Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique
Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique

Eric Berman

Project funded by: the Ford Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, the Winston Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the governments of Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Secretariat.
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Previous DCR Project Publications

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia
Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe
Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia
Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa
Preface

Under the heading of Collective Security, UNIDIR is conducting a major project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR). The project examines the utility and modalities of disarming warring parties as an element of efforts to resolve intra-state conflicts. It collects field experiences regarding the demobilization and disarmament of warring factions; reviews 11 collective security actions where disarmament has been attempted; and examines the role that disarmament of belligerents can play in the management and resolution of internal conflicts. The 11 cases are UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia), UNOSOM and UNITAF (Somalia), UNAVEM (Angola), UNTAC (Cambodia), ONUSAL (El Salvador), ONUCA (Central America), UNTAG (Namibia), ONUMOZ (Mozambique), UNOMIL (Liberia), UNMIH (Haiti), and the 1979 Commonwealth operation in Rhodesia.

Being an autonomous institute charged with the task of undertaking independent, applied research, UNIDIR keeps a certain distance from political actors of all kinds. The impact of our publications is predicated on the independence with which we are seen to conduct our research. At the same time, being a research institute within the framework of the United Nations, UNIDIR naturally relates its work to the needs of the Organization. Inspired by the Secretary General’s report on “New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era”,1 the DCR Project also relates to a great many governments involved in peace operations through the UN or under regional auspices. Last but not least, comprehensive networks of communication and cooperation have been developed with UN personnel having field experience.

Weapons-wise, the disarmament of warring parties is mostly a matter of light weapons. These weapons account for as much as 90% of the casualties in many armed conflicts. UNIDIR recently published a paper on this subject (Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts, UNIDIR Paper No 34, 1995). The Secretary General’s appeal for stronger efforts to control small arms - to promote "micro disarmament"2 - is one which UNIDIR will continue to attend to in the framework of the DCR Project.

The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) recognized the need to disarm the combatants and to remove weapons from the civilian

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Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique

population. Unlike, however, other peace operations, this objective was explicitly stated from the outset. Interestingly, what was at first a prerequisite for the holding of democratic elections “eventually became little more than an afterthought”. The monograph details how this came to pass. The author, Eric Berman, conducted the bulk of his research during the summer of 1995 when he visited Mozambique and South Africa. João Honwana, a senior researcher at the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the University of Cape Town, served as the external reviewer of the paper. The analysis also benefitted from UNIDIR’s visiting experts lecture series, in particular the presentation given by Major Bengt-Åke Folkeson, and from UNIDIR’s in-house military experts, in particular Lt. Col. Jakkie Potgieter and Lt. Col. Ilkka Tiihonen.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views or conclusions expressed in this report. They are Mr. Berman’s. The project leader, Virginia Gamba, and I are grateful to him for his contribution: UNIDIR has been happy to have such a resourceful and dedicated collaborator.

Sverre Lodgaard
Director, UNIDIR
Acknowledgements

The DCR Project takes this opportunity to thank the many foundations and governments who have contributed financially and with personnel to the establishment and evolution of the research associated with the Project. Among our contributors, the following deserve a special mention and our deep appreciation: the Ford Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, the Winston Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the governments of Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
Author’s Acknowledgements

Whatever this paper has achieved has been made possible largely because of the generous assistance I have been afforded in undertaking this research. I wish to thank first and foremost the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) for giving me the opportunity to take part in the Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project and subsequently to write one of its monographs during a break in service with the Office of the Director-General. I have benefitted from the assistance that Virginia Gamba, Kent Highnam, Lara Bernini, and Anita Blétry have provided, and am particularly indebted to Cara Cantarella.

UNIDIR made it possible for me to visit the field, and many colleagues helped me make sure that I hit the ground running. For this, I am grateful to the following three people: Eugenio Ambrosi, Peter De Clercq, and Jakkie Potgieter -- all of whom continued to take an active interest in the project. They made certain that my visits to South Africa and Mozambique would be as productive as possible. Upon arrival in South Africa, I was fortunate to have been met by Ivor Little, who took charge of my stay and return visit. The same is true for Mozambique, where Armand Rousselot and Pablo Mateu helped me in innumerable ways. I wish to make special mention of Sebastiao Cample and Jean-Michel Desble and the International Organization for Migration, for the keen interest they took in my work and my well being during my sojourn in Maputo. Outside of Maputo, I was in the capable hands of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Maria Luisa Bustamente, Maria Aurora Mendonza, and Etsegenet Seleshi Wudneh were particularly generous, but none more so than Fabricio Soares.

I would also like to acknowledge the following people who also went out of their way to assist me during my visit and who deserve special mention: Sam Barnes, Tim Born, Miguel de Brito, Erick de Mul, Paul Fauvet, Gary Gray, Anthony Hall, Jim Ivins, Dennis Jett, and Jack McCarthy.

Back in Geneva, I was fortunate to be introduced to Barbara Carrai, who provided valuable research assistance. Beth Shakman also undertook important research on my behalf. Adnan Bicaksiz supplied authoritative data on the deployment of peace-keeping forces, which proved useful. Diego Oyarzun expertly and enthusiastically designed the map of Mozambique Superimposed over Europe, for which I am grateful, and William Tarpai and Françoise Peyroux generously made UNHCR’s cartographic archives available.
The following people were especially generous in providing information and agreeing to discuss matters with me at great length. The paper is much richer because of the extra time they devoted to helping me. They are: Aldo Ajello, Pedro Comissário Afonso, Jose Da Silva Campino, Bengt-Åke Folkeson, Ursula Funk, James Jonah, Jonathan Moore, Magid Osman, Dmitry Titov, and Taye Zerihoun.

Lastly, a special thanks to João Honwana and Ton Pardoel for the patience, perserverance, and interest which they have shown in my work. I hope that they and the many other people mentioned above will find the completed monograph to be worthwhile of the time they have invested in assisting me.

March 1996, Geneva
Project Introduction

Disarmament and Conflict Resolution

The global arena's main preoccupation during the Cold War centered on the maintenance of international peace and stability between states. The vast network of alliances, obligations and agreements which bound nuclear superpowers to the global system, and the memory of the rapid internationalization of disputes into world wars, favored the formulation of national and multinational deterrent policies designed to maintain a stability which was often confused with immobility. In these circumstances, the ability of groups within states to engage in protest and to challenge recognized authority was limited.

The end of the Cold War in 1989, however, led to a relaxing of this pattern, generating profound mobility within the global system. The ensuing break-up of alliances, partnerships, and regional support systems brought new and often weak states into the international arena. Since weak states are susceptible to ethnic tensions, secession, and outright criminality, many regions are now afflicted by situations of violent intra-state conflict.

Intra-state conflict occurs at immense humanitarian cost. The massive movement of people, their desperate condition, and the direct and indirect tolls on human life have, in turn, generated pressure for international action.

Before and since the Cold War, the main objective of the international community when taking action has been the maintenance and/or recovery of stability. The main difference between then and now, however, is that then, the main objective of global action was to maintain stability in the international arena, whereas now it is to stabilize domestic situations. The international community assists in stabilizing domestic situations in five different ways: by facilitating dialogue between warring parties, by preventing a renewal of internal armed conflict, by strengthening infrastructure, by improving local security, and by facilitating an electoral process intended to lead to political stability.¹

The United Nations is by no means the only organization that has been requested by governments to undertake these tasks. However, the reputation of the United Nations as being representative of all states and thus as being objective and

trustworthy has been especially valued, as indicated by the greater number of peace operations in which it is currently engaged. Before 1991, the UN peace operations' presence enhanced not only peace but also the strengthening of democratic processes, conciliation among population groups, the encouragement of respect for human rights, and the alleviation of humanitarian problems. These achievements are exemplified by the role of the UN in Congo, southern Lebanon, Nicaragua, Namibia, El Salvador, and to a lesser extent in Haiti.

Nevertheless, since 1991 the United Nations has been engaged in a number of simultaneous, larger, and more ambitious peace operations such as those in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Mozambique and Somalia. It has also been increasingly pressured to act on quick-flaring and horrendously costly explosions of violence, such as the one in Rwanda in 1994. The financial, personnel, and timing pressure on the United Nations to undertake these massive short-term stabilizing actions has seriously impaired the UN's ability to ensure long-term national and regional stability. The UN has necessarily shifted its focus from a supporting role, in which it could ensure long-term national and international stability, to a role which involves obtaining quick peace and easing humanitarian pressures immediately. But without a focus on peace defined as longer-term stability, the overall success of efforts to mediate and resolve intra-state conflict will remain in question.

This problem is beginning to be recognized and acted upon by the international community. More and more organizations and governments are linking success to the ability to offer non-violent alternatives to a post-conflict society. These alternatives are mostly of a socio-political/economic nature, and are national rather than regional in character. As important as these linkages are to the final resolution of conflict, they tend to overlook a major source of instability: the existence of vast amounts of weapons widely distributed among combatant and non-combatant elements in societies which are emerging from long periods of internal conflict. The reason why weapons themselves are not the primary focus of attention in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies is because they are viewed from a political perspective. Action which does not award importance to disarmament processes is justified by invoking the political value of a weapon as well as the way the weapon is used by a warring party, rather than its mere existence and availability. For proponents of this action, peace takes away the reason for using the weapon and, therefore, renders it harmless for the post-conflict reconstruction process. And yet, easy availability of weapons can, and does, militarize societies in general. It also destabilizes regions that are affected by unrestricted trade of light weapons between borders.
There are two problems, therefore, with the international community's approach to post-conflict reconstruction processes: on the one hand, the international community, under pressure to react to increasingly violent internal conflict, has put a higher value on peace in the short-term than on development and stability in the long-term; and, on the other hand, those who do focus on long-term stability have put a higher value on the societal and economic elements of development than on the management of the primary tools of violence, i.e., weapons.

UNIDIR's DCR Project and the Control of Arms during Peace Processes (CAPP)

The DCR Project aims to explore the predicament posed by UN peace operations which have recently focused on short-term needs rather than long-term stability. The Project is based on the premise that the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations can be a tool for ensuring stability. Perhaps more than ever before, the effective control of weapons has the capacity to influence far-reaching events in national and international activities. In this light, the management and control of arms could become an important component for the settlement of conflicts, a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and deflation of conflict, and a critical component of the reconstruction process in post-conflict societies.

Various instruments can be used to implement weapons control. For example, instruments which may be used to support preventive diplomacy in times of crisis include confidence-building measures, weapons control agreements, and the control of illegal weapons transfers across borders. Likewise, during conflict situations, and particularly in the early phases of a peace operation, negotiations conducive to lasting peace can be brought about by effective monitoring and the establishment of safe havens, humanitarian corridors, and disengagement sectors. Finally, after the termination of armed conflict, a situation of stability is required for post-conflict reconstruction processes to be successful. Such stability can be facilitated by troop withdrawals, the demilitarization of border zones, and effective disarmament, demobilization and demining.

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2 Fred Tanner, "Arms Control in Times of Conflict", Project on Rethinking Arms Control, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, PRAC Paper 7, October 1993.
Nevertheless, problems within the process of controlling weapons have cropped up at every stage of peace operations, for a variety of reasons. In most cases, initial control of arms upon the commencement of peace operations has not generally been achieved. This may be due to the fact that political negotiations necessary to generate mandates and missions permitting international action are often not specific enough on their disarmament implementation component. It could also be that the various actors involved interpret mandates in totally different ways. Conversely, in the specific cases in which peace operations have attained positive political outcomes, initial efforts to reduce weapons to manageable levels - even if achieved - tend to be soon devalued, since most of the ensuing activities center on the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. This shift in priorities from conflict resolution to reconstruction makes for sloppy follow-up of arms management operations. Follow-up problems, in turn, can result in future threats to internal stability. They also have the potential to destabilize neighboring states due to the uncontrolled and unaccounted-for mass movement of weapons that are no longer of political or military value to the former warring parties.

The combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of light weapons has marked peace operations since 1990. This combination poses new challenges to the international community and highlights the fact that a lack of consistent strategies for the control of arms during peace processes (CAPP) reduces the effectiveness of ongoing missions and diminishes the chances of long-term national and regional stability once peace is agreed upon.

The case studies undertaken by the DCR Project highlight a number of recurrent problems that have impinged on the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations. Foremost among these are problems associated with the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment early in the mission, and problems concerned with the lack of coordination of efforts among the various groups involved in the mission. Many secondary complications would be alleviated if these two problems areas were understood differently. The establishment of a secure environment, for example, would make the warring parties more likely to agree on consensual disarmament initiatives. Likewise, a concerted effort at weapons control early in the mission would demonstrate the international community's determination to hold the parties to their original peace agreements and cease-fire arrangements. Such a demonstration of resolve would make it more difficult for these agreements to be broken once the peace operation was underway.

The coordination problem applies both to international interactions and to the components of the peace operation. A peace process will be more likely to succeed if there is co-operation and coordination between the international effort and the
nations which immediately neighbor the stricken country. But coordination must not simply be present at the international level; it must permeate the entire peace operation as well. To obtain maximum effect, relations must be coordinated among and within the civil affairs, military, and humanitarian groups which comprise a peace operation. A minimum of coordination must also be achieved between intra- and inter-state mission commands, the civil and military components at strategic, operational and tactical levels, and the humanitarian aid organizations working in the field; these components must cooperate with each other if the mission is to reach its desired outcome. If problems with mission coordination are overcome, many secondary difficulties could also be avoided, including lack of joint management, lack of unity of effort, and lack of mission and population protection mechanisms.

Given these considerations, the Project believes that the way to implement peace, defined in terms of long-term stability, is to focus not just on the sources of violence (such as social and political development issues) but also on the material vehicles for violence (such as weapons and munitions). Likewise, the implementation of peace must take into account both the future needs of a society and the elimination of its excess weapons, and also the broader international and regional context in which the society is situated. This is because weapons that are not managed and controlled in the field will invariably flow over into neighboring countries, becoming a problem in themselves. Thus, the establishment of viable stability requires that three primary aspects be included in every approach to intra-state conflict resolution: (1) the implementation of a comprehensive, systematic disarmament program as soon as a peace operation is set-up; (2) the establishment of an arms management program that continues into national post-conflict reconstruction processes; and (3) the encouragement of close cooperation on weapons control and management programs between countries in the region where the peace operation is being implemented.

In order to fulfill its research mission, the DCR Project has been divided into four phases. These are as follows: (1) the development, distribution, and interpretation of a Practitioners’ Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations; (2) the development and publication of case studies on peace operations in which disarmament tasks constituted an important aspect of the wider mission; (3) the organization of a series of workshops on policy issues; and (4) the publication of policy papers on substantive issues related to the linkages between the control of arms during peace processes (CAPP) and the settlement of conflict.

Between September 1995 and May 1996, the Project foresees four sets of publications. The first of these will involve eleven case studies, covering peace
operations in Somalia, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Bosnia/Croatia, Central America (ONUCA and ONUSAL), Cambodia, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Liberia and Haiti. The second set of publications will include nine policy papers, addressing topics such as Security Council Procedures, Mandate Specificity, Doctrine, Rules of Engagement, Coercive versus Consensual Arms Control and Demobilization Processes, Consensus, Intelligence and Media, and Training. A third set of publications will involve three papers on the relationship between arms and conflict in the region of Southern Africa. The last of the Project's published works will be an overarching policy paper summarizing the conclusions of the research and delineating recommendations based on the Project's findings.

Taking into account the existing material on some of the case studies, the DCR project has purposefully concentrated on providing more information on the disarmament and arms control components of the relevant international peace operations than on providing a comprehensive political and diplomatic account of each case.

The first volume published by the DCR Project examined the way in which three international peace processes (UNOSOM, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II) struggled with the issue of controlling and managing light weapons in Somalia. The second volume focused on the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) in Rhodesia, the third on the complex missions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR), and the fourth on the UN mission in Cambodia (UNTAC). This volume on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) examines the intricate dynamics and inherent tensions of a Chapter VI peace-keeping operation vis-à-vis disarmament and demobilization.

My special thanks go to the researcher for this case study, Eric Berman. I also want to thank the project staff at UNIDIR, especially our Information Officer, Kent Highnam; our Specialized Publications Editor, Cara Cantarella; and our Assistant Editor, Lara Bernini.

Virginia Gamba
Project Director
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Assembly Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMODEG</td>
<td>Associação Moçambicana dos Desmobilizados de Guerra (Association for Mozambican Demobilized Soldiers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Armored Personnel Carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Comissão do Cessar Fogo (Cease-fire Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Comissão de Supervisão e Controle (Supervision and Monitoring Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTNA</td>
<td>Centro de Tropas Não Acantonadas (Non-Assembly Area)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPI</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Public Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peace-keeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIU</td>
<td>Economic Intelligence Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>FADM</td>
<td>Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (Mozambican Defense Force)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAM</td>
<td>Forças Armadas de Moçambique (Mozambican Army, initially known as FPLM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPLM</td>
<td>Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique (Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique, subsequently known as FAM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td>General Peace Agreement for Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Information and Referral Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>Mozambique National Resistance (later known as RENAMO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSDP</td>
<td>Occupational Skills Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Provincial Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peace-keeping Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAD</td>
<td>Regional Arms Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National Resistance) -- [originally known as MNR]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Reintegration Support Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
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SoFA Status-of-Forces Agreement
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TU Technical Unit
TU CO Technical Unit Camp Officer
UN United Nations
UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNMO United Nations Military Observer
UNOHAC United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
WFP World Food Programme
ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
Legislatively, the country’s capital, Maputo, is also recognized and treated as a province. For this paper’s purposes (and most popular and academic treatment of the subject), Mozambique has “10” provinces (the capital not being one of them).
Map III

ONUMOZ
Deployment as of June 1994

Assembly Areas
- Government △ RENAMO
- Yellow: currently open area

Corridors
- *- Haca da *- Tete *- Beia
- ⊗ Route No. 1 ⊗ Lusaka

Legend:
- ONUMOZ Internal boundary
- International boundary

Legend:
- 50 100 150 km
- 5 10 150 m

The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Introduction

To ensure credible verification, it would be necessary to obtain from the parties lists of all troops and paramilitary forces, assembled or unassembled, together with details of weapons and ammunition held by them. There would have to be an agreement on the categories of troops that would be temporarily exempted from the requirement to assemble. Their numbers should be strictly limited and regularly verified. The demobilization process would be initiated and vigorously pursued as soon as troops started to assemble. Arrangements would also be needed for ONUMOZ [the United Nations Operation in Mozambique] to control weapons and ammunition in possession of the Government and RENAMO [the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana]. All arms and ammunition not required for the new armed forces would be destroyed under close supervision of the United Nations. A systematic programme for removal of weapons from the civilian population would also be required from the outset.

UN Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, 3 December 1992

The above excerpt from Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s report to the Security Council containing his recommendations for the peace-keeping operation (PKO) in Mozambique recalls the adage that doctors make the worst patients. It is surprising that those who should know better do not heed sage advice. The United Nations (UN) did not follow its own prescription.

The objective to demobilize and disarm the combatants as part of the October 1992 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique (GPA) was sound. It incorporated lessons learned from previous PKOs -- most notably those from the mission in Angola2 -- something that the UN is frequently criticized for failing to

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2 The effect of the second United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) on the operation in Mozambique is discussed in Chapter II.
The Security Council unanimously approved the report and decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). However, the plans were not implemented as specified. The two parties to the General Peace Agreement -- the Government of the Republic of Mozambique (hereafter referred to as the Government) and the Mozambique Resistance Movement (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, RENAMO) -- provided incomplete lists of their troops and paramilitary forces. The lists containing the numbers of assembled and unassembled troops were transmitted to the United Nations well after the agreed-upon deadline. The troops that had to be processed (and for which the UN had to make provision) were greater than the number expected. Information on their weapons and ammunition was not forthcoming. It was difficult to reach an agreement concerning the number and types of troops that would be exempted from reporting to assembly areas (AAs), and the two parties did not submit these lists (which were incomplete and inaccurate) until June 1994.

Furthermore, the troops that reported to non-assembly areas (Centros de Tropas Não Acantonadas, CTNAs) were not “strictly limited.” For every two soldiers reporting to an AA, one was registered at a CTNA. Nor were these “regularly verified.” ONUMOZ officials visited them only once or twice during the entire demobilization process. In addition, some CTNAs were not included on the lists submitted. These “spontaneous” CTNAs created numerous logistical headaches and undermined law and order. After long delays in the stated timetable, when they finally began reporting to the AAs in November 1993, the first troops were not authorized to demobilize until more than three months had passed. The weapons voluntarily turned over to ONUMOZ represented only a token gesture (as did the additional weapons that the UN “uncovered” during the subsequent verification phase). Of this relatively insignificant total, only weapons that the parties considered too dangerous to transport were destroyed in situ. Otherwise, they were returned to the newly-elected Government for it to do with as it pleased. Thus, the UN did not ensure that weapons not required for the new army -- which, as planned, was to represent a 70 percent reduction from current combined force levels -- would be destroyed. To underscore this deficiency, the new army in its final form was roughly one-third the size of the planned-for force.

