains of the opposition forces, led by the SNM in the north and the USC in the south, had severely weakened Barre's governmental and military apparatus. In territorial terms, the government was left with the capital city, Mogadishu, on which it maintained only a tenuous hold.

By now, the government, desperate for political power and control, resorted to arming the "masses" to delay or forestall the fall of Mogadishu. To this end, according to Jeffrey Clark, "Siad Barre desperately launched a massive distribution of weapons and ammunition from his vast arsenals; his power all but evaporated when he turned his army loose on Hawiye sections of the city, destroying much of the infrastructure and provoking a violent and deadly uprising in the process."28 By mid-January 1991, the disintegration of Somalia was completed with the largely unco-ordinated and riotous departure of General Barre and his loyalists from Mogadishu.29 According to Robert Patman,

Siad's retreating troops adopted a scorched-earth policy as they moved through Somalia's farmland belt, in the Juba valley area, towards the region south of Mogadishu... The troops slaughtered livestock, plundered crops and massacred local cultivators... [Consequently], [d]evastation and starvation spread throughout southern Somalia.30

Apart from destroying whatever social infrastructure existed in Mogadishu, Barre and his fleeing loyalists also inflicted a profound psychological blow to the city, thus leaving behind an urban population seething with inter- and intra-clan hatred and violence. But, above all else, Barre's exit created a political vacuum in Somalia. The USC, which played the principal role in defeating Barre's military in Mogadishu, had splintered into two major factions once the goal of unseating the government had been accomplished. In the ensuing struggle for supreme political power, the two key figures in the USC, General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Mr. Ali Mahdi - described as "a wealthy Mogadishu businessman" - turned into bitter adversaries.31 In the resulting confrontation in Mogadishu - a city which was by now littered with "more than 500,000 weapons... abandoned by the former

31 Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia, 1993, p.211.
Somali army as the civil war reached its peak in January 1992 - the two leading contenders for power turned to their sub-clans, the Habre Gedir-Hawiye and Abgal-Hawiye, respectively, for mass support. At this stage, according to Mohammed Sahnoun, the power struggle between these two erstwhile allies "laid waste to large areas of the city in November and December," claiming as many as 30,000 lives, in what has been described as "the worst part of an avoidable civil war." The multiplicity of actors and factions (see Table 1.2) and the terror they unleashed on their society presented to the world the picture of Somalia as in Hobbes's "state of nature", where life was literally nasty, brutish and pathetically short. Thousands of Somalis died as much from violence directed by competing "warlords" as from hunger. According to Sahnoun's account, by March 1992

... at least 300,000 people had died of hunger and hunger-related disease in the country [of 8 million people]. Some 70% of the country's livestock had been lost and the farming areas had been devastated, thus compelling the farming community to seek refuge in remote areas or across the border in refugee camps. Some 500,000 people were in camps in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. The severity of the 1992 drought combined with Somali warlords to produce what has been described as "the greatest humanitarian emergency in the world." Unlike previous humanitarian emergencies which were limited to parts of a country, the famine tragedy in Somalia was nation-wide, including the capital city, Mogadishu. So grave and widespread was the famine that by mid-1992 the International Committee of the Red Cross was estimating that malnutrition was afflicting 95 percent of the entire population, "with 70 percent enduring severe malnutrition." By September 1992, ICRC estimated that 1.5 million Somalis were threatened by imminent starvation, while other figures showed that 1.05 million Somalis had fled the country to escape the disaster. Put simply, months

---

33 Ibid., p.8.
34 Ibid.
35 Andrew Natsios, Vice President of World Vision and former Assistant Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), quoted in Jeffrey Clark, *Debacle in Somalia*, 1993, p.212.
after Barre's overthrow, a combination of civil war and famine had reduced Somalia to a graveyard for the living dead.

While governments pondered and politicked over the Somali tragedy as it was relayed by the international media, humanitarian relief organisations (HROs) poured into Somalia on a rescue mission. However, these organisations were soon overwhelmed by the magnitude of the human suffering and by the sheer lawlessness that prevailed over the country. According to one description of the plight of relief workers:

Relief officials were faced with the enormous hurdle of moving a minimally required 60,000 metric tons of emergency rations per month into a country with a destroyed infrastructure and no functioning government, and were also confronted by the most intensive looting ever to plague any relief operation.

By November 1992, some 80 percent of relief commodities were being confiscated. The anarchy and chaos were diminishing the prospects that [the] relief effort would be even minimally effective, and starvation was claiming in excess of a thousand victims a day [thereby prompting widespread] reports that the entire relief operation would have to be suspended, as the risk to the life of relief workers was rising well above acceptable levels.38

Essentially, therefore, Somalia had been thrown into a vicious cycle of famine and violence. As Mohammed Sahnoun put it: "[t]ragically, not only was the... assistance programme very limited but it was also so slowly and inadequately delivered that it became counterproductive. Inevitably fighting erupted over the meagre food supplied."39 The point being made is that, at this stage in Somalia,

... food equalled money and power. Merchants stole food, hoarding it to keep the price high; warlords stole it to feed armies. Hungry individuals possessing loaded automatic rifles took (...) food [to feed themselves]. That is, the chaos and the overall shortage of supplies available to relief groups resulted in a haphazard and uneven distribution of food among clans; part of the looting was a violent and dangerous redistribution effort.40

Paradoxically, however, a secure and orderly environment was required for a balanced and effective distribution of food aid among Somalis. Such an environment was lacking, and so the vicious cycle merely continued, with the

38 Ibid., p.213.
39 Mohammed Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution", 1994, p.9. Sahnoun was referring to the UN relief programme in Somalia which he criticised for its ineffectiveness.
result being that more Somalis were dying as much from starvation as from violence. The central policy challenge that confronted the international community, therefore, was how to break the vicious cycle in order to restore hope in Somalia. But to be of any assistance to Somalia, the international community would first have to recover from its own "crisis fatigue."41

Chapter 2
The Evolution of International Responses
to the Somali Conflict: Regional and
International Dimensions

It has been argued that international intervention in the Somali crisis was "slow" and pathetically erratic. This is puzzling because, according to Mohammed Sahnoun,

Somalia, after all, was and remains a member of the League of Arab States [LAS] and the Organisation of African Unity [OAU]. During the Carter and Reagan administrations Somalia was a close ally of the United States, receiving hundreds of millions of dollars in economic and military assistance. Somalia also retained good relations with the former colonial powers of Britain and Italy, two important members of the European Community. Finally, Somalia was a member of the UN. Any one of these actors could have offered their services as mediators or supported the mediation efforts timidly undertaken by neighbouring countries at various times... When the international community finally did begin to intervene in early 1992, hundreds of thousands of lives had already been lost.1

The reasons for the sluggishness of international responses to the Somali crisis are legion, but few are noteworthy. From the regional point of view, Somalia's history of aggression towards its neighbours and its abiding interest in "greater Somalia" had severely weakened whatever goodwill had existed towards it from amongst the states of the Horn. Somalia's irredentist policy had resulted in several instances of conflict with its neighbours, particularly Kenya and Ethiopia. As an aspiration, "Greater Somalia" or "Somalia for all Somalis" was not limited to the state, the elites and the two post-independence regimes. Rather, it was an aspiration shared by many ordinary Somalis, as was also the case in many African states where some ethnic groups had been split between two colonial and post-colonial states. The defeat of Barre's army by Ethiopia during the Ogaden conflict was seen by many Somalis as a betrayal of their national cause by an incompetent regime. Not surprisingly, mass

---


2 Disenchantment with the Barre regime became more vocal and more widespread soon after the end of the Ogaden war. The consequence of Somalia's irredentist attitude was that it created a nervousness amongst its neighbours who, concerned about Somalia's potential for mounting a credible aggressive campaign, sought and maintained close military co-operation with the major military powers as a form of deterrence as well as insurance. Logically, therefore, these states were unwilling to invest their limited resources in any significant effort to prevent the disintegration of Somalia in 1991.

In addition to the initial lack of enthusiasm on the part of Somalia's neighbours, there was also the problem of inadequate institutional and financial capacity for undertaking any serious regional diplomatic or military initiative to arrest the anarchy and famine in Somalia. Somalia's immediate neighbours - Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti - are each engrossed with some of the most difficult problems of nation-building in Africa. Indeed, in 1991, Kenya, the strongest of these states, was threatened by economic collapse and increased political instability. Ethiopia was on the verge of collapse as a result of the military successes of the separatist movement in Eritrea. In the light of this regional circumstance, it was left to the OAU and LAS to assume the responsibility for mediating the crisis and, if necessary, intervening to re-establish some form of order. The OAU did attempt some mediation, but its limited efforts were characteristically inadequate and lack lustre. On 18 December 1991, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, the Secretary-General of OAU, issued a statement condemning the situation in Somalia: "I continue to be gravely concerned at the continuing fratricidal fighting in Somalia... No differences whatsoever, much less political differences, can justify the random and wanton
The most urgent task at hand is to bring to a speedy end the mayhem and carnage now raging in Mogadishu. In this regard, both parties involved in this fighting have particular responsibility to ensure that there is an immediate cease-fire and normalcy is restored to the city and thus paving the way to dialogue and a peaceful resolution to the conflict. I would like to make a solemn appeal to President Mahdi of the Interim Government and General Aideed [sic] to exercise leadership and put an end to violence and self-destruction which is being visited on the Somali people.

There was little indication from Salim's statement of what the OAU planned to do in the face of the humanitarian disaster if Mahdi and Aideed failed to heed the organisation's call for an immediate cease-fire. However, there was little doubt that the organisation itself badly needed the initiative and assistance of the international community in this regard: "I would... wish to appeal, once more, to the international community at large to respond to the very urgent humanitarian needs of the victims of the conflict in all parts of Somalia by providing assistance especially of food and medicine." On its part, the OAU would "facilitate a meeting between all the parties involved... with a view to elaborating a framework for constructive dialogue."

Following Egypt's request, the LAS took up the Somali problem from where the OAU left off. At its extra-ordinary meeting held on 5 January 1992, the organisation reviewed the Somali situation and decided "to provide Somalia with emergency relief... so as to enable the Somali people to cope with their tragic plight and avert the spectre of famine that threatens them..." To this end, the LAS sought voluntary contributions from its members and the entire Arab
world. Accordingly, it instructed its Secretary-General "to open a special account for Somalia and to take such measures as he may deem necessary to determine and co-ordinate assistance in kind provided by the Member States, and ensure orderly distribution." Surprisingly, and quite in contrast to its acknowledgement of the urgency of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, the LAS relied on voluntary contributions rather than drawing from existing resources. Needless to say that nothing of any significance came out of the LAS resolution which called for an immediate humanitarian relief operation in Somalia. Full-scale famine descended on Somalia towards the end of January, just as the fighting between followers of Aideed and Mahdi intensified.

Any expectation of a regional plan to assist Somalia in any significant way had evaporated by mid-January 1992. This realisation prompted a letter of appeal dated 11 January 1992 from Mr. Omer Arteh Ghalib, Mahdi's hand-picked Prime Minister of Somalia's Interim Government, calling on the United Nations to rush to Somalia's aid:

I am confident that with the background knowledge of the new Secretary-General Dr. Boutros-Ghali and his prior commitment to reconciliation in Somalia, the United Nations will come up with a programme of effective action to end the fighting and contribute to cementing peace and stability in the country.9

In forwarding this letter to the Security Council on 20 January, Mr. Fatun Mohamed Hassan, Somalia's Chargé d'affaires, added his voice to Mr. Arteh's appeal by sounding a note of urgency which reflected the increasingly desperate situation in Somalia and the fear that only a concerted UN-led international effort could alter the path of anarchy in Somalia. According to Mr. Hassan, "[a]s the civil war situation in Somalia is worsening by the day, I support Mr. Arteh's appeal for the Security Council to convene immediately a meeting to consider the deteriorating human dilemma prevailing in Somalia."10

If Somalia's neighbours, the OAU and LAS could not respond quickly and effectively to the security and humanitarian crises in the Horn, the situation is even truer for the rest of the international community which first had to recover from its own "crisis fatigue." Few people seriously expected the OAU or LAS

---

8 Ibid., para. 4.
10 Ibid., p.1 (emphasis added).
to intervene in any significant way in Somalia, for neither of these organisations has had successful experience in this regard. However, expectations were high regarding the possibility and ability of western powers and the United Nations to mount an effective operation to save Somalia from total collapse. Such high expectation was based on the optimistic assumptions of post-Cold War communitarianism; that is, the "peace dividend" of the "new world order." That such high expectations of the international community were not immediately met in Somalia was as avoidable as it was unexpected:

In all this a crisis fatigue may soon set in, for the process will be frustrating and the results often dispiriting. It is by no means self-evident that the west Europeans have the staying power to handle even a selection of the challenges thrown up by the developing disorder in postcommunist Europe, let alone those left in the rest of the world.

By the time the Somali crisis became leading news in the major press rooms around the world in the spring and summer of 1992, the international community was already suffering from "crisis fatigue" as had been predicted by Lawrence Freedman. In 1992, the world was still coming to terms with the enormous psychological, material and human costs of the Sudanese civil war and famine, the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and the resulting "Operation Desert Storm" and "Restore Comfort" (for Kurdish refugees). Worse still, the worsening civil strives occasioned by the sudden disintegration of two major European states, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, produced the spectre of another Balkan conflict, the historical precursor of the two World Wars fought in this century. Consequently, the attention of the leading nations, particularly the only remaining Superpower, the United States, switched away from Somalia to central Europe. Thus, in explaining his country's


12 Mohammed Sahnoun argues quite passionately that the international community could have prevented the Somali tragedy. See his Prevention in Conflict Resolution, esp. pp.5-9.

attitude in this regard, former US Ambassador to Somalia, Mr. T. Frank Crigler, remarked that the United States simply "turned out the lights, closed the door and forgot about the place."\textsuperscript{14}

Not surprisingly, this attitude provided a perfect opportunity for the protagonists in the Somali crisis to rid themselves of all restraints, except those imposed by the limits of their ability, in their quest for relative advantages through military victory. In one description of the anarchy that ensued, Robert Patman wrote that "looting, random killing and banditry was carried out by gangs of Qat-chewing, armed teenagers, known as mooryaan."\textsuperscript{15} In no time, therefore, Somalia was transformed from a land of punt to a land of misery and death where sympathetic foreign aid workers, photographers and journalists were the only important visitors. It was the media attention on Somalia's waste and an uncharacteristic public admonition of western states by the UN Secretary-General that resulted in a concerted international plan of action, led by the US, for Somalia in the summer of 1992.\textsuperscript{16}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Robert Patman, "The UN Operation in Somalia", in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer (eds), \textit{UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s}, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, p. 97. Qat, a local stimulant eaten widely by East African males, is said to be an addictive drug which empowered young men in their quest for things physical, including violent crimes and acts of misdemeanour.
\item The Secretary-General embarrassed western powers when he accused them of obsessive preoccupation with the "rich man's war" in the former Yugoslavia, while neglecting the tragedy in Somalia.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
2.1 The Emergence of a Consensus on an International Emergency Relief Plan for Somalia

International media focus on Somalia generated significant public sympathy in leading donor countries for Somalia's famine-stricken population. In this regard, the television media were very instrumental in bringing live pictures of dying Somalis to the living rooms of their wide audiences around the world. International response to these gruelling pictures was rapid and intense. The international humanitarian relief agencies took the lead in reaching the starving and dying population in Somalia after initial UN humanitarian support teams, led by UNICEF, pulled out of the country due to what they termed "adverse security" considerations. According to Mohammed Sahnoun:

While the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and all the NGOs did their utmost to enhance their programmes and ventured deep inside Somalia to provide emergency relief to the population - despite tremendous danger and difficulties - some UN agencies were arguing that the security situation did not allow a large presence, or sometimes even any presence at all.18

By the end of December 1991, mounting public disapproval of UN performance in Somalia from the media and NGOs, including an uncharacteristic criticism of the world body by the ICRC, led to frantic preparations in New York for a credible UN diplomatic initiative on Somalia. According to UN sources, then out-going Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar formally informed the President of the Security Council about his intention to initiate a peace process in Somalia. As a first step, he despatched a team of senior UN officials, led by Dr. James O. C. Jonah, then Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to assess the situation on the ground and recommend an appropriate course of action.

---

17 Author's interviews with some officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 2 May 1995.
18 Mohammed Sahnoun, *Prevention in Conflict Resolution*, 1994, p.9. This view was also echoed by Jeffrey Clark, who strongly criticised the withdrawal of UN agencies from Somalia at a time when their presence was badly needed by the population. See his *Debacle in Somalia*, p.218.
The Jonah team which arrived in Mogadishu on 3 January 1992 became one of several visits to Somalia by high level UN officials which resulted in a series of "debacles."\(^21\) Jonah's task was to negotiate a cease-fire among the warring factions. Such a cessation of hostilities would permit the unhindered delivery of food aid to the starving population by UN and non-governmental relief organisations. However, the high-powered UN visit got off to a very bad start. In view of the escalating violence in Mogadishu, occasioned by the fractionalization of the USC into the Aideed and Mahdi camps, it was decided that Jonah's team would negotiate separately with the two warlords in their respective strongholds in the city. Such an arrangement entailed logistical problems which required extreme caution on the part of the Jonah team and familiarity with local conditions to avoid any appearance of partiality to one of the parties to the conflict. Unfortunately, as it turned out, some observers have noted that the Jonah team did not appear to possess such local expertise.\(^22\) According to Clark's account:

Two clans neutral in the Aideed/Ali Mahdi clash (the Hawadle and the Murasade) [had] offered to escort Jonah to both Aideed and Ali Mahdi headquarters, and to serve as local peacekeepers. Jonah, apparently unaware of the existence of neutral elements in Mogadishu, made no arrangements to accept the offer. He then fell into a trap set by General Aideed.

Aideed's forces shelled the airport to prevent Jonah's UN plane from landing and had it diverted to an airstrip at Balidogley under the [G]eneral's control; there, Jonah was met by Aideed. Manipulating Jonah's itinerary, Aideed took him on highly visible and extensive tours of territory under his control. When the Jonah party neared the planned point of crossing into Ali Mahdi's northern section of Mogadishu, an angry Ali Mahdi opened an artillery barrage. Jonah fled to Nairobi. The next morning, however, he flew back to northern Mogadishu to (very) briefly visit Ali Mahdi, then publicly announced that Ali Mahdi had agreed to UN intervention in the crisis and that General Aideed stood as the obstacle. Ali Mahdi immediately seconded Jonah's comments, seeing them as underscoring the legitimacy of his interim presidency. Aideed predictably became angry and more distrustful - and more violent.\(^23\)


Upon returning to New York, the Jonah team relayed their verdict to the Secretary-General: "support for a cease-fire in Mogadishu was expressed by all faction leaders, except General Aidid. Unanimous support was expressed, however, for a United Nations role in bringing about national reconciliation." Based on this report, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the new Secretary-General, initiated consultations with members of the Security Council on an appropriate course of action in Somalia. The result of this consultation was the passage of Security Council Resolution 733 on 23 January 1992 by unanimous vote. In this resolution, the Security Council urged the Secretary-General to increase UN humanitarian assistance to Somalia. It also decided, "under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all states shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Security Council decides otherwise." To this end, the resolution requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the OAU and LAS, to contact and seek the commitment of all parties involved in the conflict to: a) cease hostilities, so as to permit the distribution of humanitarian assistance; b) promote and comply with a cease-fire; and c) assist in the process of a political settlement. Thus began a rather precarious relationship between humanitarian assistance, the maintenance of security and political resolution in Somalia.

If the first high ranking UN visit to Somalia led by Under Secretary-General Jonah resulted in a debacle and the heightening of conflict between the warring factions, subsequent visits by high-ranking UN officials, with few exceptions, did little to reverse the situation. When Brian Wannop, the UN's Special Coordinator for Somalia, arrived Mogadishu on 5 February 1992 to formally extend the Secretary General's invitation to Mahdi and Aideed to attend peace talks in New York, Somalia's anarchy had been worsened by the bad blood generated by the UN's acceptance, perhaps "by default," of "Mahdi's status as interim-President." According to some students of Somali politics, Wannop's

26 Ibid., para. 3.
visit further inflamed inter-clan tensions in Somalia by unintentionally undermining the authority of traditional elders:

No clan leaders or elders were invited to discussions with Aideed and Ali Mahdi about proposed peace talks in New York. That the UN apparently accorded the clans little standing made it easier for Ali Mahdi to launch attacks against the smaller clans, which he did the day after the UN issued invitations to the peace talks.28

The continuing violence in Somalia provided further impetus to UN's highest priority: a formal cease-fire agreement between the leading militia in Somalia. At talks held in the New York Headquarters of the United Nations, Aideed and Mahdi agreed on the principles of a cease-fire agreement. Pursuant to this objective, they further agreed to host in Mogadishu a joint high-level delegation comprised of officials from the UN, OAU, LAS and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). This delegation would finalize and witness the signing of a formal cease-fire agreement by the two warlords.

The joint delegation which visited Mogadishu between 29 February and 3 March 1992 succeeded in securing Mahdi and Aideed's assent to an Agreement on the Implementation of a Cease-fire. In this agreement, the two warlords accepted the deployment of a team of UN security personnel to safely escort humanitarian convoys. They also consented to the deployment of "20 military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the cease-fire."29 Aside from the cease-fire monitoring mechanism, the joint delegation reached an understanding with the warring factions on the convening of a national reconciliation conference to decide on the nature and structure of a post-conflict government in Somalia.

Encouraged by the success of the joint delegation's visit to Somalia, the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council a plan to implement the Mogadishu agreement.30 This resulted in the adoption of Resolution 746 by the Security Council on 17 March. This resolution supported the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch a "technical team" to Somalia which would study and recommend for establishment a mechanism both for cease-fire monitoring

---

29 Ibid.
as well as effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{31} This move would precipitate further UN involvement which, according to Adam Roberts, would result in "a humanitarian relief effort [leading] inexorably to a major military action..."\textsuperscript{32} It is to the dynamic nature of UN involvement in Somalia that I now turn.


Chapter 3
The Dynamics of UN Intervention in Somalia

Once initiated, the United Nations involvement in Somalia took on a life of its own. The UN intervention in Somalia between 1922 and 1995 may be categorised into three distinct phases, each with its own mission objective. These are:

a) The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), an observer mission which was characterised by the relentless search for a credible role for the UN in Somalia;

b) The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in which the United States, empowered by the Security Council in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, organised and led a "non-blue-helmeted" multinational force to enforce peace in Somalia;

c) The second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) which saw the return of blue helmets for an essentially peace-building operation in Somalia.

Each of these phases shall be discussed in some detail below.

Table 3.1: UN Intervention in Somalia:
A Chronology of Major Events, 1991-95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description of Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 December 1991</td>
<td>After due consultations with in-coming UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, outgoing Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar formally informs the Security Council of his intention to launch a UN peace process in Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 January 1992</td>
<td>The first high-level UN team, led by Under Secretary-General James Jonah, arrives in Mogadishu to discuss UN humanitarian and peace-building proposals with the leaders of Somalia's principal warring factions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 January 1992</td>
<td>UN Security Council adopts the proposal of the Secretary-General in the form of Resolution 733 which imposes a complete embargo on the delivery of weapons and military equipment to Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-14 February 1992</td>
<td>General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Mr. Ali Mahdi, the leaders of the two principal warring factions in Somalia, meet with officials of the UN, OAU, LAS and OIC at the UN Secretariat in New York to discuss the principles of an immediate cease-fire agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March 1992</td>
<td>In Mogadishu, Aideed and Mahdi sign a cease-fire agreement which provides for a UN security presence to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian supplies to Somalia's famine-stricken population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 April 1992</td>
<td>The Security Council adopts Resolution 751, establishing UNOSOM as a Chapter VI operation. Subsequently, the Secretary-General unveils a 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia and appoints Mohammed Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat, as his Special Representative in Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July 1992</td>
<td>The Security Council adopts resolution 767, requesting the Secretary-General to &quot;make full use of all available means and arrangements&quot; to facilitate UN humanitarian efforts in Somalia. A few days later, the Secretary-General authorises airlift relief operations to Somalia. This is followed immediately with the deployment of an advance party of 50 <em>unarmed</em> UN observers in Mogadishu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 August 1992</td>
<td>Security Council adopts Resolution 775 which authorises the enlargement of UNOSOM by 3,800 troops to stem the deteriorating security situation in Somalia. Surprised by the move, Aideed reacts angrily to the news of UN troop reinforcement and so does Sahnoun who threatens to resign as the SRSG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1992</td>
<td>Under pressure from his bosses in New York, Sahnoun resigns as the SRSG and is replaced by Ismat Kittani, an Iraqi diplomat, amidst rising violence against UN personnel in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November 1992</td>
<td>Amidst increasing media reports of the Somali famine and UN bungling of token relief efforts, Acting US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger visits the UN to communicate to the Secretary-General his government's decision to organise and lead a multinational force to secure Somalia for effective delivery of humanitarian aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 December 1992</td>
<td>Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council adopts Resolution 794, authorising the US-led coalition to use force to secure a conducive environment for the distribution of humanitarian aid in Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 December 1992</td>
<td>The first elements of US Marines that form the bulk of the 37,000-strong Unified Task Force (UNITAF) secure a beach head in Mogadishu at the start of a complex military/humanitarian mission code-named &quot;Operation Restore Hope.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-15 January 1993</td>
<td>UN Secretary-General convenes another set of Somali peace talks in Addis Ababa. Attended by 15 Somali political groups, representatives of the Countries of the Horn and the Secretaries-General of OAU, LAS and OIC, the Addis Ababa conference produces an agreement on the general disarmament of the warring factions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 February 1993</td>
<td>In accordance with its time-table, the US withdraws part of its forces in Somalia and promises to follow through with its original plans to pull out the bulk of its forces by May.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March 1993</td>
<td>The Secretary-General reports to the Security Council the success of the UNITAF mission and proposes the transition from non-blue helmets to blue-helmets under UNOSOM II, with Chapter VII powers. He proposes the expansion of the mandate of UNOSOM II to cover the whole territory of Somalia in the following areas: i) cease-fire monitoring; ii) preventing any resumption of conflict; iii) maintaining control of weapons brought to it in accordance with agreements reached on disarmament; iv) seizing the small arms of all unauthorised militia in Somalia; v) securing or maintaining security at all sea- and airports as well as other lines of communication for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; vi) protecting UN and NGO personnel and installations; vii) clearing mines; and viii) assisting in the repatriation of refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 March 1993</td>
<td>Violent inter-clan conflict erupts in Kismayu, killing more than two dozen Somali civilians and wounding several more, including humanitarian aid workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 March 1993</td>
<td>Rtd. Admiral Jonathan Howe assumes responsibility for the UN operation in Somalia as the new SRSG. His task is to oversee the transition of operations from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The Secretary-General also appoints Lt.-General Çevik Bir of Turkey as Force Commander of UNOSOM II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 March 1993</td>
<td>Following strong accusations by Aideed of UN complicity in the capture of Kismayu by anti-Aideed forces led by General Hersi &quot;Morgan,&quot; the UN suspends national reconciliation talks which had begun in Addis on 15 March.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 March 1993</td>
<td>The Security Council adopts Resolution 814, approving the Secretary-General's proposal for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II with an enlarged mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May 1993</td>
<td>The US formally hands over command of the multilateral enforcement action to UNOSOM II. It, however, leaves behind a sizeable number of its troops and equipment in Somalia and off-shore to assist UN operations if and when needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 June 1993</td>
<td>24 Pakistani troops on a scheduled disarmament verification mission are killed in an ambush. Aideed's faction is implicated in the incident in which 40 other Pakistanis were wounded, 5 taken hostage, 35 Somalis killed and 130 wounded. This marks the return of wide-scale violence against foreign presence in Somalia. It also becomes a turning-point for the entire UN operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 June 1993</td>
<td>The Security Council reacts to the ambush of Pakistani troops with Resolution 837, which condemns the &quot;treacherous act&quot; and demands &quot;firm and prompt action&quot; against &quot;the perpetrators of this crime.&quot; This sets the stage for the progressive escalation of violence in the months to follow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 June 1993</td>
<td>In response to the killing of the Pakistani soldiers, UNOSOM II begins a series of punitive actions against Aideed's forces and installations. US Cobra helicopter gunships are called in to participate in a series of bombing raids against known and suspected Aideed force positions and installations, including Radio Mogadishu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 June 1993</td>
<td>SRSG Admiral Jonathan Howe orders the arrest of General Aideed for his involvement in the death of Pakistani peace keepers. Thereafter chaos ensues as Aideed militia successfully seek every opportunity to frustrate UNOSOM II and to inflict heavy casualties on the UN peace keepers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June 1993</td>
<td>Frustrated by the inability of his forces to apprehend Aideed, SRSG Admiral Howe commits a cultural blunder by announcing a US $25,000 reward for information leading to the capture of General Aideed. Meanwhile, US choppers engage in low-level flights searching for Aideed and also distributing offensive leaflets announcing a ransom for Aideed's capture. These efforts lead to the further degeneration of the security environment in Somalia, which reached an all-time low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 August 1993</td>
<td>The US dispatches 400 of its elite Army rangers to Mogadishu to facilitate the man-hunt for General Aideed. This action not only increases the US profile in the exercise but adds urgency to the task of capturing General Aideed - a task to which the Force Command devotes much of its military and political capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-30 September 1993</td>
<td>UN and Somali militia engage each other in a series of high-profile gun battles resulting in more casualties suffered by Nigerian, Pakistani, Italian, American and Malaysian contingents, among others, including Somali civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 October 1993</td>
<td>Somali militia shoot down two US helicopters carrying elite US Army rangers on a mission to capture an unspecified number of top aides to General Aideed. 5 of the rangers are killed instantly while 18 others die in an ensuing battle with Somali militiamen. When the battle is over, 75 US soldiers have been wounded, and Michael Durant, the pilot of one of the downed choppers, and Shankali of the Nigerian contingent, are taken prisoner by Aideed's militia which suffers even heavier casualties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 October 1993</td>
<td>In a move that would have further escalated the tension in Somalia, the US government responds to the high-profile downing of its choppers by ordering the immediate deployment of additional reinforcements of 5,300 US troops and equipment, including advanced AC-130 &quot;spectre&quot; helicopter gunships to Somalia. Soon after, Washington reverses its policy and begins a downward review of its objectives and commitment in Somalia - a process which will result in the unilateral termination of its involvement and a recourse to diplomatic solution of the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 October 1993</td>
<td>President Clinton announces the appointment of Robert Oakley as his special envoy to Somalia. Oakley's mandate is to secure the release of Durant, and to initiate a diplomatic process for the resolution of the Somali conflict. Four days after Oakley's arrival in Mogadishu, and following extensive discussions with local leaders, Aideed's militia releases Durant and Shankali. Aideed would later be flown by US pilots to attend a new round of peace meetings in Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Date               | Event                                                                
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 October 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 November 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 November 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 February 1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### March 1994
The United States completes the withdrawal of its troops from Somalia, marking the beginning of the end of the entire UN operation in Somalia. Soon afterwards, a number of western states, including Italy, Germany, Turkey and Norway also pull out their forces from Somalia. This leaves UNOSOM II psychologically and materially weak even for the execution of its drastically reduced mandate.

### 2 March 1995
With logistics support provided by the United States military, the UN completes the pull-out of its military and civilian personnel from Somalia, three weeks ahead of schedule. This event marks the formal termination of the UNOSOM II operation. Speaking two weeks earlier in New York about the pull-out operation, Mr. Kofi Annan, Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, said the decision was "deliberate and painful." The world community, he said, can only "facilitate, encourage and assist, not impose or coerce peace." In his reflection on the UN withdrawal from Somalia, the Secretary-General, speaking in Vienna, said he believed that the hopes for a new international order which blossomed at the end of the Cold War had evaporated. He added that he foresees the need to "contract out" more operations to regional organisations or multinational forces led by major powers with special interests in disputes.

### 3.1 Phase I: The First United Nations Observer Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM I)

The immediate outcome of the visit by the technical team to Somalia was the Secretary-General's proposal for a 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, which was presented to the Security
Council for consideration and approval. This proposal came as a response to the unanimous request by Somalia's warring factions for "an urgent and largely humanitarian assistance operation, as well as an important recovery programme." On 24 April, the Security Council adopted Resolution 751 approving the Secretary-General's plan to establish the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), charged with the responsibility of directing all UN activities in Somalia. The Resolution also requested the Secretary-General "immediately to deploy a unit of 50 United Nations Observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu." Four days after the passage of the Resolution, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat, as his Special Representative in Somalia.

Upon arriving in Mogadishu in May to commence the implementation of Resolution 751, Mohammed Sahnoun was confronted with a rapidly degenerating security situation in Somalia. Rather than the groups of warring militia fighting against each other for control of Mogadishu, Sahnoun observed that humanitarian relief workers and their storage depots had become the principal targets of organised violence. Following extensive discussions with the different warlords, Sahnoun shared their concern that "they would lose control of some of the young militia, who might join other unruly youths already engaged in looting" if nothing was done to stem the famine. In light of this concern, therefore, Sahnoun sought to control the availability and use of weapons through a programme of food-for-arms. Thus began the first major disarmament initiative to be undertaken in Somalia without any military support.

In explaining the rationale for the food-for-arms initiative, Sahnoun argued that

Since arms and ammunition were easily available, ... [m]any Somali leaders had requested UN assistance in disarming the population. However, the Somalis would *voluntarily* bring in their weapons only if the food basket was sufficiently attractive.

---

It was also necessary to use some other forms of inducement, such as temporary employment or other activities.5

For Sahnoun, therefore, the appropriate strategy would be to "flood" Somalia with food, for "food scarcities further contributed to the atmosphere of general insecurity that now prevailed within the country."6 Accordingly, he proposed to deliver a minimum of 50,000 metric tons of food per month for the duration of the Secretary-General's 90-day Emergency Plan of Action. The problem, however, was that UN humanitarian agencies could not meet the food target, and even the meagre supplies that were arranged could not be delivered effectively because of logistical inadequacies. As a consequence, the shortage of food amidst worsening mass starvation served only to increase the level of violence in Somalia. According to the Secretary-General's report on the problem:

... in the absence of a government or governing authority capable of maintaining law and order, Somali "authorities" at all levels of society compete for anything of value in the country. Armed threats and killings often decide the outcome. Looting and banditry are rife. Amidst this chaos, the international aid provided by the United Nations and voluntary agencies has become a major (and in some areas the only) source of income and as such is the target of all the "authorities," who may sometimes be no more than two or three bandits with guns. In essence, humanitarian supplies have become the basis of an otherwise non-existent Somali economy.7

On the security front, the implementation of resolution 751 also ran into serious obstacles. The agreement on the deployment of 50 unarmed UN observers in Somalia was contingent upon successful "consultations with the parties in Mogadishu" by the SRSG.8 Pursuant to this requirement, Sahnoun initiated a lengthy process of consultations with the leaders of the major warring factions as well as the traditional rulers of Somalia's major clans. The purpose of this approach, which has been referred to as the "bottom-up" strategy, was to weaken the authority of the increasingly over-demanding warlords by building

---

5 Ibid. (emphasis added).
6 Ibid.
grassroots support for UN activities through the medium of traditional elders. In Sahnoun’s own words:

Our delegation pursued a strategy of putting the clan system to work for Somalia. Agreements among local elders gradually helped to reduce the fighting and allowed food deliveries into the interior of the country. After arduous discussions, and with the help of the elders, we arranged a deal with Ali Mahdi, M. F. Aideed and other faction leaders for the deployment of 500 Pakistani peacekeepers in Mogadishu.9

Notwithstanding the obvious advantages of the bottom-up approach, such as the confidence and trust it generated amongst the warring parties in the UN mechanism, even Sahnoun would concede that the strategy proved to be extremely time-consuming, especially when compared with its results, for “the warlords, particularly Aideed, were in no mood to passively accept the plucking of their feathers.”10 Their success in resisting the gradual erosion of their authority resulted in a significant loss of time for the implementation of the UN initiative. For instance, “[i]t took two months just to persuade Mahdi and Aideed to accept the deployment of the 50 UN observers.”11 The team of observers, drawn from Austria, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco and Zimbabwe, arrived in Mogadishu in July 1992 under the command of Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen of Pakistan as the Chief Military Observer (CMO) of UNOSOM.12

Somalia’s warlords took advantage of the two-month gap between the adoption of Resolution 751 and the deployment of the first elements of UN observers to rearm and strengthen their military position in anticipation of a major showdown. In the process, they would further tarnish the reputation and impartiality of the UN. According to Sahnoun, in one case of rearmament which occurred in mid-June, “a Russian [Antonov] plane with UN markings, chartered by a UN agency [the World Food Programme] had delivered currency and military equipment to the north of Mogadishu, apparently to troops supporting interim president Ali Mahdi.”13 According to the Secretary-General’s

11 Ibid.
assessment, this incident had a negative impact on the processes of negotiations between Mr. Sahnoun and General Aideed (also spelled, "Aidid") for the deployment of UN observers:

General Aideid's faction thereupon accused United Nations personnel of bias and suspended the deployment of United Nations observers. United Nations Headquarters instructed the CMO to remain at his post, whereupon the USC delivered an "expulsion notice" to him and his party.14

The consequence of the clash of wits between the UN and General Aidid was the rapid deterioration of the political and security environment in Mogadishu. This was evidenced by the increased hostility towards foreigners, especially UN and relief workers. Generally speaking, as the frequency and intensity of violence against humanitarian personnel increased amidst increasingly critical media scrutiny, UN officials in New York became even more impatient with Sahnoun's inability to achieve any significant improvement in the humanitarian and security conditions in Somalia. On his part, Sahnoun stepped up pressure on UN headquarters to show "good faith" to all the warring parties in Somalia, especially General Aideed, in view of past and continuing acts which were eroding the faith and confidence of ordinary Somalis in the neutrality of the UN.15 But he also accelerated discussions with leaders of the major warring factions for the deployment of UN security personnel to escort humanitarian convoys, in accordance with Resolution 751. The success of these negotiations was relayed to the Secretary-General who, on 12 August, informed the Security Council that he was ready to deploy 500 "blue berets" to Mogadishu as part of UNOSOM.

Obviously, the co-ordination of logistics and information between field operations in Somalia and UN headquarters must have been inadequate. According to a recent report, "Sahnoun was answerable to three UN Under-Secretaries, and unifying the various UN activities in the field was nearly impossible. His requests for greater autonomy and flexibility were [also] not

---

15 Sahnoun pointed to several incidents of UN chartered flights with "mysterious cargo" which undermined the impartiality of the organisation and his subsequent pleas for a thorough investigation of these incidents (which went unheeded by New York). In his own words: "What is incredible is that although the UN name and reputation were at stake, no serious investigation was undertaken and no legal action for redress was pursued." See his "Prevention in Conflict Resolution," p.11.
met...."16 In Sahnoun's own words: "I still cannot understand why people in New York (who knew nothing of the realities in the field) made hasty and uncalled-for decisions, and still persist in having them implemented despite evidence of misjudgment and the strong objection of the people in the field."17 These gaps in communication and co-ordination led to a series of miscalculations by the UN Secretariat, all of which combined to worsen the humanitarian and security conditions in Somalia. According to Sahnoun:

... the UN headquarters in New York tended to ignore our advice and warnings in sensitive matters related to security. It took a great deal of time and difficult negotiation for our team to reach an agreement for the deployment of 500 UN troops. We were hoping that they would be deployed right away. After all, this was just a small battalion. There is no doubt that had these 500 troops been fully deployed as late as a month after the agreement, i.e. the beginning of September, it would have made an appreciable difference. However, bureaucratic delays (and skirmishes at the headquarters between different departments) led to total confusion. Hence the 500 troops had not even arrived when an announcement was made in New York that over 3,800 troops would be sent to Somalia. This statement was made without informing the UNOSOM delegation in Mogadishu and the leaders of the neighbouring countries, and, worse still, without consulting the Somali leaders and community elders as we had done before.18

The first group of UNOSOM troops, comprising a lone unit of Pakistani soldiers, arrived in Mogadishu on 14 September 1992 to confront a hopelessly anarchic environment. Their task was made even more difficult by the fact that the marauding groups of militia under General Aideed had already considered them [i.e. UN soldiers] to be anti-Aideed. The reason for this perception was rooted in the UN's actions since August, which blatantly negated the prior understanding reached between Aideed and Sahnoun. Robert Patman underscores the nuances underlying this perception:

Aideed appeared to drag his feet [on the] negotiations [preceding] the deployment of the UN security force... Mahdi [by contrast] accepted with alacrity... The protracted discussions reflected Aideed's concern that the introduction of peacekeeping troops would not only erode his competitive position with Ali Mahdi in Mogadishu - his

---

18 Ibid., p.11 (emphasis added).
faction exercised control over the lucrative Mogadishu harbour and airport facilities - but also affect his political base elsewhere in Somalia. Eventually, on 12 August, four months after Resolution 751, Aideed and his SNA allies signed an agreement with Sahnoun for the deployment of the 500 peacekeepers. As part of the agreement, Sahnoun stated that any increase in the number of UN troops would require the consent of Aideed's SNA leadership.19

New York's announcement of a major increase in the strength of UNOSOM, without adequate consultation with the SRSG, would further undermine the SRSG's credibility in future negotiations with Somalia's warring factions. It certainly amounted to a breach of the agreement reached earlier between Aideed and Sahnoun. But, even more fundamentally, that UN headquarters announced such an increase in UNOSOM's force structure without the prior consent of all the parties to the conflict in Somalia was a significant move which was bound to foul the delicate relationship between UN field personnel and local Somali militia and consequently alter the direction and status of the mission as a Chapter VI operation. This raises the following question: why did the UN take such a precipitate action?

As I have mentioned earlier, Sahnoun's "bottom-up" negotiating strategy had resulted in considerable loss of time without producing the desired impact on the dire security and humanitarian situation in Somalia. Meanwhile, at the UN Secretariat some senior officials were not only dissatisfied with Sahnoun's progress, but were also suspicious of his actions and intentions in Somalia. According to Patman, "a suspicion existed within the UN Secretariat that Sahnoun was misreading the Somali situation. With thousands of Somalis dying from hunger each week and warlords like Aideed effectively exercising a veto on UN action, the organisation perceived it faced a crisis of credibility."20

The Secretariat's response to the crisis of credibility took two forms. First, on 22 July the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council explaining "the complex political and security situation in Somalia" and a "comprehensive approach" which the situation required.21

I have therefore come to the conclusion that the United Nations must adapt its involvement in Somalia. Its efforts need to be enlarged so that it can help bring about an effective cease-fire throughout the country, while at the same time pressing forward

20 Ibid., p.102 (emphasis added).
with parallel efforts to promote national reconciliation. This will require the Organization to establish a presence in all regions and to adopt an innovative and comprehensive approach dealing with all aspects of the Somalia situation, namely the humanitarian relief and recovery programme, the cessation of hostilities and security, the peace process and national reconciliation, in a consolidated framework.\textsuperscript{22}

This proposal set forth four principal functional objectives for UNOSOM: a) humanitarian relief assistance; b) cease-fire monitoring; c) security, demobilisation and disarmament; and d) national reconciliation through conciliation, mediation and good offices.\textsuperscript{23} These objectives were predicated on the understanding that "a framework for the security of humanitarian relief operations is the \textit{sine qua non} for effective action."\textsuperscript{24}

This message was further reinforced in another report submitted a few weeks later to the Security Council. In view of the worsening famine situation and widespread looting of relief materials by armed gangs, the Secretary-General in this report recommended an immediate enlargement of on-going airlift operations into Somalia and the establishment of "preventive zones" on the Kenya-Somali border. Because of the massive refugee flows generated by the Somali conflict, the proposal to establish and maintain preventive zones was intended to "reduce significantly cross-border movements of people in search of food" as well as to "contribute to a decrease in frictions that [were] growing in the border area."\textsuperscript{25} By the Secretariat's own estimate, this proposal would require the deployment of "four additional United Nations security units, each with a strength of up to 750, to protect the humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia."\textsuperscript{26} These requests were approved by the Security Council in Resolution 775 of 28 August 1992.\textsuperscript{27} One week later, the Security Council approved yet another proposal from the Secretary-General to increase the strength of UNOSOM by the deployment of three logistic units.

\textsuperscript{22} The Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, Document S/24343, p.11, para. 56 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., pp.11-12, para. 57.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p.12, para. 59. (emphasis in the original).
comprising 719 personnel. These increases brought the total strength of UNOSOM to 4,219 persons by 8 September 1992.

In addition to substantially increasing its profile in Somalia through unilateral measures, the UN Secretariat also effected major changes in its field operations staff in Somalia. In this regard, Mohammed Sahnoun, who had strongly protested against the Secretariat's deployment of additional UNOSOM troops "without proper consultation," was forced to resign his appointment as the SRSG on 27 October. His replacement was Ismat Kittani of Iraq whose task was to cope with increasing demand for co-ordination among expanding UN agencies as well as national contributions to UNOSOM. Above all, Kittani also had to contend with the worsening famine and the deteriorating security environment in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia.

Upon his arrival in Mogadishu in October 1992, Ambassador Kittani met a far more volatile situation than did his predecessor. As might have been expected, General Aideed had reacted negatively to the announcement, without prior consultation, of additional UN troop deployment by New York. Therefore, "[c]onvinced that the UN announcement contravened his August agreement with Sahnoun, Aideed threatened to send UN troops home in bodybags." Like many Somalis, he saw the announcement as a prelude to UN "invasion" of their country. In a distress letter dispatched to the President of the Security Council on 24 November 1992, the Secretary-General underscored the danger to the UN operation of such a "widespread perception among Somalis that the United Nations has decided to abandon its policy of co-operation and is planning to "invade" the country." This perception, along with Aideed's strong opposition to increased UN military presence, was strengthened further by the sudden replacement of Mohammed Sahnoun - ostensibly because of his consensual diplomatic approach in Somalia - with Ismat Kittani as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSR) in Somalia.

---

28 For detailed analysis of the deployment of these troops, see Samuel Makinda, *Seeking Peace in Somalia*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993.
32 On this, Robert Patman, citing a senior UN official, writes that upon arrival in Mogadishu, Kittani, Sahnoun's successor, "soon reached the conclusion that Aideed would never agree to a substantial UN peacekeeping presence" (*Ibid.*, p.102). The deterioration of the security situation afterwards would therefore support the general assessment that Sahnoun's
The consequence of this development was that the general security environment in Somalia rapidly deteriorated at a pace that required a complete re-evaluation of the principles and methods of UNOSOM. In reporting to the Security Council the new security challenges brought about by the pervasive "invasion syndrome" in Mogadishu, the Secretary-General submitted that the situation could not be halted by the military resources currently available to UNOSOM, and recommended "the deployment... of the four additional UNOSOM battalions... as quickly as possible."33

3.2 Phase II: "Option 4", The United States, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and "Operation Restore Hope" in Somalia

Despite concerted efforts by officials in Washington to treat the Somali crisis as a humanitarian issue that was best handled by international relief agencies, the intensity of American media focus on the failure of ongoing UN humanitarian efforts in Somalia finally brought the subject to the attention of the White House towards the end of summer 1992. By the beginning of fall, a consensus began to emerge in Washington (and the UN Security Council as well) that "[o]nly a dramatic change in the security situation could hold back the deadly slide toward national self-destruction" in Somalia.34 Andrew Natsios, who served as President Bush's co-ordinator of relief programme in Somalia, has argued recently that the turning point in US policy towards the Somali crisis was an Oval Office meeting of the President's National Security team in mid-November 1992.35 At that meeting, President Bush instructed his top national consultative or consensual bottom-up approach to the conflict had endeared him to the locals, including the warlords, and that this had contributed to the lack of major war between the warring factions and UN forces as occurred after his departure. For further details, see Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia", 1993, pp.224-225; Samuel Makinda, Seeking Peace in Somalia, 1993; and Robert Patman, "The UN Operation in Somalia", 1995 p.102.

35 Ibid., p.144, fn. 11. Present at this meeting were President Bush (presiding); General Colin L. Powell, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser; Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense; and Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of
security advisers "to do whatever was necessary to stop the starvation in Somalia."\textsuperscript{36}

The outcome of this process was the Bush administration's decision to dispatch a sizeable contingent of US forces led by the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) to Mogadishu to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{37} This decision was communicated to the UN Secretary-General by the US Acting Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, on 25 November 1992. According to UN sources, Mr. Eagleburger informed the Secretary-General that "should the Security Council decide to authorise Member States to ensure the delivery of relief supplies, the United States would be ready to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, in which a number of other Member States would also participate."\textsuperscript{38} On the strength of this information, the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council the following set of policy options designed to "create conditions for the uninterrupted delivery of relief supplies to the starving people of Somalia."\textsuperscript{39}

**Option 1: Strict adherence to the principles and practices of traditional UN peacekeeping.** This option would force the United Nations to stay the course of traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI of the Charter, requiring the consent of the parties to the conflict.\textsuperscript{40} That being the case, the objectives

---

\textsuperscript{36} Ib\textsuperscript{id}, p. 135 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{37} Initial orders to prepare for possible deployment in Somalia were sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 1 MEF on 20 November 1992. That gave Lieutenant-General Robert Johnston, Commander of 1 MEF, 19 days to plan to for the deployment of his forces by 9 December. For details, see F. M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia", *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No 4, Winter 1995, pp. 27-41.

\textsuperscript{38} DPI, *The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia*, 1994, p. 6 (emphasis added).


and practices of the UNOSOM mission would proceed as planned with the authorised deployment of additional 4,200 blue helmets if an agreement to that effect was reached with General Aideed. The problem with this option, however, was that

Several of the de facto authorities, including especially General Aidid, have refused to agree to the deployment of United Nations troops in areas where the need for humanitarian relief is most acute. Even when they have agreed, their subsequent cooperation with UNOSOM has been at best spasmodic and, by their own admission, they do not exercise effective authority over all the armed elements in the areas which they claim to control.41

Put simply: "[t]he reality is that there are at present very few authorities in Somalia with whom a peace-keeping force can safely negotiate an agreed basis for its operations."42 Essentially, therefore, traditional peacekeeping does not and cannot work in a stateless society.43 That being the case, the Secretary-General concluded that Option 1 "would not in [the] present circumstances be an adequate response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia."44

**Option 2: Immediate cessation of the experiment in humanitarian intervention.** This option called for the immediate withdrawal of UN military personnel in Somalia as a first step towards abandoning the idea of using international military personnel to protect humanitarian activities as envisaged by proponents of humanitarian intervention.45 In the light of initial objections

---

41 Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, Document S/24868, p.2.
42 Ibid.
44 Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, Document S/24868, p.2.
to the introduction of military personnel in Somalia by some humanitarian NGOs, the Secretary-General reckoned that this option would allow the humanitarian agencies in Somalia "to negotiate the best arrangements they can with the various faction and clan leaders." As in Option 1, the Secretary-General highlighted the weaknesses of this arrangement. While acknowledging the merits associated with Option 2, especially in the eyes of some important non-governmental relief organisations, the Secretary-General rejected it but less on grounds of practicality than on principle as well as the model's negative long-term impact. In his own words:

The experience of recent months has been that, without international military protection, the [humanitarian] agencies have felt obliged to pay what is in effect protection money to the various factions, clans and sub-clans. If the international community were to allow this to continue, it would be committing itself to an endless process in which less and less of the aid it provided would reach vulnerable groups and in which lawless trading in that aid would become, even more than at present, the foundation of Somalia's economy. Such an outcome would encourage further fragmentation and destroy hopes of national reconciliation.

Accordingly, the Secretary-General argued for measures that would involve a stronger military presence because, in his view, "[t]he current difficulties are due not to their [i.e. UN military personnel] presence but to the fact that not enough of them are there and that they do not have the right mandate."

**Option 3: Deterrence through the deployment of a massive military force under UN command and control.** This option would allow the UN to deploy and maintain a significant military presence in Somalia beyond the level envisaged in any of the existing resolutions. Such a force would have the means and authority to create the conditions for the safe delivery of humanitarian relief as well as deter local factions "from withholding co-operation from UNOSOM." Such massive deployment would be based on the belief that "a determined show, and if necessary use, of force by UNOSOM would be enough to convince those..."
who are currently abusing and exploiting the international relief effort that they should cease their lawless activities.49

Essentially, therefore, the purpose of Option 3 was to extract consent from Somalia's warring factions through intimidation or, failing that, through the instrument of coercion. If this option smacks of Machiavellian diplomacy, it is because, as the following report describes it, the military scenario in Somalia had become one of survival of the fittest.

The troops in the city number several thousand when counting all the clans, sub-clans and free-roaming bandits. In Mogadishu South alone, there are approximately 150 "technical" vehicles. Each vehicle carries a heavy machine gun or 106 mm RR anti-tank gun. In each of these vehicles there are 8 to 12 soldiers armed mainly with AK 47s, G3 rifles and anti-armour RPG-7. The local forces have no uniforms and no communication... The state of training of these troops is unknown but almost all would have some kind of combat experience and they know how to operate all their weapons. The condition of their weapons is surprisingly good; ammunition is old but plentiful and still operational. In addition, they have several operational armoured wheeled vehicles with cannons of 20 mm and dump trucks with twin 30 mm AA guns. It must be assumed that the equivalent military force exists in Mogadishu North. Both sides have indirect fire capabilities (mortars, field guns and free flight rockets).50

In the view of the SG, Option 3 suffered from one major defect, and that is that the United Nations lacked the resources and organisational capacity to embark on a military operation on a scale wide enough to create "conditions throughout Somalia for the secure delivery of relief supplies."51

Option 4: Recourse to a country-wide enforcement operation undertaken by a group of Member States authorised to do so by the Security Council.

This option had all the benefits of Option 3 but without its attendant risk of failure arising from resource as well as command and control limitations. Barring any difficulties in assembling a group of Member States with the capacity and willingness to undertake such a mission, Option 4 had the advantage of accomplishing the mission of providing security for humanitarian supplies in Somalia with limited financial burden on the United Nations. But it

49 Ibid., p.4.
50 Report of the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, quoted in Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, Document S/24868, p.4.
51 Ibid.
also presented its own logistical and legal problems, and risked the possibility of degenerating into some form of unilateralism.

In light of these limitations, the Secretary-General cautioned that "[i]f the members of the Security Council were to favour this option, my advice would be that the Council should seek to agree with the Member States who would undertake the operation on ways of recognizing the fact that it had been authorized by the Security Council and that the Security Council therefore had a legitimate interest in the manner in which it was carried out." He then recommended various ways of responding to these weaknesses:

The enabling resolution could underline that the military operation was being authorized in support of the wider mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General to provide humanitarian relief and promote national reconciliation and reconstruction in Somalia. The initial authorization could be for a specific period of time and the Member States concerned could be asked to furnish the Security Council with regular reports, on the basis of which the Council would, at specified intervals, review the authority it had given for the operation to take place. It could also be stated in the enabling resolution that the purpose of the operation was to resolve the immediate security problem and that it would be replaced by a United Nations peace-keeping operation, organized on conventional lines, as soon as the irregular groups had been disarmed and the heavy weapons of the organized factions brought under international control.

These proposals, aimed at limiting the action and duration of the military operation undertaken by a group of member states, were based on the assumption that those states would be willing to commit their forces for an extended period of time. The events of the weeks that followed the acceptance of this option would contradict this assumption.

**Option 5: Country-wide enforcement action under UN command and control.** This option would underline the collectivity of international peace and security under the aegis of the United Nations. However, like Option 3, the reality was that the United Nations lacked the resources, administrative mechanism and capability for any meaningful independent enforcement action on a significant scale. According to the Secretary-General, "[t]he Secretariat, already overstretched in managing greatly enlarged peace-keeping commitments, does not at present have the capability to command and control

52 Ibid., p. 5 (emphasis added).
53 Ibid. (emphasis added).
an enforcement operation of the size and urgency required by the present crisis in Somalia.\textsuperscript{54} Because of this weakness, he argued and recommended that:

the Security Council take a very early decision to adjust its approach to the crisis in Somalia... The focus of the Council's immediate action should be to create conditions in which relief supplies can be delivered to those in need. Experience has shown that this cannot be achieved by a United Nations operation based on the accepted principles of peace-keeping. \textit{There is now no alternative but to resort to Chapter VII of the Charter...} If forceful action is taken, it should preferably be under United Nations command and control. If this is not feasible, an alternative would be an operation undertaken by Member States acting with the authorization of the Security Council. In either case the objectives of the operation should be precisely defined and limited in time, in order to prepare the way for a return to peace-keeping and post-conflict peace building.\textsuperscript{55}

As might have been expected, the Security Council chose Option 4. The Council's adoption of Resolution 794 by unanimous vote on December 3, 1992 marked a watershed in the history of United Nations efforts in the area of conflict resolution. Based on the argument that the "complex and extraordinary" character of the Somali conflict called for an "immediate and exceptional response," the Security Council determined that "the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, \textit{constitutes a threat to international peace and security.}\textsuperscript{56} Accordingly, the Council, \"[a]cting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations," mandated \"the Secretary-General and Member States co-operating to... use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.\textsuperscript{57}\" In accordance with the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council ceded command and control of the forces to "the Member States concerned," but requested the first of regular reports on the progress of the operation within fifteen days of the passage of Resolution 794.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 6 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ibid.}, para. 10 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Ibid.} Cf. paras. 8, 12 and 18.
The day following the adoption of Resolution 794 by the Security Council, US President George Bush formally announced the commencement of "Operation Restore Hope" (ORH) which would be directed by a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) under the command of Lieutenant-General Robert Johnston of the US Armed Forces. The first elements of the US military contingent to ORH landed the beaches of Mogadishu on 9 December 1992, and in no time UNITAF was able to establish a military presence sufficient enough to deter and punish, when necessary, the warring factions in Somalia (see Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Composition of UNITAF as at 7 January 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troop Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAXIMUM FORCE STRENGTH</strong></td>
<td><strong>37,000 (including 8,000 US troops stationed at sea)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Troops forming an advance party for UNITAF were also drawn from the following countries: Australia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, Tunisia and Zimbabwe.

By definition, UNITAF was a "non-blue helmented" operation, that is, "an operation in which the Security Council authorises or requests Member States voluntarily to take certain actions" to maintain international peace and security.59 Usually, the states initiating such operations bear the financial

burden, in exchange for a non-UN command and control structure. In the case of UNITAF, the United States wrote the mandate, and it did so with the advantage of accumulated lessons of experience from previous international military interventions, particularly Operation Desert Storm. According to students of US military strategy, the Pentagon plan for UNITAF was based on the "Powell Doctrine," which calls for the deployment of massive military force in a US operation adjudged to be "militarily do-able," with a clear political authority (mandate), and a defined plan for entry and exit. According to Lieutenant-General Barry McCaffrey, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the US Joint Staff, this doctrine is especially important in cases of "aggravated peacekeeping" operations, such as in Somalia, which are complicated by the "intransigence of one or more of the belligerents, poor command and control of belligerent forces, or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy." Based on these considerations, the mandate for UNITAF was cautiously drawn up to be limited in scope, time and objective. Consistent with its mandate, UNITAF's operational mission statement defined the objectives of Operation Restore Hope as:

---

60 Ibid. Aside from UNITAF, other examples of "non-blue helmeted operations" cited by Mrs. Albright include "Operation Turquoise" undertaken in Rwanda by France; "Operation Desert Storm" by a US-led coalition in Kuwait/Iraq; and "Operation Liberty" undertaken in Liberia by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These are different from "blue helmeted" operations which are authorised by the Security Council with an established UN chain of command under which contributing states agree to place their forces. These are the more common UN operations; they are funded entirely by the United Nations and their operational mandates are written and approved by the Security Council.


a) securing seaports, airstrips, and food distribution points;
b) providing security for relief convoys and the operations of relief agencies; and
c) assisting UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in providing relief to the famine-stricken population.