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3 See Document S/RES/797 (1992), 16 December 1992. The PKO is known by its bilingual hybrid acronym: ONU for “Organização Nações Unidas” (in Portuguese) and MOZ for “in Mozambique” (in English).

4 Initially the Mozambique National Resistance was known by the acronym MNR. RENAMO does not enter the lexicon until the middle 1980s. For this paper’s purposes, the term RENAMO is used throughout.
Finally, there never was any systematic programme to remove weapons from the civilian population.

This monograph addresses why the mission experienced these shortcomings and complications. The explanation does not lie in the fact that a better plan superseded the one that the Secretary-General originally laid out. No additional plan was proffered. Rather, the complex nature of the PKO together with political considerations led to the failure to implement the plan faithfully.

With regard to the first factor, the initial PKOs tended to provide important confidence- and security-building measures such as separating warring factions, monitoring a particular area during tense periods, and reporting objectively on political and military developments. ONUMOZ exemplified the second generation of PKOs. It was given a mandate to provide technical expertise and supervise the democratic elections, repatriate more than three million refugees, resettle more than a million internally-displaced persons (IDPs), disarm and demobilize some 100,000 combatants, help reconstruct an infrastructure devastated by some three decades of war and four centuries of colonial misrule, and coordinate humanitarian assistance. As for the second factor -- political considerations -- short-term interests in securing immediate objectives eclipsed concerns for pursuing difficult problems that involved less tangible, less quantifiable, and less certain results.

This paper is organized into four sections. Chapter I, “The Conflict and its Resolution,” provides an overview of the legacy of the Portuguese colonial administration and practices, the armed struggle for independence and the ensuing civil war. It also recounts developments responsible for moving the conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table. The peace process and the General Peace Agreement are subsequently addressed.

Chapter II, “The United Nations and ONUMOZ,” explains the reasons for, and the results of, the limited role that the UN played throughout the negotiations. It discusses the dynamics between the UN and the Government and the increasingly important role that the UN was asked to assume in implementing the peace accords. The rationale for creating the size and make-up of the peacekeeping force is also analyzed. Were the resources allocated sufficient to execute successfully the mission’s mandates? Were they exploited effectively?

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to understand the environment into which a PKO deploys and in which it must operate. While the section, “Toward a Political Settlement” in Chapter I discusses the political context, Chapter III, “The Two Parties’ Armed Forces and Arsenals,” examines the military context. Political interests and military interests frequently do not converge. An appreciation for the two parties’ force structures is essential. It is important when serving as a mediator -- which in effect is what Chapter VI United
Chapter VI of the UN Charter refers to “Pacific Settlement of Disputes.” It permits the UN Security Council to take unspecified actions to resolve a conflict it deems “...likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security...” (Article 37). However, such unspecified actions may be undertaken only “...if all the parties to any dispute so request...” (Article 38). [Emphasis added.] This contrasts sharply with Chapter VII operations, which permit the UN Security Council to “...take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Article 42), in which the affected parties need neither be consulted nor grant their approval of such actions -- whatever they may be. It is interesting to note that the Charter does not provide explicitly for “peace-keeping operations.”

As will be seen, the international community heeded the Secretary-General’s call. The PKO in Mozambique achieved much. A country once at war is now at peace. More than 1.6 million refugees and tens of thousands of IDPs have returned home. The roots of democracy are being established. Yet, as this study of demobilization

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5 Chapter VI of the UN Charter refers to “Pacific Settlement of Disputes.” It permits the UN Security Council to take unspecified actions to resolve a conflict it deems “...likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security...” (Article 37). However, such unspecified actions may be undertaken only “...if all the parties to any dispute so request...” (Article 38). [Emphasis added.] This contrasts sharply with Chapter VII operations, which permit the UN Security Council to “...take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Article 42), in which the affected parties need neither be consulted nor grant their approval of such actions -- whatever they may be. It is interesting to note that the Charter does not provide explicitly for “peace-keeping operations.”

and disarmament clearly shows, an adequate mandate, effort and resources alone do not necessarily guarantee success.\(^7\)
Chapter 1
The Conflict and Its Resolution

The Historical Context and the Two Parties

The Portuguese and Colonial Mozambique

The European powers’ “scramble” for Africa resulted in the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, which settled a number of competing claims to the continent’s resources. Portugal walked away with official acceptance from its peers of its control of Mozambique.1 The recognition bestowed upon Portugal vis-à-vis Mozambique had little to do with its effective control or pacification of the country and its people -- two litmus tests promulgated at the Berlin Conference as measures on which to base its decisions to award territories. Rather, it was because of a tacit understanding between Britain and Germany that neither of them had the power to take and hold the territory and a general appreciation that Portugal, which had progressively lost its possessions in Africa to stronger powers, deserved at least something.2

Portugal’s claim to Mozambique dates back to January 1498 when the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama, while on his way to India, anchored in Quelimane to permit his crews time to repair the ships and recoup their strength. Before they departed, they erected a pardão (stone pillar) that was to serve as a claim by the Portuguese Crown to discovery and overlordship. By the end of the 16th century, Portugal, through a mixture of diplomacy and military might, had made significant inroads into the interior; however, it was unable to sustain or

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1 Mozambique’s internationally recognized borders were determined six years later in a 1891 treaty between Great Britain and Portugal, which favored British power and interests.
2 For example, Portugal had lost control of the forts it had established along the East African coast in the 15th and 16th centuries to British and Ottoman interests during the 19th centuries. As was often the case with territory awarded to other smaller European powers (such as Belgium, Spain, and Italy), the larger European powers (Britain, France, and -- as concerned Africa -- to a lesser extent, Germany) consoled themselves with the knowledge that their main adversaries had been denied an advantage.
build upon these advances. By 1885, its presence was mostly limited to a small number of coastal settlements.3

Possessing neither the requisite human nor material resources needed to occupy and exploit Mozambique’s vast interior, Portugal eventually turned to international private capital to solve this problem.4 It sold charters to various business interests that permitted the bearers the right to develop huge areas of land in the interior with a minimum of interference. These concessions permitted the investors holding the titles to levy taxes, introduce currency, and take other measures usually considered to be under the purview of a sovereign State. The purchasers of these charters were interested not in developing the land, but in furthering their economic interests in neighboring countries. As the construction of railway lines attests, Mozambique was seen principally as a conduit by which to transport goods less expensively than via the existing routes to South African ports.

The result of this development largely along east-west lines was to fortify the pre-existing divisions within the country between north and south.5 While there is no single distinct physical barrier such as a river or mountain range that divides the two, it is nevertheless possible to enumerate several broad economic, cultural, and geographic differences.6 Opello speaks of southern stereotypes of people from the

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3 As Isaacman and Isaacman put it, “The first half of the seventeenth century marked the high point of early Portuguese domination. ... By the middle of the eighteenth century, Mozambique had become to Portugal little more than a backwater malarial zone of minimal value in comparison to Lisbon’s [other] holdings....” See Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982, Boulder: Westview Press, 1983, p. 15.

4 At first Portugal had sought to achieve its objectives through the parceling of land -- known as prazeros -- in the hinterland. The prazeiros (estate holders) were expected to show fidelity to the Crown, develop the land, control the indigenous people, expand their own influence and conquer additional areas. They exhibited little loyalty, however, and expended much of their energy competing against one another rather than making progress on Portugal’s agenda.

5 The first north-south paved road was not constructed until the late 1960s when Portugal built one to confront the insurgency in the north. See Horace Campbell, “War, Reconstruction and Dependence in Mozambique,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1984), p. 856. The potential significance of such a road for bringing northerners and southerners together was reduced as a result of continuous RENAMO sabotage during the 1980s.

6 Opello speaks in broad terms of predominately matrilineal peoples living north of the Zambezi river, with patrilineal decent more common to peoples situated toward the South. Those peoples closer to the capital Maputo were more likely to take advantage of the scant economic and educational opportunities Portuguese colonialism did provide. Remuneration to
The Conflict and Its Resolution


Ibid., p. 262.

Isaacman and Isaacman attribute the rise of nationalism to the 1891 Anglo-Portuguese Treaty that rendered Mozambique’s borders. They write that this “humiliating setback brought down the Portuguese government and swept into power a new generation of leaders committed to using the nation’s military resources to guarantee Portuguese hegemony.” See Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution*, p. 21.


Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution*, p. 3.

central and northern regions as being “backward,” “primative,” and “traditional,” and contends that southerners, in turn, are broadly seen as “aggressive,” “domineering,” and “corrupt.” The low- to non-existent level of interaction between these two regions would have a significant effect on post-independent Mozambique.

A military coup in 1926 ushered in nearly five decades of dictatorial rule and ardent nationalism in Portugal. Lisbon sent tens of thousands of Portuguese to settle in the colonies. Rather than injecting the colonies with skilled workers and additional capital, the majority of Portuguese arriving in Mozambique were peasants, whom the Government viewed as a drain on the metropole’s economy. These immigrants brought few skills and little capital. Rather than create jobs, they tended to take whatever existing jobs they could find. It is telling that during the colonial period, there were more Mozambican wage laborers working outside the country than within. As before, little effort was made to train or educate the indigenous population. At the time of independence in 1975, 95 percent of the indigenous population was illiterate.

As a result of the economic and symbolic benefits Portugal received from its African colonies and the fact that Portugal considered itself to be more enlightened and beneficient than the other European colonizers in Africa, it paid little heed to the call for independence throughout the continent.
FRELIMO and Mozambique at Independence

The independence movement in Mozambique began on 25 June 1962, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. On that day, three dissident groups seeking Mozambican independence announced their decision to disband, join forces and form the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO). The initiative did not come from any of the three groups, but from pan-African statesmen such as Tanzania’s President, Julius Nyerere, who supported the call for Mozambican independence and believed the inexperience and fragmentation of the nascent groups was not conducive to achieving the desired ends. The three groups had different constituencies and different origins. In September 1962, FRELIMO held its first Party Congress and elected Eduardo Mondlane -- who was not affiliated with any group -- as its first president. In September 1964, FRELIMO launched its armed struggle for independence from bases in Tanzania.

Divisions within FRELIMO existed but were never strong enough to rupture the movement, which continued to be united in the common cause. Even the

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12 In June 1961, in response to a peaceful demonstration against colonial rule in Mueda, Cabo Delgado, Portuguese authorities opened fire on the protesters. It is widely accepted that 600 Mozambicans were killed. The naivete that the Mozambique African National Union (MANU) displayed in organizing the protest, and the brutality that the Portuguese displayed in responding to it, exemplified the need to organize the independence movement. See Isaacman and Isaacman, Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, p. 81. Opello also mentions the influential role played by Ghana’s President, Kwame Nkrumah. See Opello, “Revolutionary Change in Mozambique,” p. 274.

13 The Democratic National Union of Mozambique (União Nacional Democrática de Moçambique, UDENAMO), had been founded in Rhodesia and was comprised mainly of Mozambicans from the southern part of the country. The Mozambique African National Union (MANU) had its origins in Kenya, and drew its strength largely from the Makonde people of northern Mozambique, residing primarily in the province of Cabo Delgado. The African Union for an Independent Mozambique (União Africana de Moçambique Independente, UNAMI) was formed in Malawi and its members were largely from the province of Tete.

14 For example, there was much debate on the merits of waging a lengthy war of attrition or a more concentrated series of attacks. (The former option was chosen for ideological and practical reasons.) Another contentious issue concerned the Makonde tribe, located in the province of Cabo Delgado across the border from FRELIMO’s bases in Tanzania, who felt that the large percentage of its people taking part in the armed struggle should translate into greater Makonde representation within the leadership. There were also some who felt that the movement should represent and benefit from the active participation of all Mozambicans, while others resented white or mestiço (a person of mixed racial descent) influence on decision-making. Class
murder of its recently re-elected president did not irreparably split FRELIMO. (A parcel bomb killed Mondlane on 3 February 1969.) Samora Machel, a FRELIMO military commander and former nurse, succeeded Mondlane after a bitter, but bloodless, campaign.

The insurgency progressed slowly. Although it enjoyed broad support among the non-Portuguese populace, FRELIMO found it difficult to translate such support into political or military gains. Military activity during the first two years of the armed struggle was limited to the northern-most provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa, but “despite some success, FRELIMO could hardly justify its claim in 1966 of having liberated two-thirds of these provinces,” as Seegers states. In the latter-half of the 1960s FRELIMO made some gains in the province of Tete and in the early 1970s had begun to make its presence known in the central provinces of Manica, Sofala and Zambézia. Forays by armed elements of FRELIMO into the central provinces increased during 1973 and 1974. Keegan and Wheatcroft cite FRELIMO’s first attacks against the Beira-Salisbury rain line and adjacent oil pipeline in January 1974 as the moment when the strategic initiative passed to the guerrillas.

Nevertheless, the economic and human costs to Portugal to maintain the war effort were eventually too great. On 25 April 1974 the Marcelo Caetano regime was overthrown in a military coup, and with it the last vestiges of the legacy of the dictator Antonio Salazar. Writing shortly after the event, Hastings states, “It has been widely recognized that the single most decisive factor behind the April coup in Portugal was the advance of FRELIMO in Mozambique.”


Also according to Hastings, only three weeks before the coup, Caetano had hastily transferred an additional 10,000 troops from Angola to Mozambique. See Adrian Hastings, “Some Reflections Upon the War in Mozambique,” *African Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 292 (1974), p. 263.
Government showed little interest in pursuing its predecessor’s policies -- particularly toward its possessions in Africa. In June, Lisbon proposed to grant independence to Mozambique after a transitional period during which national elections would be held. FRELIMO, however, scoffed at the idea of having to win an election after having won the war. Portugal relented and in September a nine-month transitional period was agreed upon. On 25 June 1975, Samora Machel was sworn in as the President of the newly independent State.

RENAMO and Post-Independent Mozambique

As Morgan plainly puts it, given the numerous challenges the new Government faced at independence, the economic, military, and political strategies it adopted, “...begin to look spectacularly misguided.” The new State understandably was suspicious of those who had fought on the side of the colonizer. Machel decided that there would be no attempt to integrate these forces into the new army. What is more, Machel and the political elite within FRELIMO were wary of their own armed forces -- which were largely undisciplined, uneducated and underpaid. For political, budgetary, and ideological reasons, Machel undertook numerous measures to make the army subservient to the State. The austerity measures that Machel imposed on the army were harsh and caused much dissatisfaction. Troops loyal to Machel successfully quelled an attempted coup by disgruntled military personnel in December 1975.

Another far-reaching decision of the new Government of Mozambique was to embargo trade to and from landlocked Rhodesia. This action not only affected the white-minority-ruled Ian Smith regime in Salisbury, which relied heavily on Mozambique’s ports (especially the train link to Beira) but caused particular

19 According to Seegers, Portugal had demobilized some 30,000 soldiers from its colonial army, who were scattered throughout the country. See Seegers, “From Liberation to Modernization,” p. 65.
hardship to tens of thousands of Mozambicans who counted on such trade for their livelihood. It did not matter much to these people that the Government, as a United Nations Member State, was simply abiding by a long-standing Security Council resolution\textsuperscript{22} -- one which Portugal had chosen to disregard.

This was not the only measure that Machel undertook against Rhodesia. Mozambique did not just back Zimbabwean independence through diplomatic and economic channels, it also applied military pressure, albeit indirectly. Mozambique provided logistical and material support for one of the two guerrilla forces fighting the Rhodesian Government. FRELIMO permitted the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) of Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) to operate freely from Mozambican territory.\textsuperscript{23} In further support of this cause, the Government established a radio station in Maputo called, “The Voice of Zimbabwe.”\textsuperscript{24}

Rhodesia did not react passively to this challenge. Besides engaging in counter-insurgency operations across its border with Mozambique to target ZANLA, the Director General of Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Organization had an enterprising idea of using disenchanted Mozambicans to assist Rhodesia in these efforts.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, the seeds of what was to become known as the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) or Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) were sown.

Rhodesia, with the assistance of Portuguese business interests, recruited Mozambicans inside Mozambique or from Portugal to join RENAMO. Many who joined the ranks had managed to escape from FRELIMO re-education camps or had grievances against the new Government. Others simply sought employment and room and board. Initially, there was no ideological fervor or political agenda

\textsuperscript{22} See Document S/RES/253 (1968), 29 May 1968.
\textsuperscript{23} The other guerrilla group fighting the Ian Smith regime was Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) founded in 1961, which had its military bases in Zambia.
\textsuperscript{24} See Fauvet, “Roots of Counter-Revolution,” p. 115.
\textsuperscript{25} It would be misleading to suggest that had Mozambique been less antagonistic toward its western neighbor, Rhodesia would have undertaken a different or less punishing policy \textit{vis-à-vis} Mozambique. As Johnson and Martin report, Rhodesia had sought to initiate RENAMO-type operations in Mozambique against FRELIMO as early as 1974. See Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, “Mozambique: Victims of Apartheid,” in \textit{Frontline Southern Africa: Destructive Engagement}, pp. 1-4, edited by Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1988.
that united this motley group of soldiers. Training began in 1976. The establishment of Voz da África Livre (Voice of Free Africa), which began transmitting on 5 July 1976 from Bindura, north of Salisbury, helped spread the message.

Rhodesia employed RENAMO not only to attack ZANLA targets, but increasingly to destabilize the Mozambican Government. RENAMO terrorized civilians and destroyed examples of the Government’s presence (such as medical clinics and schools). Skirmishes with Government soldiers were still rare.

The leader of this group of men was André Matsangaissa, a former FRELIMO commander who had escaped from a re-education camp after being convicted of theft. Matsangaissa was one of the first recruits to make his way across the border. He proved to be a charismatic and capable leader and he remains a force that continues to captivate the imagination of many rural Mozambicans even to this day -- more than 15 years after his death. Matsangaissa’s death and the ensuing power struggle that eventually resulted in his Deputy, Afonso Dhlakama, assuming leadership, left RENAMO poised to suffer another potential devastating setback. The Lancaster House Conference convened in London and chaired by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, reached an agreement on 17 December 1979 to end the war for liberation in Rhodesia. The Smith regime, and the two liberation movements agreed to impose a cease-fire, to disarm, and to participate in free elections to be held from 27-29 February 1980. Mugabe and

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27 The initial group numbered perhaps 50 individuals. Interview, John Redfern, former Director, Military Intelligence, Rhodesian Army, 23 June 1995, Pretoria.


29 Matsangaissa was killed in October 1979 in a fight against Government forces. Many rural Mozambicans still refer to RENAMO as “Matsangas”, and recount Matsangaissa’s legends of daring-do and magical invincibility to bullets -- although according to one account of this legend, the “spell” he was placed under did not cover a bazooka, which finally killed him. For a recounting of this tale, see Finnegans, A Complicated War, p. 66. Witchcraft, magic tattoos and healers are still common and respected among many of Mozambique’s tribes.

30 For information on this agreement and the manner in which it was implemented, see Jeremy Ginifer, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 1995.
his ZANU party won a convincing victory. The two other parties respected the
results. Losing Rhodesian patronage would, it was thought, be a severe body blow
to RENAMO. It looked as if RENAMO would soon be out for the count.

But the loss of its main sponsor did not serve as a knockout punch. Rather,
RENAMO recovered from the power vacuum left by Matsangaissa’s death and the
loss of its key patron. To the surprise and disappointment of the Government of
Mozambique, RENAMO would soon emerge rejuvenated and stronger than ever
before.

Shortly before Robert Mugabe was to be sworn in as the Prime Minister of the
new Republic of Zimbabwe on 18 April, South Africa airlifted what was left of
RENAMO – as well as the Voz da Africa Livré transmitter – to set up shop in
South Africa.31 The radio station and headquarters were established in Walmerstal,
some 50 km north of Pretoria, and training bases were established in Phalaborwa
and Zoabastad in northern Transvaal.32 South Africa provided far greater training
to RENAMO than Rhodesia had, and supplied the rebel force with significantly
better and more armaments.33

**Toward a Political Settlement**

**The Nkomati Accords**

Machel and his Government felt the effects of South Africa’s support of
RENAMO almost immediately. By mid-1981 nine of Mozambique’s 10 provinces
had come under RENAMO attacks.34 To counter this threat, Machel began to
consider what had previously been anathema – making peace with South Africa.