To accomplish these mission objectives, American military planners developed a "three-track" approach to the problem of anarchy in Somalia. According to Lieutenant-General McCaffrey, military actions were planned, in phases, to focus on the following tasks:\(^{64}\)

i) Establishing security in Mogadishu and other famine-stricken parts of Somalia. This would involve a programme of voluntary disarmament and cantonment of militia in exchange for material rewards and retraining for civilian life;

ii) Assisting NGOs and private volunteer organisations in the delivery of humanitarian relief. This would involve providing military escort for humanitarian relief supplies, thus putting an end to the use of Somali "technicals" by humanitarian agencies for providing security;

iii) Commencing early efforts to restore some semblance of law and order by encouraging the creation of an indigenous political authority and police force. This would involve establishing contact with, and encouraging dialogue between, the remnants of Somalia's political, religious and traditional elites as well as the leaders of the military factions. For this task, the UNITAF military command sought and obtained a visible civilian equivalent in the form of the US Liaison Office (USLO), headed by Mr. Robert Oakley.\(^{65}\)

The US Central Command (USCENTCOM), which was in charge of the Somali operation, planned ORH in four phases. In the first phase US marine amphibious forces, assisted by elements of UNITAF, would secure the airfield and seaport in Mogadishu. Thereafter the forces would move inland to secure

---


For reasons of domestic politics, President Bush was unwilling to commit American troops for an extended period of military action in Somalia. Indeed, barely one week after the commencement of Operation Restore Hope, Washington declared its Somali mission a success and began to urge the United Nations to commence planning for the deployment of blue helmets to take over from UNITAF as early as March 1993. This request was formalised in a letter circulated to members of the Security Council by Mr. Edward Perkins, US Ambassador to the United Nations, on 17 December 1992 - just one week after the first elements of US forces landed in Somalia. In this letter, the US government indicated that the Somali operation was "proceeding generally as planned" and pointed to "positive indications that operations will continue successfully." It then suggested that the transfer of responsibility might proceed ahead of schedule: "This transfer may occur concurrently with other phases as peace-keeping forces are available to assume responsibility for secured areas."
The Problem of Transition from UNITAF: Differing Perspectives from the UN Secretariat and the United States Government

US Ambassador Perkins's letter to the United Nations was the first official and public indication of the disagreement between the UN secretariat and the Bush administration over the objectives and duration of the US-led multinational operation in Somalia. The disagreement centred on three critical issues: a) the timing and scope of disarmament; b) the geographical limits of the UNITAF mission; and c) the duration of Operation Restore Hope. As I stated earlier, disarmament was not an integral component of US military planning for the Somali mission. The reason is simply that the political consultations that had taken place in Washington between the White House and the Congressional leadership underscored caution, do-ability and the necessity for avoiding "mission creep" as the defining variables in mobilising the support of the American public for US military involvement abroad, even in a desperate humanitarian situation such as Somalia’s.69 As far as the White House was concerned, the basis of US political consensus on ORH would be eroded if disarmament was inserted into the mission mandate. Such a mandate would increase the length of the US mission as well as the risk factor - that is, the greater likelihood of American casualties. On account of the latter, the Bush administration did not want to tarnish its impressive military record with an ambitious intervention in Somalia with little promise of generating political capital for his outgoing regime. But the administration also saw the need for some form of disarmament to be undertaken once the mission was underway. In that case, the decision of when and to what extent Somalis would be disarmed will be made in conformity with the military situation on the ground. Put simply, Washington’s view was that disarmament was not a priority but that it might be undertaken if deemed necessary by the US military in Somalia. If it was undertaken, it would be limited, voluntary and conducted on an ad hoc basis.70 By contrast, the UN Secretariat viewed disarmament as a priority programme which needed to be accomplished by UNITAF before a transition to UN

command could be effected.\textsuperscript{71} This position was underscored by the UN Secretary-General in a letter he dispatched to President Bush on 8 December 1992:

... any forceful action by the international community in Somalia must have the objective of ensuring that at least the \textit{heavy weapons} of the \textit{organized factions} are neutralized and brought under international control and that the \textit{irregular forces and gangs} are disarmed. Without this action I do not believe that it will be possible to establish the secure environment called for by the Security Council resolution...\textsuperscript{72}

The consequences of these differing positions for the disarmament process in Somalia will become obvious in the discussions of chapter 4. Meanwhile, suffice it to mention that preparations for the transition to a post-UNITAF operation proceeded in spite of the inability of the UN and the US government to resolve their conceptual and operational differences on this important subject. Similar disagreements over whether and how to administer Somalia, as well as the scope and duration of the UNITAF operation, were not resolved until the transition to the second phase of UNOSOM in the spring of 1993.\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{3.3 Phase III: The Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)}

The challenges facing UNOSOM II in Somalia are much more formidable than those faced by UNITAF. UNOSOM II has assumed responsibility for disarmament and nation-building tasks that were outside the scope of the UNITAF mission. The challenge for UNOSOM II is to accomplish the expanded mission without becoming embroiled in the factional fighting to the point of backing one faction against the others. Whether the United Nations will succeed can best be expressed by a phrase common in the Moslem world: "En Sh\'Allah", - if it is willed by God.

F. M. Lorenz\textsuperscript{74}
At the insistence of the United States, the UN Secretariat reluctantly began planning for a transition from UNITAF to a second United Nations military operation in Somalia in late January 1993. At that time, the general perception was that the non-blue helmeted forces had brought some order to Mogadishu and surrounding areas, thus paving the way for a more effective distribution of relief aid to the local population. In the words of the UNITAF command, "all areas [were] stable or relatively stable." The reality, however, was that the security situation in Mogadishu and in much of Somalia remained quite dicey. According to the Secretary-General,

Whilst the general security situation has improved considerably, the security threat to the personnel of the United Nations, UNITAF and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is still high in some areas of the city of Mogadishu and other places, including Bardera, Bale Doble [sic] and Baidoa. Inter-clan fighting still tends to break out from time to time, along with sniper attacks.76

[In short], the unique features of the situation [in Somalia] continue to prevail. There is still no effective functioning Government in the country. There is still no organized civilian police force. There is still no disciplined national armed force. ... [T]he atmosphere of lawlessness and tension is far from being eliminated.77

Given such an environment, a post-UNITAF operation had to assume the limited security tasks of the multinational force under Operation Restore Hope in addition to the responsibilities for rebuilding Somali state and society in accordance with the principles enshrined in Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace.78 This was precisely what the Secretary-General recommended for UNOSOM II.

---

75 Quoted in the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, Document S/25354, New York: United Nations, 3 March 1993, p.2, para. 6. UNITAF activities were limited to the southern and central parts of Somalia, which collectively amount to 40 per cent of the country's territory.


The UNOSOM II Mission Mandate

The mandate of UNOSOM II is as extensive as the Secretary-General's analysis of the problem of Somalia. In recommending the mandate for the approval of the Security Council, the Secretary-General explained that:

The mandate for UNOSOM II... would confer authority for appropriate action, including enforcement action as necessary, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II would seek to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. The mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali state based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.79

This broad mandate required UNOSOM II to undertake the following military tasks:

a) to monitor the existing cease-fire agreement between the warring parties;
b) to prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, to take "appropriate action against any faction that violates or threatens to violate the cessation of hostility;"
c) to maintain control of the organised factions after their disarmament and encampment in transition sites;
d) to secure and maintain a register of small arms seized from all unauthorised armed elements in Somalia;
e) to maintain security of all ports, airports and lines of communication required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
f) to ensure the protection of personnel, installations and equipment belonging to the UN and humanitarian agencies;
g) to continue the de-mining programme in the most affected areas; and
h) to assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.80

---

80 Ibid., p.13, para. 57.
This mandate was given legal backing by the Security Council with the adoption of resolution 814 of 26 March 1993. UNOSOM II thus became "the first operation of its kind to be authorized by the international community" under UN command.\textsuperscript{81} It also became an eloquent expression of the determination of the international community "not to remain a silent spectator to the sufferings of an entire people for no fault of their own."\textsuperscript{82} Put succinctly, UNOSOM II became the first empirical test of Boutros-Ghali's UN-centred theory of post-Cold War international community as postulated in his \textit{Agenda for Peace}. Pursuant to the new mandate, the Secretary-General appointed (Retired) Admiral Jonathan Howe of the United States as his new SRSG in Somalia, and Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir of Turkey as the Force Commander of UNOSOM II.

By April 1993, UNOSOM II had attained a significant level of military presence following the deployment of about 18,000 multinational forces out of a projected maximum force capacity of 28,000 troops (see Table 3.3). With forces contributed by about thirty-three states, UNOSOM II became the largest multinational force ever assembled under the direct control of the United Nations Secretary-General. This fact, in addition to the extra-ordinarily wide mandate entrusted to it, would create enormous problems for the mission, especially in the area of command and control. Due to a combination of political misjudgments and military miscalculations, UNOSOM II soon became embroiled in a series of combat actions with Somali militia from May 1993 onward.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p.22, para. 101.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
Table 3.3: Composition of UNOSOM II as of 30 April 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>7,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18,404</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between June and October 1993, UNOSOM II suffered heavy and humiliating casualties on a wide scale, thereby prompting international pressure to, first, increase its numerical strength and firepower (see Table 3.4) and, second, to embark on a complete and critical review of its approach towards the Somali crisis. The consequence of such a review was the rapid, albeit largely de facto and unilateral down-sizing of the mission strength and mandate throughout 1994. The withdrawal of many national contingents from the mission, especially those of the western countries, severely weakened the military and psychological capability of UNOSOM II to accomplish its objectives in Somalia. It therefore became only a matter of time before the mission would be formally terminated. On 4 February 1994, the Security Council passed resolution 897, "reaffirming the objective that UNOSOMII complete its mission by March 1995."83 The UN pull-out from Somalia was begun and completed ahead of schedule. By 2 March 1995, all UN personnel had been evacuated from Somalia, albeit without accomplishing their mission: disarming the factions and bringing an end to the conflict. In declaring the UN Somali mission closed, the Secretary-General lamented the failure of the Organisation to achieve its objective in Somalia: "If there is not the political will among the protagonists, we cannot achieve peace."84 In the section that follows, I shall single out, for in-depth examination, the implementation of the disarmament programme in the hope of shedding some light on why the United Nations operation in Somalia failed.

---

### Table 3.4: Composition of UNOSOM II as of November 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Force Nomenclature and Task Description</th>
<th>Total Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Movement Control</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Brigade (BDE) HQ Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Infantry Company</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Staff Personnel</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>BDE HQ, Infantry Battalion, Aviation Unit and Logistical Battalion</td>
<td>1,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Logistical Units</td>
<td>1,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Medical Unit</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>BDE HQ and 3 Infantry Battalions</td>
<td>4,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Transport Company</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>BDE HQ, 3 Infantry Battalions, Aviation Unit, Logistical/Engineering Unit, Medical Unit</td>
<td>2,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Infantry Company</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Infantry Battalion and 1 Support Unit</td>
<td>1,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Security Company</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Supply Unit</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Recce Battalion</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Headquarters Company</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Unit Description</td>
<td>Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>BDE HQ, Infantry Battalions, 4 Tank Squadrons, Signal Unit and Support Unit</td>
<td>5,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Field Hospital</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Field Hospital</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Infantry Company</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Logistical Units</td>
<td>3,017*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Infantry Battalion and Signal Company</td>
<td>958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite</td>
<td>Military Police Company</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite</td>
<td>Headquarters Staff</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>29,284</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This figure includes only those US forces under United Nations command. There were also about 17,700 troops (including the Quick Reaction Force) belonging to the United States Joint Task Force in Somalia, but under the sole command of the United States.
Chapter 4
The Task of Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

Disarming the factions and placing their heavy weaponry under international control for eventual destruction or placement at the disposal of the new national army of Somalia is, in my view, the most urgent and pressing task for UNOSOM II.

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Any disarmament or political agreement [in Somalia] will rest as much upon the appearance of alternatives to the thousands of militia members conditioned to surviving by force as it will upon the restoration of civilian administration of the country.

Jeffrey Clark

As stated in the preceding section, there were two differing views on disarmament in Somalia. First, the Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat saw disarmament as central to any international effort at restoring security and ensuring the efficient distribution of humanitarian aid in Somalia. In other words, the United Nations held the view that disarmament was the raison d'etre for international military intervention in Somalia. Second, and by contrast, the United States appreciated the importance of disarmament but not well enough to have it written into the mission mandate. The consequence of this divergence was a situation in which the organisation which desired the vigorous implementation of a disarmament programme in Somalia lacked the capability necessary to back it up, whereas the body with the capacity to disarm Somali units and irregulars lacked the will to do so. As the discussions that follow will soon demonstrate, this disequilibrium between political will and capability had a profound impact on the conception and implementation of a disarmament programme in Somalia.

---

4.1 Disarmament as a Mission Task in Somalia

As a concept, disarmament involves deliberate efforts to limit, reduce, abolish and/or destroy weapons and force structures of real or potential military/combat value. Such measures include the establishment of weapons exclusion zones, the collection and/or seizure of weapons for storage or destruction, the imposition of arms embargoes, demining activities, the imposition of restrictions on the number and movement of troops, as well as the cantonment and demobilisation of troops and armed individuals.3 In Somalia, all of these elements of disarmament were mandated and/or implemented as mission objectives with varying degrees of difficulty and success.

The United Nations disarmament policy and programme in Somalia began with the adoption of Resolution 733 on 23 January 1992 by the Security Council. In that resolution, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, decided that "all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Security Council decides otherwise."4 International compliance with the arms embargo relied on the goodwill of Member States. States were merely enjoined to respect the embargo and to refrain from any action which might contribute to the escalation of tension in Somalia. However, arms continued to find their way into Somalia through the country's land and sea borders. With the sudden collapse of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, Somalia was awash with weapons which were easily transported by fleeing Ethiopian forces across the border from the Ogaden region. To put the problem in perspective, Table 4.1 shows the dollar value of weapons that were freely circulating along the Somali/Ethiopian border as a consequence of the simultaneous collapse of the Barre and Mengistu regimes. Excluding the lucrative arms trade originating from Kenya, statistics show that more than US$18.26 billion worth of arms and ammunitions imported by Ethiopia and Somalia between 1972-1990 had circulated in and around Somalia since the outbreak of conflict. In comparative terms, this figure more than doubles the combined dollar value of all weapons imported during the same period by South Africa, Nigeria and Zimbabwe - the

---

3 See UNIDIR's DCR project definition as per Practitioners' Questionnaire, January 1995, pp.v-vi.
three major arms importing states in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 4.1). In the absence of any significant military presence to monitor borders and enforce the embargo, these weapons, of varying degrees of lethality, continued to flow freely into Somalia. This had the effect of rendering the UN arms embargo ineffective as a means of disarmament in Somalia.

Table 4.1: Comparative Statistics of Arms Deliveries to the States of the Horn and Three Leading Arms Importers in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1972-1990 (in US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1,734</td>
<td>1,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>4,970</td>
<td>10,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>3,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2,144</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), which was authorised in April 1992 by resolution 751, established a United Nations military presence in Somalia with a token force of 50 observers. Although additional troop deployment was authorised by subsequent resolutions, the strength and capability of UNOSOM I remained modest and hopelessly inadequate even for the limited purpose of policing Somalia's vast land and coastal borders. In operational terms, short of relying on the "soft power" inherent in their physical presence in Somalia, UNOSOM I lacked any coercive capability to implement their mandate, namely: monitoring the arms embargo.

Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, see comments in point 7 on "Bottom-Up Changes: disputes among the warring parties arising during the mission".
and the cease-fire agreement between Somali factions; providing security for UN personnel, equipment and supplies in Mogadishu; and escorting humanitarian relief supplies to distribution centres. The glaring failure of this mission in the face of over-armed Somali gangs forced the United Nations to seriously consider other measures to achieve security through a programme of disarmament in Somalia. The enforcement powers granted to UNITAF in December 1992 were designed to enable the multinational forces to establish security in Somalia, if need be through coercive disarmament.  

4.2 The Evolution of an Overall Concept and Plan of Disarmament in Somalia

The first serious all-party effort to initiate and execute an overall concept and plan of disarmament on any significant scale in Somalia began in January 1993 following a series of agreements reached by a dozen Somali factions attending a UN-sponsored peace conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. For purposes of emphasis, Annex III (Part I) of that agreement, spelling out the modalities for disarmament, shall be cited in full:

1.1 All heavy weaponry under the control of political movements shall be handed over to a cease-fire monitoring group for safekeeping until such a time as a legitimate Somali Government can take them over. This process shall commence immediately and be completed in March 1993.

1.2 The militias of all political movements shall be encamped in appropriate areas outside major towns where the encampment will not pose difficulties for peace. The encamped militias shall be disarmed following a process which will commence as soon as possible. This action shall be carried out simultaneously throughout Somalia. The international community will be requested to provide the encamped militias with upkeep.

1.3 The future status of the encamped militia shall be decided at the time of the final political settlement in Somalia. Meanwhile, the international community will be requested to assist in training them for civilian skills in preparation for possible demobilization.

---

6 Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, see comments in point 7 on "Bottom-Up Changes: disputes among the warring parties arising during the mission".
Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

1.4 All other armed elements, including bandits, shall be disarmed immediately and assisted through rehabilitation and integration into civil society.7

Disarmament Under UNITAF: Mission de Facto

For political and logistical reasons, UNITAF did not seek to oversee or enforce the implementation of the disarmament programme as envisaged by the Addis Ababa agreement of 8 January 1993. As stated in Chapter 3, disarmament was not written into the mandate of the UNITAF mission largely because of US opposition. The Bush Administration took the view that the task of disarming Somali irregular and organised militia should be an operational decision to be made by the Field Commander as and when the need arose. Consequently, in planning for ORH, the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) in Florida ensured that adequate allowances were made for the possibility that the troops might take on the task of disarmament as a secondary mission objective. This was reflected in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) issued to US soldiers at the start of the operation.8 According to Colonel F.M. Lorenz of the United States Marine Corps, UNITAF ROE were tailored specifically to deal with the "special circumstances in Somalia," particularly the threat posed to troop security by armed gangs and "technical vehicles."9 In this regard, part of the ROE specifically stated that:

Crew served weapons are considered a threat to UNITAF forces and the relief effort whether or not the crew demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use

---

8 Rules of Engagement (ROE) are defined as "the means by which... national Command Authorities and the military chain of command authorize subordinate commanders to employ military force" in a theatre of operation. However, "[n]othing in the rules of engagement negates the commander's right and obligation to act in defense of his unit." See F. M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia", Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, Vol. 23, No 4, Winter 1993/94, p.29.
9 The term "technicals" is "a symbol of mobile destructiveness in Somalia", resulting from an admixture of human cruelty and technical capacity for destruction. Technical vehicles are trucks refitted to carry crew-served weapons. According to Lorenz, the term "came from the humanitarian relief organizations, which justified expenses for gunmen and security guards as 'technical assistants'" (ibid., p.40, fn. 3). See also Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, point 7 on "Bottom-Up Changes: disputes among the warring parties arising during the mission".
all necessary force to confiscate and demilitarize crew served weapons in their area of operations. **Within areas under the control** of UNITAF Forces, armed individuals **may be considered a threat** to UNITAF and the relief effort whether or not the individual demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use all **necessary force** to disarm individuals in areas under the control of UNITAF. Absent a hostile or criminal act, individuals and associated vehicles will be released after any weapons are removed/demilitarized.\(^\text{10}\)

Couched in this way, UNITAF ROE provided for flexibility, thereby permitting the use of personal initiative on the part of the individual UNITAF field commander and/or soldier in challenging armed individuals and gangs. Obviously, the ROE singled out technicals as a threat, while armed individuals were not so clearly perceived. Generally speaking, this distinction between Somali individual and gangs/groups was evident in the declassified section of the ROE which was later "issued on a card for all personnel of Unified Task Force, Somalia" (see Table 4.2, Section C).\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{10}\) F. M. Lorenz, "Rules of Engagement in Somalia: Were They Effective?", draft manuscript for the *Naval Law Review*, May 1995, p.2 (emphasis in the original but not in ROE).

Implementing the Disarmament Mandate in Somalia

Table 4.2: The Rules of Engagement for US-UNITAF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RULES OF ENGAGEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threats of attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop a hostile act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. When US forces are attacked by unarmed hostile elements, mobs, and/or rioters, US forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. You may not seize the property of others to accomplish your mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REMEMBER

1. The United states is not at war.
2. Treat all persons with dignity and respect.
3. Use minimum force to carry out mission.
4. Always be prepared to act in self-defence.


Although General Johnston, UNITAF Commander, had stated on several occasions that disarmament was not part of his mission mandate, he did permit his senior policy staff to experiment with different models for achieving
Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

disarmament in Somalia. The first of such experiments was a weapons incentive programme, involving "food for guns" rather than the more widely known alternative, "cash for guns," which had been successfully employed to disarm Panamanian forces in 1990. Two reasons accounted for the choice of the food-based incentive as a means of disarmament in Somalia. The first was that UNITAF policy makers feared that the collapse of the Somali state and the country's porous borders would pose a serious impediment to successful disarmament through monetary inducements. According to Lorenz,

... the program potentially would have disarmed the hungry people who needed protection from the bandits. A cash-for-weapons program also would have run the risk of creating more crime by encouraging bandits to steal weapons to turn in, or providing incentives for arms dealers to import more weapons from other parts of East Africa.12

The second and by far more plausible reason is that because disarmament was not part of its mandate, UNITAF did not make adequate financial provisions to support such a resource-consuming programme as a cash-for-arms scheme. Consequently, in the penultimate week of January 1993, the Force Command permitted a small-scale experiment with a food-for-weapons program. Under this program, US Marines issued special receipts for every weapon turned in as well as for information leading to the location and seizure of weapons and ammunition. These receipts conferred on the holders the privileged status of "the good guys" in the eyes of the Marines. (Under conditions of anarchy, this intangible gesture could make the difference between life and death). These receipts also had a tangible benefit: they could be presented to relief agencies in exchange for bags of wheat. Given the acute famine situation in the country, many Somalis preferred to cash their receipts for bags of wheat. With so little food relative to weapons in Somalia, in no time tension began to mount between humanitarian relief agencies and the UNITAF command. In late January, General Johnston decided not to extend the weapons incentive programme beyond its experimental zone, which was only a single sector of south Mogadishu. This decision left weapons confiscation as the other viable means of implementing a disarmament programme in Somalia.

UNITAF's weapons confiscation policy derived its authority from: a) the mission mandate authorising the use of "all necessary means" to assure the delivery of relief aid; and b) the section of the Rules of Engagement which

12 Ibid., p.31.
defined crew-served weapons (i.e. technicals) and armed individuals as threats to the individual soldier and to the overall mission. To avoid complicating the task of the field commanders and troops, the Force Command's weapons confiscation policy avoided listing categories of weapons covered by the programme. Consequently, according to Lorenz, "Commanders were justifiably reluctant to issue complex confiscation rules that required the use of a reference book or a legal interpretation before a weapon could be taken." The policy simply required troops to confiscate "all crew-served weapons and individual weapons displayed openly or brandished with hostile intent." In effect, this meant that individual Somalis could keep weapons at home, and indeed could carry weapons on them insofar as these weapons were hidden from UNITAF soldiers. Even where personal weapons were "displayed," the confiscation policy required individual UNITAF troops to exercise personal judgement in determining whether the weapons so displayed posed a threat to their life. Essentially, therefore, the new policy was a middle ground between doing nothing about disarmament and expending too much political and military capital on disarmament. Consequently, whilst they were still in awe of the overwhelming foreign military presence, Somalis took advantage of UNITAF's rather benign posture and disarmament policy, hiding their weapons in their homes and other places considered to be safe. The organised militia merely pulled back to the villages and outlying districts, waiting for an opportune time to return to the streets. Surprisingly, UNITAF authorities considered this outcome to be evidence of the success of their disarmament policy. As one participant quipped in a recent interview: "What if Somalis buried their guns under their pillows? Insofar as they did not bring their guns out on the streets to disrupt relief supplies, we think our mission was accomplished."

The initial implementation of the weapons confiscation policy brought UNITAF and the humanitarian relief organisations on a collision course. In the context of Somali anarchy, HROs had, over the years, developed coping strategies which allowed them to deliver services to ordinary Somalis. One of

---

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Lieutenant Colonel Sam Butler, interview with the author, 21 March 1995.
16 On the other hand, questionnaire responses point to circumstances forcing civilian/military components to work together during UNITAF operations. The arrival of UN bureaucracy at UNOSOM II generated therefore some resentment and initially restricted goodwill. See Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, point 20 on "Comments on Interaction".
these mechanisms involved the recruitment of "technicals" as security guards for their convoys and storage depots. In many cases, some of these guards turned out to be extortionists and bandits whose victims often included goods and personnel belonging to the HROs. As Colonel Lorenz recounts,

The HROs are the heart of the Somali relief effort, and the mission of UNITAF was to make the environment secure for the relief organizations to do their work. Before the arrival of UNITAF, conditions in Somalia made it necessary for HROs to have a system of ‘security guards’ to conduct business. In Somalia there is a fine line between honest labor and extortion, so it was often difficult to distinguish security guards from bandits. What little economy was left in Somalia was based on the delivery of relief supplies, and security was a large part of the cost of doing business. The most reliable security personnel worked and lived in the walled compounds of the HROs. Other security personnel were ‘day hires’; they reported for duty in the morning and left before dark. There was some concern among UNITAF commanders that many of the day hires turned to banditry at night. If so, the HROs were unwittingly contributing to a system that rewarded extortion and made banditry profitable.

Based on this perception, many commanders ordered their troops to crack down on those bandits who marauded their zones of operation. That meant disarming every armed individual on sight, even if the individual was in the service of HROs. In the absence of standardised rules governing weapons confiscation, every operational zone had its own rules, and this created a nightmare for relief organisations whose personnel often traversed several operational zones in the course of their daily missions. Situations arose whereby the disarmament of every armed individual was compulsory in one zone but merely conditional in another. According to Lorenz, "[o]n some occasions all weapons in a vehicle were confiscated; on other occasions only weapons that were openly brandished were taken. At times, all occupants of the vehicles, including HRO officials, were required to exit and stand back from the vehicles while a detailed search was conducted." The danger resulting from such inconsistency in rule-setting and rule-application was that "if a relief vehicle travelled between sectors and different rules were in effect in each sector, the relief organisation faced the risk that its weapons would be unaccounted for."

17 See Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002 in point 7 on "Bottom-Up Changes: disputes among the warring parties arising during the mission".
19 See Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002 in point 8 on "Protection of the Population During the Mission".
20 Ibid., p.40, fn. 11.
confiscated in one sector and its personnel would be defenceless when entering the adjacent sector," for "it remained impossible to guarantee the security of HROs, particularly in the outlying areas beyond UNITAF control."21 The actual confiscation of weapons belonging to HRO guards during the early period of disarmament implementation prompted high-level HRO officials to petition UNITAF through the Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC).

In mid-January 1993, UNITAF responded to the accumulating petitions by returning confiscated weapons to the HROs, pending the standardisation of rules governing the confiscation of weapons. Such reversal of policy in the middle of programme execution resulted in the asphyxiation of the disarmament process. In April UNITAF issued a standard weapons policy card in both English and Somali, which was to be applicable in all sectors under its control. According to Lorenz, "[t]his card spelled out clearly in words and pictures the few rules that governed who could possess a weapon, what weapons were prohibited, how weapons could be carried, and what acts would result in confiscation of a weapon."22 Although this "card finally cleared up most of the confusion, significantly improving relations between UNITAF and the HROs,"23 the disarmament process lost its steam and did not regain any significant momentum until the period of transition to UNOSOM II.

**Disarmament Under UNOSOM II: Mission de Jure**

As the foregoing section has demonstrated, UNITAF embarked on disarmament as a response to the operational conditions of anarchy in Mogadishu. Not surprisingly, although some weapons were seized by UN forces from Somali gangs, especially the "technicals," such seizures were not widespread, were certainly not country-wide, and were not part of any grand design for disarmament as a mission goal.24 Indeed, it was only in the weeks leading up to the transition to UNOSOM II that a small policy unit named the "Future Operations Office," comprised of senior officers drawn from UNITAF and the Operations Branch of UNOSOM I, was established to develop an overall

---
21 Ibid., p.32.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
disarmament concept and plan for UNOSOM II using the Addis Ababa agreement as a basis.

The overall concept and plan for disarmament which emerged from that committee was presented by the Secretary-General to the Security Council for approval. This plan contained the following distinctive features:

i) Disarmament as a continuous and irreversible process. The idea was to extend the process of disarmament as long as it was considered necessary or until an effective central government had been formed in Somalia. In this way, the disarmament process would not expose compliant elements within the population to the danger arising from mid-course policy reversal;

ii) Disarmament effected through a simple and standardised mechanism. For purposes of fairness to all parties involved in the disarmament programme, this provision called for a uniform mechanism for disarming all factions. This mechanism involved the use of opposing militias within zones and sites mutually identified and accepted for purposes of cantonment prior to the commencement of the operation. As a consequence, "[o]nce a faction had committed itself to disarmament by placing its heavy weapons in cantonment sites or relinquishing its small arms at a transition site, it would not be entitled to reclaim those weapons."25

iii) Disarmament as voluntary and consensual, to whatever extent possible. This provision called for a continuous process of confidence-building between the United Nations and Somali factions through regular contacts and meetings with the leaders of the militias. It was envisaged that this would "place political pressure on factions that [sought] to delay or fail[ed] to comply with the disarmament process and would provide a sense of security for the factions complying with that process."26

Furthermore, to encourage the process of voluntary disarmament, the plan called for the provision of individual incentives to Somali factions and militia. The idea was that the provision of monetary or material incentives in exchange for voluntary disarmament would provide Somali warlords with the opportunity to utilise UN resources to effectively bankroll the retrenchment of their largely undisciplined and potentially

---

26 Ibid., para. 62.
mutinous militia, the majority of whom received little more than meagre rations of food and qat in lieu of salary. For the UN, it was calculated that the benefit of early retrenchment and demobilisation of the militia would be to hasten the process of peaceful resolution of the conflict, and for that reason it was worth the cost of the material inducements. Essentially, therefore, this was the "carrot" factor in the programme;

iv) Disarmament as also enforceable. Regarded as the "stick" factor in the programme, this provision required that "[t]hose factions or personnel who fail[ed] to comply with timetables or other modalities of the process would have their weapons and equipment confiscated and/or destroyed".

v) Disarmament utilising cantonment and transition sites, to be established and maintained under UN protection. According to the plan, a cantonment was defined as "a location where heavy weapons, including all crew-served weapons and anti-armour weapons/rockets, would be stored." Transition sites referred to locations where "factional forces would be given temporary accommodation while they turned in their small arms, registered for future governmental and non-governmental support and received guidance and training for their eventual reintegration in civilian life." Put simply, the mechanism provided for armed Somali individuals or groups to walk into a designated area (i.e., a cantonment) and hand in their weapons to UN officials selected for this purpose. These officials would receive and register the weapons in a log book, and direct the Somalis to another location - a transition site - where their security and welfare would thenceforth become the responsibility of the United Nations until their reintegration into post-conflict life. For reasons of safety and security, the plan required that "cantonment and transition sites should be separated from each other to prevent any temptation by factions or groups to seize the heavy weapons." No weapons placed under UN control could be withdrawn by the militia. Those weapons and ammunition that had been deemed suitable or maintainable by UN officials would be stored in the cantonment sites for

27 Ibid., para. 63.
28 Ibid., para. 65.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., para. 66.
the use of a future Somali government. Those adjudged to be unserviceable or unsuitable would be destroyed by the UN team; vi) UNOSOM II access to transition sites as unlimited. This was essentially a verification mechanism which allowed the United Nations to ensure full compliance with the conditions and provisions of the disarmament programme by the warring factions in Somalia. It permitted UN teams to visit the sites regularly, unconditionally and without prior notice to ensure strict adherence by all parties to the programme.

By the end of April, UNITAF and the UN had completed an operational plan for a "continuous and irreversible" process of disarmament in Somalia. At this stage, according to some sources, the Force Command and staff of UNITAF began to see disarmament as an important, even if unmandated, component of their mission in Somalia. This change of perception led to an early effort on the part of UNITAF to put into operation the new plan for disarmament. This began with the establishment of a disarmament priority within the Force Command. Based on this priority, force projection and operational assessments were made which resulted in the establishment of a Cease-fire and Disarmament Division within the Force Command. Consequent upon this development, a US Lieutenant Colonel was appointed as the disarmament chief, with the task of developing a specialised staff structure for the new division. His recommendation was that the division required six teams, each comprising 38 troops, for the discharge of its functions. The Force Command decided, albeit erroneously, to limit the manning of the Disarmament Division based on its own evaluation that the bulk of disarmament operations might not start until late summer or early spring (i.e., August/September) 1993.

The August/September time-frame for the commencement of disarmament operations was determined by, among other factors, assessments of logistics requirements for the operations. The Force Command calculated that there would be a significant reduction in the number of troops once the transition to UNOSOM II was underway. Worse still, it assessed that the bulk of the troops contributed to UNOSOM II would not be deployed until the fall. Accordingly, the Force Command directed that any decision to embark upon disarmament operations must be contingent upon the Command's ability to generate forces in the selected disarmament zones or theatres. It was on this basis that the UNITAF

Force Command rejected the suggestion made jointly by the Political Affairs Branch and the Somali Cease-fire and Disarmament Committee that the most urgent task was to disarm militia based around Lower Juba and Kismayo in light of repeated cases of violence emanating from that region. For the Force Command, that area was not ripe for disarmament because UNITAF did not enjoy a military advantage in terms of manpower and firepower.
Table 4.3: The Rules of Engagement for UNOSOM II

1. UNOSOM PERSONNEL MAY USE DEADLY FORCE:
   a. To defend themselves, other UN lives, or persons and areas under their protection against hostile acts or hostile intent.
   b. To resist attempts by forceful means to prevent the Force from discharging its duties.

2. CHALLENGING
   a. Whenever practicable, a challenge should be given before using deadly force.
   b. Challenging is done by:
      (i) Shouting in English: "UN, STOP OR I FIRE" or
      (ii) Shouting in Somali: "UN, KA HANAGA JOOGO AMA WAA GUBAN"
      (iii) Firing warning shots in the air.

3. PRINCIPLES FOR USE OF FORCE
   When it becomes necessary to use force, the following principles apply:
   a. Action which may reasonably be expected to cause excessive collateral damage is prohibited.
   b. Reprisals is [sic] forbidden.
   c. Minimum force is to be used at all times.

4. SPECIFIC RULES
   a. UNOSOM Forces may use deadly force in response to a hostile act or when there is clear evidence of hostile intent.
   b. Crew-served weapons are considered a threat to UNOSOM Forces and the relief effort whether or not the crew demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to confiscate and demilitarize crew-served weapons in their area of operations.
c. Within those areas under the control of UNOSOM Forces armed individuals may be considered a threat to UNOSOM and the relief effort whether or not the individual demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to disarm and demilitarize groups or individuals in those areas under the control of UNOSOM. Absent a hostile or criminal act, individuals and associated vehicles will be released after any weapons are removed/demilitarized.

d. If UNOSOM Forces are attacked or threatened by unarmed hostile elements, mobs and/or rioters, UNOSOM Forces are authorized to employ reasonable minimum force to repel the attacks or threats. UNOSOM Forces may also employ the following procedures: verbal warnings to demonstrators, shows of force including use of riot control formations, and warning shots.

e. UNATTENDED MEANS OF FORCE. Unattended means of force, including bobby traps, mines, and trip guns, are not authorized.

f. DETENTION OF PERSONNEL. Personnel who interfere with the accomplishment of the mission or who otherwise use or threaten deadly force against UNOSOM, UN or relief material, distribution sites, or convoys may be detained. Persons who commit criminal acts in areas under the control of UN Forces may likewise be detained. Detained persons will be evacuated to a designated location for turn/over [sic] to military police.

5. DEFINITIONS

The following definitions are used:

a. SELF DEFENCE
   Action to protect oneself or ones [sic] unit against a hostile act or hostile intent.

b. HOSTILE ACT
   The use of force against UNOSOM personnel or mission-essential property, or against personnel in an area under UNOSOM
c. HOSTILE INTENT
   The threat of imminent use of force against UNOSOM Forces or other persons in those areas under the control of UNOSOM.

d. MINIMUM FORCE
   The minimum authorised degree of force which is necessary, reasonable and lawful in the circumstances.

6. Only the Force Commander, UNOSOM, may approve changes to these ROE.


The policy of initiating disarmament operations only when they were most likely to take full advantage of the capabilities of the multinational force was inherited by the new UNOSOM II Force Command which, during the early phases of the mission, sought to utilise as much of the experiences of UNITAF as possible.\(^{32}\) The new Force Command limited disarmament operations to areas already under the military and political control of UNOSOM II. In May 1993, that meant the south-central part of Mogadishu, which it currently occupied while awaiting the deployment of its complete requirement of forces from troop-contributing states. According to some sources, the rationale for the limiting strategy was that if the Force Command initiated disarmament in an area manned by a relatively immature brigade or contingent, that would increase the risk to all parties - Somalis and multinational forces alike.\(^{33}\) Accordingly, the operational procedure required that the SRSG and the Force Commander would jointly determine whether or not the operational situation on the ground was such that it would guarantee a successful disarmament operation by forces belonging to UNOSOM II.

\(^{32}\) Lieutenant Colonel Sam Butler, telephone interview with the author, 21 March 1995.
\(^{33}\) Author's interviews with military personnel who served in Somalia, Geneva, February-May 1995.
The deterioration of the security situation in Somalia following the transition to UNOSOM II forced a revision of the original concept of disarmament in two significant ways. First, the Force Command took a ‘tougher’ stand on the timing and initiation of disarmament operations. This was a direct consequence of increases in the sporadic outbreaks of violence across Somalia from May 1993 onwards. The renewal of violent clashes between Somali militia and the multinational forces made it more difficult to determine where and when the conditions existed for a successful disarmament operation. Consequently, rather than initiate operations in areas that were already “secured” by UNOSOM II, Force Command launched disarmament operations in areas that were deemed to be necessary, even though the attendant risks were much higher. In this regard, the defining moment was the outbreak of violence in Kismayo in spring 1993, involving 150 members of the SPM-SNA led by Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess. Angered by widespread suspicions that UNOSOM was supporting General Mohamed Hersi Morgan's camp in Kismayo, and attempting in the process to frustrate the Ogadenis and the SPM out of the city, Colonel Jess had ordered the attack in an attempt to drive pro-Morgan forces out of Kismayo. In the process, Jess had also inflicted casualties on elements of the Belgian contingent which had engaged his forces in the city. Thenceforth, UNOSOM Force Command adopted the position that violations of the disarmament process by any Somali faction were tantamount to an attempt to disrupt UNOSOM II. Put simply, "Force Command ceased to treat Somali militias with kids' gloves."34

Second, and following from the former, Force Command embarked on a rethinking of its original concept of disarmament, especially in light of increased opposition from humanitarian agencies to the idea of “inducements” for voluntary disarmament. According to some sources, the Director of Humanitarian Relief in Somalia had notified the Force Command that the concept of providing factional militia with cash and other incentives was not "supportable."35 The apparent reason for the disapproval was that many donor agencies believed that the original UNITAF idea was morally repugnant because it amounted to rewarding the militias and the warlords for their brutality towards Somalis. This decision, which was based on ethical concerns raised by some important NGOs, and the serious resource problems posed by the weapons buy-back scheme from the original disarmament plan, resulted in the issuance of a

---

34 Lieutenant Colonel Sam Butler, interview with the author, 21 March 1995.
new directive by the Force Command. The new directive instructed the Operations Branch of the Cease-fire and Disarmament Division to reassess the basic concept of disarmament inherited from UNITAF. For reasons of expediency, this review produced a four-stage evolutionary concept of "limited disarmament." The new concept was premised on the proposition that the Somali society could not be completely disarmed. For this reason, the programme of disarmament would be limited to two modest objectives:

i) minimising the threat of organised violence designed to enhance the relative position and political objective of one faction vis-à-vis the others; and

ii) re-establishing as soon as possible some basic institutions of law and order, especially civilian police and the judicial system.

4.3 The New Four-Stage Concept of Disarmament

**Stage 1: Creating an environment for disarmament.** At this stage, operational activities would focus on the selection and preparation of areas or zones for initiating disarmament operations. This stage would be characterised by increased civil-military relations involving the personnel of UNOSOM II, the leaders of local militia, clan elders and other influential figures in the selected areas of operation. During this phase, the military activities of UNOSOM II were to be restricted to weapons registration, the identification of cantonment and transition sites, the selection of an appropriate development project for the region, and the constitution of functional disarmament teams for the particular area of operation.

**Stage 2: Commencement of overt military action within selected zones to effect disarmament.** In this regard, UNOSOM II would increase the frequency of its unit operations in specific zones. The main target of these operations would be factional militia or armed Somalis in general. The activities to be undertaken at this stage included the preparation of plans for the cantonment of heavy weapons; increases in the extent and frequency of contacts between the United Nations and various Somali militia; the training of civil police in areas of operation; and the conduct of military support operations such as cordon and search/rescue missions, and supply route and general area reconnaissance.
missions. These activities were designed to demonstrate and communicate to Somali factions the capability and commitment of UNOSOM II to seize all unauthorised weapons and/or neutralise the dangerous activities of armed gangs and organised militia.

**Stage 3: The threshold of final disarmament.** Activities during this phase of operations were designed to effectively integrate all UN operations conducted against Somali militia by several brigades in the various theatres of operation within a specific zone of operation. The types of actions expected at this stage of the disarmament process included the actual disarming of all militia, the cantoning of heavy weapons under UN control, the destruction of weapons adjudged to be useless or unsuitable, the transportation of selected weapons to predetermined storage sites for eventual use by a future Somali government, the conduct of large-scale disarmament verification missions, and the ensurance of security and strict compliance with the UN arms embargo at Somalia's major ports of entry and other border crossing communities.

**Stage 4: The era of consolidation and widespread security through disarmament in Somalia.** The last of the four stages, this phase was to mark the conclusion of the disarmament process in Somalia under the auspices of UNOSOM II. The highlight of this stage was the disengagement of the factional militias in the designated area of operation and the coming into force of the United Nations weapons policy in the area. In the new secure environment, nation-building activities by UN agencies and NGOs would become fully operational, and the majority of the social infrastructure such as schools, potable water, medical facilities and electricity would have been built or reactivated to support post-conflict civilian life. At this stage, the cantonment of weapons and disarmament inspections would have been completed as well, with the UN assuming responsibility for the security and protection of the disarmed militia and the returning civilian population. In addition, a civilian police force was expected to be in place to assume primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the new society. Getting to this phase was dependent on the success of the preceding phases as well as the expectation of a high degree of
co-operation among the various UN agencies, including relief NGOs, and between humanitarian agencies and the Force Command.  

As stated earlier, the new four-stage concept of disarmament resulted from the realisation that the original concept inherited from UNITAF suffered from a severe "resource flaw." The failure of the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM II to support the original UNITAF concept, because of what it claimed to be a lack of prior consultations, ethical difficulties and resource limitations, placed the Addis Ababa disarmament agreement at great risk. By establishing differential tiers of disarmament through a systematic process of regionalisation, the revised concept was, theoretically speaking, one way of preventing the troubled Addis Ababa cease-fire and disarmament agreement from total collapse. According to some participants in, and observers of, the disarmament process under UNOSOM II, the four-stage plan was essentially an attempt to conduct disarmament in an "unresourced environment."  

The revised disarmament plan was warmly received by the humanitarian division as well as by the relief and donor community in Somalia when it was presented to them at the end of May 1993. These groups were attracted by the plan's regional focus and incremental approach which shifted the resource burden on the humanitarian agencies to a later stage in the disarmament process. By so doing, the new plan gave the international relief community sufficient time to make their own assessments of the situation on the ground and the timing of their decision to commit resources to development projects. Put simply, the Humanitarian division and the relief/donor community in Somalia accepted the new concept of disarmament from UNOSOM II because it was cheap: the new plan would not tax their material and moral resources in any significant way. For the military, the new plan responded to the shortage of manpower and firepower occasioned by the massive withdrawal of American forces after the expiration of the UNITAF mandate. UNOSOM II Force Command could now deploy operational units piece by piece, using as few resources as possible.

---

36 Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, see point 7 on "Bottom-Up Changes: disputes among the warring parties arising during the mission", point 8 on "Protection of the Population During the Mission", and point 10 on "Force Composition and Force Structure".

37 The military, however, countered this claim, asserting that the original concept of disarmament was the product of co-ordinated work between the political branch which sponsored the Addis Ababa conference, the humanitarian division which provided most of the participants at the conference and the committees established thereafter, and the military branch which developed and sponsored the disarmament concept.

38 Author's interviews, Geneva, February-April 1995.
combat personnel as possible, even though the security situation had progressively degenerated after the departure of the core of UNITAF forces. Given this circumstance, it was only a matter of time before the weaknesses of the new "cost-saving" concept of disarmament became public knowledge.

4.4 The Consequences of Implementing the New Cost Saving Concept of Disarmament in Conditions of Anarchy

UNOSOM II began to implement the new disarmament concept in June 1993. Earlier disarmament measures implemented within the old framework, such as the establishment and manning of cantonment sites, were standardised to reflect the new plan. Thus, by June 1993 the bulk of current disarmament operations were categorised by Force Command as Stage 2 operations. In much of northern Somalia, voluntary disarmament had progressed smoothly since the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement on 8 January 1993. Encouraged by his rapport with UNITAF and US authorities, General Mohamed Abshir Musa, the American-educated leader of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), had worked out an arrangement with the UN which enabled him to establish weapons "concentration sites" in the north-eastern region.39 This arrangement continued largely unhampered even after the transition to UNOSOM II. According to some sources, the SSDF maintained effective control of these sites, even without UN military presence in the area.40 Indeed, one participant in the disarmament process has speculated that had UNOSOM II provided incentives and development infrastructure, in accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement, the disarmament process in some parts of north-eastern Somalia would have graduated to Stage 4 by the end of 1993.41 It was therefore the failure of

39 Technically, these sites could not be called "cantonment" sites because UNOSOM II was unable to assume physical control of these sites, as provided for by the Addis Ababa agreement. It has been suggested by General Bruno Loi, the Commander of the Italian contingent to the multinational force in Somalia, that UNOSOM II, like UNITAF before it, displayed a general disinterest in deploying in the northern part of Somalia (i.e., former British Somaliland). Although resource limitation has been adduced as a factor in explaining the virtual concentration of UN activities in southern Somalia (i.e., former Italian Somaliland), other plausible explanations emphasise the relative mildness of the famine and security conditions in northern Somalia, which declared its independence from the rest of Somalia on 17 May 1991.

40 Author's interviews, Geneva, February-April 1995.

UNOSOM II to support and source the disarmament programme in the north-east that led to the disintegration of the concentration sites by December 1993. Expectedly, the SSDF leadership returned the weapons in these sites to their supporters.

The state of the disarmament process was far more pathetic in southern Somalia from the end of May 1993 onwards. It is generally agreed that the process suffered a major setback after the transition to UNOSOM II. In the 90-day period provided for the cantonment of heavy weapons under the Addis Ababa agreement, militia factions belonging to General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Mr. Ali Mahdi had initially complied by depositing their heavy weapons in what were then known as Authorised Weapons Storage Sites (AWSS). By the time of the transition in May, seven active sites containing large but unspecified quantities of weapons were maintained by UNITAF. Five of these AWSS held weapons belonging to Aideed's forces, while two contained weapons voluntarily deposited by Mahdi's militia. These sites could not be effectively monitored by the UNOSOM II Force Command, however, both because the Command lacked intelligence capability in general, and because it had received poor information from UNITAF regarding the sites. With the general deterioration of the security situation in Mogadishu following the increasing willingness of Somalis to "test the resolve of the UNOSOM forces," Force Command feared for the status and safety of weapons in existing cantonments or AWSS. In response to the heightened insecurity in Mogadishu, the Force Commander, Lt. General Bir, "issued 'Frag Order 39' which would greatly expand the ability of UNOSOM personnel to use deadly force." The new order, which became part of the ROE, stated that: "organized, armed militias, technicals and other crew served weapons [were] considered a threat to UNOSOM Forces and [might] be engaged without provocation." According to Colonel Lorenz, "the Frag Order also included a provision that permitted the attack from the air on 'armed Somalis in vehicles moving from known militia areas'..." Put simply, the revised rules of engagement gave every troop virtually unlimited powers to engage any armed Somali anytime, anywhere. With this, the stage was set for a major confrontation between UNOSOM II and the Somali militia.

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. (emphasis added).
45 Ibid.
4.5 The 5 June 1993 Attack on UNOSOM II
Inventory Team

On 2 June 1993, just days after the issuance of Frag Order 39, intelligence reports received by the Force Command indicated that weapons were being moved from General Aideed's AWSS. To verify these reports, Force Command, on June 5, mobilised and despatched "inspection monitoring teams" to known cantonment sites in south Mogadishu and the immediate vicinity of Afgoy. These forces forcefully entered the premises of Radio Mogadishu which had long been suspected by Force Command to be also serving as General Aideed's weapon storage site. In the confrontation that ensued, "two Somalis loyal to Aidid were killed... and this began an escalation of violence directed toward UNOSOM forces. Shortly thereafter 27 Pakistani peace keepers were killed by a vengeful Somali mob." Clearly, Force Command did not utilise the element of surprise in this operation, for it had informed Aidid of the planned inspection visit 24 hours earlier. An official UN account vividly describes the incident as follows:

On the morning of 5 June 1993, the inspections began. Those at the Afgoy site and two of the four sites in Mogadishu were conducted without incident. The inspection at Site 5 - 'Mogadishu Radio (Aidid) location' - went smoothly until it was near completion. At that time several agitators arrived on scene and began to incite the crowd that had gathered. At Site 4, a major storage site located at the Aidid radio retransmission facility, the inspection team met some verbal resistance but was allowed to enter and conduct the inspection. At this site, the team was subjected to sniper fire throughout the day. It was at Site 3 that a large number of weapons were found, including 62 tow missiles, 2 Milan missiles and 1 SA-7, which were later removed. Thirteen technical vehicles and a number of machine-guns previously in storage were no longer present.

At about 10 a.m. in other areas in South Mogadishu, demonstrations began and UNOSOM II Force Command headquarters was fired on. Pakistani and Turkish soldiers returned fire. Later, Pakistani units returning from incidents elsewhere in Mogadishu transited 21 October Road, where they encountered a large, carefully prepared three-sided ambush that resulted in extensive casualties. At feeding station

---

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

No. 20, a Pakistani unit helping with food distribution was attacked by a carefully coordinated group of gunmen.48

In addition to the dead, 10 UNOSOM troops were reported missing and 57 (including 3 Americans) wounded. Although the casualty figures on the Somali side were not known, they were estimated to have been much higher.

International reactions to the June 5 incident were immediate and intense49, and these would significantly affect the course of disarmament embarked upon by UNOSOM II. The day after the attack on the inventory team, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 837 condemning the incident. Resolution 837 also contributed to the further escalation of tension in Mogadishu by empowering the Secretary-General to:

a) urgently "inquire into the incident, with particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved;"50
b) neutralise militia radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the attack on UN contingents;51
c) "take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks..., including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, ... to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment;"52 and
d) to ensure the rapid and accelerated deployment of "all UNOSOM II contingents to meet the full requirements of 28,000 men [sic], all ranks, as well as equipment..."53

48 Ibid., paras. 7-8.
49 Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, point 14 on "Comments on Information, Public Affairs and Media".
51 Ibid., para. 3.
52 Ibid., para. 5.
53 Ibid., para. 7, pp. 2-3.
This mandate provided the legal basis for the series of man-hunt operations launched by UNOSOM II to apprehend General Aideed. Thenceforth, UNOSOM II embarked on a policy of coercive disarmament which would lead eventually to a virtual obsession with punitive combat operations directed principally at General Aideed's militia. Put simply, UNOSOM II declared a "vendetta-disarmament war" on one of the factions in Somalia, and devoted much of its resources to prosecuting that war.  

In this regard, the carefully-worded report of the Secretary-General on the incident provides a useful insight into the conduct of UNOSOM II after the June 5 attack on elements of the Pakistani contingent:

At 4 a.m. on 12 June, UNOSOM II began the implementation of the first phase of a programme pursuant to Security Council resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993) to disarm Mogadishu South. This was an essential step in the light of the fact that the city was saturated with a vast arsenal of hidden illegal weapons, some of which had been used during the premeditated attacks of 5 June. In a series of carefully planned precision air and ground military actions, UNOSOM II disabled or destroyed ordnance, weapons and equipment located in three previously authorized weapons storage sites, and a related clandestine military facility used for the ambush of 5 June.

The success of this operation encouraged Force Command to initiate further strikes at known or suspected military facilities belonging to General Aideed, for whose capture Rtd. Admiral Howe, the new SRSG, had promised Somalis a reward of $25,000.

On 13 and 14 June UNOSOM II forces conducted additional precision air strikes on two clandestine weapons/ammunitions storage sites within the SNA/Aidid Mogadishu stronghold area. One was a heavily guarded weapons, ammunition and vehicle storage area that held approximately 30 heavy weapons carrier 'technical' vehicles in various states of repair. The site also served as vehicle repair facility where 'technicals' were assembled. In addition, the site was reported to contain large numbers of small arms and crew-served weapons, as well as an ammunition cache that included significant quantities of large-calibre automatic-weapons ordnance. The other site held technical vehicles, small arms and ammunition, plus heavy engineering equipment used to construct barricades. On the morning of 15 June, aerial reconnaissance observed and destroyed a 122-mm BM21-1 mobile rocket launcher in the stronghold area near the USC/SNA headquarters...

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

The actions of 12 to 14 June formed part of a continuing effort... effectively to initiate the disarmament process and neutralize all heavy weapons. This includes known USC/SNA weapons and ammunition storage sites and caches. Getting arms under control is fundamental to the restoration of law and order and public safety.56

If coercive disarmament had resulted in the destruction of large quantities of militia arms in south Mogadishu, it also produced a general climate of fear which encouraged individual Somalis to hide weapons from UNOSOM II. Worse still, by focusing on one faction, the prosecution of coercive disarmament gained notoriety for its blatant partisanship against USC/SNA. It also unwittingly conferred a hero's status on Aideed and encouraged ordinary Somalis to rally behind him in resisting further measures aimed at disarmament, in particular, and ‘UN interference’ in general.57 Simply stated, the disarmament war waged by UNOSOM II with extra-ordinary vigour produced undesirable results, such as heavy Somali and UN casualties, general insecurity and increased visibility of the use of armaments by Somalis as well as UNOSOM II.

There is little indication that the purpose and direction of the disarmament/war-on-Aideed policy of UNOSOM II during the summer months were questioned by the UN authority in New York. Quite to the contrary, there is evidence that the Secretary-General was pleased with the policy and its implementation. Indeed, he said so in his report of 1 July to the Security Council:

The skill and courage with which United Nations coalition forces executed the cordon and the search, clear and disarm operation against USC/SNA enclave and their professional response to the series of subsequent SNA attacks were impressive. By any measure, both the planned operation and the counteraction to SNA militia attacks represented significant successes. The positions of SNA and of General Aidid have been eroded, in terms of attrition of forces, disruption of command/control/communications and loss of clandestine weapons and ammunition... Although still a threat to stability, it is expected that the SNA militia in Mogadishu will now be less of an impediment to disarmament, political reconciliation and rehabilitation.58

56 Ibid., paras 21-22, p. 6 (emphasis added).
Clearly, the Secretary-General could not have been more mistaken and, as a consequence, rather than revert to a disciplined implementation of any of the pre-existing disarmament concepts or plans, such as the revised four-stage formula, the political and military authorities of UNOSOM II pressed on with their ad hoc disarmament war. To this end, they were guided by two factors. The first was the Secretary-General’s assurance that:

... UNOSOM II will continue its initial disarmament effort until satisfied it has neutralized all known USC/SNA weapons and ammunition storage sites and caches in and around Mogadishu and any others that threaten the city. After this is complete, UNOSOM II will undertake an orderly sector-by-sector disarmament of the city.59

The second factor concerned the military situation orchestrated by Aideed’s increasingly restless militia. This particular factor put UNOSOM II in the awkward position of having only to react to real or perceived politico-military moves by Aideed’s militia. This set the stage for the uncontrolled escalation of violence which continued in Mogadishu and surrounding areas until the beginning of October. At that time, an ill-fated coercive disarmament operation, led by the elite US Army Rangers, resulted in the humiliation which followed "the bloodiest battle of any UN peacekeeping operation" to date.60

59 Ibid., para. 30, p.8 (emphasis added).
4.6 The 3 October 1993 Attack on UNOSOM II and its Aftermath

As part of its efforts to capture Aideed, UNOSOM II regularly employed the services of US Rangers whose helicopter gunships routinely bombarded suspected military installations belonging to the USC/SNA. On 3 October, the Rangers were dispatched to apprehend suspected members of Aideed's "war cabinet", who were meeting at the Olympic Hotel in south Mogadishu. According to some sources, these aides were holding one of their "regular strategy sessions" at a "secret location" when elements of the Quick Reaction Force swooped down on them. In the ensuing battle, Aideed's militia gunned down two helicopters and engaged the Rangers and supporting UNOSOM II forces in a fierce encounter. The casualty figures from this incident are high: several score Somali killed and wounded, 18 US Rangers killed, and 75 US Rangers wounded. In addition, the USC/SNA captured and detained Durant, the pilot of one of the downed US choppers, and Shankali, a member of the Nigerian contingent which was dispatched to rescue the Rangers. What was particularly significant about this incident was not the apprehension of about 24 Somali 'notables', including two key Aideed aides, nor the casualty figures on both sides, but the treatment of the dead and captured multinational troops in the "most despicable and humiliating manner" by Aideed's supporters. In the United States, "[t]elevised images of chanting Somalis dragging a US soldier's body through the streets and pictures of a distressed helicopter pilot held hostage" resulted in the immediate collapse of "domestic support for the Somali operation." This signalled the beginning of the end of what many observers have described as one of the most media-driven military missions in recent history. According to Colonel Lorenz: "It is ironic that the media coverage of starving children in Baidoa had been a major factor in US involvement in the first instance. In less than a year, Operation Restore Hope had deteriorated from a humanitarian effort into a dangerous morass."

The Clinton Administration responded to the 3 October incident in two opposing directions. First, it took immediate unilateral action to increase American firepower in Somalia, ostensibly to repair political damages arising from allegations that his administration had denied repeated Pentagon requests to send additional reinforcements to Somalia. Elements from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit were rushed into Mogadishu from California days after the incident to conduct even more strikes against suspected USC-SNA targets and arrest its leadership. This resulted in more Somali casualties and the subsequent apprehension of some 740 Aideed followers suspected to have taken part in the 3 October assault. In a complete volte face, this course of action was soon abandoned for the second: the unilateral cessation of the man-hunt for Aideed in particular, and "Boutros Ghali's peace enforcement strategy" in general. In this regard, Washington announced the complete withdrawal of US troops from Somalia by the end of March 1994. Until that date, the involvement of US forces would be limited to "force protection missions" especially within the confines of the US embassy in Mogadishu. Meanwhile, in Washington, the Clinton administration stepped up its public accusation of UN leadership for being responsible for the "policy derailment" which resulted in the use of US forces for the personalised man-hunt operations rather than for humanitarian purposes as had been originally conceived.

To put the Somali peace process back on track, the Clinton administration cut out for itself a low military profile in Mogadishu. Subsequently, it despatched Robert Oakley to resuscitate political negotiations with Somali factions in the hope of ending the conflict through peaceful means. This policy change ensured the early release of Durant and Shankali by their captors. It also assured the end of coercive disarmament and set the UN on the path of complete withdrawal from Somalia. Resolution 897 of February 1994 formally obliged UNOSOM II to terminate its mission by the end of March 1995. Many national contingents pulled out long before that deadline so that by 2 March 1995 when the UN, "with luck," accomplished an "orderly retreat" from Somalia, the strength of UNOSOM II had been reduced to a mere 8,000 troops, comprised mainly of Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Egyptians. Going by official and unofficial assessments, the weight of international opinion clearly indicated that UNOSOM II did not live up to its challenge, namely: "to accomplish the

expanded mission without becoming embroiled in the factional fighting to the point of backing one faction against the others. In this regard, policy inconsistency, strategic misconceptions and faulty resource distribution emerge as important independent variables in explaining the failure of the United Nations operation in Somalia.

Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusion

The [UN] withdrawal... will leave Somalia as vulnerable as it ever was to the havoc of warlords and the threat of famine.¹

The complete withdrawal of United Nations troops and personnel from Somalia on 2 March 1995 marked the formal conclusion of the organisation's first experiment in enforcement actions under its banner in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. The last of the UN troops that left Somalia did so under the protection of heavily armed American troopers and Special Operation forces. For weeks prior to their evacuation, UN soldiers and civilian personnel had been camped in the premises of the American embassy in Mogadishu for their own safety. Even so, according to international media reports, they were lucky to have escaped Somali gun-fire. The rest of Somalia was off-limits to the blue helmets as well as other UN personnel and relief workers. Somalia had indeed reverted to the control of the warlords, the modern-day condotierris. This sad situation, laments The Economist, best summarises the UN mission in Somalia: "the Somali mission, which lasted about twenty months, ..., failed abysmally to impose political order..."² Not only was the UN unable to restore hope in Somalia, its scurried exit from a stateless society without an organised army - a mere microcosm of what was envisaged by the authors of the Charter in 1945 - crushed hopes regarding the ability of the world body to meet credible threats to international peace and security.³ The failure of the Somali mission also crushed the "vision of the UN's interventionist powers, born as the Cold War died," thereby casting a cloud of doubt over the usefulness of UN-led peace enforcement for purposes of conflict resolution.⁴ Much can be learned from the Somali operation for future UN efforts at

---
¹ The Economist, 4 February 1995, p.40.
² Ibid. (emphasis added).
³ For an insightful analysis of this dimension of the Somali tragedy, see Jonathan Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia?", Foreign Policy, No 91, Summer 1993.

101
disarmament and conflict resolution. The purpose of this section of the study is to highlight some of these lessons.

1. Understanding the nature of the society and the cause(s) of the conflict is a sine qua non for finding a solution. For purposes of conflict resolution, international intervention must strike an appropriate balance between cultural relativism and universalism. The laws of nations govern the decision to embark on multinational intervention, whilst the norms of the nation should govern operations on the ground. In Somalia, several blunders were committed, but perhaps none had more disastrous consequences for the mission than the ill-fated unilateral decision of the SRSG to declare Aideed a fugitive in "his own country" and then proceed with the promise of a $25,000 ransom for information leading to his arrest.5 As Sahnoun has argued, no one familiar with, and sensitive to, the Somali culture would have promised Somalis, indeed any African, money in exchange for the delivery of their "brother" to a foreign army. It is a painful reminder of the memories of slavery and, not surprisingly, Howe's offer bonded Somalis together to resist "foreign invasion." By committing this cultural faux pas, the UN unwittingly conferred a hero's status on Aideed, thus making an already difficult mission even almost impossible to accomplish.

The glaring deficiency in the UN's understanding of Somali culture was matched by a similar lack of knowledge, neglect or misinterpretation of the causes of the conflict. All too often, international peace operations have been dispatched to societies in conflict without any conscious efforts to educate the interveners on the nature, causes and specificities of the particular conflict which they are mandated to resolve. Sadly enough, in Somalia the result was the articulation and enforcement of "solutions" which merely intensified the conflict:

---

5 By contrast, Sahnoun has argued that it "would in fact have been much wiser to have gathered the maximum number of arguments proving the guilt of Aideed or anyone else, and then to have persuaded the elders and other sub-clan leaders of the need to cooperate with the UN in bringing the culprits to justice [because] Somali tradition itself requires stern measures for slaughter and places the highest priority on collective undertaking in the matter": M. Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia", *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, No 5, 1994, p.13.
For example, a decision to disarm one clan, but not all clans at the same time, was a recipe for continuous civil war in the country. A move to take over and shut down one radio station belonging to one clan (and not all radio stations of all clans at the same time) was equally unwise... To look for quick fixes as political solutions without taking into account the local realities was a nonsense.6

The Somali conflict was caused by the imposition of one mode of political governance by one individual upon the rest of society. The exclusivity of Barre’s dictatorship bred conspiracy and alienation among some segments of the population, and for a select group of friends and clansmen, privilege and sycophancy. Mahdi's hasty, untimely and unilateral announcement of his succession to the presidency of Somalia, albeit on an interim basis, undercut Aideed, his principal associate in the USC. This triggered the bitter struggle for power which soon revealed that the major contenders lacked any commitment to the rule of law. If there had been a proper understanding and appreciation of the cause and dynamics of the conflict as it evolved, the OAU (through its Secretary-General’s statement of 18 December 1991) and the UN (initially during Jonah’s first mission to Mogadishu and increasingly afterwards) would not have [unwittingly] accorded a pride of place to Ali Mahdi vis-à-vis the other contenders for power, especially General Aideed.7 By losing the appearance of neutrality and, even more importantly, impartiality, before the Somali public, the UN sowed the seeds of its eventual failure in Somalia.8

---

8 The UN's neutrality was one of the first casualties in Somalia. Aside from Jonah's hasty declaration of Aideed as "the bad guy", the UN's image as a neutral arbiter was damaged by confirmed allegations of secret arms/money cargo-flights into Mahdi-held territory by UN-chartered "relief" planes. Not surprisingly, some scholars have recently begun to question the possibility of impartiality in international intervention. For details, see Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No 6, 1994, pp.20-33.
2. Disarmament need not be initiated in a mission unless there is a will to see it through. A programme of disarmament is necessary in conflicts characterised by the reckless use of arms by loosely organised groups, as was the case in Somalia. However, whenever disarmament is considered to be a mission objective, be it de facto or de jure, an adequate programme should be developed and implemented comprehensively, continuously and consistently. In Somalia, the disarmament programme became a casualty of the indecision of competing political authorities and Force Commanders. Right from the start, the Secretary-General proposed that a programme of disarmament was essential to any international effort to make Somalia secure enough for the distribution of humanitarian supplies to the famine-stricken population. However, his proposal for disarming Somali militia and gangs early on during the UNITAF phase was quietly vetoed by the Bush administration. Consequently, the heavily armed multinational troops which arrived in Mogadishu in December failed to take advantage of their power, influence and enormous goodwill vis-à-vis the Somalis - that is, "the element of surprise" - to quickly collect as many weapons as possible. When UNITAF did eventually conceive of and implement a disarmament plan, it was too limited and haphazard to have any significant impact on the security situation. This pattern was not broken by UNOSOM II, for which disarmament was a key objective.

The general consequence of embarking on disarmament in fits and starts was that the entire programme had the effect of punishing those compliant segments of the population, some of whom fell victim to gangs because they had been dispossessed of their weapons in areas where disarmament had been implemented by UN troops before the commander was replaced, or in areas where UN troops were ordered to pull out or the programme was scrapped entirely. Clearly, the lesson from this experience is that once initiated, disarmament must be followed through with discipline, courage, zeal and consistency. To abandon a programme of disarmament mid-way because humanitarian agencies run out of wheat flour - an incentive offered to the local population in exchange for their guns - or renege on their earlier promise to source the programme, shows little regard for the safety of those who surrender.

---

9 General Bruno Loi, interview with the author, 29 March 1995. According to Loi, this was the first, and perhaps only, opportunity to successfully push through a programme of disarmament in Somalia with a minimum commitment of money and personnel.
their weapons. It certainly undermines the credibility of the United Nations before the local population, who need constant reassurance that the interveners care about their welfare and safety.

3. **Rather than geographical spread, competence and an existing national human rights record should be requisite conditions for troop participation in UN peace missions.** All too often, the legitimacy of UN intervention in conflict situations has been anchored on humanitarian needs, the restoration of human rights and the rule of law. The multinational imperative of these missions has necessitated conscious, almost extreme, efforts on the part of the UN Secretariat to include as many Member States as possible, whether or not the soldiers from these states are well-trained and equipped, and whether or not they show respect for human rights and the rule of law in their own countries. There is something suspect, indeed "grotesque," in the expectation that soldiers who subvert the rule of law in their own countries will respect, let alone establish, a law-based political authority in a foreign land. As has been argued recently, "[t]he importance of collective action is not necessarily in troop composition... [Indeed] there is no value in multinational composition for the sake of appearances" when the task at hand requires "the optimal profile of psychological abilities" of a soldier, comprised of "military ability... and the selflessness of a missionary."

4. **There is a need for effective co-ordination among field commanders of national contingents.** One of the major practical problems confronting multinational operations is that they present enormous co-ordination problems which further weaken the effectiveness of overall command and control. In UNOSOM II, for instance, there were 33 national contingents of varying size, capability, language, operational doctrine and esprit de corps. This problem was

---

10 Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, see point 7 on "Bottom-Up Changes: disputes among the warring parties arising during the mission".
highlighted by all of the respondents to a recent UNIDIR questionnaire as one of the principal difficulties faced by UNOSOM II.\footnote{14} In Somalia, the tension between General Bruno Loi, the Commander of the Italian contingent, and his American and Nigerian counterparts became so well known as to warrant the UN to request that Italy "remove the commander of its peacekeeping contingent... for refusing to obey orders from the UN military commander."\footnote{15} But an even more serious, though less well known, problem in Somalia was that overall co-ordination was also hampered by the decentralisation of command authority even within some national contingents. For instance, the lack of adequate co-ordination between the commanders of different US units in Somalia was partly responsible for the ill-fated operation at the Olympic Hotel to capture Aideed supporters on 3 October 1993. According to Colonel F.M. Lorenz,

> By the time of the incident at the Olympic Hotel, the command relationships were more complex, and less clearly defined. Special operations forces had arrived in Mogadishu under the direct control of USSOCENT. Maj. Gen. Montgomery, the Commander of US Forces, did not have operational control (OPCON) of the Special Operations force that conducted the Olympic Hotel raid. They reported through a separate chain of command directly to USCINCENT.

> [Put simply], ... in Somalia [even] the senior US commander did not have control over operations within his area of responsibility.\footnote{16}

The lesson from this incident is that not even the most developed military machine is immune to the danger of poor command relationships.\footnote{17} The United Nations may need to strongly assert its right to retain complete command and control over all aspects of operational decision-making during its missions. In this way, Member States voluntarily contributing contingents to UN missions would be required to place their troops under UN control for the duration of their participation.

\footnote{14} Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, see comments at the beginning of point 20 on "Comments on Interaction".
\footnote{17} Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002, see comments in point 10 on "Force Composition and Force Structure". 
5. Participating contingents should train together for a period of time before moving into an operational theatre. Closely related to the imperative of command co-ordination is the need for common training of the diverse contingents assembled for a particular mission. Such training would afford the troops the opportunity to be commonly educated about the culture of the people, the mission objective, the mission mandate, the rules of engagement, and the purpose and type of equipment to be used during the operation. Responses to a recent UNIDIR questionnaire on this subject reveal differing levels of education for national contingents about the purpose and expectations of the UN mission in Somalia. For instance, when asked whether the mandate of UNOSOM II included the disarming of the warring factions, 80% of the respondents said no. Such a fundamental problem could be corrected if all the participating contingents underwent training prior to their deployment in the theatre of operation.

6. It is necessary to demonstrate staying power once the decision to intervene has been made. It has been argued recently that "[t]he moral of early post-Cold War interventions is that hollow gestures can turn out to be worse than no action at all." One of the saddest aspects of the Somali mission concerns the widespread official announcement of the termination date of the humanitarian mission long before the mission was even started. According to Thomas G. Weiss,

   In the US-led and UN-approved intervention in Somalia in December 1992, ... Washington wanted out almost before it got in. The announcement was accompanied by George Bush's suggestion that some GIs might return home before Bill Clinton's inauguration, then less than two months away. This estimate was woefully inaccurate and misleading, as was the calculation that a narrowly circumscribed effort - excluding such essential tasks as disarmament, help in reconstituting a civil society, and assistance for reconstruction - would be fruitful in restoring hope in this hapless country.

Such premature announcement of the early termination of the Somali mission encouraged the principal warlords to play a waiting game in which they were

---

18 This figure is based on all responses received as of 5 May 1995. This response is troubling because disarmament was the cornerstone of the mandate of UNOSOM II.
20 Ibid.
sure to win. The current obsession with avoiding "mission creep" and cutting costs has had the unfortunate consequence of detracting complex peace missions from the real purpose of accomplishing set objectives. As the Somali experience has demonstrated, rather paradoxically, such missions tend to last much longer, involve deeper mission creep and cost so much more in terms of money and collateral damage that it is arguable whether this situation might not have been different had the premature announcement of departure dates not occurred. The international community needs to exercise more patience and provide greater latitude to field personnel involved in conflict-resolving multinational missions, rather than imposing unrealistic deadlines for the completion of such mission. As has been noted by one scholar, the current practice puts the United Nations in an awkward position:

The United Nations has provided means for governments to appear to be doing something without really doing anything. The urge to 'do something' in troubled regions around the world should be resisted unless the measures taken have a reasonable chance of success.\(^\text{21}\)

7. Regional organisations should be strengthened for purposes of preventive diplomacy, early intervention when conflicts break out, and effective collaboration with the United Nations in dealing with regionally-specific threats to international peace and security. The United Nations peacekeeping operation need not be the first instrument used to deal with potentially system-threatening civil conflicts. In Somalia, a strong OAU and/or LAS could have contained the conflict well enough for the United Nations to have focused on medium- and long-term peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. The "timidity" of early efforts by the OAU and LAS to arrest, or at least contain, the Somali conflict arose from their institutional weakness, especially in the area of collective security.\(^\text{22}\) Efforts should be made early on

\(^{21}\) Ibid. (emphasis added).

\(^{22}\) This contrasts sharply with the reasonably successful experiences in Liberia and Nicaragua/El Salvador, where the regional organisations concerned, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Organisation of American States (OAS), respectively - responded immediately and effectively to the conflicts and later invited the United Nations to finesse and complement the regional peace initiatives. For details, see W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 1, No 3, 1994, pp.261-302; and S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "The United Nations, Regional Organizations and Human Security: Building Theory in Central America", *Third World*
by the United Nations to target potential regional organisations in crisis-prone areas of the world with a view to instituting (where absent) or strengthening (where present) a mechanism for responding to crisis situations, even if on a first-aid basis. This would help avoid the confusion caused by the ad hoc manner in which regional organisations contact the UN or vice versa only when multinational forces are about to be assembled for deployment.
Biographical Note

Clement Adibe received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, with specializations in International Relations and Comparative Politics of Development. Between 1992-1994, he held a pre-doctoral fellowship in International Peace and Security under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council, New York, and the MacArthur Foundation in Chicago. He also held research fellowships at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (1992/93), Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University (1993/94), Legon Centre for International Affairs, University of Ghana at Legon (Summer 1993) and the Center for International Relations, Queen's University at Kingston (1994/95). He has published articles in learned journals, including Peace Research, Futures and the South African Journal of International Affairs, as well chapters in volumes on foreign policy and international political economy. He is currently a Killam post-doctoral fellow at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.
Part II:

Bibliography
Bornschier, Volker and Peter Lengyel (eds), *Conflicts and New Departures in World Society*, World Society Studies, Vol. 3.


Bibliography


Menkhaus, Ken and Terrence Lyons, "What are the Lessons to be Learned from Somalia?", CSIS Africa Notes, No 144, January 1993.


Bibliography

Stevenson, Jonathan, "Hope Restored in Somalia?", Foreign Policy, No 91, Summer 1993.
The Economist, 14 August 1993, pp.17-18.
The Economist, 28 January 1995, p.46.
The Economist, 18 February 1995, p.52.
UN Chronicle, September 1993.
UN Chronicle, June 1994.
UN Chronicle, September 1994.


**UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS**


UNIDIR PRIMARY SOURCES:

Practitioners' Questionnaire numbers:

S006.
S019.
S040.
S041.
S055.
S073.
S099.
S153.
S142.
S145.
S144.
S146.
S148.
S150.
S100.

Questionnaire Analysis UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002.

External Reviewers and Experts (phone and personal interviews undertaken between 1st March and 15 April 1995):
Col. S. Butler
Col. C. Bailey
Lt. Col. Byrne
Gen. B. Loi
Dr. Astrid Aarland
Dr. Steve Stedman
UNIDIR DCR Project Military Expert Team
Part III:

Questionnaire Analysis
Note to Readers: The responses which appear in this analysis have been reproduced directly from the respondents’ answers to the DCR Practitioner’s Questionnaire. Changes, if any, have been made only to correct spelling, grammar, and sentence structure; all efforts have been made to maintain the integrity of the original responses.

Reference Number:
UNIDIR/UNOSOM/002
Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaires

SUMMARY

1. OPERATION
   a. Name of Operation: UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II
   b. Location of Operation: SOMALIA

2. QUESTIONNAIRES
   a. Number of Questionnaires analysed: 16
   b. Time Frame Covered by questionnaires:
      - (S006) 01/01/94 - 31/05/94
      - (S019) 01/03/94 - 31/09/94
      - (S040) 23/07/92 - 15/03/93
      - (S041) 23/07/92 - 15/03/93
      - (S055) 01/12/92 - 30/09/93
      - (S059) 01/03/93 - 28/02/94
      - (S073) 21/12/92 - 16/05/93
      - (S099) 20/10/93 - 06/12/93
      - (S100) 01/02/93 - 31/07/93
      - (S142) 01/05/93 - 30/11/93
      - (S144) 14/11/92 - 30/04/93
      - (S145) 15/04/92 - 15/08/93
      - (S146) 01/12/92 - 30/04/93
      - (S148) 01/04/93 - 31/08/93
      - (S150) 08/04/93 - 22/08/93
      - (S153) 01/07/94 - 24/02/94
   c. Respondents' Primary Role:
      - UN Civilian Personnel: 01
      - Chief : 00
      - Other : 01
Humanitarian Relief Operator/NGO person: 00
National Official: 00
Military Officer: 15
Commander: 07
Other: 08

d. Respondents' Primary Mission:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Military Observer</th>
<th>Infantry</th>
<th>Armour</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Engineer</th>
<th>Medical</th>
<th>Aviation</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Logistics</th>
<th>Mil Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ Staff</td>
<td>07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil Police</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>CIVPOL 01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Regular Activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convoy Operations</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>Convoy Security</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Security</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Patrolling</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search Ops</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Check Point Ops</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cease Fire Monitor</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>Cease Fire Violation Investigation</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Inspection</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>Weapons Inventories</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon Collection Vol</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>Weapons Collection Invo</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Elimination</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>Cantonment Construction</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonment Security</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>Disarmament Verification</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Collection</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>Police Operations (Mil)</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Ops</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>Humanitarian Relief</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other: Civic Action; Medical Support to Local Population, Police Operations, NGO security, Manning Airport in capital, Destruction of weapons at storage sites.

SECTION ONE: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

(Note to readers: Two caveats should be kept in mind when surveying the respondents' answers to the Practitioner's Questionnaire. First, in answering the questionnaire, respondents were instructed to answer only those questions which pertain to their specific mission and/or function; as a result, most respondents did not answer all of the "yes" or "no" questions. The number of responses for each question, therefore, will not always add up to total number of respondents. Second, for some questions, respondents provided additional commentary for questions they should have skipped - they may have answered a question with "no", for example, and then elaborated on their answer in the space provided for the "yes" respondents. For this reason, certain questions may contain more responses than the number expected.)

I. Implementation of the Peace Agreement:

Q1.1 Was there a disarmament component in the original peace agreement and/or relevant UNSC Resolution?

Yes : 11 No : 04

Q1.2 Was the disarmament component a central feature of the agreement?

Yes : 06 No : 05

(The questionnaire responses pertain to all three operations launched in Somalia, each of which had a differing relationship to disarmament: UNOSOM I had a disarmament component in its mandate, but it was not well defined; UNITAF had no disarmament component in its mandate; and UNOSOM II did have a disarmament component in its mandate. Responses
Q1.3 Describe the desired outcome of the disarmament component vis-à-vis the peace agreement.

- (S006) Stop the inter-clan fighting and restore a recognizable form of government.
- (S040) Nil.
- (S041) Same as S040.
- (S055) Rebuilding of social structures and political institutions. Rebuilding of a new police force was reassuring and retained the safety [...] of the humanitarian flow from Mogadishu to the other parts of the country.
- (S073) Voluntary cantonment of heavy weapons, lowering of tension, particularly in Mogadishu, and no harassment of relief convoys, all leading to a favourable atmosphere for a political solution.
- (S099) Disarmament leading to demobilization and reconciliation of warring factions.
- (S153) Assembly area for heavy weapons, cantonment area for small weapons, confiscated weapons either destroyed or distributed to the new national Somalia security forces.
- (S145) Return of security in the area.
- (S144) See Report of Secretary General S/24.480, 24 August 1992, para. 23. See also Resolution 775 para. 11 & 12. As UNOSOM I was put on hold by 3 December 1992, disarmament became a UNITAF mission. In Jan. 1993, a combined UNITAF/UNOSOM working group was created in order to produce the CF & D concept of operations. Remark: An agreement signed in Addis-Abeba by 14 out
141 Somali leaders on 15 January 1993 [directed that] disarmament [be] completed by March 1993 (this was impossible).

- (S146) No "crew served" weapons authorized. Heavy and mobile weapons stored in Authorized Weapons Storage Sites (AWSS), [...] where regular control [had to] be conducted.

- (S100) Voluntary and peaceful self cantonment of weapons, inventory at cantonment, random inspections. Turn over of weapons to Somali Army when army [is] formed.

- (S142) Assembly area, heavy weapons. Cantonment area, small weapons. Confiscated weapons either destroy[ed] [or] distribute[d] to the new national Somali security forces.

- (S059) Factions' (15 separate political elements) militia disarmed and demobilized. Societal infrastructure r[e]established throughout Somalia to include NW Somalia (Somaliland).

Q1.4 Was there a timetable planned for implementation?
Yes: 07  No: 03

Q1.5 If yes, did it go as planned?
Yes: 00  No: 08

Q1.6 If no, why? Give three reasons.
- (S006) Either clan leaders would not agree, or [they] backed down or dishono[u]red the agreement later.

- (S055) Too [many] parties present in the area. Large area to control. [Situation not clear.]
- (S073) Cantonment of weapons was only partially achieved. [The] emphasis of the operation was, rightly, the security of humanitarian relief. If relief operations were not interfered with, there was little incentive to engage in active disarmament.

- (S099) Humanitarian part of plan could not be supported. NGOs/UN Humanitarian organizations had no funds for demobilization. Warring parties not sincere about disarmament.

- (S145) Due to the [inter-]clan struggle.

- (S144) UNOSOM I on hold - UNITAF deployed only in a part of Somalia. Lack of confidence between Somali factions. Somalis have always carried weapons as shepherds so why should they turn them in. Who would protect them against bandits.

- (S100) Voluntary cantonment went well [and was] enforced by UNITAF. [In the] following cantonment and turn over of the cantonment sites to the Factional Guard force there was [a] movement of weapons in and out of the sites.

- (S142) Timetable was never finalized during negotiations.

- (S059) No realistic understanding of [the] mission scope. Diverging political agendas amongst contributing nations. Lack of integrated strategy in theater (political, military, humanitarian).

**Q1.7 If there were delays in the implementation, summarize their impact on the disarmament process.**

- (S006) Delays allowed more weapons to enter and be distributed.


- (S073) See 1.6.
- (S099) Disarmament process collapsed.

- (S144) There has never been a proper disarmament process in Somalia. Only minor local successes were booked.

- (S146) No major impact on the operations.

- (S059) Delays supported warlords agenda to undermine UN staff/command. [The] exasperated populace [...] wanted tangible benefits [from the] reconstruction.

Q1.8 Did, at any time, the existing agreements hinder you from conducting disarmament measures?

Yes: 04 No: 06

Q1.9 If yes, mention some of the ways in which you felt hindered.

- (S144) [...] Disarmament phasing [...] to be conducted in the current UNITAF Area Of Responsibility (AOR) first, then in the central region, and finally in the northern region. [Difficult to be the first faction to agree] to start to disarm. They feared the other factions [...] active in [the] central and northern parts of the country as well as the bandits spread out all over Somalia.

- (S146) [...] The agreements were related to "heavy" weapons, and not to all kinds of small weapons.

- (S142) No incentives for disarmament, no disarmament enforcing measures, [and] agreement signed by faction leaders with no intention to fulfill their engagements.

- (S059) Disarmament operations require unity of command. In UNOSOM II, disarmament operations required consensus. Consensus undercuts [the] military commander.
Analyst's Comments:

The issue of consent was very much at stake during this operation. Many respondents indicated that the process of disarmament was derailed or terminated as soon as one or more of the factions were no longer in agreement with the process. This is a symptom of many UN operations; the cause, however, is a political one.

The primary objective of peace efforts in the past has been to achieve a cessation of hostilities in international conflicts. Today, we primarily find the UN deploying to internal conflicts within "failed nation states" trying to establish a lasting peace, to prevent the further spread of genocide and suffering, and to implement some standard of law and order. It has proven to be the case consistently, however, that the UN, rather than supporting a standard of authority to facilitate a local transition, adapts itself to the nature of local authority. It tends to manoeuvre in the direction of maximum consent and even accepts restrictions placed on it by the parties. This means that unless the UN was willing to exercise independent political authority in Somalia, it became just another Somali faction.

The UN should not have placed the mission on the same level as the warring factions, but rather on a level above them. In the agreements that were reached before the deployment of the UN, the belligerents were treated like other full members of the international community. A primary objective, therefore, was to achieve a cease-fire, and not to re-establish law and order. The limitations of this oversight became clear when factional fighting subsided and was replaced by general lawlessness, banditry and looting.

II. Mandate:

Q2.1 At the start of your mission, were you informed of the mandate part regarding disarmament?

Yes: 06 No: 08

Q2.2 How was the disarmament component expressed in your mission mandate? (Summarize.)

- (S006) Checked for [weapons] at entry to [the airport].
- (S040) There was no disarmament, [...] only a cease-fire agreement.

- (S041) Same as S040.

- (S055) Disarming all forces opposing [...] the mandate.

- (S073) Security of the relief effort was [of first priority], disarmament was to be a means to that end, if necessary. This, of course, changed for UNOSOM II when disarmament became [the] prime task. I was only involved in UNOSOM II for 10 days or so as our contingent withdrew.

- (S142) Disarm factions, redistribute weapons [for] new Somali forces.

- (S099) "Provide secure environment for movement and delivery of humanitarian supplies."

- (S145) In particular through the RoEs, which [directed the mission to] seize weapons during control operations, to execute [weapons] search operations, and to destroy weapons in cases of threat.

- (S144) See Resolution 775 of 28.08.92, para. 11 & 12.

- (S146) No "crew-served" weapon[s] authorized. All heavy weapons stored in AWSS. No specific directives regarding small weapons, except bandits.

- (S148) I was allowed to collect all weapons [...] found [within] the limits of the city of Kismayo, [even using military force].

- (S100) It was a key part of the enforcement mission.
Q2.3 How did you interpret the mandate you received?

- (S006) The airport would be weapons free. Any weapons found [(from non-military or UN personnel) would be confiscated].

- (S055) Simply, [to] disarm [...] everybody.

- (S073) All heavy and crew-served weapons (i.e., machine guns) were a threat to be dealt with, by use of force if necessary. Light weapons, rifles, pistols, etc. were only confiscated if displayed visibly in public, or detected during car checkpoint [or] building searches.

- (S099) Disarm only those who posed a threat to security.

- (S153) Negotiate inside Somalia disarmament committee, enforce disarmament when necessary, define weapon policy in co-ordination with the process.

- S145) To create a secure environment in our AOR, [and] to permit [increases in] humanitarian relief activities and the resumption of social and economic activit[ies].

- (S144) [Did not reach actual mission area;] any interpretation of the mandate was therefore irrelevant.

- (S146) I tried to disarm everybody. [In doing so, I was] supported by [the] local population, local leaders and later on by [...] events (warring factions in the same area).

- (S148) [...] [V]ital to collect as [many] weapons as possible to [ensure] a "secure feeling" [for] the local population.

- (S142) Negotiate [within the] Somali disarmament commit[tee, enforce disarmament when necessary, [and] define weapon policy in co-ordination with the disarmament process.
- (S100) Open rules of engagement were established based on the mandate and [on] international law.

**Q2.4 Did the way the disarmament component was expressed hinder your disarming task?**

Yes: 01 No: 04

**Q2.5 If it was a hindrance, how would you have preferred your mandate to read?**

- (S099) Specifically state disarmament of factions in mission statement.

- (S142) No incentives for disarmament available. Mandate should include incentives from the developing programs.

- (S146) I would [appreciate] clear instructions related to [...] general disarmament in order to avoid banditry, (re)actions against [the] Allied Forces, [and] fights between opposed factions.

**Q2.6 Were your actions/freedom of action during disarmament operations influenced by external factors other than the mandate?**

Yes: 07 No: 03

**Q2.7 If yes, which ones?**

- (S006) Reliance on other UN participants to do their job. Some were not nearly as conscientious as others.

- (S055) The difference between our behavior ([we collected] all the weapons we could in our sector [...] and [the other armies' behavior] in [their] sector (no collection of weapons). For this reason we could not [collect weapons as thoroughly and as quickly as we needed to].
- (S073) There was some early press coverage of the disarmament process, but when it was seen that our policies and procedures brought security to Baidoa, press interest in the selective disarmament process dissipated.

- (S099) Disarmament plan required support of humanitarian agencies to provide incentives to individual warriors to disarm. This support did not materialize.

- (S142) Somali[an] culture (weapons = dignity), confrontation with SNA.

- (S145) [The] [s]ituation [differed] in [...] different parts of the AOR. [We were] [c]oncerned [with] balancing the search operation on both sides of the opposing clans.

- (S144) A damatic lack of information about the [Somali] people and their mentality ([they] never say "no", but sometimes "yes" means "no"). A lack of experience about CF & D techniques within the UNOSOM I staff which had to be compensated [for] by calling upon [...] (US) "specialists" (ex-UN peacekeepers in Central America).

- (S100) The threat level influenced the R[e]E and the conduct of the teams. After the inspection teams were ambushed on 05 June 93, the sites and weapons were destroyed by demolition and helicopter assets.

III. Subsidiary Disarmament Agreements:

Q3.1 Did the warring factions enter into a separate disarmament agreement?

Yes: 03  No: 10

(If no, go to question 4.)
Q3.2 If yes, describe the agreement.

- (S099) Mutual voluntary cantonment of heavy weapons under own control.

- (S144) After approval by [both UNITAF and UNOSOM I] the SRSG invited the 16 warring factions to implement [the plan]. On 8 Jan. and 15 Jan. [19]93, 14 out of 16 factions agreed in Addis Abeba to [...] the proposed plan [...] [with conditions that were unacceptable to the UN].