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31 South African assistance to RENAMO began in 1979. The scope of this early
assistance was insignificant compared to its post-airlift involvement. See Johnson and Martin,


33 Besides possessing an increased capability to provide such assistance, the Apartheid
Government also had added incentive to provide enhanced levels of support to RENAMO. Two
months after suffering the loss of a like-minded ally in Rhodesia, which served as an important
strategic buffer, in April 1980 South Africa had a new potential economic threat to confront with
the convening of the first Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)
[whose name subsequently was changed to Southern African Development Community (SADC)],
which sought to reduce neighboring countries’ economic dependence on South Africa.

34 Finnegan, A Complicated War, p. 32. The province still out of RENAMO’s reach
was Cabo Delgado.
On 16 March 1984, Machel and his South African counterpart, Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha, signed an agreement known as the Nkomati Accords (named after the river that runs along the South African town where the signing ceremony was held). According to Article One, the two States agreed, “...to respect each other’s sovereignty and independence and in fulfillment of this fundamental obligation, to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other.” The agreement was essentially a *quid pro quo* whereby Pretoria pledged to cease its support for RENAMO in exchange for Maputo’s assurance that it would no longer provide sanctuary to the African National Congress (ANC), a group waging a guerrilla war against the Apartheid Government.35

But the Nkomati Accords did not, as Machel had gambled, permit the Government to defeat a weakened RENAMO. Indeed, for a number of reasons the rebels’ threat to the Government increased after the agreement. First, prior to signing the Accords, South Africa resupplied the guerrillas with substantial weapons and logistical support.37 Second, it became clear that RENAMO’s other benefactors were not insignificant. Portuguese business interests continued their support as did Western right-wing anti-communist politicians, foundations and wealthy individuals.38 Third, South Africa did not keep its end of the bargain and continued to arm, train and provide communication and logistical support to RENAMO.39 And fourth, partly to show their displeasure with South Africa, and

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36 Schneidman reports that as part of the Nkomati Accords, Machel also made a secret pledge not to permit any foreign power (read: the Soviet Union) to establish a naval or submarine base along Mozambique’s coast. See Witney W. Schneidman, “Conflict Resolution in Mozambique: A Status Report,” *CSIS Africa Notes*, Washington DC: Georgetown University, No. 121, 28 February 1991, p. 2.


39 Proof of continued South African military assistance was discovered in September 1985 when Government forces, together with Zimbabwean troops, overran RENAMO’s central base in the Gorongosa mountains in the province of Sofala. According to diaries recovered at the site, an official from South African military intelligence had assured Dhlakama that, “We, the military, will continue to give [RENAMO] support without the consent of our politicians in a massive way so that they can win the war.” (See Vines, *RENA MO: Terrorism in Mozambique*, p. 24.) The issue of subsequent support remains contentious, but there is general agreement that the aid continued, albeit at reduced levels, for several years.
partly to exhibit their increasing independence, the guerrillas pointedly struck
targets designed to hurt not simply the Government of Mozambique, but also
South African and Portuguese business interests.\footnote{40} Thus, it should not come as a surprise that an effort by the Government of Mozambique to establish a direct dialogue with RENAMO using South Africa as a go-between was unsuccessful. The combination of an embittered and emboldened guerrilla force, and a Government that continued to seek capitulation, was not conducive to reaching an agreement to end the insurgency. The fact that the Government asked to mediate pursued a disjointed policy (arming the guerrillas while simultaneously stating its intention to withhold further support) did not help matters. In October 1984, six months after initial feelers were put out, the initiative collapsed.\footnote{41}

Confronted with RENAMO’s political intransigence and military gains, Machel sought increased military assistance while continuing to apply diplomatic pressure against South Africa. He also turned his attention to Malawi, whose President, Hastings Banda, coveted Mozambican territory that was once part of Malawi’s historic kingdom and supported Portuguese, South African, and RENAMO’s interests at the expense of FRELIMO and the Government of Mozambique.\footnote{42} Machel, with the support of Zimbabwe’s Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and Zambia’s President Kenneth Kaunda, used the occasion of a summit of regional leaders in Malawi in September 1986 to appeal directly to Banda to make certain that RENAMO stopped receiving support through channels in Malawi.\footnote{43}

The Government of Mozambique was not prepared for what followed. It appears that Banda did indeed expel RENAMO from its territory. Thousands of guerrillas crossed the border and occupied numerous towns and villages. Hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans fled their homes to seek refuge in neighboring

\footnote{40} For example, following the Accords, RENAMO destroyed hundreds of pylons integral to the Cahora Basso dam (which supplied electricity to South Africa as well as Mozambique and whose creditors were largely Portuguese investors). The guerrillas also stepped up its attacks against foreigners. Portuguese workers maintaining the dam were among those kidnapped and killed.

\footnote{41} For an account of South Africa’s efforts to mediate a negotiated settlement to the war, see Vines, \textit{RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique}, pp. 21-23.

\footnote{42} See, for example, Finnegan, \textit{A Complicated War}, pp. 139-142. It should also be noted that local businessmen and police, and foreign political and religious interests, also benefitted from, or actively supported, the activities of RENAMO.

\footnote{43} Vines, \textit{Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique}, p. 56.
countries -- principally in Malawi -- or became internally displaced within their country. There was a very real concern in Maputo that RENAMO might succeed in splitting the country. Mozambique appealed to Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe for troops to counter this threat. The three countries responded affirmatively and the Government eventually was able to turn the tables.

In December 1987, Mozambique’s President, Joaquim Chissano (who, as Prime Minister, had been elected in November 1986 to succeed Machel who had died in a plane crash the previous month), offered an amnesty to any RENAMO soldier who turned himself or herself in to the authorities. By December 1988, the Government reported that more than 3,000 guerrillas had chosen to avail themselves of this programme. The People’s Assembly renewed the offer when it expired at year’s end. Nevertheless, with a force estimated to number 20,000, a 15 percent reduction was not going to be sufficient to permit the Government to defeat RENAMO militarily.

Despite gains in the field, the Government’s offensive in 1988-1989 had petered out. For Chissano the question was, where to go from here? The answer was largely given to him.

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45 Several scholars and analysts have written that Chissano had been preparing the ground to open direct negotiations with RENAMO since he took office. Certainly, the Government had known for many years that a purely military defeat of its adversary was not possible. Nevertheless, it was the numerous changes outlined in the following section, “Outside Support Dwindles,” that enabled or forced Chissano and Dhlakama to make the comprises necessary to reach a negotiated settlement. For discussions of Chissano’s efforts toward these ends, see, for example, Karl Maier, “A Program for Peace,” *Africa Report*, September-October 1989, p. 28; and Schneidman, “Conflict Resolution in Mozambique,” pp. 1-8. The pro-Government/anti-RENAMO bias of many Western anti-Apartheid sources (and as far as the US is concerned, pro-Reagan Administration sources that were critical of staunch anti-communist forces on Capitol Hill and elsewhere in the US Government who did not support the Administration’s pro-Maputo policies) should be kept in mind when reading these accounts.
Outside Support Dwindles

The Soviet Union, Mozambique’s primary supplier of military training and equipment for the past two decades, was about to collapse. Its decision to pull out of Afghanistan in 1988 was a clear red flag that professed continued support was not sacrosanct. Indeed, the pull-out from Afghanistan was a harbinger for things to come. As concerned Mozambique, events followed surprisingly quickly. In June 1989, Mozambique’s Defence Minister announced that Soviet military advisers active in the country (which were reported to have numbered some 750 men) would be phased out within two years. Six months later, the Soviet military presence in Mozambique had been significantly reduced to some 250 advisers.

The Soviet Union was not the only provider of military support to reduce its assistance. As East Germany ceased to exist, so did East German training. Tanzania used the military gains that the Government achieved in its 1988 offensive to provide political cover under which to withdraw its troops, which it did in November 1988. (Western military assistance, which had begun in the mid-1980s, was politically -- but not militarily -- significant.)

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46 This figure is based on data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in their annual publication The Military Balance, London: Brassey’s. The average number of the reported high of 850 (1988-1989, pp. 44 and 135) and low of 650 (1989-1990, see pp. 42 and 134) is used here. Weitz reports the number of Soviet advisers at the time of the announcement to have numbered between 600 and 1,500. (See Weitz, “Continuities in Soviet Foreign Policy: the Case of Mozambique,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1992), p. 92.) João Honwana, the former Chief of the Mozambique Air Force, believes the number 1,500, while “sounding a bit high,” was plausible. Personal correspondence, 6 October 1995.


49 Tanzanian troops were ill-equipped and ill-trained to deal with an insurgency. They suffered greater, and inflicted fewer, casualties than a force familiar with guerrilla warfare -- such as Zimbabwean troops. Telephone interview, João Honwana, 6 October 1995.

50 British assistance to train and lightly arm the Government’s troops began in January 1986. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher felt compelled to support Machel (and later Chissano) given Mozambique’s vital support to the 1979 Lancaster House Conference and the
Similarly -- and no less important -- was the simultaneous drop in international support for RENAMO. As previously mentioned, RENAMO’s bases in Malawi had been taken away from them by 1987. There is some evidence to suggest that local authorities in Malawi may have continued to make clandestine deals with RENAMO guerrillas. Finnegan has reported there to have been a (tacit or explicit) quid pro quo concerning Malawi support (perhaps passive) for RENAMO in exchange for the guerrillas’ refraining from attacking the Nacala corridor. See Finnegan, *A Complicated War*, p. 311/fn. 21.

It should be noted that South African assistance had been reduced considerably from its levels in the early 1980s. A great number of the weapons in the guerrillas’ arsenals were captured from stocks of the Government of Mozambique’s army, the Forças Armadas de Moçambique (FAM).

The Department of State’s Bureau for Refugee Programmes had commissioned Robert Gersony, a consultant, to travel to the region and report back on the causes for the steep escalation in refugees and displaced persons reportedly fleeing large parts of Mozambique. Ostensibly, the numbers would have certainly raised eyebrows. According to the Report, the Bureau for Refugee Programs had registered a 300 percent increase in the number of Mozambicans seeking refuge in neighboring countries during the past 12 months. (See Robert Gersony, “Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique: Report Submitted to Ambassador Jonathan Moore and Dr. Chester A. Crocker,” Washington, DC: US Department of State Bureau for Refugee Programs, 1988, p. 1.) Nevertheless, despite the empirical facts, the State Department must have understood that Gersony had provided them with political dynamite. While there is no indication that Gersony -- or anyone else -- sought to manipulate the data, the political implications should not be discounted when evaluating the information contained in the Report.
RENAMO politically unacceptable. For an account of the prominent and powerful conservatives in Congress and elsewhere within the American Government that had supported RENAMO and opposed Reagan’s efforts to support the Mozambican Government, which had been increasingly turning away from socialist policies for many years and had begun actively to court private capital.

The end of the immediate threat that RENAMO posed, the lukewarm response to the Government’s amnesty, the awareness that a discontinuation of Soviet assistance would forever take away the military option, and reform in South Africa all contributed to many Western countries’ decisions to apply pressure on Chissano to reach a political accord. These factors in addition to a terrible drought made it understandable why after 15 years of insurgency and civil war, the situation was conducive to pursuing a negotiated settlement.

The General Peace Agreement

The Government had known for many years that even with substantial assistance, a military solution was not possible. It pursued military advances to weaken, but not eliminate, RENAMO, and to provide greater clout in political negotiations. Both parties were to employ this “diplomatic tool” throughout the two years of talks leading to the General Peace Agreement. (Indeed, during an offensive against RENAMO in 1990, rumors persist within the Government that Chissano ordered his military to stop short of encircling a base where Dhlakama was thought to be present and to permit Dhlakama to “escape” capture or death. The rationale for such a command was that the Government was committed to

54 For an account of the prominent and powerful conservatives in Congress and elsewhere within the American Government that had supported RENAMO and opposed Reagan’s efforts to support the Mozambican Government, see J. Stephen Morrison, “The Battle for Mozambique,” Africa Report, September-October 1987, pp. 44-47. For an account of how Reagan, a cold war warrior par excellence could end up embracing a country “painted red” on his geo-political map, see Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992, pp. 247-248.

55 During the author’s visit to Mozambique in the summer of 1995, several interviewees spoke of growing annoyance among some of the major Western donors because of increasingly pervasive corruption within the Mozambican Government -- especially after Machel’s death. Moral and strategic considerations persuaded these donors not to press the issue and the need to reform too stringently. However, in the changed political and military environment of the early 1990s and with a peace agreement in the making, these Governments let it be known that Maputo could no longer expect business as usual. Interview, Sam Barnes, Chief, Assessment and Planning Unit, UNOHAC, 29 June 1995, Maputo.
finding a political solution and Chissano did not want to jeopardize the ongoing negotiations.)

However, even as late as 1989, the Government pursued a political settlement on its own terms. In July 1989, FRELIMO held its Fifth Party Congress during which it introduced further liberalization measures regarding economic, political, and religious freedoms. For example, it opened membership in the Party to individuals previously excluded, but did not go so far as to permit the formation of additional political parties. As concerned RENAMO, Chissano stated, “If they have the necessary qualities, well, who knows, some could even become ministers [in a FRELIMO Government]. But it is not what they want. ... [They want] to come here as a party. It is this that we refuse.” (It was exactly this recognition as a political party that RENAMO was demanding.)

Given the changed external environment as outlined above, and emboldened by the political support that the Congress afforded him, Chissano declared his readiness to undertake a direct dialogue with RENAMO. Having received his party’s approval, Chissano made public his “12 Principles” by which such a dialogue could take place. He also revealed that President Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya had agreed to serve as mediators. The first round of indirect talks took place in August in Nairobi at which time a Mozambican church delegation presented Chissano’s principles to Dhlakama.

Dhlakama, who had similarly come away with political support from a RENAMO Party Congress held in Gorongosa, in June, in which he had consolidated his control, was well-positioned to commence negotiations. He responded with a “16-Point Declaration” and agreed to participate in future talks.

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56 Telephone interview, João Honwana, 6 October 1995.
58 Chissano, in 1987, had (reluctantly) encouraged church leaders within Mozambique to pursue a dialogue with RENAMO -- something they had been advocating since 1984 but for which they had failed to obtain governmental approval. Subsequently, in 1988, Chissano approved of Kenya’s efforts to serve as an intermediary between him and Dhlakama. See Alex Vines, “No Democracy Without Money: the Road to Peace in Mozambique (1982-1992),” *CIIR Briefing Paper*, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, April 1994, pp. 6-8.
Although there were still significant outstanding issues to be negotiated, it was
now clear that both parties sought a political settlement.61 Less clear was how to
establish the means and parameters by which to conduct the negotiations. After
some six months of positioning, both sides agreed to commence direct talks. The
question of mediator was finessed by an agreement to resolve the issue as part of
the negotiations. The parties chose the Community of Sant’Egidio, a Catholic lay
organization, to serve as “observers” to facilitate the initial talks. The Community
had acted as a go-between for both sides while feelers were put out during 1988
and 1989. It served the Government’s purpose, and RENAMO concurred as it
viewed the Community as honest brokers, having dealt with their representatives
working in Mozambique for many years.62

After an aborted attempt at a first meeting between the two parties in June in
Malawi, negotiations got under way in Rome in July 1990.63 Distrust between the
two sides was high and progress was slow. Besides the two sides’ divergent views
on external participation in the talks, they also differed significantly on the means
by which to attain their shared goal: ending the war. The Government sought first
and foremost to secure a cease-fire after which issues such as elections could be
negotiated. RENAMO, on the other hand, wanted certain guarantees on political
reform prior to concluding a cease-fire. Poor to non-existent communications
between the RENAMO delegation in Rome and Dhlakama at his headquarters in
Mozambique further complicated matters. Intermittent military activity by both
sides provided a backdrop to the talks. Intersessions were used to maintain pressure
on both parties to keep the process alive and to smooth over obstacles whenever
possible. Before the third round was to commence on 9 November, the two sides
had agreed to settle the outstanding and contentious question concerning the role
of the mediator. They promoted the team of observers to mediator status. The third
round saw the conclusion of a Joint Verification Commission to oversee a partial
cease-fire. Two rounds later, in May 1991, the parties agreed on an agenda. In
October, during the seventh round, they signed Protocol I. A year later, on 4
October 1992 in Rome, they concluded Protocols IV, V, VI and VII, thus
completing the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique.

61 The United States sought to bridge the gap that existed between the two sides by
merging the 28 points into a “Seven Point Peace Proposal,” which it hoped both parties could
agree upon as a basis for further talks. For an English text of this proposal, see Ibid., p. 160.
62 See Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique’s War: The Role of Mediation and Good
63 For accounts of the direct negotiations leading to the GPA, see Hume, Ending
Dhlakama and Chissano were on hand to sign the agreement. In many ways, the peace process was really just beginning.

Table I: The General Peace Agreement for Mozambique

<table>
<thead>
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<th>DOCUMENT</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Joint Communiqué</td>
<td>10 July 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Agreement</td>
<td>1 December 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protocol I: Basic Principles</td>
<td>18 October 1991</td>
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<td>Protocol II: Criteria and Arrangements for the Formation and Recognition of Political Parties</td>
<td>13 November 1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Declaration by the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and RENAMO on the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>16 July 1992</td>
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<td>The Joint Declaration</td>
<td>7 August 1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protocol IV: Military Questions</td>
<td>4 October 1992</td>
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<td>Protocol V: Guarantees</td>
<td>4 October 1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protocol VI: Cease-fire</td>
<td>4 October 1992</td>
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<td>Protocol VII: Donors Conference</td>
<td>4 October 1992</td>
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Chapter 2
The United Nations and ONUMOZ

Underlying Dynamics

Tensions Between the Government and the United Nations

Under Chapter VI of Protocol III, the Government, among other commitments, agreed to address a formal request to the United Nations regarding guarantees for the electoral process and the role of international observers. The two parties signed this Protocol on 12 March 1992. Eleven weeks later, on 28 May, when the Community of Sant’Egidio approached the Secretary-General to brief him on the negotiations and seek his help in expediting the process, the Government of Mozambique had yet to extend the formal request to the UN.

The Secretary-General used this occasion to notify President Chissano that he had been made aware of Protocol III and that he wished to be of assistance. In response to the letter, Chissano welcomed the interest of the UN in the ongoing negotiations. He reviewed the progress achieved to date and expressed his intention to request the UN’s assistance formally as soon as the two delegations had resolved the question of observers to be included at the talks.

However, the real reason for the delay in requesting UN assistance lay in the strong desire of the Government to marginalize the role of the UN in the negotiations. United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar had been eager to assist the Government back in 1989 when efforts were just under way to use Chissano’s 12 points and Dhlakama’s 16 points as the basis to establish a political dialogue. Chissano would brief Pérez de Cuéllar on developments, but he was not interested in having the UN participate in the process, responding that he

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would welcome UN involvement when the “time was ripe.” Both knew that at some point the UN would eventually have to help implement an agreement. However, until that time, the Government sought to keep the UN at bay.

RENA MO, on the other hand, wanted to use the negotiations as a means to augment its legitimacy. It had sought throughout the talks to maximize the role that the UN would play in an eventual agreement. The world Organization would be able to command global media attention and rally public opinion to force the Government to make concessions for the sake of peace. Recognizing this dynamic, and wishing to minimize RENAMO’s stature, the Government rejected the UN as a possible mediator.4

Although the officials at the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA) had been in contact with the Community throughout the talks,5 it was not until 10 June 1992 that the UN -- along with several Governments -- was invited formally to participate directly in the negotiations as an observer.6 Two UN representatives -- an elections expert and a military expert -- joined the talks later that month.7 The UN slowly began to take a more active and hands-on approach.8 A Joint Communiqué on Humanitarian Assistance, signed on 16 July 1992, benefited from the active input of representatives of several UN humanitarian and developmental agencies in Mozambique. However, it was only in August (when Tayeb Merchoug, a senior DPA official joined the deliberations) that UN

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4 RENAMO also put forward Kenya as a possible mediator. The Government suggested Zimbabwe. While both countries had served initially as co-mediators to the indirect talks held in Nairobi in 1989, the parties subsequently agreed that neither country would be acceptable.
5 Interview, James Jonah, former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA), 1 September 1995, Geneva.
6 Hume, Ending Mozambique’s War, p. 102.
7 Ibid., p. 103.
8 UN involvement in Rome initially was solely to observe and was very limited. The first UN representative at the talks, Mr. Horacio Boneo, described his two- to three-week stint as “...some of the most boring weeks of [his] life” in which, for example, he would spend days watching the two sides negotiate the name of the new army. Telephone interview, Horacio Boneo, Director of DPA’s Electoral Assistance Division, 20 October 1995.
involvement at the talks assumed a level of real significance. In September, two technical teams arrived in Mozambique to research electoral and cease-fire issues.