- (S146) Evolutive agreements related to heavy weapons, [and] small weapons a) in the streets, b) fixed and mobile bodyguards [and] c) of militias.

Q3.3 Was the agreement formulated with the mandate in mind or independent of the mandate?

Mandate-oriented: 02  Independent of mandate: 01

Q3.4 Were there any contradictions between mandate and agreement?

Yes: 01  No: 02

Q3.5 If yes, which ones?

- (S099) Warring factions wanted to retain control/access to own weapons. Mandate inferred weapons to be under UNITAF/UNOSOM II control.

Q3.6 What was the impact of the agreement on the mandate?

- (S099) Agreement reached as a result of delay in implementing mandate. Later, warring factions resisted giving up control of cantoned weapons, resulting in fire fights with UNOSOM II forces.

- (S146) Positive. It was easier to ensure the protection of NGOs and also easier to distinguish the "bad[ guys] from] the "good guys".

IV. **Top-Down Changes: consistency of the mandate and its impact on the disarmament component:**

Q4.1 Did the mandate change while you were engaged in the UN/national operation?

Yes: 05  No: 07  
*If no, go to question 5.*

Q4.2 If yes, what was(were) the change(s)? (Describe the most important aspects.)

- (S006) Stopped actively confiscating w[eapons] outside of [the] UN compounds.

- (S055) The use of force became compulsory as the UN decided to [change] their approach to Somalian problems from the humanitarian to the strictly military point of view (bombing the town).

- (S073) It changed for UNOSOM II just before the Australian contingent in Baidoa departed.

- (S099) Disarmament was not priority during UNITAF period; [it] became priority under UNOSOM II. However, [the] opportunity to disarm warring factions quickly and with little resistance passed. Factions [were] much less co-operative under UNOSOM II.

- (S144) Chapter VI to Chapter VII on transition day. See Note S/25.354, dated 03 March 1993, para. 59-69.
- (S146) After two months, the city of Kismayo was declared a "weapon free city", and two months later, so was the valley of the Jubba.

- (S059) Post June 1995 disarmament operations were more coercive. They focused primarily on one of the 15 factions.

**Q4.3 Did these changes affect your disarmament operations?**

Yes: 05  No: 00

**Q4.4 If yes, how? (Name the three most important effects.)**

- (S006) More weapons on the street. Initially only few weapons were seen on the street, but later many were seen.

- (S055) Impossible to convince (the belligerent parties of) our neutrality. It became difficult to continue with weapons collection.

- (S099) Delay caused an increase in the boldness of warring factions. Delay eroded trust between UNOSOM and warring factions. Lack of humanitarian support for demobilization doomed the plan.

- (S146) Very clear instructions. No more differences between many of the individual cases.

- (S059) Operations became more restrictive. Clans used the change in the mission profile as a lever for increased aid. Contributing nations started working in opposition to one another (competing agenda[s]).
Q4.5 If disarmament was affected, was it still possible for you to implement disarmament measures as first envisaged?

Yes: 01  No: 03

Q4.6 In the context of 4.5, did you have to change or abandon procedures?

Change: 02  Abandon: 02

Q4.7 If you changed procedures, what were the changes? (Mention the three most important ones.)

- (S055) Weapons searches and collection [occurred] mainly outside of the town. Control of weapons traffic [rather than] searching for and collecting [the weapons].

- (S099) More coercive disarmament in some areas. Voluntary cantonnement of weapons in other areas [was under the control of] warring faction[s]. Gave up on demobilization plan.

- (S059) More search/seize operations. Less contact in the interior with smaller factions. Less factional involvement with planning and execution.

Q4.8 Were you adequately informed of changes as and when they occurred?

Yes: 01  No: 02

Q4.9 Were you able to implement alternative measures immediately?

Yes: 01  No: 01
Q4.10 If no, why not? (Give the three most salient points.)
- (S099) Lack of co-ordination and communication between Political, Humanitarian and Military branches. Negotiators on ground were not decision makers. Plans based on untenable assumptions.

V. **Bottom-Up Changes: disputes among the warring parties arising during the mission:**

Q5.1 Was there a mechanism or a provision for the settlement of disputes if and when these emerged?
Yes: 07  No: 05

Q5.2 If yes, what type of mechanism/provision did you have (i.e. mission, special agreement, the UN process, special commission, etc.)?
- (S006) [Persons from the UN political department.] Labour meetings.
- (S055) Special agreements among the parties sponsored by our forces.
- (S145) UN process: [E]ncourage[d] and organize[d] meetings by the civilian UN chief of zone with the support of the military branch of the UN contingent (security and logistics).
- (S144) The CF Committee - Monitoring Group (UNITAF/UNOSOM/factions) [...] went to the scene where incidents had occurred [...] and [...] issue[d] conclusions on the investigation.
- (S146) No, but the influence of the fights between faction[s] could [have a] negative [effect on] the general mission (the protection of NGOs). So, [in addition to] nego[t]iations, we tried to disarm members of [the] fighting factions.
Meetings between Force Commander, UN representatives and local authorities of the warring parties.

The cease-fire and disarmament committee was composed of representatives of each of the 15 political factions in Somalia. They investigated the cease-fire violations in Kismayo and other locations and rendered reports on the investigations.

US presidential envoy, and HQ UNITAF staff, particularly J3 (Operations), were used to help iron out disputes. Force was occasionally used.

Cease-fire and disarmament committee.

A special agreement evolved from the Addis Abeba agreement of January 1993 in March-April 1993.

Q5.3 What kind of regulations were agreed between the parties and the peacekeepers for the collection of arms?

On the airfield any arms would be confiscated.

We authorized arms [...] only for self defence of the command post, for NGO security, and for policemen of the parties.

There were no regulations per se, but there was an understanding that visible weapons would be confiscated. Note: In Baidoa the hostile elements were less the faction militia, and more generally bandits. Policy on display of weapons was passed through village elder councils.

Inventory/storage/maintenance by UN troops under the control of the Somali committee.

Some voluntary transfers of weapons to the UN contingent. No opposition of the parties towards search operations.
- (S144) Factions [...] turn(ed) in their heavy armament [...] to cantonment sites [...]. Militia members [...] proceed(ed) to transition sites where they [...] abandon[ed] their small arms, [and registered for assistance in] returning back to civilian life. After [the] deadline, [weapon bearers were declared bandits] and could be killed.

- (S146) Heavy weapons stored. Small weapons collected.

- (S150) Designation of a number of weapon free zones (WFZs). Outside of WFZs, only small arms allowed for self-defence. Destruction of all "technical"s" in AOR.

- (S100) Weapons were confiscated on sight. Guards had their weapons registered with the Provost.

- (S059) Factions would simultaneously move to militia encampments, be disarmed and [the weapons] retained by [the] UN (provision of incentives [was a] key point of [the] accord).

**Q5.4 What kind of negotiations/regulations were agreed at the top and lower levels with respect to the storage of arms?**

- (S006) Weapons were stored/check ed at a building at the entrance.

- (S055) At the top, accord for authorized weapon posts under UN control. At the lower [levels], [individual] authorizations for NGO security men.

- (S073) Weapons confiscated in Baidoa were destroyed.

- (S142) Storage sites/inventory. Mechanism/destroy weapons.

- (S145) All weapons seized would be gathered by UN contingent[s].

- (S144) See statement on the report from the CF & D planning group from UNOSOM/UNITAF, issued in Addis-Abeba 15.03.93.
- (S146) Storage of small [and heavy] weapons under UN control, [...] but we were forced to destroy [the heavy weapons] because [of their] unauthorized use [...].

- (S100) Arms were stored at approved cantonment sites, Authorized Weapons Storage Sites [...]. The factional militias would voluntarily store the weapons under UNITAF supervision. UNITAF [made] inventories [of] the weapons, then turned over security and maintenance to the faction whose weapons were stored there.

- (S059) Turned over to UNOSOM II for disposition.

**Q5.5 Was there a conflict between these new agreements and the original agreement and/or mandate?**

Yes: 03  No: 04

*Analyst's Comments:*

*When the Somali Army was disbanded in January 1991, they abandoned some 40,000 weapons. As a consequence of the Cold War and military alliances with a Superpower, the Somali Army was one of the best armed on the continent in the 1980s. However, due to a lack of preventive and operational maintenance, a large amount of the technically-advanced equipment was not fully operational. The Somali Forces consisted of the following:*

**Army:**
- 4 x Tank Brigades
- 45 x Infantry Brigades (Mechanized and Motorized)
- 4 x Commando Brigades
- 3 x Field Artillery Brigades
- 1 x Surface-to-Air Missile Brigade

**Air Force:**
- 3 x Ground Attack Squadrons
- 3 x Fighter Squadrons
- 1 x Counter Insurgency Squadron
- 1 x Transport Squadron
- 1 x Helicopter Squadron

The air force component simply ceased to operate, and by 1992, the carcasses of the planes were strewn about airfields everywhere in Somalia. The weapons, once part of the Army's arsenal, were channelled into the clan militias and posed a definite threat to internal security and law and order. In addition to the known arsenal of the Somali Forces, caches of arms and ammunition were built up from open and black markets. With these facts in mind, the apparent lack of a consistent disarmament strategy and plan from the outset of the first UN involvement defies logic, but not the emotions created by the pictures of starving and dying Somalis. The misery and tragedy in Somalia distracted the UN strategic planners' attention from the real issues to the symptoms.

As can be seen from the practitioners' answers, there were as many interpretations the UN forces' disarmament tasks as there were questionnaire respondents. This was in fact due to a lack of clear guidelines and mandates given during the different stages of the UN operation. By the time of UNOSOM II, the scope of disarmament was a principal point of contention between the SG and the Forces. Their disagreement effectively centred around the mandate of Resolution 794: the directive to establish a "secure environment for humanitarian relief" is as wide as the grace of the gods. Restrictively it means to protect corridors and convoys, and broadly it means creating a relatively secure environment in which relief agencies can freely operate and fulfill their duties. The SG had the intention of accomplishing the latter. On the ground the mandate was interpreted in its narrower sense, and a chance to fundamentally alter the environment of anarchy in Somalia was missed.
The UN Force in Somalia had a demobilization and disarmament plan for UNOSOM II that was based on the consent and co-operation of all of the different factions.

- Militia and weapons would be grouped in "faction groupment areas" from where they would move to cantonment sites.

- Heavy- and crew-served weapons would be handed in, registered, separated from the militia, and inspected. Serviceable weapons would be stored for use by the proposed Somalian Army; unserviceable and derelict
weapons would be destroyed on site. At this stage the militia would still be in possession of their small arms for security reasons.

- After the deadline (March 1993), the cantoned militia would be moved to transition sites, with their small arms. Small arms would be handed in, registered, inspected, and stored or destroyed, depending on their condition. The militia would then be either integrated into the proposed Somalian Army, or prepared for civilian life.

This plan did not get off the ground because the belligerent parties could neither reach an agreement nor honour agreements already made. Again the question of consent arises, and one can only wonder if the status given to the warlords (that of states in the international community) was in fact the cause of this breakdown. If the UN had positioned itself above the warlords, instead of between them, the picture may have looked different. According to some respondents, there were also problems relating to mission objectives, planning on the side of the UN, co-operation between military and civilian components, etc. (see answers to Q1.6).

- There is a logical sequence to follow in demobilization operations, of which disarming belligerents is one of the stages. The normal stages of a demobilization operation are: securing an agreement; establishing and managing a cease-fire; withdrawing and assembling belligerents; disarming the belligerents; and, finally, dispersing and rehabilitating the belligerents. All of these stages are more or less present in the above-mentioned plan, and in theory it looks as if a "textbook plan" should have provided the desired results - but this was not the case. The reasons are by no means simple, but some are very apparent.

- The first and foremost principle is that there can be no peace without a relative measure of security. A "relatively secure environment" should have been a prerequisite for all other operations in Somalia. The strategist must find the "centre of gravity" for an operation - that is, the single most important event or condition which will stabilize the situation or reverse the destruction and strife. All effort and resources must then be directed towards that one identified centre. In the streets of Mogadishu and in the Somali countryside, anarchy amounted to the biggest bully with the biggest stick exerting influence over a local area and its population. The
task of responding to this anarchy was the ultimate challenge of the international community, and this task should have been the basis of an overall framework to unwind the spiral of violence. Instead, there was a tendency to respond primarily to the symptoms of the problem: the centre of gravity for UNOSOM was the delivery of humanitarian aid to the hundreds of thousands of starving Somalis (see answers to Q2.3), and the objective of establishing a relatively secure environment within which this could take place seemingly played second fiddle. In the end, even the humanitarian aid organizations had to withdraw from the country, leaving the impression that the wrong centre of gravity was pursued.

- Another necessary precursor to a peacekeeping force or monitoring mission’s future action is the securing of an appropriate agreement for demobilization operations. Where no recognizable authority exists, as in a failed state, a model or template for demobilization and disarmament should be drawn up and enforced. This agreement/model should also offer rewards and penalties to motivate compliance. Demobilization operations, representing in effect the implementation of negotiated settlements, are therefore a foundational military task in the peacekeeping context. If demobilization operations had been the foundational military task of UNOSOM, the creation of a secure environment would also have been high on the list of things to accomplish, in order to achieve the demobilization objective. The following characteristics of the conflict and region had an effect on the outcome of the demobilization effort:

  • an ill-defined and widespread area of operation wherein opposing factions were inextricably mixed;

  • inter-communal violence and atrocity;

  • difficulty in identifying the parties to the conflict, which were undisciplined, lacking in restraint, and barely accountable to any central or recognized authority;

  • sporadic opposition to the measures of the UN; and
• restricted movement caused by widespread attacks, unmarked mines, and residual ordnance.

Notwithstanding these characteristics, the local UN authorities opted for "aid before security". The logic and wisdom of this decision were to be determined by the end result of the effort.

Operations in Somalia proceeded through three stages: UNOSOM I, a humanitarian assistance mission; UNITAF, a humanitarian assistance operation with limited military action; and UNOSOM II, a peace enforcement operation involving humanitarian assistance and active combat. Conflicting interests within the mission led to peculiar problems on the disarmament side. Apparently the military did not have the manpower to provide security to NGOs and humanitarian aid agencies in the remote parts of the country. The humanitarian aid agencies had a dire need for protection against bandits, and because of the lack of protection from the military, they hired "technicals" (men with guns) to protect them. Some friction between the military and the humanitarian aid agencies occurred when the military disarmed the "technicals", thus leaving the aid organizations vulnerable to attacks by bandits. This issue also had an influence on the outcome of the disarmament operation which needs further research. Some sort of joint management system should be implemented between the military, civilian and NGO components of a mission, to co-ordinate needs and objectives. The creation and use by the United States forces of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Somalia went a long way towards co-ordinating NGO, PVO, UN, and humanitarian operations requirements and activities on a daily basis. This CMOC concept needs to be greatly expanded to include all parties and organizations that are not considered a threat to UN operations.

VI. Protection of the Population During the Mission:

Q6.1. Did you consider the protection of the population when negotiating disarmament clauses with the warring parties?

Yes: 09  No: 03
Q6.2. Did you have the protection of the population as part of your mission?

Yes: 08 No: 06

Q6.3 If yes, did you have the means to do so?

Yes: 05 No: 04

Q6.4 What were the three most important means at your disposal to achieve this objective?

- (S055) [Thorough] and continuous control of the situation, obtained by [...] efficient intelligence work in contact with the population ([largely] Italian speaking). Operations against bandits. Patrolling [the] country[side] and villages. Assistance provided to the population on a non-stop basis in the towns and in the country[side].

- (S073) Foot and mounted patrolling throughout, but particularly in Baidoa. Main road checkpoints. Presence in town, particularly in NGO compounds.

- (S142) UN troops. Assessment of the need[...] of the factions to maintain their own security when UN troops [were] not available.

- (S145) Military means. Liaison officers and interpreters. Civilian components of the UN contingents.

- (S144) Own troops (PAKBAT-NORCOY).


- (S148) Two platoon[...] paratroopers, excellent means of communication, good weapons.
- (S100) Precision weapon systems (AC130, Cobra). Loud speaker teams with Somali translators. Newspaper and radio (CA/PSYOP). Cease-fire and disarmament committee members from the factions.

**Analyst’s Comments:**

Protective tasks include the safeguarding of individuals, communities and installations. Protective measures will tend to use up manpower. A commander should therefore balance protective requirements against the need for more operational measures. Measures used for protection can be any one or combination of the following:

- precautionary measures such as basic security safeguards;
- tactical measures such as escorts and pickets;
- contingency measures including such things as evacuation plans, rapid deployment forces, etc.;
- protected areas which aim to create the conditions under which communities can respect and observe the law without outside interference or attack; and
- control measures such as prohibitions and restrictions (curfews, roadblocks, searches, patrols, etc.) with the aim to:
  - deter violent or criminal activity
  - restrict the potential for riotous assemblies
  - limit the illegal traffic of war supplies or contraband
  - apprehend wanted persons, and
  - detect patterns of activity and gain information.

The application of accepted military doctrine for conventional operations, which was designed around the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the protection of victims of war, seems to be a one-sided affair in Africa. The value of human life and human rights is usually high when one is on the "receiving" end of the stick, but, as was the case in Somalia, when the faction leaders were on the "dishing-out" side, they did not value the lives and human rights of their own people. The very force which was there to protect the people was manipulated into becoming a force for the aggressors and offenders. In Africa, two wrongs usually made a right.
During the UNITAF period, Belgian troops watched helplessly in Kismayo while fighters from one faction (Morgan's) infiltrated in the town and a mixed gender crowd chased out the supporters of another faction (Jess). Naturally the Belgian troops were accused by Jess of deliberately allowing this to happen. The truth is that the Belgians were simply at a loss as how to break up these groups of combatants and non-combatants.

Swarming was another tactic that was difficult to combat. It was evidently assumed that if enough people ran at a vehicle or a cordon protecting a search operation, the UN troops would have the difficult choice of either having to shoot unarmed civilians or to retreat.¹

A constant worry in Somalia was how to protect UN civilians and international relief workers. Protection from shelling was just one of the dangers they encountered; civilian vulnerability was the Achilles’ heel of the operation. Yet, civilian safety was paramount if the job of facilitating the recovery of the country was to be accomplished. Military units were organized; they faced danger as part of their responsibilities, and they had the training and the means to protect themselves. Civilians, on the other hand, were often assigned to remote areas where there were no military personnel or units deployed. This made them vulnerable to criminals and those who wanted to disrupt the UN operation in the country for political reasons. To better this situation, local guards, often of uncertain reliability, were hired by civilian organizations to protect their assets. There were frequent accusations that guards hired by the NGO’s protected them by day and robbed them by night. In the case of civilians living outside military compounds in Mogadishu, it was decided in mid-May 1993 that the best way to improve their security was to deploy a Nepalese Gurka battalion to protect them. In spite of the urgency of the situation, however, it was four months before the first Gurka arrived.

One of the tasks of the military component was to protect what little infrastructure and fixed assets remained in Somalia, and which were of importance to the UN mission and the Somalian people. Light mortars shelled UN facilities on many evenings, wounding civilian and military personnel alike, and damaging vital equipment such as helicopters on the ground. There was also concern that terrorist raids would be initiated from inside compounds by infiltrating personnel and/or explosives carried in on one of the many large

Somali trucks which frequented the base to bring supplies or to pump fuel or water.

SECTION TWO: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

VII. Force Composition and Force Structure

Q7.1 Was the force composition unilateral or multilateral for your mission area?

Unilateral: 03  Multilateral: 11

Q7.2 Describe the three most important advantages in action in the manner described in 7.1.

Multilateral force composition:

- (S006) [Does not] appear as a unilateral takeover, or [as] one country forcing its will on another.

- (S019) A part of the UN system. Gives credibility. Use of different kinds of experiences.

- (S055) International community solidarity. More operational capabilities and [...] logistic[al] effort. Not to be easily considered as neo-colonialist[s].

- (S073) Broaden political consensus. Strong leadership from US. Variety of capabilities available.

- (S153) [The] different organization and different capabilities of various contingents [were] suit[ed] to meet different [...] tasks and challenges.
- (S142) Credibility of the involvement of the [international] community, size of troops. Credibility of [the] peaceful intentions of the UN[...]. Variability of culture in [the] way to fulfill the mission[...].

- (S144) Several countries shared the political responsibility to intervene in Somalia. Only possibility to find enough peacekeepers.

- (S146) […] BE and US Forces [worked together]. Any attack against Allied Forces was seen as an attack against US Forces.

- (S100) World support (US, Canada, Australia, Kuwait, Pakistan, Germany, etc.). Regional representation (Bostwana, Nigeria, Egypt). Varied experiences and points of view.

- (S059) Took advantage of area expertise. Provided a world solution to a regional problem. Lessen[ed] the bill for one country in terms of manpower.

Unilateral force composition:


- (S150) Unity of command. […] [S]ame interpretation of RoE throughout AOR.

Q7.3 Describe the three most important disadvantages in acting in the manner described in 7.1.

Multilateral force composition:

- (S006) Communications - language barriers both oral and written. Work ethic - not strong [for] some nations. Military set up - different
nations allow [people of] different ranks to [make] decisions; some militaries require an unusually high rank to [make] a decision.

- (S019) Language difficulties. Many contributing nations send[...] personnel who do[...] not fulfill [set qualifications]. Differences in attitudes.


- (S153) Political considerations of the countries who donated troops for Somalia weighed heavily on their contingents, which in turn affected their performance.

- (S142) Unequal quality of troops. Different national involvement/interests. Unanimity of culture in the way in which to fulfill the missions.

- (S144) No common military background (except for NATO countries). Difficulties linked to differences [in] race, language, culture, religion etc.

- (S146) Different background on Africa, [varying approaches to] execution of the mission [and] different view[s] on the final solution.

- (S100) National agendas. Wide variety of work ethics. Language/terminology differences.

- (S073) Some clashes with "national agenda". Level of competency varied widely. Some limitations on employment flowing from 1 and 2.
- (S059) Diverging national agendas. No unity of command. Time intensive for deliberate planning.

**Unilateral force composition:**

- No responses.

**Q7.4 If you worked in a multilateral context: how important was consensus (with peacekeepers from other countries) for the achievement of disarmament and demobilization components during the operation?**

- (S006) Not important. [What is] important [is] to make them understand the need [or the] urgency.

- (S055) No disarmament [or] demobilization without consensus.

- (S073) Moderately important, albeit given the semi-autonomous area assigned to the Australian contingent, agreement with [the] US HQ was really all that was necessary.

- (S153) Consensus was the only method left [...].

- (S142) Disarmament had a different meaning according to the culture of the troops (meaning: [the US’ perspectives do not equal Europe's, and Europe's do not equal Asia's, etc.]).

- (S144) Everybody agreed with the idea, but not many [were] directly involved [...].

- (S146) Consensus was better at the end of our collaboration than at the beginning.

- (S100) Important but not difficult to achieve.

- (S059) Most essential component. However, caused UNOSOM II the most problems.
Q7.5. Was there adequate consideration given to the disarmament component as the mission evolved?

Adequate: 04  Inadequate: 07

Q7.6 If inadequate, explain how this affected your mission (mention the three most important issues).


- (S055) Our action[s] in the North of the country and in Mogadishu were made more difficult because in the rest of the country disarmament was [not given] the same consideration by the other UN Forces.

- (S142) No incentives [...] for disarmament. No co-ord[ination] with [th]e civilian component. No specific disarmament monitoring teams.

- (S144) No UNOSOM member had [...] previous experience with CF & D. No UN documentation on the subject was made available or existed in Somalia. [...] [F]rom the [very] beginning, the [many] technical teams sent to Somalia [underestimated] the sociological importance of arms in [...] Somali society.

- (S100) Disarmament was a key to the mandate, but not adequately staffed initially. The time [frame] for the mandate w[as] unrealistic. The process was well thought out, but not [sufficiently] manned to accomplish its objectives.

Q7.7 Did the force composition identify a specific structure to support the disarmament component of the mandate?

Yes: 01  No: 09
Q7.8 If yes, what was it?

- (S142) [The] [d]isarmament section of [the operation force in] [...] HQ.

- (S146) [The structure to support the disarmament component of the mandate was] specific, but in general terms, [there was a] need [for] a lot of infantry, supported by very mobile and light armoured forces.

- (S100) We were an ad hoc group with a "peripheral mission" until things [got] out of hand.

- (S059) Cease-fire and disarmament division in U-3 operations branch. 38 personnel [were] organized into 6 teams and a DNC HQ element. [They] would provide [the] nucleus of [the military observer structure (those who stayed behind)] after transition to Chapter 6 operations.

Q7.9 Did the force composition allow for verification and monitoring measures for the control of weapons and disarmament?

Yes: 05  No: 06

Q7.10 If yes, what were they?

- (S055) Periodic sites control by the units.

- (S073) Infantry soldiers and MPs.

- (S099) Disarmament teams were established from within the J-3 (Operations) Staff to verify and monitor disarmament.

- (S144) [...] [A] plan was made by April [19]93 mainly by my successors. One officer had UNTAC experience.

- (S146) A lot of infantry, supported by armoured forces and combat/transport helicopters.
- (S100) Random inspection/verification of [weapon] sites. [The] first time [...] the USC/SNA ambushed three teams killing 53 Pakistani peacekeepers.

Q7.11 Was the chosen force structure appropriate for executing the mission?

Yes: 07  No: 05

Q7.12 Were the units efficient for the mission given?

Yes: 10  No: 02

Q7.13 Were the units appropriate for conducting the disarmament operations?

Yes: 08  No: 03

Q7.14 Were your units augmented with specific personnel and equipment for the disarmament mission?

Yes: 06  No: 05

Q7.15 If yes, what additional capabilities did they provide? (List the five most important ones.)


- (S073) Counter intelligence section. Squad radios including civilian frequencies. Night vision devices.

- (S099) Loudspeaker teams. Translators.

- (S146) More infantry, more armoured vehicles and units, [and] more helicopters.

- (S150) EOD (explosive ordnance disposal).
- (S100) Translators/speaker teams. Special operations personnel. Explosives ordnance disposal teams. Intelligence personnel. Engineers.

**Analyst’s Comments:**

In its first peace enforcement operation in a failed state, the UN developed a force along the familiar lines of a peacekeeping force. But in conducting an operation for which consent from various contesting factions might not be obtainable and was a prerequisite for entry, added to the highly volatile internal situation, the force needed a high degree of political and military cohesion. Organized opposition quickly exposed weaknesses which required greater mutual protection, co-operation, integration and unity. In preparing for this operation, the UN selected countries from a wide range of backgrounds and capabilities. Nations which normally were rivals (e.g., Pakistan and India) were thrown together and expected to co-operate. By way of contrast, the NATO alliance had many political and military weaknesses, but it had prepared for potential combat through forty years of training exercises and had developed political-military procedures for co-ordinating and unifying the policy interests of nations. In addition, it was an alliance of nations with shared values, and was designed to defend the territory of its nations, not for intervention in other parts of the world.

For UNOSOM II, some thirty nations were brought together in small units. When UNITAF left Somalia, responsibilities shifted from a single unified force to a weak and diverse international organization. Almost all of the nations involved limited what their troops could do, where they could work (for instance, some refused to be stationed in Mogadishu), and how they were to react to various situations. Nations frequently rotated their units, delayed sending promised troops for months, and arbitrarily pulled them out on short notice. The UN Military Commander was frequently unable to move ahead with strategic plans because of the need to cover gaps left by departing units or to readjust the disposition of forces. The state of training and the quality of the equipment of the different units varied significantly. In trying to find replacements, UN headquarters in New York tended to simply count numbers of troops. But in evaluating soldiers, one does not equal one.
Some units simply did not have the training to do what the Force Commander required. For example, some troops were uncomfortable patrolling at night or expanding the perimeters around compounds to help prevent short-range mortar attacks. When heavier and more capable equipment was urgently requested by the commander, the UN was dependent on nations for immediate results. They, however, seemed unable to get out of their blocks. One such example concerned the attack of 5 June 1993 against the Pakistani force. The SC called for member states to urgently contribute armoured personnel carriers and attack helicopters. More than a month later, 8 x old M48 tanks finally arrived for the Pakistanis, their breechblocks inoperative, useless to the force.

From ammunition to maintenance to language, the inter-operability of this force, assembled from all over the world, represented a continuing challenge. Such problems are to be expected. But an even more difficult problem is the inherent tendency of nations to micro-manage their units from distant capitals. It is understandable that nations would want to control their units in dangerous situations, but this inclination presents a nearly insurmountable obstacle for a commander trying to marshal limited resources and to implement a coherent strategy. On one occasion a unit was stopped by its capital from counterattacking in mid-battle. Instead of receiving an important message, the bandits were emboldened by this action. Some units were even suspected of colluding with opponents of the UN, at least in the sense of providing them with a de facto sanctuary. Another problem was that each nation seemed to have a different political threshold of casualties. No nation had an easy time justifying casualties in what was basically a humanitarian situation, but some seemed to believe that a peace enforcement operation still meant a relatively risk-free operation. When it did not, the result was often inaction, accommodation or departure. This series of reactions produced a much less effective force. The UN demonstrated that it is not yet ready for peace enforcement operations.

Q7.16 If you were a commander, were you briefed by HQ's in advance of your disarming mission and before you arrived in the area of operations?

Yes: 04  No: 04
Q7.17 Did the security situation in the mission area allow for weapons control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 08  No: 04

Q7.18 If no, what steps were required to establish and maintain a secure environment?

- (S006) More troops on the streets as a show of force and to enforce w[apons] sanctions.
- (S142) Deploy UN troops.
- (S146) To convince local leaders [of] the need for general disarmament. To convince US Commanders to make a difference in our area, w[here] opposed factions were fighting.
- (S100) We expected trouble going in[to] the A[uthorized W[apons] S[ite]]s. The ambushes occurred after the inspections were complete[d] and we were [returning] to HQ. Our "collective" guard was down.

Q7.19 Did these force protection measures positively or negatively affect the accomplishment of the disarmament operations?

Positively: 05  Negatively: 01

Q7.20 Elaborate on the impact mentioned in 7.19 above.