While seeking to deny one’s adversary an advantage is understandable, this alone does not explain adequately the Government’s view toward UN involvement during the negotiations. The concern of the Government to protect its sovereignty and maintain its pride was intense and was a major source of tension throughout the subsequent PKO. At times, the UN took extra pains to accommodate the concerns of the Government and tried to respect its feelings. These concerns could sometimes border on the irrational or illogical, and accommodating them risked compromising the efficiency of the operation. However, on some major issues (for example, the status-of-forces agreement), the relationship between the UN and the Government were strained.

The major tension as far as the Government was concerned, however, lay with the operating style of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)
for Mozambique, Aldo Ajello. The Government found him to be abrasive and disrespectful -- not just toward the Government, but toward the terms of the General Peace Agreement and the UN’s mandate as well. As the Security Council established ONUMOZ in exercise of its powers granted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the UN was obliged to operate with the consent of the parties. The Government constantly reminded the SRSG of this fact.15

The relationship between the Government and the UN vis-à-vis ONUMOZ can be understood clearly from the remarks of President Chissano, when he spoke before the General Assembly as part of the Special Commemorative Session to mark the UN’s 50th anniversary. He pointedly did not include Ajello or the UN as one of the four “fundamental factors” he cited for peace having been made possible in his country. He went on to say:

> Our country considered herself an integral part of the United Nations operation, as a member fulfilling her obligation to work for the success of the Organization. Our own experience in Mozambique underlines the need for the United Nations to bear in mind that peace-keeping forces operate on the basis of consent by the parties concerned. Therefore, they must always act with impartiality and in accordance with their mandate. Furthermore, they must respect and abide by the principles of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference, taking due regard each country’s specificities. National institutions must be respected and protected.16

The Expanding Role of the United Nations

Prior to 4 October 1992, when Protocols IV through VII were signed and the negotiating process was concluded, the UN participation in the implementation of the General Peace Agreement was quite limited. It consisted largely of providing military and electoral expertise. However, the completed document asked the UN to assume a preeminent role in assuring that both parties respected the GPA and adhered fully to its many provisions.

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15 The sensitivities of the Government likely would have made for a difficult relationship with any SRSG. The selection of Aldo Ajello, who possessed a temperament and operating style not characteristic of a career diplomat, exacerbated the pre-existing tense situation. (His approach and demeanor, however, are also widely credited as a primary reason for the operation’s success.)

According to Chapter VI of Protocol IV (Military Questions), the UN was to preside over the Reintegration Commission (Comissão de Reintegração) to assist the economic and social reintegration of demobilized soldiers.

Protocol V (Guarantees) stipulated that the UN Secretary-General would appoint a representative to chair the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (Comissão de Supervisão e Controle, CSC). The CSC was designed to guarantee the integrity of the GPA and settle any disputes that might arise between the parties. Protocol V reiterated the provisions of Protocol III as concerned UN observance of, and provision of technical and material assistance to, the electoral process, and also with regard to UN assistance to refugees and displaced persons. In addition, the parties would request that the UN make available food, medical attention and all other forms of support necessary at the assembly areas for the forces as provided for in Protocol VI.

Protocol VI (Cease-fire), stipulated that a Cease-fire Commission (Comissão do Cessar Fogo, CCF) would be created to oversee the process of the cessation of the armed conflict. According to Chapter I, the UN would preside over the CCF (sub-chapter 1); its personnel would begin to deploy in Mozambique on the first day of the cease-fire -- to be known as E-Day -- in order to carry out its verification responsibilities, which would include investigating any alleged violation (sub-chapter 5); and it would supervise the 49 assembly and billeting points -- hereafter known as assembly areas or AAs -- and would in principle be present 24 hours a day in each of those locations as of E-Day (sub-chapter 6).

While it is significant that the part played by the UN turned out to be much greater than initially anticipated, it must be stressed that the Government continued to resist this expanded role. When such a commission as the CSC was first envisioned in October 1991, it was to be “...composed of the Government, RENAMO, the UN and other organizations or Governments to be agreed upon between the parties.”17 There had been no indication that the parties would ask the UN to chair the committee. A week before the GPA was concluded, there was still no agreement as to who would chair the CSC.18 Indeed, negotiations on the UN role vis-à-vis the various commissions continued until the night before the signing.

18 According to the letter, as of 29 September, it had been agreed at that time that the UN should chair the Cease-fire Commission. The chairs of the other bodies had yet to be determined. See “Document 10: Letter dated 29 September 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,” in DPI, The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, p. 103.
ceremony. The Government also initially rejected the UN’s offer to supervise its civilian police.

Understanding the Timetable

Given that the UN came to the negotiations late in the process and that the Government sought to minimize the Organization’s influence, it might be understandable if the UN was ill-prepared to assume the expanded and extensive responsibilities it was eventually asked to undertake. Perhaps this explains why it took the UN eight months after the signing of the GPA to deploy its military component fully. ONUMOZ personnel, diplomats and aid workers familiar with the mission have described the initial 12-month timetable for the PKO as “crazy” or “criminal.” Was the UN simply doing the best it could in light of an impossible timetable that it neither asked for nor wanted?

No. The UN was not forced to accept the timetable. Rather, the UN had proffered the timetable, which the parties accepted without revision. Indeed, James Jonah, the Under-Secretary-General of DPA at the time of the negotiations in Rome, said of the peace negotiations that one of its interesting aspects was the willingness of both parties to accept the recommendations of the UN essentially with “no questions asked.” The existence of a UN “non-paper” entitled, “Modalities of United Nations Verification of Aspects of a General Peace Agreement in Mozambique,” bears this out. It was transmitted to the two parties on 13 August 1992 in Rome, and the document appears largely verbatim in Protocol IV of the GPA signed eight weeks later. Although Protocol IV includes an expanded section on the formation of the new Mozambican Defense Force, the

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19 Interview, Pedro Comissário Afonso, 14 November 1995, Geneva.
21 These terms were used frequently in interviews with the author during a visit to Mozambique and South Africa in June and July 1995.
22 The military experts of the Governments attending the negotiations as observers in effect “ghost wrote” the United Nations “non-paper” regarding military aspects of the GPA. The UN concurred with the drafters and issued the document under its name. Interview, Cameron Hume, 24 November 1995, New York.
23 Interview, James Jonah, 1 September 1995, Geneva.
timetable for demobilization and disarmament replicates that which was put forward in the “non-paper” without amendment. (The timetable is spelled out in Chapter IV.)

What explains this apparent inconsistency? Why, if the UN had taken part in drafting something as critical as entire sections of Protocol IV, would the UN have found it so difficult to implement the GPA according to the schedule established?

The answer lies with the overriding concern that the UN and the Governments represented at the negotiations in Rome had in the process -- that is, of getting from point A (war) to point B (peace). This transition was of infinitely greater importance than ironing out the possible, if not probable, difficulties in implementing the finer points of the agreement.

### The Peace-keeping Operation Takes Shape

The week prior to the signing of the GPA did not only see an expanded role for the UN in Mozambique, events also transpired that would have a direct result on the decision to deploy a larger force. A review of the PKO in Angola goes far in explaining why the UN wrote the “prescription” it would eventually choose not to follow.

### The Significance and Effect of UNAVEM II

The second United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) was to conclude shortly after elections were held on 29-30 September 1992 and a new Government was elected, thereby ending a 17-year-old civil war. Preparing for the elections, both signatories to the 1991 Peace Accords (on which the PKO was based) felt confident that they and their respective parties were going to win. Jonas Savimbi, President of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, UNITA), had stated on

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26 UNAVEM was not the only operation to affect ONUMOZ. For example, the lessons learned from the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Cambodia would complicate logistics in ONUMOZ. Internal fuel tanks within helicopters operating in Mozambique were removed because of light infantry weapon fire that pierced the fuselage of numerous helicopters operating in Cambodia. There had not been any reported instances of ONUMOZ aircraft coming under attack at the time of the policy change, or afterward. Interview, Maj. Bengt-Åke Folkeson, who served as a United Nations Military Observer with ONUMOZ in Nampala, 21 April 1995, Geneva.
numerous occasions his intention to abide by the election results, whether he and his party won or lost. (The general feeling among the UN and the international community was that the race was too close to call.)\(^{27}\) The election was held as scheduled.

Early poll projections indicated that the results would not favor UNITA. Savimbi’s expressions for concern over the manner in which the elections were conducted began almost immediately and became ever more strident. On 1 October, the SRSG for Angola, Margaret Joan Anstee, issued a statement noting that the great majority of the registered voters had cast their ballots in peaceful and orderly conditions, despite organizational and logistical difficulties.\(^{28}\) From 3 October onwards, Savimbi began to complain bitterly that wide-spread fraud and irregularities undermined the election’s credibility.\(^{29}\) The implicit threat was that he would not accept the results and would return the country to war.

Few informed persons doubted that Savimbi would make good on his threat. The Security Council sent an \textit{ad hoc} Commission to Angola from 11 to 14 October in an effort to placate Savimbi and salvage the peace process. The die had already been cast, however. On the day the \textit{ad hoc} Commission arrived in Luanda, 11 former UNITA generals withdrew from the new unified Angolan Armed Forces. On 17 October the President of the National Electoral Council announced the official election results. In the ballots for the legislative elections, the political party of the Government, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola), received 53.74 percent of the votes against 34.1 percent of those cast in favor of UNITA. The presidential elections saw the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola candidate, José Eduardo dos Santos, President of the Republic of Angola, receive 49.57 percent, against 40.07 for the President of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi.\(^{30}\) Anstee issued a

\(^{27}\) Shortly before the elections, however, some polls indicated that Savimbi’s and UNITA’s popularity had declined or had been overestimated.


\(^{29}\) According to some accounts, Savimbi was so certain that he was going to win the election that in his mind, only fraud could explain his “loss.” Confidential interview with the author. (Despite the deployment of a relatively small number of international election observers given the vast size of the country and the large number of polling sites, the UN believes the election results were substantially accurate and that they were not manipulated.)

\(^{30}\) The Electoral Law required a second round of voting if a presidential candidate did not receive at least 50 percent of the vote. Given the stakes involved, it would not be unreasonable to expect that it was not purely by chance that dos Santos “won” with just under 50 percent of the vote. In any event, whether the results were manipulated or accurate, Savimbi did not bite at this carrot. He showed no interest in taking advantage of this second chance.
statement later that day stating “there was no conclusive evidence of major systematic or widespread fraud, or that the irregularities were of [a] magnitude to have a significant effect on the results...[and that]...with all deficiencies taken into account, the elections... [could] be considered to have been generally free and fair.” 31 Shortly afterward, UNITA launched a nationwide operation to occupy municipalities by force and remove the local administrative structures of the Government. On 31 October, the day after the Security Council endorsed the statement of the SRSG, 32 heavy fighting had broken out between Government and UNITA forces in Luanda and several other localities.

The fact that Savimbi had the means to return the country to war was due to the failure of the two parties to disarm as called for in the Peace Accords. 33 To a great degree, the responsibility for this turn of events must lie with the insufficient political will of the protagonists. To a lesser extent, however, the UN must also question if the scant resources it allocated to UNAVEM II also contributed in some way. 34

Other than its name, there was little in common between UNAVEM I and II except for the deployment of only a small number of unarmed United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs). The UN mandate under UNAVEM I was limited to verifying the phased and total withdrawal of some 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola (which it did convincingly and ahead of schedule). 35 The UN mandate under UNAVEM II included verifying arrangements that the Angolan parties agreed to concerning the cease-fire and monitoring the Angolan police during the cease-fire period (and was later expanded to include observing elections and providing technical assistance to help the Government prepare for the elections). 36 The Security Council authorized relatively few resources to achieve these ends. UNAVEM II was given the following means as concerned UN personnel: 350 UNMOs, 90 civilian police officers (which was later increased to 126), a civilian

33 Of the two, UNITA’s failure to adhere to the provisions of the Peace Accords had been comparatively greater.
air unit and medical unit along with 87 international and 155 local civilian staff. There were to be no formed military units to implement the new mandate.37

As a direct consequence of the return to war in Angola, the Security Council therefore agreed with Boutros-Ghali that there was to be no election in Mozambique without effective disarmament first taking place. The Secretary-General stated:

In the light of recent experience in Angola, I believe it to be of paramount importance that the elections should not take place until the military aspects of the agreement have been fully implemented...

I feel obliged to recommend that very substantial resources be made available for this purpose, especially on the military side. This reflects my conviction that it will not be possible in Mozambique to create the conditions for a successful election unless the military situation has been brought fully into control. If the United Nations is to undertake the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Mozambicans, what has to be done must be done well and quickly.38

The Size of the Force

According to the report of the Secretary-General on which the Security Council was to base its decision to establish ONUMOZ, the mission’s mandate was organized in four broad categories: political, military, electoral, and humanitarian. The mandate adhered to the tasks that the General Peace Agreement requested the UN to fulfil. (See Table II.)

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38 Document S/24892, paras. 30 and 52.
Four considerations guided the Secretary-General in assessing the required human and material resources to undertake the mission and in formulating his recommendations.\textsuperscript{40} The first recognized that the UN would provide an impartial and supportive structure to help both parties to the GPA comply with the agreements into which they freely entered. The second acknowledged that the


\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., paras. 14-17.
breadth of the responsibilities entrusted to the UN would require the involvement of the entire international community, especially UN programs and specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The third related to the geography of Mozambique, its vast size (see Map IV), the lack of infrastructure, as well as the effect of war and drought on the populace, which led to internal displacement and forced people to resort to banditry and lawlessness. The fourth concerned the active role ONUMOZ would have to play in providing for the security of the four transport corridors to enable the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed along these corridors at the invitation of the Government of Mozambique.

Map IV: Mozambique Superimposed Over Europe

This map indicates the size of the country in which ONUMOZ was to deploy. It is not drawn exactly to scale. Nevertheless, it indicates that Mozambique is roughly the size of the combined areas of continental Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark. The level of infrastructure is not comparable.
As a result of what occurred in Angola, the number of troops was to be considerably larger than what otherwise would have been. The temporary force would have to be sufficient to guarantee that law and order would be upheld, and that both parties felt secure as a result of the UN presence to demobilize and disarm. Whereas discussions prior to Angola’s elections centered around deploying a maximum of three infantry battalions in a UN PKO in Mozambique, afterward it was decided to propose a larger force, which included five infantry battalions.\textsuperscript{42} The plan for the military component that the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council included:

\begin{quote}
...a Headquarters company and military police platoon; 354 military observers; 5 logistically self-sufficient infantry battalions, each composed of up to 850 personnel; 1 engineer battalion, with contracted assistance as needed; 3 logistic companies; and air, communications, medical and movement control support units.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

(The force that eventually deployed differed slightly in its composition. See Table III.) The Security Council approved the report of the Secretary-General and decided to establish a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).\textsuperscript{44} The authorized force was to total more than 7,300 blue helmets.\textsuperscript{45}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{42} Telephone interview, Aldo Ajello, former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mozambique, 16 February 1996.
\footnotetext{43} Document S/24892, para. 53.b.
\footnotetext{45} The authorized strength of ONUMOZ [which was never fully reached] totalled 6,979 formed units and 354 UNMOs. See, for example, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique,” Document S/1994/89, 28 January 1994, paras. 15 and 17.
\end{footnotes}
Table III: The ONUMOZ Military Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formed Units/UNMOs</th>
<th>Troop Contributing States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry battalions (5)*</td>
<td>Bangladesh; Botswana; Italy; Uruguay; Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer companies (3)</td>
<td>Bangladesh, India (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics companies (3)</td>
<td>Bangladesh, India, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters company (1)**</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement Control detachments (2)</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals battalion (1)</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical units (3)</td>
<td>Argentina, Bangladesh, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation company (1)</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Observer Group</td>
<td>Argentina, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Guinea Bissau, Hungary, India, Malaysia, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, and Zambia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A self-contained infantry company from Brazil deployed toward the end of the mission after some of the Military Component’s infantry battalions had already begun to withdraw.

** The Headquarters company included a platoon of Military Police.

The Government of Mozambique had been shocked to learn of the Secretary-General’s plans. It had assumed (incorrectly) that the UN would deploy somewhere between 100 and 300 unarmed military observers. It never expected -- and did not want -- such a large UN force. At the time when the UN issued the

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“non-paper” in August, the UN also did not foresee such a substantial deployment. The Government lobbied the Security Council to reconsider the report of the Secretary-General that was at this time still in draft form. It stressed that the cost of such a deployment was unnecessary and that the monies could be spent better in support of other projects, such as need to help reintegrate demobilized soldiers. However, the Government’s efforts were to no avail. The Security Council felt it was better to spend a bit more than necessary to avoid the costly embarrassment of another UNAVEM II.

ONUMOZ Military Deployment

The Secretary-General realized that the UN could not deploy UN troops in meaningful numbers in time to provide the oversight and security functions that the UN would likely be called upon to assume. In his letter of 29 September to the President of the Security Council he wrote, “...it would not be possible for the UN to establish more than a token presence in Mozambique within 30 days from [when the GPA is signed]...” The proliferation of PKOs and the increased demands on troop-contributing countries made it difficult for the UN to fulfil its obligations.

48 UN military planners responsible for drafting the timetable had assumed an operation on the scale of UNAVEM II. The exact number of UN troops and UNMOs was not explicitly discussed, however. The lack of communication on this matter contributed to the ensuing tension.

49 Whereas in UNAVEM II, where 400 international election observers had been tasked to monitor some 6,000 polling stations (in a country larger than the combined area of Portugal, Spain, and France), Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali outlined the need for up to 1,200 international observers for the elections in Mozambique (a country roughly half the size of Angola). See DPI, “Reference Paper: the United Nations and the Situation in Angola,” p. 3, and Document S/24892, para. 53.e., respectively. (Provision was subsequently made for more than 2,000 United Nations international observers and some 35,000 representatives of the various Mozambican political parties to monitor the elections. See “Progress Report on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique,” Document S/1994/1196, 21 October 1994, paras. 9-10.)


51 The Security Council had established PKOs in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), Cambodia (UNTAC), and Somalia (UNOSOM I) in March and April 1992. These operations would require the services of more than 70,000 United Nations blue helmets. According to Aldo Ajello, the international community showed relatively little interest in sending blue helmets to take part in ONUMOZ, which received much less coverage than other PKOs in need of staffing. Telephone interview, Aldo Ajello, 16 February 1996.
On 13 October 1992, the Security Council welcomed the first report of the Secretary-General on a United Nations operation in Mozambique, approved his nomination of Aldo Ajello as the interim Special Representative, and authorized the deployment of up to 25 UNMOs. On 15 October, Ajello and 21 UNMOs arrived in Mozambique. From the UN’s perspective, the deployment of this initial group of UNMOs provided an important UN presence in the country and publically indicated its resolve to make good on its commitments. While the UN may have been impressed with its own ability to deploy this initial group so swiftly, the parties were less so. If any symbolism was attributed to this gesture, it was that the UN was largely ineffective and that its resolve was questionable. (Indeed, by mid-January 1993, only five UNMOs remained. The ONUMOZ Force Commander did not assume his duties in Mozambique until February 14.)

By 1 April, a self-sufficient Italian contingent of 1,030 blue helmets had become fully operational and had deployed principally along the Beira. All five infantry battalions were deployed by the beginning of May, and the various support units had substantially deployed by the end of June.

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53 These UNMOs were drawn from existing missions and already had been deployed in the field. See “United Nations Operation in Mozambique: Report of the Secretary-General,” Document S/24642, 9 October 1992, para. 16.
55 Ibid., para. 9. It is not uncommon for countries’ infantry battalions to vary slightly from the number 850, which the UN uses for planning purposes. “Self-sustained” infantry battalions are normally larger. The Italian infantry battalion serving with ONUMOZ included support units whose costs Italy bore.
Table IV: Monthly Deployment of ONUMOZ Blue Helmets\(^{57}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993 UNMOs</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1082</td>
<td>1235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>3423</td>
<td>3630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>5914</td>
<td>6164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>6014</td>
<td>6268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>6210</td>
<td>6505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>6195</td>
<td>6498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPT</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>6195</td>
<td>6498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>6200</td>
<td>6502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOV</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>6266</td>
<td>6576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>6233</td>
<td>6574</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1994 UNMOs</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>6209</td>
<td>6570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>6285</td>
<td>6615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>6199</td>
<td>6569</td>
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<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>5153</td>
<td>5487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>5126</td>
<td>5453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>4271</td>
<td>4631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>4417</td>
<td>4751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>4192</td>
<td>4522</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEPT</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>4163</td>
<td>4492</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>4147</td>
<td>4471</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOV</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>3941</td>
<td>4145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>3941</td>
<td>4145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures compiled from charts provided by DPKO

* * *

However, the view that the limited UN presence did not provide for the necessary security to enable the parties to adhere to the timetable, and was therefore responsible for the delays, overstates the linkage. As will be seen in greater detail in Chapter IV, the delays in the adherence of the parties to the schedule would have taken place with or without an enhanced UN presence. When the two parties were given a summary of the “commitments” they had made, Chissano was “shocked” by what he saw. He asked if the diplomats at the

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\(^{57}\) These figures represent the physical deployment of UN uniformed forces at the last day of each month. The actual force levels normally exceeded the authorized force level when personnel rotation took place at the end of the month. The first 21 UNMOs arrived on 15 October 1992. The last ONUMOZ military personnel departed Mozambique in January 1995.
talks were trying to derail the process. This was not the case. The list simply reflected accurately and comprehensively all the various things to which the two parties had agreed during the past two years of negotiations. Cameron Hume, the head of the American team observing the talks in Rome, said that to a significant extent, “the parties simply did not know the detailed implications of what they were signing.”