- (S055) The units gained credibility.
- (S142) UN troops providing secure environment.
- (S100) The ambush and killing of the Pakistanis led to Aideed's arrest order and the eventual failure of both the political and military initiatives.
Disarmament was natural extension of force protection mission.

**Q7.21 Were command and control/operational procedures adequate for your task?**

Yes: 06  No: 05

**Q7.22 If no, mention three examples which demonstrate the inadequacy.**

- (055) Lack of information [...] collection and evaluation. Lack of communication system[s]. Lack of co-ordination in actions [...].

- (S153) The lack of will was the most important factor.

- (S142) No disarmament monitoring team [...]. No co-ordination [of] disarmament [at the] local level. [The] weapon[s] policy [was] not unified.

- (S144) UNOSOM I had [units only] in Mogadishu. Even so, communications were a problem (no secure radio net [or] telephones). Somalis were monitoring our motorola net through the use of the fixed stations they found on our hijacked vehicles. No "operations" as such, mainly base security. 50 UNMOs without a proper mission for many weeks, later relocated.

- (S100) Needed better communications on the tactical end and more responsiveness from the tactical units. Language and national agendas prevented some contingents from complying with orders from Force HQ. Peacekeepers from other nations died because of recalcitrance from certain units/national forces.
Q7.23 Summarize your salient experiences with command and control/operational procedures while on this mission.

- (S055) [It was practically] impossible [to] co-operate in operations with non-NATO forces.

- (S073) UNITAF HQ was a functioning national HQ with attached other nations LOs (Liaison officers) or national HQs. The UNITAF HQ was extremely well organized and run, and provided clear guidance and command and staff support. The flow of information was excellent. The contrast with both UNOSOM I and II HQs was telling.

- (S153) Contingent commanders must obey the orders of Force Commanders without taking into account the political considerations of their [...] countries.

- (S142) Orders [were] not executed by UN troops. Monitors for disarmament [were] without [a] secure environment due to [the] lack of interest in disarmament. Confrontations between factions, SNA and UN [troops] made any disarmament [...] [un]realistic.

- (S144) The military HQ of UNOSOM I [did not function] properly due to the lack of personnel combined with the local security level which forced us to abandon our offices before sunset [until] the next morning.

- (S148) My experiences are probably different [from] those [dealing with] "Classical UN Operations" because we were not confronted with [...] classical armies but [...] with armed clans that [have] practice[d] [...] civil[...] war, [...] stealing, [etc..] [...] for centuries.

- (S150) On intervention of the US QRF from Mogadishu in our AOR, there was a fundamental difference of opinion on the establishment of WFZ's, which could not be solved due to the C2 structure.

- (S100) Better tactical radios would eliminate the excuse. Better LNOs and the elimination of national agendas would make real combat operations feasible. National pride [has no] place in a c[ombat]
operation. The commander of one unit [died] because he [refused] his position to be relieved by a force from another nation.

Q7.24 What additional support (special capabilities/force multipliers) did you receive which helped the disarmament mission? List the three most important.

- (S055) None.
- (S073) Nil.
- (S099) Loudspeaker teams. Aerial leaflet drops.
- (S142) US troops [...] secure[d] operations which were] outside [the] UN troops' deployment areas. Log support for [the] disarmament committee.
- (S145) Mobility: [t]ransport helicopters to move one whole company anywhere in the AOR. Command and control: observation helicopters.
- (S146) More small armoured vehicles, more helicopter support [and] more US forces in [the] sector.
- (S150) See 7.15.
- (S100) AC130s. Real Time Intelligence. Helicopters.

Q7.25 Were they adequate?

Yes: 05  No: 01
Q7.26 If no, what other capabilities would you have needed to make your mission more effective? (List the most relevant.)

- (S142) Disarmament monitoring teams on a permanent basis in the areas.

Analyst's Comments:

As the composition of the main body of a force, the command structure also reflects the speed and efficiency with which a force can act and execute its mission. Channels of command and staff procedures must be direct and quick.

Force HQ Structure
The old military maxim, "if command and control arrangements take more than 10 seconds to explain, they're not going to work", was forgotten by the planners of UNOSOM II. The UN chain of command resembled in form that of a conventional combined peacekeeping operation: Brigade Commanders reported directly to the UNOSOM II Force Commander, who in turn reported directly to the SRSG. The SRSG was directly responsible to the SG, who in turn reported to the SC. This was, however, just the theory.

Annex J to the operational plan confused the issue totally by describing the command relationship as a coalition force (like UNITAF). Without going into a detailed discussion about the difference between a coalition and a UN operation, it is sufficient to say that a unlike a coalition, a UN operation is collectively mandated and controlled. Despite the proverbial tendency of contingents in peacekeeping operations to maintain separate lines of communications with, and to receive orders from, their home capitals, in a UN operation contingents are supposed to be strictly under the control of the Force Commander. This is not necessarily true of a coalition operation.

As was discussed, this led to a loose relationship between the contingents, the Force Commander and the national capitals, which seriously affected command and control. The US Commander in Chief (USA) retained command of all the US forces assigned to UNOSOM II, and would assign operational control to the Commander of the US Forces in Somalia. This meant that the Commander of the US Forces could override any decision of the UN Force Commander where US troops were concerned. The Commander of the US Forces in Somalia was also the Deputy Force Commander of the UN Force. In reality he was the direct subordinate of the Force Commander, as well as his indirect superior. As some respondents indicated [Q7.16, Q7.21, Q7.22 (S055, S153), and Q7.23 (S055, S073, S144, and S150)], there were problems with the efficiency of HQ's and the Command and Control system that were never solved.

VIII. Operational Procedures/Rules of Engagement

Q8.1 Did you abide by national or UN rules of engagement/operational procedures during the pursuit of your mission?

National: 04 UN: 09
Q8.2 Were these rules/procedures adequate for the performance of your task?

Yes: 11  No: 02

Q8.3 If no, what other rules should you have had?

- (S144) Chapter VII type RoE's.
- (S146) The authorization to disarm everybody.

Q8.4 If and when the situation changed, were your rules changed accordingly?

Yes: 07  No: 05

Q8.5 If yes, summarize the relevant changes.

- (S006) Use of lethal [and] non-lethal force.
- (S055) In order to guarantee more security for units.
- (S099) Even though situation changed, RoE remained adequate.
- (S153) Change [from] Chapter 7 to 6 also necessitated the changes in [the] rules of engagement.
- (S145) Example: after the development of the situation in Mogadishu, June-July 1993, [we were permitted to fire without warning on] vehicles which carried [technical]s and, of course, heavy weapon[s] [...]. We [did not] need to put [the permission to fire] into effect in our AOR.
- (S146) No weapon[s] authorized in our area (city of Kitmayo, Jubbah valley).
- (S150) Authorization to carry grenades after the even[t] in Mogadishu of early July.

- (S100) An individual seen in public w[i]th a weapon was an open target.

- (S059) Once coercive disarmament op[eration]s started, RoE became more force- protection oriented. Technicians were engaged on-site if located w[i]th UN soldiers/com[m]an[der]s. Any visible w[ea]p[o]n constituted a threat.

IX. **Coercive Disarmament and Preventive Disarmament**

Q9.1 Did you have to use force (coercive disarmament) to achieve the mission as mandated?

Yes: 09  No: 04

Q9.2 After your experience, is it possible to use coercive disarmament in these types of operations?

Yes: 11  No: 02

Q9.3 Do you believe that force can and should be used to enforce the disarmament components of an agreement?

Can:  Yes: 08  No: 00
Should: Yes: 12  No: 00

Q9.4 Mention three reasons why force can/cannot and should/should not be used to enforce the disarmament component of an agreement.

- (S006) If the mission is to disarm, then whatever steps are necessary should be taken. People will not willingly give up their arms when they believe those same arms represent their strength.
- (S055) To warrant the defence of the unprotected population. To warrant [...] self defence. To improve peace will. To give [...] authority to institutions.

- (S073) When disarmament is an adjunct to the greater mission, (i.e. the security of humanitarian relief), forceful means may be necessary - [when] an agreement, having been obtained, breaks down for [one] reason or another.

- (S099) Using force initially keeps initiative with peacekeeping forces. Disarmament is easier in the long run if warlords see resistance is futile early on. [Coercive] disarmament often has a favourable impact on local populace.

- (S148) We have to be credible. We must avoid any start of "non respect" [for] the agreement, and we [must] avoid any physical risks to our own soldiers.

- (S150) Disarmament of dissident elements within the factions. Credibility of UN forces.

- (S100) Force was not used originally to induce disarmament although disarmament would not have occurred w[ith]o[ut] the threat of UNITAF force and demonstrations of their will to use force.

- (S059) Must be able to demonstrate resolve. Force protection. Implement an agreement (cannot let one belligerent hold accord "hostage" by inaction).

Q9.5 If fighting was an ongoing process, was it possible for you to continue with your disarmament tasks?

Yes: 01  No: 09
Q9.6 If yes, describe how it was possible to continue with your disarmament tasks.

- (S006) Only on the airfield, which was UN controlled.

- (S146) As soon [as] our mandate foresaw the interdiction to carry weapons, anybody with a weapon could be arrested and disarmed.

- (S059) Conduct coercive disarmament in Mogadishu and surrounding areas. Continue dialogue w[ith] participating/non-belligerent factions in interior.

Q9.7 Were you involved in any preventive deployment operations (i.e., as an observer, preventive diplomacy official, etc.)?

Yes: 01 No: 11

Q9.8 If yes, was disarmament a major concern of this deployment?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q9.9 If yes, were there already arms control agreements (i.e., register of conventional weapons, MTCR, etc.) in place within the country where you were operating?

Yes: 00 No: 01

SECTION THREE: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

X. Information: Collection, Public Affairs, and the Media.

Q10.1 Did you receive sufficient relevant information prior to and during your disarming mission?

Prior: Yes: 02 No: 09
During: Yes: 07 No: 04
Q10.2 Was information always available and reliable?

Yes: 03  No: 08

Q10.3 How did you receive/obtain your information prior and during the mission? (Describe the three most important ways.)

- (S006) HUMINT (Human Intelligence) from locals. UN Briefings.

- (S055) By national intelligence organization (prior). By national net of HUMINT (during). By continuous and deep contact with the population (during).


- (S099) National Intelligence organisations. Media. Local informants.

- (S142) National, UN Military Information, UN Civil Information.

- (S145) Patrols, observation, liaison officers, contact with soldiers and population.

- (S144) UNITAF sources only. Later, we received "information" given by the Somali factions themselves [...].

- (S146) Prior: briefing at New York HQ; collection of information[...] from local NGO[s], Arabic experts, pilots, journalists[,...]. During: long discussions with local intellectuals.

- (S148) Only by receiving [b]riefing[s] from the Intelligence Officer.

- (S150) Prior: debriefing predecessors. During: translators, meeting with locals, patrolling, check points.
- (S100) Poor communications capabilities [prevented] up-to-the-minute information from being transmitted.

- (S059) Humanitarian sources (Somali Nations), UN information structure, UNIT LNO's.

Q10.4 Was there a structured information exchange between HQ's and the units in the field?

Yes: 09   No: 02

Q10.5 And between the various field commanders?

Yes: 06   No: 02

Q10.6 Did you use sensor mechanisms for verification/information purposes?

Yes: 06   No: 05

Q10.7 If yes, list which ones and for what purpose. (Mention not more than three.)

- (S006) Metal detectors.

- (S142) Airforce, means of troops in the field.

- (S145) Metal detectors, mine detectors, occasionally infra-red camera[s] (support of Canadian helicopters).

- (S146) Special forces, night vision assets, infrared sensors.

- (S073) Night vision devices - perimeter security. SIG INT - intelligence.

- (S059) USAWC/PKI to address.
Q10.7.1 Was the use of on-site and remote sensing an adequate tool for verifying and monitoring weapons control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 03  No: 03

Q10.7.2 In your opinion, could sensor systems (acoustic, radar, photo, video, infrared, etc.) play a useful role in monitoring the weapons control and disarmament aspects of a peacekeeping operation?

Yes: 08  No: 01

Q10.7.3 If yes, give some examples of phases of the peacekeeping process in which such sensors could be used.

- (S006) Remote observation. Density detection.
- (S055) Controlling of known weapons storages. [Control during night time].
- (S073) Monitoring movement, verifying positions.
- (S099) Video cameras could monitor cantonment sites.
- (S142) Cantonment and assembly air force. Disarmament control: night-seeing radar.
- (S144) Searching for bivouacs, training camps, caches[, etc].
- (S146) Movement of armed forces (by night). Control at check points, especially women.
- (S100) Monitoring of cantonment sites after weapons have been stored.
- (S059) Cantonment monitoring, weapons movement.
Q10.7.4 What would you suggest about the possible organizational set-up of the use of such sensor systems (i.e., UN, regional organization, national, etc.)?

- (S055) National.
- (S073) [It would be] [b]etter to use national organizations detached [to] UN service.
- (S142) UN.
- (S145) UN and National.
- (S146) National remains the most efficient.
- (S100) Regional or UN - until a viable [govern[ment]] exists to assume the mission.
- (S006) Both UN [and] national.
- (S059) Not viable, national resource.

Q10.8 Do you think that normal information collection assets (i.e., intelligence) could and should be used for peacekeeping and disarming purposes?

Yes: 11 No: 00

Q10.9 Why? (List three reasons.)

- (S006) Need reliable HUM INT for local opinion or planned events, demonstrations, etc.
- (S055) It is the basis of any plan (knowledge of [opposing forces] and terrain). It is the best way to avoid the use of force or to [limit] it. It is fundamental for [the security of] our [own] personnel [...].
- (S073) Without good intelligence, you may as well tie one hand behind your back and close both eyes.

- (S099) System works.

- (S145) Without information and [...] exploitation, no operation is possible. Normal information also [forms] the base of knowledge of the environment in which the mission has to be executed.

- (S144) No military operation is feasible without information on the "threat" (not to say "the enemy"). UN should listen to local radio[s], [...] read the local press and pay informants.

- (S146) Lack of background, lack of confidence (from/of the fighting factions), [and] research for solutions (local).

- (S148) A peacekeeping operation is still a military operation [...]. Avoid risks of surprise. Security of own soldiers.

- (S150) Information is vital in all kinds of "military" undertakings, [and thus] all resources should be used.

- (S100) To preclude unauthorized movement of weapons. To preclude ambushes of cease-fire/[d]isarmament [t]eams. To provide a check of normal monitoring methods.

- (S142) Assess the situation, provide info[rmation] to the factions (confidence), own security.

- (S059) No viable UN structure[s] exist[...]. Need to verify actions of belligerents. Service as a force protection multiplier.

Q10.10 Is there a need for satellite surveillance in peacekeeping/peace enforcing operations?

Yes: 11 No: 01
Q10.11 Did you use the local population for information collection purposes?
Yes: 10  No: 01

Q10.12 Did you implement any transparency measures to create mutual confidence between warring parties?
Yes: 06  No: 04

Q10.13 If yes, did you act as an intermediary?
Yes: 05  No: 01

Q10.14 Was public affairs/media essential to the disarming mission?
Yes: 09  No: 02

Q10.15 Were communication and public relations efforts of importance during your mission?
Yes: 11  No: 00

Q10.16 If yes, give three reasons why this was so.
- (S006) Keep population informed of UN goals. Psycho Ops (psychological operations).
- (S055) To avoid wrong perceptions about our presence and purposes. To stimulate the incoming information flow from [the] population. To [let] them know what we were looking for.
- (S073) Confidence of the local population in our efforts was essential to maintain the momentum. This confidence was gained by numerous means, public relations being an important one of these.

- (S142) Disarmament has to be enforced by the population, [and the population has a need for information] regarding disarmament. [Any step forward in the process should be publicized in order to motivate population towards] voluntary disarmament.

- (S144) To inform correctly local people about our mission, intentions, and methods.

- (S146) [...][S]tress the peace effort on one or the other side; [...] better explain the situation; and [...] [receive] adequate [...] reinforcement[s] or support from local leaders [in time].

- (S150) Explaining what we were doing. Confidence-building.

- (S100) In alerting and calming the local populations.

- (S145) All military operations in such an environment were risky. To reduce the risks, it was necessary to gain the confidence and the respect of the population, via the elders.

- (S059) Need to give Somalis [an] accurate picture of UN actions. Maintain unbiased view of contributing nation[s]' citizens.

Q10.17 Was there a well-funded and planned communications effort to support and explain your activities and mission to the local population?

Yes: 09 No: 02

Q10.18 If not, should there have been one?

Yes: 04 No: 00
Q10.19 Did media attention at any time hamper or benefit your disarming efforts?

Hamper: 06   Benefit: 02

Q10.20 Summarize your experience with the media.

- (S006) One UN paper stated [that] many jobs were to be forthcoming, when in fact they were not. Once the local public discovered they had been lied to tensions mounted. [At] [o]ther times, clan leaders would seem to use the[ir] paper to help sway others towards their ideas.

- (S055) The media [did not] have any relevant impact [o]n the Somali society. Our contact[s] with national media were good and we [did not have] any problems. Foreign media [was] not always [very] favourable because they [did not] understand our behaviour.

- (S073) Generally I had a favourable experience with the media, although at times I found their analysis shallow. They were a necessary, if frustrating, aspect of the operation.

- (S099) Media helped when it showed success. Media hindered when it criticized the process or second-guessed delays, thereby giving support to those against disarmament.

- (S142) Became counterproductive, as suspected by the population to support new colonialism.

- (S144) Mainly national contacts (although our group was very small). Contacts with international media were mainly made out of Somalia (Kenya, Ethiopia).

- (S146) Very good experience. We allowed any media expert to collect information[...] about our work and about the situation in our area.
- (S148) Only deal[ed] with "occidental" (Western) media that [solely] wanted to report [on] our military activities. There was no local media, so it was not possible to use this means to support our efforts.

- (S150) Slander campaign by African Rights movement drew a lot of media attention [...] in Somalia as [well as] outside. This had a bad influence on the attitude of the average Somali towards us and on the moral of the soldiers.

- (S100) The USC/SNA played the Western Press like a fine violin. They properly manipulated a generally liberal press against the UN/US forces and eventually let Aideed win the "war" in the papers after his militias had been soundly beaten in the [Oct.] 13 incident at the Olympia Hotel.

- (S145) Essentially national media came in our AOR. Very good experience as they [were] fully [...] supported by the Belgian army. Air transportation, logistics in the AOR and security. Very good contacts and positive feedback.

- (S059) Aideed planned his actions in accordance with media impact. Media supported Aideed as an "underdog" fight[ing] society.

Q10.21 Was there sufficient briefing to the general public in the conflict area on the disarming process?

Yes: 06    No: 04

Q10.22 If yes, who organized this and who carried it out?

Organized: (S055) Our HQ's
(S073) UNITAF HQ
(S099) J-3 Planners
(S146) Local Commanders
(S148) Civilian Affairs
(S150) Field Commanders
(S145) UN contingent
Carried it out: (S055) G2 and Civilian Affairs [c]ell
   (S073) PA staff UNITAF HQ
   (S099) Psy[ehological] Op[eration]s units
   (S146) US Psy[ehological] Op[eration]s units
   (S148) Commanders in the field
   (S150) Field Commanders
   (S145) UN contingent

Q10.23 Was there co-operation with the local media in explaining the steps of disarmament you were carrying out?

Yes: 03  No: 05

Q10.24 Were leaflets distributed?

Yes: 09  No: 02

Analyst's Comments:

a. Information:

   For the most part, UNOSOM did not face overwhelming, sustained or even skillfully executed attacks. The tactics used against the force were typical of guerilla warfare in many areas of the world. But in an urban environment such as Mogadishu, these tactics could be difficult to combat, even with a well-trained force. In order to do their jobs, military commanders needed to be able to detect the movement of opposing forces, to determine the location of hidden arms caches, and to anticipate the plans of those who might attack their forces. This required a sound information gathering, digestion and distribution system. Nearly all respondents mentioned the need for a proper intelligence system during peace operations. The importance of this capability cannot be over-emphasised.

   Related to good intelligence was the need to be a step ahead of the opposition and to anticipate their moves. When confronted with periodic random attacks, it is important to prepare for them by taking proper defensive measures. Early warning helped, but was often incorrect. Accurate warning
would have allowed more effective counter-measures and would have provided an opportunity to disrupt attacks before they are launched. This, again, requires good intelligence, and the ability to evaluate, disseminate and react rapidly. Here it is important to indicate that:

- Belligerent parties may perceive information-gathering as a hostile act. Intelligence operations may therefore destroy the trust that the parties may have in the peacekeeping force. However, it is reasonable to assume that the parties will pursue their divergent aims by exploiting the presence of the peacekeeping force (as had indeed been the case during UNOSOM). They may also attempt to deceive it from time to time. Circumstances may place the force under direct attack. Such attacks may come from one of the parties to the agreement, or from extremist elements acting independently. This poses a serious problem, but whatever the circumstances, the peacekeepers need information and must have the ability to collect it. The way in which it is collected is important, and it should as far as possible not create stones for the belligerent parties to throw back at the peacekeeping force.

- Threat capabilities are usually the first consideration in determining information requirements. It is difficult for a commander to make a decision when the picture is not reasonably clear. There may also be requirements for the production of economic, political, sociological, medical and other information. It is therefore unthinkable that an operation can be successful without proper and shared information-gathering capabilities.

- The intelligence community must define intelligence requirements for supporting the military commitment as early as possible. This is crucial because the re-deployment and planning phases of the operation require optimum support. Once deployed, a unit or formation should develop its requirements and information-gathering plan in conjunction with the operational plan, and submit it along the proper channels of command for approval. Intelligence support must always focus on operational planning considerations.

- To ensure the safety of assigned forces, the commander must have the capability to disseminate critical indications and warnings to all echelons
quickly. A robust theatre architecture must be in place to provide accurate and timely all-source information. This information must be formatted clearly and be at the disposal of the entire deployed force.

- Mission success and the security of the force depends almost entirely on the observational skills of the personnel and leadership of the small unit. In the absence of other systems, human intelligence may be the primary source of timely information. This is also the first line of defence against any threat and is a critical factor in determining mission success. It must be developed to its full potential during every military peace operation.

b. **Media:**

As can be seen from the responses to the questionnaires, this is a challenging subject for a military man to comment on. Peacekeeping operations are carried out under the full glare of public scrutiny. By using satellites and other modern communications technology, the press is able to distribute reports and pictures faster than the proverbial Jack Rabbit. (And certainly faster than the news can be released by the peacekeeping force HQ, because the media does not have to double check the news for accuracy). Incidents, sometimes embellished or slanted toward a partisan viewpoint, are screened on television the same day and are in the press the next morning, to excite audiences in the countries that are parties to a dispute and their allies.

The role of the press during delicate negotiations is indeed of incalculable importance. When information is withheld, journalists fall back on speculation. Such speculation, although usually inaccurate, is often near enough to the truth to be accepted as such by large sections of public opinion, and even by governments (depending upon whether it suits their case or not). Belligerents may sometimes find it advantageous to leak part of a story to the press to build public support for their own position. On occasion, such activities can grow into fully orchestrated press campaigns.

Some of the warring parties in Somalia understood this "weapon" very well, and staged events to get to the soft underbelly of the democratic world, public opinion. Long gone were the images of dying and starved Somalis, the looting of the relief convoys and the banditry committed by the very people who now are portrayed as the suffering ones. In such circumstances, it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the UN mission in Somalia to set the record straight without destroying its neutrality.
- One opposition tactic was to stage a demonstration and attempt to provoke peacekeepers. Women and children would be deliberately mixed into organized crowds to complicate the problem of control. An example was the demonstration staged on 13 June 1993 in front of a Pakistani strongpoint. (Not by accident, the selected site was located next to the only press centre in the city). As the crowd was nearing the Pakistani position, shots were fired at the soldiers from the top of nearby buildings and from the crowd. The Pakistanis returned fire, wounding some of the civilians. The organizers reached their goal: presenting an image to the press of a UN out of control, which was sent to the world within minutes after it had happened. It would have been far preferable to have been able to disperse this organized crowd using non-lethal means, thereby preventing a contrived demonstration from becoming damaging in terms of world opinion.

- Women and children were also repeatedly mixed in with gunmen and used as shields. On 17 June, they were used to close a Moroccan column to handgrenade range, resulting in serious casualties to the soldiers. Women and children were often used to construct roadblocks and were mixed into ambush groups as well. In one incident, a combination of US engineers and Pakistani escorts trying to remove a roadblock on a main route were ambushed by several hundred Somalis. With women mixed into their group, the gunmen attacked from behind walls and buildings. The resulting defence by tanks and helicopters, in an effort to extract the soldiers from the ambush, resulted in heavy casualties amongst the Somali gunmen and civilians alike. (The media reports were much more damaging to the UN, however.)

- Military peacekeepers must accept the fact that the media plays a major role in keeping families informed and in determining, to a great extent, how the world public will perceive the operation. This phenomenon called "media" can greatly enhance a mission or sink it to the depths of inauspicious public reaction. The challenge was for the mission commander in Somalia to deal with the needs of the media, to implement effective information/briefing sessions, and to build a trust relationship with the journalists. In that way, the commander could have avoided the successes his rivals had on the battlefields in the living rooms of the world.
SECTION FOUR: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

XI. Experiences in the control of weapons and in disarmament during your mission:

Q11.1 Describe, by order of importance, your specific tasks, if any, in weapons control and disarmament during this mission.

- (S006) Only to stop the transportation or import of weapons into the airport.
- (S073) NGO guards were permitted some weapons which were registered and periodically checked. All other weapons which were publically displayed were confiscated. Sweeps for unregistered weapons were periodically carried out and all weapons confiscated were destroyed.
- (S142) Negotiate disarmament with factions, provide orders to UN troops in disarmament, enforce disarmament SNA, and monitor disarmament [in] other areas.
- (S145) Checkpoints, cordon and search operations.
- (S144) Producing [...] concept of operations together with a UNITAF team and a civilian member of the political branch of UNOSOM I (Civilian Affairs). Military advisor on CF & D to the political director.
- (S146) Storage of heavy weapons, check points (fixed and mobile), patrols (on foot and with v[e]h[i]c[i]les), search operations, [and] negotiations.
- (S148) Search organized at company or battalion level. Check points. Security patrols.

- (S150) Establishment of WFZ (check points, patrolling). Searches.

- (S100) Deputy Chief Cease-fire & Disarmament Division, Future Operations, Force U-3 (COO). Responsible for writing SOP’s, Training Teams, investigating violations, and assisting the Cease-fire and Disarmament Committee.

- (S059) Conduct of weapons inventories. Establishment of disarmament timelines. Supervise weapons turn-in and destruction.

Q11.2 Did the security situation in the mission area allow for arms control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 08 No: 04

Q11.3 If no, what steps were required to establish and maintain a secure environment?

- (S006) More troops visibly on the streets conducting weapons seizures and maintaining the peace.

- (S019) Organize (re-organize) a local police force, equip and train them.

- (S142) Provide incentives [...] to convince the populations/factions to enforce disarmament.

- (S144) Deployment of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, and not only West of 46°E, and South of 5°N, with enough troops to block 3500 km of coast line[...], and three national borders, keeping in mind all airfields had to be controlled.

- (S146) [...] [C]hange the mandate in order to disarm everybody.
After 5 June 1993, disarmament was predominantly conducted as a part of [the] combat operation. Principal focus was on the larger belligerent clans/factions. (USC-SNA, SPM Jess, SPM morgar, SNF Gabio, fundamentalists).

**Q11.4 Do you think your weapons control and disarming tasks could have been handled more efficiently?**

Yes: 07  No: 04

**Q11.5 If yes, mention three ways in which your task could have been improved.**

- (S006) More con[s]cientious checking by the security forces involved.
- (S073) It must be remembered that we were in an area devoid of formed militia [...]. Our major threat was banditry.
- (S099) Ensure [h]umanitarian [o]rganizations provide support as promised.
- (S142) Provide incentives, define and support parts of the populations which could enforce disarmament. Negotiate disarmament in a comprehensive way.
- (S145) A more coherent and complete policy at UNOSOM level is the beginning of the operation.
- (S146) From the beginning, clear, adequate instructions related to all type[s] of weapons.
- (S100) Manning for the inspection teams. Better security operations on the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders.

**Q11.6 Were opportunities missed to take advantage of or implement weapons control and disarmament measures?**

Missed: 06    Not missed: 03

**Q11.7 If opportunities were missed, mention the main reasons why this happened.**

- (S055) The initial surprise should have been much more exploited; [...] hesitation has been negative. Also, the other UN forces should have undertaken our same efforts in disarming tasks.

- (S099) Lack of support from UN [p]olitical representatives and humanitarian representatives for demobilization and disarmament. Treating disarmament as a purely military problem. No formal peace between warring parties.

- (S142) No incentives available (humanitarian component), negative attitude [of] SNA, wrong mandate [to] restore hope, no disarmament while [the] strongest forces in place.

- (S144) UNOSOM I, UNITAF, (and UNOSOM II) [addressed] warlords but maybe this was not the best attitude to adopt towards them as it gave them an importance they did not deserve and even never expected.

- (S146) The lack of will from UN to disarm everybody. During the first hours and days, it was possible to disarm everybody, but weapons were given back to NGO[s'] bodyguards, and the militia were not disarmed.

- (S100) Many invitations by the SSDF and other northern-based factions to expand UNOSOM II operations. We were unable to do this [because of] USC/SNA local threat/instability and insufficient manning.
Political games between coalition partners. Basic challenges resulting from clan/faction structure.

Q11.8 Did you find the national diversity of contributed troops a problem for command and control during disarmament operations?

Yes: 05  No: 05

Q11.9 If yes, mention the three problems you considered most challenging.


- (S055) Different way[s] to interpret the mandate. Different procedures (language, religion, way of life, [and] civilization). Different ways to perceive Somali problems.

- (S146) Different view on the mission [and] mandate. Different background regarding Africa.

- (S150) Differences in interpretation of the concept WFZ.


- (S059) Equipment, [n]ational agenda, level of commit[...]ment and training of soldiers and leaders.

Q11.10 Was the disarmament process reversible (i.e., were there instances where devolution was foreseen or requested)?

Yes: 05  No: 03

Q11.11 If yes, were there provisions to this effect in the mandate, mission or agreement?