Despite the delays, the fundamental aim of the GPA and the PKO was achieved: democratic elections were held. Furthermore, both the campaign and the elections took place in a non-violent manner and Dhlakama and RENAMO accepted their defeat gracefully.

What is of particular interest is that the elections in Mozambique were held without disarmament having taken place. Moreover, this came about not despite, but rather with the acceptance of the UN. The UN understood perhaps better (and certainly sooner) than Dhlakama or Chissano, that the armed forces of the two parties were totally fed up and would not return to war -- weapons or no weapons. It is to this understanding that we now turn.

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58 Interview, Cameron Hume, 24 November 1995, New York.
59 Dhlakama did, however, give the UN and the international community quite a scare. On the night before the first day of polling he unexpectedly pulled out of the elections. A period of frantic phone calls and meetings followed, and the RENAMO chief subsequently reversed his decision. Balloting commenced the following day on 27 October as scheduled. The polls were kept open an additional third day to allow for those citizens confused by news of the events to have an extra opportunity to avail themselves of the right to vote.
Chapter 3  
The Two Parties’ Armed Forces and Arsenals

Any discussion of the UN’s effectiveness toward overseeing disarmament and demobilization must include an analysis of the two parties’ armed forces. An accurate appraisal of the numbers of both sides’ troops and weapons would enable the UN to gauge the adherence of the parties to the GPA and build much-needed confidence. Recording the number of troops and weapons registered at the AAs and CTNAs was an exercise of critical importance to the peace process. However, its usefulness was implicitly linked to the parties supplying information that could be independently verified. Given the great distrust that existed between the Government and RENAMO, it was crucial for the UN to be able to report authoritatively that the lists of troops and weapons that the parties submitted were accurate. Such information would not only allow the UN to evaluate the true intentions of the parties, it would also be useful in assessing the two armies’ capabilities. Analyzing intentions is a key to establish confidence in the process. Analyzing capabilities is essential for enabling the process to be implemented with confidence.

**Force Structures**

**The Government**

At the time of independence, the formed military units of FRELIMO numbered no more than 10,000 troops.¹ Machel’s post-independence austerity measures as concerned the army were draconian and led to much discontent within the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique, FPLM). [The name of the FPLM was changed to the

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¹ IISS speaks of an estimated 10,000 troops that were “organized and equipped” serving under FRELIMO as of June 1975. See IISS, *The Military Balance 1976-1977*, p. 43. Seegers cites reports listing the force to be as small as 4,000, but believes the number to have been between 8,000 and 10,000. The number of people that had taken up arms as part of loosely-formed militia during the independence struggle was considerably larger than the formed units. See Seegers, “From Liberation to Modernization,” pp. 59 and 64.
Mozambique Armed Forces, (Forças Armadas de Moçambique, FAM) in 1980. To avoid confusion, the term FAM subsequently is used. Machel was motivated to act as he did by the need to make difficult choices regarding the allocation of (extremely) scarce resources, an ideology dictating that the military should not be seen as a class of professionals separate from the masses it was supposed to represent and protect, and a desire to subordinate the army to strict political control.2

Machel subsequently re-evaluated his decision in light of Rhodesian support for RENAMO, as well as poor morale and disgruntlement within the armed forces. (As mentioned previously, in December 1975 there was a failed attempt at a military coup.) By the end of 1977, the FAM was to be 20,000 strong (although this figure may not have been attained until a somewhat later date).3 In 1978, Machel introduced conscription4 and increased the military budget substantially. Subsequent budgets saw similar large increases to the military. In the latter half of the 1980s, military expenditures consistently represented between 40 and 50 percent of the Government’s budget. (If the military assistance that the Soviet Union provided on credit were to be incorporated, this figure would have been greater than 50 percent.)5

While RENAMO attacks were not without cost, they were not considered in the years immediately following independence to pose a fundamental threat to the Government. Rather, Mozambique initially had viewed South Africa as representing the greatest danger to the nation’s security. Its military planning reflected this view. Machel discarded any pretence for maintaining a people’s army and began to lay the groundwork for a conventional army trained in conventional warfare. A navy and air force were created, formal ranks and military insignia were introduced, and an officer’s training college was established.

This threat perception would change when RENAMO became stronger despite Zimbabwean independence. The growing appreciation within the Government that it would never possess the military means to confront -- or even

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5 Confidential interview with the author.
The South African Defense Force (SADF) undertook military operations within Mozambique with near impunity. For example, in January 1981 SADF troops drove across the border and attacked the African National Congress (ANC) in Matola, just outside of Maputo. And twice in 1983 (in May and again in October) SADF jets bombed ANC targets in the Mozambican capital. See Horace Campbell, “War, Reconstruction and Dependence in Mozambique,” pp. 842-843. See also Johnson and Martin, “Mozambique: Victims of Apartheid,” p. 20. The SADF encountered no resistance in carrying out these operations.

This realization explains Machel’s approval of a dialogue in 1982 that led to the Nkomati Accords. However, there are reports that clandestine negotiations between the two countries had taken place as early as 1979. Kühne reports, for example, that South Africa and Mozambique concluded a secret formal agreement in February 1979 on economic cooperation. See William Kühne, “What Does the Case of Mozambique Tell Us About Soviet Ambivalence Toward Africa?,” *CSIS Africa Notes*, Washington, DC: Georgetown University, No. 46, August 30, 1985, p. 2.

As a direct response to the unexpected resurgence of RENAMO activity in 1980, the Government reorganized the army into three regional commands. The regional headquarters for the Northern, Central, and Southern regions were located in Nampula, Beira, and Maputo, respectively. The independent mechanized infantry and tank brigades continued to be administered at central headquarters in Maputo, which oversaw the regional commands as well.

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9 The Northern Command was responsible for the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Niassa, and Zambézia; the Central Command, Manica, Sofala, and Tete; and the Southern Command, Gaza, Inhambane, and Maputo.

10 For all intents and purposes, only the Central region was functional. The two others existed primarily in name only. Personal correspondence, João Honwana, 16 January 1996.
This effort did not achieve the intended results. RENAMO continued to make greater inroads throughout the country. Machel instituted another reorganization of the army in 1982 when he created 10 provincial commands to replace the three regional commands. This change would have far-reaching consequences, as described in detail below. For the immediate purpose of calculating the Government’s armed forces, it is only of limited utility.

Each Provincial Commander was to recruit soldiers to serve in the districts, of which there were more than 100. In theory, each district was to be staffed at about battalion strength -- or approximately 350 troops. In practice, the Government’s military presence in most districts was considerably smaller. As threats differed, so did the priority assigned to staffing certain districts. By the end of the decade, there were approximately 145,000 people on the military payroll.

This number included some 6,000 civilian personnel working for the military, such as secretaries, janitors, and clerks -- who would not participate in the demobilization process. The payroll, however, was not an accurate record of the armed forces’ true strength. For example, it was common for any random inspection of a barrack to register two-thirds as being “absent” as compared to those “existing” on the books. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 1990 the Government of Mozambique’s armed forces stood at 72,000: 60,000 in the army; 1,000 navy; 6,000 air force (which included air defence units); and 5,000 “border guards.”

**RENAMO**

As stated earlier, RENAMO began modestly in mid-1976 with a force numbering in the dozens. The force grew quickly as the glut of able-bodied men willing -- if not eager -- to fight the new Government satisfied the demand of the Rhodesian Government and Portuguese businessmen for their services. Under Rhodesian sponsorship, the guerrilla force was never very large. In December

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11 Sidaway pointedly states that political control over the army was always of paramount interest. The FAM was to be “…in no better condition to threaten a coup than to threaten RENAMO.” See James Derrick Sidaway, “Mozambique: Destabilization, State, Society and Space,” *Political Geography*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1992), p. 250.

12 Confidential interview with the author.

13 Confidential interview with the author.

1978, some 900 trained RENAMO soldiers were reported to have been active.\textsuperscript{15} In 1979 RENAMO’s operations were expanded and a base was established in the Gorongosa mountains in the province of Sofala. The same source reports RENAMO’s strength to have increased to 4,500 in 1979.\textsuperscript{16} Its strength may have been exaggerated, however. For example, attacks initially attributed to RENAMO guerrillas, such as the March 1979 attack against the Munhara oil tanks (located outside of Beira), now have been attributed to Rhodesian special forces.\textsuperscript{17}

The clashes between RENAMO and FAM forces in October 1979 that resulted in Matsangaissa’s death and the fall of RENAMO’s Gorongosa base were serious blows to the guerrillas. The ensuing leadership struggle pitted Afonso Dhlakama, Matsangaissa’s deputy, against Lucas Mhlanga, a RENAMO commander. The election results announced on 4 March 1980 declared Mugabe and his ZANU party as victors, which resulted in RENAMO and its handlers hastily departing the country to set up a new base in Sitatonga in the province of Manica. Rhodesian military sources variously reported this transplanted force to number some 1,000 to 2,000.\textsuperscript{18}

The creation of the new Republic of Zimbabwe on 18 April was a blow to RENAMO in general, and in particular to Mhlanga, who had enjoyed Rhodesian support in his leadership struggle against Dhlakama. Dhlakama was to seize control of the rebel force in June 1980 after forces loyal to him defeated those of Mhlanga in a shoot-out in Chisumbanje, Zimbabwe, in which Mhlanga was killed. The Government claimed that some 600 guerrillas died, turned themselves in, or were captured in June 1980, during which time the FAM had also overrun the Sitatonga base.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, when South Africa assumed full control of RENAMO at this time, the guerrilla force is reported to have numbered between 250 and 500.\textsuperscript{20}


\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{17} Tom Young, “The MNR/RENAMO: External and Internal Dynamics,” \textit{African Affairs}, Vol. 89, No. 357 (1990), p. 495.

\textsuperscript{18} Johnson and Martin, “Mozambique: Victims of Apartheid,” p. 8.


\textsuperscript{20} For an account of the South African airlift and initial steps see Johnson and Martin, “Mozambique: Victims of Apartheid,” pp. 9-13, which reports the number of RENAMO soldiers at this juncture to have numbered some 250. Other sources mention 300 and less than 500. See, for example, Steve Metz, “The Mozambique National Resistance and South African Foreign
From mid-1980, under South African sponsorship, the rebel force began to grow substantially and quickly. South Africa established a RENAMO base in Garagua in the province of Gaza and a base in Phalaborwa, in Northern Transvaal across the border from Gaza in South Africa. Reports of RENAMO strength during this period vary considerably, but the upward trend is not disputed. By 1982 estimates of RENAMO strength were widely quoted to be between 3,000 and 8,000.\textsuperscript{21}

Between 1982 and 1984 RENAMO appears to have grown significantly. A clear increase in the guerrillas’ activity throughout Mozambique provides evidence of this development. Indeed, in 1984 when South Africa attempted to broker a deal between RENAMO and the Government, Pretoria (which perhaps more than anyone else would have been capable of knowing RENAMO’s true size) indicated that the rebel force stood at 16,000. As part of its efforts to broker a negotiated settlement, South Africa made it known that it was willing to employ 8,000 guerrillas in South African mines and sought others to assume responsibility for providing non-military opportunities to the other 50 percent of the force.\textsuperscript{22}

During the period 1984 to 1992, RENAMO’s fortunes waxed and waned, but the number of armed rebels within its ranks was widely reported to have remained fairly constant in the range of 16,000 to 20,000. Notwithstanding the 3,000 guerrillas the Government reported to have opted to hand in their weapons and avail themselves of its amnesty program in 1988-1989, IISS recorded a rise in the strength of RENAMO from 18,000 in the mid-1980s to 20,000 from 1990 until the signing of the GPA. Perhaps half this number were part of formed units.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{21} See, for example, Tom Young, “The MNR/RENAMO: External and Internal Dynamics,” p. 498. A year later, Legum, reports 5,000 to 6,000 guerrillas to have been operating within the country. See Colin Legum, “The MNR,” CSIS Africa Notes, Washington, DC: Georgetown University, No. 16, 15 July 1983, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{22} Vines, \textit{RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique}, p. 22

\textsuperscript{23} See, for example, IISS \textit{The Military Balance 1992-1993}, p. 204.
External Military Support

The Government

Rich in cashews but not in cash, the Government possessed neither strategic minerals nor precious metals and stones with which to barter for military equipment.24 With no indigenous production capabilities and few means with which to procure weapons and training, Mozambique was almost entirely dependent on largesse.

The larger and more sophisticated weapon systems in service with the FAM were almost entirely Soviet, with the Soviet Union supplying the vast majority of equipment.25 This assistance was not necessarily what was required or requested. Political, ideological and financial considerations explain why the Soviet Union’s willingness to provide Mozambique weapons was within limits. The relationship was never that close.26 For example, the Soviet Union would not provide the Sukhoi Su-25 close-air-support aircraft that Mozambique coveted.27

The following equipment is reported to have been in the arsenal of the FAM. Armored vehicles included: T-34, T-54, and PT-76 tanks; BRDM-1/-2 reconnaissance vehicles; BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles; and BTR-40/-60/-152 armored personnel carriers (APCs). Self-propelled artillery and missile systems included: ZSU 23-4 and ZSU 57-2 anti-aircraft guns; BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, and SA-2/-3/-7 surface-to-air missiles. Aircraft included: MiG-17 and MiG-21 jets; AN-26 cargo planes; Mi-24 attack helicopters; Mi-8 transport helicopters; and a variety of single- and twin-engined light and utility aircraft of

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24 Conversely, the Government of Angola is able to support its war effort because the country is rich in both oil and gems.
25 The most significant non-Soviet arms transfer was a shipment of MiG-17s from East Germany. Interview, João Honwana, 24 June, 1995, Cape Town.
26 For example, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (known as CMEA or COMECON) granted Mozambique observer status and not full membership. Also, Mozambique did not permit the Soviet Union to establish naval bases along its coast. For a fuller discussion of the relationship, see Kühne, “What Does the Case of Mozambique Tell Us About Soviet Ambivalence Toward Africa?”
27 Unfortunately for Mozambique, numerous other countries similarly had been impressed with the aircraft that was in service in Afghanistan and had proven to be an effective weapon. For Moscow, the Su-25 represented a means by which to attain much-needed hard currency. There were no surplus Su-25s available for Maputo to receive on credit. Interview, João Honwana, 24 June 1995, Cape Town.
Western production left over from colonial days. The navy, for all intents and purposes, existed in name only and did not receive any vessels of notable sophistication.

The FAM’s arsenal was decidedly less than overpowering. First, the weapons were provided in relatively small numbers. Second, a lack of infrastructure, spare parts, and training resulted in short service-life. The result was that many weapons were in disrepair.

Thus, for the larger weapon systems, the task of the UN was not overwhelming. The numbers were easily quantifiable and even if the Government wished to hide them, large numbers of the systems could not be moved from their well-known bases, airfields, and ports.

However, the situation concerning light infantry weapons and -- in particular - small arms, differed significantly from that described above. For while requests for certain types of weapons such as the SU-25 aircraft went unheeded, the Government’s requirements for small arms were largely met. The Soviet Union was the single largest supplier of light weapons to Mozambique, although numerous other countries also provided such weapons. East Germany and -- to a far lesser extent -- Bulgaria and North Korea supplied the FAM with small arms such as the much sought-after AK-47. Unlike the larger weapon systems, small arms supplied to the Government of Mozambique were not only from the Eastern Bloc. The United Kingdom and Portugal provided weapons as well. Perhaps the greatest differences between these two situations, as far as the PKO was concerned, were the numbers of weapons involved, the ease with which they could be hidden, and the fact that small arms need little or no care to function properly.

The number of small arms that the Government procured is impossible to quantify with any precision. Smith reports that in 1995 an estimated 6 million AK-
The Two Parties’ Armed Forces and Arsenals

47s were “at large” in Mozambique and that the Government distributed 1.5 million assault rifles to the civilian population for protection during the civil war. The number of AK-47s seems high, but no one has supplied a different figure. Indeed, the rifle is so ubiquitous in Mozambique, that it even appears on the country’s flag.

This is not to suggest that the Government was able to arm the army and the militia without difficulty. Shortly after the switch from regional to provincial commands in 1982, it was not possible to furnish each soldier in the newly-established district “battalions” with a weapon. As concerns the militia, which the Government sought to revitalize that same year as a direct response to increased RENAMO activity, Isaacman and Isaacman reported that, “[a]s of August 1982, [only] about 40 percent of the adult rural population in Sofala was armed, and in the [provincial] capital the newly formed militia boasted upward of 30,000 men and women.” While the Government never overcame the obstacles of outfitting the provincial armed forces with uniforms, paying their salaries, or distributing their rations, it was eventually able to provide them weapons. As for the militia, Mathews reports that it had been issued rifles as a result of a special consignment from Portugal.

**RENA MO**

A strict accounting of the weaponry that RENAMO had in its arsenal is particularly difficult. Some things, however, are not in doubt. For example, RENAMO had no air force or navy. South Africa ferried supplies and personnel to RENAMO in Mozambique using its own aircraft and vessels that the South African forces operated. There are no reports of South Africa having supplied armored vehicles -- indeed any vehicles -- to RENAMO. Gersony reports that the rebel force appeared to have “virtually no mechanized transport anywhere in

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33 The militia had been largely disbanded after June 1975.
35 Confidential interview with the author.
The vehicles and towed artillery that RENAMO did possess were most likely captured from the Government. The lack of roads and the inaccessibility of petroleum, oil and lubricants made the capture of such weapons of questionable strategic or tactical value (but the weapons did make for the occasional excellent photograph for propaganda purposes).38

What RENAMO did procure (as well as capture) were large supplies of light infantry weapons such as small arms, mines, and grenades. South Africa provided significant shipments of captured Soviet equipment from its operations in Namibia and Angola.

However, RENAMO was not totally dependent on South Africa. Pro-Christian and anti-communist organizations in the West are also known to have provided the guerrillas with financial resources with which to purchase weapons and supplies on the black market, if not to have provided these supplies directly. For example, an annual convention of the World Anti-Communist League provided a venue for RENAMO representatives to appeal for military hardware and related accessories.39 Furthermore, while Mozambique did not possess oil and gems, it did possess wild game, which provided RENAMO not only with meat, but also with hides and ivory to sell and barter.40 IISS reports that RENAMO’s arsenal included only assorted artillery pieces that ranged in size from 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns to 120mm mortars.41

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38 For example, Johnson and Martin claim that artillery pieces serving with RENAMO were parachuted by the South African army. (See Johnson and Martin, Frontline Southern Africa: Destructive Engagement, photograph and relevant caption in centrepiece.) A military analyst concurred that the equipment in question was indeed “parachuteable”, but that the model of the APC and guns in the photograph (a single BTR-152 APC, and a few 76mm field guns and 23mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft guns), if delivered in such a manner, would not be serviceable upon delivery. (Confidential interview with the author.) It is more likely that the weapons were captured.
39 According to a report, the list included “500 surface-to-air missiles, AK-47 ammunition ‘for up to 30,000 people,’ 500 bazookas, 100 jeeps with gun mounts, 5 coastal cutters, and Special Forces equipment and instructors...” See Scott Anderson and John Lee Anderson, Inside the League: the Shocking Exposé of How Terrorists, Nazis and Latin American Death Squads Have Infiltrated the World Anti-Communist League, New York: [no publisher given], 1986, p. 259, as cited in Finnegan, A Complicated War, p. 266/fn. 20.
40 See, for example, Finnegan, A Complicated War, p. 260/fn. 7.
Operational Assessment

The Government

The type of foreign military assistance that the Government of Mozambique received partly explains why it was not able to engage RENAMO effectively despite possessing superior troop strength and military hardware. The tactics and weapons it employed were ill-suited for guerrilla warfare. However, there are other important factors that must be taken into account as well. Numerous administrative shortcomings and questionable decisions resulting from poor planning or execution by the Government contributed to the problems the Government encountered in its war effort. The legacy of these problems would continue to undermine the Government’s peace efforts as well.