Yes: 01  No: 04
Q11.12 Which types of weapons were in use, and by whom (e.g., your own unit(s), warring parties, individuals, irregular units, national officials, etc.)? (If applicable, list the five principal ones for each category.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Whom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>Warring Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti Tank Rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicals (Civilian pickup trucks armed with machine guns and/or recoilless guns)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Whom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>UN Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC's</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti Tank Weapons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Whom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>Bandits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other comments:

- (S073) Heavy weapons (mortar, HMG, light AA, artillery) were confiscated early on, but were never [used] against us.

- (S144) According to UNITAF (U2) intelligence sources, the Somalian clans' order of battle showed 61,500 men as of mid-January 1993.

- (S146) Own troops: night vision assets, armoured vehicles, vehicles, helicopters.

- (S148) We did not have to deal with regular armies. So, we met a lot of different weapons [of Russian, Chinese, Italian, Belgian, German, etc. origin].

- (S100) Night vision devices are extremely important. Eyes over Mogadishu was a good source of intelligence.

- (S142) Mortars used by factions as harassment; [tank+] APC - SNA: not used, destroyed in their weapon[s] storage sites by UN troops as they enforced disarmament.

- (S059) This type[...] of information is best gleaned from weapons reports forwarded to UN[-New York] daily during mission period.

Table taken from questionnaire S144. This data is unconfirmed, but it was the source used for planning purposes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Wpn System</th>
<th>SDA</th>
<th>SDM/ SNA</th>
<th>SNFU (GEDO)</th>
<th>SNF/GALGA DII</th>
<th>SFM</th>
<th>SSDF</th>
<th>SSNM/SNA</th>
<th>USC</th>
<th>USC/ SNA</th>
<th>USF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>APC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tech Veh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AA Artillery</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>HMG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Rec Rifles</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>RPG's</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>LMG</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Radar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>9,300</td>
<td>1,530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q11.13 Were you given priorities as to the type of weapons you should disarm first?

Yes: 10  No: 01

Q11.14 If yes, how were priorities assigned (i.e., on what basis)? (List three reasons.)

- (S055) Technical cars, mortars, guns [and] light weapons.
- (S073) Briefings, operation orders implicit in [Rules of Engagement].
- (S142) Heavy SNA (factions which did not apply process). Priority [given] to area[s] w[h]ere weapon[s] policy was the best implemented (weapon[s] free areas).

- (S144) First, all heavy armament. Then, small arms. For details see annex B.


- (S150) Danger represented by the weapon (first "technical", then crew served weapons, lastly small arms).

- (S100) Heavy weapons, technical vehicles, crew served w[ea]p[o]ns.

- (S145) Heavy weapons mounted on vehicles (technical), small weapons.

- (S059) Priority was based on [t]hreat (i.e., new served weapons, [a]nti-armour, artillery, tanks, etc.). Small weapons were lowest priority, but most proliferate.

Q11.15 At the beginning of your mission, were you able to have sufficient information on military capabilities in regard to numbers and quality of equipment used by warring parties?

Yes: 06  No: 05

Q11.16 Did you have the impression that there were hidden caches of weapons in your sector or adjoining sectors?

Yes: 10  No: 01
Q11.17 Were illicit weapons a problem for you (illicit as in: not in your inventories)?
Yes: 09  No: 01

Q11.18 Was there evidence in your sector that the warring parties continued to have access to weapons through external channels of supply?
Yes: 11  No: 01

Q11.19 Could you control external channels of weapons supply in your sector?
Yes: 01  No: 09

Q11.20 How important was the control of external channels of supply for the success of the mission?
Very Important: 08  Important: 01  Unimportant: 00

Q11.21 In your experience, do weapons continue to flow during the conflict even after sanctions, inspections, and checks are applied?
Yes: 11  No: 00

Q11.22 Were there any security zones established?
Yes: 07  No: 03

Q11.23 If yes, were you able to control your sector effectively?
Yes: 03  No: 05

Q11.24 Depending on your answer under 11.23, elaborate on How (i.e., how were you able to control the sector?) and Why (i.e., why were you unable to control it?).
- (S055) We were able to control the sector with patrolling, check points, strong points, observation [posts], intelligence [and] contact with [the] population.

- (S073) Roadblocks, patrolling, deployed presence in villages, weapons sweeps and searches.

- (S099) Aggressive inspections of vehicles entering sector reduce[d] inflow of weapons.

- (S142) [...] [To enforce] disarmament [requires] too [many] troops. Voluntary disarmament is enforced by the population-the Somali population was not willing [to] due to their own culture.

- (S146) Control, pat[rol], and search operations. Use of children and women by warring factions. Very large area with [great] possibility of infiltration and movement (flat area without obstacles).

- (S148) The city of Kismayo is so typically African, that it was quite impossible to control it with [only] one infantry battalion.

- (S150) Lack of troops. Terrain suitable for hidden caches and illicit weapons traffic.

Q11.25 Were you involved in any monitoring of arms embargoes/sanctions?

Yes: 03 No: 08

Q11.26 What was your experience in this respect?

- (S055) Little.

- (S099) Other nations do not necessarily respect embargoes if there is a profit to be made. Effective control can only occur if neighbouring countries police their borders.
- (S100) Trips to outlying Force [HQ] and discussions with Special Forces units and border control/observation missions.

**Q11.27 Were any weapons collected for cash or land during your mission?**

Yes: 03  No: 07

**Q11.28 If yes, comment on the effectiveness of this incentive.**

- (S006) Cash for the return of lost or stolen weapons seemed to work.

- (S146) We tried to provide rewards to children for information. US allowed cash against information.

- (S100) The political and [force sides of UNOSOM supported this initiative, but the Humanitarian Affairs side could not get the incentive packages together in time to make it effective.

**Q11.29 Were national police involved in the collection of arms?**

Yes: 05  No: 07

**Q11.30 Were other organizations involved in the collection of arms?**

Yes: 01  No: 10

**Q11.31 If yes, which ones?**

- (S006) UN forces.

**Q11.32 If involved in chapter VI operations (peacekeeping), were military observers used in the collection of arms?**

Yes: 01  No: 08
Q11.33 If yes, what type of military observer was used (i.e., UN, regional, other organization, etc.)?

- No responses.

Q11.34 Answer if applicable: Was there satisfactory co-ordination between military observers and yourself as unit commander/chief of operation?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q11.35 Were the warring factions themselves involved in the collection of arms?

Yes: 05 No: 03

Q11.36 Did you use opposite party liaison officers so that all factions were represented in the collection of arms and the disarming process?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q11.37 If yes, reflect upon your experiences in this issue.

- (S099) LNO's effective [for] verifying that all sides were disarming.

- (S142) The process went no further than negotiations and reports on enforced disarmament. Enforced disarmament was carried out without party liaison officers.

- (S144) No experience at all since UNOSOM I had not the forces, the structure, or the logistical support to disarm militia members and bandits. All we noticed was that representatives would accuse constantly other (So[mali]) members of the CF monitoring group [of] cheat[ing] [and] [lying].

- (S100) Worked well - verification [wise].
Q11.38 With regard to the UN/national mission you participated in, do you believe arms can be effectively collected?

Yes: 07  No: 03

Q11.39 Were you involved in the disarming of individuals, private and irregular units, and/or bandits?

Yes: 10  No: 01

Q11.40 Was the UN police involved in these tasks?

Yes: 03  No: 09

Q11.41 Were local authorities involved in disarming individuals?

Yes: 06  No: 07

Q11.42 If yes, what was their role?

- (S006) Somali Police generally worked under the auspices of the UN.
- (S073) Very late in the operation, local police were re-raised and accompanied us on patrols and weapons searches.
- (S099) Crowd control. Intelligence gathering.
- (S142) Somali police helping UN troops with disarmament sweeps, Somali officials providing information.
- (S146) Allow us to change the mandate (for local use), [...] provide some information regarding weapons caches.
- (S100) Village elders, council members, clan elders, police.
- (S059) They assisted UN units because of the complete break down of societal structure and the basic clan structure, civil police were not overly effective.
Q11.43 Were there regulations in the mandate or peace agreement with respect to how to deal with private and irregular units?
Yes: 00  No: 09

Q11.44 If no, do you think your task would have improved if there had been such an accord?
Yes: 03  No: 06

Q11.45 Did you suffer sniper problems?
Yes: 06  No: 03

Q11.46 If yes, how did you counter this?

- (S006) Buildings where problems stemmed were taken under UN control. Own snipers put into guard positions.
- (S055) Positive defence of our personnel. Immediate reaction by our forces.
- (S099) Firing back. Aggressive RoE. Killing snipers.
- (S142) Neutralize.
- (S100) Counter sniper [t]eams [w]ith [a]uthority to preemptively engage individuals [w]ith [w]eapons.
- (S059) Tried to eliminate through use of counter sniper teams.
SECTION FIVE: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

XII. Demobilization Experiences

Q12.1 Did the disarmament component of your mission include or infer demobilization?
Yes: 03  No: 09

Q12.2 If yes, what types of demobilization operations were conducted during this UN/national operation (i.e., cease-fire monitoring, weapons cantonment, etc.)?
- (S019) Some weapons were collected voluntarily. Stored in containers under UN supervision.
- (S099) Demobilization planned but not supported. Plan called for weapons collection and cantonment, registration of militia members, retraining/incentive[s] program for demobilized militia members.
- (S144) None.
- (S100) Both [cease-fire monitoring and weapons cantonment].
- (S059) None to speak of. Small efforts were initiated w[ith] about 200 "ex-militia". But it was an immature program which did not address current militia in the field, such as the USC-SNA or SSDF in [the] Central region of Somalia.

Q12.3 Was the demobilization process accompanied by a national reintegration process involving government forces and opposing forces?
Yes: 03  No: 03
Q12.4 If yes, were sufficient means available for an effective reintegration process?

Yes: 00    No: 06

Q12.5 If no, elaborate on the problems you experienced with this task.

- (S019) There was little interest from the local leaders to demobilize.

- (S099) Demobilization collapsed through lack of support from humanitarian organizations.

- (S142) UNDP as leading element of the humanitarian component [intentionally] provided [...] aid [to] factions which refused any disarmament and not [to] factions which were [prepared] to disarm.

- (S144) The humanitarian branch of UNOSOM I declared [itself] unable to support our plan. NGO's did not want to [assist us logistically] as they feared retaliation of the factions [...].

- (S100) N/A. We never got that far in the process.

- (S059) Lack of resources and no agreed plan between Somali factions and UN made reintegration a virtually impossible task. Also, [a] large number of clans were moved by famine and civil war into [...] areas traditionally held by [other] clans.

- (S055) We have [no] experience [regarding] this problem.

Q12.6 Which organizations assisted you in demobilizing (i.e., other services, international organizations, national organizations, or nongovernmental organizations)? List by order starting with most assistance to least assistance.

- (S019) UNOSOM had a branch for demobilizing.

- (S099) UNDP, UNHCR. Everyone else hindered.
- (S142) None, due to the extremely negative attitude of Humanitarian Affairs.

- (S100) USMC and UNITAF, UNOSOM II predecessors.

**Q12.7** Was there a person or a branch responsible for plans for demobilization?

Yes: 05  No: 01

**Q12.8** If yes, who or which branch was it?

- (S099) UNDP.

- (S142) Cease-fire and disarmament branch.

- (S144) Humanitarian branch.

- (S100) Cease-fire and Disarmament Division worked with the U-3 plans cell at Force HQ.

- (S059) Disarmament, Demobilization and Demining Branch of UNOSOM II.

**XIII. Demining Experiences**

**Q13.1** Did you experience mine problems?

Yes: 07  No: 06

**Q13.2** If yes, what did you do to counteract them?

- (S006) Mines were occasionally placed on UN road[s]. UN engineers removed or defused mines.

- (S019) Avoided areas, if I was informed by the local police that they were mined.
- (S099) Mark fields. Train and hire locals to clear mines.

- (S146) Search for mines caches. Intensive use of helicopters[, and] EOD teams. Local information[...].

- (S148) Localization and marking[...]. [Trust] in the military specialist. Evacuate and/or destroy.

- (S100) Remote Detonation and Pressure.

- (S145) Demining by professional personnel in the unit.

- (S059) Contracted companies for areas in NW. Units avoided known or suspected mined areas.

- (S142) Request mine clearance. Destroy mine storage sites.

**Q13.3 Was there an exchange of maps of minefields at the outset when the agreements were signed?**

Yes: 01 No: 09

**Q13.4 If not, was it feasible to have such maps?**

Yes: 03 No: 07

**Q13.5 If yes, do you think there should have been an agreement for the exchange of maps at the outset as part of the agreements signed?**

Yes: 05 No: 00

**Q13.6 If no maps were available and it was not feasible to chart the location of minefields, did you consider yourself adequately prepared to deal with the demining of haphazard minefields?**

Yes: 05 No: 04
Q13.7 Did your unit play a role in the demining process?
Yes: 03   No: 07

Q13.8 Was the UN involved in demining?
Yes: 04   No: 05

Q13.9 Was the UN interested in becoming involved in demining?
Yes: 04   No: 05

Q13.10 Was the host nation involved in demining or interested in becoming involved in demining?
Yes: 02   No: 09

Q13.11 Were local groups/militias involved in demining?
Yes: 02   No: 09

Q13.12 Do you think local groups and militias should be encouraged to undertake demining tasks?
Yes: 09   No: 02

Q13.13 Why?
- (S006) When the UN leaves, those left behind need the knowledge.
- (S019) If and when disarmament/demining agreement is reached, those with knowledge about [...] local minefields should be involved in demining.
- (S055) It [is] better to involve local groups and militias in [...] such activities. They have a better knowledge of the territory.
- (S099) They know the area. They have vested interest in demining their own area. Demining is a form of employment for ex-militias.

- (S142) This is the best way as a first step towards peace after ceasefire. When factions are demining together they are unlikely to re-mine afterwards.

- (S144) No UN mission will remain forever in a particular mission area. It is a national problem that has to be solved by the local groups with the help of UN.

- (S146) After two years of civilian war, it would be very difficult to know which roads and other areas were mined and by whom.

- (S150) They are the only ones who have the relevant information.

- (S100) They placed them, they live there. They must be monitored to ensure accountability of the recovered mines.

- (S145) Because they were concerned about the mining.

- (S059) It is their problem. They had the mines.

Q13.14 Were humanitarian organizations or private firms involved in demining?

Humanitarian Organizations: Yes: 02 No: 07
Private Firms: Yes: 04 No: 06

Q13.15 In your opinion, who should undertake demining processes and why?

- (S006) UN for UN goals. Local groups for the remainder.

- (S019) Various military units. They have the big resources. Private firms to be used for specific tasks, outside areas with military deployment, etc. They are more flexible.
- (S055) Specialized UN forces, because that is a hard task.

- (S099) Contract private firms to train locals to do it. Peacekeeping forces should not become involved. Locals have interest in ensuring it is done right.

- (S142) Local fighters: they know where to demine, they are demining their own land, they will be unlikely to re-mine afterwards, they must be organized and trained by UNPEN.

- (S144) Local groups with the assistance of UN. Solidarity/credibility.

- (S148) By professional soldiers because it is a part of our task. Good training.


- (S059) UN should contract in conjunction with host nation. Most member nations [do not] want to become bogged down in this very dangerous task. Too time- and labour-intensive.
SECTION SIX: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

XIV. Training

Q14.1 Prior to deployment, did your units undertake specific training programs related to disarmament operations?

Yes: 08 No: 05

Q14.2 If yes, were these training programs based on guidance from the UN forces already in the field, from the UN in general, or from your national authorities?

UN forces in field: 02 UN in general: 03
National authorities: 05 Other: 00

Q14.3 Were your units trained specifically for the collection of arms and cantonment of factions?

Yes: 01 No: 10

Q14.4 Were you and/or your units trained in on-site inspection and observation techniques?

Yes: 04 No: 08

Q14.5 Have you been trained in verification technologies nationally?

Yes: 02 No: 09

Q14.6 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific weapons control and disarmament operations (i.e., weapons searches, inventories, elimination, etc.)?

Yes: 09 No: 03
Q14.7 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific demobilization operations?
Yes: 02 No: 10

Q14.8 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific demining operations?
Yes: 05 No: 07

Q14.9 On the whole, did you consider yourself technically and tactically prepared for the accomplishment of your mission?
Technically: Yes: 09 No: 02
Tactically: Yes: 10 No: 01

Q14.10 Was there anything done at the end of the mission to gather lessons learned?
Yes: 08 No: 04

Q14.11 Back in your own country, were you debriefed?
Yes: 10 No: 02

SECTION SEVEN: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

XV. Interactions

Given that there are three common elements to a UN mission - the military, the humanitarian agencies, and the political branch:

Q15.1 Would you consider the relationship between humanitarian elements/organizations and the military personnel during the mission to have been very good, adequate, or inadequate?
Very good: 01 Adequate: 03 Inadequate: 11
Q15.2 If you think it could have been improved, specify three ways in which it could have been improved.

- (S019) Any UN field operation must have SOP's or other regulation[s] in order to specify all areas of responsibility. Commander[s]/Chiefs on regional/local level must have the possibility [of] co-operat[ing]. Information at all levels.

- (S055) Clear agreements between military forces and NGO's. Priority to the military forces. Co-ordination among NGO's.

- (S073) We developed a very good relationship with the various NGO[s] in Baidoa. It would be arrogant to suggest that it could not be improved upon, but at the same time we constantly worked on maintaining good relations with the NGO[s] without looking at specific areas for improvement.

- (S099) More co-operation in planning that affects both missions. More support from [h]umanitarian agencies for demobilization.

- (S153) Everyone [should] have [a] positive attitude. Lack of understanding of military capabilities by the civilian agencies. Unnecessary confrontation between civilian and military set ups.

- (S142) UN humanitarian agencies should be controlled by SRSG and link their efforts towards disarmament (development [of] incentive[s]) as part of the UN goals in the area.

- (S145) Necessity of gathering information and having contracts with the different organizations. Necessity for [...] civilian organization[s] to co-ordinate their work through the UN[...].

- (S144) Co-ordination meetings on a weekly and [...] daily bas[is] at different levels (planning - current operations). Special branch (civil affairs) within the military staff. More information on possibilities of humanitarian agencies and NGOs (cross-border operations, food, medical, seeds and tools, etc.)
- (S146) The level: there was no counterpart at Cdr level. The assistance was not [...] adequate: no tools, no means to [restore] education, local police, [or] local lawyers; [no means] to vaccinate population and cattle, etc. There was no co-ordination between NGO's. There was no control on the action of NGO's.

- (S100) The HA people could not/would not draw the difference between Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 operations. They would not work w[ith] the Force, nor constrain the operations based on Force recommendations. They would not support Force disarmament incentives programs.

- (S059) Integrated planning process at the theatre level. Increased liaison between Pol-Mil, Mil-HR. Establishing a hierarchical approach to providinrelief/disarmament/nation-building resources to the country. Maintaining impartiality (politically).

Q15.3 How was the overall co-operation of the three elements of the UN components achieved during your mission? Summarize.

- (S019) On regional/zone level by co-location of offices ([P]olitical-[H]umanitarian-CIVPOL). No military units in the level I served.

- (S055) Not well done.

- (S073) Co-operation of the three elements was obtained by constant briefings, meetings and addressing [everybody's] concerns. While it paid dividends with the NGO community, co-operation with the UN political wing was much harder to obtain. This may have been due to a lack of priority and resources by the UN political sector.

- (S099) Co-operation between political and military was good. Between [h]umanitarian and [p]olitical/military less good.

- (S153) Sadly, it was never achieved.

- (S142) [Co-operation was only co-ordinated] on the highest level. This co-ordination was in fact the confirmation of the unwillingness of
some parties to co-ordinate (UNDP, some NGOs, [and] some Somali [h]umanitarian NGO’s).

- (S145) Very good co-operation between political and military branch. More difficult between humanitarian and military branch. Therefore we took the task of co-ordination.

- (S144) Contacts between political and military branches seemed [...] friendly and efficient. Contacts between humanitarian and military branches [occurred] to my knowledge only a few times. Contacts between administrative and military branches were bad [...].


- (S148) [...] [D]aily briefing [enabling] NGOs to inform us of their need[s], requests, [etc]. They were also informed [of] our military actions (sometime[s] afterwards).

- (S150) Close co-operation between UN representative and Force Commander. Daily co-ordination meetings with humanitarian organi[z]ations.

- (S100) The [p]olitical and [m]ilitary branches were closely co-ordinated and worked very well together.

- (S059) Prior to 5 June 1993, relationships were strained at best. Career UN bureaucrats were perceived as very aloof [towards] their military counterparts. Additionally, [the UN bureaucrats] did not consider what [the] force […] was capable of accomplishing in [its] early stages. Therefore goals were too ambitious. This caused relationships to be strained further. After 5 June 1995, co-operation w[ith] HR personnel eroded tremendously. Military action was viewed as a threat to individual organisations[’] agendas.
Q15.4 Did co-operation exist between the UN military, private and irregular elements, and existing police forces (UN or local)?

Yes: 08 No: 02

Q15.5 If yes, describe which components co-operated with whom and the level of their co-operation.

- (S019) Early in the mission there was [...] co-operation between the Provost Marshals (battalion/brigade level) and local police in the forming of an effective local police force. At the same time there was a lack of co-operation between the UNOSOM Justice division and the UN military component. At a later stage when a CIVPOL unit was created within UNOSOM, there was [...] good co-operation on [a] central level between UNICIVPOL and the UN military component [regarding the] training of local police. [The] US department of Justice, ICITAP, had a presence in the mission area. This presence was neglected by the UNOSOM Justice Division. When UNOSOM CIVPOL was effective there was good co-operation in [the] training of local police, [which ended when] the security situation deteriorated.

- (S055) We trained Somali Police.

- (S073) We helped re-raise the local police force and developed close and co-operative relationships.

- (S099) Military trained, equipped and supported police.

- (S142) Co-ordination between Somali police and MP.

- (S146) Occasionally at a very low level. [In] the beginning, we tried to [restore] the former local police, but their allegiance to one faction was not acceptable by the others[...].

- (S150) Police forces (local) were formed and trained by our forces. The police assisted the UN forces on the check points, they accompanied the patrols and participated in the searches.
- (S100) Most of the NGOs went their own way until someone got killed, [after which] they wanted the [force to] immediately come and guard them or their compounds. The whole HA/NGO [part] of the TRIAD was severely broken.

- (S145) Local police was built up with the support of UNOSOM and monitored by our unit. Very passive and limited co-operation due to the lack of balancing of clans in the police corps.

- (S059) Factional militia other than USC-SNA, SPM-SNA, SNF worked with UN towards disarmament only to the degree it benefitted their faction or clan agenda. Therefore it was not uncommon for co-operation to exist one week only to disappear the following week. As a result, political solutions were eventually impossible to achieve.

**Analyst’s Comments:**

The analysis of this section of the questionnaires demonstrates the need for a joint doctrine/procedure within the UN system to unite the civilian and military missions, aims, and objectives, and to share the responsibility for reaching those goals. The levels of liaison between the UN military and civilian components and NGOs also need some sort of formalization if successful operations of this kind are to be executed in the future. In Somalia there was a common goal by force of circumstances amongst NGOs and the military. This assisted co-operation, which, by the time of the transition phase between UNITAF and UNOSOM II, had become strained. The arrival of UN bureaucracy restricted goodwill. As can be seen from the responses to Q15.2 and Q15.3, the interaction between the various actors in the operation was stressed. This is very much a symptom of the lack of defined structure and procedure for directing and co-ordinating field operations towards one common goal.
XVI. Personal Reflections

On reflection,

Q16.1 What was the overall importance of the disarmament task for the overall success of the mission?

Very important: 09  Important:  01  Not important: 00

Q16.2 What were the three major lessons you learned from your field experience?

- (S006) Need control and show of strength to gain respect. All parties must want to negotiate earnestly. [Cannot] help those who [do not] want to be helped, or those who try to undermine the system[']s progress.

- (S055) No humanitarian work without military operations. [...] [C]ontact[...] with the population [is] essential. It is necessary to exploit initial surprise. [It is] [n]ot [to have too many different countries represented in the] Hqs. [...]. [...] RoEs [must be] clear and reliable [...].

- (S073) [...] It [is should have been] a chapter VII operation, and force [should have] be[en] used. It [would have been] better managed by appointing a lead[ing] nation to command the operation. Well-trained and disciplined [troops] can handle peace[keeping] operations with little specific training. UN [HQ] in the field suffer[ed] from enormous bureaucratic and organizational difficulties which seriously limit[ed] their effectiveness early on.

- (S099) Disarmament should have been part of the mission statement. Humanitarian Agencies should be brought on board early to support demobilization and disarming. Disarmament [will not] work without positive incentives to disarm.

- (S153) There should be [a] clear-cut policy and strategy to achieve the mission or carry out a mandate. Security Council should evolve this.
Military aspects should be left to force HQ. Member States should not control their contingents once these have been donated for peacekeeping operations.

- (S142) Disarmament [...] depend[s] on the ability of the population to force their own fighters to disarm. This depend[s] on the culture and on the incentives (economic future). Disarmament should be a major item in the survey mission (determination of the incentives).

- (S145) Peace is not possible when the involved parties do not [want] peace. We only can help and support the [peace] process. The military unit[s] [must maintain] contact with all parties and must gain [their] respect and confidence. The security of the personnel [should be] the first priority of the [commander].

- (S144) CF & D are only possible if warring factions find a real interest in doing so (incentive package for militias). Reconnaissance and technical teams should keep in mind the sociological background of the inhabitants (traditions). UN missions should develop an "information branch," "not just a provost marshall section.

- (S146) There can be no "Peace Keeping Op[eration]s" possible in an area where factions are fighting. "Peace Making or Enforcing Op[eration]s" are the best solution in order to establish peace. General disarmament is needed in order to fulfill the mission.

- (S148) It was quite impossible to disarm everyone in Somalia. If such a process is started, we [must] bring it [to an] end. We have to be, [and] to stay, neutral.

- (S150) Information is the key; all possible means must be employed. Full disarmament is very difficult to achieve and requires a lot of soldiers.

- (S100) Get the proper mix of forces/nations on the ground (you [cannot] have units w[ith] national agendas which counter [...] the UN objectives). Get the Humanitarian Affairs portion of [d]isarmament incentive programs up front - [they cannot] be an afterthought. Ensure
obtainable objectives are in the mandate. Stay the course, reach your objectives, and get out. After that, it is up to the people -UNTAC versus UNOSOM. [Do not] deal with warlords.

- (S019) Do not start a disarmament-demobilization process unless there is a consensus. You will hardly succeed by force. Security must be provided.

- (S059) Criticality of integrated planning at theater level. The inability of UNNY to plan/resource military operations (due to donor nation reluctance to contribute). Preeminent position of "National Agenda" undercuts FC. Commander to command and control forces in theater.

Q16.3 What other question should we have asked here and how would you have answered it?

Questions:

- (S006) What went wrong? Why did the security problem remain?

- (S153) Was there enough effort made to win over the war lords or the main political leaders?

- (S144) Was your UNOSOM experience useful for your UNAMIR mission?

- (S146) [In this operation,] what was the political will to (re)establish [...] peace?

- (S019) Shall (could) UNCIVPOL have a role in disarmament?

- (S142) What was the major difficulty with disarmament [which you encountered]?

Answers:

- (S006) The airport was a specific case and was relatively well controlled by the UN. Most of the outside area (i.e. the city of
Mogadishu), was free run by clans [and] banditry. There were areas where the UN would not go. This undermined the UN's effectiveness and appearance as a powerful figure. The UN ended up supporting/protecting itself [against] the nation it was initially trying to help - a nation which perhaps really did not want the help to start with.

- (S153) In my opinion, enough effort was not made.

- (S144) Yes, as I better understood [...] concepts like "mandate", "ROE's", etc. and as I knew more about the UN organization. No, for CF & D, as the situation in Rwanda also proved - parties again did not find any interest in complying with agreements, peace talks, and peaceful settlements of disputes.

- (S146) If the real reason of operation "Restore Hope" was the protection of NGO's, disturbing factors must be countered. Warlords and their militia must be disarmed. No decision was made, we know today the result of the lack of consensus.

- (S019) Yes. In their mission as monitors/observers or advisers they will come across armed civilians, bandits, hidden weapon[s], etc. A rule could be that UN military units have the overall responsibility of disarmament, but UNCPOL could take part in 'micro-disarmament'. [In] my experience (from Cambodia), deserters would rather turn to UNCPOL than to UN military units.

- (S142) [To] convince the fighter (and his leader) to give [up] his weapons (which [allow] him to survive and to get what he wants) and to go back to a civilian life. [This] is [...] possible [only] if a decent future is provided to him (incentive, amnesty, economic future, education,[ etc.]).
To be answered only by those who participated in finished UN/national peacekeeping missions:

Q16.4 Do you think that the disarmament-related tasks which you undertook had an impact on the national reconstruction processes which followed the end of the mission?

Yes: 01  No: 05

Q16.5 If yes, briefly explain how and why:

- (S073) The political and military aims in Somalia became confused[...]. The latter support[ed] the former, with disastrous results.

- (S099) Reconstruction process failed because of the UN['s] failure to demobilize and disarm factions. Disarmament failed because of [the] perception that it was a military problem which only required taking weapons away. Humanitarian demobilization support was lacking. There were no incentives to support disarmament.

- (S100) Look at Somalia today. [It is] [February 28th], and the marines are ashore guarding the withdrawal of the last UNOSOM II forces. Ali Mahdi and Aideed['s] people are rearmed and ready to fight for the port and Air Field. We saved hundreds of thousands of lives only to lose our political backbone, pull the US forces out when we had broken Aideed's forces (bowing to public relations pressure), and doom the UN mission to failure. Now the very people we saved from starvation are strong enough to continue the fight. Western minds cannot fathom the depth of inter-clan/faction hatred that exists in that region. Aideed is the key to the failure of the mission; his personal desire to run the country prevented his party from dealing openly in the political processes being established. His manipulation of the Western press and correct read[ing] of presidential will drove the US out. That doomed the mission to marginalize Aideed and [to] stage free elections. If we had been able to stage elections, we (the UN) would have been successful.
- (S153) If we had undertaken the task, it would have certainly had a positive impact on the national reconstruction processes.

- (S142) Development[s] [...] [in the mission] made [...] disarmament efforts ineffective.