The lack of motivated and well-trained soldiers, suitable and functioning equipment, and effective command and control had always undermined the fighting ability of the FAM. However, it was when the Mozambique army was reorganized into 10 provincial commands that the military lost control of the situation. The 10 Major-Generals who assumed these commands were given no budget and no extant formed military units of which to speak. (The mechanized infantry brigades and the tank brigade continued to be placed under central headquarters command in Maputo. The air force and navy similarly were separate.) The “battalions” they were asked to form actually were to consist of only three infantry companies. There was no provision made to recruit, train, or equip engineering, logistical, medical, communication, or administrative platoons that would normally complement a battalion.42

Previously, Machel had used the army as a tool to integrate society. Northern and Southern recruits served side-by-side, if not at the sub-unit level then certainly at the company level. But, when Provincial Commanders recruited or conscripted at the provincial and district levels, no such integration took place.

The Provincial Commanders would instruct state-owned businesses within their command to supply and outfit their men -- often without paying for the services rendered. Similarly, aid destined for the general population would be channelled to meet the needs of these soldiers before being distributed to the general civilian population. Still, these measures were insufficient. The result was that morale was low and discipline was frequently lacking. (These measures also

42 Confidential interview with the author.
had a detrimental effect on economic production and served to give the army a negative image among some sections of the civilian population.)

RENAMO

Contrary to their portrayal by the media and many academics, the guerrillas operated not in loose bands but as part of well-trained and disciplined forces. The “groups of 100 to 150 men” were military companies. Perhaps of greater value to the guerrillas than armaments from South Africa was communications equipment, which was more sophisticated than anything in operation with the FAM.43 Besides communicating with its own units,44 RENAMO also used the equipment to receive valuable intelligence reports on FAM activity from the SADF.45

It is now clear that some atrocities reported to have been perpetrated by RENAMO were more likely to have been committed by un(der)paid and un(der)fed Government troops, or by criminal elements that were affiliated neither with the rebels nor with the Government.46 (The Government’s inability to provide uniforms to its troops resulted in some FAM soldiers being “indistinguishable” from the guerrillas.)47 Finnegan, upon greater reflection and experience, was to

43 Finnegan cites reports of RENAMO using solar-powered radios through laptop computers. An advanced British Racal communication system, which shifted frequency 16 times a minute to avoid monitoring, linked RENAMO’s headquarters inside Mozambique to a South African base. See Finnegan, A Complicated War, pp. 58 and 270/fns. 7-8.

44 Each company was equipped with a radio. According to a hostage’s report, his captors were in radio contact with their central base three times a day. See Young, “The MNR/RENAMO: External and Internal Dynamics,” p. 500.


46 Interviews with Mozambican academics and journalists would give examples of atrocities attributed to RENAMO that were implausible for any number of reasons: e.g., the Government was in complete control of the area or the victims were obvious supporters of RENAMO.

47 It should be noted that uniforms would likely have been part of the booty RENAMO captured from FAM stores over the course of the war. Furthermore, according to David Laubscher, Acting Chief Director, Southern Africa Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, it had been possible to “rent” an AK-47 and a Mozambican police uniform for US$ 50. Interview, David Laubscher, 12 July 1995, Pretoria.
acknowledge that the internal conflict in Mozambique was “a complicated war” in which not everything was as it first seemed.48

Still, there can be little doubt that the chief source of discipline consisted of a combination of fear, violence and coercion. Field research and interviews with survivors and foreigners held hostage have provided considerable documentation of RENAMO tactics.49 The guerrillas practised a brutality and savagery that makes for harrowing reading. Stories abound of children being forced to kill their parents and parents being forced to eat their children. The “logic” behind such inhuman behavior is that such children, who would then be taken away and trained to fight alongside RENAMO, would be disinclined to attempt to escape and rejoin their communities. Parents hearing the latter account would be more likely to allow their sons to join RENAMO, to permit their daughters to provide comfort for the guerrillas, and to share with the force what little food and provisions they possessed. These atrocities were carried out in public so that there would be witnesses to spread the word. Mutilations of people’s noses, breasts, ears, or lips served as vivid reminders that the “armed bandits” (“bandidos armados” as the Government used to call RENAMO) were not to be trifled with and that there would be harsh punishment for those who did not do as they were told. It was under such circumstances that RENAMO was able to recruit not only soldiers, but the requisite number of porters as well.

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Thus, when the Security Council established ONUMOZ in December 1992, the military situation may be summed up as follows: Mozambique was a country awash in small arms with a Government that did not have full control over all its soldiers and a guerrilla force whose chief motivating tool (fear) would certainly diminish as the prospects for an end to the war became increasingly evident to all concerned. Add to this the overriding political reality that despite the desire to enforce a negotiated settlement, neither party to the agreement trusted the other. If one keeps in mind these two underlying truths, then the efforts of the UN and the international community to implement the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique becomes easier to comprehend.

48 This understanding only came late in his research and reporting on the conflict. See, Finnegan, A Complicated War, pp. 262-263/ln. 12.
49 For example, see Gersony, “Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts.”
Chapter 4
Demobilization and Disarmament

As Planned

The Government’s Intention to Act Unilaterally

The problems and shortcomings mentioned in Chapter II and Chapter III as concerned the performance of the FAM were not lost on the Government. Maputo realized that its military budget was untenable, that its armed forces were ineffective, and that it could no longer count on the support of its major arms supplier.

The Government, which had made initial approaches to the West in the early 1980s under Machel, began to move less tentatively in that direction under Chissano. This was particularly so as concerned its economic policy. Mozambique joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 1984, secured a loan from the International Development Association in 1985, saw its economic assistance from the United States increase some 10-fold during this period, and also decided to join the Lomé Convention of the European Economic Community. In 1987 the Government adopted an IMF-sponsored structural adjustment program which it called the Economic Rehabilitation Program (Programa de Reabilitação Económica, PRE).

The Mozambican Minister of Finance, Magid Osman, knew that his country’s financial problems could not be resolved without reducing the national budget and enacting deep cuts in military expenditures. His initial efforts to secure international funding for a reintegration program for demobilized soldiers were unsuccessful. In September 1990 President Chissano visited Switzerland and

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submitted a formal request to the Federal Council for support in this endeavor.\(^3\) Berne agreed. In 1991 the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) provided consultants and supported research in order to prepare a demobilization and reintegration program. A questionnaire was designed to collect socio-economic data on which to create an appropriate reintegration program. (The FAM, however, did not accept to distribute it at that time.) In August, this preparation culminated with a seminar in Maputo that military officials attended. The FAM, while not enthusiastic, realized that change was inevitable (although to what degree was still contentious). A proposal was drawn up and subsequently presented to the international donor community at the Consultative Group Meeting held in Paris that December.

The proposal was not supported. The principal criticism was that the program was too expensive. Furthermore, some donors felt it to be politically problematic to support such a program before a cease-fire, and others first wanted greater transparency from the military. The concern that RENAMO might view support for the Government’s program suspiciously and that it might further complicate ongoing negotiations in Rome, was also raised.\(^4\)

The Government of Mozambique continued to desire a pre-cease-fire demobilization and reintegration program and Switzerland remained committed to helping it find a suitable solution. Toward this end, the FAM agreed to distribute the questionnaire to some 16,000 prospective program participants. This was done in the spring of 1992. The findings confirmed the major assumptions that had been made in the absence of hard data. The main conclusions drawn were that more than 50 percent of respondents had been recruited in the same or in a neighboring province from where they were deployed, 90 percent had not finished primary school, and some 97 percent wanted to return to a district in which they had family and friends. The evaluation of the reintegration of soldiers after the liberation struggle in 1975 revealed that it was essential to organize transportation back to the district to which the (ex-)soldiers wanted to settle. It was decided that the demobilized soldiers should be able to choose their destination. There would be no

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\(^3\) The following account of the Government of Mozambique’s efforts to create and implement a unilateral demobilization program and Swiss assistance toward this end, is based on interviews with, and materials provided by, Ursula Funk of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation’s East Africa Section. Personal correspondence and telephone interview, Ursula Funk, 17 January 1996 and 15 February 1996, respectively.

\(^4\) The Government’s stated intention was to make the demobilization program available to RENAMO as part of any post cease-fire agreement. Telephone interview, Ursula Funk, 12 March 1996.
attempt to influence the respondents’ decisions. In addition, short-term benefits and assistance would be provided.

In May 1992, a second, more modest and comprehensive proposal was put forward and funders sought. The Government of Mozambique proposed reducing its armed forces by up to 45,000 soldiers and laying off an additional 6,000 civilians working for the Ministry of Defense prior to the conclusion of the GPA. Switzerland was committed to moving forward with unilateral demobilization, but sought in vain for at least two more countries to help shoulder the financial and political responsibilities such a program would require. Except for the soldiers who participated in the questionnaire and who the Government described as “demobilized” (although they stayed in their barracks, appeared to remain armed, and continued to receive their salaries) this “first phase” of demobilization did not proceed any further. (After the GPA was signed, the Government did proceed to demobilize “unilaterally” 15,087 FAM soldiers under UN supervision.)

The Parties’ Commitments According to the GPA

The UN and the Governments represented at the talks in Rome did not consult the SDC or integrate the accumulated statistics in the plans for demobilization or disarmament contained in the GPA. According to the GPA, the parties would abide by a cease-fire that was to enter into force on the day when the Assembly of the Republic adopted the General Peace Agreement and thus incorporated the agreement into Mozambican law. The day this event transpired would be known as “E-Day.”

The respective armed forces of the two parties would separate in an effort to reduce potential conflict and report to locations to be agreed upon between themselves and with the UN concurrence. The separation of the two forces was to commence on E-Day and conclude within six days by E-Day + 5. The issue of the locations was to be settled no later than seven days after the signing of the GPA. The list detailing these locations was to specify the name and site of the 29

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Government assembly areas (AAs) and the 20 RENAMO AAs as well as the main military facilities of the two parties such as military hospitals, logistical units and training facilities.

Soldiers serving with the FAM or RENAMO would register with the UN at either AAs or, as an exception, at non-assembly areas (CTNAs). Those not wishing to join the new integrated national army of Mozambique, the Mozambique Defense Force (Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique, FADM), were to be demobilized and re-enter civilian life.

The Cease-fire Commission (Comissão de Cessar Fogo, CCF) would be established on E-Day and would have 30 days to define which troops were to be demobilized and to develop the various administrative and physical structures to initiate the process. These structures would have to accommodate and account for the following processes and tasks:

- planning and organization;
- regulation and procedures;
- direction and supervision;
- registration of troops to be demobilized and issue of the respective identity cards;
- collection, registration and custody of weapons, ammunition, explosives, equipment, uniforms and documentation;
- destroying or deciding on the other disposition of weapons, ammunition, explosives, equipment, uniforms and documentation as agreed by the parties;
- medical examinations; [and]
- issue of demobilization certificates.

The first 20 percent of the soldiers to be demobilized were to begin the process on E-Day + 30 and complete the process within 30 days at which point the second 20 percent would commence these proceedings and conclude them under the same conditions. This process would culminate on E-Day + 180 when the fifth and final 20 percent would have been demobilized or have joined the FADM.
Even taking into account the provision that “The United Nations shall assist in the implementation, verification and monitoring of the entire demobilization process,”\(^\text{12}\) it will become clear that implementing the timetable faithfully would have been implausible under the best of conditions: a fully functioning CCF; an atmosphere of trust and conciliation; easily-identifiable and already-existing billeting points; and a developed infrastructure that permitted easy access to and from these sites. Given the fact that none of these conditions were met when the GPA was signed -- indeed, the antithesis was true in every point mentioned above -- implementing the agreement as stipulated was not implausible, but impossible. The reason for this has already been explained in Chapter II. The negotiators in Rome were primarily concerned with creating a political process and engendering a political fact that would shift fundamentally the course of Mozambican history. The fine points of how to implement that which was agreed would be dealt with after the documents were signed.

### The United Nations’ Approach

While the first report of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the Security Council similarly did not take the statistics of the SDC and the work of the Swiss Government into account, this information was incorporated into the Secretary-General’s second report, which contained his recommendations to the Security Council. The ONUMOZ Technical Unit (TU) was the embodiment of the institutional know-how and expertise which the SDC had accumulated in its two years of work prior to the GPA and the creation of the PKO.

According to the report, which the Security Council subsequently authorized, the TU would assist the SRSG in implementing the demobilization program, and would “collaborate closely” with the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) in its running of the AAs. The TU would be responsible for:

(a) the distribution of food, medicine, health care and other essential services to the assembly areas;

(b) the organization of a database, as well as the issue of personal documents for the demobilized;

\(^{12}\) Protocol IV, para. VI.i.2.e. See Document S/24635, p. 29.
(c) the supply of civilian clothing and the organization of transport for the ex-combatants when they leave the assembly areas for their homes; [and]
(d) the establishment of a solid link with the provincial and district authorities responsible for the civilian dimension of the demobilization process.13

Its staff initially included officials seconded from the following organizations: the SDC (a representative of which served as the Unit’s Chief), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the European Community (EC), the World Food Program (WFP) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), SwedRelief, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). A United Nations Volunteer (UNV) would be stationed at each AA and serve as the Technical Unit Camp Officer (TUCO) responsible for the site’s administration. The TU was to coordinate its activities with the ONUMOZ Military Observer Group, and was to share information on donor funding of its program components with UNOHAC. It was formally part of the Office of the Special Representative and was to report directly to the SRSG. The Technical Unit would have its central office in Maputo and its own warehouses in three regional depots (Matola, Beira, and Nampula), which UNVs working for the TU would staff.

UNMOs assisted the Technical Unit in helping to ensure that the AAs ran smoothly. Three to five UNMOs staffed each AA. They were responsible for overseeing the storage of weapons and reported to the chief regional UNMO at the appropriate regional command who in turn reported to the Chief Military Observer in Maputo and onward to the Force Commander. The Government and RENAMO would appoint military Camp Commanders to assume responsibility for disciplining the assembled troops and serving in a liaison capacity with the appropriate commissions.14 A doctor, 1-2 nurses, and a monitor for the information and social reintegration program, were also present at each AA to assist the TUCO.

Despite its organizational links, the TU operated largely independently. (It even possessed its own satellite feed and, therefore, was not dependent on the rest of ONUMOZ for its communication requirements.) The seconded officials served in useful liaison capacities with their organizations, all of which provided materials and expertise to the AAs. This independence would prove useful in expediting decision-making. The large number of organizations taking part in the operation was indicative of the fact that the Secretary-General’s call for the international

14 This function is stated in Protocol VI, para. 1.7.f. See Document S/24635, p. 42.
community to help the UN had been heeded. This lack of integration with the rest of the mission would also create some problems.

Given the projected number of soldiers to be processed (and even with CTNAs taken into account), it was clear that 49 AAs would not suffice. (This was because despite ONUMOZ’s best efforts and clear instructions, there was still little correlation between the parties’ selection of sites and the projected personnel which would be processed there.) A multi-phase approach (where soldiers would arrive and depart in stages) would therefore be necessary. Because it would be impossible to canton and simultaneously release the soldiers, it was known that a proper control of individual soldiers would be required so that they did not go from one AA to another to claim multiple benefits. Thus, it was necessary to create and maintain a centralized and computerized registration database. Fingerprints and photographs were taken to serve as a psychological constraint against soldiers AA-hopping.

ONUMOZ expected that each soldier that registered at an AA would need to reside there for roughly three weeks. This was the minimum time needed to complete such administrative tasks as entering the registrants’ information into a central database, informing the parties of the soldiers’ intentions vis-à-vis the FADM, and contacting the Ministry of Finance so that demobilized soldiers would be able to draw their stipends. The plan was to transport up to 250 demobilized soldiers per week from each AA. Transit camps would be constructed to accommodate those travelling long distances. Those who were to travel the furthest were to depart first (so that they could travel during daylight). Efforts would be made to transport those who had been in the AA the longest ahead of more recent arrivals so as to maintain order.

**As Implemented**

**Assembly Areas**

The UN was responsible for establishing guidelines to select and construct AAs and for ensuring that these requirements were satisfied. For example, all AAs were to be easily accessible by road, near a potable water source, far away from a swamp or mines, and were to possess at least rudimentary infrastructure. Whereas health, safety, and logistical considerations influenced the UN in establishing its criteria, military considerations were the overriding factor in guiding the parties in their selections. Whenever possible the UN would endeavor to help make the
proposed AAs acceptable. In many instances, however, when these guidelines went unheeded, the UN was forced to reject the site outright.

Once the site was approved, the TU worked with UN specialized agencies and the parties to get it ready to open so that registration could commence. Where potable water was scarce or non-existent, the TU together with UNICEF helped provide wells, boreholes, pumps, engines and necessary chemicals. Non-perishable items such as soap, blankets, tarpaulins, cooking pots, utensils, plates and cups were also provided. The parties were responsible for providing the labor to construct or refurbish necessary structures and facilities. As for the daily operation of the AAs, the WFP assumed responsibility for providing basic food rations according to pre-established criteria (although the Government insisted on providing meat and fish rations for its own soldiers). The parties took responsibility for cooking and providing their own firewood. The TU together with the World Health Organization provided medicines and a tent to serve as a clinic at each AA. They also contracted non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (such as Oxfam and several national branches of Médecins Sans Frontières) to provide the requisite medical personnel, medicines, salaries, and vehicles. The Government supplied its own doctors and offered to provide doctors for all 49 AAs, but RENAMO opted for international assistance instead.

The first reconnaissance of an AA occurred in January 1993, with the last being approved in February 1994. In June, ONUMOZ had approved six AAs

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15 The following examples are drawn from Document S/25518, para. 14 and are made more complete owing to an interview with Ton Pardoel, former Chief of the ONUMOZ Technical Unit as seconded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), 8 July 1995, Maputo.

16 Interestingly, Aldo Ajello notes that while this plan might have made sense according to development theory [the assumption being that it is better to make someone learn to take care of himself rather than constantly providing the service for him, in which case apathy is rewarded, initiative thwarted, and no skills are passed on or developed], it caused numerous and unnecessary problems. The soldiers who arrived at the AAs (some having walked considerable distances) were offended by being treated as peasants. They had not expected to have to build their own accommodations, and the rudimentary dwellings they did create were of poor quality. The situation made them question the reliability and effectiveness of the UN. Simply put, “they did not appreciate the highly educational implication of this approach.” The lengthy and unexpected delays these soldiers subsequently experienced exacerbated this tense situation. Personal correspondence, Aldo Ajello, 22 February 1996.

The UN split the country into three regions for administrative reasons, much in the same manner that the Government had back in 1980. The sole exception was that the UN considered the province of Zambézia to be “central” and not in the “north.” The actual assembly of the first troops did not commence until five months later in December. In the interim, ONUMOZ continued to maintain its presence at these sites and at all subsequent AAs as soon as they satisfied the necessary criteria. The logistical and administrative supports were in place. The first 20 AAs were declared “officially” open on 30 November. Fifteen additional AAs were established on 20 December. For all intents and purposes, the final 14 were open by 1 February 1994, but were declared officially operational on 21 February when the final site was formally opened.

The initial delays in the opening of the AAs resulted partly from the time-consuming and complex processes described above. Military and political considerations, however, were primarily responsible. Neither Dhlakama and RENAMO, nor the FAM (with the support of hard-liners in the Government), were prepared to forgo the military option. Ajello speaks of ONUMOZ as having had two distinct “phases,” but of there having been one constant thread linking the two: both parties’ desires not to demobilize.

Broadly speaking, Ajello describes the first phase as lasting from the signing of the agreement until October 1993, during which time Dhlakama and RENAMO were “inventing a new excuse [on why they could not begin to demobilize] every day.” They felt that if they brought their troops in from the bush, the Government would no longer fear them militarily and might decide not to abide by the agreement. Ajello, with the support of the international donor community, created the conditions which enabled Dhlakama to feel that he could be confident that the

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18 The UN split the country into three regions for administrative reasons, much in the same manner that the Government had back in 1980. The sole exception was that the UN considered the province of Zambézia to be “central” and not in the “north.”

19 During this time, IOM and ONUMOZ were busy processing the FAM soldiers unilaterally demobilized prior to the signing of the GPA. Between May and June 1993, IOM assisted 13,765 ex-soldiers. IOM transported 13,682 of them (along with the 13,424 family members who accompanied them) to their chosen areas of final settlement. See IOM, “IOM’s Humanitarian Assistance Program in Mozambique,” pp. 3-4.

20 Telephone interview and personal correspondence, Aldo Ajello, 16 and 22 February 1996, respectively.

21 RENAMO also needed time to educate its senior members on the GPA, to find suitable officials to staff the various committees provided for in the GPA, and to acclimate its representatives to life in the capital after having lived in the bush (some, for their entire lives).
Government would not abrogate its commitments under the GPA and that he therefore no longer needed to rely on maintaining a military threat. Dhlakama was appeased by promises made both in private and in public by the SRSG and Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, who visited Mozambique in October 1993 and guaranteed that they would not sanction an election that was anything but free and fair. (Some tough talk about the limits of the UN’s willingness to countenance any further delays also played a part in Dhlakama’s decision-making. There were financial inducements as well, such as supplementation and strengthening of the Trust Fund that had been established to help transform (read: bankroll) RENAMO from a guerrilla force into a (viable) political party.)

The second phase of the mission, which began after the Secretary-General’s departure, is characterized by RENAMO refraining from its previous practices while the Government sought (“at every conceivable opportunity”) to delay the demobilization process. During the first year of the operation, when RENAMO was constantly creating problems, the Government could feign a strong commitment to play by the rules “if only” RENAMO would do so. After October 1993, however, this policy was no longer viable. There were those in the Government who sought to hold the election without UN participation, believing that they would benefit as a result of diminished -- or non-existent -- UN and international involvement and supervision.

Thus, the two parties’ failure to demobilize were not explained by the delays which the UN experienced in deploying its troops. Nevertheless, the parties seized on perceived UN shortcomings on this score to justify their lack of adherence. For example, Dhlakama stated that he was unable to proceed with demobilization until approximately 65 percent of the UN troops had deployed. The existence of foreign forces on Mozambican soil after the agreed-upon deadline of 15 November 1992 was another reason for non-compliance. The UN had reached and exceeded deployment of 65 percent of the authorized mission strength in May 1993 and had confirmed the departure of the last foreign forces from Mozambique on 9 June 1993.

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24 According to Protocol VI, para. I.10.c, all foreign forces were to be withdrawn as of E-Day + 30 (which in effect meant 15 November). See Document S/24635, pp. 43-44.
1993.\(^{25}\) (There was no explicit link in the GPA between the deployment of UN troops or the withdrawal of foreign forces and the relative commitment that parties were to make toward cantoning and demobilizing their troops.) Yet, as stated above, RENAMO and Government troops did not begin to report to AAs until December.

The Government also sought to blame the UN for contributing to the lack of progress. The UN’s inability to conclude a status-of-forces agreement (SoFA) with the Government exacerbated the situation.\(^{26}\) Without a SoFA, the movement of UN forces throughout the country was significantly hampered even though the GPA contained a provision that both sides were to permit the UN total freedom of movement throughout the territories under their control.\(^{27}\) The Government thought the UN had been callous in its handling of the situation, had affronted Mozambican honor, and had not appreciated Mozambican sovereignty. UN and other Government officials see the matter differently. The SoFA is a standard international legal instrument that the UN employs not just in operations such as Cambodia, but throughout the world where it establishes missions. The failure to conclude a SoFA also had budgetary implications as the UN was forced (in its absence) to pay various national duties and taxes.\(^{28}\) The SoFA was finally concluded on 14 May 1993.\(^{29}\)

\(^{25}\) ONUMOZ recorded the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from the Beira corridor and Malawian troops from the Nacala corridor on 15 April and 9 June respectively. See Document S/26034, para. 4.

\(^{26}\) The fact that the UN initially was not prepared to deploy its military component also contributed somewhat to the delays in concluding the agreement, as it was not a high priority for the UN and the UN, therefore, did not press the issue. Personal correspondence, Aldo Ajello, 16 February 1996.

\(^{27}\) According to the GPA (Protocol VI, para. 1.5.b.), the parties agreed that “in performing [its] functions ... the United Nations shall enjoy complete freedom of movement throughout the territory of Mozambique.” See Document S/24635, p. 41.

\(^{28}\) See Document S/25518, paras. 49-50.

\(^{29}\) See Document S/26034, para. 9.
Registration proceeded unevenly but without incidents. As mentioned above, it had been understood that the AAs would not be capable of handling the planned-for number of soldiers to be registered and demobilized. At peak capacity, the AAs were expected to accommodate no more than 50 percent of those to be processed. The plan to register and demobilize soldiers in stages seemed to be a commonsense solution to this dilemma. Unfortunately, some AAs were under-utilized while others were over-prescribed. Capacity utilization ranged from a low of 3 percent to a high of 420 percent. It is a credit to the SRSG and the TU that ONUMOZ was able to meet the increased and unexpected needs. For example, when Government food rations proved inadequate, sufficient additional supplies were procured. (The delays in demobilization, discussed below, exacerbated this situation.)

Initially, there were discrepancies between the number of soldiers reporting to the camps and the number being officially declared as having registered. This created some tension between the parties and the UN. The parties’ overwhelming preoccupation with “simultaneous proportionality” concerning demobilization made them extremely hesitant to adhere to their commitments without being assured that the other side was doing the same. Ensuring that each party received proper credit for its adherence was therefore an important step in keeping the process on track. At first, both parties contested ONUMOZ’s figures, believing that their numbers were under-reported. However, they quickly came to view their numbers as accurately reported by the system that the TU had established, and they accepted the TU’s figures as authoritative.

As things turned out, getting the two parties to have their troops report to the AAs was only half the problem. Getting them to let their troops leave the AAs was also troublesome. Whereas delays prior to opening and operating the AAs were not uncommon in other PKOs, and were therefore “all in a day’s work,” so to speak, the failure to process in a timely manner those that did eventually register, was a headache that the UN did not expect. Moreover, the cause for the delays was something which could have been easily averted. The formation of the FADM almost derailed the demobilization process.

33 Similarly, when it became clear that officers were skimming rations for themselves (for families or for profit), Ajello instructed the TU to increase the rations and not to haggle over who was responsible. Interview, Ton Pardoel, 8 July 1995, Maputo.
The FADM

The questionnaire that each soldier received and was required to fill out as part of the registration process included the following question: “Do you want to join the FADM?” Less than 10 percent of the respondents checked the corresponding box marked “yes.” 34 This development would affect several aspects of ONUMOZ planning and operations. For example, more soldiers demobilizing would place a greater burden on IOM, which was responsible for transporting the ex-soldiers and their dependents to the destination of their choice. This greater number of individuals opting to be demobilized would also have a substantial budgetary implication. Funds would have to be found to pay additional pensions and other benefit for which no provision had been made. IOM and the international donor community would prove to be equal to this task. Additional trucks were obtained, contracts were extended, and monies were made available to cover these and other costs. 35 The most serious affect on the process, however, was that the Government and RENAMO short-circuited the process until they could come to grips with this development -- a development that they too had not expected. 36

The FADM was to be composed of 30,000 soldiers (24,000 army, 4,000 air force, and 2,000 navy) of which each party to the GPA was to provide exactly half of each category. Fearful of being unable to supply the permitted number of troops -- and thus that their side would appear weaker or less committed than the other -- each party withheld their lists detailing which soldiers registered at the AAs would

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34 Roughly 10 percent of RENAMO combatants and between five and six percent of FAM soldiers checked “yes.” Ibid.

35 IOM is widely acknowledged to have handled this task effectively. IOM relocated 160,354 soldiers and their dependents primarily using some 500 locally-hired vehicles. This process peaked in August 1994 when IOM was transporting more than 2,000 persons a day. See IOM, “IOM’s Humanitarian Assistance Program in Mozambique,” pp. 4-5.

36 Indeed, this development was somewhat ironic in that it was the Government that held out for a much larger army. Long after the principle of an equal share vis-à-vis personnel had been resolved, the Government still put forth a 50,000-strong FADM compared to RENAMO’s proposed-FADM at 15,000 troops. (See Mozambique Information Agency (AIM), “Peace Agreement Signed,” Mozambiquenefile, October 1992, No. 195, p. 4.) This was one of the last points to be resolved before the GPA could be signed. One theory on why the Government wanted such a large force was to provide an incentive for RENAMO to register its troops and therefore match the Government’s contribution to the new army. The higher the number, the less likely RENAMO would keep troops hidden in reserve. This may be true. However, the ability of the Government to provide less than 50 percent of its entitlement in this much reduced force, indicates that it did not understand its own limitations.
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demobilize and which would join the FADM. Without these lists, the UN could not issue the demobilization certificates and begin transporting ex-combatants to the destinations where they would establish their new lives as civilians.

According to Protocol IV of the GPA:

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\begin{align*}
\text{The process of forming the FADM shall be conducted simultaneously with the} \\
\text{concentration, disarmament and integration into civilian life of the personnel demobilized} \\
in stages as a result of the cease-fire. The Government and RENAMO shall be responsible} \\
for contributing units drawn from the existing forces of each side; this process shall 
\text{proceed until the new units of the FADM have been formed, with all existing units being} \\
demobilized when the FADM has reached full strength.}
\end{align*}
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Thus, although it was not the intention of the drafters to do so, in effect, they created a situation whereby the parties could “hold the UN hostage,” in a manner of speaking. The “simultaneous” process was contingent upon receipt of the lists detailing which units would report to the FADM and which would not. Without these lists, the process could not proceed.

There was some level of appreciation that those still to register at CTNAs would be more likely to choose to remain in the armed forces. These soldiers were from better established units and, as a whole, had been better taken care of administratively and remuneratively (at least as concerned the FAM) than their peers serving in district-level companies, for example. Nevertheless, relying on the numbers to come from this lot of potential applicants was not seen as a viable option.

The soldiers in the AAs, therefore, languished for extended periods of time as the Government and RENAMO tried somehow to come up with their 15,000-strong contributions. Instead of the plan to process their registration questionnaires, benefits, and transportation details in several weeks, soldiers found themselves at these AAs for several months. It was not until 10 March 1994 that the first soldiers were demobilized and left the AAs on IOM trucks for the trip back home and other destinations of their choice.

When the lists were submitted, not everyone on them had “volunteered.” This is because there was no explicit directive instructing the parties to honor the expressed intentions of the individual combatant. This partly explains why only roughly 90 percent of those who registered at AAs or CTNAs are accounted for as


\[38\] By 18 April, the UN had demobilized 12,195 Government soldiers and 561 RENAMO soldiers. See Document S/1994/511, para. 8.
having been demobilized or having joined the FADM. The remaining 10 percent listed as “gone absent” consist of those who left the AAs or CTNAs for one reason or another. One explanation for such an occurrence (which would necessitate forfeiting one’s demobilization benefits) was to avoid being conscripted into the new army.  

No serious effort had been made to “sell” the FADM as a viable career option. The soldiers knew that if they joined the FADM they would forego significant demobilization benefits. If they chose to remain in the army, they were simply given new clothes. For many, the chance to stop fighting was all the incentive they needed to return to civilian life. On top of this, demobilized soldiers were to receive six-months of salary (three months of back salary paid immediately upon demobilization, and three additional months paid in monthly installments beginning a month after demobilization). With the advent of the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS), which provided for an additional 18 months of salary, there was even less reason to choose the FADM.

The UN used this additional time to assist the soldiers’ transition and reintegration into civil society. This included numerous educational efforts. Twenty one-hour “radio” programs were produced that combined educational material with music. Information dealt with such themes as “What is the UN?” and “What is the GPA?” Health issues such as AIDS were also raised. There were sports activities and singing and dancing too. Literacy training was provided to a few hand-picked individuals who were then to teach others. Copies of Mozambican newspapers Noticias and Tempo were distributed to each AA.

Despite these efforts, the soldiers’ frustration and annoyance often found expression in usually short -- but sometimes sustained -- acts of violence. The Camp Commanders were generally capable officers who did their best to maintain order and instill discipline. Whereas RENAMO soldiers initially were better...
disciplined than their Government counterparts because of fear, they became increasingly difficult to control. The effectiveness of dispatching more senior RENAMO officers to AAs to restore order waned over time. Disturbances at Government AAs increased as well. Unmet demands for back pay, displeasure with their spartan accommodations and meagre rations, and distrust that they would indeed receive that which they had been promised, all contributed to the registered soldiers’ unruliness. But most of all, they wanted to go home and restart their lives.

Control and Destruction of Weapons

These disturbances rarely boiled over to the point at which weapons temporarily stored at the AAs were seized. This was in large part due to the competence of the UNMOs and TUCOs who usually managed to cajole agitated soldiers to calm down -- often at considerable personal risk. The TU and other international aid organizations did an admirable job backstopping these efforts. Retrieving registered weapons would not have been an insurmountable task. (Indeed, registered soldiers raided other storage sites, such as kitchens and clothing lockers, with near impunity at many AAs.) The UNMOs were unarmed as were the TUCO and other international personnel serving at the AAs. The only deterrent to reclaiming these weapons were two padlocks that secured the room where the weapons were stored. The Camp Commander possessed the key to one lock and the UNMO team leader the key to the second. These locks were mostly a symbolic deterrent as there were ways to enter the storage areas other than utilizing the two keys.

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42 Interview, Bengt-Åke Folkeson, 21 April 1995, Geneva. Subsequent interviews in the field reflected experiences similar to those of Maj. Folkeson, who served as an UNMO in the Northern Region.

43 Interview, Ton Pardoel, 8 July 1995, Maputo.

43 In the rare event when weapons were retrieved, they did not leave the AA and were later returned. Interview, Ton Pardoel, 8 July 1995, Maputo.
Even though the GPA stipulated that “...all collective and individual weapons...should be stored in warehouses under United Nations control,” both parties at first objected to any such transports. However, in light of the deteriorating security environment at many AAs, the parties eventually allowed ONUMOZ to transport all military equipment in excess of 200 arms from each AA for safe keeping. For this purpose, the UN established three regional arms depots (RADs). Responsibility for guarding the RADs rested with ONUMOZ armed infantry battalions, which would oversee the transfer as well. The first transfer of weapons from an AA to a RAD took place on 15 March 1994. Subsequent transfers proceeded on a regular basis. The military equipment transferred to the RADs occurred without incident.

ONUMOZ fully understood that the parties were even less enthusiastic to disarm than they were to demobilize. Not every soldier registering arrived with a weapon, as was envisioned. Similarly, the number of arms collected from paramilitary troops was also below expectations. Furthermore, the munitions that were submitted were deemed to be generally of poor quality. It was felt that those of better quality were being held in reserve. Also, there were several instances when the parties denied ONUMOZ permission to collect and disable weapons at CTNAs.

The CCF agreed to introduce a mechanism to ascertain the existence of undeclared arms depots and caches. (Undeclared armed groups would also be subject to this review.) ONUMOZ knew that the weapons registered represented only a small percentage of those in the parties’ possession. As initially planned, this “verification process” was to take place after demobilization and before the

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46 The three RADs were located in Nampula (in the Northern Region), Chimoio (in the Central Region) and Matola (in the Southern Region).
48 Interview, Ton Pardoel, 8 July 1995, Maputo.
50 See, for example, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Practitioners’ Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization During Peacekeeping Operations, No. M098, Geneva: UNIDIR, unpublished survey response.
October elections, and was to last three months. However, because of the parties’ delays in demobilizing, the verification phase did not commence until 30 August. Furthermore, the parties were reluctant initially to participate fully in the process.

Despite this lack of enthusiasm and the shortened time frame, the verification process succeeded in registering a substantial amount of additional weaponry, including tanks, APCs, artillery and mortar bombs. The undertaking benefitted from the knowledge ONUMOZ had gained from its time in the field. Through first-hand experience and from contacts with Mozambicans, ONUMOZ was able to investigate numerous locations that previously had been undisclosed. According to the CCF’s procedures, the teams tasked to carry out the verification would have to investigate information provided by either party, the UN, or any other source. The teams, which included representatives of the Government, RENAMO, and ONUMOZ, visited 744 sites. The UN did not verify all the declared or undeclared sites given the short time frame for the operation and the failure to be given permission to visit some of the sites in question.

Very little of the arms and ammunition recovered and registered was destroyed. Only a very small percentage of munitions, which had been deemed too dangerous to move, was destroyed in situ. Weapons and equipment stored at the RADs were classified into three major categories: operational, repairable, and beyond repair. Working through the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (Comissão Conjunta para a Formação das Forças de Defesa e Segurança de Moçambique, CCFADM), the CCF channelled equipment deemed to be essential to the training of the new army to the FADM. Material

54 Ibid., para. 13.
55 A small number of previously unregistered military personnel were also identified. See Ibid., para. 12.
56 See, for example, UNIDIR, Practitioners’ Questionnaire, Nos. M113 and M114.
58 Interview, Ton Pardoel, 8 July 1995, Maputo.
deemed to be “beyond repair” was to be destroyed. However, a UN study on how best to dispose of the material that fell under this category concluded that it was not economically viable to arrange disposal at any of the metal foundries. In the end, all equipment at the RADs was transferred to the FADM.

CTNAs

Disturbances at CTNAs were more problematic. The GPA envisioned the creation of CTNAs, which were to include: administrative units, military hospitals, headquarters for the Government, and areas segregated to include children, women, or groups of RENAMO soldiers that were disabled. There were to be no UN officers stationed at the CTNAs.

The procedure was to send a TUCO and support team to the CTNA on an agreed-upon day, register the soldiers, collect their weapons, have them fill out the questionnaire, and enter the information into the database. The UN would return some time later to complete the process. The soldiers at CTNAs were responsible for their own accommodation and meals. This was not thought to create any undue problems as CTNAs were principally military sites that had the necessary infrastructure. Also, it was expected that a very high percentage of soldiers reporting to CTNAs would choose to join the FADM and therefore would present less of a logistical and financial burden to the UN.

The truth was that the parties did not really know how many of their troops would report. According to the parties, 27 RENAMO CTNAs would process 4,666 soldiers and 172 Government CTNAs, 18,912. Both RENAMO and the Government severely under-reported the number of troops that were eventually to

60 Ibid., p. 12. The ONUMOZ budget did not make provision for the weapons’ destruction. Furthermore, no country wanted -- or was asked -- to fund such a program. Personal correspondence, Tom Pardoel, 20 February 1996.
62 It had been expected that upwards of 50 percent of those registering at CTNAs would join the FADM. While a higher percentage of Government troops at CTNAs did enlist compared to their AA counterparts, the numbers were much lower than had been planned. Roughly 19 percent of Government soldiers enlisted in the FADM -- about twice the percentage of those joining from AAs. Interestingly, only nine percent of RENAMO soldiers registered at CTNAs chose to join the FADM -- roughly half the percentage of their counterparts at AAs. The early practice of “volunteering” its soldiers to join the FADM might explain this anomaly.
register: the Government by 25 percent; RENAMO by more than half. This created numerous logistical headaches. Furthermore, the UN did not receive these lists until June 1994.

Additional problems arose when the UN was forced to administer CTNAs that did not appear on the submitted lists. To get the attention of the UN, these “spontaneous CTNAs” did not use military channels, but rather relied on more direct means such as setting up road blocks and detaining international aid workers and UN staff members. The UN staff deployed outside of the provincial capitals, often at the sub-district level, were most likely to be detained. Fabricio Soares, a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff member working in Mutarara District of the province of Tete had his vehicle stopped at one of these road blocks while driving through Sinjal. As the RENAMO leader of this group explained to him, the road block and hostage-taking was simply “a phone call to the outside world” in an appeal for help. These soldiers wanted the same food and benefits they had seen others receive or had been told others had received.

The decentralized lines of reporting, the remoteness of field offices, and the lack of infrastructure, made tense situations like this one and several others potentially life-threatening. UNHCR had no formal role in the process of demobilization and its staff members were not familiar with the procedures or entitlements afforded demobilized soldiers, which differed from the returnees and “vulnerable groups” that they were assisting. The provision of food and materials from UNHCR warehouses were often insufficient to defuse the situation. Such “solutions” would also cause logistical problems, invite further demands, and encourage similar behavior elsewhere. Some NGOs with warehouses nearby were

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64 Interview, Fabricio Soares, Field Officer, Mutarara “North,” Tete, UNHCR, 4 July 1995, Sinjal (Mutarara District), Tete.
65 UNHCR and the World Food Program (WFP) provided returnee families with a food rations only until the first harvest. UNHCR distributed seed kits and an agricultural tool kit to every returnee family. Discretionary disbursements included blankets, kitchen sets and tarpaulins. Vulnerable groups can be loosely defined as groups or individuals within the assisted community deemed to be in need of special assistance. This reflects UNHCR’s “area-based approach” that seeks to integrate returnees into the places they settle and not to have the community view them as an “unwanted burden”. Interview, Peter de Clercq, Senior Desk Officer - Mozambique, UNHCR Regional Bureau for Africa, 19 January 1996, Geneva. Personal correspondence, Peter de Clercq, 29 January 1996.
reluctant to help provide what was requested for ideological reasons.66 But the hungry, desperate and angry men and women living in the bush, did not appreciate the complex nature of the PKO. They wanted results -- the sooner the better. Drugs and alcohol exacerbated the situation. When TUCOs did arrive, the different benefits they could provide did not satisfy these soldiers who wanted whatever they saw others get. Bureaucratic regulations, budgetary constraints, and philosophical rationalizations did not interest them. Fortunately, no one was killed in these exchanges.

It is not clear if an imperfect command and control network had failed to inform these troops of the process, or if they deliberately had not been reported to serve as a potential reserve force to be called upon for one reason or another (such as discontent with the election results). The UN and the international donor community, mindful of what had occurred in Angola, desired to hold elections in a peaceful atmosphere and to ensure that neither party to the GPA would be able to contest the results through the resumption of military force. It was with this goal in mind that they created the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS).

The Reintegration Program for Demobilized Soldiers

As originally conceived, demobilized soldiers were to receive three months of back salary upon departing from the AA or CTNA and coupons for three months of salary to be paid in monthly installments at the capital of the district where they chose to settle. Government soldiers serving for 10 years or longer would be eligible to receive a pension. (RENAMO soldiers were not granted this benefit as they had not been contributing a portion of their salary toward such a plan.) Both RENAMO and Government soldiers were entitled to disability benefits that included cash payments.67

66 World Vision, a Christian NGO active in the area, explained that their food was not for soldiers. Their Mutarara warehouse was subsequently ransacked. Interview, Fabricio Soares, 3 July 1995, Doa (Mutarara District), Tete.

67 The International Committee of the Red Cross and Handicap International provided further assistance to these people at the district capital upon resettlement. UNICEF provided rehabilitation programs to traumatized children soldiers.
Furthermore, upon demobilization, each demobilized soldier was to receive a package of clothing,\(^{68}\) a food ration containing two weeks of supplies for one person; an agricultural tool kit along with a bucket and seeds, and an all-purpose capulana.\(^{69}\) As part of the reintegration program, donors funded transportation home (via planes, trucks, buses and boats). IOM implemented this program. For example, IOM-contracted trucks and buses drove from the AAs to district capitals. A one-time cash allowance (of 20,000 Meticas, then about US$ 2) was dispensed to each demobilized soldier to cover any additional transportation costs to their villages. They were entitled to take with them 40 kg of personal belongings, which might include their blanket, dish and mug from the AA if they so chose. Dependents of demobilized soldiers who had been so claimed were entitled to accompany them on the trucks and could each take up to 20 kg of personal belongings.\(^{70}\)

These benefits dovetailed nicely with the understood needs of the demobilized soldiers and the views of the development agencies and organizations. The data collected from the SDC questionnaire that had been distributed to some 16,000 Government soldiers indicated that slightly more than 50 percent intended to go into agriculture and fisheries; about 27 percent intended to go into trade or transport; slightly less than 15 percent would like to get a job in industry; and less

\(^{68}\) Initially, the package (which included a pair of shoes, two shirts, two trousers, two pairs of underwear and two pairs of socks) was to be allocated upon departure from the AAs and CTNAs only to soldiers choosing to demobilize. In response to a request from RENAMO (many of whose soldiers lacked clothing as well as uniforms), ONUMOZ agreed to provide the clothing package to each RENAMO combatant upon registration at the AA. Furthermore, those choosing to join the FADM were also to be similarly outfitted. The same benefit was given to Government soldiers, although they received it upon departure as originally planned. Interview, Ton Pardoel, 8 July 1995, Maputo. Personal correspondence, Ton Pardoel, 10 January 1996.

\(^{69}\) A capulana is a single piece of cloth, which often serves as women’s skirts or is used to carry items.

\(^{70}\) Because the UN did not provide further support for dependents of demobilized soldiers, there was no incentive to claim additional ones. Indeed, claiming a dependent would mean that the separation package would be spread thinner to cover additional people. The culturally-accepted practice of taking on “little wives” in addition to the “big wife” meant that many of these soldiers planned to return home to the big wife and family. The little wife (or wives) and children from these unions often would be left behind with neither a provider nor benefits. Some were able to receive assistance from other UN agencies or international and non-governmental relief organizations.
than one percent would like to go back to school or into a training program. Therefore, more than three in four wanted to undertake an autonomous activity.

Based on the different studies, the SDC concluded that there was a general appreciation, therefore, that autonomous reintegration should be encouraged as much as possible. Special reintegration projects for those demobilized should be discouraged as they would cause frustration among those who would not benefit, and would raise expectations and inhibit people from taking their own initiative. Any efforts undertaken should be kept as simple as possible in order to facilitate their efficient and rapid implementation and to avoid overwhelming an already overburdened bureaucracy. In fact, the Government had no capacity to grant significant numbers of jobs to low-skilled workers for any sustained period of time.

Given the reluctance of both the Government and RENAMO to demobilize their troops, and because of a fear that these ex-soldiers might resort to banditry and generally undermine law and order -- determined to be crucial to the holding of the elections -- the international donor community decided to expand on the initial reintegration program being offered to these soldiers as inducements to return to civilian life. The Reintegration Commission, which UNOHAC chaired, was responsible for planning, organizing and monitoring the economic and social reintegration of demobilized soldiers. This was a sensible approach, but was deemed to be long-term in nature, when short-term considerations were at the fore of the concerns of SRSR Ajello and parts of the international community. A number of additional programs geared to assist demobilized soldiers were created in 1994. Chief among them was the Reintegration Support Scheme.

The RSS provided for an additional 18 months of salary to those soldiers who chose to demobilize. Whereas the Government was responsible for funding the first six months of salary to be disbursed as described above, the international community would fund the RSS. The UNDP office in Maputo was given responsibility for implementing the RSS operations and for contracting the financial arrangements to the Popular Bank for Development (Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento, BPD) for the direct payments to the demobilized soldiers. The demobilized soldiers would receive their monthly disbursements in bi-monthly checks at district-level banks.

This program proved to be hugely popular among the soldiers, who began flocking to AAs, eager to claim these additional benefits. (Those FAM soldiers that had initially demobilized as part of the Government’s unilateral efforts also “flocked” to demonstrate vociferously that any subsequent additional benefits

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71 Personal correspondence, Ursula Funk, 17 January 1996.
should also be made available to them. The donors agreed to register them for the program as well.)

Besides the RSS, three other programs were created especially to help demobilized soldiers: the Occupational Skills Development Program (OSDP); the Information and Referral Service (IRS); and the Provincial Fund (PF). (The International Labour Organisation (ILO) was selected to implement the OSDP. IOM is responsible for overseeing the IRS and the PF.) These programs are continuing to teach demobilized soldiers skills and to help them find work after the 18 month period covered by the RSS.
Conclusion

Moments before Dhlakama left his hotel room in Rome to attend the signing ceremony for the GPA, he vowed to James Jonah that “he was not a Savimbi” and that he would not again take up arms. The fear that he might not have been sincere explains why the Secretary-General stated so forcefully that the operation in Mozambique must not be permitted to end as the second mission in Angola had. The Security Council supported such a stand not only in words, but in deeds -- to which its authorization of a military force exceeding 7,300 blue helmets attests.

The appropriateness of the size and deployment of this force is hotly contested by some. The majority of UN troops sent to ONUMOZ were part of infantry battalions whose duty was to secure the five transport corridors. Some feel that these troops should have assisted unarmed UNMOs at the AAs to maintain law and order more effectively. With 49 AAs, the number of infantry troops required to deploy at AAs would have significantly increased the size of the force without measurably improving matters as far as disarmament and demobilization were concerned. The problem at the AAs was not so much the...

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1 Interview, James Jonah, 1 September 1995, Geneva.
2 Scepticism over Dhlakama’s trustworthiness was warranted. The GPA was scheduled to be signed on 1 October. Chissano was in Rome for the ceremony. Dhlakama was back in Marangue, his headquarters. On each step of Dhlakama’s journey north (via Lilongwe and Nairobi, and even after he arrived in Rome), it remained unclear if he would sign the document. See Mozambique Information Agency (AIM), “Peace Agreement Signed,” pp. 4-8.
3 The effect of the force’s size and deployment on other aspects of the mission, such as humanitarian assistance, the election, and the protection of human rights, is another issue altogether. Initially, the infantry battalions were deployed strictly along their respective corridors because of security concerns, the high priority placed on creating the conditions whereby foreign troops would depart quickly as called for in the GPA, and the narrow reading of the mandate as interpreted by the mission’s first Force Commander. Subsequently, the infantry battalions engaged in efforts to win hearts and minds as well as to patrol the corridors and began to venture out further into the hinterland.

The failure to “fly the flag” in Zambézia -- the most populated province in the country, but through which none of the five principal transport corridors transversed -- has been criticized. It was not until very late in the mission that ONUMOZ established a military presence in Zambézia with the deployment of a self-contained infantry company of 170 troops in Mocuba. (The platoon-strength presence of ONUMOZ blue helmets in Quelimane was not meant to
inability to quell rebellions that flared up occasionally, but to process those who registered and stagnated at the sites because of their parties’ shenanigans. One of the interesting lessons learned from the operation in Mozambique was that cantonment of troops was possible with a minimum of UN presence.

By the time the Council authorized the enlarged PKO in December 1992, UN officials planning the operation were becoming convinced that Dhlakama could not “pull a Savimbi” even if he tried. Nevertheless, the UN and the international donor community chose not to take any chances. They were willing to implement and fund the Reintegration Support Scheme to ensure that any soldiers not yet accounted for would make themselves known so that they could claim the benefits. The advent of spontaneous CTNAs and the larger number of soldiers registering than the parties reported to exist indicates that the RSS achieved its immediate results. The overriding concern was for the elections to be held in a peaceful environment. Any social problems resulting from the RSS down the road would be dealt with accordingly.

These social problems may be significant. More significantly, they may arise not in spite of the RSS, but because of it. The introduction of the RSS certainly achieved its immediate goal. It bought a peaceful election. The question now is, have the UN and the international donor community helped create exactly that which they had sought to forestall: namely, an organized group of angry, disillusioned young men, trained in warfare, making demands on the Government that likely cannot or will not be met? The first 8,635 ex-combatants to receive RSS benefits on 20 June 1994 stopped receiving these benefits in December 1995. The number of disenfranchised ex-soldiers will continue to swell throughout 1996 as benefits continue to run out for those subsequently demobilized. (Some of these ex-soldiers may yet choose to join the FADM, which remains under-subscribed.) Although the RSS was purposefully not pegged to inflation and therefore has been worth less over time (in an effort to cut costs and encourage initiatives to become self-dependent),


4 However, in instances when the parties must depend on the UN for their physical safety and the military option has yet to be foregone, this cost-saving measure will not suffice.

5 With the first demobilized soldiers’ additional 18-months of RSS cash subsidies ending in December 1995, the long-term effects of the policy will soon become apparent.
there is evidence that the demobilized soldiers want -- and expect -- more.\textsuperscript{6} The OSDP, IRS and PF have helped assuage the potential problem.\textsuperscript{7} However, they have also contributed to demobilized soldiers’ belief they are special -- a different class from the rest of society. Coming together every two months to collect their payments has provided them with an opportunity to coalesce as a unified force.\textsuperscript{8}

This short-term approach to a complex and high-stake issue (ensuring successful demobilization) mirrors the thinking behind the drafting of the GPA, such as the timetable. The overriding concern had been to conclude the agreement -- the finer points of which would be dealt with in due course. A more detailed and realistic agreement would have averted a number of complications and strengthened ONUMOZ’s and the SRSG’s authority.\textsuperscript{9}

In one instance, where the agreement had been specific, it caused the UN unnecessary problems. For administrative reasons it would have been much

\textsuperscript{6} According to Júlio Joaquim Nimuire, President of the Association for Mozambican Demobilized Soldiers (Associação Moçambicana dos Desmobilizados de Guerra, AMODEG), the combatants in the war -- both RENAMO and FAM -- are deserving of additional benefits because, unlike refugees and internally-displaced persons, “they were the only ones who were never given a choice.” Interview, Júlio Joaquim Nimuire, 10 July 1995, Maputo.

\textsuperscript{7} According to Armand Rousselot, the Chief of the IOM Mission in Mozambique, roughly half of the 95,000 demobilized soldiers have reintegrated successfully into civilian life. The great majority of these people live in rural areas and base their livelihoods on agriculture. The concern arises primarily over those demobilized soldiers who have settled in urban and peri-urban areas, many of whom have yet to find gainful employment. As of February 1996, the Occupational Skills Development Programme, the Information and Referral Service, and the Provincial Fund have directly helped some 20,000 demobilized soldiers. Still, there are perhaps as many as 20-30,000 who may present problems for the Government. Interview, Armand Rousselot, 26 February 1996, Geneva.

\textsuperscript{8} On 3 July 1995, demobilized soldiers (both RENAMO and FAM) used the occasion of their bi-monthly disbursement to accost the District Governor and tell of their grievances and concerns. The exchange was peaceful, with the governor saying that he would look into the matter. Interview, Estegenet S. Wudneh, UNHCR Field Officer stationed in Murambala, 5 July 1995, on the road from Murambala to Quelimane, Mozambique. At present, there is little the Government can do -- or is willing to do -- to meet the demobilized soldiers’ demands. The governor may have bought himself some time to keep the peace. Further promises to review the situation may not be so warmly received.

\textsuperscript{9} For example, Ajello says the original timetable was “a big mistake” as it put a great deal of pressure on ONUMOZ to meet obligations and commitments and gave the parties an opportunity to question the UN’s seriousness and capabilities. Telephone interview, Aldo Ajello, 16 February 1996.
better to have had everyone demobilize and then be given the choice to join the FADM voluntarily. There would have been many less headaches (because of unnecessary delays) in the AAs. Allowing the parties to submit their lists of registered soldiers to join the new army was a costly oversight that should not be repeated. Once the UN learned of the unfortunate link and saw what was happening as a result of the unintended bottleneck, perhaps it could have done more to make the FADM a more attractive option and thus encourage more soldiers to volunteer and thus allay the two parties fears and reduce the need to seize on the loophole. Having said this, it must be acknowledged that the war-weariness of the Mozambican people -- especially the combatants -- was such that even the most able Madison Avenue public relations firm would have had a most difficult time creating a viable campaign to “sell” the FADM, particularly with the benefits being given to demobilized soldiers.

However, overall, the greatest problem with the GPA was that it was too general. The non-specific nature of much of the GPA -- especially as concerned disarmament and arms destruction -- gave both parties room to maneuver in interpreting the plans. The UN, therefore, was not able to ensure that the parties adhered strictly to their commitments. The UN’s mission was further complicated by the Chapter VI framework in which the PKO was undertaken; the Government’s acute sensitivity toward upholding its sovereignty; and powerful interests within both parties to delay demobilization and to refrain from disarming.

The UN and the international community dealt with this predicament by affecting policies not foreseen in the GPA as a means to undercut both parties’ influence. The RSS achieved the goal of demobilization, but did little toward realizing disarmament. The Government is now forced to locate and destroy caches of weapons in the post-ONUMOZ environment with substantially reduced resources than those which were available during the PKO. The result

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10 According to the head of the wildlife conservation department of the Ministry of Agriculture, thousands of hungry demobilized soldiers took advantage of newly opened roads to kill animals with their AK-47s. See Dan Isaacs, “Fulfilling a Dream,” Africa Report, January-February 1995, p. 17.

11 South Africa has assisted Mozambique in locating and destroying caches of weapons. The first joint effort, “Operation Rachel,” undertaken over a three-week period in June and July 1995, uncovered 26 sites and netted more than 1,000 rifles and some 800 hand grenades, land-mines and mortars and launchers. Weapons were destroyed in situ. Both sides recognize this to be the tip of the iceberg. Despite the evident political will, neither side has the financial wherewithal to fund such undertakings at the level desired. Interview, Pieter Coetzee, Counselor,
Conclusion

has been a marked increase in violent crimes in neighboring countries as the cross-border trade in assault rifles escalates.\footnote{The economic incentive fuelling the illicit sale of weapons is considerable. For example, an AK-47 in Mozambique can be purchased for around US$ 14. The weapon gains in value the further it travels across the South African border. Interview, David Laubscher, 12 July 1995, Pretoria. For examples of the effect these weapons are having on undermining law and order and inflicting high casualties in Swaziland and South Africa, see Christopher Smith, “Light Weapons and the International Arms Trade,” and Peter Batchelor, “Disarmament, Small Arms and Internal Conflict: the Case of Souther Africa,” in UNIDIR, Small Arms Management and Peace-keeping in Southern Africa, Geneva: UN, forthcoming.}

Disarmament, which at first had been the prerequisite to holding elections, eventually became little more than an afterthought. The operation’s great failing lies with the fact that it did not also make disarmament a priority. Granted, it was a Chapter VI operation. Granted, the Government was a Member State of the UN in good standing and possessed a sovereign right to possess weapons. Granted, there may have been more pressing issues. However, whereas creative responses were developed -- and the money found to support -- supplemental reintegration programs, additional food for the AAs, and a separate trust fund for RENAMO, to keep the process on track, the disarmament train was allowed to derail. The decision pushed through the CCF to invent a “verification phase” was laudable, but while it recorded substantial additional military equipment (see Annex II), its implementation was more noteworthy for highlighting what could have been, rather than what was. The FADM stands at only a shadow of its former separate entities and is not even half of its authorized strength. The weapons and ammunition that ONUMOZ recorded and returned were enough to arm the FADM many times over. Moreover, what ONUMOZ recorded is known to represent only a small portion of what the UN and the average Mozambican know to exist in barracks and warehouses and in caches hidden under the ground.

It is rare when the UN and the international community have an opportunity to reduce significantly the threat that small weapons pose to law and order within a country as well as within a region. ONUMOZ presented such an opportunity, yet it was not appropriately exploited.
### Annex I

**Demobilization: Final Numbers**

#### Registered vs. Demobilized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>G</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>G+R</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>G+R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AAs</strong></td>
<td>43,409</td>
<td>17,524</td>
<td>60,933</td>
<td>39,300</td>
<td>14,148</td>
<td>53,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CTNAs</strong></td>
<td>23,513</td>
<td>7,124</td>
<td>30,637</td>
<td>17,981</td>
<td>6,371</td>
<td>24,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>66,922</td>
<td>24,648</td>
<td>91,570</td>
<td>57,281</td>
<td>20,519</td>
<td>77,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### FADM Gone Absent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>G</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>G+R</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>G+R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AAs</strong></td>
<td>3,922</td>
<td>3,010</td>
<td>6,932</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CTNAs</strong></td>
<td>4,769</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>5,421</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>8,691</td>
<td>3,662</td>
<td>12,353</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>1,417</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY:**
- G = Government forces (FAM)
- R = RENAMO

* These figures are extrapolated from those provided by UNOHAC. (See UNOHAC, “Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Programme, 1992-94: Final Report, Geneva: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, December 1994, paras. 226-229.) These figures differ somewhat from the “Final Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ” which reports a total of 91,691 soldiers (67,042 G, and 24,649 R) having registered, of which 78,078 demobilized (57,540 G and 20,538 R) and 11,579 joined the FADM. (See Document S/1994/1449, paras. 10 and 15. No additional breakdown of the numbers is given.) The 15,087 FAM soldiers that were demobilized unilaterally prior to the opening of the AAs are not included in the above statistics.
Annex II

Disarmament: Final Numbers *

Military Equipment Registered At AAs and CTNAs **

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>RENAMO</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAs</td>
<td>60,937</td>
<td>14,627</td>
<td>75,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTNAs</td>
<td>33,126</td>
<td>2,841</td>
<td>35,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>94,063</td>
<td>17,468</td>
<td>111,531</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** These figures include 157 armored vehicles, 30 pieces of artillery, and 6,738 “collective arms.”
The remaining figure consists of what the report lists as “individual arms.”

Military Equipment Registered During the Verification Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Equipment</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>46,193</td>
<td>of various types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>2,703,733</td>
<td>of various types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,217</td>
<td>boxes of ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>19,047</td>
<td>of various types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>5,687</td>
<td>kilograms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Grenades</td>
<td>4,997</td>
<td>individual grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>220</td>
<td>intact boxes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other Military Equipment Registered during ONUMOZ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Unilaterally Demobilized</td>
<td>12,736 weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Troops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Armed, Paramilitary, Private</td>
<td>43,491 weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Irregular Troops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Biographical Note

Eric Berman is presently serving as the Special Assistant to the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva. His previous UN experience includes a tour with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in which he served as the Assistant Spokesman for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. His first position with the United Nations was in New York where he worked in the Department for Disarmament Affairs. He received his Master’s degree in international relations from Yale University, with a concentration in conflict resolution and a regional emphasis on the Middle East and Africa. After receiving his Bachelor’s degree from the University of Michigan, he helped construct a database on arms production and arms transfers in the developing world for the Comparative Defense Studies Program at Columbia University.
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